tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29909707410978198762024-03-16T00:15:59.920-07:00Shoestring 9/11Investigating 9/11 and Other Acts of the Secret State.Shoestringhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01534319150672667644noreply@blogger.comBlogger101125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2990970741097819876.post-19150069362769469962021-10-24T01:11:00.000-07:002021-10-24T01:11:11.756-07:00Federal Aviation Administration Failures on 9/11: Why Did Those Responsible for Responding to the Hijackings Get It So Wrong?<div class="separator" style="clear: both;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgZZH2GKPM7DC3zSV-mz5PQ6cmfAmeXwWAlHTwRMyAzPBpv7aunC08_4Q_bK81Vy9u-fqWkXrOUhreV7pmOAJ70psMqesxksAVeTFkCLdXyOVE8TzqCy6NaWo_AMYndNTwWgfxJ3qX53HWs/s0/FAACommandCenter.jpg" style="display: block; padding: 1em 0; text-align: center; " target="_blank"><img alt="The FAA's Command Center" border="0" data-original-height="192" data-original-width="290" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgZZH2GKPM7DC3zSV-mz5PQ6cmfAmeXwWAlHTwRMyAzPBpv7aunC08_4Q_bK81Vy9u-fqWkXrOUhreV7pmOAJ70psMqesxksAVeTFkCLdXyOVE8TzqCy6NaWo_AMYndNTwWgfxJ3qX53HWs/s0/FAACommandCenter.jpg"/></a></div>The actions of personnel at the headquarters of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on September 11, 2001, were marked by failures that likely hindered the U.S. government's response to the hijackings that day and may consequently have increased the chances that the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon would succeed.
<br><br>Well-established procedures were meant to be followed in the event of a hijacking in American airspace. FAA headquarters was required to promptly call the National Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon about the incident and, if necessary, request fighter jets to follow the hijacked aircraft.
<br><br>On September 11, though, this never happened. FAA headquarters learned that a plane--American Airlines Flight 11--had been hijacked at around 8:32 a.m. but subsequently made no attempt to contact the military about the incident. The NMCC consequently only learned that a hijacking had occurred almost half an hour later, after Flight 11 crashed into the World Center and an officer there called FAA headquarters seeking more information about the crash.
<br><br>Furthermore, the FAA headquarters employee who answered the call gave a wildly inaccurate description of the hijacking. He said the pilot of Flight 11 had reported that everything was under control and the plane was going to land soon in New York, even though the pilot never communicated with anyone on the ground after the plane was hijacked, the terrorists had been in control of the plane after they hijacked it, and the plane had already crashed and so was never going to land in New York. He also made no request for military assistance, even though such assistance was surely essential.
<br><br>FAA headquarters personnel subsequently set up a teleconference to help manage the crisis. The "primary net" was intended to connect the FAA to other government agencies so information could be shared and the participating agencies could coordinate their actions. The primary net, however, turned out to be practically worthless. It only began at 9:20 a.m., at least 48 minutes after FAA headquarters learned about the hijacking of Flight 11, by which time two hijacked planes had already crashed into the World Trade Center.
<br><br>Additionally, the NMCC was inexplicably either not included in the primary net or only in it briefly early on after it was established. And yet the facility was meant to be the "focal point" within the Department of Defense for providing assistance in response to a hijacking in U.S. airspace. One senior FAA official noted that during the dozens of hijackings he had previously responded to, the NMCC was "always on the net"--but not on September 11, it seems. What is more, little information was shared over the primary net and the teleconference "played no role in coordinating a response to the attacks," according to two of its participants.
<br><br>Although the failures of FAA headquarters personnel may have had serious consequences, little effort has been made to properly investigate these failures and find out what caused them. A possibility worth considering is that FAA headquarters personnel were participating in a training exercise on the morning of September 11, which may have been based around a scenario with similarities to the 9/11 attacks, like one featuring a hijacking. If such an exercise was taking place, the concurrence of events could have caused headquarters personnel to mistake the real-world hijackings for part of the exercise or in other ways hindered their response to the attacks.
<br><br>FAA personnel had in fact previously participated in numerous exercises that included simulated hijackings. Aviation security personnel at FAA headquarters had actually participated in two exercises earlier in 2001 based around hijackings. It would therefore have been a fairly typical event if an exercise featuring a simulated hijacking was set to take place at FAA headquarters on September 11.
<br><br>If an exercise was being held when the 9/11 attacks began, we would need to consider whether this unhelpful situation was brought about intentionally so as to hinder the response of FAA headquarters personnel to the attacks. But al-Qaeda--the group that supposedly perpetrated the attacks--would have been unable to influence what scenarios featured in FAA exercises. We would therefore also need to contemplate the disturbing possibility that rogue individuals in the U.S. government, who could indeed have influenced what these exercises involved, played a role in planning the attacks.
<br><br><b>FAA HAD A KEY ROLE DURING A HIJACKING</b>
<br>The FAA had an essential role when it came to responding to hijackings in United States airspace. The agency is responsible for regulating civil aviation and operating a system of air traffic control. [1] On September 11, many air traffic controllers worked at its 21 Air Route Traffic Control Centers across the U.S. These centers were grouped under regional offices and coordinated closely with the Air Traffic Control System Command Center in Herndon, Virginia, which managed traffic flow within the entire airspace system. [2]
<br><br>At FAA headquarters in Washington, DC, the civil aviation security division was responsible for dealing with "air piracy" and bringing a hijacking crisis to a safe resolution. [3] And the aviation command center (ACC), where FAA security personnel responded to a crisis, was responsible for directing the activities of law enforcement in response to a hijacking. [4]
<br><br>The NMCC also had important responsibilities when a hijacking occurred. The facility comprises a labyrinth of rooms in the Pentagon basement, in the center portion of the building. It is a highly secure command and control complex equipped with sophisticated communications capabilities, which serves as the "nerve center" of the Pentagon. General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on September 11, described it as "a switchboard connecting the Pentagon, the civilian government, and the combatant commanders."
<br><br>While its primary task is to monitor worldwide events for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the NMCC also has a crisis response component. It is where the secretary of defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff would run the Pentagon during a major emergency that could last for a prolonged period of time. This presumably meant it had an essential role to play as the U.S. military responded to the 9/11 attacks. [5]
<br><br>The protocol for responding to a hijacking, and the key roles of the FAA and the NMCC, were described in documents published between 1998 and 2001. The administrator of the FAA had "exclusive responsibility to direct law enforcement activity related to actual or attempted aircraft piracy (hijacking) in the 'special aircraft jurisdiction' of the United States," a military instruction from June 2001 stated. And if the FAA required fighter jets to follow a hijacked aircraft, the hijack coordinator at FAA headquarters was responsible for requesting them from the military, according to an FAA order from November 1998.
<br><br>The NMCC, meanwhile, was "the focal point within [the] Department of Defense for providing assistance." In the event of a hijacking, it was meant to be notified "by the most expeditious means" by the FAA. Furthermore, the FAA, the NMCC, and the deputy director for operations in the NMCC were required to "maintain coordination during the aircraft piracy situation." [6]
<br><br><b>FAA HEADQUARTERS DID NOT CALL THE NMCC ABOUT THE FIRST HIJACKING</b>
<br>On September 11, however, FAA headquarters failed to contact the NMCC about the hijacking of Flight 11 after it learned of the incident and so the NMCC only heard that a hijacking had occurred later on, when an officer there called FAA headquarters as he tried to gather information about the crash at the World Trade Center.
<br><br>American Airlines Flight 11 was the first of four commercial aircraft to be hijacked that day. The Boeing 767 took off from Logan International Airport in Boston at 7:59 a.m., bound for Los Angeles. The 9/11 Commission--the panel created by Congress and the president in 2002 to investigate the 9/11 attacks--concluded that it was likely hijacked by five Middle Eastern terrorists 15 minutes into its flight, at around 8:14 a.m. Just over half an hour later, at 8:46 a.m., Flight 11 crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center in New York. Everyone on the plane and many people in the tower were killed.
<br><br>The first indication air traffic controllers had of a problem with Flight 11 was at 8:14 a.m., when the pilot failed to respond to an instruction from a controller at the FAA's Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center. All subsequent attempts to communicate with the flight were unsuccessful. Boston Center controllers concluded that the plane had been hijacked at 8:25 a.m. after hearing a couple of suspicious radio transmissions, apparently made by a hijacker, from the plane.
<br><br>Managers at the center then started alerting their chain of command. At 8:28 a.m., they contacted the FAA's Command Center in Herndon and said they believed Flight 11 had been hijacked. In response, at 8:32 a.m., the Command Center contacted FAA headquarters and told the duty officer there about the hijacking. [7]
<br><br>FAA headquarters was in fact already aware of the hijacking by that time, apparently because it had just been alerted to the incident by the FAA's New England Regional Operations Center (ROC). The ROC was contacted by the Boston Center at 8:30 a.m. and informed of the hijacking, and appears to have passed on the news to FAA headquarters right away. Therefore, when the Command Center called FAA headquarters at 8:32 a.m., the duty officer there said that "security personnel at headquarters had just begun discussing the apparent hijack on a conference call with the New England regional office," according to the <i>9/11 Commission Report</i>. [8]
<br><br>And yet no one at FAA headquarters subsequently contacted the NMCC about the hijacking. "FAA headquarters began to follow the hijack protocol but did not contact the NMCC to request a fighter escort," the <i>9/11 Commission Report</i> noted. [9] Consequently, NMCC personnel only learned that this was something other than a normal day at the same time and in the same way as members of the public did, when they saw television networks reporting the crash at the World Trade Center in the minutes after it occurred. [10]
<br><br>"We monitor the television networks in the center," Steve Hahn, an operations officer in the NMCC, described. "And along with the rest of America we saw the smoke pouring from the tower," he added. With no knowledge that a group of terrorists had recently hijacked an aircraft, however, it apparently never occurred to NMCC staffers that the crash was a terrorist attack. "At first, we thought it was a terrible accident," Dan Mangino, another operations officer, recalled. [11]
<br><br>The NMCC only learned a plane had been hijacked at least 28 minutes after FAA headquarters was alerted to the incident, when Lieutenant Colonel Ryan Gonsalves, the senior operations officer there, called FAA headquarters, and the person he spoke to mentioned that Flight 11 had been hijacked and gave some details of what had happened. However, the poor response of FAA headquarters to the hijacking continued, as the person gave Gonsalves wildly inaccurate information about it.
<br><br><b>FAA HEADQUARTERS EMPLOYEE GAVE INCORRECT DETAILS OF THE HIJACKING</b>
<br>Gonsalves had set about gathering information about the crash at the World Trade Center after NMCC personnel saw coverage of it on television and consequently, at 9:00 a.m., called FAA headquarters. [12] The person he spoke to briefed him on the "explosion" at the World Trade Center, which they said was "possibly" caused by an aircraft crash. They also mentioned the hijacking of Flight 11, which they said was a flight from Boston to Los Angeles. They apparently made no connection between the hijacking and the crash in New York, and never suggested to Gonsalves that the plane that hit the World Trade Center might have been Flight 11.
<br><br>They also gave Gonsalves some incorrect details of the hijacked flight. They said it was still airborne, the pilot was still in control, and the plane was "now en route" to John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York. [13] The pilot "had called in and said everything was under control, and he was going to land at New York shortly," Captain Charles Leidig, the acting deputy director for operations in the NMCC on September 11, has explained. [14] In fact, according to the official narrative of 9/11, the terrorists took over the controls of Flight 11 from the original pilots when they hijacked the plane and Flight 11 was never en route to JFK International Airport. And rather than everything being under control, the plane had crashed about a quarter of an hour earlier. [15]
<br><br>Furthermore, the person at FAA headquarters made no request for military help in dealing with the hijacking. Gonsalves told the 9/11 Commission that he didn't "recall that anyone asked for assistance." [16] Lieutenant Colonel John Sims, who was with Gonsalves at the time and listened to the call with FAA headquarters, corroborated this. When he was asked by the 9/11 Commission, "Did [the] FAA ask for assistance [from the] NMCC" regarding "scrambling fighters"? he replied, "There was none of that in the initial call." [17]
<br><br>Gonsalves should have perhaps asked the caller if the FAA required military assistance. However, he made no such inquiry. "That isn't something he would do," he told the 9/11 Commission. [18] The scrambling of fighters to follow the hijacked aircraft "was not discussed" during the call, the <i>9/11 Commission Report</i> noted. [19]
<br><br><b>FAA TELECONFERENCE 'PLAYED NO ROLE IN COORDINATING A RESPONSE TO THE ATTACKS'</b>
<br>Other problems with the FAA headquarters response to the hijackings surround a teleconference headquarters personnel established called the "primary net." A primary net would be set up by the FAA to bring other federal agencies into the loop in an emergency and assemble decision makers to allow for coordinated action. It would be run from the ACC within the operations center on the 10th floor of the FAA headquarters building. [20] It was meant to be "the fundamental primary source of information" between participating agencies, according to Monte Belger, the acting FAA deputy administrator when the 9/11 attacks occurred, and would allow these agencies to "talk strategically." [21]
<br><br>Before the primary net was set up on September 11, FAA headquarters established another important teleconference. It activated the "tactical net," an internal teleconference between various FAA facilities, at 8:50 a.m. and this had been run from the ACC since then. [22] A tactical net was intended to bring FAA personnel "up to speed" before they contacted other agencies. [23]
<br><br>The primary net was activated by security personnel at FAA headquarters half an hour later, at about 9:20 a.m. [24] Michael Weikert, a crisis management specialist, instructed Sharon Battle, an operations officer, to activate the teleconference. [25] Using a checklist of agencies that were meant to be included, operations center personnel then added appropriate parties to the primary net. [26] The process involved using a PC-based conferencing system to speed dial the participating agencies. [27]
<br><br>Key government agencies were brought into the teleconference. The FBI was added to it at 9:21 a.m.; the Secret Service at 9:22 a.m.; the Department of Justice at 9:23 a.m.; the CIA at 9:25 a.m.; the Defense Intelligence Agency at 9:27 a.m.; the State Department at 9:28 a.m.; and the White House at 9:29 a.m. Regional FAA division managers also participated. [28] Weikert ran the teleconference and when a new person joined it, he would announce who he was, identify the primary net, and then give updates. [29]
<br><br>And yet the primary net turned out to be of little benefit. Major Charles Chambers, who represented the NMCC on the teleconference, recalled that either "nothing was being said" or "nothing of substance" was said over it. Communications were "intermittent" and there was "a lot of dead air," he commented. [30] Weikert said that while he gave out information, he received little back and so there was "not much traffic." [31] Both men said they believed the primary net "played no role in coordinating a response to the attacks," according to the <i>9/11 Commission Report</i>. [32]
<br><br><b>NMCC WAS POSSIBLY INITIALLY ABSENT FROM THE FAA TELECONFERENCE</b>
<br>Furthermore, the NMCC was, according to several accounts, either absent from the primary net or only on it briefly early on after it was activated. On the one hand, a couple of chronologies compiled by the FAA stated that the NMCC, or specifically Charles Chambers at the NMCC, was included in the primary net from the time it began, being added to it at 9:20 a.m. [33] And FAA headquarters employee Sharon Battle told the 9/11 Commission, "She remembers adding the NMCC to the primary net." [34]
<br><br>But a report produced by the NMCC stated that the FAA "did not bring [the] NMCC into their hijack conference" as it responded to the hijacking of Flight 11. [35] This contention was supported by Lee Longmire, the FAA's director of civil aviation security operations on September 11, who said that while the NMCC should have been on the primary net from the outset, he "learned that this didn't occur" and "wasn't sure when the situation was rectified." [36] The NMCC was "absent for some undetermined length of time," he recalled. [37]
<br><br>And, notably, Michael Weikert--the man who ran the primary net--said he was unable to recall the NMCC joining the teleconference or anyone from the military speaking to identify themselves. He said he remembered the military participating only "for a short period of time" before the attack on the Pentagon, which took place just before 9:38 a.m. He recalled FAA headquarters personnel "trying to raise" the NMCC "when we were tracking the plane that crashed [into] the Pentagon." And he said he was unable to recall "what was finally done to locate the military when it was learned no one in the ACC had [the NMCC] on the line." [38]
<br><br>Monte Belger, meanwhile, said he became aware at some point that the NMCC was not included "in any meaningful way" in the primary net. "The most frustrating after-the-fact scenario for me to understand is to explain ... the communication link on that morning between the FAA operations center and the NMCC," he commented. He was very unhappy when he learned about the absence of the NMCC from the teleconference and uttered what has been described as "some rather colorful language" as he expressed his annoyance. "I know how it's supposed to work, but ... it's still a little frustrating for me to understand how it actually did work on that day," he remarked. [39]
<br><br>Even after the primary net had been running for some time and the NMCC was presumably properly connected to it, the military command center was only involved in a limited way. Chambers estimated that he spent just 25 percent of his time listening to the teleconference. The primary net was only monitored periodically because there were a limited number of personnel available in the NMCC, he explained, and these people had a lot of tasks demanding their attention. [40]
<br><br><b>SOME FAA PERSONNEL MAY HAVE BEEN UNAWARE OF THE HIJACKING</b>
<br>We surely need to determine why there was such poor communication between FAA headquarters and the NMCC on September 11, considering the key roles of the two facilities when a hijacking occurred. It was the job of aviation security personnel at FAA headquarters to deal with aircraft hijackings and bring them to a safe resolution. [41] And the NMCC was meant to be "the focal point within [the] Department of Defense for providing assistance" in response to hijackings in U.S. airspace. [42] The poor communication between the facilities might therefore have seriously hampered the U.S. government's response to the 9/11 attacks.
<br><br>Numerous questions need to be addressed. To begin with, was there a lack of communication within FAA headquarters about what was happening on the morning of September 11, which hindered the ability of personnel there to respond to the crisis? The recollections of Lee Longmire and Michael Weikert suggest this could have been the case.
<br><br>Longmire, who arrived at the ACC before 8:46 a.m., when Flight 11 crashed into the World Trade Center, recalled that even by 9:03 a.m., when a second hijacked plane hit the World Trade Center, he had not heard the word "hijack" mentioned in the ACC and he did not hear anyone in the ACC discuss seeking military assistance around that time. [43] Weikert similarly recalled that when he arrived at the ACC, apparently shortly after 8:50 a.m., when it was activated, no one in the facility was talking about getting military help. [44]
<br><br>Were people in the ACC unaware that a plane had been hijacked? If so, why was this? Surely headquarters personnel needed to know about the hijacking and should have been openly discussing it. And could a failure to share the news of the hijacking of Flight 11 be one reason why no one at FAA headquarters contacted the NMCC about the incident?
<br><br>A further question is when Ryan Gonsalves called FAA headquarters from the NMCC and was told about the hijacking, why did the person he spoke to make no request for military assistance? Although Flight 11 had already crashed by the time the call was made, the person Gonsalves spoke to seemed to believe it was still airborne and there had been numerous problems with the flight that surely meant military assistance was essential.
<br><br>Radio contact with Flight 11 was lost at around 8:14 a.m. Then, at 8:21 a.m., the plane's transponder--which sends an aircraft's identifying information, speed, and altitude to air traffic controllers' radar screens--was turned off. The <i>9/11 Commission Report</i> noted that "the simultaneous loss of radio and transponder signal would be a rare and alarming occurrence, and would normally indicate a catastrophic system failure or an aircraft crash." The severity of the crisis presumably became even clearer at around 8:26 a.m., when Flight 11 veered drastically off course as it began a sharp turn to the south. [45] And yet the FAA employee Gonsalves spoke to apparently thought it was unnecessary to request that fighter jets be launched to help deal with the situation.
<br><br><b>FAA TELECONFERENCE WAS SLOW TO BE ACTIVATED</b>
<br>Another crucial question is why did it take the FAA so long to establish the primary net that would enable it to share information and coordinate its actions with other government agencies? The primary net was only activated at 9:20 a.m. according to one FAA chronology. Since it was titled "Operations Center Activity Report," this document was presumably put together by personnel from the operations center at FAA headquarters who would surely have been well placed to accurately determine when the teleconference began. [46]
<br><br>From the beginning of the crisis on September 11, a fast response was essential. But if the Operations Center Activity Report is correct, by the time the primary net was activated, at least 48 minutes had passed since FAA headquarters was alerted to the hijacking of Flight 11 and around half an hour had passed since personnel there likely noticed the first crash at the World Trade Center being reported on television.
<br><br>The time it took FAA headquarters to establish communication with the other agencies that were included in the primary net was in fact even longer than the 9:20 a.m. time implies, since, as Michael Weikert noted, it "took some time for other parties to get on the line." [47] Sharon Battle estimated that it took up to 10 minutes to set up the call. [48] According to the Operations Center Activity Report, it took until 9:29 a.m. for the participating agencies to be added to the teleconference. [49]
<br><br>One claim about the primary net, if correct, is particularly concerning, this being the suggestion that the teleconference was requested around 30 minutes before it was activated. FAA civil aviation security operations representatives requested that "the primary communication net be established" at 8:50 a.m., an FAA timeline published six days after the attacks stated. [50] Consistent with this document, Weikert recalled instructing Sharon Battle to "open up the nets and fire up the [aviation] command center." [51] He was apparently implying that he asked for the ACC to be activated at the same time as he asked for the primary net to be activated. Since the ACC was activated at 8:50 a.m., this suggests that he asked for the primary net to be activated at 8:50 a.m. [52] And Robert McLaughlin recalled that when he went to the ACC at "around 8:55 a.m. or 9:00 a.m.," the primary net "was in the process of being activated." [53] If the primary net was requested at 8:50 a.m., then, what happened in the following 30 minutes to delay its activation?
<br><br><b>NMCC WAS INITIALLY MISSING FROM THE PRIMARY NET</b>
<br>A further question regarding the primary net is why was the NMCC initially absent from the teleconference or only in it briefly? The NMCC should surely have been fully involved from the outset in light of its crucial role in responding to hijackings. Indeed, this is what some senior FAA personnel have said they expected to happen.
<br><br>The NMCC was "supposed to be monitoring the [primary] net as a protocol," Weikert commented. [54] "The primary net should have included the NMCC," Jeff Griffith, the deputy director of air traffic, similarly stated. [55] Lee Longmire explained that the NMCC was meant to be "automatically included in that net." [56] It was "standard procedure to pull the military into the communications link as soon as possible so they could monitor the [hijacked] aircraft," he said. [57] The NMCC was then meant to stay in the background, monitoring the teleconference and providing information if requested, he explained. [58] And yet Weikert recalled the NMCC only being on the primary net "for a short period of time" before the Pentagon was hit, at around 9:38 a.m. [59]
<br><br>The absence of the NMCC from the primary net was unprecedented. The facility was "always included in the communication net that was used to manage a hijack incident," according to Monte Belger. [60] Belger said that in 30 years working for the FAA, he had responded to "dozens of hijackings" before 9/11 and during every one of these incidents, the NMCC was "always there." "They were always on the net and were always listening in with everybody else," he recalled. [61] What happened on September 11, then, such that this wasn't the case that day?
<br><br>A final question regarding the primary net is why did the NMCC treat this potentially invaluable resource with indifference? The primary net was meant to be "the fundamental primary source of information" between participating agencies, according to Belger. And yet it was regarded as being of only minor importance by NMCC personnel on September 11. It was "not viewed as urgent," Chambers commented. [62]
<br><br><b>HIJACKING OF FLIGHT 11 COULD HAVE BEEN MISTAKEN FOR AN EXERCISE SIMULATION</b>
<br>When we try to determine what caused the lack of communication between FAA headquarters and the NMCC on September 11, a couple of factors worth considering are training exercises that had taken place before that day, which included simulated hijackings, and the possibility that the FAA and NMCC were involved in exercises on the morning of September 11 featuring scenarios that had similarities to the real-world attacks.
<br><br>If FAA headquarters and NMCC personnel were taking part in exercises when the 9/11 attacks occurred based around scenarios resembling the real-world crisis, they could have mistaken real events for simulations in the exercises. Alternatively, they may have mistakenly thought real events were part of an exercise because these events resembled scenarios featured in exercises they had participated in on previous dates. If either of these situations was the case, this may have caused them to fail to respond to the real-world hijackings, respond to the hijackings inappropriately, or respond without the urgency that was required.
<br><br>For example, if FAA headquarters personnel thought the reported hijacking of Flight 11 was part of an exercise, this might be one reason why it took them until 9:20 a.m. to set up the primary net. They would presumably have been unaware of the potentially catastrophic consequences of their inaction and would have felt little urgency to set up a teleconference with other agencies to deal with a hijacking that they thought was only a simulation.
<br><br>Perhaps they were participating in an exercise that featured a simulated hijacking, but military assistance was unnecessary. If this was the case, it could help explain why no one called the NMCC after FAA headquarters was alerted to the hijacking of Flight 11.
<br><br><b>FAA RAN EXERCISES BASED AROUND SIMULATED HIJACKINGS</b>
<br>FAA personnel certainly participated in numerous exercises before September 11 that included simulated hijackings. The FAA held various tabletop exercises in the years before 9/11 and its civil aviation security office may have exercised hijacks, Monte Belger told the 9/11 Commission. Additionally, "multi-agency exercises"--which the FAA presumably participated in--"addressed hijacks," he said. [63] Michael Weikert recalled that he had "worked a hijacking in training" before 9/11. [64]
<br><br>One large exercise held by the FAA in 1995, called Twin Star, was based around the scenario of terrorists hijacking a plane bound from Dulles International Airport in Washington, DC, to Gander International Airport in Newfoundland, Canada. It involved a real commercial airliner playing the part of the hijacked plane and a fighter jet shadowing the aircraft. FAA headquarters personnel tested their teleconference bridge and use of the ACC. They also tested their ability to communicate with other FAA facilities and regional units. The "entire FAA system" was involved and the NMCC also participated, along with the FBI, the U.S. Air Force, the State Department, and airline industry personnel.
<br><br>Although this exercise took place quite a long time before 9/11, similar exercises may have been held on subsequent occasions. Mae Avery, manager of the operations center at FAA headquarters on September 11, said she believed there were "a number of exercises of this type" before 9/11. [65]
<br><br>An exercise was held by the FAA in December 2000 in which scenarios that were "pretty damn close to [the] 9/11 plot" were practiced. One scenario "may have had something to do with a chartered flight out of Ohio that had turned the transponder off," John Hawley, who worked for the FAA's intelligence division, recalled. [66] (This aspect of the scenario resembled the events of September 11 in that the transponder was turned off on three of the four hijacked planes that day. [67])
<br><br>Exercises featuring hijack scenarios were held in the months preceding 9/11. The FAA civil aviation security operations division ran two "crisis exercises" early in 2001 based around hijackings, Robert McLaughlin recalled. These involved "traditional" hijacking scenarios that did not include suicide attacks. [68]
<br><br>In the summer of 2001, the FAA held a hijack exercise as part of its efforts to update the "Common Strategy"--the doctrine and training materials it developed on how to deal with hijackings. The exercise made use of a Boeing 767--the type of aircraft that crashed into the World Trade Center on September 11. Along with the FAA, participants included the FBI's Miami, Florida, field office, Miami-Dade County Police Department, a SWAT team, and Varig Airlines. [69]
<br><br>Although no evidence has so far come to light showing FAA headquarters personnel were involved in a training exercise on September 11, it is worth noting that numerous government agencies and facilities, and also military organizations, were conducting or preparing for exercises that day. [70] It appears like different exercises may have been coordinated to occur at the same time. If this was the case, it is surely possible that the FAA planned to hold an exercise on September 11 too, so its exercise would be taking place at the same time as these other agencies held theirs.
<br><br><b>MILITARY EXERCISE THAT INCLUDED A SIMULATED HIJACKING WAS TAKING PLACE ON SEPTEMBER 11</b>
<br>It is also worth noting that on the morning of September 11, at least one exercise was taking place that was set to include a simulated hijacking. The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)--the military organization responsible for monitoring and defending U.S. airspace--was at the time several days into a major annual exercise called Vigilant Guardian. This exercise, described as a "simulated air war" and "an air defense exercise simulating an attack on the United States," was set to include "a range of scenarios" on September 11. Among them was a "traditional" hijacking "in which politically motivated perpetrators commandeer an aircraft, land on a Cuba-like island, and seek asylum," <i>Vanity Fair</i> reported. [71]
<br><br>It is unclear if FAA personnel played any role in the exercise. While the FAA featured in scenarios in Vigilant Guardian exercises before September 11, apparently no FAA personnel usually took part and instead military personnel played a simulated version of the agency. A document that described Vigilant Guardian scenarios run in the days just before 9/11 specified, "Execution of these scenarios did not involve any agencies outside of the NORAD chain." [72] And documents that describe scenarios included in the Vigilant Guardian exercises held in September 2001 and October 2000 refer to a "simulated FAA" or a "sim FAA." [73]
<br><br>Vigilant Guardian is curious, though, because before September 11 it had featured simulated hijackings with similarities to the hijacking described to Ryan Gonsalves when he called FAA headquarters to inquire about the plane crash at the World Trade Center. Most notable among these was a scenario run on October 20, 2000, in which a Boeing 747 bound from London, England, to Cairo, Egypt, was hijacked shortly after takeoff by religious fanatics. The hijackers demanded to be flown to New York. The FAA contacted the NMCC and requested a hijack conference, which the NMCC then convened. Fighter jets were tasked with providing "covert surveillance" of the hijacked aircraft, which eventually landed without incident at JFK International Airport in New York. [74]
<br><br>The hijacking described to Gonsalves by the person he spoke to at FAA headquarters was certainly more like the one in this exercise scenario than to the actual hijacking that had occurred. It was a "traditional" hijacking in which the pilot was still in control of the plane and it involved the hijacked plane heading for JFK International Airport. [75]
<br><br>This suggests that the person at FAA headquarters may have been describing to Gonsalves a mock hijacking in a training exercise that FAA personnel were participating in, rather than the actual hijacking of Flight 11. Maybe the FAA held exercises that were coordinated with NORAD exercises and consequently featured the same, or similar, scenarios. The person at FAA headquarters might have thought the call from Gonsalves, requesting information about a plane that had crashed into the World Trade Center, was part of the exercise and so he responded by providing details of the simulated hijacking.
<br><br><b>NORAD EXERCISE PREVIOUSLY FEATURED SIMULATED HIJACKINGS</b>
<br>Additional scenarios in Vigilant Guardian exercises featured a simulated FAA, simulated hijackings, and other similarities to the events of September 11. On October 21, 2000, a scenario involved a group of Native American protesters hijacking a Boeing 737 bound from SeaTac, Washington, to Juneau, Alaska. The FAA convened a "hijack conference" in response and requested assistance from the military, including military aircraft to follow the hijacked aircraft. It contacted the NMCC which initiated a multi-agency teleconference. The hijacked aircraft eventually landed safely in Juneau and the hijackers were arrested.
<br><br>And the 2001 Vigilant Guardian exercise included scenarios in the days before 9/11 that were based around hijackings. On September 6, a scenario featured a terrorist group hijacking a Boeing 747 bound from Tokyo, Japan, to Anchorage, Alaska, and threatening to "rain terror from the skies onto a major U.S. city." The FAA was involved in directing military aircraft to shadow the hijacked plane.
<br><br>Then on September 10, a scenario was based around a group of Cubans hijacking a plane bound from Havana, Cuba, to Shannon, Ireland. It involved the hijackers, who were seeking political asylum, demanding to be taken to JFK International Airport--similar to the hijacking described to Gonsalves the following day, in which the hijacked plane was going to land at JFK International Airport. The FAA requested assistance from NORAD. Eventually, the plane landed safely at Dobbins Air Force Base in Georgia and the hijackers were apprehended. [76]
<br><br>FAA headquarters personnel may have been aware of these NORAD exercises and the scenarios featured in them or could have trained for similar scenarios in their own exercises. If this was the case and--like some other government agencies--the FAA was running an exercise on September 11, they may have mistakenly thought the hijacking of Flight 11 was part of an exercise when they heard about it, since it resembled scenarios they had previously encountered in exercises. If so, the error could be one reason for their inadequate response to the real-world crisis.
<br><br><b>NMCC WAS LIKELY PARTICIPATING IN AN EXERCISE ON SEPTEMBER 11</b>
<br>NMCC personnel, too, may have been taking part in a training exercise on September 11, which could have caused confusion and hindered their response to the real-world crisis. Evidence suggests they might have been participating in a major exercise called Global Guardian. This annual exercise sponsored by the U.S. Strategic Command (Stratcom)--the military command responsible for the day-to-day readiness of America's nuclear forces--had been underway in the days preceding 9/11 and was still taking place on the morning of September 11.
<br><br>Global Guardian was intended to test Stratcom's ability to fight a nuclear war and in 2001 featured the scenario of a fictitious Northeast Asian nation attacking the United States with nuclear weapons. It was held in cooperation with NORAD and linked with NORAD's Vigilant Guardian exercise. [77]
<br><br>The NMCC was certainly involved in Global Guardian on the day before 9/11 since on that day it issued a "Global Guardian exercise message" stating that the U.S. president had been briefed on the Single Integrated Operational Plan--the United States' general plan for nuclear war. [78] If NMCC personnel were involved in Global Guardian on September 10, it seems plausible that they were participating in the exercise on the morning of September 11.
<br><br>They may also have been participating in Vigilant Guardian on September 11, since the NMCC had previously featured in scenarios in the NORAD exercise. Some Vigilant Guardian scenarios prior to 9/11 included a "sim NMCC," presumably manned by non-NMCC personnel. However, on at least one occasion actual NMCC personnel took part. The script for a simulated "hijack conference" held on October 20, 2000, mentioned that the "actual NMCC will participate." [79]
<br><br>Additional evidence indicates that NMCC personnel were participating in an exercise at the time of the 9/11 attacks. The 9/11 Commission was told that the emergency action cell in the NMCC "was monitoring all ongoing exercises in the U.S." on the morning of September 11. [80] And Lieutenant Colonel John Brunderman recalled that he was in the emergency action cell, "working on [a] play sheet for [the] exercise," when the attacks began. [81]
<br><br>If NMCC personnel were taking part in an exercise on the morning of September 11, they may have mistaken real-world events for part of the exercise and the error could have impaired their response to the terrorist attacks. If, for example, they thought the primary net was a simulated hijack conference, like the one they participated in during Vigilant Guardian on October 20, 2000, this could be why they treated it with indifference. Even though the teleconference was meant to be a crucial source of information for its participants, the primary net on September 11 was "not viewed as urgent" by NMCC personnel and participation in it was "not viewed" as being a task "of utmost importance," Charles Chambers noted. [82]
<br><br><b>FAA CRISIS MANAGEMENT SPECIALIST WAS THE 'MASTERMIND OF THE SYSTEM'</b>
<br>In addition to examining the possible role of training exercises, it is worth scrutinizing the actions of a number of senior officials when we try to determine why FAA headquarters personnel responded so poorly to the 9/11 attacks. Three officials who likely had a significant influence over what happened at FAA headquarters on September 11 were Michael Weikert, Lee Longmire, and Pete Falcone. Did any of these men act in ways that prevented an effective response to the crisis? Or did things happen that stopped them from carrying out their duties?
<br><br>Weikert, who was the duty officer in the FAA operations watch on September 11, appears to have been a particularly important figure. He likely had much influence over the primary net. He reportedly instructed Sharon Battle to activate the teleconference and then managed it throughout the day. [83] Apparently referring to Weikert's role in the primary net, Falcone called him the "mastermind of the system." [84]
<br><br>Was Weikert therefore in any way responsible for it taking so long to set up the primary net? And was he in any way responsible for the teleconference being so ineffective that it "played no role in coordinating a response to the attacks"?
<br><br>Longmire claimed that "part of the problem" with the FAA's response to the crisis was that "whoever was on [the] primary net, they were using headphones [and] wouldn't have known what was going on on the tactical net." [85] Presumably he was either referring to Weikert or to a number of people in the ACC, including Weikert, who were participating in the primary net.
<br><br>If Longmire's allegation is correct, this gives rise to several questions. As the man running the primary net, should Weikert have been monitoring the tactical net so he could pass on any important information shared over it to the agencies on the primary net? Was it normal for the person running the primary net to wear headphones, such that they were unable to hear what was said on the tactical net? And if Weikert was failing to pick up information shared between FAA facilities on the tactical net, was this one reason why "nothing of substance" was said over the primary net, as Charles Chambers claimed?
<br><br>Weikert also played a key role in training exercises at FAA headquarters. He "ran exercises for security" personnel there, according to Daniel Noel, manager of the emergency operations staff. [86] He "ran a lot of these exercises" at the FAA, John Hawley similarly commented. [87]
<br><br>Therefore, if FAA headquarters personnel were participating in an exercise on September 11, was Weikert running it? And was he involved in designing the scenarios included in FAA exercises on earlier dates that had similarities to the 9/11 attacks and may consequently have led FAA headquarters personnel to mistake the hijackings on September 11 for simulations?
<br><br>Additionally, Weikert may have affected the ability of FAA headquarters personnel to respond to the 9/11 attacks through his key role in designing the ACC, where FAA security personnel went to respond to the crisis and from where the primary net was run on September 11.
<br><br>The ACC had apparently undergone some kind of upgrade shortly before September 11 and Weikert was "the lead for designing the facility," according to Longmire. [88] For example, there had previously been no computers in the ACC. [89] But, Weikert explained, "event recorders" had been "computerized" using "a software product designed in-house" that was "capable of tracking multiple events." [90]
<br><br>The possibility that the recent changes to the ACC impaired the ability of FAA headquarters personnel to respond to the 9/11 attacks is surely worth looking into. Investigators could consider issues such as whether the changes were a factor behind the apparently poor connection between the ACC and the NMCC on the primary net.
<br><br><b>FAA DIRECTOR WAS THE 'HIJACK COORDINATOR' ON SEPTEMBER 11</b>
<br>Longmire was another important figure. As the director of civil aviation security operations, he was responsible for coordinating the FAA's response to a hijacking. He was reportedly the "hijack coordinator" at FAA headquarters on September 11. He was also responsible for running the ACC in a crisis. [91]
<br><br>As the hijack coordinator, Longmire had important duties. It was his job to request "an escort aircraft for a confirmed hijacked aircraft" if needed, according to FAA protocol. He was required to do this "by direct contact with the NMCC." [92]
<br><br>Was he therefore in any way responsible for the failure of FAA headquarters to contact the NMCC to request that fighter jets be launched in response to the hijacking of Flight 11? Was he also in any way responsible for the FAA employee who told Ryan Gonsalves about the hijacking of Flight 11 making no request for military assistance when Gonsalves called FAA headquarters?
<br><br>Falcone, meanwhile, was a manager in the civil aviation security operations division and ran the tactical net--the "internal" teleconference between various FAA facilities--on September 11. His duties presumably meant he could have had less influence than Weikert and Longmire potentially had on the failures of FAA headquarters in its response to the hijackings. All the same, it appears he may still have contributed toward them.
<br><br>He "had the experience to make sure that [the] NMCC was on the net," Longmire claimed, presumably referring to the primary net. Was he therefore in any way responsible for the NMCC being absent early on during the teleconference? Curiously, he recalled that he "tried to reach [the] NMCC" but "couldn't reach them" and this "was surprising to him." [93] He surely needs to provide further details of this problem.
<br><br>Falcone also "should have been taking the information from the tactical net" and passing it on to "the folks on the primary net," Monte Belger said. This was "his job as coordinator" of the tactical net, Belger added. [94] Did he do this on September 11? If not, was he therefore in any way responsible for either "nothing ... being said" or "nothing of substance" being said over the primary net?
<br><br><b>HIJACKING PROTOCOLS WERE WELL ESTABLISHED</b>
<br>Since FAA headquarters had key responsibilities when a hijacking occurred in U.S. airspace, the way its employees responded to the hijackings on September 11 could have had a significant impact on the ability of the U.S. government and military to protect the nation that day. It is therefore of serious concern that these employees either failed to take necessary action or were alarmingly slow to respond.
<br><br>It would be difficult to argue that the poor response of FAA headquarters personnel to the 9/11 attacks was due to a lack of awareness of the protocol for dealing with a hijacking, since the procedures that should have been followed on September 11 had been in place since the late 1990s, if not before then, and so were presumably well known. Indeed, Monte Belger commented that at the time of the attacks, "interagency response protocols were well established" and it was clear when the FAA should seek the assistance of other agencies to help deal with a hijacking. [95]
<br><br>The FAA order that dealt with requesting military assistance in response to a hijacking had been effective for close to three years, since November 1998. [96] And while the military instruction that outlined how hijackings should be responded to was published just three months before 9/11, the previous version of the instruction that was published in July 1997--over four years before 9/11--was almost identical to it. This too stated that the administrator of the FAA was responsible for directing law enforcement activity in response to a hijacking; that the NMCC was the "focal point" within the Department of Defense for providing military assistance and should be "notified by the most expeditious means by the FAA" in the event of a hijacking; and that the FAA, the NMCC, and the deputy director for operations were required to "maintain coordination" until the hijacking situation was resolved. [97]
<br><br>It would also be difficult to argue that the poor response of FAA headquarters personnel to the 9/11 attacks was due to incompetence, because these individuals had on numerous occasions practiced what to do in the event of a hijacking in training exercises. The civil aviation security operations division had even run two hijacking exercises earlier in 2001 and so, Robert McLaughlin noted, "everyone knew what to do." [98]
<br><br>Why then did no one contact the NMCC about the hijacking of Flight 11 after FAA headquarters was notified of it? And since the NMCC only learned of the hijacking when one of its officers, Ryan Gonsalves, took the initiative to call FAA headquarters, what would have happened if that call wasn't made? Would someone at FAA headquarters have even contacted the NMCC about the hijacking?
<br><br>Furthermore, why did the person at FAA headquarters who Gonsalves spoke to provide inaccurate and misleading information about the hijacked flight? Why was there no discussion of scrambling fighter jets between the two men? And who was the person at FAA headquarters who took Gonsalves's call? All Gonsalves has said on the issue is that he called the duty officer at FAA headquarters but "got patched into another office in [the] FAA." [99]
<br><br><b>AGENCIES SHARED LITTLE INFORMATION OVER THE FAA TELECONFERENCE</b>
<br>It is also concerning that FAA headquarters took so long to establish the primary net and, after it did, the participants failed to share information over it. The teleconference could have played an invaluable role in the government's response to the attacks. It was intended to enable "decision makers" to take coordinated action, according to Robert McLaughlin, and "talk strategically," according to Monte Belger--surely important objectives under the unprecedented circumstances. [100] And yet, as the <i>9/11 Commission Report</i> noted, it "played no role in coordinating a response to the attacks." [101]
<br><br>Since some key agencies participated, including the White House, the Secret Service, the State Department, the CIA, the Department of Justice, the FBI, and the Defense Intelligence Agency, a lot of important information could presumably have been shared, thereby enhancing the ability of the government to respond effectively to the crisis. And yet it appears that participants failed to pass on what their agencies knew. Michael Weikert recalled that he was "not receiving much information" over the teleconference. [102]
<br><br>Who, then, were the people on the primary net? And why did they waste this opportunity to share what their agencies knew about the attacks?
<br><br><b>WERE FAA PERSONNEL TAKING PART IN AN EXERCISE ON SEPTEMBER 11?</b>
<br>It is surely important to know if FAA headquarters personnel were participating in a training exercise on September 11. It would also be helpful to know if NMCC personnel were participating in an exercise, such as the Stratcom exercise Global Guardian, when the attacks occurred, as some evidence suggests.
<br><br>If exercises involving FAA headquarters and the NMCC were taking place, we need to know more about them. Did they include scenarios, like hijackings or plane crashes, such that they resembled the real-world attacks? Did NMCC and FAA headquarters personnel mistakenly think real-world events were part of the exercises, and, if so, did this have a negative effect on how they responded to the attacks? And how long did it take before they realized the crisis was real, rather than part of an exercise?
<br><br>Also, if exercises were being conducted at FAA headquarters and the NMCC, who was in charge of running them? At FAA headquarters, was it Michael Weikert, since he "ran a lot of these exercises" at the FAA, according to John Hawley? [103] Or was it Daniel Noel, who told the 9/11 Commission that he was responsible for "national disaster exercises"? [104]
<br><br>And who designed the exercises? At FAA headquarters, was it Monte Belger? Mae Avery told the 9/11 Commission she believed the "deputy administrator staff" was responsible for developing FAA hijacking exercises, and Belger was the acting deputy administrator of the FAA in 2001. [105] (It is unclear, however, whether Avery was referring to the deputy administrator or to the deputy administrator's staff.)
<br><br><b>WERE EXERCISES DESIGNED TO FACILITATE THE ATTACKS?</b>
<br>Importantly, if exercises were taking place that featured scenarios resembling aspects of the real-world attacks, was this a coincidence or was there something more sinister to it? Might exercise scenarios have been designed intentionally to resemble the 9/11 attacks by people who knew in advance what the attacks would involve? The goal of these people could have been to create confusion over what was real and what was simulated on September 11, thereby preventing honest and dedicated personnel from effectively responding to the attacks.
<br><br>Al-Qaeda, the terrorist group blamed for 9/11, would have lacked the ability to influence what FAA and NMCC training exercises involved. If this was the case, then, it would suggest that the attacks were planned and perpetrated by a group other than al-Qaeda, one that likely included rogue individuals in the U.S. government and military. The attacks, however, must have been carefully designed to <i>appear</i> like they were perpetrated by al-Qaeda.
<br><br>Too little attention has been paid to the numerous oddities and failures regarding the response of FAA headquarters to the crisis on September 11, despite the key role its personnel had in responding to hijackings. But what happened that day was the deadliest terrorist attack ever on American soil. These oddities and failures therefore need to be properly investigated, to determine exactly what occurred and uncover who was behind it.
<br><br><b>NOTES</b>
<br>[1] <a href="https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-05-266.pdf" target="_blank"><i>Federal Aviation Administration: Stronger Architecture Program Needed to Guide Systems Modernization Efforts</i>. United States Government Accountability Office, April 2005, p. 3</a>; <a href="https://www.faa.gov/about/mission/activities/" target="_blank">"What We Do." Federal Aviation Administration, June 27, 2016</a>.
<br>[2] <a href="https://ia801306.us.archive.org/0/items/FAAAdministratorsFactBookJuly2001/FAA%20Administrators%20Fact%20Book%20July%202001.pdf" target="_blank"><i>Administrator's Fact Book</i>. Federal Aviation Administration, July 2001, p. 36</a>; 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States</i>. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004, pp. 14-16; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/17053258/T8-B2-FAA-Command-Center-Ben-Sliney-Fdr-5-21-04-MFR-717" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Benedict Sliney." 9/11 Commission, May 21, 2004</a>.
<br>[3] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/17183190/t8-b6-Faa-Hq-May-Avrey-Fdr-3-25-04-Mfr-833" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With May Avrey." 9/11 Commission, March 25, 2004</a>; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/17218062/T8-B6-FAA-HQ-Dan-Noel-Fdr-4-28-04-MFR-and-Typed-Notes-863" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Dan Noel, Manager, Emergency Operations Staff." 9/11 Commission, April 28, 2004</a>.
<br>[4] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/17422447/T7-B11-Morse-Fdr-Entire-Contents-9-15-03-Mike-Morse-MFR-w-Notes-208" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Mike Morse, FAA National Security Coordination Staffer." 9/11 Commission, September 15, 2003</a>; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/17183190/t8-b6-Faa-Hq-May-Avrey-Fdr-3-25-04-Mfr-833" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With May Avrey."</a>
<br>[5] <a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/OpaAPI/media/2610351/content/arcmedia/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00756.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Orientation and Tour of the National Military Command Center (NMCC) and National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC)." 9/11 Commission, July 21, 2003</a>; Richard Myers with Malcolm McConnell, <i>Eyes on the Horizon: Serving on the Front Lines of National Security</i>. New York: Threshold Editions, 2009, p. 151; <a href="https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/25762/trump-said-he-found-the-greatest-room-hed-ever-seen-deep-in-the-pentagon-heres-what-he-meant" target="_blank">Tyler Rogoway, "Trump Said He Found the Greatest Room He'd Ever Seen Deep in the Pentagon, Here's What He Meant." <i>War Zone</i>, January 3, 2019</a>.
<br>[6] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20001217230200/http:/www.faa.gov/atpubs/MIL/Ch7/mil0701.html" target="_blank">Federal Aviation Administration, <i>Order 7610.4J: Special Military Operations</i>. Washington, DC: Federal Aviation Administration, November 3, 1998, paras. 7-1-1, 7-1-2</a>; <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20060512090527/http:/www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/cjcsd/cjcsi/3610_01a.pdf" target="_blank">Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, <i>CJCSI 3610.01A: Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking) and Destruction of Derelict Airborne Objects</i>. Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 1, 2001</a>.
<br>[7] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, pp. 4, 7, 18-19; <a href="https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=484625" target="_blank"><i>Staff Report: The Four Flights</i>. 9/11 Commission, August 26, 2004, pp. 6-8, 10-11, 15</a>.
<br>[8] <a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/OpaAPI/media/7598035/content/arcmedia/dc-metro/rg-237/7419198-9-11-faa/3.%20AAL%2011/%28e%29%20Other/3%20ZBW%2025%20QA%20bulletin%209-20-01.pdf" target="_blank">"Quality Assurance Bulletin: Boston Center Bulletin." Federal Aviation Administration, September 20, 2001</a>; 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 19.
<br>[9] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 19.
<br>[10] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/491778828/2012-156-Doc-26" target="_blank">John A. Brunderman, "NMCC Report on 11 Sep. 01 Response to Terrorist Attack." U.S. Department of Defense, October 4, 2001</a>.
<br>[11] <a href="https://www.army.mil/article/11/911_keeping_the_heart_of_the_pentagon_beating" target="_blank">Jim Garamone, "9/11: Keeping the Heart of the Pentagon Beating." American Forces Press Service, September 8, 2006</a>.
<br>[12] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 35; <a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/OpaAPI/media/2610279/content/arcmedia/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00684.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Captain Charles Joseph Leidig, USN, Commandant of Midshipmen, U.S. Naval Academy." 9/11 Commission, April 29, 2004</a>; <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/14274408/DH-B2-Cmdr-Gardner-DOD-Fdr-Entire-Contents-Handwritten-Interview-Notes-May-5-2004-064" target="_blank">Commander Patrick Gardner, 9/11 Commission Interview Part I, Handwritten Notes. 9/11 Commission, May 5, 2004</a>.
<br>[13] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/491778535/2012-156-Doc-14-Part-1" target="_blank">"Senior Operations Officer Log." U.S. Department of Defense, September 11, 2001</a>; 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 462; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/241754154/2012-042-Larson-Release-Document-07" target="_blank">Admiral Charles Joseph Leidig, 9/11 Commission Interview, Handwritten Notes. 9/11 Commission, April 29, 2004</a>.
<br>[14] <a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/OpaAPI/media/2610279/content/arcmedia/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00684.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Captain Charles Joseph Leidig, USN, Commandant of Midshipmen, U.S. Naval Academy."</a>
<br>[15] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, pp. 5, 7.
<br>[16] <a href="https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2011-048-doc19.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Lt. Col. Ryan Gonsalves." 9/11 Commission, May 14, 2004</a>.
<br>[17] <a href="https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2011-048-doc18.pdf" target="_blank">Lt. Col. John Sims, U.S. Army, 9/11 Commission Interview, Handwritten Notes (1). 9/11 Commission, May 12, 2004</a>; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/14274474/DH-B3-Lt-Col-John-Sims-DOD-NMCC-Fdr-Handwritten-Interview-Notes-084" target="_blank">Lt. Col. John Sims, U.S. Army, 9/11 Commission Interview, Handwritten Notes (2). 9/11 Commission, May 12, 2004</a>.
<br>[18] <a href="https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2011-048-doc19.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Lt. Col. Ryan Gonsalves."</a>
<br>[19] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 35.
<br>[20] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/17218062/T8-B6-FAA-HQ-Dan-Noel-Fdr-4-28-04-MFR-and-Typed-Notes-863" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Dan Noel, Manager, Emergency Operations Staff"</a>; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/20583176/Mfr-Nara-t7-Faa-Mclaughlin-Robert-C-6-3-04-00717" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Robert C. McLaughlin, FAA HQ Security Operations on 9/11." 9/11 Commission, June 3, 2004</a>.
<br>[21] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/17183201/t8-b6-Faa-Hq-Monte-Belger-Fdr-4-20-04-Mfr-835" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Monte Belger, Former Deputy Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration." 9/11 Commission, November 24, 2003</a>; <a href="http://www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing12/9-11Commission_Hearing_2004-06-17.htm" target="_blank">National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: Twelfth Public Hearing. 9/11 Commission, June 17, 2004</a>.
<br>[22] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/14354204/T8-B18-HQ-FAA-1-of-3-Fdr-ADA30-Operations-Center-Activity-Report-Pgs-112-of-13-078" target="_blank">"ADA-30 Operations Center Activity Report, September 11-14, 2001." Federal Aviation Administration, September 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB165/faa7.pdf" target="_blank">"Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events: September 11, 2001." Federal Aviation Administration, September 17, 2001</a>; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/17218115/t8-b6-Faa-Hq-Mike-Weikert-Fdr-5-7-04-Mfr-876" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Mike Weikert, Federal Air Marshal Service of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Service." 9/11 Commission, May 7, 2004</a>; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/17218120/t8-b6-Faa-Hq-Pete-Falcone-Fdr-5-11-04-Mfr-848" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Pete Falcone, TSA." 9/11 Commission, May 11, 2004</a>.
<br>[23] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/17218062/T8-B6-FAA-HQ-Dan-Noel-Fdr-4-28-04-MFR-and-Typed-Notes-863" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Dan Noel, Manager, Emergency Operations Staff."</a>
<br>[24] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/14354204/T8-B18-HQ-FAA-1-of-3-Fdr-ADA30-Operations-Center-Activity-Report-Pgs-112-of-13-078" target="_blank">"ADA-30 Operations Center Activity Report, September 11-14, 2001"</a>; 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 36.
<br>[25] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/17183206/T8-B6-FAA-HQ-Sharon-Battle-Fdr-3-25-04-2-Sets-Handwritten-Notes-837" target="_blank">Sharon Battle, 9/11 Commission Interview, Handwritten Notes. 9/11 Commission, March 25, 2004</a>; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/17218115/t8-b6-Faa-Hq-Mike-Weikert-Fdr-5-7-04-Mfr-876" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Mike Weikert, Federal Air Marshal Service of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Service."</a>
<br>[26] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/17218115/t8-b6-Faa-Hq-Mike-Weikert-Fdr-5-7-04-Mfr-876" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Mike Weikert, Federal Air Marshal Service of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Service"</a>; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/17218112/T8-B6-FAA-HQ-Mike-Weikert-Fdr-5-7-04-2-Sets-Handwritten-Notes-877" target="_blank">Mike Weikert, 9/11 Commission Interview, Handwritten Notes. 9/11 Commission, May 7, 2004</a>.
<br>[27] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/17183207/t8-b6-Faa-Hq-Sharon-Battle-Fdr-3-25-04-Mfr-836" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Sharon Battle." 9/11 Commission, March 25, 2004</a>; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/17183206/T8-B6-FAA-HQ-Sharon-Battle-Fdr-3-25-04-2-Sets-Handwritten-Notes-837" target="_blank">Sharon Battle, 9/11 Commission Interview, Handwritten Notes</a>.
<br>[28] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/14354204/T8-B18-HQ-FAA-1-of-3-Fdr-ADA30-Operations-Center-Activity-Report-Pgs-112-of-13-078" target="_blank">"ADA-30 Operations Center Activity Report, September 11-14, 2001"</a>; <a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/OpaAPI/media/7598471/content/arcmedia/dc-metro/rg-237/7419198-9-11-faa/4.%20UAL%20175/%28e%29%20Other/4%20AWA%20619%20Chronology%20of%20Events%20on%209-11-01.pdf" target="_blank">"Chronology of Events on 9/11/01." Federal Aviation Administration, September 11, 2001</a>; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/20583176/Mfr-Nara-t7-Faa-Mclaughlin-Robert-C-6-3-04-00717" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Robert C. McLaughlin, FAA HQ Security Operations on 9/11."</a>
<br>[29] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/17218115/t8-b6-Faa-Hq-Mike-Weikert-Fdr-5-7-04-Mfr-876" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Mike Weikert, Federal Air Marshal Service of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Service"</a>; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/17218112/T8-B6-FAA-HQ-Mike-Weikert-Fdr-5-7-04-2-Sets-Handwritten-Notes-877" target="_blank">Mike Weikert, 9/11 Commission Interview, Handwritten Notes</a>.
<br>[30] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/241754161/2012-042-Larson-Release-Document-18" target="_blank">Major Charles Chambers, 9/11 Commission Interview, Handwritten Notes. 9/11 Commission, April 23, 2004</a>.
<br>[31] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/17218112/T8-B6-FAA-HQ-Mike-Weikert-Fdr-5-7-04-2-Sets-Handwritten-Notes-877" target="_blank">Mike Weikert, 9/11 Commission Interview, Handwritten Notes</a>.
<br>[32] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, pp. 36, 462.
<br>[33] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/14354204/T8-B18-HQ-FAA-1-of-3-Fdr-ADA30-Operations-Center-Activity-Report-Pgs-112-of-13-078" target="_blank">"ADA-30 Operations Center Activity Report, September 11-14, 2001"</a>; <a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/OpaAPI/media/7598471/content/arcmedia/dc-metro/rg-237/7419198-9-11-faa/4.%20UAL%20175/%28e%29%20Other/4%20AWA%20619%20Chronology%20of%20Events%20on%209-11-01.pdf" target="_blank">"Chronology of Events on 9/11/01."</a>
<br>[34] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/17183206/T8-B6-FAA-HQ-Sharon-Battle-Fdr-3-25-04-2-Sets-Handwritten-Notes-837" target="_blank">Sharon Battle, 9/11 Commission Interview, Handwritten Notes</a>.
<br>[35] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/491778828/2012-156-Doc-26" target="_blank">John A. Brunderman, "NMCC Report on 11 Sep. 01 Response to Terrorist Attack."</a>
<br>[36] <a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/OpaAPI/media/2610286/content/arcmedia/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00691.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Lee Longmire." 9/11 Commission, October 28, 2003</a>.
<br>[37] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/17183201/t8-b6-Faa-Hq-Monte-Belger-Fdr-4-20-04-Mfr-835" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Monte Belger, Former Deputy Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration." 9/11 Commission, November 24, 2003</a>.
<br>[38] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, pp. 36, 462; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/17218115/t8-b6-Faa-Hq-Mike-Weikert-Fdr-5-7-04-Mfr-876" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Mike Weikert, Federal Air Marshal Service of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Service"</a>; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/17218112/T8-B6-FAA-HQ-Mike-Weikert-Fdr-5-7-04-2-Sets-Handwritten-Notes-877" target="_blank">Mike Weikert, 9/11 Commission Interview, Handwritten Notes</a>.
<br>[39] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 36; <a href="http://www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing12/9-11Commission_Hearing_2004-06-17.htm" target="_blank">National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: Twelfth Public Hearing</a>.
<br>[40] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/241754161/2012-042-Larson-Release-Document-18" target="_blank">Major Charles Chambers, 9/11 Commission Interview, Handwritten Notes</a>.
<br>[41] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/17183190/t8-b6-Faa-Hq-May-Avrey-Fdr-3-25-04-Mfr-833" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With May Avrey"</a>; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/17218062/T8-B6-FAA-HQ-Dan-Noel-Fdr-4-28-04-MFR-and-Typed-Notes-863" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Dan Noel, Manager, Emergency Operations Staff."</a>
<br>[42] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20060512090527/http:/www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/cjcsd/cjcsi/3610_01a.pdf" target="_blank">Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, <i>CJCSI 3610.01A: Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking) and Destruction of Derelict Airborne Objects</i></a>.
<br>[43] <a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/OpaAPI/media/2610286/content/arcmedia/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00691.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Lee Longmire"</a>; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/13911366/T8-B6-FAA-HQ-Lee-Longmire-Fdr-Typed-Interview-Notes-FAA-285" target="_blank">Lee Longmire, 9/11 Commission Interview, Typed Notes. 9/11 Commission, April 30, 2004</a>.
<br>[44] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/17218115/t8-b6-Faa-Hq-Mike-Weikert-Fdr-5-7-04-Mfr-876" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Mike Weikert, Federal Air Marshal Service of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Service."</a>
<br>[45] <a href="http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB165/faa7.pdf" target="_blank">"Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events: September 11, 2001"</a>; <a href="http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB196/doc01.pdf" target="_blank">"Flight Path Study: American Airlines Flight 11." National Transportation Safety Board, February 19, 2002</a>; 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, pp. 4, 16, 18; <a href="https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=484625" target="_blank"><i>Staff Report: The Four Flights</i>, pp. 7, 9</a>.
<br>[46] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/14354204/T8-B18-HQ-FAA-1-of-3-Fdr-ADA30-Operations-Center-Activity-Report-Pgs-112-of-13-078" target="_blank">"ADA-30 Operations Center Activity Report, September 11-14, 2001."</a>
<br>[47] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/17218112/T8-B6-FAA-HQ-Mike-Weikert-Fdr-5-7-04-2-Sets-Handwritten-Notes-877" target="_blank">Mike Weikert, 9/11 Commission Interview, Handwritten Notes</a>.
<br>[48] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/17183206/T8-B6-FAA-HQ-Sharon-Battle-Fdr-3-25-04-2-Sets-Handwritten-Notes-837" target="_blank">Sharon Battle, 9/11 Commission Interview, Handwritten Notes</a>.
<br>[49] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/14354204/T8-B18-HQ-FAA-1-of-3-Fdr-ADA30-Operations-Center-Activity-Report-Pgs-112-of-13-078" target="_blank">"ADA-30 Operations Center Activity Report, September 11-14, 2001."</a>
<br>[50] <a href="https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB165/faa5.pdf" target="_blank">"Executive Summary: Chronology of a Multiple Hijacking Crisis, September 11, 2001." Federal Aviation Administration, September 17, 2001</a>.
<br>[51] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/17218115/t8-b6-Faa-Hq-Mike-Weikert-Fdr-5-7-04-Mfr-876" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Mike Weikert, Federal Air Marshal Service of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Service."</a>
<br>[52] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/14354204/T8-B18-HQ-FAA-1-of-3-Fdr-ADA30-Operations-Center-Activity-Report-Pgs-112-of-13-078" target="_blank">"ADA-30 Operations Center Activity Report, September 11-14, 2001"</a>; <a href="https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB165/faa5.pdf" target="_blank">"Executive Summary: Chronology of a Multiple Hijacking Crisis, September 11, 2001."</a>
<br>[53] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/20583176/Mfr-Nara-t7-Faa-Mclaughlin-Robert-C-6-3-04-00717" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Robert C. McLaughlin, FAA HQ Security Operations on 9/11."</a>
<br>[54] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/17218115/t8-b6-Faa-Hq-Mike-Weikert-Fdr-5-7-04-Mfr-876" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Mike Weikert, Federal Air Marshal Service of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Service."</a>
<br>[55] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/17218089/T8-B6-FAA-HQ-Jeff-Griffith-3-31-04-MFR" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Jeff Griffith, Former FAA Assistant Director of Air Traffic Control." 9/11 Commission, March 31, 2004</a>.
<br>[56] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/13911366/T8-B6-FAA-HQ-Lee-Longmire-Fdr-Typed-Interview-Notes-FAA-285" target="_blank">Lee Longmire, 9/11 Commission Interview, Typed Notes</a>.
<br>[57] <a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/OpaAPI/media/2610286/content/arcmedia/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00691.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Lee Longmire."</a>
<br>[58] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/13911366/T8-B6-FAA-HQ-Lee-Longmire-Fdr-Typed-Interview-Notes-FAA-285" target="_blank">Lee Longmire, 9/11 Commission Interview, Typed Notes</a>.
<br>[59] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 36; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/17218115/t8-b6-Faa-Hq-Mike-Weikert-Fdr-5-7-04-Mfr-876" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Mike Weikert, Federal Air Marshal Service of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Service."</a>
<br>[60] <a href="https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/hearings/hearing12/belger_statement.pdf" target="_blank">"Prepared Statement of Monte R. Belger to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States." 9/11 Commission, June 17, 2004</a>.
<br>[61] <a href="http://www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing12/9-11Commission_Hearing_2004-06-17.htm" target="_blank">National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: Twelfth Public Hearing</a>.
<br>[62] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/241754161/2012-042-Larson-Release-Document-18" target="_blank">Major Charles Chambers, 9/11 Commission Interview, Handwritten Notes</a>.
<br>[63] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/17183201/t8-b6-Faa-Hq-Monte-Belger-Fdr-4-20-04-Mfr-835" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Monte Belger, Former Deputy Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration." 9/11 Commission, November 24, 2003</a>; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/17183201/t8-b6-Faa-Hq-Monte-Belger-Fdr-4-20-04-Mfr-835" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Monte Belger, Former Deputy Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration." 9/11 Commission, April 20, 2004</a>.
<br>[64] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/17218115/t8-b6-Faa-Hq-Mike-Weikert-Fdr-5-7-04-Mfr-876" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Mike Weikert, Federal Air Marshal Service of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Service."</a>
<br>[65] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/18990372/DH-B5-DODNORAD-Notes-Fdr-3404-MFR-Maj-Paul-Goddard-Canada-and-Ken-Merchant-Military-Exercises" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Major Paul Goddard (Canadian Forces) and Ken Merchant." 9/11 Commission, March 4, 2004</a>; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/17183190/t8-b6-Faa-Hq-May-Avrey-Fdr-3-25-04-Mfr-833" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With May Avrey"</a>; <a href="https://www.fvhofsociety.org/resch.html" target="_blank">"Dean Resch, U.S. Army (Retired), Panama City Beach, FL." Florida Veterans' Hall of Fame Society, Inc., n.d.</a>
<br>[66] <a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/OpaAPI/media/2610202/content/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00608.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With John Steven Hawley, TSA Liaison to the Department of State (DSITA) Diplomatic Security/Intelligence and Threat Analysis." 9/11 Commission, October 8, 2003</a>.
<br>[67] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 16.
<br>[68] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/20583176/Mfr-Nara-t7-Faa-Mclaughlin-Robert-C-6-3-04-00717" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Robert C. McLaughlin, FAA HQ Security Operations on 9/11."</a>
<br>[69] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/17422447/T7-B11-Morse-Fdr-Entire-Contents-9-15-03-Mike-Morse-MFR-w-Notes-208" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Mike Morse, FAA National Security Coordination Staffer."</a>
<br>[70] See <a href="http://www.historycommons.org/timeline.jsp?timeline=complete_911_timeline&day_of_9/11=complete_911_timeline_training_exercises" target="_blank">"Complete 911 Timeline: Training Exercises on 9/11." History Commons, n.d.</a>
<br>[71] Leslie Filson, <i>Air War Over America: Sept. 11 Alters Face of Air Defense Mission</i>. Tyndall Air Force Base, FL: 1st Air Force, 2003, pp. 55, 122; William M. Arkin, <i>Code Names: Deciphering U.S. Military Plans, Programs, and Operations in the 9/11 World</i>. Hanover, NH: Steerforth Press, 2005, p. 545; <a href="https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2006/08/norad200608" target="_blank">Michael Bronner, "9/11 Live: The NORAD Tapes." <i>Vanity Fair</i>, August 2006</a>.
<br>[72] <a href="https://ia802305.us.archive.org/7/items/gsa-b-32-rdod-03005032-fdr-entire-contents-wn-and-norad-exercise-docs-924/GSA%20B32%20RDOD03005032%20Fdr-%20Entire%20Contents-%20WN%20and%20NORAD%20Exercise%20Docs%20924.pdf" target="_blank">"Point Paper on Training and Exercises." North American Aerospace Defense Command, October 13, 2001</a>.
<br>[73] <a href="https://ia601507.us.archive.org/14/items/gsa-b-32-rdod-03005032-fdr-entire-contents-wn-and-norad-exercise-docs-924/GSA%20B32%20RDOD03005032%20Fdr-%20Entire%20Contents-%20WN%20and%20NORAD%20Exercise%20Docs%20924.pdf" target="_blank">"NCOTA: Exercise Data." North American Aerospace Defense Command, July 25, 2003</a>.
<br>[74] Ibid.; <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16411947/NORAD-Exercises-Hijack-Summary" target="_blank">"NORAD Exercises: Hijack Summary." 9/11 Commission, n.d.</a>
<br>[75] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/491778535/2012-156-Doc-14-Part-1" target="_blank">"Senior Operations Officer Log"</a>; <a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/OpaAPI/media/2610279/content/arcmedia/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00684.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Captain Charles Joseph Leidig, USN, Commandant of Midshipmen, U.S. Naval Academy"</a>; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/241754154/2012-042-Larson-Release-Document-07" target="_blank">Admiral Charles Joseph Leidig, 9/11 Commission Interview, Handwritten Notes</a>.
<br>[76] <a href="https://ia601507.us.archive.org/14/items/gsa-b-32-rdod-03005032-fdr-entire-contents-wn-and-norad-exercise-docs-924/GSA%20B32%20RDOD03005032%20Fdr-%20Entire%20Contents-%20WN%20and%20NORAD%20Exercise%20Docs%20924.pdf" target="_blank">"NCOTA: Exercise Data"</a>; <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16411947/NORAD-Exercises-Hijack-Summary" target="_blank">"NORAD Exercises: Hijack Summary."</a>
<br>[77] <a href="https://nuke.fas.org/guide/usa/doctrine/dod/sustain/document.html" target="_blank"><i>Nuclear Weapon Systems Sustainment Programs</i>. Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 1997</a>; <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20050206084541/http:/close.batcave.net/GlobalGuardian.html" target="_blank">Joe Dejka, "Inside Stratcom on Sept. 11 Offutt Exercise Took Real-Life Twist." <i>Omaha World-Herald</i>, February 27, 2002</a>; William M. Arkin, <i>Code Names</i>, p. 378; Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, <i>Counterstrike: The Untold Story of America's Secret Campaign Against Al-Qaeda</i>. New York: Times Books, 2011, p. 22.
<br>[78] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/241754149/2012-042-Larson-Release-Document-10" target="_blank">Wayne M. Rezzonico, "POTUS SIOP Brief." E-mail message to Pat Downs, April 2, 2004</a>.
<br>[79] <a href="https://ia601507.us.archive.org/14/items/gsa-b-32-rdod-03005032-fdr-entire-contents-wn-and-norad-exercise-docs-924/GSA%20B32%20RDOD03005032%20Fdr-%20Entire%20Contents-%20WN%20and%20NORAD%20Exercise%20Docs%20924.pdf" target="_blank">"NCOTA: Exercise Data."</a>
<br>[80] <a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/OpaAPI/media/2610351/content/arcmedia/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00756.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Orientation and Tour of the National Military Command Center (NMCC) and National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC)."</a>
<br>[81] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/241754153/2012-042-Larson-Release-Document-04" target="_blank">Col. John Brunderman, 9/11 Commission Interview, Handwritten Notes. 9/11 Commission, May 17, 2004</a>.
<br>[82] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/241754161/2012-042-Larson-Release-Document-18" target="_blank">Major Charles Chambers, 9/11 Commission Interview, Handwritten Notes</a>.
<br>[83] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/17183206/T8-B6-FAA-HQ-Sharon-Battle-Fdr-3-25-04-2-Sets-Handwritten-Notes-837" target="_blank">Sharon Battle, 9/11 Commission Interview, Handwritten Notes</a>; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/17218115/t8-b6-Faa-Hq-Mike-Weikert-Fdr-5-7-04-Mfr-876" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Mike Weikert, Federal Air Marshal Service of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Service."</a>
<br>[84] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/17218120/t8-b6-Faa-Hq-Pete-Falcone-Fdr-5-11-04-Mfr-848" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Pete Falcone, TSA."</a>
<br>[85] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/13911366/T8-B6-FAA-HQ-Lee-Longmire-Fdr-Typed-Interview-Notes-FAA-285" target="_blank">Lee Longmire, 9/11 Commission Interview, Typed Notes</a>.
<br>[86] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/17218062/T8-B6-FAA-HQ-Dan-Noel-Fdr-4-28-04-MFR-and-Typed-Notes-863" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Dan Noel, Manager, Emergency Operations Staff."</a>
<br>[87] <a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/OpaAPI/media/2610202/content/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00608.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With John Steven Hawley, TSA Liaison to the Department of State (DSITA) Diplomatic Security/Intelligence and Threat Analysis."</a>
<br>[88] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/13911366/T8-B6-FAA-HQ-Lee-Longmire-Fdr-Typed-Interview-Notes-FAA-285" target="_blank">Lee Longmire, 9/11 Commission Interview, Typed Notes</a>.
<br>[89] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/17218120/t8-b6-Faa-Hq-Pete-Falcone-Fdr-5-11-04-Mfr-848" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Pete Falcone, TSA."</a>
<br>[90] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/17218115/t8-b6-Faa-Hq-Mike-Weikert-Fdr-5-7-04-Mfr-876" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Mike Weikert, Federal Air Marshal Service of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Service"</a>; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/17218112/T8-B6-FAA-HQ-Mike-Weikert-Fdr-5-7-04-2-Sets-Handwritten-Notes-877" target="_blank">Mike Weikert, 9/11 Commission Interview, Handwritten Notes</a>.
<br>[91] <a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/OpaAPI/media/2610286/content/arcmedia/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00691.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Lee Longmire"</a>; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/17183201/t8-b6-Faa-Hq-Monte-Belger-Fdr-4-20-04-Mfr-835" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Monte Belger, Former Deputy Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration." 9/11 Commission, November 24, 2003</a>.
<br>[92] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20001217230200/http:/www.faa.gov/atpubs/MIL/Ch7/mil0701.html" target="_blank">Federal Aviation Administration, <i>Order 7610.4J: Special Military Operations</i>, paras. 7-1-1, 7-1-2</a>; <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20060512090527/http:/www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/cjcsd/cjcsi/3610_01a.pdf" target="_blank">Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, <i>CJCSI 3610.01A: Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking) and Destruction of Derelict Airborne Objects</i></a>.
<br>[93] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/13911366/T8-B6-FAA-HQ-Lee-Longmire-Fdr-Typed-Interview-Notes-FAA-285" target="_blank">Lee Longmire, 9/11 Commission Interview, Typed Notes</a>; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/17218115/t8-b6-Faa-Hq-Mike-Weikert-Fdr-5-7-04-Mfr-876" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Mike Weikert, Federal Air Marshal Service of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Service"</a>; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/17218120/t8-b6-Faa-Hq-Pete-Falcone-Fdr-5-11-04-Mfr-848" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Pete Falcone, TSA."</a>
<br>[94] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/17183201/t8-b6-Faa-Hq-Monte-Belger-Fdr-4-20-04-Mfr-835" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Monte Belger, Former Deputy Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration." 9/11 Commission, April 20, 2004</a>.
<br>[95] Ibid.
<br>[96] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20001214201800/http:/www.faa.gov/atpubs/mil/index.htm" target="_blank">Federal Aviation Administration, <i>Order 7610.4J: Special Military Operations</i></a>.
<br>[97] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20060512090521/http:/www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/cjcsd/cjcsi/3610_01.pdf" target="_blank">Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, <i>CJCSI 3610.01: Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking) and Destruction of Derelict Airborne Objects</i>. Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 31, 1997</a>.
<br>[98] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/20583176/Mfr-Nara-t7-Faa-Mclaughlin-Robert-C-6-3-04-00717" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Robert C. McLaughlin, FAA HQ Security Operations on 9/11."</a>
<br>[99] <a href="https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2011-048-doc19.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Lt. Col. Ryan Gonsalves."</a>
<br>[100] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/17183201/t8-b6-Faa-Hq-Monte-Belger-Fdr-4-20-04-Mfr-835" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Monte Belger, Former Deputy Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration." 9/11 Commission, November 24, 2003</a>; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/20583176/Mfr-Nara-t7-Faa-Mclaughlin-Robert-C-6-3-04-00717" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Robert C. McLaughlin, FAA HQ Security Operations on 9/11."</a>
<br>[101] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 36.
<br>[102] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/17218112/T8-B6-FAA-HQ-Mike-Weikert-Fdr-5-7-04-2-Sets-Handwritten-Notes-877" target="_blank">Mike Weikert, 9/11 Commission Interview, Handwritten Notes</a>.
<br>[103] <a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/OpaAPI/media/2610202/content/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00608.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With John Steven Hawley, TSA Liaison to the Department of State (DSITA) Diplomatic Security/Intelligence and Threat Analysis."</a>
<br>[104] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/17218062/T8-B6-FAA-HQ-Dan-Noel-Fdr-4-28-04-MFR-and-Typed-Notes-863" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Dan Noel, Manager, Emergency Operations Staff."</a>
<br>[105] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/17183190/t8-b6-Faa-Hq-May-Avrey-Fdr-3-25-04-Mfr-833" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With May Avrey."</a>
Shoestringhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01534319150672667644noreply@blogger.com8England, UK52.3555177 -1.174319724.045283863821155 -36.3305697 80.665751536178846 33.9819303tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2990970741097819876.post-78258532947149619232020-12-01T01:15:00.000-08:002020-12-01T01:15:31.555-08:00Time-Waster in Chief: General Richard Myers, the Highest-Ranking Military Officer in the U.S. During the 9/11 Attacks<div class="separator" style="clear: both;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgCeITdO_cbMKDIDzrEzLafN3F03rwY4lI0S14IqbF1pSGumnEU_zd8_bBGXA10BUN12MIaBW_y6gbpQesB7aMmjz1lIXaJdVcXYJMeNR_DPAP9GXcHpe8SdnkIUkM8gswS7HwgXNAzrkpE/s0/RichardMyers.jpg" target="_blank" style="display: block; padding: 1em 0; text-align: center; "><img alt="Richard Myers" border="0" data-original-height="263" data-original-width="300" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgCeITdO_cbMKDIDzrEzLafN3F03rwY4lI0S14IqbF1pSGumnEU_zd8_bBGXA10BUN12MIaBW_y6gbpQesB7aMmjz1lIXaJdVcXYJMeNR_DPAP9GXcHpe8SdnkIUkM8gswS7HwgXNAzrkpE/s0/RichardMyers.jpg"/></a></div>General Richard Myers was the highest-ranking military officer in the country when America came under terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, and yet he appears to have done nothing that would have helped protect the nation while the attacks took place.
<br><br>Myers was, in September 2001, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff--the second-highest-ranking officer in the U.S. military. However, when the 9/11 attacks occurred, General Henry Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was out of the country and so Myers was the acting chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and took on the chairman's responsibilities until Shelton returned to the United States late in the afternoon of September 11.
<br><br>Despite learning of the two plane crashes at the World Trade Center and the crash at the Pentagon shortly after they occurred, Myers did nothing of particular value in response to the attacks while they were taking place. His poor performance continued in the hours following the attacks and the few things he did that might have helped protect America from terrorists came well after the attacks ended, too late to influence the outcome of the crisis. Furthermore, he appears to have been, at times, deliberately time-wasting, engaging in unnecessary activities and thereby avoiding doing anything helpful.
<br><br>Myers was on Capitol Hill in Washington, DC, for a 9:00 a.m. meeting with a senator when he learned of the first crash from television. He was less than five miles from the Pentagon, which was where he ideally needed to be to respond to the crisis, and yet he only headed there after 9:37 a.m., shortly after the Pentagon was attacked and more than 50 minutes after the first attack on the World Trade Center.
<br><br>He made no decisions and took no action between 9:03 a.m., when the second hijacked plane crashed into the World Trade Center, and 9:37 a.m., when the Pentagon was struck, even though he could easily have done so during this period when he talked over the phone with his executive assistant at the Pentagon and the commander of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) in Colorado.
<br><br>He only reached the Pentagon's National Military Command Center (NMCC)--which he described as his "battle station when things are happening"--close to 10:00 a.m., only minutes before United Airlines Flight 93--the fourth and final plane hijacked that day--crashed in a field in Pennsylvania and the attacks were therefore over. Then, almost immediately after arriving at the NMCC, he abandoned his post, wandering off to search for Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. He was apparently away from the NMCC for close to 18 minutes while he carried out this needless task.
<br><br>No attempt has been made to explain Myers's poor response to the 9/11 attacks. It is difficult to attribute the vice chairman's behavior to incompetence, though. Myers had decades of experience in the U.S. Air Force and had held a number of senior posts in the military. Notably, immediately before being appointed vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he was commander in chief of NORAD. Since NORAD is the military organization responsible for monitoring and defending U.S. airspace, this role surely provided him with the ideal experience to respond effectively to attacks from the air, like those that took place on September 11.
<br><br>We therefore need to consider if there were more sinister reasons for Myers's behavior. Did Myers perhaps have foreknowledge of what was going to happen on September 11? Were his inaction, time-wasting, and other failures intentional, carried out because he wanted the terrorist attacks to succeed? Was he trying to impair the U.S. military's response to the crisis so the attacks would progress unimpeded?
<br><br>Could Myers have even been involved with planning 9/11? If so, he could have carefully prepared to act with negligence when the attacks took place.
<br><br><b>MYERS WAS ACTING CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS ON SEPTEMBER 11</b>
<br>Richard Myers, an Air Force veteran and former fighter pilot, had been vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since March 2000. [1] Just over two weeks before 9/11, then-President George W. Bush in fact nominated him to be the nation's next chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, although he would only take over that position on October 1 after being confirmed by the Senate on September 14. [2]
<br><br>However, while the 9/11 attacks were taking place, he was in the position of acting chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This was because Henry Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time, had taken off early in the morning of September 11 to attend a NATO meeting in Europe and was consequently out of the country, flying over the Atlantic Ocean, when the attacks occurred. [3] "By law, as vice chairman, I was designated acting chairman of the Joint Chiefs during his absence," Myers noted. [4]
<br><br>After his plane landed back at Andrews Air Force Base, just outside Washington, at 4:40 p.m., Shelton finally reached the NMCC at 5:40 p.m. that afternoon and was then able to resume his duties as chairman. [5] But, he noted, "Until I crossed back into United States airspace, all the decisions would be [Myers's] to make, in conjunction with Secretary [of Defense Donald] Rumsfeld and the president." [6]
<br><br>As acting chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Myers was the nation's highest-ranking military officer, in the position of principal military adviser to the president, the secretary of defense, and the National Security Council. [7] He spent much of September 11 with Rumsfeld and consequently provided the "primary advice" to the secretary of defense throughout the day. [8]
<br><br><b>MYERS LEARNED OF THE FIRST CRASH FROM TELEVISION</b>
<br>On September 11, Myers was scheduled to have a series of meetings with senators in preparation for his confirmation hearing to be chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on September 13. [9] His first meeting was to be with Georgia Senator Max Cleland at 9:00 a.m. in Cleland's office in the Dirksen Senate Office Building on Capitol Hill. [10]
<br><br>At 8:46 a.m., however, American Airlines Flight 11, which had been hijacked by terrorists, crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center and this was reported on television three minutes later, when CNN began showing video of the burning building. [11]
<br><br>Myers learned of the incident as he was waiting in Cleland's outer office, prior to his meeting with the senator. He saw the coverage of what had happened on the television there and noticed text across the bottom of the TV screen stating that a plane had hit the North Tower. [12] He heard a reporter saying something like: "We think it was an airplane. We don't know if it's a big one or a little one." [13] "Must have been a light aircraft ... maybe on a sightseeing flight," he thought.
<br><br>He took no action in response to the incident and proceeded into Cleland's office for his meeting. He then chatted with the senator about what had happened in New York for a short while. [14] Having noted that it was a beautiful, clear day, he wondered aloud, "How could a pilot be that stupid, to hit a tower?" [15] However, he supposedly assumed the crash was an accident and never considered that it could have been a terrorist attack. "It didn't click yet that it might have been intentional," he recalled. [16] He therefore went ahead with his meeting as if nothing unusual had occurred. [17]
<br><br><b>SECOND HIJACKED PLANE CRASHED WHILE MYERS WAS MEETING CLELAND</b>
<br>But at 9:03 a.m., three minutes after the meeting began, a second hijacked aircraft, United Airlines Flight 175, crashed into the South Tower of the World Trade Center. [18] Millions of people saw the incident live on television. Two crashes at the Twin Towers within minutes of each other could not have been a coincidence. It was now clear that America was under attack.
<br><br>Meanwhile, Myers and Cleland had been discussing national security. [19] "By pure coincidence," according to the <i>Washington Post</i>, this included talking about terrorism. [20] They had talked about the country's need "to look at the question of terrorism and attacks on the United States," Cleland recalled. [21] "Ironically, we were discussing how best to defend the nation," he has written.
<br><br>The two men learned of the second crash when they saw it on television, according to Cleland. While they were talking, Cleland's secretary, Elaine Iler, burst into the room in an agitated state and said, "You've gotta see the TV." Myers and Cleland followed her out to where the television was. "Almost as soon as we got into the room, we saw the second plane hit the tower at the World Trade Center," Cleland described. "For a moment, I thought it was a replay of the first plane hitting the tower, but it quickly became apparent there were two planes involved and neither of them was little," he added. [22]
<br><br>Myers, however, recalled that he and Cleland learned of the second crash sometime after it occurred. On most occasions, he stated that they learned of it when someone interrupted their meeting and told them what had happened, rather than from seeing it on television.
<br><br>On some occasions, Myers indicated that he and Cleland were notified very shortly after the crash took place. "[Cleland] had started preparing a pot of tea, but we hadn't taken a sip when a staff person came in from the outer office and informed us that the second tower had been hit," he described in 2009, in his memoir. [23] "We were about ready to get down to some serious conversation when a word came in from the outer office that they said the second tower had been hit," he told an interviewer in September that year. [24] "A couple of minutes into the meeting, one of the aides came in and said the second building had been hit," he recalled in 2011. [25] But on another occasion Myers indicated that he and Cleland may have learned of the second crash at a later time. Someone came in and alerted them to it "somewhere in the middle of that meeting," he said in 2002. [26]
<br><br>However, in the first interview in which he described his experiences on September 11, five weeks after the attacks took place, Myers had contradicted these accounts, claiming that no one interrupted the meeting to alert him and Cleland to the second crash. "Nobody informed us of that, but when we came out, that was obvious," he said. [27]
<br><br>Upon learning of the second crash, Myers realized this was a terrorist attack. "That's when we figured out something: that America, or at least the World Trade Center, is under attack," he recalled. [28] The crash was "no light aircraft accident, but certainly an act of unthinkable terrorist savagery," he wrote. [29]
<br><br>If Myers was alerted to the second crash during his meeting with Cleland, it is unclear how long he remained with the senator after learning the extraordinary news. In his memoir, he wrote only that, after they were alerted to the second crash, he and Cleland "knew the interview was over and started out to the TV to see the South Tower erupting with smoke and flame." [30] And during a public event in 2006, he said only that the meeting "was over very quickly" after the crash occurred. [31]
<br><br><b>EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT TALKED TO MYERS ABOUT THE ATTACKS</b>
<br>While Myers was with Cleland, sometime before 9:29 a.m., Colonel Matthew Klimow, his executive assistant, called him. Klimow, who was back at the Pentagon, had just been called by General Ralph Eberhart, the commander of NORAD, who'd said he urgently wanted to talk to Myers. [32]
<br><br>Eberhart was is in his office at NORAD's headquarters at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado Springs, Colorado, and had realized a coordinated terrorist attack was underway when he saw the second crash on television. In response, he initially tried to contact Henry Shelton but, since the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was airborne, had been unable to reach him. He therefore tried to contact Myers instead. [33]
<br><br>He called Myers's office and Klimow answered the phone. When he asked to speak to Myers, Klimow explained, "Sir, he's on Capitol Hill." "Man, it's urgent," Eberhart said. He then told Klimow, "Get hold of him, get him to a phone" and Klimow replied, "I'm on it."
<br><br>Klimow then set about contacting Myers. He called the cell phone of Captain Chris Donahue, Myers's military aide, who was with the vice chairman on Capitol Hill. When Donahue answered, Klimow told him, "Chris, get the old man on the phone." Myers was apparently still in Cleland's office at the time, since Donahue asked, "Do you really want me to interrupt the senator?" "It's urgent!" Klimow exclaimed and he ordered Donahue, "Get in there!" Donahue then went and found Myers, and put him on the line.
<br><br>Klimow asked the vice chairman if he was aware of what happened in New York and Myers said he had just been briefed on it by Cleland's staff. "It looks like there's a major hijacking underway and I recommend that you return to the Pentagon as soon as possible," Klimow said. He also told Myers: "NORAD needs to talk. It sounds pretty bad." He then asked, "Can you get back to the Pentagon?" "We're on our way back to the Pentagon now," Myers said. "I'll call NORAD from my sedan; I'll be there in 15 minutes," he told his executive assistant. Myers ended the call and Klimow then started preparing for his return to the Pentagon. [34]
<br><br>The exact time when this call occurred is unknown. However, it apparently took place sometime before 9:29 a.m., since Klimow recalled that after he made it, he received a call inviting him to join the "significant event conference" and this conference call is known to have been convened at 9:29 a.m. [35]
<br><br><b>NORAD COMMANDER TALKED TO MYERS</b>
<br>Presumably after he spoke to Klimow, Myers received a call from Eberhart. [36] Donahue approached him as he was leaving Cleland's office, and said Eberhart was on his cell phone and wanted to talk to the vice chairman. Myers then took Donahue's cell phone and spoke to the NORAD commander. [37]
<br><br>The call was brief. "It was a short conversation," Myers commented. Eberhart updated Myers on what was happening and what NORAD was doing in response. He said both of the Twin Towers had been hit and there were "several hijack codes in the system." [38] He said the situation in the air was "confused" and there were "aircraft squawking that they had been hijacked." [39]
<br><br> (He was referring to the fact that pilots can discretely notify authorities on the ground that their plane is being hijacked by punching a special four-digit code into the plane's transponder. However, none of the pilots of the four planes hijacked that morning did this, so it is unclear why Eberhart implied they had. [40])
<br><br>Eberhart told Myers he was going to land aircraft at "the nearest suitable base" to sort things out. [41] "The decision I'm going to make is, we're going to land everybody and we'll sort it out when we get them on the ground," he said. [42]
<br><br>He also told Myers that NORAD was scrambling fighter jets in response to the hijackings. [43] He would have been referring to two F-15s that were launched from Otis Air National Guard Base in Cape Cod, Massachusetts, at 8:46 a.m. and three F-16s that were launched from Langley Air Force Base in Virginia at 9:24 a.m. [44] However, after hearing this, Myers did not discuss with Eberhart what "rules of engagement" the pilots of the fighters should follow.
<br><br>Myers in fact said little during the call. He "mainly listened," he recalled. He told Eberhart he could not communicate with him over a cell phone, presumably because it was an unsecured line, and said he needed to get to the NMCC. [45] He said he was going to head back to the Pentagon and would talk to Eberhart again when he got there. [46]
<br><br>It is unclear exactly when this call occurred. Eberhart mentioned the call when, in 2004, he spoke to the 9/11 Commission--the investigation created by Congress and the president in 2002 to examine the 9/11 attacks--about his actions on September 11, but failed to provide a specific time for it. He only placed it between when he saw the second crash on television--i.e. 9:03 a.m.--and around 9:30 a.m., when he left his office at Peterson Air Force Base to head to NORAD's Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center. [47] Myers has been equally unspecific. He told the 9/11 Commission only that he thought the call occurred sometime after the second crash at the World Trade Center, between 9:03 a.m. and 9:30 a.m. [48]
<br><br><b>MYERS LEARNED OF THE PENTAGON ATTACK FROM HIS DRIVER</b>
<br>Myers recalled that "immediately" after the call with Eberhart ended, he set out from the Dirksen Senate Office Building, where Cleland's office was located, to return to the Pentagon. [49] As he was doing so, he learned there had been a third terrorist attack, this one at the Pentagon.
<br><br>He was alerted to it by Dan Downey, his driver. Downey said: "Sir, just got a call from the office. The Pentagon's been hit." He apparently provided no further details of what had happened. [50]
<br><br>Since the Pentagon was hit at 9:37 a.m., Myers presumably learned of the attack shortly after that time. It is unclear, however, where he was and what he was doing at the time. He learned of the Pentagon attack "as we're leaving the building" on Capitol Hill, he said in an interview in 2002. [51] He told the 9/11 Commission he was notified about it "as he was getting into his car." [52] But in his memoir, he recalled being alerted to it during the drive to the Pentagon--"as we raced away from Capitol Hill." [53]
<br><br>Myers promptly called Klimow to ask about what had happened at the Pentagon. Klimow told him that all the fire alarms were going off, and people were running around and shouting in the E Ring--the outermost corridor of the Pentagon. Myers asked Klimow if he was alright and Klimow said he was. He explained that the Pentagon must have been hit "on the west side of the building, near the helo pad."
<br><br>He told Myers that the White House had said the combatant commanders would probably want to raise the threatcon--the terrorist threat condition--as they saw fit. He also said that "the FBI had been designated the lead civilian agency in the crisis, with the military standing by as needed if the terrorist attacks involved weapons of mass destruction," meaning chemical, biological, or radiological weapons.
<br><br>Myers asked Klimow if the NMCC was up and running and Klimow said it was. "We're coming in," Myers told Klimow. "I'll be there in three minutes," he said and then instructed his executive assistant to meet him at the Pentagon's River Entrance. [54]
<br><br><b>MYERS STOPPED TO TALK TO THE DEPUTY DEFENSE SECRETARY</b>
<br>Myers's car drove across the Potomac River and subsequently pulled up outside the Pentagon. There, Myers found the steps of the River Entrance crowded with people who had evacuated and Klimow waiting calmly near the door. [55]
<br><br>Myers had been thinking that he needed to "quickly get to the ... National Military Command Center." [56] And yet he did not immediately join his executive assistant and head there. Instead, he stopped to talk with Paul Wolfowitz, the deputy secretary of defense. [57] Wolfowitz had been evacuated from the Pentagon shortly after it was attacked and joined other Pentagon employees on the parade ground in front of the building. [58]
<br><br>What the two men talked about is unknown. However, Myers soon continued on his way. He recalled that he only "stopped briefly" to talk to Wolfowitz. [59] He then grabbed Klimow by the arm, and the two men headed to the inner rings of the Pentagon and the NMCC. [60] They reached the command center by 9:58 a.m.
<br><br><b>MYERS REACHED THE NMCC BEFORE 10:00 A.M.</b>
<br>The National Military Command Center is "the nerve center of the Pentagon," according to Klimow. [61] Myers described it as the U.S. military's "worldwide monitoring, crisis response center." [62] It is "a communications hub, a switchboard connecting the Pentagon, the civilian government, and the combatant commanders," he wrote.
<br><br>The large Current Actions Center (CAC) within the NMCC was filled with computer cubicles, and when Myers and Klimow arrived there they found members of the armed forces at "their consoles, their telephones, and their computers, manning communication links around the world."
<br><br>The two men then headed to the deputy director for operations' office--a small, windowless room located at one end of the CAC, which had several desks, a conference table, and lots of telephones. There, they found Captain Charles Leidig, the acting deputy director for operations, participating in the "air threat conference," which had been initiated by the NMCC at 9:37 a.m. and linked the command center to the White House, NORAD, and other agencies. [63]
<br><br>Myers estimated that he reached the NMCC between 10:00 a.m. and 10:10 a.m. when he was interviewed by the 9/11 Commission. [64] Evidence shows, though, that he was there by 9:58 a.m. At that time, Leidig said over the air threat conference that Myers had recommended evacuating the Sears Tower in Chicago. [65] And Leidig told the 9/11 Commission he was "certain that the vice chairman was in the room" when the "Sears Tower issue" was discussed over the air threat conference. [66]
<br><br><b>MYERS LEFT THE NMCC TO LOOK FOR RUMSFELD</b>
<br>Myers has acknowledged that the NMCC needed to be his command post that morning and described it as "essentially my battle station when things are happening." [67] And yet he left it soon after arriving. He decided to go all the way from the NMCC, in the basement of the Pentagon, to the office of Donald Rumsfeld, on the third floor of the E Ring, to see if he could find the secretary of defense.
<br><br>He found thick smoke in the E Ring corridor and similar conditions in Rumsfeld's office suite, but no sign of Rumsfeld. [68] Rumsfeld had been in his office when the Pentagon was attacked but promptly headed out to inspect the crash site and help carry an injured person on a stretcher. [69] One of his aides therefore explained to Myers that the secretary of defense was outside, helping the wounded. Myers left a message for Rumsfeld, stating that he was returning to the NMCC, and then headed back to the command center. [70]
<br><br>Myers appears to have spent up to 18 minutes away from the NMCC while he searched for Rumsfeld. He recalled seeing the South Tower of the World Trade Center collapsing on television as he was leaving the CAC, which means he left there at 9:59 a.m., when the collapse occurred--perhaps only a minute or so after he arrived at the NMCC. [71] And he was apparently back in the NMCC by 10:17 a.m., since at that time Leidig mentioned over the air threat conference that the "vice chairman would like to know who's controlling the aircraft over Washington, DC." [72]
<br><br><b>MYERS WORKED ON RULES FOR FIGHTER PILOTS WITH THE NORAD COMMANDER</b>
<br>Apparently after arriving back at the NMCC from his search for Rumsfeld, Myers spoke over the phone for the second time that morning with NORAD commander Ralph Eberhart. The focus of the call was establishing rules of engagement for fighter pilots defending U.S. airspace.
<br><br>Myers and Eberhart had two immediate issues to resolve during the call, according to Matthew Klimow, who was with the vice chairman at the time. These were, "First, to determine when to pull the trigger for the shootdown of an airliner and, second, to clarify who would have the ultimate authority to give that command to shoot." It was important to settle these issues, since the two men "didn't want to put the burden of killing innocent passengers on the shoulders of a single fighter pilot," Klimow commented. [73]
<br><br>By 10:30 a.m., Myers and Eberhart had agreed on the rules of engagement. Fighter pilots would "try to persuade a potentially hijacked plane to land, but if it was headed to a large city, take it down." [74] They decided to delegate the authority to order the shootdown of a suspicious aircraft to "the regional air defense commander," Klimow recalled. [75] Klimow was presumably referring to Major General Larry Arnold, the commander of the Continental United States NORAD Region.
<br><br>And yet, after devising these rules, Myers and Eberhart made no effort to pass them on to the fighter pilots involved in the air defense response. Myers told the 9/11 Commission that in the "initial period"--apparently referring to the hour after he first arrived at the NMCC--he "did not do anything to ensure that effective rules of engagement were communicated to pilots." [76] And Eberhart said only that he "assumed" the rules were "passed to the level of the fighter pilot." [77]
<br><br>Furthermore, during the call, Myers failed to tell Eberhart that Vice President Dick Cheney had just given his authorization for fighters to shoot down suspicious aircraft, despite the obvious relevance of this information to their discussion.
<br><br>Shortly after 10:10 a.m., Cheney, who was at the White House, had been alerted to an unidentified aircraft approaching Washington that was believed to be hijacked. He was asked for authorization for the military to engage the aircraft and immediately gave it. Subsequently, at 10:14 a.m. and again at 10:19 a.m., someone at the White House relayed over the air threat conference that the vice president had confirmed that fighters were cleared to engage an aircraft if they could verify that it was hijacked. [78]
<br><br>While it is unclear whether, at 10:14 a.m., Myers had arrived back at the NMCC from his search for Rumsfeld, he was there before 10:19 a.m. and therefore ought to have heard about Cheney's action when it was reported over the air threat conference for a second time. Indeed, he indicated in his memoir that he heard about it over the conference call. He described a military aide at the White House stating, "Vice President Cheney has forwarded the president's authorization to go weapons free if that plane is confirmed hijacked and threatens the White House or the Capitol." [79]
<br><br>Even if Myers did not hear about Cheney's shootdown authorization over the air threat conference, someone in the NMCC who was monitoring the conference call presumably ought to have passed such important information on to him, considering he was the highest-ranking military officer in the country at the time.
<br><br>And yet Myers apparently failed to tell Eberhart about Cheney's action. When the 9/11 Commission asked him if he communicated with NORAD "to inform them of the vice president's authorization and ensure that they understood their instructions," his answer was confused and inexplicit. "I'm not sure I didn't have that conversation with Eberhart on this," he said, adding, "I don't remember ... that being a simple issue we worked our way through." [80]
<br><br>And Eberhart implied that Myers failed to tell him about Cheney's action. He told the 9/11 Commission that he believed he learned of the vice president's shootdown authorization from Major General Rick Findley, the director of operations at NORAD's Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center, and made no mention of Myers telling him about it. [81]
<br><br><b>MYERS CONTINUED WORKING ON THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT WITH RUMSFELD</b>
<br>Donald Rumsfeld, after leaving the building to visit the crash site, finally went back inside and then joined Myers in the NMCC at around 10:30 a.m. [82] He immediately asked for an update, especially on the rules of engagement for fighters, and was told the policy Myers and Eberhart had just agreed on. [83]
<br><br>Myers and Rumsfeld were then together for much of the day. "We joined up and we stayed joined the rest of the day," Myers recalled. [84] They were "never more than a few inches from each other," Victoria Clarke, the assistant secretary of defense for public affairs, who was at the Pentagon that day, wrote. [85]
<br><br>At around 10:39 a.m., Rumsfeld, with Myers beside him, spoke over the air threat conference with Cheney and the vice president let him know he had authorized the military to shoot down suspicious aircraft. "There's been at least three instances here where we've had reports of aircraft approaching Washington--in a couple of those cases they were confirmed as hijacked aircraft--and, pursuant to the president's instructions, I gave authorization for them to be taken out," Cheney said. Rumsfeld asked, "Has that directive been transmitted to the aircraft?" and Cheney replied, "Yes it has." [86]
<br><br>Rumsfeld's thoughts then "went to the pilots of the military aircraft who might be called upon to execute such an order." "It was clear that they needed rules of engagement telling them what they could and could not do--they needed clarity," Rumsfeld commented.
<br><br>There were already "standing rules of engagement," he noted. [87] However, "There were no rules of engagement on the books about when and how our pilots should handle a situation in which civilian aircraft had been hijacked and might be used as missiles to attack American targets." "I'd hate to be a pilot up there and not know exactly what I should do," he told Myers. [88]
<br><br>Even though rules of engagement had already been established by Eberhart and Myers, apparently due to Rumsfeld's concerns, the vice chairman and the secretary of defense "returned to further refine those rules." [89]
<br><br>Rumsfeld has described some of the discussion they had as they worked on the rules. They talked about the possibility of a fighter pilot making "hand signals and communications, and flying in front [of a suspicious aircraft] and waving at them, and getting them to go in a direction that's not dangerous." The two men determined that if a suspicious aircraft was "going in a direction that's dangerous," meaning toward "a high value target on the ground," the fighter pilot would "have to shoot them down." [90]
<br><br>Myers told Rumsfeld that "even a plane that appeared to be descending toward an airport in the Washington metropolitan area with no prior sign of hostile intent could suddenly veer off and strike any federal building in the DC area." By the time the plane crashed, he noted, "it's too late." He suggested that any plane within 20 miles of the White House that failed to land when ordered to do so might have to be shot down. [91]
<br><br>The two men continued discussing rules of engagement for fighter pilots during a secure video teleconference that began at 11:00 a.m. For this, they moved from the deputy director for operations' office to the Joint Chiefs of Staff conference room--more commonly known as "the tank." [92] This tiny room was "the NMCC facility for secure teleconferences," according to Myers. They were joined there by Matthew Klimow; Victoria Clarke; Vice Admiral Edmund Giambastiani Jr., Rumsfeld's senior military assistant; Stephen Cambone, Rumsfeld's closest aide; and William Haynes, the general counsel of the Department of Defense.
<br><br>The teleconference was intended to link the Defense Department's civilian and military leadership with the rest of the government. "The main issue under discussion," Myers recalled, "was rules of engagement for NORAD to follow should there be more hijackings." [93]
<br><br><b>RUMSFELD APPROVED THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT</b>
<br>At 12:19 p.m., Myers, Rumsfeld, and the other officials who had been in the tank for the teleconference moved to the Executive Support Center, a secure communications hub with a video teleconference facility on the third floor of the Pentagon. This was because they had started feeling unwell and then found that this was because the oxygen level in the room was dangerously low. [94] Even then, Myers and Rumsfeld's work developing rules of engagement was incomplete.
<br><br>The vice chairman and the secretary of defense appear to have finished working on the rules at around 12:40 p.m., when Myers gave Rumsfeld an update on what he knew about the crisis and the military's response to it. Myers told Rumsfeld, among other things, that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had reported that five airliners inbound to the United States from the Far East--one of which had possibly been hijacked--had come too far on their journeys to head back due to low fuel and fighter jets had been scrambled to escort them. He also said NORAD had requested an additional Reserve call-up of air defense units and this request was going to be routed through the secretary of defense's office to the president. [95]
<br><br>Rumsfeld brought up the subject of rules of engagement for fighter pilots. "I want to tie up the rules of engagement," he told Myers. He explained: "We need granularity here. This is not simple for a pilot, especially if he knows he's shooting down a plane over a civilian area like Washington." [96]
<br><br>Myers told Rumsfeld he had received the final recommended rules of engagement from Ralph Eberhart. These were, he said, "If our fighters intercept an aircraft obviously heading for a runway, they will let it land, but if a plane is on a glide path toward a possible government target or civilian installation, they will shoot it down." Rumsfeld approved these rules. [97]
<br><br>However, the rules were apparently only sent out about an hour later. The Department of Defense "did not circulate written rules of engagement until sometime after 1:00 p.m.," according to the <i>9/11 Commission Report</i>. It in fact may have only done so at 1:45 p.m. At that time, it faxed a memo that included the rules to Andrews Air Force Base. [98] This was three and a half hours after Myers and Eberhart likely started work on the rules, and five hours after the first attack on the World Trade Center.
<br><br>Since the attacks were long over by the time the rules of engagement were distributed, the hours Myers and Rumsfeld spent working on them were wasted. Their efforts were "an irrelevant exercise," journalist and author Andrew Cockburn noted, as the times at which the rules were completed and issued were "hours after the last hijacker had died." [99]
<br><br><b>MYERS SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERED THE FIRST CRASH A POSSIBLE TERRORIST ATTACK</b>
<br>The behavior of Richard Myers appeared suspicious on numerous occasions on September 11. The vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff sometimes responded to the unfolding crisis with alarming inaction when he should have been responding with urgency; on other occasions, he appeared to be wasting precious time on pointless or unnecessary activities.
<br><br>Evidence indicates that he did nothing to protect the United States while the 9/11 attacks were underway. And yet he was the highest-ranking military officer in the country for much of the day and so it was surely essential that he responded promptly and effectively. With his poor performance, he may have impaired the U.S. military's ability to respond to the terrorist attacks. His actions therefore require close scrutiny.
<br><br>A couple of questions worth considering are why did Myers fail to take action after seeing on television that a plane had crashed into the World Trade Center? and why did it apparently never occur to him that the incident may have been the result of terrorism?
<br><br>Myers's response to the first crash was particularly odd considering that, during the period when he was its commander in chief, NORAD held exercises based around the possibility of terrorists crashing planes into buildings. An exercise in January 1999 called Falcon Indian was based around the scenario of suicidal terrorists planning to crash a stolen Learjet into the White House. Another Falcon Indian exercise in June that year was based around the same scenario. [100] And a Falcon Indian exercise in November 1999 was based around the scenario of terrorists hijacking an aircraft with the intention of crashing it into the United Nations headquarters building in New York. [101]
<br><br>Since he was presumably aware of these exercises, Myers ought to have believed it possible that terrorists would deliberately crash a plane into a building and should therefore have acted as if the crash in New York might have been a terrorist attack when he saw it reported on television. He could easily have phoned his colleagues at the Pentagon to see if they knew anything about the incident. And his prearranged meeting with Max Cleland was relatively trivial and could have been canceled so he could return to the Pentagon right away in case a military response was necessary.
<br><br>And yet Myers acted as if the unexplained crash of a plane into the World Trade Center was of no concern to him. After spending a short time reflecting on it, he simply thought, "Well, whatever" and then proceeded with his scheduled meeting. [102] "Maybe we should have known after the first one [that this was terrorism]," he has commented. However, his justification for doing nothing was that following the first crash but before the second one, "people still couldn't agree on what had actually happened." [103]
<br><br><b>MYERS TOOK NO ACTION AFTER THE SECOND CRASH</b>
<br>Another important question is what did Myers do in the 34 minutes between 9:03 a.m., when Flight 175 crashed into the South Tower, and 9:37 a.m., when the Pentagon was attacked? Evidence indicates that he did alarmingly little during this critical period of time.
<br><br>According to most accounts, Myers learned of the second crash at the World Trade Center when it took place or very shortly after. Cleland said he and Myers saw the crash on television, and Myers indicated on several occasions that he and Cleland learned of the crash soon after it occurred when someone interrupted their meeting and told them what had happened.
<br><br>Myers should surely have headed back to the Pentagon right away after he learned of the second crash to help the military respond to the crisis, since it was then indisputable that America was under attack. And yet instead of doing so, he remained at the Dirksen Senate Office Building for a significant time.
<br><br>The next things we know he did after finding out about the second crash were talking to Matthew Klimow, who called him from the Pentagon, and talking to Ralph Eberhart at NORAD headquarters. These calls appear to have taken place a significant time after the second crash. Myers apparently spoke to Klimow shortly before 9:29 a.m. and to Eberhart soon afterward.
<br><br>This leaves a period of perhaps over 20 minutes unaccounted for. What did Myers do during that time? Did he continue talking to Cleland after he learned of the second crash? Did he watch the coverage of the crashes on television? If he did either of these things, it would have been the first of the numerous instances when he wasted time rather than responding effectively to the attacks.
<br><br>Even when he talked over the phone with Klimow and Eberhart, Myers wasted the opportunities the calls provided to do something useful, such as issuing orders, in response to the attacks. He inadvertently admitted this when he was interviewed by the 9/11 Commission in 2004. He said that he "did not recall making any decisions or taking any actions between the time the second tower was hit and the time the Pentagon was struck," at 9:37 a.m. [104]
<br><br>Furthermore, neither of the calls were initiated by him. Eberhart set about getting in touch with the vice chairman after he saw the second crash on television and Klimow phoned him after being called by Eberhart. Without Eberhart making the effort to contact him, therefore, Myers may have done nothing in response to the crisis before the Pentagon was hit.
<br><br><b>EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT FAILED TO CONTACT MYERS ABOUT THE CRASHES</b>
<br>Aside from the numerous questions regarding Myers's behavior on September 11, it seems odd that Klimow--as Myers's executive assistant--made no effort to contact the vice chairman of his own initiative following the second crash at the World Trade Center. He presumably would have learned of the incident when it was shown live on television or very shortly afterward. He has not explicitly stated this. However, he has mentioned that the television was on in his office on the morning of September 11 and he saw the coverage of the first crash shortly after it occurred. "I looked up from my desk across the room to the television screen and there was that image of the World Trade Center smoking, and I was dumbfounded," he recalled. He thought the crash "must be an accident." [105] He presumably therefore would have seen Flight 175 crashing into the South Tower and realized immediately that this was a terrorist attack. Even if for some reason he did not, a colleague ought to have quickly alerted him to what had happened.
<br><br>Why then did he subsequently fail to promptly contact the vice chairman to make sure he knew America was under attack, see what actions he wanted to take in response, and arrange for him to return to the Pentagon right away? Klimow has never recalled trying to get in touch with Myers of his own accord after the second crash and is instead only known to have contacted the vice chairman sometime later, after Eberhart called and ordered him to "get hold of [Myers], get him to a phone." [106]
<br><br><b>MYERS MAY HAVE DAWDLED ON THE WAY TO HIS CAR</b>
<br>Another question worth asking in light of his general slowness in responding to the attacks on the World Trade Center is how long did it take for Myers to walk from the Dirksen Senate Office Building, where Max Cleland's office was located, to his car, in order to be driven back to the Pentagon?
<br><br>Myers started making his way back to the Pentagon following his call with Eberhart, which presumably ended sometime before 9:30 a.m.--the time at which Eberhart left the NORAD headquarters building to head to the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center.
<br><br>He apparently reached his car shortly after the Pentagon was hit. Although he has given vague and contradictory accounts of when he learned of the Pentagon attack, it seems likely that what he told the 9/11 Commission--that he was informed of it "as he was getting into his car"--is correct, since he has also stated that he learned about the attack from Dan Downey, his driver. Being as the Pentagon was hit at 9:37:46 a.m., he must have been told of the attack at 9:38 a.m. at the earliest.
<br><br>Evidence therefore indicates that it took him eight minutes, at the very least, to get from the area outside Cleland's office to his car. Should the walk really have taken that long or was Myers time-wasting as he headed to his car, perhaps walking slowly when he should have been hurrying?
<br><br><b>MYERS TOOK NO ACTION AS HE TRAVELED TO THE PENTAGON</b>
<br>As previously mentioned, Myers told the 9/11 Commission that he "did not recall making any decisions or taking any actions between the time the second tower was hit and the time the Pentagon was struck." But it appears he also failed to make any decisions or take action immediately after the Pentagon attack, while he was being driven to the Pentagon, even though the journey provided him with valuable minutes to make phone calls in which he could have carried out important tasks, such as issuing orders. Although he made one call during the journey--to Matthew Klimow--all he did in it was listen as Klimow gave a brief update on what had happened at the Pentagon and how the government was responding to the attacks.
<br><br>The need for prompt action was even clearer by then, since the attack on the Pentagon showed that Washington, and not just New York, was a target. Perhaps the White House or the Capitol building would be attacked next. So why did Myers still do nothing in response to the crisis?
<br><br><b>MYERS DELAYED GOING TO THE NMCC BY TALKING WITH THE DEPUTY DEFENSE SECRETARY</b>
<br>Myers continued behaving with a lack of urgency when he arrived at the Pentagon. This is particularly odd because he has on numerous occasions acknowledged that he needed to be in the NMCC on the morning of September 11, as it was the best place for him to be to respond to the crisis, and he needed to get there as soon as possible after he realized America was under attack.
<br><br>"In the event of an attack, standing procedures called for the vice chairman [of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] to move to an alternate command post at a remote location ... while the chairman held the fort at the National Military Command Center," he noted. However, since Henry Shelton, the chairman, was out of the country, Myers was the acting chairman and so "my command post had to be in the burning Pentagon," he wrote. [107]
<br><br>After he learned the Pentagon had been attacked, while leaving Capitol Hill, his "first instinct was to get back to the Pentagon, to the National Military Command Center, as quickly as possible," he said. [108] "I felt I needed to get there as soon as I could," he commented.
<br><br>"I had to ... quickly get to the command center, the National Military Command Center," he recalled thinking as he crossed the Potomac River on his way to the Pentagon. [109] He asked Klimow if the NMCC was up and running when he called him around this time because he knew he'd "need to be where we had the appropriate command and control apparatus." [110] Then, when he reached the Pentagon, his concern was, "Where can you best discharge your duties?" "Well, my battle station was in the National Military Command Center," he said. [111]
<br><br>And yet after his car pulled up outside the Pentagon, instead of heading straight to the NMCC, Myers stopped outside the building to speak to Paul Wolfowitz. Why did he do this? Was it really necessary? Although Myers only "spoke briefly" with the deputy secretary of defense, he surely needed to get to the NMCC as soon as possible to help the military respond to the crisis and should therefore have foregone the opportunity to stop and talk to another senior official at this time. With the nation in the middle of a massive terrorist attack, every moment was precious and even the smallest delay could have had catastrophic consequences.
<br><br><b>MYERS LEFT HIS 'BATTLE STATION' TO SEARCH FOR RUMSFELD</b>
<br>Myers did at least join Klimow at the River Entrance and go to the NMCC right after he finished talking to Wolfowitz. But why did he subsequently leave the command center almost immediately after he arrived there, simply to go and search for Donald Rumsfeld?
<br><br>The 9/11 Commission pointed out to Myers that the first hour after he reached the NMCC would have been "life or death minutes." [112] There may have been essential tasks that, as acting chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he alone was able to carry out. Searching for Rumsfeld, in contrast, was a relatively trivial undertaking. Furthermore, Myers could have just phoned Rumsfeld's office and asked where Rumsfeld was or sent a junior staffer from the NMCC to look for the secretary of defense. Why did he forego these options?
<br><br>The NMCC is in the basement of the Pentagon and, according to Myers, is "more or less" in "the center portion of the building." [113] It was surely a long walk from there to Rumsfeld's office, on the third floor of the outermost ring of the Pentagon. Myers was consequently away from the NMCC for up to 18 minutes while he went to the office to see if he could find the secretary of defense. During that time, he was presumably unable to do anything in response to the terrorist attacks.
<br><br>The justification Myers gave for leaving the NMCC at this critical time was that he had determined it was acceptable for him to do so since the NMCC's deputy director for operations "was doing a good job of managing the information flow and keeping the chain of command plugged in." [114] But did this excuse him abandoning his post while the nation was under attack? The NMCC was, after all, "the duty station ... when you need to coordinate with lots of people and figure out what's happening," as Myers himself noted. [115] It was where he needed to be.
<br><br>Indeed, Myers has inadvertently acknowledged why he should have stayed in the NMCC at the time. He told the 9/11 Commission his first thought when he reached there was, "What's next?" which implied that he'd recognized that additional attacks could be imminent. [116]
<br><br>"Terrorists had staged major attacks in New York and Washington. Although we did not yet have reliable intelligence on when and where they would strike next, it seemed likely that they would," he wrote. [117] "We didn't know at that time if we were in the middle of a several-day long attack, what kind of attacks could come next, or who and what might be targeted," he commented. [118] If he believed more attacks were likely, Myers surely ought to have stayed in the NMCC so he would be in the best position to respond to them if they occurred.
<br><br>By stopping outside the Pentagon to talk to Wolfowitz and then leaving the NMCC very shortly after arriving there to search for Rumsfeld, Myers appears to have been time-wasting again. By doing so, he delayed getting involved in the military's response to the attacks and may thereby have weakened the military when it was urgently needed, to protect the nation against terrorists.
<br><br><b>MYERS WASTED TIME REFINING THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT</b>
<br>There are questions about the actions of Richard Myers after he returned to the NMCC following his unsuccessful search for Rumsfeld that need to be addressed. In particular, why did the vice chairman spend so much time working on rules of engagement for fighter pilots? After all, Dick Cheney had given the military authority to shoot down hostile aircraft shortly after 10:10 a.m. This authorization was surely adequate for the time being, such that Myers could have focused on other tasks.
<br><br>Even if Myers was unaware of Cheney's action, he himself had established rules of engagement with Ralph Eberhart by 10:30 a.m. Why, then, did he subsequently spend perhaps over two hours refining these rules in collaboration with Rumsfeld, such that they were only approved by the secretary of defense at around 12:40 p.m.?
<br><br>Rules of engagement for fighter pilots were even "the main issue under discussion" during the 11:00 a.m. secure video teleconference Myers participated in that linked the Defense Department's leaders with the rest of the government. There were presumably numerous important subjects that needed to be addressed during the teleconference. Why then did the participants focus on something that had already been adequately dealt with?
<br><br>It appears that in devoting so much time to refining the rules of engagement, Myers was yet again time-wasting. While he directed his attention to this likely unnecessary task, however, he avoided crucial activities, such as protecting America from further attacks that could have occurred at any moment.
<br><br>Indeed, in the middle of refining the rules, Myers inadvertently revealed that he recognized more attacks might happen. Apparently shortly before midday on September 11, as he was leaving the Joint Chiefs of Staff conference room with Rumsfeld following the secure video teleconference, Rumsfeld suddenly stopped and called out to the officers in the NMCC, "Okay everybody, what else can the enemy do?" Myers immediately responded, "NBC," meaning a nuclear, biological, or chemical attack. [119]
<br><br>If Myers thought the terrorists were capable of carrying out something as devastating as an attack involving nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, his priority surely ought to have been preventing further attacks rather than wasting time refining rules of engagement that had already been agreed upon.
<br><br><b>RULES OF ENGAGEMENT WERE NOT PASSED ON TO FIGHTER PILOTS</b>
<br>Another question on this matter is why did Myers fail to issue the rules of engagement he developed with Eberhart once the two men agreed to them, shortly before 10:30 a.m.? Even if he wanted to refine these rules, he could surely have issued them at 10:30 a.m. and then sent out the refined rules once they were completed, with the instruction that they supersede the earlier rules. Instead, as he recalled, in the "initial period"--apparently meaning the first hour after he reached the NMCC--he "did not do anything to ensure that effective rules of engagement were communicated to pilots." [120]
<br><br>Myers and Eberhart have inadvertently made clear the potentially catastrophic consequences of their failure to issue the rules of engagement as soon as they agreed to them. "Clearly, shooting down a civilian airliner with innocent men, women, and children on board was not a good option, but given the circumstances, it was really the only course of action to minimize the death and destruction planned by the hijackers," Myers wrote. [121] But, Eberhart pointed out, "Rules of engagement are only good if those engaged know the rules." And, he said, "No matter what the circumstance, the pilot would look toward his command for an indication of what to do." [122]
<br><br>In other words, if a fighter pilot had received no rules of engagement, was therefore unsure whether they should shoot down suspicious aircraft, and consequently allowed a suspicious aircraft to continue on its course, countless people in addition to the plane's passengers and crew would have been killed if that aircraft subsequently crashed into another target like the World Trade Center or the Pentagon.
<br><br><b>MYERS WASTED TIME RAISING THE DEFENSE READINESS CONDITION</b>
<br>A further issue of concern is Myers's involvement in making the decision and giving the order to raise the defense readiness condition. The defense readiness condition, according to the Department of Defense, is a "uniform system of progressive alert postures for use between the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders of unified and specified commands, and for use by the [armed] services." [123] It can be one of five levels, with the lowest, Defcon 5, representing normal peacetime readiness and the highest, Defcon 1, representing maximum force readiness. [124]
<br><br>Donald Rumsfeld gave the order to raise the defense readiness condition on September 11, according to the <i>9/11 Commission Report</i>. However, Rumsfeld recalled that he discussed the issue with Myers before doing so. "It's a huge move, but it's appropriate," Myers had advised him. [125]
<br><br>Apparently about 10 minutes was spent dealing with the task. The decision to increase the defense readiness condition was announced over the air threat conference at 10:43 a.m. The NMCC's deputy director for operations stated that the "secretary of defense has directed that we go to worldwide Defcon 3," which was an intermediate level that represented an increased state of military readiness. At 10:45 a.m., however, those on the conference call were instructed to "hold off on Defcon 3." But a minute later that instruction was overridden and it was announced that Myers was "directing worldwide Defcon 3." Finally, at 10:52 a.m., an emergency action message was released that directed going to Defcon 3. [126]
<br><br>While the raising of the defense readiness condition on September 11 may appear like a serious attempt to protect the nation, some people have claimed it was unhelpful and possibly counterproductive. Increasing the defense readiness condition was "suited more to a Cold War conflict than to al-Qaeda's attack," some 9/11 Commission staffers commented. [127] John Farmer, the senior counsel to the 9/11 Commission, pointed out that the defense readiness condition was "devised to respond to a nuclear threat." [128] And Ralph Eberhart said Defcon 3 was "not intended for [events like] the attacks of 9/11." He said he thought raising the defense readiness condition would have had no benefits within the continental United States and could in fact have complicated the response to the attacks. [129]
<br><br>If these criticisms were correct, why did Myers devote his time and energy to such an inappropriate task? Was this another instance of him time-wasting and thereby avoiding carrying out actions better suited to the problems at hand?
<br><br><b>MYERS'S APPARENTLY BENEFICIAL ACTION WAS SOMEONE ELSE'S INITIATIVE</b>
<br>There appears to have been one exception to Myers's failure to do anything useful in response to the crisis on September 11 before Flight 93 crashed and the terrorist attacks ended. However, evidence shows that this action was in fact the initiative of someone else, which Myers simply endorsed.
<br><br>At 9:58 a.m., Charles Leidig said over the air threat conference that Myers "recommends evacuating" the Sears Tower in Chicago "based on the flight plan of one of the possible hijacked aircraft." [130] The Sears Tower was then evacuated at around 10:02 a.m. [131] Had a hijacked aircraft subsequently crashed into it, the recommendation to evacuate the tower could have meant countless lives were saved.
<br><br>However, Leidig later revealed that the recommendation was actually made by someone other than Myers. He told the 9/11 Commission that he recalled telling Myers there was a recommendation to evacuate the Sears Tower, and Myers said this was a good idea and the military supported it. [132]
<br><br><b>MYERS ONLY TOOK ACTION TO PROTECT MILITARY FACILITIES AFTER THE ATTACKS ENDED</b>
<br>Richard Myers took a few actions on September 11 that might genuinely have been helpful as part of the nation's response to the terrorist attacks. However, all of them were taken after the attacks ended, too late to influence the outcome of the crisis.
<br><br>The first of these actions was discussing with Donald Rumsfeld raising the force protection condition (FPCON) to the highest level. The force protection condition--known as the terrorist threat condition, or "threatcon," until June 2001--is a "standard for identification of, and recommended responses to, terrorist threats against U.S. personnel and facilities," according to the Department of Defense. [133]
<br><br>It can be one of five levels. The highest level, Delta, means a terrorist attack has occurred or intelligence has been received indicating that action against a specific location is likely. A declaration of FPCON Delta on September 11 would have led to placing more guards on duty at military installations, having all vehicles on installations identified, and having all personnel positively identified, among other things. It would presumably therefore have meant U.S. military facilities were better defended against terrorist attacks.
<br><br>Myers recalled that at some point after he arrived at the NMCC, he "recommended that all American military commands and units worldwide go to [FPCON] Delta." [134] And Rumsfeld recalled that after he arrived at the NMCC, he and Myers "discussed and I recommended raising ... the force protection level." [135] "If terrorists were executing a complex and massive attack ... our isolated naval, air, and ground bases overseas might be especially vulnerable, so raising the threatcon was essential," Myers has commented. [136]
<br><br>It is unclear exactly when the decision to raise the force protection condition was made. It must have been after around 10:30 a.m., since that was when Rumsfeld entered the NMCC, and it was apparently before 10:38 a.m., since at that time Rumsfeld told Dick Cheney over the air threat conference that U.S. forces were "on Threatcon Delta." [137] The decision therefore appears to have been made roughly half an hour after the final hijacked plane--Flight 93--crashed. In other words, it was only made well after the terrorist attacks ended.
<br><br>Furthermore, the decision may have been made in response to prompting by the White House rather than something Myers and Rumsfeld did of their own initiative. As Myers was being driven from Capitol Hill to the Pentagon, Mathew Klimow told him that "the White House advised that the combatant commanders will probably want to increase threatcon as they see fit." [138] It is surely possible that the decision to raise the force protection condition was only made as a result of Myers receiving this information.
<br><br><b>DECONTAMINATION UNITS WERE ONLY SET UP AFTER MIDDAY</b>
<br>Another potentially useful action Myers took was arranging for decontamination units to be set up in case there was an attack involving weapons of mass destruction. However, as with making the decision to raise the force protection condition, he only did this well after the terrorist attacks ended. And, again, his action appears to have been the result of something other than his own initiative. In this case, it came about in response to an off-the-cuff enquiry by Rumsfeld.
<br><br>As previously mentioned, after Rumsfeld asked, "What else can the enemy do?" as he and Myers were leaving the Joint Chiefs of Staff conference room following the 11:00 a.m. secure video teleconference, Myers responded, "NBC," meaning a nuclear, biological, or chemical attack. This interaction apparently prompted Myers to give the order for special decontamination units to be positioned outside Washington and New York, ready to be used if there was a nuclear, biological, or chemical attack against one of these cities.
<br><br>This was surely a sensible thing to do to prepare the nation for possible further acts of terrorism. However, the decontamination units were apparently only set up in the afternoon of September 11 since, in his memoir, Myers placed the question from Rumsfeld that prompted him to take action at just before midday. [139]
<br><br>The exact time when the units were set up is unclear, but it must have been before 6:30 p.m. At that time, the Deputies Committee of the National Security Council held a teleconference during which it was "verified that counter-NBC decontamination units had been called out and deployed, standing by in case al-Qaeda decided to follow up with [weapons of mass destruction] attacks on our cities," Myers wrote. [140] By 6:30 p.m., of course, many hours had passed since the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were attacked, during which a weapons of mass destruction attack could have occurred.
<br><br><b>MYERS PASSED ON AUTHORIZATON FOR A PARTIAL RESERVE CALL-UP</b>
<br>One more potentially useful action Myers took was passing on authorization Rumsfeld had given for a partial call-up of the Air Force Reserves. Those activated included fighter pilots, air tanker crews, and communications specialists. "With the country suddenly at war, we would need all the help we could muster, and much of that help was in the Reserve and National Guard," Myers has commented.
<br><br>The vice chairman's action presumably put the military in a better position to defend the nation against further attacks from the air, should any have occurred. However, like the two actions described above, it was done too late to make a difference to the outcome of the crisis. Myers only passed on Rumsfeld's authorization more than two hours after the attacks ended, following his move to the Executive Support Center at 12:19 p.m. [141]
<br><br>Furthermore, by the time he took this action, U.S. airspace had been cleared of all air traffic except military and emergency flights as a result of the FAA ordering all airborne aircraft to land at the nearest airport, at 9:45 a.m. [142] This meant the danger of further hijackings or attacks from the air had been massively reduced and so the benefits of the partial Reserve call-up were presumably much less than would have been the case if it had been authorized earlier on.
<br><br><b>EXTENSIVE EXPERIENCE MEANT MYERS WAS WELL PREPARED TO HANDLE THE ATTACKS</b>
<br>Close examination of the actions of Richard Myers on September 11 reveals a pattern of negligence. In the most important hours of his military career, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff repeatedly either did nothing or wasted time engaging in unhelpful or unnecessary activities. What was the reason for this?
<br><br>It might be claimed that Myers was simply incompetent. However, this seems unlikely in light of his decades of military experience and considerable accomplishments prior to 9/11. As a fighter pilot, he accumulated over 4,100 flying hours, including 600 hours of combat experience in the Vietnam War. He had also held significant positions in the military. During the 1990s, he served as commander of U.S. forces in Japan and commander of U.S. air forces in the Pacific. And from August 1998 to February 2000 he was commander in chief of NORAD--the military organization responsible for defending U.S. airspace. [143]
<br><br>He clearly possessed skills and experience that should have enabled him to competently respond to the 9/11 attacks. Matthew Klimow noted that his 600 hours of combat experience in Vietnam and his experience as NORAD commander meant Myers "understood the air defense scenario playing out" on September 11. [144] And during a 9/11 Commission hearing on the subject of national defense and crisis management on September 11, 9/11 Commissioner John Lehman pointed out to Myers, "Your service from '98 to 2000 commanding NORAD gives you particular authority in talking about this." [145]
<br><br><b>MYERS QUICKLY INITIATED RETALIATION AGAINST AFGHANISTAN</b>
<br>It is also difficult to attribute Myers's inaction and time-wasting to incompetence since, in contrast to his slow and inadequate response when it came to protecting his country, Myers initiated preparations for military action against Afghanistan in retaliation for the terrorist attacks remarkably quickly. When it came to this task, therefore, he appeared highly competent.
<br><br>At around midday on September 11, Vice Admiral Tom Wilson, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, confirmed to Myers and others in the NMCC that the day's attacks had undoubtedly been committed by al-Qaeda. [146] This prompted Myers and his colleagues to immediately start considering "some sort of response." [147]
<br><br>Myers noted that Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda leadership were in Afghanistan, a country in the area of responsibility of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), which controlled U.S. operations in the Middle East. However, General Tommy Franks, commander in chief of CENTCOM, was out of the country that day, on the Greek island of Crete.
<br><br>Myers therefore set about quickly getting him back to America to prepare a response to the attacks. He told Klimow to contact Franks and "ask him to get back to CENTCOM headquarters in Tampa, Florida, as soon as possible." "I want General Franks to start looking at options for al-Qaeda," he added. [148]
<br><br>Presumably in response to Myers's instructions, Franks spent the evening beginning preparations for the military's response to the terrorist attacks from his hotel in Crete and flew back to America the following day. [149] Reflecting on the instructions for Franks he gave on September 11, Myers agreed that planning for a military response to the 9/11 attacks "began almost immediately." [150]
<br><br><b>WAS MYERS COMPLICIT IN 9/11?</b>
<br>Since incompetence seems an unlikely explanation for Myers's behavior, we surely need to consider more disturbing possibilities. Did Myers perhaps have foreknowledge of what was going to happen on September 11 and also, for unknown reasons, want the terrorist attacks to succeed? If so, his inaction and time-wasting could have been deliberate attempts to impair the U.S. military's ability to respond to the attacks and thereby increase the likelihood that the attacks would be successful.
<br><br>Could Myers have even been involved with planning the 9/11 attacks? If he was, he could have carefully arranged to engage in repeated time-wasting and inaction on September 11 when a fast, competent response would be imperative.
<br><br>The apparently serious negligence of such a key figure during the worst attack on American soil since the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, in December 1941 is surely cause for serious alarm. It is one of the numerous aspects of 9/11 that need to be fully investigated as part of a new and unrestrained investigation of the terrorist attacks.
<br><br><b>NOTES</b>
<br>[1] <a href="https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Biographies/Display/Article/104623/general-richard-b-myers/" target="_blank">"General Richard B. Myers." U.S. Air Force, October 1, 2005</a>; <a href="https://www.chicagotribune.com/chinews-mtblog-2006-03-former_top_us_general_gets_200-story.html" target="_blank">"Former Top U.S. General Gets $200,000-a-Year Board Gig." <i>Chicago Tribune</i>, March 15, 2006</a>; Richard Myers with Malcolm McConnell, <i>Eyes on the Horizon: Serving on the Front Lines of National Security</i>. New York: Threshold Editions, 2009, p. 7.
<br>[2] <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2001/ALLPOLITICS/08/24/bush.defense/index.html" target="_blank">"Bush Nominates Myers as Joint Chiefs Chairman." CNN, August 24, 2001</a>; <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/18/ret.joint.chiefs/" target="_blank">"Pentagon Chiefs' Records Reflect Modern Military." CNN, October 1, 2001</a>.
<br>[3] <a href="https://www.consensus911.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/MSNBC_General_Richard_Myers_9_11_interview.htm" target="_blank">Richard Myers, interview by Jim Miklaszewski. NBC News, September 11, 2002</a>; Hugh Shelton with Ronald Levinson and Malcolm McConnell, <i>Without Hesitation: The Odyssey of an American Warrior</i>. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2010, pp. 430-432.
<br>[4] Richard Myers with Malcolm McConnell, <i>Eyes on the Horizon</i>, p. 10.
<br>[5] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20120113130429if_/http:/data.911workinggroup.org:80/foia/911%20COMMISSION%20REPORT%20DATA%20%28redact%29/5%20AWA%20314%20Package%20Followup%20to%20Commission-FAA%20Staff%20and%20Flight%20Strips%20REDACT.pdf" target="_blank">"9/11 Documentation, Andrews Air Traffic Control Tower." Andrews Air Force Base, September 11, 2001</a>; Richard Myers with Malcolm McConnell, <i>Eyes on the Horizon</i>, p. 159.
<br>[6] Hugh Shelton with Ronald Levinson and Malcolm McConnell, <i>Without Hesitation</i>, p. 432.
<br>[7] <a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GOVMAN-1999-06-01/pdf/GOVMAN-1999-06-01.pdf" target="_blank">Office of the Federal Register/National Archives and Records Administration, <i>The United States Government Manual 1999/2000</i>. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999, p. 178</a>; <a href="https://www.defense.gov/our-story/meet-the-team/" target="_blank">"Our Leaders." U.S. Department of Defense, n.d.</a>
<br>[8] <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_Giambastiani%20Edmund7-18-2002.pdf" target="_blank">Edmund P. Giambastiani Jr., interview by Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron, part II. Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, August 1, 2002</a>; <a href="http://www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing12/9-11Commission_Hearing_2004-06-17.htm" target="_blank">National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: Twelfth Public Hearing. 9/11 Commission, June 17, 2004</a>.
<br>[9] <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20011118060728/http:/www.dtic.mil/jcs/chairman/AFRTS_Interview.htm" target="_blank">"Interview, General Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, With Petty Officer Quinn Lyton, USN." Armed Forces Radio and Television Service, October 17, 2001</a>; <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x-2c7TlV9GQ" target="_blank">Matthew Klimow, "Marshall Center STACS Graduation Speech." Speech, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, August 3, 2012</a>.
<br>[10] <a href="http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0111/20/lkl.00.html" target="_blank">"Larry King Interviews Bob Dole, Max Cleland." <i>Larry King Live</i>, CNN, November 20, 2001</a>; <a href="https://www.consensus911.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/MSNBC_General_Richard_Myers_9_11_interview.htm" target="_blank">Richard Myers, interview by Jim Miklaszewski</a>.
<br>[11] <a href="https://archive.org/details/cnn200109110848-0929" target="_blank">"CNN Sept. 11, 2001, 8:48 a.m.-9:29 a.m." CNN, September 11, 2001</a>; 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States</i>. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004, pp. 4-7.
<br>[12] Richard Myers with Malcolm McConnell, <i>Eyes on the Horizon</i>, pp. 7-8.
<br>[13] <a href="https://www.consensus911.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/MSNBC_General_Richard_Myers_9_11_interview.htm" target="_blank">Richard Myers, interview by Jim Miklaszewski</a>.
<br>[14] Richard Myers with Malcolm McConnell, <i>Eyes on the Horizon</i>, p. 8.
<br>[15] <a href="https://www.cfr.org/event/hbo-history-makers-series-richard-b-myers" target="_blank">"HBO History Makers Series: Richard B. Myers." Council on Foreign Relations, June 29, 2006</a>.
<br>[16] <a href="https://www.spreaker.com/user/10614200/general-richard-b-myers" target="_blank">"General Richard B. Myers." <i>Veterans Chronicles</i>, Radio America, April 14, 2009</a>.
<br>[17] <a href="https://www.cfr.org/event/hbo-history-makers-series-richard-b-myers" target="_blank">"HBO History Makers Series: Richard B. Myers."</a>
<br>[18] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 8.
<br>[19] <a href="https://www.cfr.org/event/hbo-history-makers-series-richard-b-myers" target="_blank">"HBO History Makers Series: Richard B. Myers."</a>
<br>[20] <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/2003/07/03/political-veteran/0c86b425-57eb-4c5e-ad7f-79680f8aa440/" target="_blank">Peter Carlson, "Political Veteran." <i>Washington Post</i>, July 3, 2003</a>.
<br>[21] <a href="http://www.cogsci.uci.edu/~ddhoff/Myers.html" target="_blank">U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services, <i>U.S. Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) Holds Hearing on Nomination of General Richard Myers to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</i>. 107th Cong., 1st sess., September 13, 2001</a>.
<br>[22] Max Cleland with Ben Raines, <i>Heart of a Patriot: How I Found the Courage to Survive Vietnam, Walter Reed, and Karl Rove</i>. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009, p. 170.
<br>[23] Richard Myers with Malcolm McConnell, <i>Eyes on the Horizon</i>, p. 8.
<br>[24] <a href="https://federalnewsnetwork.com/all-news/2009/09/general-richard-myers-on-911/" target="_blank">"General Richard Myers on 9/11." Federal News Network, September 11, 2009</a>.
<br>[25] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170930015536/http:/archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=65286" target="_blank">Jim Garamone, "Former Chairman Myers Recalls 9/11 Pentagon Attack." American Forces Press Service, September 9, 2011</a>.
<br>[26] <a href="https://www.consensus911.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/MSNBC_General_Richard_Myers_9_11_interview.htm" target="_blank">Richard Myers, interview by Jim Miklaszewski</a>.
<br>[27] <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20011118060728/http:/www.dtic.mil/jcs/chairman/AFRTS_Interview.htm" target="_blank">"Interview, General Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, With Petty Officer Quinn Lyton, USN."</a>
<br>[28] <a href="https://www.consensus911.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/MSNBC_General_Richard_Myers_9_11_interview.htm" target="_blank">Richard Myers, interview by Jim Miklaszewski</a>.
<br>[29] Richard Myers with Malcolm McConnell, <i>Eyes on the Horizon</i>, p. 9.
<br>[30] Ibid. p. 8.
<br>[31] <a href="https://www.cfr.org/event/hbo-history-makers-series-richard-b-myers" target="_blank">"HBO History Makers Series: Richard B. Myers."</a>
<br>[32] <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x-2c7TlV9GQ" target="_blank">Matthew Klimow, "Marshall Center STACS Graduation Speech."</a>
<br>[33] <a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/OpaAPI/media/2610387/content/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00788.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With CINC NORAD (Commander in Chief NORAD), General Edward 'Ed' Eberhart." 9/11 Commission, March 1, 2004</a>; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/241754155/2012-042-Larson-Release-Document-12" target="_blank">"Kevin's NORAD HQ Notes: Interview With General Ralph Eberhart." 9/11 Commission, March 1, 2004</a>; 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 465.
<br>[34] Richard Myers with Malcolm McConnell, <i>Eyes on the Horizon</i>, p. 9; <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x-2c7TlV9GQ" target="_blank">Matthew Klimow, "Marshall Center STACS Graduation Speech."</a>
<br>[35] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 37; <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x-2c7TlV9GQ" target="_blank">Matthew Klimow, "Marshall Center STACS Graduation Speech."</a>
<br>[36] However, in his memoir, Myers claimed that he spoke to Eberhart <i>before</i> he was called by Klimow. See Richard Myers with Malcolm McConnell, <i>Eyes on the Horizon</i>, p. 9.
<br>[37] Richard Myers with Malcolm McConnell, <i>Eyes on the Horizon</i>, p. 9.
<br>[38] <a href="https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2012-047-doc4.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview of General Richard Myers." 9/11 Commission, February 17, 2004</a>.
<br>[39] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170930015536/http:/archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=65286" target="_blank">Jim Garamone, "Former Chairman Myers Recalls 9/11 Pentagon Attack."</a>
<br>[40] <a href="http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0109/11/se.07.html" target="_blank">"Government Official Has New Evidence Regarding Hijacked Airlines." <i>Live Event/Special</i>, CNN, September 11, 2001</a>; <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20011202044421/http:/www.newsday.com/ny-usbox132363596sep13.story" target="_blank">Sylvia Adcock, "Voices Reveal 'Problem' on One Doomed Flight." <i>Newsday</i>, September 13, 2001</a>.
<br>[41] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170930015536/http:/archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=65286" target="_blank">Jim Garamone, "Former Chairman Myers Recalls 9/11 Pentagon Attack."</a>
<br>[42] <a href="https://www.cfr.org/event/hbo-history-makers-series-richard-b-myers" target="_blank">"HBO History Makers Series: Richard B. Myers."</a>
<br>[43] <a href="https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2012-047-doc4.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview of General Richard Myers"</a>; <a href="https://www.consensus911.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/MSNBC_General_Richard_Myers_9_11_interview.htm" target="_blank">Richard Myers, interview by Jim Miklaszewski</a>.
<br>[44] Leslie Filson, <i>Air War Over America: Sept. 11 Alters Face of Air Defense Mission</i>. Tyndall Air Force Base, FL: 1st Air Force, 2003, pp. 57, 63; 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, pp. 20, 27.
<br>[45] <a href="https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2012-047-doc4.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview of General Richard Myers."</a>
<br>[46] <a href="https://www.consensus911.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/MSNBC_General_Richard_Myers_9_11_interview.htm" target="_blank">Richard Myers, interview by Jim Miklaszewski</a>.
<br>[47] <a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/OpaAPI/media/2610387/content/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00788.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With CINC NORAD (Commander in Chief NORAD), General Edward 'Ed' Eberhart"</a>; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/241754155/2012-042-Larson-Release-Document-12" target="_blank">"Kevin's NORAD HQ Notes: Interview With General Ralph Eberhart."</a>
<br>[48] <a href="https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2012-047-doc4.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview of General Richard Myers."</a>
<br>[49] <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20011118060728/http:/www.dtic.mil/jcs/chairman/AFRTS_Interview.htm" target="_blank">"Interview, General Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, With Petty Officer Quinn Lyton, USN."</a>
<br>[50] <a href="https://www.spreaker.com/user/10614200/general-richard-b-myers" target="_blank">"General Richard B. Myers."</a>
<br>[51] <a href="https://www.consensus911.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/MSNBC_General_Richard_Myers_9_11_interview.htm" target="_blank">Richard Myers, interview by Jim Miklaszewski</a>.
<br>[52] <a href="https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2012-047-doc4.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview of General Richard Myers."</a>
<br>[53] Richard Myers with Malcolm McConnell, <i>Eyes on the Horizon</i>, p. 9.
<br>[54] Ibid. pp. 9-11; <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x-2c7TlV9GQ" target="_blank">Matthew Klimow, "Marshall Center STACS Graduation Speech."</a>
<br>[55] Richard Myers with Malcolm McConnell, <i>Eyes on the Horizon</i>, pp. 11, 151.
<br>[56] <a href="https://www.consensus911.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/MSNBC_General_Richard_Myers_9_11_interview.htm" target="_blank">Richard Myers, interview by Jim Miklaszewski</a>.
<br>[57] <a href="https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2012-047-doc4.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview of General Richard Myers"</a>; <a href="http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/hearings/hearing12/myers_statement.pdf" target="_blank">"Statement of General Richard Myers, USAF, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States." 9/11 Commission, June 17, 2004</a>.
<br>[58] <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/interviews/wolfowitz.html" target="_blank">Paul Wolfowitz, interview by PBS, <i>Campaign Against Terror</i>. PBS, April 22, 2002</a>; <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20161208054215/http:/archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2594" target="_blank">"Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz Interview With Sam Tannenhaus, Vanity Fair." U.S. Department of Defense, May 9, 2003</a>.
<br>[59] <a href="https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2012-047-doc4.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview of General Richard Myers."</a>
<br>[60] <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x-2c7TlV9GQ" target="_blank">Matthew Klimow, "Marshall Center STACS Graduation Speech."</a>
<br>[61] Ibid.
<br>[62] <a href="http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/hearings/hearing12/myers_statement.pdf" target="_blank">"Statement of General Richard Myers, USAF, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States."</a>
<br>[63] Richard Myers with Malcolm McConnell, <i>Eyes on the Horizon</i>, pp. 151-152; <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x-2c7TlV9GQ" target="_blank">Matthew Klimow, "Marshall Center STACS Graduation Speech."</a>
<br>[64] <a href="https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2012-047-doc4.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview of General Richard Myers."</a>
<br>[65] <a href="https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2012-076-doc1.pdf" target="_blank">Air Threat Conference and DDO Conference, Transcript. U.S. Department of Defense, September 11, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.oredigger61.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Air-Threat-Conference-Call-Hyde.pdf" target="_blank">Air Threat Conference Call, Transcript. U.S. Department of Defense, September 11, 2001</a>.
<br>[66] <a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/OpaAPI/media/2610279/content/arcmedia/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00684.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Captain Charles Joseph Leidig, USN, Commandant of Midshipmen, U.S. Naval Academy." 9/11 Commission, April 29, 2004</a>.
<br>[67] <a href="http://www.cogsci.uci.edu/~ddhoff/Myers.html" target="_blank">U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services, <i>U.S. Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) Holds Hearing on Nomination of General Richard Myers to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</i></a>; Richard Myers with Malcolm McConnell, <i>Eyes on the Horizon</i>, p. 10.
<br>[68] Richard Myers with Malcolm McConnell, <i>Eyes on the Horizon</i>, p. 152.
<br>[69] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 37; Andrew Cockburn, <i>Rumsfeld: His Rise, Fall, and Catastrophic Legacy</i>. New York: Scribner, 2007, pp. 1-2; Alfred Goldberg et al., <i>Pentagon 9/11</i>. Washington, DC: Defense Department, Office of the Secretary, Historical Office, 2007, p. 130.
<br>[70] Richard Myers with Malcolm McConnell, <i>Eyes on the Horizon</i>, pp. 152-153.
<br>[71] Ibid. p. 152.
<br>[72] <a href="https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2012-076-doc1.pdf" target="_blank">Air Threat Conference and DDO Conference, Transcript</a>; <a href="http://www.oredigger61.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Air-Threat-Conference-Call-Hyde.pdf" target="_blank">Air Threat Conference Call, Transcript</a>.
<br>[73] <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x-2c7TlV9GQ" target="_blank">Matthew Klimow, "Marshall Center STACS Graduation Speech."</a>
<br>[74] Garrett M. Graff, <i>The Only Plane in the Sky: An Oral History of 9/11</i>. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2019, p. 236.
<br>[75] <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x-2c7TlV9GQ" target="_blank">Matthew Klimow, "Marshall Center STACS Graduation Speech."</a>
<br>[76] <a href="https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2012-047-doc4.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview of General Richard Myers."</a>
<br>[77] <a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/OpaAPI/media/2610387/content/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00788.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With CINC NORAD (Commander in Chief NORAD), General Edward 'Ed' Eberhart."</a>
<br>[78] <a href="http://www.oredigger61.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Air-Threat-Conference-Call-Hyde.pdf" target="_blank">Air Threat Conference Call, Transcript</a>; 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, pp. 41-42.
<br>[79] Richard Myers with Malcolm McConnell, <i>Eyes on the Horizon</i>, p. 152.
<br>[80] <a href="https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2012-047-doc4.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview of General Richard Myers."</a>
<br>[81] <a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/OpaAPI/media/2610387/content/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00788.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With CINC NORAD (Commander in Chief NORAD), General Edward 'Ed' Eberhart"</a>; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/241754155/2012-042-Larson-Release-Document-12" target="_blank">"Kevin's NORAD HQ Notes: Interview With General Ralph Eberhart."</a>
<br>[82] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, pp. 43-44; Alfred Goldberg et al., <i>Pentagon 9/11</i>, pp. 130-131.
<br>[83] Garrett M. Graff, <i>The Only Plane in the Sky</i>, p. 236.
<br>[84] <a href="http://www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing12/9-11Commission_Hearing_2004-06-17.htm" target="_blank">National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: Twelfth Public Hearing</a>.
<br>[85] Torie Clarke, <i>Lipstick on a Pig: Winning in the No-Spin Era by Someone Who Knows the Game</i>. New York: Free Press, 2006, p. 225.
<br>[86] <a href="https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2012-076-doc1.pdf" target="_blank">Air Threat Conference and DDO Conference, Transcript</a>; 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 43.
<br>[87] <a href="http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/archive/hearing8/9-11Commission_Hearing_2004-03-23.htm" target="_blank">National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: Eighth Public Hearing. 9/11 Commission, March 23, 2004</a>.
<br>[88] Donald Rumsfeld, <i>Known and Unknown: A Memoir</i>. New York: Sentinel, 2011, p. 340.
<br>[89] <a href="https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/hearings/hearing8/rumsfeld_statement.pdf" target="_blank">"Testimony of U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld Prepared for Delivery to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States." 9/11 Commission, March 23, 2004</a>.
<br>[90] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20200926103954/https:/archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2602" target="_blank">"Secretary Rumsfeld Interview With the Washington Post." U.S. Department of Defense, January 9, 2002</a>.
<br>[91] Donald Rumsfeld, <i>Known and Unknown</i>, p. 340.
<br>[92] <a href="https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_WasselJoseph4-9-2003.pdf" target="_blank">Joseph M. Wassel, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron. Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, April 9, 2003</a>.
<br>[93] Richard Myers with Malcolm McConnell, <i>Eyes on the Horizon</i>, p. 155.
<br>[94] Alfred Goldberg et al., <i>Pentagon 9/11</i>, p. 132; Donald Rumsfeld, <i>Known and Unknown</i>, pp. 340-341; Garrett M. Graff, <i>The Only Plane in the Sky</i>, pp. 277-278.
<br>[95] Richard Myers with Malcolm McConnell, <i>Eyes on the Horizon</i>, p. 157.
<br>[96] Torie Clarke, <i>Lipstick on a Pig</i>, p. 225.
<br>[97] Richard Myers with Malcolm McConnell, <i>Eyes on the Horizon</i>, pp. 157-158.
<br>[98] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 465.
<br>[99] Andrew Cockburn, <i>Rumsfeld</i>, p. 7.
<br>[100] <a href="https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2013-002-doc8.pdf" target="_blank">"NEADS AOR Hijack/WMD Scenarios." U.S. Air Force, 2003</a>.
<br>[101] <a href="https://archive.org/stream/implicationsford00unit/implicationsford00unit_djvu.txt" target="_blank">U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services, <i>Implications for the Department of Defense and Military Operations of Proposals to Reorganize the United States Intelligence Community</i>. 108th Cong., 2nd sess., August 17, 2004</a>.
<br>[102] <a href="https://www.cfr.org/event/hbo-history-makers-series-richard-b-myers" target="_blank">"HBO History Makers Series: Richard B. Myers."</a>
<br>[103] <a href="https://www.consensus911.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/MSNBC_General_Richard_Myers_9_11_interview.htm" target="_blank">Richard Myers, interview by Jim Miklaszewski</a>.
<br>[104] <a href="https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2012-047-doc4.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview of General Richard Myers."</a>
<br>[105] <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x-2c7TlV9GQ" target="_blank">Matthew Klimow, "Marshall Center STACS Graduation Speech."</a>
<br>[106] Ibid.
<br>[107] Richard Myers with Malcolm McConnell, <i>Eyes on the Horizon</i>, p. 10.
<br>[108] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170930015536/http:/archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=65286" target="_blank">Jim Garamone, "Former Chairman Myers Recalls 9/11 Pentagon Attack."</a>
<br>[109] <a href="https://www.consensus911.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/MSNBC_General_Richard_Myers_9_11_interview.htm" target="_blank">Richard Myers, interview by Jim Miklaszewski</a>.
<br>[110] Richard Myers with Malcolm McConnell, <i>Eyes on the Horizon</i>, p. 11.
<br>[111] <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20011118060728/http:/www.dtic.mil/jcs/chairman/AFRTS_Interview.htm" target="_blank">"Interview, General Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, With Petty Officer Quinn Lyton, USN."</a>
<br>[112] <a href="https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2012-047-doc4.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview of General Richard Myers."</a>
<br>[113] <a href="https://www.consensus911.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/MSNBC_General_Richard_Myers_9_11_interview.htm" target="_blank">Richard Myers, interview by Jim Miklaszewski</a>.
<br>[114] Richard Myers with Malcolm McConnell, <i>Eyes on the Horizon</i>, p. 152.
<br>[115] <a href="https://www.consensus911.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/MSNBC_General_Richard_Myers_9_11_interview.htm" target="_blank">Richard Myers, interview by Jim Miklaszewski</a>.
<br>[116] <a href="https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2012-047-doc4.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview of General Richard Myers."</a>
<br>[117] Richard Myers with Malcolm McConnell, <i>Eyes on the Horizon</i>, p. 153.
<br>[118] <a href="http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/hearings/hearing12/myers_statement.pdf" target="_blank">"Statement of General Richard Myers, USAF, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States."</a>
<br>[119] Richard Myers with Malcolm McConnell, <i>Eyes on the Horizon</i>, p. 156; <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x-2c7TlV9GQ" target="_blank">Matthew Klimow, "Marshall Center STACS Graduation Speech"</a>; Garrett M. Graff, <i>The Only Plane in the Sky</i>, p. 302.
<br>[120] <a href="https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2012-047-doc4.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview of General Richard Myers."</a>
<br>[121] Richard Myers with Malcolm McConnell, <i>Eyes on the Horizon</i>, p. 157.
<br>[122] <a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/OpaAPI/media/2610387/content/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00788.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With CINC NORAD (Commander in Chief NORAD), General Edward 'Ed' Eberhart."</a>
<br>[123] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20110514000206/http:/www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf" target="_blank"><i>Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms</i>. Washington, DC: Joint Staff, November 8, 2010, as amended through April 15, 2011</a>.
<br>[124] <a href="https://fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/c3i/defcon.htm" target="_blank">"DEFCON DEFense CONdition." Federation of American Scientists, April 29, 1998</a>.
<br>[125] <a href="http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/archive/hearing8/9-11Commission_Hearing_2004-03-23.htm" target="_blank">National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: Eighth Public Hearing</a>; 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 326; Donald Rumsfeld, <i>Known and Unknown</i>, p. 338.
<br>[126] <a href="https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2012-076-doc1.pdf" target="_blank">Air Threat Conference and DDO Conference, Transcript</a>; <a href="http://www.oredigger61.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Air-Threat-Conference-Call-Hyde.pdf" target="_blank">Air Threat Conference Call, Transcript</a>; 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 554.
<br>[127] <a href="http://www.rutgerslawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/special/911/Sept11_Monograph.pdf" target="_blank">John Farmer et al., "A New Type of War: The Story of the FAA and NORAD Response to the September 11, 2001 Attacks." <i>Rutgers Law Review</i>, September 7, 2011</a>.
<br>[128] John Farmer, <i>The Ground Truth: The Untold Story of America Under Attack on 9/11</i>. New York: Riverhead Books, 2009, p. 235.
<br>[129] <a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/OpaAPI/media/2610387/content/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00788.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With CINC NORAD (Commander in Chief NORAD), General Edward 'Ed' Eberhart."</a>
<br>[130] <a href="https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2012-076-doc1.pdf" target="_blank">Air Threat Conference and DDO Conference, Transcript</a>; <a href="http://www.oredigger61.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Air-Threat-Conference-Call-Hyde.pdf" target="_blank">Air Threat Conference Call, Transcript</a>.
<br>[131] <a href="https://archive.org/details/cnn200109110929-1011" target="_blank">"CNN Sept. 11, 2001, 9:29 a.m.-10:11 a.m." CNN, September 11, 2001</a>; <a href="http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0109/11/bn.05.html" target="_blank">"Terrorists Attacks in Both Washington, DC, and New York." <i>Breaking News</i>, CNN, September 11, 2001</a>.
<br>[132] <a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/OpaAPI/media/2610279/content/arcmedia/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00684.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Captain Charles Joseph Leidig, USN, Commandant of Midshipmen, U.S. Naval Academy."</a>
<br>[133] <a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2002-jan-22-mn-24148-story.html" target="_blank">William M. Arkin, "Building up a False Sense of Security?" <i>Los Angeles Times</i>, January 22, 2002</a>; <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20110514000206/http:/www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf" target="_blank"><i>Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms</i></a>.
<br>[134] <a href="https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2001/09/what-is-threatcon-delta.html" target="_blank">"What is Threatcon Delta?" Slate, September 12, 2001</a>; Richard Myers with Malcolm McConnell, <i>Eyes on the Horizon</i>, p. 153.
<br>[135] <a href="http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/archive/hearing8/9-11Commission_Hearing_2004-03-23.htm" target="_blank">National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: Eighth Public Hearing</a>.
<br>[136] Richard Myers with Malcolm McConnell, <i>Eyes on the Horizon</i>, p. 10.
<br>[137] <a href="https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2012-076-doc1.pdf" target="_blank">Air Threat Conference and DDO Conference, Transcript</a>; <a href="http://www.oredigger61.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Air-Threat-Conference-Call-Hyde.pdf" target="_blank">Air Threat Conference Call, Transcript</a>.
<br>[138] Richard Myers with Malcolm McConnell, <i>Eyes on the Horizon</i>, p. 10.
<br>[139] Ibid. p. 156; <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x-2c7TlV9GQ" target="_blank">Matthew Klimow, "Marshall Center STACS Graduation Speech."</a>
<br>[140] Richard Myers with Malcolm McConnell, <i>Eyes on the Horizon</i>, p. 160.
<br>[141] Ibid. p. 157; Donald Rumsfeld, <i>Known and Unknown</i>, p. 342.
<br>[142] <a href="http://avalon.law.yale.edu/sept11/garvey_001.asp" target="_blank">U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, <i>Statement of Jane F. Garvey, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration, Before the House Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure</i>. 107th Cong., 1st sess., September 21, 2001</a>; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/18663534/T8-B19-HQ-FAA-2-of-3-Fdr-FAA-Historian-Chronology-9-11-01-to-4-15-02" target="_blank">"Chronology of the Attacks of September 11, 2001, and Subsequent Events." Federal Aviation Administration, April 15, 2002</a>; <a href="https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/sept11/2002-08-12-atc_x.htm" target="_blank">Alan Levin, "For Air Traffic Controllers, a Historic Achievement." <i>USA Today</i>, August 12, 2002</a>.
<br>[143] <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/25/us/man-in-the-news-a-low-key-space-buff-richard-bowman-myers.html" target="_blank">James Dao, "A Low-Key Space Buff: Richard Bowman Myers." <i>New York Times</i>, August 25, 2001</a>; <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/18/ret.joint.chiefs/" target="_blank">"Pentagon Chiefs' Records Reflect Modern Military"</a>; <a href="https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Biographies/Display/Article/104623/general-richard-b-myers/" target="_blank">"General Richard B. Myers."</a>
<br>[144] <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x-2c7TlV9GQ" target="_blank">Matthew Klimow, "Marshall Center STACS Graduation Speech."</a>
<br>[145] <a href="http://www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing12/9-11Commission_Hearing_2004-06-17.htm" target="_blank">National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: Twelfth Public Hearing</a>.
<br>[146] Richard Myers with Malcolm McConnell, <i>Eyes on the Horizon</i>, p. 156.
<br>[147] <a href="https://www.consensus911.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/MSNBC_General_Richard_Myers_9_11_interview.htm" target="_blank">Richard Myers, interview by Jim Miklaszewski</a>.
<br>[148] Richard Myers with Malcolm McConnell, <i>Eyes on the Horizon</i>, p. 156.
<br>[149] Tommy Franks with Malcolm McConnell, <i>American Soldier</i>. New York: HarperCollins, 2004, pp. 243, 247-248.
<br>[150] <a href="https://www.consensus911.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/MSNBC_General_Richard_Myers_9_11_interview.htm" target="_blank">Richard Myers, interview by Jim Miklaszewski</a>.
Shoestringhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01534319150672667644noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2990970741097819876.post-84837998607830764202019-12-08T01:14:00.000-08:002019-12-08T01:14:41.497-08:00The Strange Story of Daniel Lewin, the First Victim of the 9/11 Attacks<br><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhdvTGXga_XAJx6b3A3l4gRdpU0kT5NspedSlnP2FDnUQtdx3no5461nIn_HeveWYAgl-jOI326Vg-QY25LvkigLfQPIJpuk9IMfFdLJUgc8XT6wO_inbA7MINAYCGDH4ixQjVQLgaq33jj/s1600/WTC_North_Tower.jpg" target="_blank" alt="The North Tower of the World Trade Center" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhdvTGXga_XAJx6b3A3l4gRdpU0kT5NspedSlnP2FDnUQtdx3no5461nIn_HeveWYAgl-jOI326Vg-QY25LvkigLfQPIJpuk9IMfFdLJUgc8XT6wO_inbA7MINAYCGDH4ixQjVQLgaq33jj/s1600/WTC_North_Tower.jpg" data-original-width="300" data-original-height="196" /></a></div><br>Daniel Lewin is believed to have been the first person killed in the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001. The 31-year-old from Brookline, Massachusetts, was a passenger on American Airlines Flight 11, the first plane to be hijacked that day. He was reportedly murdered by Satam al Suqami, one of the alleged hijackers, while the terrorists were taking over his plane.
<br><br>Even before September 11, though, Lewin had secured his place in history. He was unusually intelligent and talented, and had excelled as a soldier, a student, and a businessman. Examination of his story, however, reveals many anomalies, contradictions, and odd coincidences that deserve scrutiny.
<br><br>The official story of how he was killed is certainly suspicious. Lewin was very strong and had served in the Israeli military as a member of an elite counterterrorism unit. Al Suqami, in contrast, was short and thin, and had no military experience. And yet he supposedly took Lewin down with just a knife. Furthermore, Lewin was supposedly not originally going to be on Flight 11 on September 11. He was reportedly meant to fly to Los Angeles a day earlier but changed his plans so he could help take care of some issues at his company's headquarters.
<br><br>It also seems odd that the first person to die in the 9/11 attacks--perhaps the most significant event of the 21st century--was an important figure in his own right, even before he became a key player in the events of September 11. Although he was little known among the general public, Lewin was a highly successful Internet entrepreneur. In 1998, he co-founded the pioneering technology company Akamai. Akamai's product utilized algorithms that Lewin helped devise, which could manage Web traffic in a way that was significantly faster and more efficient than existing methods.
<br><br>He helped build the company from scratch to one that, by 9/11, employed about 1,500 people. Its success meant Lewin was, for a time, a billionaire and the technology he helped develop revolutionized how content was delivered over the Internet.
<br><br>It has been suggested that, had he not been killed on September 11, Lewin could have become a household name, someone like Bill Gates or Steve Jobs. Some people even believed he would have gone into politics and could have become prime minister of Israel.
<br><br>Certain aspects of Lewin's life seem unusual in light of the fact that Lewin was the first person killed in the 9/11 attacks. For example, while he was in the military, Lewin reportedly became committed to the cause of "wiping out terrorism." This means the first victim of America's worst terrorist attack, who may have died while trying to stop the hijackers on his plane, happened to be a man who was dedicated to stopping terrorists.
<br><br>Furthermore, in the years before he died, Lewin acted as if he foresaw the 9/11 attacks or at least something on the scale of 9/11. He told people that a "cataclysmic event" would occur, during which people would turn to the Internet for information.
<br><br>Of particular note, considering that Lewin died in a terrorist attack, is that just two months before 9/11, his company was visited out of the blue by the White House chief of counterterrorism. Richard Clarke went to Akamai to employ it to protect the White House website from an imminent attack by a computer virus.
<br><br>And yet, while Lewin was the first person to be killed in the 9/11 attacks and an exceptional individual, surprisingly little attention has been paid to his story. Author Molly Knight Raskin explained how this lack of attention compelled her to write a book about him. "The more I heard about Danny," she said, "the more I wondered, 'Why hasn't this story ever been told before?'" She commented that "in all of those stories of September 11th, 2001," she had "never heard anything about him." [1]
<br><br>Lewin's story is certainly remarkable. But parts of it indicate that there may be more to what happened on September 11 than we have been led to believe and so it requires close scrutiny.
<br><br><b>LEWIN WAS KILLED WHILE FLIGHT 11 WAS BEING HIJACKED</b>
<br>Daniel Lewin, according to the official narrative of 9/11, was killed on the morning of September 11, 2001, when five Middle Eastern men armed with knives attempted to take control of Flight 11. He had his throat slashed by Satam al Suqami, one of the hijackers. [2]
<br><br>Lewin was traveling on the 7:45 a.m. flight from Boston to Los Angeles--a trip he had frequently taken over the past year--on behalf of Akamai. He was going to California to sign a major business deal that he hoped would save his company, which was at the time struggling as a result of the previous year's dot-com crash. He was also set to attend the Credit Suisse First Boston Software Conference while he was in California. [3]
<br><br>He was in seat 9B, in the business class section near the front of the plane. [4] Two of the alleged hijackers, Mohamed Atta and Abdul Aziz al Omari, were in the row of seats in front of his while al Suqami was in seat 10B, directly behind him. [5]
<br><br>At 8:14 a.m. or shortly after, it is believed, the five hijackers on Flight 11 rose from their seats and began their takeover of the plane. In the course of doing this, al Suqami killed Lewin. Flight 11 crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center at 8:46 a.m. Everyone on board and many people in the tower were killed in the crash. [6]
<br><br><b>FLIGHT ATTENDANT SAID LEWIN HAD HIS THROAT SLASHED</b>
<br>Details of what supposedly happened to Lewin were described by two flight attendants, Betty Ong and Amy Sweeney, in phone calls they made from the rear of Flight 11 to authorities on the ground.
<br><br>Ong reached the American Airlines Southeastern Reservations Office in Cary, North Carolina, at 8:18 a.m. and, apparently describing what had happened to Lewin, reported, "Somebody's stabbed in business class." [7] Later during the call she said other flight attendants had told her "that a passenger by the name of Daniel Lewin may have been fatally wounded." [8]
<br><br>Sweeney relayed details of the hijacking to personnel at the American Airlines flight services office at Logan International Airport in Boston in a series of calls beginning at 8:25 a.m. Presumably describing what happened to Lewin, she reported that "a passenger in row 9 ... had their throat cut by a passenger in seat 10B." She said the passenger whose throat had been cut was "bleeding severely" and was "not going to make it." [9]
<br><br>Ong and Sweeney never mentioned whether Lewin was wounded in the course of trying to stop the hijacking. The 9/11 Commission, created by Congress to investigate the 9/11 attacks, tentatively concluded that he "may have made an attempt to stop the hijackers in front of him, not realizing that another was sitting behind him." [10]
<br><br>But friends and relatives of his were certain that he would have tried to stop the hijackers. Many of them who were interviewed by Molly Knight Raskin for the book she wrote about him said that in light of his "physical strength, counterterrorism training, and fighting spirit," there was "no way Lewin could have sat idly by and watched terrorists hurt flight attendants and attempt to hijack the plane."
<br><br>"Knowing his character and his training, we know that he got up and tried to do something," Marco Greenberg, one of Lewin's closest friends, commented. [11] "He wasn't one to sit passively by and see something bad happening and not try to get up and do something about it. It was in his nature to be a hero," one of his brothers said. [12]
<br><br><b>LEWIN WAS HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL</b>
<br>While Lewin may be remembered simply as the first victim of the 9/11 attacks, even before September 11 his life was remarkable. The son of a psychiatrist and a pediatrician, he was born in Denver, Colorado, in May 1970 and grew up in a large house there. [13] When he was 14, though, he moved with his family to Israel.
<br><br>At the age of 18, he joined the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), but after serving in the military for about four years, he left to study for degrees in math and engineering at the Israel Institute of Technology--better known as the Technion--in Haifa. [14]
<br><br>After graduating, he successfully applied to study at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), a prestigious private research university in Cambridge, Massachusetts. He consequently moved back to the U.S. in fall 1996 to study for a Ph.D. in applied math. [15]
<br><br>He quickly established himself as a top student at MIT, and co-authored several papers on algorithms and complexity theory while he was there. [16] Significantly, Lewin and his professor, Tom Leighton, devised a way to handle Internet congestion that would speed up the delivery of content and make websites feel faster. [17] The algorithms they came up with became the foundation of Akamai, the company the two men set up in August 1998. [18]
<br><br>Akamai established a network of servers around the world. This network could rewrite the addresses of its customers' Web pages and ensure fast access to them by providing the information requested by Internet users via any of the company's servers that were available, instead of via congested servers. [19] Its product, called FreeFlow, thereby enabled customers' Web pages and online applications to load faster and more reliably. [20]
<br><br>FreeFlow was marketed as the "world's largest fault-tolerant network for distributing Web content." [21] Alan Edelman, an associate professor of applied mathematics at MIT, described it as "something like a limousine service that guarantees a short ride no matter what the traffic conditions." [22]
<br><br>Akamai became a great success in the late 1990s Internet boom. It quickly signed up a healthy number of clients, thereby ensuring it millions of dollars in revenue, and Lewin and Leighton soon became wealthy men. [23] <i>Wired</i> magazine commented in August 1999 that "in less than a year, the little-known company is well on its way toward global domination." [24]
<br><br><b>STORY OF HOW LEWIN DIED IS SUSPICIOUS</b>
<br>Lewin's story, however, includes many anomalies. The official account of how Lewin died on Flight 11 is especially hard to believe.
<br><br>To begin with, Lewin would have been a tough adversary for anyone who took him on. He was, in the words of Lior Netzer, who served with him in the IDF, "a very strong guy." [25] He was 5 feet 10 inches tall and, according to Molly Knight Raskin, "built like a bull--burly and broad-shouldered, sheer muscle from head to toe." [26]
<br><br>As a teenager, he regularly went to a gym in Jerusalem where he trained intensely. His strength increased so much that by the age of 16 he could bench-press more than 300 pounds. He was even crowned "Mr. Teenage Israel" after winning a coveted bodybuilding competition. [27]
<br><br><b>LEWIN SERVED IN 'THE MOST EFFECTIVE COUNTERTERRORISM FORCE IN THE WORLD'</b>
<br>Lewin then gained around four years of military experience after joining the Israel Defense Forces when he was 18. [28] Notably, considering that he was supposedly killed by a terrorist, he served in the IDF's elite Sayeret Matkal. This unit was described by <i>Vanity Fair</i> as "the most effective counterterrorism force in the world." Its members have "almost unmatched counterterrorism skills," according to Raskin.
<br><br>Lewin must have been highly regarded to be accepted into it. The Sayeret Matkal includes only about 200 full-time commandos and so getting in is rare, even for the best soldiers. Out of the thousands who apply at any one time, following two grueling test camps, only 20 to 40 men are selected. The fact that Lewin made it into the unit was particularly impressive considering that, according to Raskin, "for soldiers who were not Israeli-born, recruitment to Sayeret Matkal was almost unheard of."
<br><br>Those who make it into the unit undergo nearly two years of intense training. This includes a course in counterterrorism in which they learn to storm planes and rescue hostages, and lessons in hand-to-hand combat. [29] Such training would surely have given Lewin a significant advantage against the hijackers on Flight 11. Indeed, it was reported that he had the skills to kill a terrorist "with a pen or a credit card, or just his bare hands." [30]
<br><br>As well as having advanced combat skills, Lewin spoke some Arabic. He may consequently have picked up on the hijackers' intentions if he heard them discussing their plans to hijack Flight 11 in this language and might therefore have been able to come up with a strategy for stopping them when they attempted to take over the plane. [31]
<br><br>Lewin appears to have excelled in the Sayeret Matkal since, after three years in the unit, he was promoted to the rank of captain. [32] Brad Rephen, who knew him as a teenager, commented on his success, saying: "About 2,500 guys try out for the unit he was in. Twenty-five make it and one gets chosen as an officer. It was him." [33]
<br><br><b>LEWIN'S ALLEGED KILLER WAS SHORT AND SKINNY</b>
<br>Incredibly, considering his strength and military experience, Lewin was supposedly killed by a man who appears to have been quite feeble, someone he should have taken down with ease.
<br><br>Satam al Suqami, a 25-year-old from Saudi Arabia, was just 5 feet 7 inches tall. [34] Like the other terrorists tasked with storming the cockpits and controlling the passengers rather than flying the hijacked planes on September 11--ironically referred to as the "muscle hijackers"--he was "slender in build" and "not physically imposing," according to the 9/11 Commission. [35]
<br><br>A CIA report on the alleged 9/11 hijackers portrayed him as an unimpressive man. He came from a broken family, the report stated, and had little education. He had worked as a security guard for a hospital and only got involved with extremists two years before 9/11, in 1999. He was also unconcerned with religion, according to members of his family, was known to drink alcohol, possibly having a drinking problem, and may have taken drugs. [36]
<br><br>However, London's <i>Sunday Times</i> reported that an investigation of the backgrounds of the alleged 9/11 hijackers found him to be a very different man. The investigation found that al Suqami came from a wealthy family, was intelligent and educated, and graduated in law at King Saud University in Riyadh. [37]
<br><br>While these accounts appear to be describing two different men, neither of them described someone who would likely have made a particularly dangerous terrorist. However, a CIA report about al-Qaeda's camps in Afghanistan claimed that al Suqami received some training that would have helped prepare him for the events of September 11. It stated that he attended Khaldan, a large facility near Kabul, where he received basic training in fields such as firearms, heavy weapons, explosives, and topography. It also claimed that the "muscle hijackers," which included al Suqami, "engaged in months-long, daily, intensive instruction, which included martial arts."
<br><br>How the CIA determined this and how reliable the claims are is unclear. The report stated that the information came from "a variety of intelligence reporting" but provided no further details. [38]
<br><br>In fact, the young Saudi's behavior after he arrived in the U.S. in April 2001 seems inconsistent with the actions of a trained warrior preparing for the most important battle of his life. Al Suqami checked in at the Body Perfect Fitness Center, a gym in Lake Worth, Florida, on a number of occasions in June and July of 2001, and then purchased a one-month membership for the World Gym in Boynton Beach, Florida. He and other hijackers who joined gyms around this time "may have been told to go get as strong as they could get in case of body conflict or a fight," Jim Woolard, who owned the World Gym in Boynton Beach, surmised. [39]
<br><br>However, trainers observed that al Suqami and two other alleged hijackers who attended the World Gym with him "did not appear to know how to use the equipment" there. They "simply clustered around the machines, never pushing any weights," according to the <i>New York Times</i>. "They would just stand around and watch," trainer Joe Farnoly recalled. [40]
<br><br>Would such an unremarkable man as Satam al Suqami really have been capable of killing Daniel Lewin? Certainly, people who knew Lewin appeared to be highly skeptical of the official story of how the entrepreneur was killed. "Those of us who knew him well can't figure out how only five terrorists managed to overpower him," Tom Leighton commented. [41]
<br><br>"With his training, he would have killed [the hijackers] with his bare hands," Brad Rephen said. Lewin "knew how to fight with knives and take knives away from people," he explained, and "would have taken [the hijackers'] knives or their box cutters away and used them against them." [42] "I'd be surprised if he didn't kill one or two of the terrorists before he went down," Marco Greenberg remarked. [43]
<br><br><b>FLIGHT ATTENDANTS WHO DESCRIBED LEWIN'S DEATH GAVE CONFLICTING INFORMATION</b>
<br>There are other oddities in the evidence relating to Lewin's death, in addition to the reports that such a tough man as Lewin was killed by a short, skinny hijacker armed only with a knife.
<br><br>For example, the two flight attendants who described what had happened to Lewin contradicted each other over a notable detail during their phone calls to authorities on the ground. Amy Sweeney mentioned that Lewin was being cared for by a doctor and a nurse. [44] But when Betty Ong was asked, "Is there a doctor on board ... that's assisting you guys?" she said there were no doctors on Flight 11.
<br><br>Furthermore, both flight attendants, independently of each other, initially said incorrectly that they were on "Flight 12" in their calls. When Ong reached the American Airlines Southeastern Reservations Office, Winston Sadler, the resolution agent there, asked her, "Which flight are you on?" and she replied, "Flight 12." She gave the correct information, though, about a minute later. When Sadler asked, "What is your name?" she replied: "My name is Betty Ong. I'm number three [flight attendant] on Flight 11." She also immediately corrected Sadler when he subsequently told a supervisor that Ong was on Flight 12. "No, we're on Flight 11 right now; this is Flight 11," she said. [45]
<br><br>And when Sweeney made her first successful call to the American Airlines flight services office at Logan International Airport, she told the employee who answered that two flight attendants had been stabbed on Flight 12. American Airlines Flight 12 was in fact a flight from Los Angeles to Boston that had not yet taken off. [46]
<br><br><b>EVIDENCE SUGGESTED LEWIN HAD BEEN SHOT</b>
<br>Another anomaly is that some evidence indicated Lewin was shot, although investigations found that this scenario was highly improbable and he was most likely killed with a knife.
<br><br>The first indication of a shooting on Lewin's plane was received by the operations center at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) headquarters in Washington, DC, at 8:44 a.m. on September 11. In a conference call with the FAA's New England Regional Operations Center, it heard that a passenger on Flight 11 had been shot. [47]
<br><br>Another indication of a shooting occurred about 35 minutes later. At that time, Janet Riffe, the FAA's principal security inspector for American Airlines, was reportedly told by Suzanne Clark, a manager of corporate security at American Airlines, that a passenger on Flight 11 had been shot dead. [48]
<br><br>Riffe, who was working at FAA headquarters and had been receiving information about the hijacking of Flight 11, called American Airlines headquarters in Fort Worth, Texas, at 9:20 a.m. for a status update. [49] Her usual point of contact at the airline was a manager of corporate security called Chris Bidwell, but he was away from his office and so her call was passed on to Clark. [50]
<br><br>During the call, according to Riffe, Clark said one of the flight attendants on Flight 11 had contacted the American Airlines System Operations Control center and reported that the passenger in seat 10B--i.e. Satam al Suqami--had shot and killed the passenger in seat 9B--i.e. Daniel Lewin. Just one bullet had been fired, she reportedly said. [51]
<br><br>Following the call, Riffe filled out an event sheet, describing what Clark had told her. The details she wrote down were subsequently entered into a log and the information in the log was included in a memo prepared by FAA headquarters personnel early that evening. [52]
<br><br><b>INVESTIGATIONS REFUTED THE CLAIM THAT LEWIN WAS SHOT</b>
<br>Various agencies, though, later determined that it was highly unlikely that Lewin was shot. When the memo that described the alleged shooting was leaked to the press in 2002, FAA and FBI officials said the report of a gun being used on Flight 11 was a mistake. The FAA said the memo was just a first draft. FAA spokeswoman Laura Brown said the erroneous information in it was the result of "a miscommunication" and the error was corrected later in the evening of September 11. [53]
<br><br>When the General Accounting Office (GAO) conducted a comprehensive investigation of the alleged shooting, the American Airlines personnel it interviewed all denied reporting to anyone that a shooting had occurred on any of the aircraft hijacked on September 11. The GAO concluded that there was "no information to corroborate a shooting on American Airlines Flight 11." [54]
<br><br>The 9/11 Commission also investigated whether a shooting occurred on Flight 11 and came to the same conclusion. It pointed out that the only possible sources of authoritative reports that a gun was fired on Flight 11 were the phone calls made from the plane by Amy Sweeney and Betty Ong. But, it noted, there were no mentions of a gun or a shooting in the tape recordings of these calls or the accounts of participants and witnesses to the calls. It also pointed out that while investigators found evidence of the alleged hijackers purchasing numerous knives in the period before September 11, "there was no evidence that they purchased or possessed firearms." [55]
<br><br>Strangely, Clark denied that the alleged phone call in which she supposedly told Riffe about the shooting took place. When she was interviewed by the 9/11 Commission, she "unequivocally stated that she never made a report about a gun being used on Flight 11 on 9/11 or subsequently because she never had such information." She said she didn't remember talking with Riffe on September 11. She also said she didn't recall receiving any information about the weapons or tactics used on Flight 11 and only learned the seat numbers of the hijackers on the day after 9/11, thereby implying that she would have been unable to provide the information she supposedly gave to Riffe. [56]
<br><br><b>LEWIN WAS ORIGINALLY GOING TO FLY TO LOS ANGELES ON THE DAY BEFORE 9/11</b>
<br>There are other anomalies in the story of Daniel Lewin besides those relating to the hijacking of Flight 11 and his death. To begin with, Lewin was reportedly not originally meant to be flying to Los Angeles on September 11. George Conrades, Akamai's CEO, Tim Weller, the company's chief financial officer, and Steven Wolfe Pereira, the director of corporate strategy, flew from Boston to Los Angeles on September 10, 2001, to give a presentation at the Credit Suisse First Boston Software Conference on the morning of September 11. "Danny Lewin was supposed to be on our flight," Pereira claimed.
<br><br>But according to Pereira, "There was something going on back at the office and--typical Danny--he said he would help take care of it." Lewin told his colleagues to "just go" and said he would meet them in Los Angeles. [57] If he had stuck with his original plans, therefore, he would have avoided being on Flight 11 and still been alive on September 12.
<br><br>Lewin even rejected the request of some of his colleagues to cancel his trip so he could help them deal with the effects of the previous year's dot-com crash. Akamai was at the time faced with the difficult task of laying off hundreds of its workers. Consequently, on September 10, he called a meeting for some of his employees in which he proposed a new vision for the company.
<br><br>At the end of the meeting, the attendees tried to convince him to cancel his trip to Los Angeles the following day, and stay with them to help with the layoffs and restructuring of the firm. Lewin appeared to be considering their suggestion but decided to stick to his schedule. "You guys will be fine," he said. [58]
<br><br><b>LEWIN PREDICTED A 'CATACLYSMIC EVENT'</b>
<br>Curiously, in the years before 9/11, Lewin repeatedly talked about some kind of major catastrophe occurring in the future. It was as if he foresaw the event in which he would die.
<br><br>He "talked about a time when there would be some cataclysmic event that would cause people to turn to the Internet for information," Molly Knight Raskin said. This event would "cause phone lines to go down" and "interrupt what then were more commonly used forms of communication." [59] Since 1998, he "had called attention to the unpredictable nature of news, foreseeing a time when technology rooted in his algorithms would have the power to keep the Internet alive under an extraordinary crush of traffic," Raskin wrote. [60]
<br><br>When he visited CNN to try and gain the television network as a customer, he attempted to sell it Akamai's services with the argument that "CNN could one day see a news event so huge that no amount of servers or bandwidth could handle it." Internet users "would turn to CNN, which billed itself 'the most trusted name in news,' only to find blank or skeletal Web pages." [61]
<br><br>The day when the "cataclysmic event" Lewin talked of occurred "really was September 11th," Raskin commented. [62] That day, like in the scenario Lewin warned of, CNN's website experienced trouble because so many people visited it for information and the increase in traffic actually forced it offline between 9:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. CNN eventually had to contact Akamai and employ it to help keep the site running. [63]
<br><br><b>COUNTERTERRORISM CHIEF VISITED AKAMAI SHORTLY BEFORE 9/11</b>
<br>An especially notable oddity considering that Lewin was killed in America's worst terrorist attack is that, just two months before 9/11, his company was unexpectedly visited by the White House chief of counterterrorism. Richard Clarke approached Akamai to request its help in protecting the White House website from a predicted attack by a computer virus called Code Red.
<br><br>Code Red was created to conduct a "distributed denial of service" attack. This kind of attack involves thousands of compromised computers targeting a website or server at the same time, thus causing it to overload and become unavailable. [64] The virus was designed to specifically target the White House infrastructure on the Internet by bombarding the White House Web server with data, thereby shutting it down for hours or even days. [65]
<br><br>Clarke became concerned when, in July 2001, he learned that 300,000 computers infected with Code Red were about to attack the White House's website. [66] To address the threat, he approached Akamai for help, even though he had never dealt with the company before and it had no previous experience of doing cybersecurity work. He turned up at its headquarters in Cambridge and, Tom Leighton recalled, said that "there was going to be a massive attack on the White House Internet infrastructure ... and he believed that [Akamai] could help him." [67]
<br><br>Akamai agreed to provide the support that Clarke requested and when the Code Red virus struck on July 19, it was able to stop the attack by deflecting the requests that threatened to overload the White House website's server to Akamai servers around the world. [68]
<br><br>Clarke presumably talked to Lewin when he visited Akamai since, as its chief technology officer, Lewin "effectively ran the company," according to Lior Netzer, who worked at Akamai at the time. [69] Ironically, just weeks later, the two men were key figures in the events of September 11. While Lewin was the first victim of the hijackings, Clarke was in the White House Situation Room when America was under attack and played a major role in coordinating the government's response to the crisis.
<br><br><b>LEWIN WAS ESPECIALLY TALENTED</b>
<br>It is also curious that the first person killed in such a major historical event as 9/11 was an important historical figure, albeit little known for what he had achieved. Daniel Lewin was in fact an unusually talented and successful man.
<br><br>"In purely objective terms, Danny was an extraordinary human being," Marco Greenberg commented. [70] The entrepreneur was "exceptionally smart," according to Leighton. [71] Todd Dagres, who met Lewin when he was studying at MIT, described him as "intellectually brilliant" and "creatively brilliant." [72]
<br><br>Even as a child, Lewin had "seemingly limitless talents," Molly Knight Raskin noted. He had such a beautiful singing voice that he was given leading roles in the musicals staged at his synagogue and he was also an extremely gifted violinist. At school, he excelled academically and in athletics. [73] He could "outrun and outplay all of his classmates on the sports field," according to Raskin. [74] Micah Lakin Avni, who was friends with him as a teenager, described Lewin as "smarter, stronger, more driven, more charismatic, and more energetic than anyone that I have ever met." [75]
<br><br><b>LEWIN EXCELLED AT UNIVERSITY</b>
<br>As previously mentioned, Lewin excelled in the Israel Defense Forces, becoming one of only a small number of recruits to be accepted into the Sayeret Matkal and then being promoted to the rank of captain in the elite unit.
<br><br>His achievements continued after he left the military. The first university he attended--the Technion--is Israel's premier technology university. And in 1995, it named him the year's outstanding student in computer engineering. [76] While he was studying there, he also worked at IBM's research laboratory in Haifa and helped develop the Genesys system, a processor verification tool that was used widely at IBM and other companies. He graduated from the Technion with highest honors. [77]
<br><br>Then, in 1996, he applied to study at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology on one of the top 10 computer science programs in the United States. [78] That year, only 100 out of over 2,000 applicants were accepted into the elite Laboratory for Computer Science at MIT and only five of these joined the theory group run by Tom Leighton, a professor of applied mathematics who was one of the world's leading authorities on algorithms for computing. Lewin was one of these five people. [79]
<br><br>Leighton noted that, upon commencing his studies at MIT, Lewin soon stood out for his intellectual brilliance and his uninhibited personality. [80] In 1998, he was one of just a few MIT students to be awarded the Morris Joseph Levin Award for the Best MasterWorks Oral Thesis Presentation, for a paper he delivered in May that year. [81]
<br><br><b>LEWIN BECAME A BILLIONAIRE</b>
<br>His biggest achievements, though, were with Akamai. With his work at the company, Lewin established himself as "one of the Internet generation's chief innovators," according to the <i>Jerusalem Post</i>, and by 2001, Leighton noted, he "was widely recognized as one of the most influential technologists of his generation." [82]
<br><br>Akamai's rise to success was rapid and the company quickly gained some major customers. By June 1999, less than a year after it was established, these included 20 of the most popular websites, such as CNN Interactive, the <i>New York Times</i>, and Yahoo! [83] Earlier that year, Akamai was even contacted by Steve Jobs, the renowned co-founder of Apple Computers, who said he wanted to buy the company. (It declined his offer.) [84] And by the time Lewin died, just three years after it was established, Akamai employed 1,500 people. [85]
<br><br>The company's initial public offering in October 1999 was particularly successful. On the first day of trading, Akamai shares increased in value by 458 percent, the fourth biggest climb ever for an IPO. Lewin was then, on paper, worth more than $1.8 billion. The Israeli newspaper <i>Haaretz</i> called him "one of the richest Israelis in the world." [86]
<br><br>Lewin received recognition for his success at Akamai. In April 2001, <i>Forbes</i> magazine placed him at number 72 in its annual list of "100 Highest Rollers," which comprised the highest earners working in information technology. [87] And in July 2001, <i>Enterprise Systems</i> magazine placed him seventh in its "Power 100" list of leaders in information technology. [88]
<br><br>Akamai's success continued after Lewin died. By 2013, the company regularly controlled between 15 and 30 percent of the world's Internet traffic, and delivered content for such well-known companies as Facebook, Twitter, and Apple's iTunes. It had offices around the world and over 3,500 employees. But its core technology still relied on the algorithms created by Lewin and Leighton. [89] The impact of Lewin's work, Leighton commented in 2002, "will be felt throughout the high-tech industry for many years to come." [90]
<br><br><b>LEWIN WAS CONSIDERED A POTENTIAL FUTURE ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER</b>
<br>In light of how much he achieved by the age of 31, people have wondered what else Lewin would have accomplished if he had not died on September 11. CNN suggested that "he could have become a high-tech household name, like Bill Gates or Steve Jobs." [91] Others concurred. "There was talk that he would be Bill Gates' successor," Gil Rudawsky, a childhood friends of Lewin's, wrote. [92] Writer and content strategist Craig Playstead, who worked for Akamai from 1999 to 2001, commented: "There's no doubt in my mind that Danny Lewin would have gone down in the same breath as the tech titans of today if he were still around. [Mark] Zuckerberg, the Google twins [Larry Page and Sergey Brin], [Bill] Gates, the list goes on. He was in that league." [93]
<br><br>Some people said he would have moved on to a career in politics. "Danny always thought that he might like to come back [to Israel] and enter Israeli politics, and influence the political situation," his brother Jonathan commented. [94] It has even been suggested that he was a possible future prime minister.
<br><br>Indeed, one of his dreams was to become prime minister of Israel. When his friend Micah Lakin Avni visited him in 2000, Lewin said that "eventually he would return to Israel, we would set up a political party, and he would become prime minister." He said he would "spend hundreds of millions of dollars of [his] own money on the election campaign" and would "win an absolute majority in [the] Knesset." Avni believed Lewin could have achieved his goal. "I have no doubt that if he had not been murdered on 9/11, Danny would have eventually returned to Israel and he would have become prime minister," he opined. [95]
<br><br><b>STORY OF LEWIN'S DEATH INCLUDES CONTRADICTIONS</b>
<br>It is curious that the first person to die in such an unprecedented event as 9/11 was a man with such a unique and remarkable life story. There are aspects of this story, however, that need to be investigated.
<br><br>Certainly, the official story of how Daniel Lewin was murdered seems highly unlikely and ought to be examined more closely than has so far been the case. Could Satam al Suqami really have killed Lewin? Lewin should have easily fought him off. He was bigger and surely far stronger than the young Saudi, and must have had vastly superior fighting skills.
<br><br>But if the official story of what happened to Lewin on Flight 11 is false, what really happened to the young entrepreneur? How did evidence revealing an incorrect story about his death come about and how was it possible for this story to be accepted as true?
<br><br>Specific anomalies ought to be probed. These include the apparently false evidence that Lewin was shot rather than killed with a knife. The 9/11 Commission commented that it found it "troubling" that FAA security inspector Janet Riffe said American Airlines manager Suzanne Clark told her Lewin had been shot but Clark denied doing so. "This discrepancy is a problem that we should at least try to resolve if we can," it stated. However, it is unclear whether the 9/11 Commission ever got to the bottom of the issue. [96]
<br><br>Additionally, why did Betty Ong and Amy Sweeney initially state incorrectly that they were on "Flight 12," not Flight 11, in their calls from the hijacked plane? Would two experienced flight attendants both make an error over such a rudimentary detail?
<br><br>And why did Ong and Sweeney contradict each other over whether Lewin was being treated by a doctor, with Sweeney saying he was being cared for by a doctor and a nurse while Ong said there were no doctors on the plane? Sweeney said she was sitting next to Ong when she was making her calls and so the two women should have been receiving details of what was happening on the plane from the same sources. [97] How then could they have given authorities on the ground conflicting information about this issue?
<br><br>The calls made by Ong and Sweeney were the only sources for the official story of Lewin's death, and so it is concerning that they contain these blatant anomalies. Was there more to them than the official story of 9/11 suggests? If there was, can the account of what happened to Lewin provided by the two flight attendants be believed?
<br><br><b>LEWIN WAS COMMITTED TO 'WIPING OUT TERRORISM'</b>
<br>There are other parts of Lewin's story, in addition to the details of what happened to Lewin on Flight 11, that are curious. Whether these are significant in relation to the events of September 11 is unknown. All the same, they could be worth investigating, in case scrutiny of them reveals them to indeed be relevant.
<br><br>Lewin's membership in Israel's Sayeret Matkal is surely notable. It seems an incredible coincidence that the man who was reportedly the first victim of America's worst terrorist attack had served in "the most effective counterterrorism force in the world," whose members have "almost unmatched counterterrorism skills."
<br><br>Was it also just a coincidence that a man who is believed to have died while trying to protect the people on Flight 11 against terrorists had previously dedicated himself to the cause of "wiping out terrorism"? "As a soldier he believed that it was his job to risk his life to fight against people who were trying to do evil in the world," Lewin's brother, Jonathan, said. Jonathan Lewin added that Daniel Lewin believed that "the way to address terrorism was not to sit idly by and let innocent people be killed, but to actively go out and cut the head off the stick." [98]
<br><br>And was there any particular reason why Lewin told people that a "cataclysmic event that would cause people to turn to the Internet for information" would occur? Was his prediction of a catastrophic event, which turned out to be accurate, simply the result of good judgment or did he have at least some degree of foreknowledge of 9/11, or a disaster on the scale of it?
<br><br><b>COUNTERTERRORISM CHIEF LIKELY MET LEWIN BEFORE 9/11</b>
<br>An incident that should certainly be looked into is the visit made by White House counterterrorism chief Richard Clarke to Akamai in July 2001. Clarke's decision to request the company's help with protecting the White House website from the Code Red virus seems an odd choice. Tom Leighton suggested that his reason for approaching Akamai was that he had "figured out that we had a large edge network with a large number of servers close to where the users were and where the attacking bots were," and he "felt that if the traffic was directed through us, that the network had enough capacity to filter out the attack and protect the core." [99]
<br><br>However, Clarke surely ought to have sought help from a company with extensive experience in cybersecurity when the White House faced such a major threat. Indeed, the distributed denial of service attack that was subsequently caused by Code Red was "of such proportions that some feared parts of the Internet would shut down, unable to cope with the unprecedented flood of data," according to CNET News. Before it began on July 19, 2001, "Many thought the massive influx of data could slow parts of the Internet to a crawl." [100] Why then did Clarke approach a company with no experience in cybersecurity work?
<br><br>His decision to go to Akamai for assistance was also strange since he'd reportedly had no previous contact with the company. "We did not know him, but he somehow knew us," Leighton commented. [101] Surely, considering the seriousness of the threat, he should have gone to a company he had dealt with before and so knew from his own experience was reliable?
<br><br>If Lewin talked to Clarke when the counterterrorism chief visited Akamai, as seems likely, it would mean two men who played key roles when America was attacked on September 11 met each other, apparently for the first time, just two months before the attacks occurred. For this to happen due to chance would have been an incredible coincidence.
<br><br>It is therefore worth considering if there was an ulterior motive behind Clarke's visit to Akamai. Were there reasons, besides the threat of the Code Red virus, for it? And was this really the first time Clarke contacted Akamai or had he met at least some of its executives--perhaps including Lewin--before?
<br><br><b>LEWIN'S STORY RECEIVED LITTLE ATTENTION</b>
<br>It is curious that the first person to die during such an important and historical event as 9/11 happened to be unusually talented and successful. Was this a coincidence or is there more to it?
<br><br>There are probably numerous possible nefarious reasons why such a scenario could have occurred. As just one example, people involved with planning 9/11 may have wanted the first victim of the attacks to be a particularly well-regarded person so as to increase the amount of outrage the attacks would cause. They selected Lewin for this unfortunate role because they determined he was someone who stood out from the crowd and would therefore be particularly missed. (Indeed, a memorial service for him at MIT was attended by over 1,000 people. [102]) They then found a way to ensure he would take Flight 11 on September 11.
<br><br>Something that may support this possibility is the claim that Lewin was only on the doomed flight because of a change of schedule. As previously mentioned, he was originally meant to fly to Los Angeles with some other Akamai executives on September 10, according to one of his colleagues. [103] Although he supposedly took a later flight so he could deal with some issues at Akamai headquarters, it is surely possible that there was a different as yet unknown reason for his change of plans.
<br><br>But while Lewin was an exceptional man, relatively little attention has been paid to his extraordinary and fascinating life story, including his key role in the events of September 11. Molly Knight Raskin said she was astonished that many years after 9/11 she had been unaware of the story of the first victim of the attacks. "I lived in New York City on September 11th, 2001 ... and I was just really surprised that in all of the stories that came out of that day, I had never heard his," she commented.
<br><br>She was also surprised that Lewin had achieved so much in his short life. "When I heard Danny's story, my first response was: 'This can't be true. This person cannot possibly have accomplished all this by such a young age,'" she recalled. [104] She remarked that as a journalist she knew from experience that Lewin's story was something that was "begging to be told" and so ought to have been reported extensively. [105]
<br><br>Might the lack of attention have come about because authorities feared that awareness of suspicious aspects of it could have caused people to start wondering whether there was more to the events of September 11 than the official narrative of 9/11 suggests? In particular, greater attention to Lewin's story could have led people to question the dubious official account of how Lewin was murdered.
<br><br>Daniel Lewin's story should surely receive more attention. While Lewin deserves recognition for his considerable achievements, investigation of aspects of his life might reveal important new details about 9/11, which could increase our knowledge of what really happened on September 11 and who was responsible for the terrorist attacks that day.
<br><br><b>NOTES</b>
<br>[1] <a href="https://www.rebeccacosta.com/show-may-8-2014-molly-knight-raskin-215.htm" target="_blank">"Molly Knight Raskin." <i>Costa Report</i>, Genesis Communications Network, May 5, 2014</a>.
<br>[2] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States</i>. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004, pp. 4-6; <a href="https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=484625" target="_blank"><i>Staff Report: The Four Flights</i>. 9/11 Commission, August 26, 2004, p. 8</a>.
<br>[3] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/18775561/T7-B10-FBI-302s-Homer-Fdr-302s-Re-Daniel-Lewin-357" target="_blank">Anne E. Lewin, interview by the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation, September 18, 2001</a>; <a href="https://medium.com/@wolfepereira/the-day-after-eb525683b555" target="_blank">Steven Wolfe Pereira, "The Day After." Medium, September 12, 2016</a>; Mitchell Zuckoff, <i>Fall and Rise: The Story of 9/11</i>. New York: HarperCollins, 2019, pp. 38-39.
<br>[4] <a href="https://www.pressreader.com/israel/jerusalem-post/20160912/281642484626236" target="_blank">David Brinn, "A Model Life and a Heroic Death." <i>Jerusalem Post</i>, September 8, 2011</a>; <a href="https://nypost.com/2011/09/11/the-eleventh-day/" target="_blank">Anthony Summers, "The Eleventh Day." <i>New York Post</i>, September 11, 2011</a>.
<br>[5] <a href="https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=484625" target="_blank"><i>Staff Report: The Four Flights</i>, pp. 6, 8</a>; Molly Knight Raskin, <i>No Better Time: The Brief, Remarkable Life of Danny Lewin, the Genius Who Transformed the Internet</i>. Boston, MA: Da Capo Press, 2013, p. 203; <a href="https://www.psychologytoday.com/gb/articles/201309/the-genius-who-perished-flight-11" target="_blank">Molly Knight Raskin, "The Genius Who Perished on Flight 11." <i>Psychology Today</i>, September 2, 2013</a>.
<br>[6] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, pp. 4-5, 7; Molly Knight Raskin, <i>No Better Time</i>, pp. 202-203.
<br>[7] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/13499778/T7-B13-AA-Phone-Transcripts-Fdr-AA-11-Calls-Kean-Commission-Transcripts" target="_blank">"Transcripts of 9/11 Telephone Calls: Betty Ong to Vanessa Minter, Winston Sadler, and Nydia Gonzalez (AA Raleigh Reservations Office)." American Airlines, September 11, 2001</a>; <a href="https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=484625" target="_blank"><i>Staff Report: The Four Flights</i>, p. 8</a>.
<br>[8] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/14094215/T7-B17-FBI-302s-of-Interest-Flight-11-Fdr-Entire-Contents" target="_blank">Nydia E. Gonzalez, interview by the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation, September 12, 2001</a>; <a href="https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=484625" target="_blank"><i>Staff Report: The Four Flights</i>, p. 12</a>.
<br>[9] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/14094215/T7-B17-FBI-302s-of-Interest-Flight-11-Fdr-Entire-Contents" target="_blank">Evelyn Nunez, interview by the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation, September 11, 2001</a>; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/18775594/T7-B10-FBI-302s-Olsen-Fdr-302s-Re-Michael-Woodward-372" target="_blank">Michael Woodward, interview by the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation, September 11, 2001</a>; <a href="https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=484625" target="_blank"><i>Staff Report: The Four Flights</i>, pp. 10-11</a>.
<br>[10] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 5.
<br>[11] Molly Knight Raskin, <i>No Better Time</i>, pp. 218-219.
<br>[12] <a href="https://www.pressreader.com/israel/jerusalem-post/20160912/281642484626236" target="_blank">David Brinn, "A Model Life and a Heroic Death."</a>
<br>[13] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/18775561/T7-B10-FBI-302s-Homer-Fdr-302s-Re-Daniel-Lewin-357" target="_blank">Anne E. Lewin, interview by the FBI</a>; Molly Knight Raskin, <i>No Better Time</i>, pp. 4, 25.
<br>[14] Molly Knight Raskin, <i>No Better Time</i>, p. 4; <a href="https://www.psychologytoday.com/gb/articles/201309/the-genius-who-perished-flight-11" target="_blank">Molly Knight Raskin, "The Genius Who Perished on Flight 11"</a>; <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2013/09/09/tech/innovation/danny-lewin-9-11-akamai/" target="_blank">Todd Leopold, "The Legacy of Danny Lewin, the First Man to Die on 9/11." CNN, September 11, 2013</a>; <a href="https://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/144090/fighting-genius-on-flight-11" target="_blank">Liel Leibovitz, "Remembering Tech Titan Danny Lewin, the Fighting Genius on Flight 11." <i>Tablet</i>, September 11, 2013</a>.
<br>[15] <a href="https://www.pressreader.com/israel/jerusalem-post/20160912/281642484626236" target="_blank">David Brinn, "A Model Life and a Heroic Death"</a>; <a href="https://www.psychologytoday.com/gb/articles/201309/the-genius-who-perished-flight-11" target="_blank">Molly Knight Raskin, "The Genius Who Perished on Flight 11."</a>
<br>[16] <a href="https://www.sigact.org/prizes/student/remarks.html" target="_blank">Tom Leighton, "Remarks Made by Tom Leighton to Commemorate the Naming of the STOC Best Student Paper Award in Honor of the Late Daniel Lewin." Speech, Montreal, Canada, May 19, 2002. ACM Special Interest Group on Algorithms and Computation Theory</a>.
<br>[17] Molly Knight Raskin, <i>No Better Time</i>, pp. 113-114; <a href="https://www.psychologytoday.com/gb/articles/201309/the-genius-who-perished-flight-11" target="_blank">Molly Knight Raskin, "The Genius Who Perished on Flight 11"</a>; <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/peterhigh/2019/03/25/akamai-ceo-on-the-companys-push-toward-cybersecurity/" target="_blank">Peter High, "Akamai CEO on the Company's Push Toward Cybersecurity." <i>Forbes</i>, March 25, 2019</a>.
<br>[18] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20140214203449/https:/www.theguardian.com/september11/story/0,11209,601127,00.html" target="_blank">Jack Schofield, "Daniel Lewin." <i>The Guardian</i>, September 15, 2001</a>; <a href="https://www.pressreader.com/israel/jerusalem-post/20160912/281642484626236" target="_blank">David Brinn, "A Model Life and a Heroic Death"</a>; <a href="https://www.psychologytoday.com/gb/articles/201309/the-genius-who-perished-flight-11" target="_blank">Molly Knight Raskin, "The Genius Who Perished on Flight 11."</a>
<br>[19] <a href="https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-380897" target="_blank">Ronny Lifschitz, "Daniel Lewin--Akamai: Outstanding Student." <i>Israel's Business Arena</i>, December 22, 1999</a>.
<br>[20] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20060206030759/http:/money.cnn.com/magazines/business2/business2_archive/2005/07/01/8265489/index.htm" target="_blank">Bridget Finn, "A Star is Reborn." <i>Business 2.0</i>, July 2005</a>.
<br>[21] <a href="https://gilbane.com/1999/01/mit-akamai-plan-a-faster-way-to-distribute-content-over-the-web/" target="_blank">"MIT and Akamai Plan a Faster Way to Distribute Content Over the Web." <i>Gilbane Advisor</i>, January 13, 1999</a>.
<br>[22] <a href="https://archive.siam.org/pdf/news/790.pdf" target="_blank">Alan Edelman, "Akamai Technologies: A Mathematical Success Story." <i>SIAM News</i>, December 1999</a>.
<br>[23] <a href="https://www.forbes.com/1999/06/18/feat.html" target="_blank">Regina Joseph, "Aloha Akamai." <i>Forbes</i>, June 18, 1999</a>; <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20000302193028/http:/www.akamai.com/news/press010500.html" target="_blank">Akamai, "Akamai Doubles Customer Base to 200 in Six Weeks." News release, January 5, 2000</a>; <a href="https://www.pressreader.com/israel/jerusalem-post/20160912/281642484626236" target="_blank">David Brinn, "A Model Life and a Heroic Death."</a>
<br>[24] <a href="https://www.wired.com/1999/08/akamai/" target="_blank">Paul Spinrad, "The New Cool." <i>Wired</i>, August 1999</a>.
<br>[25] <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/1.5208698" target="_blank">Judy Maltz, "He Went Down Fighting." <i>Haaretz</i>, November 11, 2001</a>.
<br>[26] Molly Knight Raskin, <i>No Better Time</i>, p. 5.
<br>[27] Ibid. pp. 30-31; <a href="https://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/144090/fighting-genius-on-flight-11" target="_blank">Liel Leibovitz, "Remembering Tech Titan Danny Lewin, the Fighting Genius on Flight 11."</a>
<br>[28] <a href="https://www.chicagotribune.com/ct-xpm-2001-09-17-0109170085-story" target="_blank">"Lewin." <i>Chicago Tribune</i>, September 17, 2001</a>; Molly Knight Raskin, <i>No Better Time</i>, p. 4.
<br>[29] <a href="https://www.vanityfair.com/culture/2001/12/israeli-counterterrorism-200112" target="_blank">Rich Cohen, "Stealth Warriors." <i>Vanity Fair</i>, December 2001</a>; Molly Knight Raskin, <i>No Better Time</i>, pp. 34-36, 38.
<br>[30] <a href="https://www.wnd.com/2002/03/13281/" target="_blank">Paul Sperry, "Lewin: Flight 11's Unsung Hero?" WorldNetDaily, March 27, 2002</a>.
<br>[31] <a href="https://www.psychologytoday.com/gb/articles/201309/the-genius-who-perished-flight-11" target="_blank">Molly Knight Raskin, "The Genius Who Perished on Flight 11"</a>; <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2013/09/09/tech/innovation/danny-lewin-9-11-akamai/" target="_blank">Todd Leopold, "The Legacy of Danny Lewin, the First Man to Die on 9/11."</a>
<br>[32] <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/1.5208698" target="_blank">Judy Maltz, "He Went Down Fighting"</a>; Molly Knight Raskin, <i>No Better Time</i>, p. 37.
<br>[33] <a href="https://www.wnd.com/2002/03/13281/" target="_blank">Paul Sperry, "Lewin: Flight 11's Unsung Hero?"</a>
<br>[34] <a href="https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/368989/2003-06-01-11-september-the-plot-and-the.pdf" target="_blank"><i>11 September: The Plot and the Plotters</i>. Central Intelligence Agency, June 1, 2003, p. 36</a>.
<br>[35] <a href="http://www.9-11commission.gov/staff_statements/staff_statement_16.pdf" target="_blank">"Staff Statement No. 16: Outline of the 9/11 Plot." 9/11 Commission, June 16, 2004</a>.
<br>[36] <a href="https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/368989/2003-06-01-11-september-the-plot-and-the.pdf" target="_blank"><i>11 September: The Plot and the Plotters</i>, pp. 28, 36</a>; 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 232.
<br>[37] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20011103100832/http:/www.sunday-times.co.uk/news/pages/sti/2001/10/28/stiusausa02023.html" target="_blank">"Hijackers Were From Wealthy Saudi Families." <i>Sunday Times</i>, October 28, 2001</a>.
<br>[38] <a href="https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/369179/2003-06-20-afghanistan-camps-central-to-11.pdf" target="_blank"><i>Afghanistan Camps Central to 11 September Plot: Can Al-Qa'ida Train on the Run?</i> Central Intelligence Agency, June 20, 2003, pp. 2-3</a>; 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 234.
<br>[39] <a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2001-sep-20-mn-47840-story.html" target="_blank">Richard A. Serrano and John-Thor Dahlburg, "Officials Told of 'Major Assault' Plans." <i>Los Angeles Times</i>, September 20, 2001</a>; <a href="https://vault.fbi.gov/9-11%20Commission%20Report/9-11-chronology-part-02-of-02/" target="_blank">"Hijackers Timeline (Redacted), Part 2." Federal Bureau of Investigation, November 14, 2003</a>.
<br>[40] <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/23/us/nation-challenged-plot-unpolished-secret-agents-were-able-hide-plain-sight.html" target="_blank">Tim Golden and Michael Moss, "Unpolished Secret Agents Were Able to Hide in Plain Sight." <i>New York Times</i>, September 23, 2001</a>; <a href="https://www.toledoblade.com/news/World/2001/09/30/Terror-sprouts-in-Florida-sun/stories/200109300040" target="_blank">Michael D. Sallah, "Terror Sprouts in Florida Sun." <i>Toledo Blade</i>, September 30, 2001</a>.
<br>[41] <a href="https://www.sigact.org/prizes/student/remarks.html" target="_blank">Tom Leighton, "Remarks Made by Tom Leighton to Commemorate the Naming of the STOC Best Student Paper Award in Honor of the Late Daniel Lewin"</a>; <a href="https://www.pressreader.com/israel/jerusalem-post/20160912/281642484626236" target="_blank">David Brinn, "A Model Life and a Heroic Death."</a>
<br>[42] <a href="https://www.wnd.com/2002/03/13281/" target="_blank">Paul Sperry, "Lewin: Flight 11's Unsung Hero?"</a>
<br>[43] <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/1.5208698" target="_blank">Judy Maltz, "He Went Down Fighting."</a>
<br>[44] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/18775594/T7-B10-FBI-302s-Olsen-Fdr-302s-Re-Michael-Woodward-372" target="_blank">James Sayer, interview by the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation, September 11, 2001</a>; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/18775594/T7-B10-FBI-302s-Olsen-Fdr-302s-Re-Michael-Woodward-372" target="_blank">Michael Woodward, interview by the FBI</a>.
<br>[45] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/13499778/T7-B13-AA-Phone-Transcripts-Fdr-AA-11-Calls-Kean-Commission-Transcripts" target="_blank">"Transcripts of 9/11 Telephone Calls: Betty Ong to Vanessa Minter, Winston Sadler, and Nydia Gonzalez (AA Raleigh Reservations Office)"</a>; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/13499802/T7-B13-Flight-Call-Notes-and-302s-Folder-Entire-Contents" target="_blank">Vanessa Dias Minter, interview by the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation, September 12, 2001</a>.
<br>[46] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/14094215/T7-B17-FBI-302s-of-Interest-Flight-11-Fdr-Entire-Contents" target="_blank">Evelyn Nunez, interview by the FBI</a>; <a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/OpaAPI/media/2609599/content/arcmedia/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00013.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Michael Woodward, American Airlines Flight Service Manager on September 11, 2001." 9/11 Commission, January 25, 2004</a>; <a href="https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=484625" target="_blank"><i>Staff Report: The Four Flights</i>, p. 10</a>.
<br>[47] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/14354204/T8-B18-HQ-FAA-1-of-3-Fdr-ADA30-Operations-Center-Activity-Report-Pgs-112-of-13-078" target="_blank">"ADA-30 Operations Center Activity Report, September 11-14, 2001." Federal Aviation Administration, September 2001</a>; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/13723754/T7-B16-Flight-11-Gun-Story-Fdr-GAO-Briefing-on-Flight-11-Shooting-Story" target="_blank">"Briefing Flight AA 11." United States General Accounting Office, August 30, 2002</a>.
<br>[48] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/13723755/T7-B16-Flight-11-Gun-Story-Fdr-Letter-to-Commission-From-Author-of-Exec-Summary-Re-AA-11-Shooting-Story-Plus-Exec-Summary-and-LA-Times-ABC-Re-Amy-Sw" target="_blank">"Executive Summary: September 11, 2001." Federal Aviation Administration, September 11, 2001</a>; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/13723754/T7-B16-Flight-11-Gun-Story-Fdr-GAO-Briefing-on-Flight-11-Shooting-Story" target="_blank">"Briefing Flight AA 11"</a>; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/18886685/T7-B16-Flight-11-Gun-Story-Fdr-Zelikow-Facts-v-Fiction-Email-Notes-Paperclipped-See-Alt-Version-T7-B7" target="_blank">Team 7, "Facts vs. Fiction." E-mail to Philip Zelikow, 9/11 Commission, n.d.</a>
<br>[49] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/13723754/T7-B16-Flight-11-Gun-Story-Fdr-GAO-Briefing-on-Flight-11-Shooting-Story" target="_blank">"Briefing Flight AA 11"</a>; <a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/OpaAPI/media/2610582/content/arcmedia/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00983.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Phone Call With Janet Riffe, FAA's Principal Security Inspector Assigned to American Airlines on 9/11." 9/11 Commission, September 11, 2003</a>; <a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/OpaAPI/media/2610582/content/arcmedia/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00983.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Janet Riffe, FAA Principal Security Inspector for American Airlines." 9/11 Commission, February 26, 2004</a>.
<br>[50] <a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/OpaAPI/media/2610582/content/arcmedia/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00983.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Phone Call With Janet Riffe, FAA's Principal Security Inspector Assigned to American Airlines on 9/11"</a>; <a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/OpaAPI/media/2609593/content/arcmedia/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00007.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Suzanne Clark, American Airlines Employee." 9/11 Commission, November 18, 2003</a>.
<br>[51] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/13723755/T7-B16-Flight-11-Gun-Story-Fdr-Letter-to-Commission-From-Author-of-Exec-Summary-Re-AA-11-Shooting-Story-Plus-Exec-Summary-and-LA-Times-ABC-Re-Amy-Sw" target="_blank">"Executive Summary: September 11, 2001."</a>
<br>[52] <a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/OpaAPI/media/2610582/content/arcmedia/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00983.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Phone Call With Janet Riffe, FAA's Principal Security Inspector Assigned to American Airlines on 9/11"</a>; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/13911361/T8-B6-FAA-HQ-Fran-Lozito-Fdr-Typed-Interview-Notes-FAA-286" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Frances Lozito." 9/11 Commission, May 11, 2004</a>; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/18886685/T7-B16-Flight-11-Gun-Story-Fdr-Zelikow-Facts-v-Fiction-Email-Notes-Paperclipped-See-Alt-Version-T7-B7" target="_blank">Team 7, "Facts vs. Fiction."</a>
<br>[53] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20020309120929/http:/story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/usatoday/20020228/pl_usatoday/3901389" target="_blank">Blake Morrison, "9/11 Group Troubled by Gun Report." <i>USA Today</i>, February 27, 2002</a>; <a href="https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2002-03-03-0203030399-story.html" target="_blank">Dan Eggen, "Airports Screened Nine of Sept. 11 Hijackers, Officials Say." <i>Washington Post</i>, March 2, 2002</a>; <a href="https://www.upi.com/Defense-News/2002/03/06/UPI-hears/87441015437383/" target="_blank">"UPI Hears ..." United Press International, March 6, 2002</a>.
<br>[54] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/13723754/T7-B16-Flight-11-Gun-Story-Fdr-GAO-Briefing-on-Flight-11-Shooting-Story" target="_blank">"Briefing Flight AA 11."</a>
<br>[55] <a href="https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=484625" target="_blank"><i>Staff Report: The Four Flights</i>, pp. 16-17</a>.
<br>[56] <a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/OpaAPI/media/2609593/content/arcmedia/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00007.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Suzanne Clark, American Airlines Employee."</a>
<br>[57] <a href="https://medium.com/@wolfepereira/the-day-after-eb525683b555" target="_blank">Steven Wolfe Pereira, "The Day After."</a>
<br>[58] Molly Knight Raskin, <i>No Better Time</i>, pp. 199-200.
<br>[59] <a href="http://www.internethistorypodcast.com/2014/12/the-brief-remarkable-life-of-danny-lewin-co-founder-of-akamai-technologies/" target="_blank">Brian McCullough, "The Brief, Remarkable Life of Danny Lewin, Co-Founder of Akamai Technologies." <i>Internet History Podcast</i>, podcast audio, December 8, 2014</a>.
<br>[60] Molly Knight Raskin, <i>No Better Time</i>, p. 210.
<br>[61] Ibid. p. 132.
<br>[62] <a href="http://www.internethistorypodcast.com/2014/12/the-brief-remarkable-life-of-danny-lewin-co-founder-of-akamai-technologies/" target="_blank">Brian McCullough, "The Brief, Remarkable Life of Danny Lewin, Co-Founder of Akamai Technologies."</a>
<br>[63] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20011021020834/http:/www.nwfusion.com/news/2001/0917attacks.html" target="_blank">"Internet, Telecom Networks Put to Test in Wake of Terrorist Strikes on U.S." <i>Network World</i>, September 17, 2001</a>; Molly Knight Raskin, <i>No Better Time</i>, pp. 211-212; <a href="https://jewishreviewofbooks.com/articles/610/scaling-the-internet/" target="_blank">Amy Newman Smith, "Scaling the Internet." <i>Jewish Review of Books</i>, Winter 2014</a>.
<br>[64] <a href="https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/code-red-worm-assault-on/" target="_blank">Carolyn Meinel, "Code Red: Worm Assault on the Web." <i>Scientific American</i>, October 28, 2002</a>; <a href="https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/the-raffles-conversation/internets-gatekeeper" target="_blank">Amit Roy Choudhury, "Internet's Gatekeeper." <i>Business Times</i>, September 24, 2016</a>.
<br>[65] <a href="https://www.bizjournals.com/twincities/stories/2001/08/27/focus1.html" target="_blank">Mark Reilly, "Code Red Wreaks Havoc." <i>Minneapolis/St. Paul Business Journal</i>, August 26, 2001</a>; <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/peterhigh/2019/03/25/akamai-ceo-on-the-companys-push-toward-cybersecurity/" target="_blank">Peter High, "Akamai CEO on the Company's Push Toward Cybersecurity."</a>
<br>[66] <a href="https://www.forbes.com/forbes/2010/0426/opinions-cyberwar-internet-security-nsa-ideas-opinions.html" target="_blank">Andy Greenberg, "Weapons of Mass Disruption." <i>Forbes</i>, April 8, 2010</a>.
<br>[67] <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/peterhigh/2019/03/25/akamai-ceo-on-the-companys-push-toward-cybersecurity/" target="_blank">Peter High, "Akamai CEO on the Company's Push Toward Cybersecurity."</a>
<br>[68] <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2001/aug/31/viruses.security" target="_blank">Sarah Left, "Code Red Virus Traced to China." <i>The Guardian</i>, August 31, 2001</a>; <a href="https://www.forbes.com/forbes/2010/0719/technology-security-hacking-firewall-foiling-hackers.html" target="_blank">Andy Greenberg, "Akamai: Funneling Bits, Foiling Hackers." <i>Forbes</i>, July 1, 2010</a>.
<br>[69] <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/1.5208698" target="_blank">Judy Maltz, "He Went Down Fighting."</a>
<br>[70] <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/1.5021740" target="_blank">Marco Greenberg, "Finding the Next Danny." <i>Haaretz</i>, September 5, 2008</a>.
<br>[71] <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2013/09/09/tech/innovation/danny-lewin-9-11-akamai/" target="_blank">Todd Leopold, "The Legacy of Danny Lewin, the First Man to Die on 9/11."</a>
<br>[72] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20050310182432/http:/www.nydailynews.com/front/story/215285p-185305c.html" target="_blank">Richard Sisk and Monique El-Faizy, "First Victim Died a Hero on Flt. 11." <i>New York Daily News</i>, July 24, 2004</a>.
<br>[73] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20020917044055/http:/rockymountainnews.com/drmn/america_under_attack/article/0,1299,DRMN_664_1366703,00.html" target="_blank">Gil Rudawsky, "At 29, a Billionaire; at 31, a Casualty." <i>Rocky Mountain News</i>, September 4, 2002</a>; <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/1.5208698" target="_blank">Judy Maltz, "He Went Down Fighting"</a>; Molly Knight Raskin, <i>No Better Time</i>, p. 25.
<br>[74] <a href="https://www.psychologytoday.com/gb/articles/201309/the-genius-who-perished-flight-11" target="_blank">Molly Knight Raskin, "The Genius Who Perished on Flight 11."</a>
<br>[75] <a href="https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/911-the-day-israel-lost-her-future-prime-minister/" target="_blank">Micah Lakin Avni, "9/11: The Day Israel Lost Her Future Prime Minister." <i>Times of Israel</i>, September 11, 2016</a>.
<br>[76] <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/17/classified/paid-notice-deaths-lewin-daniel-m.html" target="_blank">"Paid Notice: Deaths, Lewin, Daniel M." <i>New York Times</i>, September 17, 2001</a>; <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20020917044055/http:/rockymountainnews.com/drmn/america_under_attack/article/0,1299,DRMN_664_1366703,00.html" target="_blank">Gil Rudawsky, "At 29, a Billionaire; at 31, a Casualty"</a>; <a href="https://www.akamai.com/uk/en/about/leadership/executive-team/akamai-remembers-danny-lewin.jsp" target="_blank">"Akamai Remembers Danny Lewin." Akamai, n.d.</a>
<br>[77] <a href="http://news.mit.edu/2001/lewin" target="_blank">"Memorial Service for Daniel Lewin Scheduled for Thursday in Kresge." MIT News, September 14, 2001</a>; <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/17/classified/paid-notice-deaths-lewin-daniel-m.html" target="_blank">"Paid Notice: Deaths, Lewin, Daniel M."</a>; <a href="https://www.pressreader.com/israel/jerusalem-post/20160912/281642484626236" target="_blank">David Brinn, "A Model Life and a Heroic Death."</a>
<br>[78] <a href="https://www.psychologytoday.com/gb/articles/201309/the-genius-who-perished-flight-11" target="_blank">Molly Knight Raskin, "The Genius Who Perished on Flight 11."</a>
<br>[79] Molly Knight Raskin, <i>No Better Time</i>, p. 48.
<br>[80] <a href="https://www.psychologytoday.com/gb/articles/201309/the-genius-who-perished-flight-11" target="_blank">Molly Knight Raskin, "The Genius Who Perished on Flight 11."</a>
<br>[81] <a href="http://news.mit.edu/1998/eecs-0603" target="_blank">"EECS Students Garner Honors." MIT News, June 3, 1998</a>; Molly Knight Raskin, <i>No Better Time</i>, p. 83.
<br>[82] <a href="https://www.sigact.org/prizes/student/remarks.html " target="_blank">Tom Leighton, "Remarks Made by Tom Leighton to Commemorate the Naming of the STOC Best Student Paper Award in Honor of the Late Daniel Lewin"</a>; <a href="https://www.pressreader.com/israel/jerusalem-post/20160912/281642484626236" target="_blank">David Brinn, "A Model Life and a Heroic Death."</a>
<br>[83] <a href="https://www.forbes.com/1999/06/18/feat.html" target="_blank">Regina Joseph, "Aloha Akamai"</a>; Molly Knight Raskin, <i>No Better Time</i>, p. 160.
<br>[84] Molly Knight Raskin, <i>No Better Time</i>, p. 138; <a href="https://www.psychologytoday.com/gb/articles/201309/the-genius-who-perished-flight-11" target="_blank">Molly Knight Raskin, "The Genius Who Perished on Flight 11."</a>
<br>[85] Molly Knight Raskin, <i>No Better Time</i>, p. 200; <a href="https://www.keystonepartners.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Episode-32-Tiffany-Mosher-dataxu-FINAL.pdf" target="_blank">Dave Hennessy, "Tiffany Mosher--Dataxu." <i>Hennessy Report</i>, podcast transcript, April 4, 2019</a>.
<br>[86] <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1999/10/30/business/akamai-technologies-stock-surges-on-first-trading-day.html" target="_blank">"Akamai Technologies Stock Surges on First Trading Day." Associated Press, October 30, 1999</a>; Molly Knight Raskin, <i>No Better Time</i>, pp. 175-178; <a href="https://www.psychologytoday.com/gb/articles/201309/the-genius-who-perished-flight-11" target="_blank">Molly Knight Raskin, "The Genius Who Perished on Flight 11."</a>
<br>[87] <a href="https://www.forbes.com/asap/2001/0402/078_print.html" target="_blank">Clint Willis, "The 100 Highest Rollers." <i>Forbes</i>, April 2, 2001</a>.
<br>[88] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20020211110137/http:/www.esj.com/article.asp?ID=0703200174522AM" target="_blank">"The Enterprise Systems Power 100: Our Picks for Today's Top IT Leaders." <i>Enterprise Systems</i>, July 2001</a>.
<br>[89] Molly Knight Raskin, <i>No Better Time</i>, pp. 221-222; <a href="https://www.psychologytoday.com/gb/articles/201309/the-genius-who-perished-flight-11" target="_blank">Molly Knight Raskin, "The Genius Who Perished on Flight 11."</a>
<br>[90] <a href="https://www.sigact.org/prizes/student/remarks.html " target="_blank">Tom Leighton, "Remarks Made by Tom Leighton to Commemorate the Naming of the STOC Best Student Paper Award in Honor of the Late Daniel Lewin."</a>
<br>[91] <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2013/09/09/tech/innovation/danny-lewin-9-11-akamai/" target="_blank">Todd Leopold, "The Legacy of Danny Lewin, the First Man to Die on 9/11."</a>
<br>[92] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20020917044055/http:/rockymountainnews.com/drmn/america_under_attack/article/0,1299,DRMN_664_1366703,00.html" target="_blank">Gil Rudawsky, "At 29, a Billionaire; at 31, a Casualty."</a>
<br>[93] <a href="https://medium.com/@playstead/-40703aa377be" target="_blank">Craig Playstead, "Remembering 9/11: The Smartest Person I Ever Met." Medium, September 11, 2016</a>.
<br>[94] <a href="https://www.pressreader.com/israel/jerusalem-post/20160912/281642484626236" target="_blank">David Brinn, "A Model Life and a Heroic Death."</a>
<br>[95] <a href="https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/911-the-day-israel-lost-her-future-prime-minister/" target="_blank">Micah Lakin Avni, "9/11: The Day Israel Lost Her Future Prime Minister."</a>
<br>[96] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/18886685/T7-B16-Flight-11-Gun-Story-Fdr-Zelikow-Facts-v-Fiction-Email-Notes-Paperclipped-See-Alt-Version-T7-B7" target="_blank">Team 7, "Facts vs. Fiction."</a>
<br>[97] <a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/OpaAPI/media/2609599/content/arcmedia/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00013.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Michael Woodward, American Airlines Flight Service Manager on September 11, 2001"</a>; <a href="https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=484625" target="_blank"><i>Staff Report: The Four Flights</i>, p. 11</a>.
<br>[98] Molly Knight Raskin, <i>No Better Time</i>, pp. 37-38.
<br>[99] <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/peterhigh/2019/03/25/akamai-ceo-on-the-companys-push-toward-cybersecurity/" target="_blank">Peter High, "Akamai CEO on the Company's Push Toward Cybersecurity."</a>
<br>[100] <a href="https://www.cnet.com/news/code-red-for-security/" target="_blank">Robert Lemos, "Code Red for Security." CNET News, July 27, 2001</a>.
<br>[101] <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/peterhigh/2019/03/25/akamai-ceo-on-the-companys-push-toward-cybersecurity/" target="_blank">Peter High, "Akamai CEO on the Company's Push Toward Cybersecurity."</a>
<br>[102] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20020917044055/http:/rockymountainnews.com/drmn/america_under_attack/article/0,1299,DRMN_664_1366703,00.html" target="_blank">Gil Rudawsky, "At 29, a Billionaire; at 31, a Casualty."</a>
<br>[103] <a href="https://medium.com/@wolfepereira/the-day-after-eb525683b555" target="_blank">Steven Wolfe Pereira, "The Day After."</a>
<br>[104] <a href="https://www.italkpodcast.com/episode/no-better-time-the-story-of-danny-lewin-with-author-molly-knight-raskin,8266.html" target="_blank">"No Better Time: The Story of Danny Lewin With Author Molly Knight Raskin." <i>Dr. Pat Show</i>, Transformation Talk Radio, February 25, 2014</a>.
<br>[105] <a href="http://deborahkalbbooks.blogspot.com/2013/10/q-with-author-molly-knight-raskin.html" target="_blank">"Q&A With Author Molly Knight Raskin." Book Q&As With Deborah Kalb, October 1, 2013</a>.
Shoestringhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01534319150672667644noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2990970741097819876.post-49139987544697209272019-07-11T01:15:00.000-07:002019-07-11T02:01:50.453-07:00The Apathy and Inaction of Vice President Dick Cheney During the 9/11 Attacks<br><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgu0Db74uijnEBUeX-voGBghsFZ2cS-VeWykqw5cGWuqq5lfhN5ghxzO4WZPgBwdjNuaQUzVFQsFypf6_4JlwLKe85O9Ikhbqmnupfkad0FL_OYq8rmMaA1dm_g1griQZPho2GdYZb0AjB0/s1600/CheneyOffice911.jpg" target="_blank" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgu0Db74uijnEBUeX-voGBghsFZ2cS-VeWykqw5cGWuqq5lfhN5ghxzO4WZPgBwdjNuaQUzVFQsFypf6_4JlwLKe85O9Ikhbqmnupfkad0FL_OYq8rmMaA1dm_g1griQZPho2GdYZb0AjB0/s1600/CheneyOffice911.jpg" data-original-width="300" data-original-height="200" alt="Dick Cheney in his office at 9:30 a.m. on September 11"/></a></div><br>Dick Cheney, as vice president of the United States, had an important role to play when America came under terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, and yet he appears to have taken no significant action until the attacks were over. He did nothing to initiate or implement a government response to the crisis until it was too late for his actions to make a difference to the outcome of the attacks.
<br><br>Cheney, who was at the White House on the morning of September 11, was alerted to the first crash at the World Trade Center shortly after 8:46 a.m., when it occurred. He followed the coverage of the incident on television and saw the second hijacked plane crashing into the Trade Center at 9:03 a.m.
<br><br>And yet, even though he realized then that the U.S. was under attack, he had no serious discussions with other officials about how to respond and failed to issue any significant orders. By the time Secret Service agents came and evacuated him from his office, more than half an hour later, practically all he had done was watch "developments on the television" and start to "get organized to figure out what to do," according to his own recollections.
<br><br>The vice president did eventually act with the kind of urgency and decisiveness we might reasonably have expected from him. For example, he authorized American fighter jets to shoot down aircraft that were believed to have been hijacked, so as to prevent terrorists from crashing them into targets on the ground. He was also involved in getting congressional leaders and some cabinet members evacuated to a secure facility outside Washington, DC, and helped Secretary of Transportation Norman Mineta track aircraft after all planes in U.S. airspace were ordered to land. But by the time he started taking this more active role, the fourth and final plane to be hijacked that day had reportedly crashed in rural Pennsylvania and so the attacks were over.
<br><br><b>CHENEY AUTHORIZED THE MILITARY TO SHOOT DOWN SUSPICIOUS PLANES</b>
<br>Perhaps Cheney's most significant action on the morning of September 11 was arranging "rules of engagement" for fighter pilots, authorizing them to shoot down hostile aircraft. It was clearly important for the military to be given this authority, since shooting down a hijacked aircraft might have been the only way to stop the hijackers crashing it into a target on the ground and killing perhaps hundreds of people in addition to the plane's passengers.
<br><br>Although shootdown authorization needed to be issued by the president, Cheney's involvement with giving it appears to have come about because President George W. Bush was away from Washington when the attacks occurred and so Cheney was the most senior official at the White House.
<br><br>Arranging for the military to have this authorization presumably ought to have taken place as early as possible. At the latest, efforts should surely have begun at 9:03 a.m., when the second hijacked plane crashed into the World Trade Center and it became clear that America was under attack. And yet Cheney only told the military it was authorized to shoot down hijacked aircraft shortly before 10:15 a.m. and got the president to retroactively give his approval for this authorization in a phone call at 10:18 a.m. In two earlier calls between Bush and Cheney, the subject of shootdown authorization was never discussed. The military therefore only received authorization to shoot down hostile aircraft after the attacks ended.
<br><br>Another significant action Cheney was involved with was getting those in the presidential line of succession--officials who might have had to take over as president if Bush was killed or incapacitated--to a secure location outside Washington in line with the "continuity of government" (COG) plan, which was intended to maintain a functioning government in the event of a catastrophic emergency.
<br><br>Cheney claimed this task was one of his priorities on September 11. And yet he took no action to get those in the presidential line of succession to a secure location after he saw the second hijacked plane hit the World Trade Center on television, even though it was then clear that a catastrophic emergency was taking place. The order to activate COG was given by Richard Clarke, the White House counterterrorism chief, without any prompting from the vice president and Cheney only started implementing the plan at some point more than an hour after the second crash occurred.
<br><br><b>CHENEY WAS THE TOP OFFICIAL AT THE WHITE HOUSE ON SEPTEMBER 11</b>
<br>The need for Cheney to respond immediately and decisively to the crashes at the World Trade Center was surely increased because the president was away from Washington, visiting a school in Florida, when America came under attack. Cheney was consequently the most senior official at the White House and presumably might have needed to carry out some of the president's duties if Bush was unable to adequately respond to the crisis due to being so far away.
<br><br>Cheney also ought to have taken prompt action to reduce the risk of his coming to harm since, if he had been killed or injured, there may have been no one immediately available to carry out the duties of the vice president. And yet, even though the White House, as the home of the U.S. president, was an obvious target for terrorists, he was content to stay in his office there after he saw the second crash on television. He only went to a safer location shortly after 9:35 a.m.--at least 50 minutes after the first crash at the World Trade Center--when his Secret Service agents forcefully removed him from his office.
<br><br>Cheney's failure to adequately respond to the 9/11 attacks until they ended is suspicious and needs to be explained. It is difficult to attribute his behavior to incompetence, since he had years of experience working in government. Significantly, he was secretary of defense from 1989 to 1993. This experience should have helped him understand the need for prompt action on September 11, when the U.S. military had to organize a response to protect the nation.
<br><br>A possible explanation that, though disturbing, needs to be considered is that Cheney was involved in planning the attacks and wanted them to succeed. If this was the case, his initial inaction, although treasonous, was quite logical. By doing nothing significant while the attacks were underway, he avoided doing anything that might reduce the likelihood of them being carried out successfully.
<br><br><b>CHENEY HAD MEETINGS BEFORE THE ATTACKS OCCURRED</b>
<br>September 11, 2001, began like a typical day for Dick Cheney. Shortly before 7:00 a.m., he received his regular CIA briefing. That day's briefing was "unremarkable," according to journalist and author Stephen Hayes. He left the vice president's residence at the Naval Observatory in Northwest Washington at 7:44 a.m. and was driven to the White House, arriving there 13 minutes later. He then went to his office in the West Wing, where he met briefly with I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, his chief of staff. [1]
<br><br>Shortly before 8:30 a.m., Sean O'Keefe stopped by for an unscheduled meeting. [2] O'Keefe, the deputy director of the Office of Management and Budget, had been a close confidant of Cheney's when Cheney was secretary of defense. [3] Although Cheney had another meeting scheduled for 8:30 a.m. and colleagues were usually expected to keep any informal meetings with him brief, O'Keefe stayed with him for over 20 minutes. Curiously, neither man has been able to recall what they talked about during the meeting.
<br><br>Cheney was scheduled to meet John McConnell, his chief speechwriter, at 8:30 a.m. to discuss a series of upcoming speeches, but McConnell waited patiently outside Cheney's office until O'Keefe left there. While he was waiting, he saw a report about the first crash at the World Trade Center--when the hijacked American Airlines Flight 11 was flown into the North Tower--on television. (This was presumably at around 8:49 a.m., when CNN became the first network to report the incident that occurred three minutes earlier.)
<br><br>He had been chatting with the Secret Service agent at the door to Cheney's office and the agent, after receiving a call from his intelligence division, told him the plane that hit the Trade Center was a passenger jet. McConnell finally went into Cheney's office shortly before 9:00 a.m. for his meeting with the vice president. [4]
<br><br>Cheney learned of the crash shortly after or possibly shortly before McConnell came in. His secretary, Debbie Heiden, called and let him know what had happened. [5] It apparently did not occur to him that the crash might have been a terrorist attack. "How the hell could a plane hit the World Trade Center?" he wondered, since it was "a clear day" and there was "no weather problem." [6]
<br><br>Cheney and McConnell watched the coverage of the incident on television and saw the second crash--when United Airlines Flight 175 was flown into the South Tower--at 9:03 a.m. [7] Cheney realized then that this was terrorism. "At that moment, you knew this was [a] deliberate act, that it was a terrorist act," he recalled. [8]
<br><br>He promptly called Scooter Libby and summoned him to his office. [9] He went across the hallway to the office of Andrew Card, Bush's chief of staff, who was with the president in Florida, and told Card's secretary that he wanted to talk with Card or the president as soon as this could be arranged. [10]
<br><br>He picked up a phone in his office with a direct line to Bush's mobile communications team in Florida and told the person who answered, "I need to talk to the president." And he received a call around this time from his eldest daughter, Liz Cheney. She had heard that a plane hit the World Trade Center on her car radio and wanted to alert her father to the incident. After she told him about it, he replied: "Two planes have hit. It's a terrorist attack." He then abruptly ended the call, saying, "I've got to go." [11]
<br><br><b>COLLEAGUES WENT TO CHENEY'S OFFICE</b>
<br>A number of Cheney's colleagues promptly went to the vice president's office after they learned of the crashes in New York. Apparently one of the first to arrive was National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice. [12]
<br><br>Richard Clarke then arrived. He told the vice president: "It's an al-Qaeda attack and they like simultaneous attacks. This may not be over." He told Rice that he and his colleagues were "putting together a secure teleconference to manage the crisis." He added that he would "like to get the highest-ranking official from each department" on the teleconference and Cheney told him, "Do it." Clarke then left and headed to the White House Situation Room. [13]
<br><br>Doug Cochrane, naval aide to the vice president, also arrived at Cheney's office around this time. After he learned of the first crash at the World Trade Center, Cochrane went to the Situation Room, hoping to learn more about the incident. There, he recalled, he was told that Cheney got cut off while he was on the phone with the president. (However, no other accounts have described Cheney talking to Bush around the time Cochrane's account suggests.) Cochrane therefore headed to Cheney's office carrying a piece of paper with a phone number the Situation Room had for the president on it.
<br><br>When he reached the office, he found Cheney with Rice. Cheney looked up and acknowledged him. It is unclear whether the two men spoke. When he was interviewed by the 9/11 Commission, Cochrane simply recalled seeing Cheney answering a call from Bush and saying, "Yes, Mr. President" when he picked up the phone. Cochrane then closed the door to Cheney's office and headed back to the Situation Room. [14]
<br><br>Other officials subsequently came to Cheney's office. These included Scooter Libby; Mary Matalin, the vice president's closest aide; Josh Bolten, the deputy White House chief of staff; Brian McCormack, Cheney's personal aide; and possibly Sean O'Keefe. [15]
<br><br>Cheney instructed Libby to go to the Situation Room since, Libby recalled, "because the president was away, we had the responsibility for sort of organizing things and he wanted to make sure that he was well connected." [16] While Cheney was waiting for Bush to call him, he told his colleagues, "The cabinet is going to need direction" and he then "set about providing it," according to journalist and author Barton Gellman. However, Gellman gave no details of what this supposed "direction" involved. [17]
<br><br>John McConnell initially stayed in Cheney's office when the officials arrived but decided to leave after a short time and returned to his own office before heading out of the building along with dozens of staffers. [18]
<br><br><b>CHENEY TALKED TO THE PRESIDENT AT 9:15 A.M.</b>
<br>Cheney talked with President Bush for the first time following the crashes at the World Trade Center at 9:15 a.m. Bush was almost a thousand miles away from Washington that morning, visiting the Emma E. Booker Elementary School in Sarasota, Florida. He called Cheney after leaving a reading demonstration he had been participating in and talked with him for two minutes. [19]
<br><br>The two men assessed the situation and agreed that terrorists were probably behind the attacks. They also discussed what the president would say in the public statement he was going to deliver. [20]
<br><br>What Cheney did in the 18 minutes following the call are unclear. Evidence indicates he may have done very little. Along with the other people in his office, he watched Bush giving his statement from the Booker Elementary School on television, at 9:30 a.m. [21] But by 9:35 a.m., he recalled, all he had been doing since speaking to the president was "watching developments on the television" and starting "to get organized to figure out what to do." [22] Then, shortly after 9:35 a.m., the Secret Service agents responsible for protecting him came and abruptly removed him from his office. [23]
<br><br><b>ARMED SECRET SERVICE AGENTS EVACUATED CHENEY</b>
<br>The Secret Service had been contacted at around 9:33 a.m. by an air traffic controller who reported that an unidentified aircraft was flying toward the White House at high speed. The controller then reported that the aircraft had changed course, but when they subsequently said it was beginning to circle back, the Secret Service decided to evacuate the vice president from his office immediately. [24]
<br><br>The news about the suspicious aircraft was passed on to members of the vice presidential protective division in the West Wing. They heard a message over their radios from the Secret Service's Joint Operations Center, stating, "Unidentified aircraft coming toward the White House." Right away, they went into Cheney's office to move the vice president to a secure location. [25]
<br><br>Four or five agents carrying submachine guns went in and one of them, Special Agent James Scott, told the vice president, "Sir, we need to move you--now." [26] The agents grabbed Cheney and took him to the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC), a secure bunker below the East Wing of the White House. [27]
<br><br>Scott put his hand on Cheney's shoulder, grabbed the back of his belt, and propelled him out the door. [28] Then, Cheney recalled, the agents "moved me very rapidly down the hallway, down some stairs, through some doors, and down some more stairs." [29] Cheney's colleagues who had come to see the vice president were left behind in the office. [30]
<br><br>The exact time when the evacuation occurred is unclear. It took place at 9:36 a.m. according to one Secret Service chronology and Cheney said that, according to the Secret Service, he left his office at "around 9:35 a.m. or 9:36 a.m." [31] A photograph taken that morning indicates the evacuation must have occurred at 9:36 a.m. at the earliest. It shows Cheney in his office with the television set visible and the time shown by the television network in the corner of the screen appears to be 9:36 a.m. [32]
<br><br><b>CHENEY CALLED BUSH FROM AN UNDERGROUND TUNNEL</b>
<br>At the bottom of the stairs, on the way to the PEOC, Scott stopped and gave out additional firearms, gas masks, and flashlights to the other Secret Service agents. He explained to Cheney that the reason for the evacuation was that he had heard over his radio that an unidentified aircraft was flying toward the White House. He then received new information over his radio, which he passed on to Cheney. "Sir, the plane headed for us just hit the Pentagon," he said. "Now I knew for certain that Washington as well as New York was under attack," Cheney has commented. [33]
<br><br>The vice president entered a short tunnel that led to the PEOC about a minute after he was removed from his office. He stopped in an area of it where there was a television, a bench to sit on, and a secure phone, and said he wanted to speak to the president. However, operators had trouble connecting him to Bush, who by then had left the Booker Elementary School and was preparing to leave Sarasota on Air Force One. Cheney therefore only reached the president at around 9:45 a.m. [34]
<br><br>Cheney has recalled that he told Bush the Pentagon had been hit and the White House was a target in the call. [35] He also "strongly urged [the president] not to return to Washington right away" and advised him to "delay his return until we could find out what the hell was going on." [36]
<br><br>Cheney's wife, Lynne Cheney, who had been brought to the White House by her Secret Service detail, joined her husband in the tunnel while he was making the call. [37] As well as telling Bush that a plane had hit the Pentagon, she heard him say three planes were missing. [38] Scooter Libby, who was accompanying her, recalled that the vice president "was communicating ... in a very efficient manner the status of the situation" to the president. [39]
<br><br>Bush told Cheney he had heard about the attack on the Pentagon and commented, "Sounds like we have a minor war going on here." [40] He also told Cheney to call the congressional leadership and give them a briefing. [41]
<br><br>Lynne Cheney noted that her husband was still on the phone with the president at 9:55 a.m., indicating the call lasted at least 10 minutes. [42] However, accounts of it have made no mention of the president and vice president making any decisions about how to respond to the attacks or discussing orders they could issue during their conversation.
<br><br><b>CHENEY ENTERED THE PEOC JUST BEFORE 10:00 A.M.</b>
<br>While Cheney was on the phone with Bush, he was joined in the tunnel by other officials, including Condoleezza Rice and Doug Cochrane. [43] After the call ended, he was escorted into the PEOC along with the other people who were now with him. [44]
<br><br>The group passed through a small communications studio and entered a conference room. [45] There was a table in the middle of this room that was long enough to accommodate 16 people and had several secure phones located around it. There was also a row of chairs along the wall for support staff, large television screens on the walls, and cameras for video conferencing. [46]
<br><br>Cheney and his entourage entered the PEOC "shortly before 10:00, perhaps at 9:58," according to the <i>9/11 Commission Report</i>. [47] Once inside the conference room, Cheney took his place at the center of the table. [48] Then, he recalled, he "plugged in" and started "working the phones and working the problem." [49] He subsequently "took briefings, conferred with Scooter Libby in a voice too low for anyone else to hear, then got on the phone with heads of agencies," according to Barton Gellman. [50]
<br><br>Cheney's "number one priority" after he entered the PEOC, according to Cochrane, was to be provided with "accurate, brief, and credible information that he could pass to the president, to enable the president to make good decisions." [51] Cheney told the other people in the PEOC that their task was "to assimilate information for the president." [52]
<br><br>He also helped Norman Mineta and Condoleezza Rice track the tail numbers of aircraft while planes were being brought down, since all aircraft in U.S. airspace were being instructed to land at the nearest airport. [53] While Mineta called out tail numbers, he kept track of how many planes were still in the air. [54] He regarded this task as one of his priorities, since, he said, getting planes out of the air meant "we could sort out which [aircraft] had been hijacked." [55]
<br><br><b>MILITARY NEEDED AUTHORIZATION TO SHOOT DOWN HOSTILE AIRCRAFT</b>
<br>Probably the most important things Cheney did after he entered the PEOC were his actions that dealt with authorizing the military to shoot down aircraft that were believed to have been hijacked.
<br><br>Reportedly, the president was the only person permitted to authorize the shooting down of a civilian aircraft. Larry Arnold, the commanding general of the North American Aerospace Defense Command's Continental U.S. Region on September 11, agreed that "only the president had the authority to order a shootdown of a commercial aircraft." [56] Major General Paul Weaver, the director of the Air National Guard at that time, similarly stated that "only the president could give the order for a U.S. fighter to shoot down a commercial airliner filled with American travelers." [57] And Cheney described shootdown authorization as "a presidential-level decision." [58]
<br><br>The <i>9/11 Commission Report</i> stated, "Prior to 9/11, it was understood that an order to shoot down a commercial aircraft would have to be issued by the National Command Authority (a phrase used to describe the president and secretary of defense)." [59] The vice president was not in the chain of command and Cheney knew this. In 1989, when he was secretary of defense, he told then Vice President Dan Quayle that "the vice president had no lawful place in the chain of command." [60]
<br><br>However, Cheney understood the importance of authorizing fighters to shoot down a hostile aircraft from his experience as secretary of defense. "When you deploy force, you've got to give [the military] rules of engagement; that's something you learn as defense secretary," he has commented. "Without authorization to shoot," he added, a combat air patrol is "not much of a combat air patrol." [61]
<br><br>In light of the nature of the 9/11 attacks, with aircraft being crashed into targets in order to cause mass casualties, it was surely essential that the military be given authorization to shoot down hostile aircraft as soon as possible. Although the passengers would be killed if a fighter shot down a commercial plane, countless additional deaths would result if the plane was allowed to crash into another skyscraper or a large government building, such as the Capitol. Shooting the plane down would at least save the lives of people on the ground.
<br><br>Bush and Cheney have made clear that they understood on September 11 the necessity of giving the military shootdown authorization. In an account of the events of that day, Bush wrote: "Hijacked planes were weapons of war. Despite the agonizing costs, taking one out could save countless lives on the ground." [62] And Cheney noted that authorizing the military to shoot down a civilian airliner was essential because, "once a plane was hijacked, it was a weapon in the hands of the enemy." [63]
<br><br>And yet Cheney made no attempt to arrange for the military to be given this authorization after he saw the second crash at the World Trade Center on television and realized America was under attack. Evidence indicates that he only discussed rules of engagement for fighter pilots with Bush and arranged for the president to authorize the military to shoot down civilian aircraft in a phone call well over an hour later. By that time, there were no more hostile aircraft in the sky and so it was too late for the two men's actions to make a difference to the outcome of the attacks.
<br><br>Bush only issued shootdown authorization for fighter pilots at 10:18 a.m., according to the <i>9/11 Commission Report</i>, 15 minutes after United Airlines Flight 93--the final plane to be hijacked that day--reportedly crashed. And yet he and Cheney talked on the phone about the attacks at least twice before then--at 9:15 a.m. and around 9:45 a.m. [64]
<br><br>Cheney could have advised Bush to issue shootdown authorization during either of these calls and surely should have. Journalist and author Mitchell Zuckoff pointed out the significance of his failure to do so. According to the official account of 9/11, Zuckoff noted, "No one outside al-Qaeda knew how many more planes and targets might be part of the terrorists' plot." But at the time the president and vice president's second call ended, shortly before 10:00 a.m., "If there were more [hijacked] planes, Bush and Cheney had yet to discuss how far the military should go to stop them." [65]
<br><br><b>CHENEY AND BUSH CLAIMED THEY DISCUSSED SHOOTDOWN AUTHORIZATION AT AROUND 10:00 A.M.</b>
<br>While they failed to discuss rules of engagement for fighter pilots during their first two calls, Cheney and Bush have claimed they addressed the issue during a call that took place significantly earlier than the call in which the <i>9/11 Commission Report</i> stated that the president gave shootdown authorization.
<br><br>Cheney described this alleged call, stating: "I said [to Bush], 'We've got to give the pilots rules of engagement and I recommend we authorize them to shoot.' We talked about it briefly and he said, 'Okay, I'll sign up to that.'" [66]
<br><br>He indicated that this conversation took place at around 10:00 a.m. He told the 9/11 Commission that he "remembered placing a call to the president just after entering the shelter conference room" to discuss "the rules of engagement" for the combat air patrol that the Air Force was trying to establish over Washington. [67]
<br><br>Bush also indicated that the call in which he gave shootdown authorization occurred at around 10:00 a.m., although he claimed that he called Cheney, rather than Cheney calling him. He made the call, he wrote, "as Air Force One climbed rapidly to 45,000 feet" after taking off from the Sarasota airport. (His plane took off at 9:55 a.m.) "We needed to clarify the rules of engagement," he recalled, and so he told Cheney "that our pilots should contact suspicious planes and try to get them to land peacefully. If that failed, they had my authority to shoot them down." [68]
<br><br>Although this call was allegedly made almost an hour after the second attack on the World Trade Center, if it occurred this would at least mean the president issued shootdown authorization while the attacks were still underway, before Flight 93 reportedly crashed. However, when the 9/11 Commission examined the relevant evidence, some of its staffers concluded that the call never took place. [69]
<br><br>Barton Gellman and another journalist and author, Philip Shenon, have summarized this evidence. Gellman noted that at the time the call supposedly occurred, Bush and Cheney "were among the most thoroughly monitored people on earth." Shenon noted that every phone call involving Bush and his senior staff on September 11 was logged, and a detailed summary was made of what was said.
<br><br>The White House secure switchboard logged communications to and from Air Force One, and seven other sets of official records tracked the calls between Bush and Cheney. Furthermore, several people in the PEOC made detailed notes about everything that happened in the PEOC, which included descriptions of what they overheard of Cheney's phone conversations. [70]
<br><br>If a call had been made at around 10:00 a.m. in which the president and the vice president discussed shootdown authorization, at least one document should have mentioned it. However, the 9/11 Commission found, there was "no documentary evidence for this call." [71] This was despite the fact that the relevant records appeared to be complete. There was "no other alleged gap in the president's telephone records" for September 11, Gellman pointed out. [72]
<br><br><b>CHENEY GAVE SHOOTDOWN AUTHORIZATION WITHOUT THE PRESIDENT'S APPROVAL</b>
<br>While Bush therefore appears to have issued shootdown authorization at 10:18 a.m., not 10:00 a.m., Cheney told a military officer in the PEOC that fighters could shoot down suspicious aircraft a few minutes before then, without the president's prior authorization.
<br><br>Captain Anthony Barnes, the senior military officer on duty in the PEOC, received a call from a general who, Barnes recalled, wanted "permission to engage confirmed terrorists on board commercial airplanes." At around 10:10 a.m. or shortly after, in response to this request, Barnes went into the PEOC conference room and told the people there an inbound aircraft that was presumably hijacked was 80 miles away. He asked Cheney for the authority to engage the aircraft and Cheney immediately gave his authorization.
<br><br>A short time later, Barnes reported that the aircraft was 60 miles out and once more asked Cheney for permission to engage it. Again, Cheney gave his authorization. Barnes then went back to the phone and told the general who had called him, "The vice president has authorized you to engage confirmed terrorist[s] aboard commercial aircraft." [73]
<br><br>Others in the military were promptly informed about what Cheney had said. His authorization was relayed over an air threat conference call convened by the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon. At 10:14 a.m., a military officer in the PEOC told those on the conference call, "The vice president has just confirmed: fighters are cleared to engage the aircraft inbound if we can verify that it is, in fact, the hijacked aircraft." Five minutes later, the officer repeated the information, saying, "The vice president has cleared fighter aircraft to engage any aircraft inbound to Washington, DC, area without authority." [74]
<br><br>At 10:31 a.m., Cheney's authorization was relayed within the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)--the military organization responsible for monitoring and defending U.S. airspace. Larry Arnold instructed his staff to broadcast a message over a NORAD instant messaging system, stating, "Vice president has cleared us to intercept tracks of interest and shoot them down if they do not respond." [75]
<br><br>It is worth noting that even though Cheney had apparently taken the initiative to go outside the chain of command and authorize the military to shoot down hostile aircraft without the prior approval of the president, his authorization was still only issued after the attacks ended. It therefore came too late to make a difference to the outcome of the crisis.
<br><br> (As it turned out, shootdown authorization was unnecessary at the time the vice president issued it, since Barnes's reports of an approaching aircraft were incorrect. The <i>9/11 Commission Report</i> suggested they related to Flight 93, even though this plane had already crashed. [76])
<br><br><b>BUSH GAVE SHOOTDOWN AUTHORIZATION AFTER CHENEY ISSUED IT</b>
<br>As previously mentioned, the 9/11 Commission determined that Bush told Cheney that fighters were authorized to shoot down hostile aircraft at 10:18 a.m., several minutes after Cheney told the military they could do this.
<br><br>In a "quiet moment" after Cheney gave his authorization, the <i>9/11 Commission Report</i> described, Josh Bolten suggested to the vice president that he "get in touch with the president and confirm the engage order," since Bolten "had not heard any prior discussion on the subject with the president." In response to Bolten's suggestion, Cheney called Bush at 10:18 a.m. and spoke with him for two minutes. During the call, Bush gave his confirmation for the shootdown order. [77]
<br><br>Bush then told those with him on Air Force One what he had just done. He "said that he had talked to the vice president ... and gave the authorization that [the] military could shoot down any planes not under control of their crews that were gearing critical targets," Karl Rove recalled. [78] White House press secretary Ari Fleischer wrote in the notes he was taking at the time that, at 10:20 a.m., Bush said he had just authorized the shooting down of aircraft, if necessary. [79]
<br><br>Bush's report to his colleagues at 10:20 a.m., recorded in Fleischer's notes, was the earliest mention the 9/11 Commission found of the president giving shootdown authorization. [80] If the call at 10:18 a.m. was therefore when Bush told Cheney that fighters could shoot down hostile aircraft, it means Cheney only set about arranging rules of engagement for fighter pilots with the president an hour and a quarter after he learned of the second crash at the World Trade Center and realized America was under attack. Even then, he failed to do this on his own initiative and only acted because Bolten prompted him to.
<br><br><b>CHENEY ONLY HELPED IMPLEMENT CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT AFTER THE ATTACKS ENDED</b>
<br>Cheney has stated that one of the things that was "uppermost" in his mind on September 11 was getting those in the presidential line of succession to secure locations in accordance with the U.S.'s continuity of government plan. [81] "One of my major concerns was to 'preserve the continuity of government,'" he wrote, adding, "In the event that an attack should take out both the president and vice president, it's crucial to make certain that potential successors are safe and secure." [82] And yet, evidence indicates, like arranging shootdown authorization, he only set about implementing COG after the attacks ended, by which time there was no longer any danger to those in the presidential line of succession.
<br><br>The secret COG plan, which was formulated during the Cold War, was originally intended to ensure that the federal government would continue to function during and after a nuclear war with the Soviet Union. [83] It "designates which officials should be taken to the [PEOC] at the White House, which cabinet members should be taken to secure locations, and where to move congressional leaders," the <i>Washington Post</i> described. [84] The main goal of COG, according to Cheney, "was making certain we protected successors in the line of succession to the presidency, so that when the smoke settled, that you had somebody as president who had the authority and constitutional responsibilities to run the country." [85]
<br><br>When COG is activated, "the leadership of our three branches of government--and those in the line of succession to the presidency--are ordered to each move to their individual, predetermined, hardened sites around the country," Lieutenant Colonel Robert Darling, who worked for the White House Military Office on September 11, wrote. "This better enables them to survive a nuclear attack, for example, or a man-made or natural catastrophic event and take on the responsibilities to maintain the federal government's operations," he added. [86]
<br><br>Cheney had a better understanding than most of the COG plan, since he was a key figure in the program in the 1980s, when he participated in regular COG exercises. [87] And yet he apparently made no effort to activate COG on September 11 and he only helped implement the plan after he entered the PEOC.
<br><br><b>COUNTERTERRORISM CHIEF ACTIVATED CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT</b>
<br>Richard Clarke was the man who reportedly activated COG on September 11 and, according to his recollections, he did this of his own initiative, without any prompting from Cheney. He activated COG after the coordinator for the plan joined him in the Situation Room. Clarke asked the coordinator, "How do I activate COG?" and he replied, "You tell me to do it." Clarke then gave the instruction, "Go."
<br><br>He gave a message to a military officer in the PEOC to tell others in the PEOC that he was "instituting COG." He also told officials at the Pentagon over a video teleconference: "We are initiating COG. Please activate your alternate command centers and move staff to them immediately." [88]
<br><br>Clarke apparently activated COG shortly before 9:59 a.m. since, around that time, Stephen Hadley, the deputy national security adviser, spoke to Colonel Michael Irwin, the director of operations for the White House Military Office, and, presumably in response to Clarke's instruction, requested implementation of the plan. [89]
<br><br>Clarke has indicated that someone other than him--such as Cheney, perhaps--could have activated COG. "There was no paperwork that said who could push the button" and initiate the plan, he said. "The directives said that I was explicitly in charge of the procedures, but not explicitly that I could activate it," he added. [90]
<br><br>And yet the only thing relating to COG that Cheney did while the attacks were taking place was urge Bush to delay returning to Washington. [91] When he spoke to the president at around 9:45 a.m., while he was in the tunnel leading to the PEOC, he advised Bush to delay his return to Washington because, he recalled, "What I was immediately thinking about was sort of continuity of government." [92] CNN described what was probably his line of thinking. It noted that COG protocols recommended "keeping the president and vice president in separate locations during times of significant terrorist threat." [93]
<br><br><b>CHENEY HELPED IMPLEMENT CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT PROCEDURES AFTER ENTERING THE PEOC</b>
<br>While he apparently played no role in activating COG, Cheney did at least help implement the plan. He was involved in evacuating Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert and later the rest of the congressional leadership to a secure facility outside Washington. He also ordered the evacuation of some members of the cabinet. [94]
<br><br>In light of the valuable knowledge of COG he would have gained during his years as a key player in the program, Cheney should surely have set about arranging for the plan to be activated and then helped implement it as soon as possible after he saw the second crash at the World Trade Center on television and realized America was under attack. Robert Darling pointed out that, in line with the COG plan, "in a national crisis such as 9/11, it's essential to track and know exactly where each leader is at all times." [95]
<br><br>And yet, despite claiming that preserving the continuity of government was one of his "major concerns" on September 11, Cheney only set about implementing the COG plan after the attacks ended. [96] Certainly, no accounts have described him taking any actions to implement it before he entered the PEOC. By the time he talked to Hastert, who was second in the line of presidential succession, and told him, "I want you to go to a secure location," Hastert had already been evacuated by his security detail to Andrews Air Force Base, about 12 miles outside Washington, from where he was going to be flown to this "secure location." [97]
<br><br><b>CHENEY WAS A UNIQUELY POWERFUL VICE PRESIDENT</b>
<br>Dick Cheney's actions on September 11 require close scrutiny because Cheney was a key member of the administration and had specific responsibilities. The vice president is the second highest executive officer of the United States government, after the president. The "executive functions" of the vice president include participation in cabinet meetings and membership of the National Security Council. [98] The primary responsibility of the vice president, though, is to be ready to immediately assume the presidency if the existing president becomes unable to perform his duties due to death, resignation, or temporary incapacitation. [99]
<br><br>While for much of U.S. history vice presidents held little power, over recent decades they have been integral members of an administration, functioning more like an assistant president. They have had increased privileges, which include having their own office in the West Wing of the White House, having full access to intelligence briefings, serving as a presidential adviser, and having regular meetings and a weekly private lunch with the president. [100]
<br><br>The duties of the vice president, beyond those laid out in the Constitution, are in fact at the discretion of the president in office. [101] And the nature of the job of vice president has been influenced by the personality and skills of the person occupying the post. [102]
<br><br>Cheney's tenure as vice president, between 2001 and 2009, represented the apex of U.S. vice presidential power, according to many foreign policy experts. [103] Cheney redefined the post by taking on more of the day-to-day managerial responsibilities of the presidency. [104] He also had significant influence over the George W. Bush administration's national security policies. [105]
<br><br>Cheney was in a particularly important position on September 11 because if Bush had been killed or become incapacitated during the attacks, as first in the presidential line of succession he would have taken over as president. [106] He would then have taken on critical responsibilities, including being commander in chief of the nation's armed forces. "My job, above all other things, is to be prepared to take over if something happens to the president," he noted while recalling his experiences on September 11. [107] He has in fact specifically indicated that, on that day, he thought he may have needed to take over as president. He said he believed someone was trying to "take out the leadership" of the United States for "most of the day." [108]
<br><br>Cheney has claimed his awareness of his responsibilities as vice president determined his behavior on September 11. "Because you've got a job to do, you've got to focus on that, so you don't have time for personal considerations," he said. "You're thinking in terms of your official responsibilities," he added. [109] And yet his response to the terrorist attacks while they were taking place was particularly poor for someone in such a key position.
<br><br>His lack of action while America was under attack is even more alarming in light of the fact that the president was away from Washington. This meant he was the most senior official at the White House. He appears to have recognized the significance of this. He "saw himself as the man responsible for teeing decisions up for the president," one White House staffer who was with him in the PEOC commented. [110]
<br><br><b>CHENEY WAS A FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE</b>
<br>It is important to note that Cheney was secretary of defense from 1989 to 1993 when we assess his actions during the 9/11 attacks. Secretary of defense is one of the most important cabinet positions. The person holding this post is the principal defense policy adviser to the president and exercises authority, direction, and control over the U.S. Department of Defense. [111]
<br><br>Furthermore, the secretary of defense forms with the president what is known as the National Command Authority. [112] This means the two officials have unique authority to issue military orders. [113] "No <i>offensive</i>, lethal military action will ever be taken by any component of the U.S. military without the direct consent of the president or the secretary of defense," Robert Darling stated. [114]
<br><br>As a former secretary of defense, Cheney would surely have had a better understanding than most on September 11 of how to organize an effective military response to the terrorist attacks. Indeed, as previously mentioned, he said his experience as secretary of defense led him to understand the importance of issuing rules of engagement to the military that day. [115] He should also have been particularly aware of the necessity of taking action immediately following the attacks on the World Trade Center, so as to stop any possible further attacks before the targets were hit. And yet he appears to have taken no significant action for about an hour after the second crash.
<br><br><b>CHENEY PLAYED NO ROLE IN SETTING UP THE WHITE HOUSE TELECONFERENCE</b>
<br>Cheney indicated that he may have been involved in at least one important action before he was evacuated from his office, specifically the establishing of a multi-agency video teleconference to deal with the crisis. However, Richard Clarke has stated that he arranged to set up the teleconference and the vice president played no role.
<br><br>Cheney recalled that when his colleagues such as Scooter Libby and Mary Matalin came to his office after the second crash at the World Trade Center occurred, he started talking with them "about getting the counterterrorism task force up and operating." [116] "The main thing at that point was to make sure that we had--that we started to react to events, to get the counterterrorism task force up and running," he commented.
<br><br>The "counterterrorism task force" was "a designated group of people that's ... on video conference, down in the Situation Room," he said. [117] He was presumably referring to the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG), which included the leaders of each of the federal government's counterterrorism and security organizations.
<br><br>However, Clarke, who chaired the CSG, claimed that he--not Cheney--gave the instruction for the group to be activated on a video teleconference. He recalled that he told a colleague to "activate the CSG on secure video" at 9:03 a.m. He then went to Cheney's office and said the teleconference was being established. The only thing Cheney did in relation to the CSG at the time was tell Clarke, "Do it." [118]
<br><br><b>CHENEY JUST WATCHED TELEVISION BEFORE BEING EVACUATED</b>
<br>Cheney practically admitted explicitly that he initially did nothing significant in response to the 9/11 attacks in one interview. He said that by the time he was evacuated from his office, shortly after 9:35 a.m., all he had been doing was "watching developments on the television" and starting "to get organized to figure out what to do" in response to the crashes at the World Trade Center. [119]
<br><br>Photographs of the vice president in the minutes before he was evacuated support this account. In a few of them, the television in the office is showing Bush giving a speech from the Booker Elementary School, which means they were taken at 9:30 a.m., when the speech was made. In these photos, Cheney appears relaxed, and is doing nothing more than sitting back in his chair and watching the television. [120]
<br><br>In other photos, the clock shown by the network in the corner of the TV screen reveals the time was 9:33 a.m. and 9:36 a.m. The photos show that, at these times, Cheney was still doing nothing more than watching the coverage of the crashes on television. He again appears relaxed, with a foot resting on his desk. [121]
<br><br>In the photos that have been released of him on September 11 before he was evacuated from his office, the vice president is either watching television or chatting with colleagues who have come to see him. In none of the photos does he appear to be taking action or displaying any signs of the urgency we might reasonably have expected from a U.S. vice president in the middle of the worst attack on American soil since the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, in December 1941. [122]
<br><br>Cheney apparently remained indifferent to the seriousness of the situation when the armed Secret Service agents rushed into his office and said they needed to move him immediately. He just nodded his head, indicating that he would respond to them in a moment, and turned to say something to one of his colleagues.
<br><br>Special Agent James Scott had to slam his hand down on Cheney's desk and order, "<i>Now!</i>" and then the agents practically had to carry Cheney away in order to get him out of the office, according to Barton Gellman. [123] Even then, the vice president took the time to pick up the latest issue of <i>The Economist</i> from a table, so he would have something to read if he got stuck anywhere. [124]
<br><br>Cheney's apparent indifference and lack of urgency were still evident just over 20 minutes later, after he entered the PEOC. Those with him observed his lack of response when he watched the South Tower of the World Trade Center collapsing on television, at 9:59 a.m. One person recalled that while they heard "a groan in the room" when the tower came down, Cheney made no sound and "his expression never changed." His only reaction was that he "closed his eyes against the image for one long, slow blink." [125] And when he was subsequently told "that a casualty estimate ranged well into the thousands," <i>Newsweek</i> described, "Cheney just nodded grimly." [126]
<br><br><b>CHENEY WAS UNCONCERNED FOR HIS OWN SAFETY</b>
<br>Dick Cheney's behavior on the morning of September 11 was suspicious not just because Cheney failed to do anything significant to protect the country while it was under attack, but also because he never seemed concerned for his own safety while the attacks were taking place. If he had been killed or seriously injured, the nation would have been left without a vice president at a time when it was most dependent on its leaders. And yet he made no attempt to quickly get himself to a secure location.
<br><br>If Cheney was unaware of what the crisis was going to involve and what the targets of the terrorist attacks would be, as is implied by official accounts of 9/11, he should presumably have thought that, as the home of the U.S. president, the White House was a likely target and consequently feared that he might be in danger there.
<br><br>Indeed, the possibility of the White House being attacked was repeatedly considered before 9/11. After a man crashed a small plane into it in 1994, <i>Time</i> magazine noted: "The unlikely incident confirmed all too publicly what security officials have long feared in private: The White House is vulnerable to sneak attack from the air." Former CIA Director Richard Helms commented, "For years I have thought a terrorist suicide pilot could readily divert his flight from an approach to Washington to blow up the White House." [127]
<br><br>Cheney was likely well aware of the danger since, Barton Gellman noted, "In previous jobs, the vice president had studied 'decapitation attacks,' intended to wipe out a nation's senior leadership." [128] These "decapitation attacks" presumably included attacks on the White House, which aimed to take out the president, vice president, and other top officials there.
<br><br>Cheney's Secret Service agents certainly believed the White House was a possible target while the 9/11 attacks were taking place. After they had moved the vice president from his office to the underground tunnel leading to the PEOC, they "positioned themselves at the top, middle, and bottom of the staircase, creating layers of defense in case the White House itself should be invaded," Cheney recalled. [129]
<br><br>Ashley Snee, Cheney's special assistant, who was in Cheney's outer office when the Twin Towers were hit, also thought the White House might be attacked. She said that "at a certain point" after the second crash, "fear did begin to creep in." She recalled thinking that "if this was intentional, someone is attacking our nation and I'm sitting in probably a pretty significant target." [130]
<br><br>Why then did it apparently never occur to Cheney, while America was under attack, that he might be leaving himself in danger by staying in his office, on the first floor of the White House?
<br><br><b>CHENEY WAS SAFER IN THE WHITE HOUSE BUNKER</b>
<br>There were surely numerous locations Cheney could have gone to that were safer than his office. He would likely have been in less danger if he simply left the White House and went to somewhere less prominent and less associated with the U.S. government, which was therefore a less likely target for terrorists.
<br><br>He certainly would have been safer if he had gone to the PEOC as soon as he realized America was under attack. The PEOC was located several floors below ground and was built to survive a nuclear strike on Washington. [131] If he was in it he would have been unharmed if a plane crashed into the White House. But if a plane hit the White House while he was in his office, he could have been killed or seriously injured.
<br><br>As well as being safer, Cheney would probably have been in a better position to respond to the crashes at the World Trade Center. This is because the PEOC was well equipped for dealing with an emergency. Among other things, it was staffed around the clock by specially chosen military personnel from several services and had equipment for video conferencing. [132] Cheney described it as "a more secure facility that's got ... all the communications." [133] Indeed, after he eventually went to the PEOC, much of the U.S. government's response to the 9/11 attacks was managed from there. [134]
<br><br><b>CHENEY FAILED TO SHOW ANY URGENCY</b>
<br>Dick Cheney described 9/11 as if the terrorist attacks were a surprise to him. He recalled: "We don't know what's happening. We know Washington's under attack. We don't know by who, we don't know how many additional planes are coming. We don't know what all is planned for us." [135]
<br><br>But if the attacks were a surprise to him, he surely would have immediately taken action to prepare for any possibility, including an attack on the White House. And yet he seems to have initially responded with a chilling lack of urgency. By the time he started taking serious action, probably more than an hour had passed since the second hijacked plane hit the World Trade Center and the crisis was over.
<br><br>It seems unlikely that Cheney's initial failure to take action was due to incompetence since once the attacks had ended, he was well able to get involved with the government's response to them. For example, he helped Norman Mineta track aircraft as they landed and helped implement the COG plan, thereby ensuring the government would still function in the worst of situations. His actions after the attacks ended led one White House staffer who observed him in the PEOC to describe Cheney as "the man in charge" who was "holding the fort." [136]
<br><br>It also seems unlikely that his initial apparent apathy was simply due to his temperament since he eventually displayed the urgency and decisiveness that were absent while the attacks were taking place. For example, when he was asked by Anthony Barnes if the military could engage the suspicious aircraft believed to be heading toward Washington, at around 10:10 a.m., his response was immediate and authoritative. "You could see him weigh it quickly and make his call," Scooter Libby described. It was a "very quick decision," Libby added. [137]
<br><br><b>WAS CHENEY COMPLICIT IN 9/11?</b>
<br>We surely need to consider whether there was a more sinister reason for Cheney's initial lack of concern and failure to take action after he learned of the crashes at the World Trade Center. Might Cheney's unusual behavior have come about because the vice president was involved in planning and perpetrating the 9/11 attacks? If he was, his initial lack of action could have been deliberate, intended to make sure he did nothing that might stop the attacks before all the planned targets were hit.
<br><br>Cheney may have been employing a simple tactic: He did nothing meaningful for about an hour after he saw the second crash on television; then, after 10:03 a.m., when the last of the hijacked planes apparently crashed into the ground, he started responding with the urgency and commitment he should have exhibited from the outset. Since the attacks were by then over, he could now do whatever he wanted, because nothing he did would affect the outcome of the crisis.
<br><br>If Cheney was involved in planning the attacks, he would have known in advance what was going to happen on September 11. And if he knew what would happen, this could help explain his calmness when the devastating events took place. For example, photos of him in his office between 9:30 a.m. and 9:36 a.m. show that in the middle of the attacks he was apparently relaxed and content to just watch the coverage of the crisis on television. And while other White House officials were visibly distressed when they saw the collapse of the South Tower on television, he appeared emotionless. If Cheney already knew what was going to happen that morning, the catastrophic events would have been less of a shock to him than to others at the White House and, therefore, it presumably would have been easier for him to stay calm.
<br><br>Foreknowledge of the attacks could also explain why Cheney was in no hurry to leave his office and go to somewhere safer, even when his Secret Service agents told him he needed to evacuate immediately. Because he knew what the targets were going to be, he knew that no planes were going to crash into the White House and so he was safe in his office.
<br><br><b>CHENEY SAID THERE WERE 'THINGS' HE HAD 'TO MAKE HAPPEN'</b>
<br>Dick Cheney, as U.S. vice president and the most senior official at the White House when America came under attack, was a key figure on September 11. He described his experiences that day as if he recognized his important role and took it seriously. "This is your job and ... you have things that you have to make happen," he said. "You don't have time for the emotional reaction that might otherwise occur if somebody was just sitting there watching these events unfold and had no responsibilities," he added. [138]
<br><br>Furthermore, his ability to react quickly and effectively to the terrorist attacks should have been greater due to his experiences as secretary of defense and a participant in the continuity of government program. And, surrounded by other senior officials, he was in a good position at the White House to help organize the government's response to the crisis.
<br><br>And yet his response to the attacks while they were taking place was alarmingly poor. At the most important time of his professional life, he apparently failed to do anything significant to help protect his country. Before he was evacuated from his office, he acted like somebody who was indeed "just sitting there watching these events unfold and had no responsibilities."
<br><br>But while his behavior on September 11 was suspicious, official investigations have failed to examine whether Cheney was involved with planning and perpetrating the 9/11 attacks. This possibility now needs to be taken seriously and properly looked into.
<br><br><b>NOTES</b>
<br>[1] <a href="https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB358a/doc22.pdf" target="_blank">"9/11/01 Timeline." United States Secret Service, November 17, 2001</a>; Stephen F. Hayes, <i>Cheney: The Untold Story of America's Most Powerful and Controversial Vice President</i>. New York: HarperCollins, 2007, pp. 327-328.
<br>[2] Stephen F. Hayes, <i>Cheney</i>, p. 328.
<br>[3] <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1992/07/07/us/cheney-friend-to-be-next-navy-secretary-bush-officials-say.html" target="_blank">Eric Schmitt, "Cheney Friend to be Next Navy Secretary, Bush Officials Say." <i>New York Times</i>, July 7, 1992</a>.
<br>[4] <a href="http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp20010916.html" target="_blank"><i>Meet the Press</i>. NBC, September 16, 2001</a>; Stephen F. Hayes, <i>Cheney</i>, pp. 328-330.
<br>[5] <a href="http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp20010916.html" target="_blank"><i>Meet the Press</i></a>; Stephen F. Hayes, <i>Cheney</i>, p. 330; Dick Cheney and Jonathan Reiner with Liz Cheney, <i>Heart: An American Medical Odyssey</i>. New York: Scribner, 2013, p. 189.
<br>[6] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16869695/NY-B9-Farmer-Misc-WH-1-of-3-Fdr-111901-Newsweek-Interview-of-Cheney-450" target="_blank">White House transcript, telephone interview of the vice president by <i>Newsweek</i>. White House, November 19, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/day-changed-america-148319" target="_blank">Evan Thomas, "The Day That Changed America." <i>Newsweek</i>, December 30, 2001</a>.
<br>[7] <a href="http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp20010916.html" target="_blank"><i>Meet the Press</i></a>; Stephen F. Hayes, <i>Cheney</i>, pp. 330-331.
<br>[8] <a href="http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0209/11/se.75.html" target="_blank">"Profiles of Victims, Heroes, Leaders From September 11." <i>Live Event/Special</i>, CNN, September 11, 2002</a>.
<br>[9] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16869893/NY-B10-Farmer-Misc-WH-3-of-3-Fdr-111601-Newsweek-Interview-of-Scooter-Libby-476" target="_blank">White House transcript, interview of Scooter Libby by <i>Newsweek</i> magazine. White House, November 16, 2001</a>; Stephen F. Hayes, <i>Cheney</i>, p. 331.
<br>[10] <a href="http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp20010916.html" target="_blank"><i>Meet the Press</i></a>; <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16869695/NY-B9-Farmer-Misc-WH-1-of-3-Fdr-111901-Newsweek-Interview-of-Cheney-450" target="_blank">White House transcript, telephone interview of the vice president by <i>Newsweek</i></a>; Stephen F. Hayes, <i>Cheney</i>, p. 331.
<br>[11] Stephen F. Hayes, <i>Cheney</i>, pp. 331-332; Barton Gellman, <i>Angler: The Cheney Vice Presidency</i>. New York: Penguin, 2008, p. 114; <a href="https://www.hughhewitt.com/vice-president-dick-cheney-on-his-memoir-in-my-time/" target="_blank">"Vice President Dick Cheney on His Memoir, In My Time." <i>Hugh Hewitt Show</i>, Salem Radio Network, September 8, 2011</a>.
<br>[12] <a href="http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp20010916.html" target="_blank"><i>Meet the Press</i></a>; Barton Gellman, <i>Angler</i>, p. 114.
<br>[13] Richard A. Clarke, <i>Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror</i>. New York: Free Press, 2004, pp. 1-2.
<br>[14] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20110312113702/http:/jacksonville.com/tu-online/stories/091003/nep_13482431.shtml" target="_blank">Christopher F. Aguilar, "Remembering Sept. 11." <i>Florida Times-Union</i>, September 10, 2003</a>; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/231427857/DH-B2-Doug-Cochrane-VP-Military-Aide" target="_blank">Interview with Douglas Cochrane, written notes. 9/11 Commission, April 16, 2004</a>.
<br>[15] <a href="http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp20010916.html" target="_blank"><i>Meet the Press</i></a>; <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16869893/NY-B10-Farmer-Misc-WH-3-of-3-Fdr-111601-Newsweek-Interview-of-Scooter-Libby-476" target="_blank">White House transcript, interview of Scooter Libby by <i>Newsweek</i> magazine</a>; <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16869695/NY-B9-Farmer-Misc-WH-1-of-3-Fdr-111901-Newsweek-Interview-of-Cheney-450" target="_blank">White House transcript, telephone interview of the vice president by <i>Newsweek</i></a>; Stephen F. Hayes, <i>Cheney</i>, pp. 331-332; Barton Gellman, <i>Angler</i>, p. 114.
<br>[16] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16869893/NY-B10-Farmer-Misc-WH-3-of-3-Fdr-111601-Newsweek-Interview-of-Scooter-Libby-476" target="_blank">White House transcript, interview of Scooter Libby by <i>Newsweek</i> magazine</a>.
<br>[17] Barton Gellman, <i>Angler</i>, p. 114.
<br>[18] Stephen F. Hayes, <i>Cheney</i>, pp. 332-333; Robert Schlesinger, <i>White House Ghosts: Presidents and Their Speechwriters</i>. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008, p. 456.
<br>[19] <a href="https://www.georgewbushlibrary.smu.edu/en/Research/~/~/media/7C587F69E2464AF1A01CF74A6A39F2FB.ashx" target="_blank">"The Daily Diary of President George W. Bush." White House, September 11, 2001</a>; 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States</i>. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004, pp. 38-39.
<br>[20] Bill Sammon, <i>Fighting Back: The War on Terrorism--From Inside the Bush White House</i>. Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2002, p. 92-93; Stephen F. Hayes, <i>Cheney</i>, p. 332; Dick Cheney and Jonathan Reiner with Liz Cheney, <i>Heart</i>, p. 189.
<br>[21] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16869695/NY-B9-Farmer-Misc-WH-1-of-3-Fdr-111901-Newsweek-Interview-of-Cheney-450" target="_blank">White House transcript, telephone interview of the vice president by <i>Newsweek</i></a>.
<br>[22] <a href="http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp20010916.html" target="_blank"><i>Meet the Press</i></a>.
<br>[23] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, pp. 39-40.
<br>[24] <a href="http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB165/faa7.pdf" target="_blank">"Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events: September 11, 2001." Federal Aviation Administration, September 17, 2001</a>; 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 39.
<br>[25] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/30764772/Monaghan-FOIA-USSS-Memos-and-Timelines" target="_blank">USSS memo, interview with ATSAIC Scott Johnson and SA James Scott. United States Secret Service, October 1, 2001</a>; <a href="https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB358a/doc22.pdf" target="_blank">"9/11/01 Timeline."</a>
<br>[26] Barton Gellman, <i>Angler</i>, pp. 114-115.
<br>[27] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, pp. 39-40; Dick Cheney with Liz Cheney, <i>In My Time: A Personal and Political Memoir</i>. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011, p. 1.
<br>[28] <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/day-changed-america-148319" target="_blank">Evan Thomas, "The Day That Changed America"</a>; Stephen F. Hayes, <i>Cheney</i>, p. 333.
<br>[29] <a href="http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp20010916.html" target="_blank"><i>Meet the Press</i></a>.
<br>[30] <a href="https://www.nationalreview.com/2011/09/what-i-remember-nro-symposium/" target="_blank">"What I Remember." <i>National Review</i>, September 8, 2011</a>.
<br>[31] <a href="https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB358a/doc22.pdf" target="_blank">"9/11/01 Timeline"</a>; <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16869695/NY-B9-Farmer-Misc-WH-1-of-3-Fdr-111901-Newsweek-Interview-of-Cheney-450" target="_blank">White House transcript, telephone interview of the vice president by <i>Newsweek</i></a>.
<br>[32] See <a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/usnationalarchives/19295963143/in/gallery-flickr-72157656324019012/" target="_blank">David Bohrer, <i>V1546-14: Vice President Cheney Watches Television</i>. September 11, 2001, White House Photo Office, Washington, DC</a>. A few accounts have suggested Dick Cheney was evacuated from his office significantly earlier, apparently shortly after the second hijacked plane crashed into the World Trade Center. See <a href="http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a910tobunker&scale=0" target="_blank">"(Shortly After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Vice President Cheney Evacuated From Office, Earlier Than Some Accounts Claim." History Commons, n.d.</a> However, photos of Cheney in his office in which the television is visible and showing the time reveal that he must have been evacuated much later than this.
<br>[33] Dick Cheney with Liz Cheney, <i>In My Time</i>, p. 1.
<br>[34] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16869695/NY-B9-Farmer-Misc-WH-1-of-3-Fdr-111901-Newsweek-Interview-of-Cheney-450" target="_blank">White House transcript, telephone interview of the vice president by <i>Newsweek</i></a>; 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, pp. 39-40; Stephen F. Hayes, <i>Cheney</i>, p. 335.
<br>[35] Dick Cheney with Liz Cheney, <i>In My Time</i>, p. 2.
<br>[36] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16869695/NY-B9-Farmer-Misc-WH-1-of-3-Fdr-111901-Newsweek-Interview-of-Cheney-450" target="_blank">White House transcript, telephone interview of the vice president by <i>Newsweek</i></a>.
<br>[37] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/30764772/Monaghan-FOIA-USSS-Memos-and-Timelines" target="_blank">USSS memo, interview with SAIC Carl Truscott. United States Secret Service, October 1, 2001</a>; 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 40; Dick Cheney with Liz Cheney, <i>In My Time</i>, p. 2.
<br>[38] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/12992809/Lynne-Cheneys-911-Notes-from-the-White-House-Bunker" target="_blank">White House notes: Lynne Cheney notes, September 11, 2001</a>.
<br>[39] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16869893/NY-B10-Farmer-Misc-WH-3-of-3-Fdr-111601-Newsweek-Interview-of-Scooter-Libby-476" target="_blank">White House transcript, interview of Scooter Libby by <i>Newsweek</i> magazine</a>.
<br>[40] <a href="https://s.yimg.com/dh/ap/politics/interactive/pdf/160911_bush_aids_notes.pdf" target="_blank">White House notes: Ari Fleischer notes, September 11, 2001</a>; Bill Sammon, <i>Fighting Back</i>, p. 101; Ari Fleischer, <i>Taking Heat: The President, the Press, and My Years in the White House</i>. New York: HarperCollins, 2005, p. 141.
<br>[41] <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2001/10/01/the-options" target="_blank">Nicholas Lemann, "The Options." <i>New Yorker</i>, October 1, 2001</a>; Bob Woodward, <i>Bush at War</i>. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002, p. 17.
<br>[42] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/12992809/Lynne-Cheneys-911-Notes-from-the-White-House-Bunker" target="_blank">White House notes: Lynne Cheney notes</a>.
<br>[43] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/30764772/Monaghan-FOIA-USSS-Memos-and-Timelines" target="_blank">USSS memo, interview with SAIC Carl Truscott</a>; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/231427857/DH-B2-Doug-Cochrane-VP-Military-Aide" target="_blank">Interview with Douglas Cochrane, written notes</a>.
<br>[44] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/30764772/Monaghan-FOIA-USSS-Memos-and-Timelines" target="_blank">"Actions of TSD Related to Terrorist Incident." United States Secret Service, September 12, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16869893/NY-B10-Farmer-Misc-WH-3-of-3-Fdr-111601-Newsweek-Interview-of-Scooter-Libby-476" target="_blank">White House transcript, interview of Scooter Libby by <i>Newsweek</i> magazine</a>; <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/day-changed-america-148319" target="_blank">Evan Thomas, "The Day That Changed America"</a>; Dick Cheney with Liz Cheney, <i>In My Time</i>, p. 2.
<br>[45] Barton Gellman, <i>Angler</i>, p. 116.
<br>[46] Stephen F. Hayes, <i>Cheney</i>, p. 337; Dick Cheney with Liz Cheney, <i>In My Time</i>, p. 2.
<br>[47] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 40.
<br>[48] Stephen F. Hayes, <i>Cheney</i>, p. 338; Barton Gellman, <i>Angler</i>, p. 116.
<br>[49] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16869695/NY-B9-Farmer-Misc-WH-1-of-3-Fdr-111901-Newsweek-Interview-of-Cheney-450" target="_blank">White House transcript, telephone interview of the vice president by <i>Newsweek</i></a>.
<br>[50] Barton Gellman, <i>Angler</i>, p. 118.
<br>[51] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20110312113702/http:/jacksonville.com/tu-online/stories/091003/nep_13482431.shtml" target="_blank">Christopher F. Aguilar, "Remembering Sept. 11."</a>
<br>[52] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/231427857/DH-B2-Doug-Cochrane-VP-Military-Aide" target="_blank">Interview with Douglas Cochrane, written notes</a>.
<br>[53] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16571528/T3-B11-EOP-Produced-Documents-Vol-III-Fdr-8202-Scott-PelleyCBS-Interview-of-Rice-002" target="_blank">White House transcript, interview of National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice by Scott Pelley, CBS. White House, August 2, 2002</a>; <a href="http://www.consensus911.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/MSNBC_Condoleezza_Rice_9_11_interview.htm" target="_blank">Condoleezza Rice, interview by David Gregory. NBC News, September 11, 2002</a>.
<br>[54] Peter Baker, <i>Days of Fire: Bush and Cheney in the White House</i>. New York: Doubleday, 2013, p. 127.
<br>[55] Dick Cheney with Liz Cheney, <i>In My Time</i>, p. 6; <a href="https://www.hughhewitt.com/vice-president-dick-cheney-on-his-memoir-in-my-time/" target="_blank">"Vice President Dick Cheney on His Memoir, In My Time."</a>
<br>[56] <a href="http://www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing2/9-11Commission_Hearing_2003-05-23.htm" target="_blank">National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: Public Hearing. 9/11 Commission, May 23, 2003</a>.
<br>[57] <a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2001-sep-15-mn-46082-story.html" target="_blank">Paul Richter, "Fighter Jets Assume New Protective Role." <i>Los Angeles Times</i>, September 15, 2001</a>; <a href="http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2001-09-16/news/0109150281_1_air-national-guard-airliner-fighter-planes" target="_blank">Richard Whittle, "National Guard Jets Raced to Intercept 2 Airliners." <i>Dallas Morning News</i>, September 16, 2001</a>.
<br>[58] <a href="http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp20010916.html" target="_blank"><i>Meet the Press</i></a>.
<br>[59] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 17.
<br>[60] Barton Gellman, <i>Angler</i>, p. 120; <a href="https://www.thedailybeast.com/president-bush-national-geographic-interviews-unanswered-questions" target="_blank">Anthony Summers and Robbyn Swan, "President Bush National Geographic Interview's Unanswered Questions." Daily Beast, August 28, 2011</a>.
<br>[61] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16869695/NY-B9-Farmer-Misc-WH-1-of-3-Fdr-111901-Newsweek-Interview-of-Cheney-450" target="_blank">White House transcript, telephone interview of the vice president by <i>Newsweek</i></a>.
<br>[62] George W. Bush, <i>Decision Points</i>. New York: Crown, 2010, p. 129.
<br>[63] Dick Cheney with Liz Cheney, <i>In My Time</i>, p. 3.
<br>[64] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, pp. 39-41; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/12992821/Brief-Timeline-of-Day-of-9-11-Events-drafted-by-White-House" target="_blank">"September 11, 2001: 'Tic Toc' of Significant Events." White House, n.d.</a>
<br>[65] Mitchell Zuckoff, <i>Fall and Rise: The Story of 9/11</i>. New York: HarperCollins, 2019, p. 147.
<br>[66] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16869695/NY-B9-Farmer-Misc-WH-1-of-3-Fdr-111901-Newsweek-Interview-of-Cheney-450" target="_blank">White House transcript, telephone interview of the vice president by <i>Newsweek</i></a>.
<br>[67] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 40.
<br>[68] George W. Bush, <i>Decision Points</i>, p. 129.
<br>[69] <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/who-was-really-charge-128771" target="_blank">Daniel Klaidman, "Who Was Really in Charge?" <i>Newsweek</i>, June 27, 2004</a>.
<br>[70] Barton Gellman, <i>Angler</i>, p. 121; Philip Shenon, <i>The Commission: The Uncensored History of the 9/11 Investigation</i>. New York: Twelve, 2008, pp. 265-266.
<br>[71] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 41.
<br>[72] Barton Gellman, <i>Angler</i>, p. 121.
<br>[73] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/231427857/DH-B2-Doug-Cochrane-VP-Military-Aide" target="_blank">Interview with Douglas Cochrane, written notes</a>; 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 41; Anthony Summers and Robbyn Swan, <i>The Eleventh Day: The Full Story of 9/11 and Osama bin Laden</i>. New York: Ballantine Books, 2011, pp. 141-142.
<br>[74] <a href="https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2012-076-doc1.pdf" target="_blank">Air Threat Conference and DDO Conference, Transcript. U.S. Department of Defense, September 11, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.oredigger61.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Air-Threat-Conference-Call-Hyde.pdf" target="_blank">Air Threat Conference Call, Transcript. U.S. Department of Defense, September 11, 2001</a>; 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 42.
<br>[75] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 42.
<br>[76] Ibid. p. 41.
<br>[77] <a href="https://www.georgewbushlibrary.smu.edu/en/Research/~/~/media/7C587F69E2464AF1A01CF74A6A39F2FB.ashx" target="_blank">"The Daily Diary of President George W. Bush"</a>; 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 41.
<br>[78] <a href="http://www.consensus911.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/MSNBC_Karl_Rove_9_11_interview.htm" target="_blank">Karl Rove, interview by Campbell Brown. NBC News, September 11, 2002</a>.
<br>[79] <a href="https://s.yimg.com/dh/ap/politics/interactive/pdf/160911_bush_aids_notes.pdf" target="_blank">White House notes: Ari Fleischer notes</a>.
<br>[80] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 465.
<br>[81] Dick Cheney with Liz Cheney, <i>In My Time</i>, p. 6.
<br>[82] Dick Cheney and Jonathan Reiner with Liz Cheney, <i>Heart</i>, p. 190.
<br>[83] <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200403/mann" target="_blank">James Mann, "The Armageddon Plan." <i>The Atlantic</i>, March 2004</a>; <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2004/04/07/armageddon-plan-was-put-into-action-on-911-clarke-says/fce9af72-54e6-43d3-a177-7d29dccfb50b/" target="_blank">Howard Kurtz, "'Armageddon' Plan Was Put Into Action on 9/11, Clarke Says." <i>Washington Post</i>, April 7, 2004</a>.
<br>[84] <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/18/AR2006071801175_pf.html" target="_blank">Dan Balz and Bob Woodward, "America's Chaotic Road to War." <i>Washington Post</i>, January 27, 2002</a>.
<br>[85] <a href="https://www.hughhewitt.com/vice-president-dick-cheney-on-his-memoir-in-my-time/" target="_blank">"Vice President Dick Cheney on His Memoir, In My Time."</a>
<br>[86] Robert J. Darling, <i>24 Hours Inside the President's Bunker: 9/11/01 The White House</i>. Bloomington, IN: iUniverse, 2010, p. 67.
<br>[87] <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200403/mann" target="_blank">James Mann, "The Armageddon Plan"</a>; Dick Cheney with Liz Cheney, <i>In My Time</i>, p. 129.
<br>[88] Richard A. Clarke, <i>Against All Enemies</i>, p. 8.
<br>[89] <a href="http://www.oredigger61.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Air-Threat-Conference-Call-Hyde.pdf" target="_blank">Air Threat Conference Call, Transcript</a>; 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 38.
<br>[90] Garrett M. Graff, <i>Raven Rock: The Story of the U.S. Government's Secret Plan to Save Itself--While the Rest of us Die</i>. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2017, p. 337.
<br>[91] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16869695/NY-B9-Farmer-Misc-WH-1-of-3-Fdr-111901-Newsweek-Interview-of-Cheney-450" target="_blank">White House transcript, telephone interview of the vice president by <i>Newsweek</i></a>; <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/day-changed-america-148319" target="_blank">Evan Thomas, "The Day That Changed America."</a>
<br>[92] Stephen F. Hayes, <i>Cheney</i>, pp. 335-336.
<br>[93] <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/09/10/ar911.cheney.alert/index.html" target="_blank">John King, "Vice President in Secure Location at Night." CNN, September 11, 2002</a>.
<br>[94] <a href="http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp20010916.html" target="_blank"><i>Meet the Press</i></a>; <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16869695/NY-B9-Farmer-Misc-WH-1-of-3-Fdr-111901-Newsweek-Interview-of-Cheney-450" target="_blank">White House transcript, telephone interview of the vice president by <i>Newsweek</i></a>; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/16869732/NY-B9-Farmer-Misc-WH-1-of-3-Fdr-12-17-01-Woodward-Balz-Washington-Post-Interview-of-Cheney-455" target="_blank">White House transcript, telephone interview of the vice president by Bob Woodward and Dan Balz, the <i>Washington Post</i>. White House, December 17, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200403/mann" target="_blank">James Mann, "The Armageddon Plan"</a>; Dick Cheney with Liz Cheney, <i>In My Time</i>, p. 6.
<br>[95] Robert J. Darling, <i>24 Hours Inside the President's Bunker</i>, p. 67.
<br>[96] <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/18/AR2006071801175_pf.html" target="_blank">Dan Balz and Bob Woodward, "America's Chaotic Road to War."</a>
<br>[97] Dennis Hastert, <i>Speaker: Lessons From Forty Years in Coaching and Politics</i>. Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2004, pp. 8-9; Dick Cheney with Liz Cheney, <i>In My Time</i>, p. 6.
<br>[98] <a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GOVMAN-1999-06-01/pdf/GOVMAN-1999-06-01.pdf" target="_blank">Office of the Federal Register/National Archives and Records Administration, <i>The United States Government Manual 1999/2000</i>. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999, p. 90</a>; <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-vice-president-and-foreign-policy" target="_blank">Jonathan Masters, "The U.S. Vice President and Foreign Policy." Council on Foreign Relations, September 22, 2016</a>; <a href="https://system.uslegal.com/executive-branch/vice-president/" target="_blank">"Vice President." U.S. Legal, n.d.</a>; <a href="https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice_President.htm" target="_blank">"Vice President of the United States (President of the Senate)." United States Senate, n.d.</a>
<br>[99] <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-white-house/the-executive-branch/" target="_blank">"Our Government: The Executive Branch." White House, n.d.</a>
<br>[100] <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-vice-president-and-foreign-policy" target="_blank">Jonathan Masters, "The U.S. Vice President and Foreign Policy"</a>; <a href="https://www.thoughtco.com/vice-president-duties-and-details-3322133" target="_blank">Robert Longley, "Vice President of the United States: Duties and Details." ThoughtCo, May 1, 2019</a>; <a href="https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice_President.htm" target="_blank">"Vice President of the United States (President of the Senate)."</a>
<br>[101] <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-white-house/the-executive-branch/" target="_blank">"Our Government: The Executive Branch."</a>
<br>[102] <a href="https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice_President.htm" target="_blank">"Vice President of the United States (President of the Senate)."</a>
<br>[103] <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-vice-president-and-foreign-policy" target="_blank">Jonathan Masters, "The U.S. Vice President and Foreign Policy."</a>
<br>[104] <a href="https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice_President.htm" target="_blank">"Vice President of the United States (President of the Senate)."</a>
<br>[105] <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-vice-president-and-foreign-policy" target="_blank">Jonathan Masters, "The U.S. Vice President and Foreign Policy."</a>
<br>[106] <a href="https://system.uslegal.com/executive-branch/vice-president/" target="_blank">"Vice President."</a>
<br>[107] <a href="http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp20010916.html" target="_blank"><i>Meet the Press</i></a>.
<br>[108] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/16869732/NY-B9-Farmer-Misc-WH-1-of-3-Fdr-12-17-01-Woodward-Balz-Washington-Post-Interview-of-Cheney-455" target="_blank">White House transcript, telephone interview of the vice president by Bob Woodward and Dan Balz, the <i>Washington Post</i></a>.
<br>[109] <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/vice-president-dick-cheney" target="_blank">"Vice President Dick Cheney." <i>NewsHour</i>, PBS, September 9, 2002</a>.
<br>[110] Barton Gellman, <i>Angler</i>, p. 118.
<br>[111] <a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GOVMAN-1999-06-01/pdf/GOVMAN-1999-06-01.pdf" target="_blank">Office of the Federal Register/National Archives and Records Administration, <i>The United States Government Manual 1999/2000</i>, p. 177</a>; <a href="https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d5100_01.pdf" target="_blank"><i>Department of Defense Directive 5100.01: Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components</i>. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, December 21, 2010</a>; <a href="https://dod.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/Travels-with-the-Secretary/" target="_blank">"Travels With the Secretary." U.S. Department of Defense, n.d.</a>
<br>[112] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 17; <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20180126012537/https:/www.defense.gov/About/DoD-101/" target="_blank">"DOD 101: Overview of the Department of Defense." U.S. Department of Defense, n.d.</a>
<br>[113] <a href="https://www.aclu.org/files/projects/foiasearch/pdf/DODDOA008159.pdf" target="_blank"><i>Multiservice Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance Operations</i>. Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1994</a>; <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/25/books/chapters/0325-1st-cockb.html" target="_blank">Andrew Cockburn, <i>Rumsfeld: His Rise, Fall, and Catastrophic Legacy</i>. New York: Scribner, 2007, p. 4</a>; <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20030202052302/http:/www.dtic.mil/jcs/core/overview.html" target="_blank">"Overview of National Security Structure." Defense Technical Information Center, n.d.</a>
<br>[114] Robert J. Darling, <i>24 Hours Inside the President's Bunker</i>, p. 103.
<br>[115] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16869695/NY-B9-Farmer-Misc-WH-1-of-3-Fdr-111901-Newsweek-Interview-of-Cheney-450" target="_blank">White House transcript, telephone interview of the vice president by <i>Newsweek</i></a>.
<br>[116] <a href="http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp20010916.html" target="_blank"><i>Meet the Press</i></a>.
<br>[117] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16869695/NY-B9-Farmer-Misc-WH-1-of-3-Fdr-111901-Newsweek-Interview-of-Cheney-450" target="_blank">White House transcript, telephone interview of the vice president by <i>Newsweek</i></a>.
<br>[118] Richard A. Clarke, <i>Against All Enemies</i>, pp. 1-2.
<br>[119] <a href="http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp20010916.html" target="_blank"><i>Meet the Press</i></a>.
<br>[120] <a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/usnationalarchives/19295976273/in/album-72157656213196901/" target="_blank">David Bohrer, <i>V1546-04: Vice President Cheney Watches Television</i>. September 11, 2001, White House Photo Office, Washington, DC</a>; <a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/usnationalarchives/19728931340/in/album-72157656213196901/" target="_blank">David Bohrer, <i>V1546-05: Vice President Cheney Watches Television</i>. September 11, 2001, White House Photo Office, Washington, DC</a>; <a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/usnationalarchives/19916932565/in/album-72157656213196901/" target="_blank">David Bohrer, <i>V1546-06: Vice President Cheney Watches Television</i>. September 11, 2001, White House Photo Office, Washington, DC</a>.
<br>[121] <a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/usnationalarchives/19921999311/in/album-72157656213196901/" target="_blank">David Bohrer, <i>V1546-10: Vice President Cheney Watches Television</i>. September 11, 2001, White House Photo Office, Washington, DC</a>; <a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/usnationalarchives/19295963143/in/gallery-flickr-72157656324019012/" target="_blank">David Bohrer, <i>V1546-14</i></a>.
<br>[122] See the set of 356 photos of Dick Cheney on September 11 that were released to PBS in 2015: <a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/usnationalarchives/sets/72157656213196901" target="_blank"><i>Vice President Cheney on September 11, 2001</i>. September 11, 2001, White House Photo Office, Washington, DC</a>.
<br>[123] Barton Gellman, <i>Angler</i>, p. 115.
<br>[124] <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/day-changed-america-148319" target="_blank">Evan Thomas, "The Day That Changed America"</a>; Stephen F. Hayes, <i>Cheney</i>, p. 333.
<br>[125] <a href="http://voices.washingtonpost.com/cheney/chapters/chapter_1/" target="_blank">Barton Gellman and Jo Becker, "'A Different Understanding With the President.'" <i>Washington Post</i>, June 24, 2007</a>; Barton Gellman, <i>Angler</i>, pp. 116-117.
<br>[126] <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/day-changed-america-148319" target="_blank">Evan Thomas, "The Day That Changed America."</a>
<br>[127] <a href="http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,165128,00.html" target="_blank">Michael Duffy, "Flight of the Intruder." <i>Time</i>, September 26, 1994</a>.
<br>[128] Barton Gellman, <i>Angler</i>, p. 115.
<br>[129] Dick Cheney with Liz Cheney, <i>In My Time</i>, p. 1.
<br>[130] Peter Baker, <i>Days of Fire</i>, p. 121; <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cmqB-RkVWGY" target="_blank">Adriana Padilla, Bethany Jones, and Karen Daniel, "9/11: Inside the White House." <i>Queens of Crime</i>, podcast audio, October 11, 2017</a>.
<br>[131] <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/13/opinion/essay-inside-the-bunker.html" target="_blank">William Safire, "Inside the Bunker." <i>New York Times</i>, September 13, 2001</a>; <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/us/9-11-newly-released-photos-show-us-leaders-in-aftermath-of-attacks-1.2297363" target="_blank">Éanna Ó Caollaí, "9/11: Newly Released Photos Show U.S. Leaders in Aftermath of Attacks." <i>Irish Times</i>, July 25, 2015</a>; <a href="https://www.bellinghamherald.com/news/business/article102231307.html" target="_blank">David W. Myers, "Get Your Home Ready for Cooler Months Ahead." <i>Bellingham Herald</i>, September 16, 2016</a>.
<br>[132] Robert J. Darling, <i>24 Hours Inside the President's Bunker</i>, p. 50; Dick Cheney with Liz Cheney, <i>In My Time</i>, p. 2; <a href="https://www.bellinghamherald.com/news/business/article102231307.html" target="_blank">David W. Myers, "Get Your Home Ready for Cooler Months Ahead."</a>
<br>[133] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16869695/NY-B9-Farmer-Misc-WH-1-of-3-Fdr-111901-Newsweek-Interview-of-Cheney-450" target="_blank">White House transcript, telephone interview of the vice president by <i>Newsweek</i></a>.
<br>[134] Stephen F. Hayes, <i>Cheney</i>, p. 337.
<br>[135] <a href="http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp20010916.html" target="_blank"><i>Meet the Press</i></a>.
<br>[136] Barton Gellman, <i>Angler</i>, p. 118.
<br>[137] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16869893/NY-B10-Farmer-Misc-WH-3-of-3-Fdr-111601-Newsweek-Interview-of-Scooter-Libby-476" target="_blank">White House transcript, interview of Scooter Libby by <i>Newsweek</i> magazine</a>.
<br>[138] <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/vice-president-dick-cheney" target="_blank">"Vice President Dick Cheney."</a>
Shoestringhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01534319150672667644noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2990970741097819876.post-62836332900418595172019-01-31T01:19:00.000-08:002019-01-31T01:19:22.440-08:00The Inexplicable Calls From a Hijacked Plane Made by the Solicitor General's Wife on 9/11<br><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgh9g02e-JnMzFRi15JgOh8XPvg-mFHVD4FwnihF-qhIz2CPdMkLCZ5rmWbLttfRZCVwAVD4oFZFvppwRKb3jDDLgOIi7ZAq0H_1bbJzMLXeStKUqIXCiGFO8BStgxE2EFqhv4N2btfrudL/s1600/TedOlsonPhone.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;" target="_blank"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgh9g02e-JnMzFRi15JgOh8XPvg-mFHVD4FwnihF-qhIz2CPdMkLCZ5rmWbLttfRZCVwAVD4oFZFvppwRKb3jDDLgOIi7ZAq0H_1bbJzMLXeStKUqIXCiGFO8BStgxE2EFqhv4N2btfrudL/s1600/TedOlsonPhone.jpg" data-original-width="290" data-original-height="225" alt="Ted Olson's phone"/></a></div><br>Barbara Olson, a passenger on one of the planes hijacked on September 11, 2001, called her husband from the hijacked aircraft and gave him important details of the hijacking. The information she provided subsequently helped establish the official narrative of the 9/11 attacks. However, close analysis of the various accounts of her calls reveals so many anomalies and contradictions that the calls appear highly suspicious.
<br><br>Barbara Olson, a well-known political commentator, was on American Airlines Flight 77, the third of the four planes to be hijacked on September 11, which supposedly crashed into the Pentagon. After the hijackers took over her plane, she made two phone calls to her husband, Ted Olson, the solicitor general of the United States.
<br><br>The details she provided in the calls gave an insight into what the passengers and crew members supposedly experienced when their plane was taken over, and in the time between the hijacking and when the plane crashed. She was, for example, the only person on the hijacked planes to reveal in a phone call the much-reported detail that the hijackers were armed with box cutters. [1] She was subsequently the first victim of the 9/11 attacks to be named on television and the most famous person to die in the attacks. [2]
<br><br>There are, however, significant contradictions between accounts given by those who dealt with her calls. There are, for example, conflicting accounts of where she was on the plane when she made the calls and whether she used a cell phone or one of the plane's seatback Airfones.
<br><br>There are also problems with official records that provide details of the calls. For example, while Ted Olson has described receiving only two calls from his wife, official records indicate that four successful calls were made to his office from Flight 77.
<br><br>If the official story of how Barbara Olson called her husband from Flight 77 after it was hijacked and told him what had happened on her plane is accurate, the various accounts of her calls would surely be fairly consistent in the information they provided. The appearance of so many contradictions and anomalies in these accounts thus indicates there was more to the calls than the official narrative of 9/11 suggests.
<br><br>Since reports about the calls in the news helped establish the official 9/11 story, anything that casts doubt on how the calls came about and the validity of the information Barbara Olson provided in them surely brings into question the entire official narrative of 9/11.
<br><br><b>BARBARA OLSON WAS DUE TO APPEAR ON TV ON SEPTEMBER 11</b>
<br>Barbara Olson was a well-known public figure in the United States. She had been a federal prosecutor, but when the 9/11 attacks occurred, she was a conservative political commentator who regularly appeared on television. [3]
<br><br>Ted Olson, her husband, was a lawyer who, three months before 9/11, took office as solicitor general of the United States, the fourth-highest-ranking official in the U.S. Department of Justice who represents the federal government in cases before the Supreme Court. [4] He previously represented candidate George W. Bush in the Supreme Court case that settled the disputed 2000 presidential election. [5]
<br><br>Barbara Olson was a passenger on Flight 77, a plane bound from Dulles International Airport in Washington, DC, to Los Angeles, California. [6] She was going to Los Angeles to appear on Bill Maher's television show, <i>Politically Incorrect</i>, and to attend a major media business conference. [7]
<br><br>Flight 77 took off at 8:20 a.m. on September 11 and was hijacked between 8:51 a.m. and 8:54 a.m., according to the <i>9/11 Commission Report</i>. The hijackers were five Middle Eastern men. No passengers are believed to have been injured or killed during the hijacking. Then, after deviating from its assigned course, the plane was flown by the hijackers back toward Washington and, according to the official narrative, crashed into the Pentagon at 9:37 a.m. [8]
<br><br>Only one person other than Barbara Olson is reported to have made a phone call from Flight 77 after it was hijacked. Renee May, one of the flight attendants, called her mother on an Airfone at 9:12 a.m. [9] She said her plane had been taken over by six individuals, and these hijackers had moved the passengers and crew members to the back of the aircraft. She instructed her mother to call American Airlines to report the incident. [10]
<br><br><b>SECRETARY ANSWERED A SERIES OF AUTOMATED CALLS</b>
<br>While Barbara Olson only reached her husband sometime after May talked to her mother, evidence indicates that she may have made several unsuccessful attempts at calling his office at the Department of Justice earlier on. Specifically, beginning at around 9:00 a.m., Lori Keyton, a secretary in the office, answered around six to eight collect calls in succession. They were all automated and comprised a recorded voice advising her of the collect call, and telling her to hold for an operator; a short time later, a recorded voice stated that all operators were busy and gave the advice to hang up and try the call again later.
<br><br>These were presumably attempted calls made by Barbara Olson, since they occurred just before Barbara Olson was able to reach her husband's office and her first successful call was a collect call. However, Keyton's phone had no caller identification feature, so Keyton would have been unable to determine the origin of the calls. [11]
<br><br>It also appears that Barbara Olson may have tried passing on information about the hijacking of Flight 77 by calling Ted Olson's number at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, the law firm he worked for before taking over as solicitor general, and leaving voicemail messages. Ted Olson spoke to the FBI on September 13, after previously being interviewed by the bureau on September 11 about the calls from his wife, and said he had "new messages on his voicemail at his old law firm" and "his old secretary would provide access to these calls to the FBI." [12]
<br><br>While the FBI's record of its September 13 conversation with the solicitor general provides no details about what was in the messages, Ted Olson was presumably referring to voicemail messages left by his wife when she called from Flight 77 after it was hijacked. Barbara Olson may have called his old law firm because she had difficulty reaching him at the Department of Justice. Ted Olson has in fact mentioned how hard it could be to contact him there. While describing his wife's calls from Flight 77, he told the London <i>Telegraph</i>, "She was trying to get through to the Department of Justice, which is never very easy." [13]
<br><br><b>BARBARA OLSON CALLED AN OPERATOR AND ASKED TO BE CONNECTED TO HER HUSBAND'S OFFICE</b>
<br>Barbara Olson made her first successful call to Ted Olson at sometime between 9:15 a.m. and 9:25 a.m. (Investigators have been unable to determine the exact time of the call. [14]) She reportedly reached his office by dialing "0" on one of the Airfones on Flight 77 and initially talking to an operator. [15] She gave Mercy Lorenzo, the operator she spoke to, details of what was happening on Flight 77 before Lorenzo connected the call to Ted Olson's office.
<br><br>Barbara Olson told Lorenzo her plane "was currently being hijacked," Lorenzo has recalled. She said the hijackers were "armed with guns and knives," and "were ordering the passengers to move to the back of the plane." She also "wanted to know how to let the pilots know what was happening," because it "did not appear as if they were aware of the situation."
<br><br>She asked to be connected to her husband, who she said was "a sergeant who resides in Washington, DC," and provided his telephone number. [16] Lorenzo connected her to Ted Olson's office where the call was answered by Lori Keyton. Lorenzo told Keyton there was "an emergency collect call." Keyton accepted the call and then Barbara Olson came on the line. She asked Keyton to pass on a message to Ted Olson, but Keyton said she would put him on the line. [17]
<br><br>Keyton alerted Helen Voss, Ted Olson's special assistant, to the call, and then Voss rushed up to Ted Olson and told him, "Barbara is on the phone." At that point, Ted Olson, who had been watching the coverage of the attacks on the World Trade Center on television, took over the call. [18]
<br><br>Barbara Olson then gave her husband details of the crisis on her plane. She said it had been hijacked by men armed with "knives and box cutters." She said she had been sitting in first class, which was at the front of the plane, but the hijackers had moved the passengers to the back of the plane. She said the hijackers were unaware that she was making the call. [19] The call then inexplicably got cut off. [20] Ted Olson has estimated that he talked to his wife for about a minute before it ended. [21]
<br><br><b>TED OLSON ALERTED HIS COMMAND CENTER</b>
<br>The solicitor general then set about alerting others to what he had learned. He tried calling Attorney General John Ashcroft but was unable to reach him. He then called the Department of Justice command center. He did so, he recalled, because he "wanted them to know there was another hijacked plane out there" and to pass on the information his wife had given him "to someone who could possibly do something."
<br><br>He told the person at the command center who answered the call that his wife's plane had been hijacked and he gave them the number of the flight. [22] He said his wife was able to communicate from the plane, even though her call to him got cut off. [23] He was told that, prior to his call, officials in the command center had been unaware of the hijacking of Flight 77. [24]
<br><br>He also asked for someone from the command center to come to his office. [25] Allen Ferber, a security officer, was therefore instructed to go to the solicitor general's office. After he arrived there, he sat watching the television coverage of the attacks with Ted Olson. [26]
<br><br><b>BARBARA OLSON PHONED AGAIN SHORTLY AFTER HER FIRST CALL ENDED</b>
<br>Barbara Olson was able to talk to her husband again within a few minutes of her first call to him getting cut off and provided additional information about the hijacking of Flight 77.
<br><br>Her second call to Ted Olson was made at sometime between 9:20 a.m. and 9:30 a.m. (As with her first call, investigators have been unable to determine the exact time. [27]) Unlike previously, she now phoned his office directly rather than being connected to it by an operator. As before, the call was initially answered by Lori Keyton, who then passed it on to the solicitor general. [28]
<br><br>Barbara Olson told her husband the pilot of Flight 77 had announced that the plane had been hijacked. Ted Olson asked if she had any idea of her plane's location. She said the plane had been hijacked shortly after it took off and had been "circling around for a while." She said it was flying over some houses. She also said she thought it was heading northeast. How she determined this is unclear. Ted Olson has commented that he believed she must have consulted someone else on the plane.
<br><br>During the call, Ted Olson alerted his wife to the crisis that was taking place that morning. He said two other planes, besides Flight 77, had been hijacked and these had crashed into the World Trade Center.
<br><br>For much of the call, according to Ted Olson, the couple "segued back and forth between expressions of feeling for one another and this effort to exchange information." They reassured each other that things were going to work out okay. [29]
<br><br>The last thing Barbara Olson said to her husband was: "What shall I tell the pilot? What can I tell the pilot to do?" [30] The call then got cut off. [31] It had lasted between two and four minutes, Ted Olson has estimated. [32] Ted Olson then returned to watching the coverage of the attacks on television. [33]
<br><br><b>TED OLSON THOUGHT FLIGHT 77 HAD CRASHED AS SOON AS HE HEARD OF AN INCIDENT AT THE PENTAGON</b>
<br>When he saw reports about some kind of explosion occurring at the Pentagon, the solicitor general was immediately certain his wife's plane had crashed there. He recalled that when he saw the first reports of the incident, "I knew in my heart that was that aircraft and I also knew in my heart that [Barbara Olson] could not possibly have survived that kind of an explosion with a full load of fuel on a recently taken-off airplane." [34] "I knew it was her" as soon as he learned of the incident, he told the London <i>Telegraph</i>. [35] "I did and I didn't want to, but I knew," he told CNN. [36]
<br><br>Ted Olson promptly told others what he had concluded. Helen Voss recalled that when the incident at the Pentagon was first reported, he told her, "That's Barbara's plane." [37] Allen Ferber recalled that, referring to the early television coverage of the incident, Ted Olson told him, "The plane is down." [38]
<br><br>Ted Olson stayed in his office at the Department of Justice for the next few hours, and phoned friends and family members to let them know that Barbara Olson was probably dead. [39] He recalled: "I called my mother and I called my son. I said I didn't think--I thought that--I was hoping that it wasn't true, but I was very worried. I did not want them to see something on television and hear her name." [40]
<br><br><b>ACCOUNTS CONFLICT OVER BARBARA OLSON'S LOCATION ON THE PLANE</b>
<br>While the story of how Barbara Olson phoned her husband on September 11 and told him about the hijacking of Flight 77 may appear straightforward and unproblematic, close analysis of it reveals countless problems that have never been properly addressed by official investigations of the 9/11 attacks. There are, for example, numerous contradictions in the various accounts of her calls and other evidence relating to them.
<br><br>To begin with, there is conflicting evidence of where on the plane Barbara Olson was located when she made the calls. Some evidence indicates she was near the back of the coach section. She used an Airfone to call her husband, according to the Department of Justice, and the Airfones were attached to the back of the plane's seats. [41] Since the hijackers reportedly moved the passengers to the back of the plane, this would presumably mean she was at the back of the coach section with the other passengers, using an Airfone on the back of one of the seats there.
<br><br>And yet one account contradicted this. A spokesman for Ted Olson stated that Barbara Olson "said she was locked in the toilet" when she made the calls. [42]
<br><br><b>ACCOUNTS CONFLICT OVER THE TYPE OF PHONE BARBARA OLSON USED</b>
<br>There are also conflicting claims about what kind of phone Barbara Olson used when she called her husband. She used a cell phone, according to some accounts; according to others, she used an Airfone.
<br><br>If she was locked in the toilet when she made the calls, she must have used a cell phone, since there would have been no Airfone there for her to use. However, the Department of Justice and the FBI told the 9/11 Commission, "All of the calls from Flight 77 were made via the onboard Airfone system." [43]
<br><br>Ted Olson, meanwhile, has given contradictory accounts. Initially, on the day of the attacks, he told the FBI he didn't know if his wife used a cell phone or an Airfone. He mentioned, though, that she "always has her cell phone with her." [44] He similarly told Fox News, three days later, that he was unaware of what kind of phone she used, but added that he initially assumed she must have used an Airfone and called collect because "she somehow didn't have access to her credit cards." [45]
<br><br>Lori Keyton, who initially answered the calls from Barbara Olson, seemingly confirmed that Ted Olson would have been unable to determine what kind of phone his wife used. She told the FBI there was no caller identification feature on her phone and so she was unable to ascertain whether Barbara Olson's calls were made on a cell phone or an Airfone. Unless Barbara Olson mentioned to him what kind of phone she was using, therefore, Ted Olson would presumably have been unaware of whether she used a cell phone or an Airfone. [46]
<br><br>However, on September 11, he told CNN that his wife "called him twice on a cell phone." [47] Six months later, he again implied that he knew what kind of phone she called him on, only this time he claimed she used an Airfone. "She wasn't using her cell phone; she was using the phone in the passengers' seats," he told the London <i>Telegraph</i>. [48] But at a public event in 2014, he indicated that she used a cell phone. While describing her calls from Flight 77, he commented, "I don't know how Barbara managed to make her cell phone work," since she was "up in the air." [49]
<br><br><b>ACCOUNTS CONFLICT OVER WHETHER ONE OR BOTH CALLS WERE MADE THROUGH AN OPERATOR</b>
<br>There is also contradictory evidence regarding whether the second call Barbara Olson made to her husband was, like her first call, made via an operator or made directly to the solicitor general's office.
<br><br>An FBI report published on September 20, 2001, that described the Airfone calls from Flight 77 listed four calls from unknown callers to unknown recipients, which, the Department of Justice and the FBI have determined, included the calls made by Barbara Olson to her husband. These four calls all involved the caller dialing "0" in order to reach an operator, the report stated. [50] If the Department of Justice and the FBI's determination was correct, it means Barbara Olson's second call, like the first, went via an operator.
<br><br>And yet Lori Keyton, who initially answered the second call, contradicted this. Barbara Olson "called direct," she told the FBI. There was no operator on the line when she picked up the phone and the first words she heard were, "It's Barbara." [51]
<br><br><b>BARBARA OLSON'S COMPOSURE CHANGED DRASTICALLY</b>
<br>There are conflicting descriptions of how composed Barbara Olson was when she called her husband's office. Keyton said she "sounded hysterical" when she made her first call. [52] Helen Voss recalled Keyton telling her that Barbara Olson was "in a panic" when she alerted her to the call. [53]
<br><br>Ted Olson, however, described his wife as being unusually calm during her calls. "She sounded very, very calm ... in retrospect, enormously, remarkably, incredibly calm," he said. [54]
<br><br>Barbara Olson's behavior was quite bizarre, if these accounts are accurate. It appears that Barbara Olson went from sounding "hysterical" to being "incredibly calm" in the space of probably just a few seconds.
<br><br>Additionally, it seems odd that Barbara Olson would be so calm when she talked to her husband, since she apparently had no previous experience of dealing with a crisis as serious as the situation she was in, unlike, say, someone who worked for the military or in law enforcement. Ted Olson recalled that even when he told her two planes, besides Flight 77, had been hijacked and subsequently crashed into the World Trade Center, she "did not seem panicked." [55]
<br><br>Ted Olson's explanation for how Barbara Olson was able to remain so calm was that she would have been focused on thinking, "What can I do to help solve this problem?" And yet the solicitor general also surmised that she "must have been partially in shock from the fact that she was on a hijacked plane." [56] So, even if she was thinking about how to respond to the hijacking, would she really have remained "enormously, remarkably, incredibly calm" in such a threatening situation?
<br><br><b>TED OLSON HEARD NO BACKGROUND NOISE</b>
<br>The other passengers on Flight 77 were also apparently remarkably calm. Ted Olson said he could hear no "other noises on the plane" besides the sound of his wife's voice. [57]
<br><br>This is extraordinary. If Barbara Olson was at the back of the coach section rather than locked in the toilet--as would have been the case if she was calling on an Airfone--there would likely have been 52 other passengers and four flight attendants in the same area of the plane as her. [58] In such terrifying circumstances, would these 56 people all have been so calm that none of them made a sound while Barbara Olson spoke to her husband?
<br><br>Their silence seems even stranger considering that it appears no hijackers were with them, since Barbara Olson told her husband the hijackers were unaware that she was calling him even though, he recalled, she was "speaking loud enough that I could hear her" and not whispering. [59]
<br><br>If no hijackers were with them, the passengers and crew members could presumably have talked freely among themselves. They could have discussed things like what they knew about the hijacking, what they thought the hijackers' intentions were, and what they could do in response to the crisis. Under these circumstances, would they really all have remained silent?
<br><br><b>BARBARA OLSON GAVE INACCURATE INFORMATION</b>
<br>Another oddity is that Barbara Olson made some claims in the calls that contradict findings of official investigations of the 9/11 attacks. For example, she said her plane was hijacked "shortly after takeoff." [60] However, the <i>9/11 Commission Report</i> determined that the hijacking occurred quite a long time after Flight 77 left the ground. It took off from Dulles International Airport at 8:20 a.m. and, the 9/11 Commission established, the hijacking occurred more than 30 minutes later, between 8:51 a.m. and 8:54 a.m. [61]
<br><br>And she said the plane had been "circling around for a while" after it was hijacked. [62] But according to a study by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) based on information from the plane's flight data recorder and radar data, this claim was also incorrect.
<br><br>After the plane is believed to have been hijacked, the NTSB determined, it deviated from its assigned course and turned to the south. By 9:00 a.m. it had reversed course and was heading east. At 9:07 a.m. it made a slight change of course and headed to the east-northeast. Over the next three minutes its heading "remained steady." And between 9:10 a.m. and 9:34 a.m. only "slight course changes were initiated." [63] The plane was therefore never "circling around" between when it was hijacked and when Barbara Olson called her husband.
<br><br><b>MESSAGES WERE LEFT ON TED OLSON'S OLD VOICEMAIL</b>
<br>It seems unusual that there are so many contradictions in the various accounts of Barbara Olson's calls from Flight 77 and other evidence relating to the calls. If the official story of how the calls came about and what was said in them is accurate, details would surely be more consistent between the accounts. The existence of so many contradictions and anomalies therefore gives rise to numerous questions.
<br><br>There are questions regarding the messages Ted Olson said were left on his voicemail at his old law firm. If these messages were left by Barbara Olson, why has Ted Olson never mentioned them and described their contents during public appearances in which he talked about the calls from his wife on September 11? The only time he is known to have revealed their existence was during a phone call with the FBI on September 13, 2001. [64]
<br><br>Furthermore, were the messages recorded before or after Barbara Olson spoke to her husband? And why was there no mention of the calls to the law firm in information the Department of Justice provided to the 9/11 Commission, which supposedly covered all of the calls made from Flight 77? [65]
<br><br><b>BARBARA OLSON TOLD AN OPERATOR THAT THE HIJACKERS HAD GUNS</b>
<br>Why did Barbara Olson call an operator, rather than phoning her husband's office directly, when she made her first successful call to Ted Olson? She clearly knew the number for the office, since she provided it to the operator, Mercy Lorenzo, so Lorenzo could connect her to the office. [66] And she must have been capable of phoning Ted Olson's office directly, since she phoned it directly when she made her second successful call. [67]
<br><br>Additionally, did she tell Lorenzo that the hijackers on Flight 77 had guns, as Lorenzo claimed when she was interviewed by the FBI? [68] The <i>9/11 Commission Report</i> made no mention of the hijackers being armed with guns. [69] And Ted Olson has never mentioned his wife telling him they had guns. [70]
<br><br>Did Lorenzo therefore incorrectly claim that Barbara Olson told her the hijackers had guns because she misheard what the solicitor general's wife said? Or was she perhaps mistaken in her recollection of her conversation with Barbara Olson when she spoke to the FBI? If, however, her claim was accurate, why is there no other evidence of the hijackers on Flight 77 having guns? Why has Ted Olson never said his wife told him they were armed with guns?
<br><br><b>BARBARA OLSON GAVE NO DESCRIPTION OF THE HIJACKERS</b>
<br>Then, when she spoke to her husband, why did Barbara Olson provide no information about the appearance of the hijackers? She surely ought to have noticed what at least some of them looked like, since three of them were, like her, initially seated in first class. [71] And yet she "never identified what the nationality [of the hijackers] was or what the hijackers were like," Ted Olson recalled. [72]
<br><br>When flight attendant Renee May called her mother from Flight 77, she did at least specify how many hijackers there were, saying there were six of them. [73] Barbara Olson and May were both near the front of the aircraft when it began its flight, and so they presumably would have been in this part of the plane when it was hijacked and witnessed the same things at that time. And yet, while May determined how many hijackers there were and passed this information on, Barbara Olson never told her husband anything about the number of hijackers.
<br><br>Why did she either fail to determine how many hijackers there were or fail to pass on such an important piece of information? She did reveal that there was more than one hijacker, but only inadvertently, since she referred to the hijackers as "they" rather than "he" or "she." [74] (Curiously, though, May's claim about the number of hijackers contradicts official accounts. According to the FBI and the <i>9/11 Commission Report</i>, there were five hijackers--not six--on Flight 77. [75])
<br><br>Even if, for some reason, Barbara Olson failed to observe any details of the physical appearance of the hijackers, she ought to have heard their voices. She therefore should have noticed that, as the Department of Justice and the FBI have pointed out, they had only "limited English language skills." [76] But she never mentioned any such detail to her husband.
<br><br>The only possible explanation Ted Olson has suggested for why his wife told him nothing about the appearance of the hijackers was, "We just didn't--that didn't come up" in his conversations with her. [77] But surely she would have wanted, as a matter of priority, to give him details that might help identify the hijackers, especially since he worked at the Department of Justice and would likely have been able to quickly contact key individuals who could help respond to the hijacking. If, for example, she'd mentioned the hijackers' poor English, this would have indicated that they were foreigners.
<br><br><b>SOME OF BARBARA OLSON'S CLAIMS CONTRADICT THE OFFICIAL 9/11 STORY</b>
<br>Also, why does some of the information that Barbara Olson provided to her husband conflict with the official narrative of the hijacking of Flight 77? She said the plane was hijacked "shortly after takeoff." And yet, according to the <i>9/11 Commission Report</i>, the hijacking occurred more than half an hour after the plane left the ground. She also said the plane had been "circling around" after it was hijacked. But the NTSB determined that it maintained quite a steady course after the hijackers took over and flew it back toward Washington.
<br><br>Assuming the <i>9/11 Commission Report</i> and the NTSB were correct, how could Barbara Olson have made such blatant mistakes? She would surely have known her claim that the hijacking occurred shortly after takeoff was wrong and that the plane was never circling around after it was hijacked.
<br><br><b>TED OLSON HAD LITTLE REASON TO CONCLUDE SO SOON THAT FLIGHT 77 HAD CRASHED</b>
<br>There are questions regarding what Ted Olson has said about the calls he received from Barbara Olson after her plane has hijacked. Why, for example, has he given different accounts about the kind of phone his wife used?
<br><br>He told the FBI, on September 11, that he was unaware of whether she called him on a cell phone or an Airfone. [78] Why, then, did he sometimes specify what kind of phone she used when he talked about her calls in subsequent interviews and public appearances? And why has he contradicted himself, sometimes saying she used a cell phone and at other times saying she used an Airfone?
<br><br>Additionally, why was he immediately certain, when he heard there had been an explosion at the Pentagon, that this was the result of Barbara Olson's plane crashing there, especially since the initial reports were unspecific about what had happened?
<br><br>The first television network to report the incident, NBC, made no mention of a plane crash. At 9:39 a.m., its correspondent, Jim Miklaszewski, only stated, "It felt, just a few moments ago, like there was an explosion of some kind here at the Pentagon." He was unclear what the cause was. "I have no idea whether it was part of the construction work, whether it was an accident, or what is going on," he said. [79]
<br><br>Ted Olson said he thought he was watching CNN's coverage of the attacks when they occurred. [80] But CNN, too, was initially vague about what had happened at the Pentagon. Its first reference to the incident was a banner that appeared on the screen at 9:40 a.m., which stated, "Reports of fire at Pentagon." Three minutes later, Chris Plante reported from the Pentagon: "It's impossible for me to say ... exactly what caused this. I did not hear an explosion, but there is certainly a very, very significant fire in this enormous office building."
<br><br>At 9:49 a.m., Plante suggested that a helicopter may have hit the building. "Initial reports from witnesses indicate that there was in fact a helicopter circling the building ... and that this helicopter disappeared behind the building, and that there was then an explosion," he said. CNN first reported that a plane had crashed at 9:53 a.m., when anchor, Aaron Brown, stated, "We also have a report now that it was a plane that crashed into the Pentagon." [81]
<br><br>Indeed, despite concluding immediately that the explosion at the Pentagon was a result of Flight 77 crashing there, Ted Olson has recalled that it was some time before the television reports he saw indicated that this may have been what happened. The initial reports "indicated that there had been an explosion of some sort at the Pentagon," he said. He added: "It was a long time before what had happened at the Pentagon--or it seemed like a long time--before it was identified as an airplane [crash]. Then the first report that I heard was that it was a commuter plane [that crashed] and then I heard it was an American Airlines plane." [82]
<br><br><b>BARBARA OLSON GAVE NO INDICATION THAT HER PLANE WAS FLYING TOWARD THE PENTAGON</b>
<br>The promptness with which Ted Olson concluded that Flight 77 had crashed at the Pentagon is also curious since Barbara Olson had given him no reason to think her plane was being flown toward the Department of Defense's headquarters. During her second call, she told him only that she thought it was heading northeast and was over some houses. "I don't know where she was when she called," Ted Olson commented. [83] Additionally, as the <i>9/11 Commission Report</i> noted, Barbara Olson "did not indicate any awareness of an impending crash" in her conversations with her husband. [84]
<br><br>Why, then, did Ted Olson decide so quickly that the reports of an explosion at the Pentagon meant Flight 77 had crashed there? Surely, he would have wanted more information before he reached a conclusion, especially since if he incorrectly assumed Flight 77 had crashed he might consequently fail to assist his wife when he could still help her.
<br><br>If he assumed the explosion at the Pentagon may have been caused by something other than Flight 77 crashing and the plane might still be airborne, he could perhaps have contacted people he knew in the U.S. government and passed on to them the information his wife had given him, so as to help agencies respond more effectively to the hijacking. He could also have thought about what to say if Barbara Olson phoned him again. Since the last thing she said in her second call was, "What can I tell the pilot to do?" he could have thought of an answer to give her.
<br><br>But by immediately resigning himself to believing Flight 77 had crashed, Ted Olson ruled out the possibility of doing anything to help his wife if her plane was still in the air.
<br><br><b>ONLY TWO PEOPLE MADE CALLS FROM FLIGHT 77</b>
<br>It is also odd that only Barbara Olson and Renee May made calls from Flight 77. If Barbara Olson was able to make calls without the hijackers noticing, as she claimed, other passengers ought to have been able to make calls without the hijackers noticing, too, and would presumably have done so. Why, then, did only two people make calls?
<br><br>The lack of calls from Flight 77 stands out when we consider what happened on United Airlines Flight 93, the fourth plane to be hijacked on September 11, which supposedly crashed in rural Pennsylvania after its passengers tried to retake control of it. Even though there were fewer passengers on Flight 93 than on Flight 77, significantly more of them made calls from the plane.
<br><br>Flight 77 had 58 passengers on board, including the five hijackers, along with two pilots and four flight attendants, making 64 people in total. [85] Flight 93, meanwhile, had only 44 people on board, comprising 37 passengers, including four hijackers, two pilots, and five flight attendants. [86] And yet at least 10 passengers and two crew members made calls from Flight 93--six times as many people as made calls from Flight 77. [87]
<br><br><b>JUSTICE DEPARTMENT'S INFORMATION IS PROBLEMATIC</b>
<br>Information about the phone calls from Flight 77 that the Department of Justice gave to the 9/11 Commission, which was also included in an FBI report published on September 20, 2001, was central to official accounts of 9/11, such as the <i>9/11 Commission Report</i>. Close analysis of this information, however, reveals several problems and casts doubt on its reliability.
<br><br>Assistant U.S. Attorney David Novak and two FBI agents provided the information to 9/11 Commission staffers during a briefing in May 2004. The information, according to the Commission, "was derived from a study of all phone records from [Flight 77], an examination of the cell phone records of each of the passengers aboard [the plane] who owned cell phones, and interviews with those who received calls from the flight, as well as with family members of the other passengers and crew." Novak and the FBI agents told the Commission staffers they were "confident that they had identified all completed calls from the flight."
<br><br>The list of calls they provided included what the <i>9/11 Commission Report</i> described as four "connected calls to unknown numbers." These were made at 9:15 a.m., 9:20 a.m., 9:25 a.m., and 9:30 a.m. They lasted 1 minute 42 seconds, 4 minutes 34 seconds, 2 minutes 39 seconds, and 4 minutes 20 seconds, respectively. The 9/11 Commission determined that these four calls included Barbara Olson's two calls to her husband. It was unable to say, though, which specific calls were the ones between Barbara and Ted Olson, and it was therefore unable to give exact times for when these two calls occurred.
<br><br>Inexplicably, though, the Commission staffers at the briefing were told that the FBI and the Department of Justice had determined that all four calls, which were from unknown callers to unknown recipients, were communications between Barbara Olson and her husband's office. [88]
<br><br>How is this possible? Ted Olson recalled receiving only two calls from his wife. [89] Helen Voss, who was in his office on September 11, said he was only called twice by her. [90] And Lori Keyton, who initially answered the calls, has described receiving only two calls from Barbara Olson. [91]
<br><br>If the FBI and the Department of Justice were correct, and all four "connected calls to unknown numbers" were communications between Barbara Olson and her husband's office, what did the other two calls involve? And why have Ted Olson, Voss, and Keyton never mentioned them? If, however, only two calls between Barbara Olson and her husband's office were made, who made and received the other two calls?
<br><br>The evidence that any of the four calls were between the Olsons is in fact inconclusive. The 9/11 Commission noted that there was no "direct evidence" that any of them were between Barbara Olson and Ted Olson's office. The calls were therefore just listed as being made by an "unknown" caller to an "unknown" recipient. [92]
<br><br><b>JUSTICE DEPARTMENT INDICATED THAT ALL OF BARBARA OLSON'S CALLS WERE COLLECT CALLS</b>
<br>Another problem with the four "connected calls to unknown numbers" is that all of them appear to have been collect calls, which are made through an operator and involve the recipient agreeing to pay the charges for the call. They were made by the caller dialing "0" on the Airfone. [93]
<br><br>And yet Keyton recalled that only the first of the two successful calls from Barbara Olson that she answered was a collect call, in which she spoke to an operator before the solicitor general's wife came on the line. For her second call, Barbara Olson called Ted Olson's office directly and was therefore on the line immediately when Keyton picked up the phone. The second call "was not a collect call," Keyton told the FBI. [94]
<br><br>A further problem is that, even though David Novak and the two FBI agents with him said the list of calls from Flight 77 they provided to the 9/11 Commission included all of the calls from the hijacked plane, the list made no mention of the six to eight collect calls comprising an automated message that Keyton answered shortly before Barbara Olson successfully reached the solicitor general's office.
<br><br>The list did include a call that failed to connect, which was described as being made by Barbara Olson to Ted Olson's office. However, this was just one call, not six to eight, and it was made just before 9:19 a.m., whereas Keyton said the calls with an automated message began at "approximately 9:00 a.m." [95]
<br><br><b>THE CALLS MAY HAVE BEEN STAGED TO CREATE FALSE EVIDENCE</b>
<br>The evidence relating to Barbara Olson's calls from Flight 77 on September 11, as we can see, is filled with anomalies and contradictions. The story of how the wife of the solicitor general called her husband from one of the hijacked planes and gave him valuable information about what was happening on the aircraft may, on the surface, appear plausible and believable. However, close analysis reveals it to be highly suspicious.
<br><br>A possible reason for the problems with the evidence is that Barbara Olson's phone conversations with her husband were something other than calls from a hijacked aircraft. They could have been staged so as to appear as if this is what they were, thereby creating false evidence that would support the official narrative of the 9/11 attacks. But in reality, they were a malicious act of deception against the public.
<br><br>This possibility surely needs to be looked into as part of a new investigation of the 9/11 attacks. And if the story of Barbara Olson's calls from Flight 77 was found to be fabricated, we would need to consider whether other evidence that supports the official narrative of the attacks was also faked.
<br><br><b>NOTES</b>
<br>[1] <a href="https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=484625" target="_blank"><i>Staff Report: The Four Flights</i>. 9/11 Commission, August 26, 2004, pp. 32, 48</a>.
<br>[2] <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20050410234208/http:/www.telegraph.co.uk/health/main.jhtml?xml=/health/2002/03/05/folsen05.xml&secureRefresh=true&_requestid=147907" target="_blank">Toby Harnden, "'She Asked Me How to Stop the Plane.'" <i>Daily Telegraph</i>, March 5, 2002</a>.
<br>[3] <a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-72007/Desperate-calls-relatives-jets-hijacked.html" target="_blank">Harriet Arkell and Anthony France, "Desperate Calls From Relatives as Jets Were Hijacked." <i>Evening Standard</i>, September 12, 2001</a>; <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/the-stream-of-calls-to-say-i-love-you-5364133.html" target="_blank">Michael McCarthy, "The Stream of Calls to Say 'I Love You.'" <i>The Independent</i>, September 13, 2001</a>; <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/13/us/barbara-olson-45-advocate-and-conservative-commentator.html" target="_blank">Neil A. Lewis, "Barbara Olson, 45, Advocate and Conservative Commentator." <i>New York Times</i>, September 13, 2001</a>.
<br>[4] <a href="https://www.justice.gov/osg/bio/theodore-b-olson" target="_blank">"Solicitor General: Theodore B. Olson." U.S. Department of Justice, October 31, 2014</a>; <a href="https://lawandcrime.com/high-profile/legal-superstar-attorney-who-turned-down-trumps-job-offer-comes-back-to-haunt-the-president/" target="_blank">Matt Naham, "'Legal Superstar' Attorney Who Rejected Trump's Job Offer Comes Back to Haunt the President." Law & Crime, November 13, 2018</a>.
<br>[5] <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/may/11/worlddispatch.martinkettle" target="_blank">Martin Kettle, "Democrats Back on the Offensive." <i>The Guardian</i>, May 11, 2001</a>; <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gaymarriage-california-court/bush-v-gore-lawyers-take-on-gay-marriage-ban-idUSTRE54Q4DG20090528" target="_blank"> Steve Gorman, "Bush v. Gore Lawyers Take on Gay Marriage Ban." Reuters, May 28, 2009</a>; <a href="https://www.washingtonian.com/2018/11/13/a-conservative-lawyer-said-no-to-joining-trumps-legal-team-now-hes-representing-cnn-in-its-suit-against-him/" target="_blank">Brittany Shepherd, "A Conservative Lawyer Said no to Joining Trump's Legal Team. Now He's Representing CNN in its Suit Against Him." <i>Washingtonian</i>, November 13, 2018</a>.
<br>[6] <a href="https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=484625" target="_blank"><i>Staff Report: The Four Flights</i>, p. 28</a>.
<br>[7] <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0109/14/lkl.00.html" target="_blank">"America's New War: Recovering From Tragedy." <i>Larry King Live</i>, CNN, September 14, 2001</a>; <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5ppFvUc10nc" target="_blank">"Ted Olson on Barbara Olson's Last Moments on Flight." Hudson Union, August 8, 2014</a>.
<br>[8] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/13120344/FBI-Case-Summary-for-9-11-from-the-9-11-Commission-Files" target="_blank"><i>PENTTBOM Case Summary as of 1/11/2002</i>. Federal Bureau of Investigation, January 11, 2002, p. 47</a>; 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States</i>. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004, pp. 8-10.
<br>[9] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 9; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/18886083/T7-B12-Flight-93-Calls-General-Fdr-5-20-04-DOJ-Briefing-on-Cell-and-Phone-Calls-From-AA-77-408" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Department of Justice Briefing on Cell and Phone Calls From AA Flight 77." 9/11 Commission, May 20, 2004</a>.
<br>[10] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/24392516/T7-B19-Key-302s-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-302s" target="_blank">Ronald May and Nancy May, interview by the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation, September 11, 2001</a>; <a href="https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=484625" target="_blank"><i>Staff Report: The Four Flights</i>, p. 31</a>; Tom Murphy, <i>Reclaiming the Sky: 9/11 and the Untold Story of the Men and Women Who Kept America Flying</i>. New York: AMACOM, 2006, p. 57.
<br>[11] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/13499802/T7-B13-Flight-Call-Notes-and-302s-Folder-Entire-Contents" target="_blank">Lori Lynn Keyton, interview by the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation, September 11, 2001</a>; <a href="https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=484625" target="_blank"><i>Staff Report: The Four Flights</i>, p. 94</a>.
<br>[12] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/13499802/T7-B13-Flight-Call-Notes-and-302s-Folder-Entire-Contents" target="_blank">Ted Olson, interview by the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation, September 13, 2001</a>.
<br>[13] <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20050410234208/http:/www.telegraph.co.uk/health/main.jhtml?xml=/health/2002/03/05/folsen05.xml&secureRefresh=true&_requestid=147907" target="_blank">Toby Harnden, "'She Asked Me How to Stop the Plane.'"</a>
<br>[14] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 455.
<br>[15] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/24392516/T7-B19-Key-302s-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-302s" target="_blank">"American Airlines Airphone Usage." Federal Bureau of Investigation, September 20, 2001</a>.
<br>[16] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/24392516/T7-B19-Key-302s-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-302s" target="_blank">Mercy Lorenzo, interview by the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation, September 11, 2001</a>; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/24392516/T7-B19-Key-302s-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-302s" target="_blank">Teresa Gonzalez, interview by the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation, September 11, 2001</a>.
<br>[17] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/13499802/T7-B13-Flight-Call-Notes-and-302s-Folder-Entire-Contents" target="_blank">Lori Lynn Keyton, interview by the FBI</a>.
<br>[18] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/13499802/T7-B13-Flight-Call-Notes-and-302s-Folder-Entire-Contents" target="_blank">Helen Voss, interview by the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation, September 11, 2001</a>; <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0109/14/lkl.00.html" target="_blank">"America's New War: Recovering From Tragedy."</a>
<br>[19] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/15072623/T1A-B33-Four-Flights-Phone-Calls-and-Other-Data-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-302s-843" target="_blank">Theodore Olson, interview by the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation, September 11, 2001</a>.
<br>[20] <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/i-cant-just-sit-back-152287" target="_blank">Michael Isikoff, "'I Can't Just Sit Back.'" <i>Newsweek</i>, September 28, 2001</a>.
<br>[21] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/15072623/T1A-B33-Four-Flights-Phone-Calls-and-Other-Data-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-302s-843" target="_blank">Theodore Olson, interview by the FBI</a>.
<br>[22] Ibid.; <a href="https://s3.amazonaws.com/911timeline/2001/foxnews091401.html" target="_blank"><i>Hannity & Colmes</i>. Fox News, September 14, 2001</a>.
<br>[23] <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0109/14/lkl.00.html" target="_blank">"America's New War: Recovering From Tragedy."</a>
<br>[24] <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2001/09/12/on-flight-77-our-plane-is-being-hijacked/85b3c4b3-876b-4bb5-b1f7-00cc8c37b75e/" target="_blank">Marc Fisher and Don Phillips, "On Flight 77: 'Our Plane is Being Hijacked.'" <i>Washington Post</i>, September 12, 2001</a>.
<br>[25] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/15072623/T1A-B33-Four-Flights-Phone-Calls-and-Other-Data-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-302s-843" target="_blank">Theodore Olson, interview by the FBI</a>.
<br>[26] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/13499802/T7-B13-Flight-Call-Notes-and-302s-Folder-Entire-Contents" target="_blank">Allen Ferber, interview by the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation, September 11, 2001</a>.
<br>[27] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 455.
<br>[28] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/13499802/T7-B13-Flight-Call-Notes-and-302s-Folder-Entire-Contents" target="_blank">Lori Lynn Keyton, interview by the FBI</a>.
<br>[29] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/15072623/T1A-B33-Four-Flights-Phone-Calls-and-Other-Data-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-302s-843" target="_blank">Theodore Olson, interview by the FBI</a>; <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0109/14/lkl.00.html" target="_blank">"America's New War: Recovering From Tragedy"</a>; <a href="https://s3.amazonaws.com/911timeline/2001/foxnews091401.html" target="_blank"><i>Hannity & Colmes</i></a>.
<br>[30] <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2001/09/12/on-flight-77-our-plane-is-being-hijacked/85b3c4b3-876b-4bb5-b1f7-00cc8c37b75e/" target="_blank">Marc Fisher and Don Phillips, "On Flight 77: 'Our Plane is Being Hijacked'"</a>; <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0109/14/lkl.00.html" target="_blank">"America's New War: Recovering From Tragedy."</a>
<br>[31] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/15072623/T1A-B33-Four-Flights-Phone-Calls-and-Other-Data-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-302s-843" target="_blank">Theodore Olson, interview by the FBI</a>; <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0109/14/lkl.00.html" target="_blank">"America's New War: Recovering From Tragedy."</a>
<br>[32] <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0109/14/lkl.00.html" target="_blank">"America's New War: Recovering From Tragedy</a>"; <a href="https://s3.amazonaws.com/911timeline/2001/foxnews091401.html" target="_blank"><i>Hannity & Colmes</i></a>.
<br>[33] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/15072623/T1A-B33-Four-Flights-Phone-Calls-and-Other-Data-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-302s-843" target="_blank">Theodore Olson, interview by the FBI</a>; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/13499802/T7-B13-Flight-Call-Notes-and-302s-Folder-Entire-Contents" target="_blank">Helen Voss, interview by the FBI</a>.
<br>[34] <a href="https://s3.amazonaws.com/911timeline/2001/foxnews091401.html" target="_blank"><i>Hannity & Colmes</i></a>.
<br>[35] <a href=" http://web.archive.org/web/20050410234208/http:/www.telegraph.co.uk/health/main.jhtml?xml=/health/2002/03/05/folsen05.xml&secureRefresh=true&_requestid=147907" target="_blank">Toby Harnden, "'She Asked Me How to Stop the Plane.'"</a>
<br>[36] <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0109/14/lkl.00.html" target="_blank">"America's New War: Recovering From Tragedy."</a>
<br>[37] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/13499802/T7-B13-Flight-Call-Notes-and-302s-Folder-Entire-Contents" target="_blank">Helen Voss, interview by the FBI</a>.
<br>[38] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/13499802/T7-B13-Flight-Call-Notes-and-302s-Folder-Entire-Contents" target="_blank">Allen Ferber, interview by the FBI</a>.
<br>[39] <a href=" http://web.archive.org/web/20050410234208/http:/www.telegraph.co.uk/health/main.jhtml?xml=/health/2002/03/05/folsen05.xml&secureRefresh=true&_requestid=147907" target="_blank">Toby Harnden, "'She Asked Me How to Stop the Plane.'"</a>
<br>[40] <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0109/14/lkl.00.html" target="_blank">"America's New War: Recovering From Tragedy."</a>
<br>[41] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/18886083/T7-B12-Flight-93-Calls-General-Fdr-5-20-04-DOJ-Briefing-on-Cell-and-Phone-Calls-From-AA-77-408" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Department of Justice Briefing on Cell and Phone Calls From AA Flight 77."</a>
<br>[42] <a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-71919/Wifes-secret-hijacked-plane.html" target="_blank">Duncan Gardham, "Wife's Secret Call From Hijacked Plane." <i>Daily Mail</i>, September 12, 2001</a>; <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/1340339/Wife-phoned-from-hijack-airliner-as-it-hit-Pentagon.html" target="_blank">Toby Harnden, "Wife Phoned From Hijack Airliner as it Hit Pentagon." <i>Daily Telegraph</i>, September 12, 2001</a>.
<br>[43] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/18886083/T7-B12-Flight-93-Calls-General-Fdr-5-20-04-DOJ-Briefing-on-Cell-and-Phone-Calls-From-AA-77-408" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Department of Justice Briefing on Cell and Phone Calls From AA Flight 77."</a>
<br>[44] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/15072623/T1A-B33-Four-Flights-Phone-Calls-and-Other-Data-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-302s-843" target="_blank">Theodore Olson, interview by the FBI</a>.
<br>[45] <a href="https://s3.amazonaws.com/911timeline/2001/foxnews091401.html" target="_blank"><i>Hannity & Colmes</i></a>.
<br>[46] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/13499802/T7-B13-Flight-Call-Notes-and-302s-Folder-Entire-Contents" target="_blank">Lori Lynn Keyton, interview by the FBI</a>.
<br>[47] <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/11/pentagon.olson/" target="_blank">Tim O'Brien, "Wife of Solicitor General Alerted Him of Hijacking From Plane." CNN, September 12, 2001</a>.
<br>[48] <a href=" http://web.archive.org/web/20050410234208/http:/www.telegraph.co.uk/health/main.jhtml?xml=/health/2002/03/05/folsen05.xml&secureRefresh=true&_requestid=147907" target="_blank">Toby Harnden, "'She Asked Me How to Stop the Plane.'"</a>
<br>[49] <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5ppFvUc10nc" target="_blank">"Ted Olson on Barbara Olson's Last Moments on Flight."</a>
<br>[50] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/24392516/T7-B19-Key-302s-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-302s" target="_blank">"American Airlines Airphone Usage"</a>; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/18886083/T7-B12-Flight-93-Calls-General-Fdr-5-20-04-DOJ-Briefing-on-Cell-and-Phone-Calls-From-AA-77-408" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Department of Justice Briefing on Cell and Phone Calls From AA Flight 77."</a>
<br>[51] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/13499802/T7-B13-Flight-Call-Notes-and-302s-Folder-Entire-Contents" target="_blank">Lori Lynn Keyton, interview by the FBI</a>.
<br>[52] Ibid.
<br>[53] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/13499802/T7-B13-Flight-Call-Notes-and-302s-Folder-Entire-Contents" target="_blank">Helen Voss, interview by the FBI</a>.
<br>[54] <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0109/14/lkl.00.html" target="_blank">"America's New War: Recovering From Tragedy."</a>
<br>[55] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/15072623/T1A-B33-Four-Flights-Phone-Calls-and-Other-Data-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-302s-843" target="_blank">Theodore Olson, interview by the FBI</a>.
<br>[56] <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0109/14/lkl.00.html" target="_blank">"America's New War: Recovering From Tragedy."</a>
<br>[57] Ibid.
<br>[58] <a href="https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=484625" target="_blank"><i>Staff Report: The Four Flights</i>, pp. 28-29</a>.
<br>[59] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/15072623/T1A-B33-Four-Flights-Phone-Calls-and-Other-Data-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-302s-843" target="_blank">Theodore Olson, interview by the FBI</a>; <a href="https://s3.amazonaws.com/911timeline/2001/foxnews091401.html" target="_blank"><i>Hannity & Colmes</i></a>.
<br>[60] <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0109/14/lkl.00.html" target="_blank">"America's New War: Recovering From Tragedy."</a>
<br>[61] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 8.
<br>[62] <a href="https://s3.amazonaws.com/911timeline/2001/foxnews091401.html" target="_blank"><i>Hannity & Colmes</i></a>.
<br>[63] <a href="https://www.ntsb.gov/about/Documents/Flight_Path_Study_AA77.pdf" target="_blank">"Flight Path Study: American Airlines Flight 77." National Transportation Safety Board, February 19, 2002</a>.
<br>[64] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/13499802/T7-B13-Flight-Call-Notes-and-302s-Folder-Entire-Contents" target="_blank">Ted Olson, interview by the FBI</a>.
<br>[65] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/18886083/T7-B12-Flight-93-Calls-General-Fdr-5-20-04-DOJ-Briefing-on-Cell-and-Phone-Calls-From-AA-77-408" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Department of Justice Briefing on Cell and Phone Calls From AA Flight 77."</a>
<br>[66] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/24392516/T7-B19-Key-302s-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-302s" target="_blank">Teresa Gonzalez, interview by the FBI</a>.
<br>[67] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/13499802/T7-B13-Flight-Call-Notes-and-302s-Folder-Entire-Contents" target="_blank">Lori Lynn Keyton, interview by the FBI</a>.
<br>[68] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/24392516/T7-B19-Key-302s-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-302s" target="_blank">Mercy Lorenzo, interview by the FBI</a>.
<br>[69] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 8.
<br>[70] See, for example, <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/15072623/T1A-B33-Four-Flights-Phone-Calls-and-Other-Data-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-302s-843" target="_blank">Theodore Olson, interview by the FBI</a>; <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0109/14/lkl.00.html" target="_blank">"America's New War: Recovering From Tragedy"</a>; <a href="https://s3.amazonaws.com/911timeline/2001/foxnews091401.html" target="_blank"><i>Hannity & Colmes</i></a>.
<br>[71] <a href="https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=484625" target="_blank"><i>Staff Report: The Four Flights</i>, p. 28</a>.
<br>[72] <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0109/14/lkl.00.html" target="_blank">"America's New War: Recovering From Tragedy."</a>
<br>[73] <a href="https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=484625" target="_blank"><i>Staff Report: The Four Flights</i>, p. 31</a>.
<br>[74] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/15072623/T1A-B33-Four-Flights-Phone-Calls-and-Other-Data-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-302s-843" target="_blank">Theodore Olson, interview by the FBI</a>.
<br>[75] <a href="https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/pressrel/press-releases/the-fbi-releases-19-photographs-of-individuals-believed-to-be-the-hijackers" target="_blank">"The FBI Releases 19 Photographs of Individuals Believed to be the Hijackers of the Four Airliners That Crashed on September 11, 2001." Federal Bureau of Investigation press release, Washington, DC, September 28, 2001</a>; 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, pp. 2-3.
<br>[76] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/18886083/T7-B12-Flight-93-Calls-General-Fdr-5-20-04-DOJ-Briefing-on-Cell-and-Phone-Calls-From-AA-77-408" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Department of Justice Briefing on Cell and Phone Calls From AA Flight 77."</a>
<br>[77] <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0109/14/lkl.00.html" target="_blank">"America's New War: Recovering From Tragedy."</a>
<br>[78] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/15072623/T1A-B33-Four-Flights-Phone-Calls-and-Other-Data-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-302s-843" target="_blank">Theodore Olson, interview by the FBI</a>.
<br>[79] <a href="https://archive.org/details/nbc200109110912-0954" target="_blank">"NBC Sept. 11, 2001, 9:12 a.m.-9:54 a.m." NBC News, September 11, 2001</a>.
<br>[80] <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0109/14/lkl.00.html" target="_blank">"America's New War: Recovering From Tragedy."</a>
<br>[81] <a href="https://archive.org/details/cnn200109110929-1011" target="_blank">"CNN Sept. 11, 2001, 9:29 a.m.-10:11 a.m." CNN, September 11, 2001</a>; <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0109/11/bn.03.html" target="_blank">"Terrorism Strikes in the United States in a Massive Attack." <i>Breaking News</i>, CNN, September 11, 2001</a>; <a href="http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0109/11/bn.06.html" target="_blank">"The White House Has Been Evacuated." <i>Breaking News</i>, CNN, September 11, 2001</a>.
<br>[82] <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0109/14/lkl.00.html" target="_blank">"America's New War: Recovering From Tragedy."</a>
<br>[83] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/15072623/T1A-B33-Four-Flights-Phone-Calls-and-Other-Data-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-302s-843" target="_blank">Theodore Olson, interview by the FBI</a>; <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0109/14/lkl.00.html" target="_blank">"America's New War: Recovering From Tragedy"</a>; <a href="https://s3.amazonaws.com/911timeline/2001/foxnews091401.html" target="_blank"><i>Hannity & Colmes</i></a>.
<br>[84] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 9.
<br>[85] <a href="https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=484625" target="_blank"><i>Staff Report: The Four Flights</i>, p. 28</a>.
<br>[86] Ibid. p. 36.
<br>[87] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 13.
<br>[88] Ibid. p. 455; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/18886083/T7-B12-Flight-93-Calls-General-Fdr-5-20-04-DOJ-Briefing-on-Cell-and-Phone-Calls-From-AA-77-408" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Department of Justice Briefing on Cell and Phone Calls From AA Flight 77."</a>
<br>[89] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/15072623/T1A-B33-Four-Flights-Phone-Calls-and-Other-Data-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-302s-843" target="_blank">Theodore Olson, interview by the FBI</a>; <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/11/pentagon.olson/" target="_blank">Tim O'Brien, "Wife of Solicitor General Alerted Him of Hijacking From Plane."</a>
<br>[90] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/13499802/T7-B13-Flight-Call-Notes-and-302s-Folder-Entire-Contents" target="_blank">Helen Voss, interview by the FBI</a>.
<br>[91] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/13499802/T7-B13-Flight-Call-Notes-and-302s-Folder-Entire-Contents" target="_blank">Lori Lynn Keyton, interview by the FBI</a>.
<br>[92] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/18886083/T7-B12-Flight-93-Calls-General-Fdr-5-20-04-DOJ-Briefing-on-Cell-and-Phone-Calls-From-AA-77-408" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Department of Justice Briefing on Cell and Phone Calls From AA Flight 77."</a>
<br>[93] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/24392516/T7-B19-Key-302s-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-302s" target="_blank">"American Airlines Airphone Usage."</a>
<br>[94] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/13499802/T7-B13-Flight-Call-Notes-and-302s-Folder-Entire-Contents" target="_blank">Lori Lynn Keyton, interview by the FBI</a>.
<br>[95] Ibid.; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/18886083/T7-B12-Flight-93-Calls-General-Fdr-5-20-04-DOJ-Briefing-on-Cell-and-Phone-Calls-From-AA-77-408" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Department of Justice Briefing on Cell and Phone Calls From AA Flight 77."</a>
Shoestringhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01534319150672667644noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2990970741097819876.post-79828751720247005362018-10-15T01:17:00.000-07:002018-10-15T01:17:49.395-07:00Why Did the Secret Service Report That a Plane Had Crashed into the White House on 9/11?<br><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhw4WuMDVqzkcwVevUkFhkKL5AGPLDWM5_C9Zges3JdMj5JGLKGPeVTvHxg2zxmA0Cu7V4HN7QNwZ9MsSJpS_9g5nU5fSF9ciHPO6Ge77KDcEYnSLY2NHxi-zSujzm3SugpBi-yTaxaW-OG/s1600/WhiteHouse.jpg" target="_blank" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhw4WuMDVqzkcwVevUkFhkKL5AGPLDWM5_C9Zges3JdMj5JGLKGPeVTvHxg2zxmA0Cu7V4HN7QNwZ9MsSJpS_9g5nU5fSF9ciHPO6Ge77KDcEYnSLY2NHxi-zSujzm3SugpBi-yTaxaW-OG/s1600/WhiteHouse.jpg" alt="The White House" data-original-width="300" data-original-height="236" /></a></div><br>Firefighters were called out to a major incident that supposedly occurred at the White House, minutes after the Pentagon was attacked on September 11, 2001. The Secret Service had reported that a plane had crashed into the home of the U.S. president, the building was on fire, and there had been a structural collapse. However, when members of the District of Columbia Fire Department arrived on the scene, it quickly became apparent to them that no such incident had taken place and they were promptly ordered to leave.
<br><br>While it might be claimed that this incident was merely the result of confusion in the middle of an unprecedented crisis, there is an alternative explanation for it. Evidence suggests the Secret Service could have been running a training exercise on the morning of September 11, which included the scenario of a plane crashing into the White House.
<br><br>For example, other government agencies are known to have been holding exercises on September 11 and so the Secret Service could have run an exercise that day in order to coordinate its activities with the activities of these agencies. Additionally, the Secret Service is known to have conducted exercises before 9/11, based around the scenario of a terrorist attack at the White House. In some exercises, it actually simulated a plane crashing into the White House. So, when it reported a plane crash at the White House on September 11, it may have been responding to a simulated incident that regularly featured in its exercises.
<br><br>Furthermore, before it reported the crash, the Secret Service was alerted to a suspicious plane that was supposedly approaching Washington, DC. Evidence indicates that this plane may have been a simulated aircraft in an exercise, which was subsequently imagined to have crashed into the White House.
<br><br>The Secret Service was, according to numerous accounts, alarmingly slow to respond to the 9/11 attacks. If the agency was running an exercise when the attacks occurred, this may help explain its poor performance, especially if the exercise was based around the scenario of suicidal terrorists using planes as weapons. Agents may have thought real world events they heard about were simulations in the exercise, and therefore failed to respond to them promptly and appropriately.
<br><br>If the Secret Service's report about a plane crashing into the White House was made as part of an exercise, this has serious implications. The report was made around an hour after the first crash at the World Trade Center occurred and several minutes after the Pentagon--the third and final building to be hit that day--was attacked. If an exercise was taking place at that time, it would mean this exercise had been allowed to continue even when it was obvious that America was under attack and the Secret Service needed to help defend the nation.
<br><br>If a Secret Service exercise was allowed to continue throughout the 9/11 attacks, we need to determine the reason for this. Was it the result of incompetence or confusion? Or was what happened a planned action, perhaps orchestrated by rogue government officials who aimed to paralyze the Secret Service at this critical time, thereby increasing the likelihood that the attacks succeeded?
<br><br><b>FIREFIGHTERS RESPONDED TO A REPORT OF A PLANE CRASH AT THE WHITE HOUSE</b>
<br>At around 9:46 a.m. on September 11, the District of Columbia Fire Department (DCFD) sent a number of engines and trucks to the White House to respond to an alleged incident there. This was in response to an incorrect report made by the Secret Service--the agency that protects the president and the White House--that a plane had crashed into the presidential residence, the building was on fire, and some or all of it had collapsed. Because a building collapse had reportedly occurred, the DCFD's "cave-in task force" was sent to the White House along with the other units.
<br><br>However, when the first firefighters arrived at the White House, they found no incident had occurred there and were ordered to leave. A uniformed officer waved them away and said: "Get the fuck outta here! There's a plane coming in!" "It was mass confusion; we go down to the White House and no one knows what's going on," Lieutenant Jeff Wright, one of the firefighters, has recalled.
<br><br>The report about the crash was soon investigated and determined to be unfounded. However, DCFD units were kept near the White House in case an attack subsequently occurred there. [1]
<br><br>This curious incident is virtually unknown and no official explanation has been provided as to why the Secret Service made such an obviously false report. A possibility we need to examine is that the agency was running a training exercise based around the scenario of a plane being crashed into the White House and its report to the emergency services was made as part of this exercise.
<br><br><b>SECRET SERVICE CONTACTED THE 'STRUCTURAL COLLAPSE TEAM'</b>
<br>Curiously, the Secret Service appears to have been preparing for the possibility of the White House collapsing well before it reported that some or all of the building had come down. Specifically, at around 9:07 a.m., according to a Secret Service timeline, the agency's Technical Security Division contacted the "structural collapse team" at Fort Belvoir, an Army base about 20 miles south of Washington, and told it "that the Secret Service may have a need for [its] assets and [the team's personnel] should report to their duty station." [2]
<br><br>This "structural collapse team" was the Military District of Washington (MDW) Engineer Company, which was tasked with "rescuing survivors of building breakdowns and preventing such collapses in emergencies." [3] The unit had never previously been called on to carry out its mission in a real-world situation, since its creation in 1989. [4]
<br><br>But now the MDW Engineer Company was placed on "alert status" and on "30-minute standby" for the White House. Later that day, it was released to go to the Pentagon to help respond to the attack there and its personnel arrived at the Department of Defense headquarters early that afternoon. [5]
<br><br>But why was a "structural collapse team" contacted when no collapse had occurred at the White House and there was no indication, at the time, that one was going to happen? A possible explanation is that the MDW Engineer Company was participating in a Secret Service exercise and it was contacted in preparation for a simulated plane crash, which, in the simulation, would cause some or all of the White House to collapse.
<br><br><b>SECRET SERVICE WAS ALERTED TO A SUSPICIOUS AIRCRAFT SUPPOSEDLY APPROACHING WASHINGTON</b>
<br>An incident consistent with the Secret Service running an exercise that involved the simulation of a plane being crashed into the White House occurred before the agency reported that a plane had hit the presidential residence. Specifically, the Secret Service was informed that at least one suspicious aircraft was approaching Washington. Evidence suggests this aircraft could have been a simulated plane that was going to crash into the White House.
<br><br>Nelson Garabito, a senior agent at the Secret Service's Joint Operations Center who was responsible for protecting the White House airspace, received reports about the aircraft from Terry Van Steenbergen, an employee at Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) headquarters who was responsible for dealing with the president's movements.
<br><br>Garabito contacted Van Steenbergen sometime after 9:03 a.m., when the second crash at the World Trade Center occurred, and Van Steenbergen told him two more planes were unaccounted for and possibly hijacked, in addition to the two that hit the Trade Center. He said one of these planes was heading toward Washington, and it was "30 miles out and coming in fast and low." [6]
<br><br>Van Steenbergen's information led the Secret Service to believe the White House was in danger. "We were tracking two hijacked aircraft as they approached Washington, DC, and our assumption was that the White House was a target," Assistant Director Barbara Riggs, who was in the Director's Crisis Center at Secret Service headquarters that morning, recalled. [7]
<br><br><b>SUSPICIOUS AIRCRAFT COULD HAVE BEEN A SIMULATED PLANE IN AN EXERCISE</b>
<br>It might be claimed that the suspicious aircraft Van Steenbergen told Garabito about was American Airlines Flight 77, the plane that allegedly crashed into the Pentagon at 9:37 a.m. After all, Flight 77 was reportedly flying toward the White House before it changed course and then flew into the Pentagon. However, two pieces of evidence refute this possibility.
<br><br>Firstly, it appears that Flight 77 was missing from air traffic controllers' radar screens when Van Steenbergen alerted Garabito to the suspicious aircraft, and so the FAA would have been unable to report that it was heading toward Washington at that time.
<br><br>Van Steenbergen said he was in contact with Garabito "within 30 seconds" of the second crash at the World Trade Center. [8] Garabito said he called Van Steenbergen "a few minutes" after the second crash. [9] But a Secret Service timeline stated that the open line between the two men was established at 9:25 a.m., Van Steenbergen told Garabito two planes were unaccounted for at 9:27 a.m., and he reported that one of these was approaching Washington and was 30 miles from the White House between 9:30 a.m. and 9:31 a.m. [10] While these accounts conflict, all three appear inconsistent with the possibility that the plane Van Steenbergen said was heading toward Washington was Flight 77. This plane disappeared from controllers' radar screens at 8:56 a.m. and, according to the <i>9/11 Commission Report</i>, was only located again at around 9:32 a.m., when controllers at Washington Dulles International Airport noticed it on their radar screens. [11]
<br><br>Secondly, Flight 77 supposedly turned away from the White House three minutes before the Pentagon was hit. Based on an analysis of radar data, the <i>9/11 Commission Report</i> stated that after flying eastward: "American 77 began turning south, away from the White House, at 9:34. It continued heading south for roughly a minute, before turning west and beginning to circle back." [12]
<br><br>And yet Garabito and his colleagues believed the plane they were following never changed direction. They were counting down as it supposedly approached the White House and, Garabito described, "At one point, we got under a minute and I said, 'It's about 30 seconds out.'" He was then told that the aircraft had disappeared from radar screens. [13]
<br><br>If the plane Van Steenbergen told Garabito about was Flight 77, he surely would have informed Garabito immediately when this aircraft changed course. Instead, it appears that Garabito and his colleagues thought a plane was going to crash into the White House right up to the time when the crash would have occurred.
<br><br>Since the aircraft they were following appears to have been something other than Flight 77, it is surely possible that the aircraft Van Steenbergen told Garabito about was a simulated plane. This incident could therefore have been the simulation of the mock plane being crashed into the White House. If so, this simulated crash may have been what the Secret Service reported to the emergency services, thereby resulting in firefighters being sent to the White House.
<br><br><b>AGENTS COULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN FALSE INFORMATION AS PART OF AN EXERCISE</b>
<br>One piece of evidence supports the possibility that Secret Service agents were participating in a training exercise on September 11, although not necessarily one involving a plane crash at the White House. This is the large amount of false information received by agents in the Director's Crisis Center (DCC) at Secret Service headquarters, which was used to direct operations in emergencies and was reportedly activated at 9:00 a.m. that day.
<br><br>An agent recalled that personnel in the DCC were receiving an "enormous" amount of information on September 11, which included "conflicting info from ID, unconfirmed data, or raw information," and this information "hindered the DCC's ability to make proper decisions." Consequently, those in the DCC were "making decisions [based] on inaccurate data that could have been quickly verified, such as the misinformation [about] an aircraft that had crashed near Camp David." [14]
<br><br>While it might be claimed that the misleading reports were simply the result of confusion in an unprecedented crisis, it is surely possible that they in fact related to simulated scenarios in an exercise. Perhaps Secret Service agents were being tested on how they would cope with the mass of information that would result if multiple crises occurred simultaneously.
<br><br><b>SECRET SERVICE HELD EXERCISES BEFORE 9/11 BASED ON A PLANE CRASHING INTO THE WHITE HOUSE</b>
<br>Other evidence supports the possibility that, if the Secret Service was indeed running an exercise on the morning of September 11, this exercise may have included the simulation of a plane crashing into the White House. In particular, the Secret Service is known to have held exercises before then that involved this scenario. If the Secret Service believed a plane crashing into the White House was a scenario worth training for before 9/11, it surely could have simulated this scenario again if it was holding an exercise on September 11.
<br><br>Specifically, since 1998, the Secret Service had run exercises at its James J. Rowley Training Center in Beltsville, Maryland, which involved the simulated crashing of planes into the White House on a piece of computer software provided by the military. These simulations were intended to test the responses of the agencies that provided security and support to the White House.
<br><br>Paul Nenninger, a Secret Service agent who was assigned to the training center, described these exercises, but did not explicitly state whether the simulated crashes were imagined to be part of a terrorist attack. However, he indicated that this may have been the case, since he mentioned that the Secret Service's use of computer simulations "allow you to practice scenarios that can be attempted by a terrorist." [15]
<br><br>Another piece of evidence supports the possibility that, if the Secret Service was running an exercise on September 11, this exercise could have involved some kind of simulated attack on the White House. Specifically, four months before 9/11, then-Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill stated that the Secret Service held "interagency tabletop exercises in preparation for terrorist attacks on the White House." [16] He did not say whether these exercises included simulations of a plane being crashed into the White House. All the same, his statement shows that around the time the 9/11 attacks occurred, the Secret Service considered the White House a potential target for terrorists when it held an exercise.
<br><br>Furthermore, the Secret Service participated in a tabletop exercise at the White House in 1998, run by White House counterterrorism chief Richard Clarke, which involved a scenario in which a group of terrorists seized a Learjet, loaded it with explosives, and flew it toward a target in Washington. [17] While the identity of the imagined target is unreported, the existence of this exercise confirms that, before 9/11, the possibility of a plane being used as a weapon was something the Secret Service had considered in exercises.
<br><br>It also seems logical to assume that the Secret Service would have regularly trained for the possibility of a plane crashing into the White House in light of an incident that occurred exactly seven years before 9/11. On the night of September 11, 1994, a man called Frank Eugene Corder stole a single-engine plane, flew to Washington, and crashed the plane into the wall of the White House. In fact, even before this incident occurred, the possibility of a plane being used as a weapon to attack the White House had been considered. <i>Time</i> magazine noted, shortly after Corder crashed a plane into the presidential residence, that security officials had "long feared in private" that the White House was "vulnerable to sneak attack from the air." [18]
<br><br><b>U.S. MILITARY WAS RUNNING AN AIR DEFENSE EXERCISE ON SEPTEMBER 11</b>
<br>The Secret Service, if it was planning to hold an exercise, may have scheduled this exercise specifically for the morning of September 11 so it could coordinate its activities with those of other government agencies. It has been reported that numerous agencies were running, or preparing for, exercises when the 9/11 attacks occurred. [19] And according to Major Don Arias, First Air Force chief of public affairs, different organizations would sometimes participate "in the same exercise for different reasons," because it was "common practice, when we have exercises, to get as much bang for the buck as we can." [20]
<br><br>A major annual exercise that the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)--the military organization responsible for monitoring and defending U.S. airspace--was in the middle of on September 11 may be particularly significant. Our knowledge of what this exercise, called Vigilant Guardian, involved is limited. [21] There is some evidence, however, that it could have included the scenario of a plane being crashed into the White House. If this was the case, the Secret Service might have used the same scenario so it could coordinate its activities with those of NORAD.
<br><br>Vigilant Guardian has been described as a "transition to wartime operations command post exercise," an "air defense exercise simulating an attack on the United States," and a "simulated air war." [22] It included a series of "ever-escalating scenarios, from strained diplomacy to the outbreak of conventional warfare that headed inexorably toward nuclear conflict," according to the <i>Denver Post</i>. [23] It involved some "scripted inputs," such as "unknown aircraft that we scramble aircraft ... to intercept," Jeff Ford, an Air Force lieutenant colonel assigned to NORAD on September 11, said. [24]
<br><br>An official document that has been publicly released outlines scenarios that were simulated as part of Vigilant Guardian in the five days before 9/11. However, this document does not describe the scenarios that were planned for the day of September 11. [25] It has been reported, though, that at least one hijacking was scheduled to be simulated that day.
<br><br>Personnel at NORAD's Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) in Rome, New York, which was responsible for coordinating the U.S. military's response to the 9/11 attacks, were actually going to learn of this simulated hijacking around the time when the Secret Service reported that a plane had crashed into the White House. Major Kevin Nasypany, the mission crew commander at NEADS, recalled that when NEADS was alerted to the first hijacking, at 8:37 a.m. on September 11, he said out loud, "The hijack's not supposed to be for another hour," which means it was set to occur at around 9:37 a.m.
<br><br>This particular simulated hijacking, though, was apparently not going to involve the mock hijacked aircraft being crashed into the White House. According to <i>Vanity Fair</i>, it was going to involve politically motivated perpetrators getting control of the aircraft, landing it on a Cuba-like island, and seeking asylum there. [26]
<br><br>However, the possibility that Vigilant Guardian was set to include the simulation of a plane being crashed into the White House on September 11 is supported by the fact that a scenario along these lines featured in previous NORAD exercises. This particular event was therefore one that NORAD considered worth training for.
<br><br>Specifically, NORAD is known to have conducted at least three exercises in the three years before 9/11 that included the scenario of terrorists hijacking or stealing an aircraft with the intention of crashing it into the White House. These command post exercises, all called "Falcon Indian," were held in January 1999, June 1999, and June 2000. They all involved a scenario in which a Learjet, loaded with explosives, was under the control of terrorists who intended to crash the plane into the White House. [27]
<br><br><b>FALSE REPORT OF A PLANE APPROACHING WASHINGTON COULD HAVE BEEN PART OF AN EXERCISE</b>
<br>An anomalous incident that occurred between the attacks on the World Trade Center and the attack on the Pentagon also supports the possibility that an exercise was taking place on September 11 based around the scenario of a plane crashing into the White House. Around 16 minutes before the Pentagon was hit, NEADS received an incorrect report that American Airlines Flight 11 had not actually crashed into the World Trade Center at 8:46 a.m., as was believed, and was heading south toward Washington. It is surely possible that the aircraft being referred to was in fact a simulated plane in an exercise and this mock aircraft was subsequently imagined, by the Secret Service, to have crashed into the White House.
<br><br>Specifically, at 9:21 a.m., Colin Scoggins, the military liaison at the Boston Air Traffic Control Center, called NEADS and said: "I just had a report that American 11 is still in the air and it's on its way towards--heading towards Washington. ... It was evidently another aircraft that hit the [World Trade Center] tower." [28]
<br><br>It seems odd that Scoggins passed on this inaccurate information without trying to verify it or gain more clarity first, since such a mystifying report was sure to cause confusion at NEADS at a time when the military needed precise information. Indeed, Scoggins's call created confusion at NEADS that lasted "for hours," according to <i>Vanity Fair</i>.
<br><br>Furthermore, Scoggins admitted, air traffic controllers "were never tracking an actual plane on the radar after losing American 11 near Manhattan." He explained that, "had it continued south past New York in the direction it was flying before it dipped below radar coverage," Flight 11 would have "headed on a straight course toward [Washington]." And yet, despite the apparent lack of evidence that Flight 11 was still airborne, the only action he took before passing on the false report to NEADS was "talking to a supervisor." [29]
<br><br>Scoggins's action makes more sense if the non-existent aircraft Scoggins told NEADS about was actually a simulated hijacked plane in the NORAD exercise. And if the Secret Service was running an exercise that was, at least to some degree, coordinated with the NORAD exercise, this mock aircraft could have featured in its exercise too.
<br><br><b>INVESTIGATORS WERE UNABLE TO FIND THE ORIGIN OF THE FALSE REPORT</b>
<br>Explanations for the false report about Flight 11 being airborne 35 minutes after it crashed have been vague and inadequate. The <i>9/11 Commission Report</i> stated, "We have been unable to identify the source of this mistaken FAA information." [30] Scoggins claimed the misunderstanding came about during "an unwieldy conference call between FAA centers" that he was monitoring. "The word came across--from whom or where isn't clear--that American 11 was thought to be headed for Washington," he told <i>Vanity Fair</i>. [31] He told the 9/11 Commission he "never learned" who originally reported that Flight 11 was still airborne and heading toward Washington. [32] But according to author Lynn Spencer, the false information was announced during the FAA teleconference by someone at the Washington Air Traffic Control Center. [33]
<br><br>Could the lack of clarity around how this incident arose be because it was a simulated scenario in a training exercise? Perhaps those who described the incident to the 9/11 Commission were unaware of this detail and were consequently unclear about how the false report came about. Or maybe measures were taken to cover up this detail and those who knew it were ordered to keep quiet.
<br><br>It is notable that the time when Flight 11 was reported as being still airborne and flying toward Washington is probably consistent with this non-existent aircraft reaching the White House around the time the Secret Service reported that a plane crashed there. The timing of this event is therefore consistent with an exercise scenario being played out in which a hijacked plane flew south from New York to Washington and then crashed into the White House.
<br><br><b>POSSIBLE EXERCISE APPARENTLY CONTINUED ALL THROUGH THE ATTACKS</b>
<br>The Secret Service's incorrect report that a plane had crashed into the White House could be significant. Analysis of the incident gives rise to numerous questions relating to what exactly happened on September 11, who was responsible for the terrorist attacks that day, and why government agencies failed to stop them.
<br><br>To begin with, who at the Secret Service reported the supposed crash to the emergency services? Why did they make the false report? Was their action performed as part of a training exercise? If so, what did the exercise involve? Did it include the scenario of a plane being crashed into the White House, which resulted in a fire and some or all of the building collapsing? Who planned it?
<br><br>Additionally, who at the Secret Service alerted the MDW Engineer Company--the "structural collapse team"--at 9:07 a.m., even though no collapse had occurred at the White House and there was no evidence that an incident was going to take place that would cause it to collapse? Was the MDW Engineer Company contacted because it was participating in a Secret Service exercise that was going to include the scenario of the White House collapsing?
<br><br>If the Secret Service's report to the emergency services was part of an exercise, this indicates the exercise was allowed to continue until at least 9:46 a.m., when the District of Columbia Fire Department was called out to respond to the alleged incident. This was an hour after the first crash at the World Trade Center occurred and nine minutes after the Pentagon--the final building to be hit that day--was attacked.
<br><br>But if an exercise was indeed being conducted, surely this exercise should have been called off immediately when it became apparent that a real crisis was taking place, to which government agencies needed to respond. Certainly, some Secret Service agents appear to have quickly recognized the seriousness of the real-world emergency. "When we saw the plane crash into the second tower we knew it was no accident," Rebecca Ediger, who was in the Joint Operations Center that morning, recalled. [34] "At that moment," she said, "we all knew the first plane was not an accident; the country was under attack." [35] So why would an exercise be allowed to continue while America was under attack, when doing so might seriously impair the ability of the Secret Service to respond to the real-world crisis?
<br><br><b>SECRET SERVICE MADE A 'SLOW START' IN ITS RESPONSE TO THE ATTACKS</b>
<br>The performance of the Secret Service on September 11 was notably poor. [36] Author Philip Melanson, in a book about the agency, referred to the Secret Service's "slow start to 9/11 protection." [37] And <i>U.S. News & World Report</i> specifically pointed out that "Secret Service executives did not implement an 'emergency call-up' of all personnel until the third [hijacked] plane crashed, into the Pentagon." [38]
<br><br>If the Secret Service was running an exercise while the terrorist attacks were taking place, this factor might help explain its poor performance. The exercise may have created confusion, which affected the ability of agents to respond to the attacks. Agents could have mistaken real-world events they heard about for simulated events in the exercise and consequently failed to respond to them as they normally would have. Perhaps agents had also been isolated from what was going on in the real world so they could focus on the exercise and it consequently took longer for them to learn that a genuine crisis was taking place.
<br><br>An exercise could have been part of a deliberate attempt to paralyze the Secret Service when the agency was urgently needed to help protect the nation. If so, this would suggest a network of rogue officials in the U.S. government was involved in planning and conducting the 9/11 attacks, since only powerful individuals in key positions could have influenced when the Secret Service held its exercises and what these exercises involved. Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda terrorist network would certainly have been unable to influence these things.
<br><br>More than 17 years after September 11, 2001, we still know little about the actions of the Secret Service that day. The limited information available is inconclusive. Despite the circumstantial evidence indicating the agency was running an exercise when the 9/11 attacks occurred, there is currently no official confirmation of such an exercise taking place. It is therefore essential that more information be released, so we can properly assess the actions of the Secret Service on September 11. This information may help us determine whether rogue employees deliberately acted to sabotage the response of their colleagues, in order to help ensure the attacks on the U.S. succeeded.
<br><br><b>NOTES</b>
<br>[1] <a href="https://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/news/article/13022867/this-is-only-a-test" target="_blank">Howard Witt, "This is Only a Test." <i>Washington City Paper</i>, September 21, 2001</a>; <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20060814051504/http:/info.jems.com/911/pdf/jems0402.pdf" target="_blank">Michael J. Ward, "Attack on the Pentagon: The Initial Fire and EMS Response." <i>Journal of Emergency Medical Services</i>, April 2002</a>; <a href="https://www.firehouse.com/home/news/10545153/dc-crews-dispatched-to-the-pentagon" target="_blank">Michael L. Smith, "DC Crews Dispatched to the Pentagon." <i>Firehouse</i>, November 2002</a>.
<br>[2] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/30764772/Monaghan-FOIA-USSS-Memos-and-Timelines" target="_blank">"Actions of TSD Related to Terrorist Incident." United States Secret Service, September 12, 2001</a>; Garrett M. Graff, <i>Raven Rock: The Story of the U.S. Government's Secret Plan to Save Itself--While the Rest of us Die</i>. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2017, p. 333.
<br>[3] Alfred Goldberg et al., <i>Pentagon 9/11</i>. Washington, DC: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2007, p. 96.
<br>[4] <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20040214230959/http:/www.belvoir.army.mil/news.asp?id=honorees" target="_blank">Tim Hipps, "MDW Engineers Honored for Operation Noble Eagle." Fort Belvoir News, April 4, 2002</a>; <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20040215064414/http:/www.army.mil:80/soldiers/aug2002/pdfs/aug02all.pdf" target="_blank">Jonathan Wiley, "Search and Rescue Challenge." <i>Soldiers</i>, August 2002</a>; <a href="https://www.army.mil/article/73963/911th_engineers_take_action_in_training_scenario" target="_blank">Ally Rogers, "911th Engineers Take Action in Training Scenario." <i>Belvoir Eagle</i>, February 16, 2012</a>.
<br>[5] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/30764772/Monaghan-FOIA-USSS-Memos-and-Timelines" target="_blank">Untitled document. United States Secret Service, 2001</a>; Alfred Goldberg et al., <i>Pentagon 9/11</i>, p. 96.
<br>[6] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/14353654/DH-B5-Secret-Service-Requests-Fdr-Entire-Contents-5-Withdrawal-Notice-Doc-Req-Notes-Garabito-Shortly-After-9am-FAA-Van-Steenbergen-Said-4-Planes" target="_blank">"USSS Statements and Interview Reports." 9/11 Commission, July 28, 2003</a>.
<br>[7] <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20080506001246/http:/pccw.alumni.cornell.edu/news/newsletters/spring06/riggs.html" target="_blank">"Spotlight on: Barbara Riggs." <i>PCCW eNewsletter</i>, Spring 2006</a>.
<br>[8] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/17218142/T8-B6-FAA-HQ-Terry-Van-Steenbergen-Fdr-3-30-04-MFR-875" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Terry Van Steenbergen." 9/11 Commission, March 30, 2004</a>.
<br>[9] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/14353654/DH-B5-Secret-Service-Requests-Fdr-Entire-Contents-5-Withdrawal-Notice-Doc-Req-Notes-Garabito-Shortly-After-9am-FAA-Van-Steenbergen-Said-4-Planes" target="_blank">"USSS Statements and Interview Reports."</a>
<br>[10] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/14553471/T8-B16-Misc-Work-Papers-Fdr-Secret-Service-Timeline" target="_blank">"Secret Service Timeline, Unclassified Extract." United States Secret Service, September 11, 2001</a>.
<br>[11] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States</i>. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004, pp. 24-25; <a href="https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=484625" target="_blank"><i>Staff Report: The Four Flights</i>. 9/11 Commission, August 26, 2004, pp. 29, 33</a>.
<br>[12] <a href="https://www.ntsb.gov/about/Documents/Flight_Path_Study_AA77.pdf" target="_blank">"Flight Path Study: American Airlines Flight 77." National Transportation Safety Board, February 19, 2002</a>; 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, pp. 39, 464.
<br>[13] <a href="http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1109/11/cp.02.html" target="_blank">"The Footnotes of 9/11." <i>CNN Presents</i>, CNN, September 11, 2011</a>.
<br>[14] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/14353654/DH-B5-Secret-Service-Requests-Fdr-Entire-Contents-5-Withdrawal-Notice-Doc-Req-Notes-Garabito-Shortly-After-9am-FAA-Van-Steenbergen-Said-4-Planes" target="_blank">"USSS Statements and Interview Reports."</a>
<br>[15] Paul L. Nenninger, "Simulation at the Secret Service: As Real as it Gets." In <i>Learning Rants, Raves, and Reflections: A Collection of Passionate and Professional Perspectives</i>, edited by Elliott Masie, pp. 175-187. San Francisco, CA: Pfeiffer, 2005, pp. 175-178; <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20131007160108/https:/www.semissourian.com/story/1757355.html" target="_blank">Paul L. Nenninger, "One Secret Service Agent's Experience." <i>Southeast Missourian</i>, August 29, 2011</a>; <a href="http://shoestring911.blogspot.com/2011/09/secret-service-simulated-crashing.html" target="_blank">"Secret Service Simulated Crashing Planes into the White House Before 9/11." Shoestring 9/11, September 24, 2011</a>.
<br>[16] <a href="https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/po361.aspx" target="_blank">"Testimony of Paul H. O'Neill, Secretary of the Treasury, Before the Senate Committee on Appropriations." U.S. Department of the Treasury, May 8, 2001</a>.
<br>[17] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, pp. 345, 457-458.
<br>[18] <a href="http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,165128,00.html" target="_blank">Michael Duffy, "Flight of the Intruder." <i>Time</i>, September 26, 1994</a>.
<br>[19] See <a href="http://www.historycommons.org/timeline.jsp?timeline=complete_911_timeline&day_of_9/11=complete_911_timeline_training_exercises" target="_blank">"Training Exercises on 9/11." History Commons, n.d.</a>
<br>[20] Michael C. Ruppert, <i>Crossing the Rubicon: The Decline of the American Empire at the End of the Age of Oil</i>. Gabriola Island, BC: New Society Publishers, 2004, p. 367.
<br>[21] William M. Arkin, <i>Code Names: Deciphering U.S. Military Plans, Programs, and Operations in the 9/11 World</i>. Hanover, NH: Steerforth Press, 2005, p. 545.
<br>[22] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/388866726/Fdr-Entire-Contents-Vigilant-Guardian-Docs-760" target="_blank">"Vigilant Guardian 01-2." Northeast Air Defense Sector, August 23, 2001</a>; Leslie Filson, <i>Air War Over America: Sept. 11 Alters Face of Air Defense Mission</i>. Tyndall Air Force Base, FL: 1st Air Force, 2003, pp. 55, 122.
<br>[23] <a href="https://www.denverpost.com/2011/08/27/rearmed-forces-911-changed-military-life-in-colorado/" target="_blank">Kevin Simpson, "Rearmed Forces: 9/11 Changed Military Life in Colorado." <i>Denver Post</i>, August 27, 2011</a>.
<br>[24] <a href="http://www.dvidshub.net/news/76670/their-own-words-norad-members-recall-september-11-jeff-ford" target="_blank">Thomas Doscher, "In Their Own Words--NORAD Members Recall September 11: Jeff Ford." Defense Visual Information Distribution Service, September 8, 2011</a>.
<br>[25] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/388598610/Fdr-Entire-Contents-WN-and-NORAD-Exercise-Docs-924" target="_blank">"NCOTA: Exercise Data." North American Aerospace Defense Command, July 25, 2003</a>; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/16411947/NORAD-Exercises-Hijack-Summary" target="_blank">"NORAD Exercises: Hijack Summary." 9/11 Commission, n.d.</a>
<br>[26] <a href="http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2006/08/norad200608" target="_blank">Michael Bronner, "9/11 Live: The NORAD Tapes." <i>Vanity Fair</i>, August 2006</a>.
<br>[27] <a href="https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2013-002-doc8.pdf" target="_blank">"NEADS AOR Hijack/WMD Scenarios." U.S. Air Force, 2003</a>; <a href="https://archive.org/stream/implicationsford00unit/implicationsford00unit_djvu.txt" target="_blank">Senate Committee on Armed Services, <i>Implications for the Department of Defense and Military Operations of Proposals to Reorganize the United States Intelligence Community</i>. 108th Cong., 2nd sess., August 17, 2004</a>.
<br>[28] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 26; Lynn Spencer, <i>Touching History: The Untold Story of the Drama That Unfolded in the Skies Over America on 9/11</i>. New York: Free Press, 2008, p. 137.
<br>[29] <a href="http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2006/08/norad200608" target="_blank">Michael Bronner, "9/11 Live."</a>
<br>[30] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 26.
<br>[31] <a href="http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2006/08/norad200608" target="_blank">Michael Bronner, "9/11 Live."</a>
<br>[32] <a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/OpaAPI/media/2610747/content/arcmedia/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-01147.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview With Colin Scoggins, Military Operations Specialist." 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003</a>.
<br>[33] Lynn Spencer, <i>Touching History</i>, p. 137.
<br>[34] <a href="http://peabodykansas.com/olddirect/two_phs_grads_serve_top_office_of_the_land+7pgrads+54776f2050485320677261647320736572766520746f70206f6666696365206f6620746865206c616e64" target="_blank">Susan Marshall, "Two PHS Grads Serve Top Office of the Land." <i>Peabody Gazette-Bulletin</i>, February 12, 2003</a>.
<br>[35] <a href="http://wsu.wichita.edu/the-shocker/story.php?eid=31&id=923#.W7szRDGWyHs" target="_blank">Kerry Jones, "Trust and Confidence." <i>The Shocker</i>, Summer 2002</a>.
<br>[36] See <a href="http://shoestring911.blogspot.com/2012/06/laura-bush-on-911-why-was-presidents.html" target="_blank">"Laura Bush on 9/11: Why Was the President's Wife Left Vulnerable and Unprotected?" Shoestring 9/11, June 18, 2012</a>; <a href="http://shoestring911.blogspot.com/2013/10/the-dangerously-delayed-reactions-of.html" target="_blank">"The Dangerously Delayed Reactions of the Secret Service on 9/11." Shoestring 9/11, October 2, 2013</a>; <a href="http://shoestring911.blogspot.com/2017/03/why-did-secret-service-leave-president.html" target="_blank">"Why Did the Secret Service Leave the President and a School Full of Children in Danger in the Middle of the 9/11 Attacks?" Shoestring 9/11, March 4, 2017</a>.
<br>[37] Philip H. Melanson, <i>The Secret Service: The Hidden History of an Enigmatic Agency</i>. 2nd ed. New York: Carroll & Graf, 2005, p. 331.
<br>[38] <a href="http://chitraragavan.com/usnews/secret2.pdf" target="_blank">Chitra Ragavan, "Under Cloudy Skies." <i>U.S. News & World Report</i>, December 9, 2002</a>.Shoestringhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01534319150672667644noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2990970741097819876.post-68111530934040088172018-06-18T01:48:00.000-07:002018-06-18T01:48:06.461-07:00Security Alerts, Disabled Fire Alarms, and Unused Elevators: Suspicious Events at the World Trade Center Before 9/11<br><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhkEFLBoXe1x8tGsKxgFieSf8y8IC-d1q2ZYvkuKR6FG6LPjyIINrZfnDXWtDp4PuRNs6yb9u8Pcql-xqf5oeBFpGUSQSM2DmcrylPOt_YmLZqA5zuzWX5j7evpg6uq54qUlkfTfJ0saFoP/s1600/TwinTowers.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;" target="_blank"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhkEFLBoXe1x8tGsKxgFieSf8y8IC-d1q2ZYvkuKR6FG6LPjyIINrZfnDXWtDp4PuRNs6yb9u8Pcql-xqf5oeBFpGUSQSM2DmcrylPOt_YmLZqA5zuzWX5j7evpg6uq54qUlkfTfJ0saFoP/s1600/TwinTowers.jpg" data-original-width="290" alt="The Twin Towers" data-original-height="224" /></a></div><br>At least three notable anomalous events occurred at the World Trade Center in the weeks and months leading up to September 11, 2001, which may have related to the imminent terrorist attacks but could not have been caused by al-Qaeda, the group supposedly responsible for 9/11.
<br><br>There was an increase in security at the Trade Center in the two weeks before 9/11, for reasons that are unclear, which only ended the day before the attacks. Also, the fire alarm system in World Trade Center Building 7 was placed on "test condition" every morning in the seven days before the attacks and on the day of 9/11. While it was in this mode, any alarms would be ignored. WTC 7 was a massive skyscraper located just north of the Twin Towers, which mysteriously collapsed late in the afternoon of September 11. And some of the elevators in the Twin Towers were out of service in the months before the attacks, supposedly due to maintenance work or modernization.
<br><br>It seems odd that these events happened at the World Trade Center just before the Twin Towers were the target of a terrorist attack and three of the Trade Center buildings collapsed. It would have been notable if just one of them occurred in the period leading up to 9/11. The fact that all three did is remarkable.
<br><br>Osama bin Laden--the man who supposedly ordered the 9/11 attacks--and his al-Qaeda terrorist organization would surely have been unable to bring about these events. Therefore, if the official account of 9/11 is true and they were responsible for the attacks, then it must have been just a coincidence that these events occurred before September 11. But if the events were related to preparations for the attacks on the World Trade Center, this would cast serious doubt on the official narrative of 9/11. It is possible, therefore, that they are evidence that a group other than al-Qaeda was behind 9/11.
<br><br>These events may have occurred because 9/11 was a false flag operation, which is a kind of covert operation designed to appear as if it was committed by some group other than the actual perpetrators. The 9/11 attacks could perhaps have been perpetrated by a rogue group within the U.S. military and government but were carefully planned to appear as if they were carried out by Islamic terrorists.
<br><br>A new investigation of the attacks would be necessary to determine if the unusual events at the World Trade Center in the period leading up to 9/11 were significant and, if they were, what their purposes were. All the same, we can at least consider possible reasons for them.
<br><br>It is possible, for example, that they related to efforts to secretly prepare the Twin Towers and WTC 7 to be brought down with explosives as part of the 9/11 attacks. Perhaps the heightened security at the World Trade Center and the supposed maintenance work on the elevators were intended to create cover stories for the men who were planting the explosives. If a person inquired about mysterious workers they had seen at the Trade Center, they could be falsely told these men were there to repair the elevators or help out in response to the heightened security. Or if someone asked about unusual work they had noticed being carried out in the buildings, they could be told this work related to repairs on the elevators, even though it in fact related to the preparations for demolishing the buildings.
<br><br><b>SECURITY AT THE WORLD TRADE CENTER WAS INCREASED JUST BEFORE 9/11</b>
<br>It is striking, in light of the fact that the World Trade Center was about to become the scene of a massive terrorist attack, that security at the Trade Center was suddenly increased around the end of August 2001.
<br><br>Security at the checkpoint leading to the garage under the Trade Center complex, through which "deliveries and everything" had to pass, was "markedly increased about two weeks before" September 11, firefighter Timothy Brown, a supervisor at New York City's Office of Emergency Management, has recalled. Extra measures included "a lot more Port Authority police officers" at the checkpoint, and "[bomb-sniffing] dogs running around and checking all the trucks." [1] At the same time, security personnel at the Trade Center had to work extra-long shifts due to the heightened security. [2]
<br><br>And Ben Fountain, who worked for a company on the 47th floor of the South Tower, recalled that in the "few weeks" before September 11, he and his colleagues were evacuated from the building "a number of times." It is unclear whether this was because of the heightened security. All the same, the amount of evacuations was "unusual," Fountain commented. [3] Brown similarly said the increased security measures were "unusual." "We had wondered if something was up," he remarked. [4] "I think they had an inkling something was going on," Fountain said. [5]
<br><br>The additional security measures were withdrawn in the days before 9/11. Bomb-sniffing dogs were "abruptly removed" on September 6 and September 11 was "the first day there was not the extra security," Daria Coard, a guard in the North Tower, said.
<br><br>No clear reason was provided for the increase in security. While Coard said it occurred in response to "numerous phone threats," the London <i>Independent</i> reported that "no explanation has been given" for it. [6] And when Brown and his colleagues asked people "in the intelligence area" if something was going on, they were told, "No." [7]
<br><br><b>FIRE ALARM SYSTEM WAS ON 'TEST CONDITION' IN THE WEEK BEFORE 9/11</b>
<br>While these extra security measures were being implemented, another anomalous event occurred at WTC 7, a 47-story office building located 370 feet north of the North Tower. Specifically, every morning for the seven days before September 11, the building's fire alarm system was placed on "test condition." On September 11, it was again put on test condition, at 6:47 a.m., and only returned to normal monitoring, automatically, eight hours later, at 2:47 p.m.
<br><br>Test condition was usually requested when maintenance or testing was being carried out on the alarm system. Perhaps significantly, when the system was in this mode, any alarms that were received would be considered the result of the maintenance or testing and were therefore ignored. Additionally, any alarm signals would not appear on the operator's display, although they were still recorded in the system's history file. [8]
<br><br>Anything unusual that took place at WTC 7 deserves scrutiny since this building collapsed completely at 5:20 p.m. on September 11, even though no plane hit it, after being set on fire by debris when the Twin Towers came down and then burning throughout the day. The <i>New York Times</i> called its collapse "a mystery that under normal circumstances would probably have captured the attention of the city and the world," and noted that WTC 7 was "the first skyscraper in modern times to collapse primarily as a result of a fire." [9]
<br><br>Official explanations have ruled out or ignored the use of explosives as a possible cause of its collapse. [10] Many people, though, have commented that its collapse resembled a typical controlled demolition and suggested that explosives were indeed used to bring it down. [11]
<br><br><b>ELEVATORS WERE OUT OF OPERATION BEFORE 9/11</b>
<br>The third unusual event at the World Trade Center was that some of the elevators in the Twin Towers were out of service in the months before September 11. This anomaly could be particularly significant in light of the possibility that the Twin Towers were brought down with explosives, since it has been indicated that the availability of unused elevator shafts would have made it easier for demolition workers to plant explosives throughout the buildings.
<br><br>At least one elevator that went all the way up the North Tower was out of operation before 9/11. Each of the Twin Towers had two passenger elevators that went from the base to the top of the building. [12] Referring to one of these elevators in the North Tower, journalists Kevin Flynn and Jim Dwyer wrote that the "elevator that ran directly from the ground" up to Windows on the World, the restaurant on the top floors of the building, "was out of service" on September 11. [13] Apparently referring to the same elevator, ABC News correspondent Don Dahler reported on the morning of September 11 that "a major elevator that went all the way to the top ... has been malfunctioning for at least a month." "They've been having a lot of trouble with that," he added. [14]
<br><br>In fact, according to a report by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), both of the elevators that went from the base to the top of the North Tower were out of operation on September 11. "Elevators 6A and 7A were out of service for modernization," the report stated. [15]
<br><br>Some people who worked in the North Tower have recalled problems with the building's elevators just before 9/11, but it is unclear whether they were referring to these two elevators or to other ones.
<br><br>Susan Frederick, who worked on the 80th floor, said two elevators "had been out of service for more than six months" before September 11, "as renovations were taking place." [16] Nancy Cass, who worked on the 44th floor, stated that the "passenger elevators on the west side of the building had been out of order for the past five or six weeks" before September 11 "and the elevator company had a crew of men working on the scene." [17] And Monica Goldstein, who worked on the 101st floor, told her sister that in the weeks just before 9/11, "elevators skipped floors and went out of service." [18]
<br><br>At least two elevators in the South Tower were out of operation just before 9/11. Each of the Twin Towers had 10 elevators that went up from the concourse to the 78th floor sky lobby. [19] Judy Wein, who worked on the 103rd floor of the South Tower, recalled that two of these in her building "had been out of service for months" before September 11. [20] And someone who was on the 78th floor of the South Tower when the plane crashed into the building on September 11 mentioned "elevators that were being repaired" there at that time. [21]
<br><br><b>DID THE UNUSUAL EVENTS RELATE TO PREPARATIONS FOR 9/11?</b>
<br>It is certainly curious that at least three anomalous events occurred at the World Trade Center just before September 11, when the Twin Towers were the targets of a massive terrorist attack and these two buildings, along with WTC 7, unexpectedly collapsed. It is at least plausible that it was a coincidence that these events all took place just before 9/11. However, while it would have been notable if even one of them occurred, for all three to happen at that time due to chance would have been extraordinary.
<br><br>It seems quite likely, therefore, that there were more sinister reasons for these events. If, as some people have suggested, the Twin Towers and WTC 7 were brought down with explosives, the events may have related to work carried out to prepare the three buildings to be demolished on September 11. It is consequently worth considering what purposes each event could have served if this was the case.
<br><br><b>SECURITY ALERT COULD HAVE PROVIDED A COVER STORY FOR OPERATIVES PREPARING THE ATTACKS</b>
<br>It is unclear what the heightened security at the World Trade Center in the two weeks before 9/11 might have achieved. Perhaps there were a large number of people at the Trade Center at that time, helping to prepare for the attacks on September 11. This could have meant there was a danger that security guards or others who worked there would get suspicious if they noticed all these unknown people around the place. The heightened security could have been implemented so if anyone questioned what these people were doing, it could be claimed they were there to help deal with this.
<br><br>Another possibility is that the security alert was intended to create a pretext for bringing to the Trade Center operatives who would make sure the explosives planted there weren't discovered at the last minute. Men disguised as security guards could have been brought there under the cover story that they were helping to implement extra security measures. Their actual role, however, would have been to guard areas where explosives were planted or work was being carried out to prepare the buildings to be demolished.
<br><br><b>'TEST CONDITION' COULD HAVE PREVENTED FIRE ALARMS DRAWING ATTENTION TO PREPARATIONS FOR 9/11</b>
<br>The purpose of placing the fire alarm system in WTC 7 on test condition in the week before 9/11 could have been to prevent any last-minute work preparing the building for demolition from setting off the alarm. Had the alarm gone off, it could have drawn attention to this work and perhaps led to the sinister plan for September 11 being uncovered.
<br><br>Even if the work had caused the fire alarm to go off, the fact that the system was on test condition should have meant the alarm would have been disregarded and therefore not draw attention to the work preparing WTC 7 to be demolished. As NIST pointed out, when the fire alarm system was on test condition, "any alarms received from the system were considered the result of ... maintenance or testing and were ignored."
<br><br>Perhaps work was being carried out that involved drilling or other activities that created a lot of dust, which could have got into the smoke detectors and set off the fire alarm. NIST, in one of the reports it produced on the collapse of WTC 7, confirmed that dust could set off the fire alarm. Specifically, it suggested that the presence of a large amount of dust from the collapse of the South Tower could have been the cause of the alarm system in WTC 7 registering a "fire condition." Referring to an alarm at 10:00 a.m. on September 11, NIST stated that it "could not determine whether this fire alarm was triggered by smoke from a fire or by dust entering smoke detectors." [22]
<br><br>It is harder to come up with possible reasons why the alarm system was on test condition on the day of 9/11, since any work preparing the building for demolition presumably would have been completed by then. Perhaps the system was on test condition that day so investigators would subsequently have less information with which to determine the sequence of events that led up to the collapse of WTC 7.
<br><br>The amount of information available to investigators would in fact already have been limited due to the way information from the fire alarm system was recorded. The fire alarm system in WTC 7 recorded information at the fire command station in the building's third-floor lobby. It was also monitored away from the World Trade Center site by AFA Protective Services, a New York-based company that designs, installs, and services fire alarm systems. [23] However, NIST noted, "specific fire information beyond the fact that a fire condition has been detected is rarely sent to the monitoring site."
<br><br>For example, the record in the system's history file, of the alarm in WTC 7 that occurred at 10:00 a.m. on September 11, showed that the fire condition existed in "AREA 1." However, AREA 1 was not a specific location within WTC 7, but instead referred to the entire building.
<br><br>While the fire alarm equipment in WTC 7 could have provided "a much greater amount of information" than the history file recorded at the monitoring site, NIST stated, "None of that information was recovered from the building systems, which were destroyed in the collapse." [24]
<br><br><b>ELEVATORS COULD HAVE BEEN OUT OF USE SO EXPLOSIVES COULD BE PLANTED IN THE SHAFTS</b>
<br>It is perhaps easiest to think of possible reasons why rogue individuals who planned to bring the Twin Towers down with explosives as part of the 9/11 attacks would have arranged to have elevators in the towers out of service in the months before September 11.
<br><br>The group Architects & Engineers for 9/11 Truth pointed out, "The architectural drawings of the WTC North Tower ... indicate that most of the [building's] core columns would be easily accessed from the elevator shafts in order to plant explosives." [25] And Tom Sullivan, an explosives technician, commented: "Looking at the [World Trade Center] building, [demolishing] it wouldn't be a problem once you gained access to the elevator shafts. Then a team of loading experts would have access to all the core columns and beams." [26]
<br><br>We can see, therefore, that a reason for having elevators in the Twin Towers out of operation before 9/11 could have been to enable demolition workers to plant explosives in the unused elevator shafts or make it easier for them to access areas where they needed to plant explosives.
<br><br>In light of this possibility, it is notable that one or two of the elevators in the North Tower that were out of operation went all the way up the building. Therefore, if demolition workers wanted to plant explosives in the elevator shafts or in areas accessible from the elevator shafts, having these particular elevators out of use would presumably have enabled them to rig the entire building, from the bottom to the top, with explosives.
<br><br>Similarly, the fact that two elevators in the South Tower that were out of service went from the base of the tower to the 78th floor presumably would have meant demolition workers were able to plant explosives on over two-thirds of the building's floors.
<br><br>An additional reason for having elevators out of service could have been to create a cover story for the demolition workers who were planting explosives in the Twin Towers. If anyone got suspicious and inquired about what these men were doing, they could have been falsely told the men were maintenance workers, there to work on elevators that were supposedly malfunctioning or being modernized.
<br><br><b>ELEVATOR MECHANICS WERE AWAY FROM THE TWIN TOWERS WHEN THEY COLLAPSED</b>
<br>In light of the possibility that demolition workers planted explosives in the elevator shafts in the Twin Towers or used the elevator shafts to access the areas where they were planting explosives, it is curious that elevator mechanics at the World Trade Center appear to have been particularly fortunate on September 11, such that none of them died in the attacks.
<br><br>ACE Elevator, the company responsible for servicing and modernizing the elevators at the World Trade Center, had 83 employees working at the Trade Center on September 11. Remarkably, these elevator mechanics "left the buildings after the second jet struck, nearly an hour before the first building collapsed," according to <i>USA Today</i>, even though, at the time, "dozens of people were trapped in stuck elevators." The mechanics were consequently about a block and a half away from the towers when the first collapse occurred. "Our people miraculously left when the second plane hit and it saved our lives," Ron Baamonde, ACE Elevator's president, commented.
<br><br>The departure of elevator mechanics from a disaster site is unusual, according to <i>USA Today</i>. "Nobody knows the insides of a high-rise like an elevator mechanic," Robert Caporale, editor of <i>Elevator World</i> magazine, told the newspaper.
<br><br>Baamonde said the mechanics left the towers "on their own [initiative] because they were in danger." James O'Neill, ACE Elevator's supervisor of maintenance, said they left to "assess the damage and come back in as needed." Their plan, he said, had been "to return to the building later in the day to help with rescues." [27]
<br><br>However, according to elevator history expert Patrick Carrajat, no clear reason has been provided as to why ACE Elevator personnel were away from the towers when they collapsed. "We have heard several versions of why ACE personnel were not at the Trade [Center]," he wrote, and "most revolve around a labor management dispute." [28]
<br><br>Furthermore, if the elevator mechanics left the World Trade Center on their own initiative after the second crash, their actions apparently violated protocol. The New York Port Authority, which owned the Trade Center, said its "emergency plan called for mechanics to stay and help with rescues." Port Authority spokesman Allen Morrison said, "There was no situation in which the mechanics were advised or instructed to leave on their own." [29]
<br><br>Considering the conflicting explanations that have been offered as to why the elevator mechanics were away from the Twin Towers when they collapsed and the fact that the mechanics' actions appear to have gone against standard procedures, it is surely possible that there was a more sinister reason for the mechanics' apparent good fortune on September 11.
<br><br>Perhaps someone at ACE Elevator, due to the company's involvement with maintaining the elevators at the World Trade Center, knew demolition workers had been planting explosives in the elevator shafts in the Twin Towers or using the elevator shafts to access areas where they were planting explosives. If so, this person may have consequently taken actions that ensured the company's workers were out of harm's way when the towers came down on September 11.
<br><br><b>THE UNUSUAL EVENTS AT THE TRADE CENTER BEFORE 9/11 ARE SUSPICIOUS AND NEED TO BE INVESTIGATED</b>
<br>It seems reasonable to assume that the occurrence of at least three anomalous events at the World Trade Center just before September 11, when the Trade Center was the scene of a massive terrorist attack, is significant. These events therefore ought to be looked into as part of a new investigation of the 9/11 attacks.
<br><br>There are many questions that need to be addressed. To begin with, were these events indeed connected to the attacks that subsequently occurred at the Trade Center? If so, what were their purposes? Did they relate to preparations for bringing down the Twin Towers and WTC 7 with explosives? Who was responsible for bringing them about?
<br><br>It ought to be fairly straightforward to find out who arranged to have the fire alarm system in WTC 7 put on test condition in the days up to and including September 11. Currently, the identity of this person is unclear. AFA Protective Systems, the company that monitored the alarm system, usually placed the system on test condition in response to a request from the building manager, according to NIST. [30] And Mike Catalano, chief engineer for Salomon Smith Barney at WTC 7, said the building manager was a man called Ed Campbell. [31] However, the monitoring station history tape record for the alarm system on September 11 stated that the system was placed on test condition that day at the request of a person with the surname, "Williams." [32]
<br><br>Also, was it usual to have the alarm system in WTC 7 on test condition every day for a week? Surely this was quite a drastic and risky action. If there had been a fire in WTC 7 during the week before 9/11, while the system was in this mode, would the alarm have failed to go off or, if it did go off, would it have been ignored because people assumed this was due to testing? Would those in the building therefore have stayed where they were instead of evacuating, thereby potentially putting themselves in danger? And would it have taken longer for the Fire Department to be alerted, such that the fire grew more and caused more damage before firefighters were able to bring it under control?
<br><br>It has been claimed that elevators in the Twin Towers were out of service before September 11 for reasons such as "renovations," "modernization," or because they were "malfunctioning" or "being repaired." And according to people who worked in the Twin Towers, some elevators were out of use for months. But why would it take months for an elevator to be repaired or modernized? Was it usual for such work to take this long? If not, were any suspicions raised at the time about the elevators being out of operation and, if they were, what explanations were given?
<br><br>Since it is plausible that the increased security at the World Trade Center, the placing of the fire alarm system in WTC 7 on test condition, and having some of the elevators in the Twin Towers out of service were connected to preparations for bringing down the Twin Towers and WTC 7 with explosives on September 11, it is surely important that these events be investigated thoroughly. Closer examination of them could help determine how the 9/11 attacks were carried out and who was responsible for them.
<br><br><b>NOTES</b>
<br>[1] <a href="https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/1046727/Tim_Brown_2002.pdf" target="_blank">Tim Brown, interview by Jim Whitaker. Project Rebirth, June 30, 2002</a>.
<br>[2] <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20050127000302/http:/www.nynewsday.com/news/local/manhattan/wtc/ny-nyaler122362178sep12,0,6794009.story" target="_blank">Curtis L. Taylor and Sean Gardiner, "Heightened Security Alert Had Just Been Lifted." <i>Newsday</i>, September 12, 2001</a>.
<br>[3] <a href="https://people.com/archive/hell-on-earth-vol-56-no-13/" target="_blank">"Hell on Earth." <i>People</i>, September 24, 2001</a>.
<br>[4] <a href="https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/1046727/Tim_Brown_2002.pdf" target="_blank">Tim Brown, interview by Jim Whitaker</a>.
<br>[5] <a href="https://people.com/archive/hell-on-earth-vol-56-no-13/" target="_blank">"Hell on Earth."</a>
<br>[6] <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20050127000302/http:/www.nynewsday.com/news/local/manhattan/wtc/ny-nyaler122362178sep12,0,6794009.story" target="_blank">Curtis L. Taylor and Sean Gardiner, "Heightened Security Alert Had Just Been Lifted"</a>; <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/bush-did-not-heed-several-warnings-of-attacks-9137508.html" target="_blank">Andrew Gumbel, "Bush Did Not Heed Several Warnings of Attacks." <i>The Independent</i>, September 17, 2001</a>.
<br>[7] <a href="https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/1046727/Tim_Brown_2002.pdf" target="_blank">Tim Brown, interview by Jim Whitaker</a>.
<br>[8] <a href="http://ws680.nist.gov/publication/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=861611" target="_blank">Therese P. McAllister et al., <i>Structural Fire Response and Probable Collapse Sequence of World Trade Center Building 7</i>. Gaithersburg, MD: National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2008, pp. 68-69</a>.
<br>[9] <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/29/nyregion/nation-challenged-site-engineers-have-culprit-strange-collapse-7-world-trade.html" target="_blank">James Glanz, "Engineers Have a Culprit in the Strange Collapse of 7 World Trade Center: Diesel Fuel." <i>New York Times</i>, November 29, 2001</a>; <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/02/nyregion/a-nation-challenged-ground-zero-burning-diesel-is-cited-in-fall-of-3rd-tower.html" target="_blank">James Glanz and Eric Lipton, "Burning Diesel is Cited in Fall of 3rd Tower." <i>New York Times</i>, March 2, 2002</a>; <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/22/nyregion/22wtccnd.html" target="_blank">Eric Lipton, "Fire, Not Explosives, Felled 3rd Tower on 9/11, Report Says." <i>New York Times</i>, August 21, 2008</a>.
<br>[10] <a href="https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1512-20490-2227/403_ch5.pdf" target="_blank">Therese McAllister (Editor), <i>World Trade Center Building Performance Study: Data Collection, Preliminary Observations, and Recommendations</i>. Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2002, pp. 5-1 - 5-32</a>; <a href="https://ws680.nist.gov/publication/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=861610" target="_blank"><i>Final Report on the Collapse of World Trade Center Building 7</i>. Gaithersburg, MD: National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2008, pp. 26-28</a>.
<br>[11] <a href="http://cafr1.com/Beyond-Misinformation-2015.pdf" target="_blank">Ted Walter, <i>Beyond Misinformation: What Science Says About the Destruction of World Trade Center Buildings 1, 2, and 7</i>. Berkeley, CA: Architects & Engineers for 9/11 Truth, 2015, p. 2</a>. For a short video that compares the collapse of WTC 7 with the known controlled demolitions of some high-rise buildings, see <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D7Rm6ZFROmc" target="_blank">"WTC 7: Side-by-Side Comparison to Controlled Demolition." Architects & Engineers for 9/11 Truth, February 4, 2013</a>.
<br>[12] <a href="http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/sept11/2002-09-04-elevator-usat_x.htm" target="_blank">Dennis Cauchon and Martha T. Moore, "Elevators Were Disaster Within Disaster." <i>USA Today</i>, September 4, 2002</a>; <a href="https://ws680.nist.gov/publication/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=101046" target="_blank">Jason D. Averill et al., <i>Occupant Behavior, Egress, and Emergency Communications</i>. Gaithersburg, MD: National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2005, p. 34</a>.
<br>[13] Jim Dwyer and Kevin Flynn, <i>102 Minutes: The Untold Story of the Fight to Survive Inside the Twin Towers</i>. New York: Times Books, 2005, p. 151.
<br>[14] <a href="https://archive.org/details/abc200109111118-1159" target="_blank">"ABC Sept. 11, 2001, 11:18 a.m.-11:59 a.m." ABC 7, September 11, 2001</a>.
<br>[15] <a href="http://www.nist.gov/customcf/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=101049" target="_blank">J. Randall Lawson and Robert L. Vettori, <i>The Emergency Response Operations</i>. Gaithersburg, MD: National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2005, p. 43</a>.
<br>[16] <a href="https://www.masslive.com/news/index.ssf/2011/09/9-11_survivor_tale_it_was_not.html" target="_blank">Susan A. Frederick, "9/11 Survivor's Tale: 'It Was Not my Time,' Holyoke Native Susan Frederick Says." <i>The Republican</i>, September 18, 2001</a>.
<br>[17] Damon DiMarco, <i>Tower Stories: An Oral History of 9/11</i>. Santa Monica, CA: Santa Monica Press, 2007, p. 59.
<br>[18] <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/25/nyregion/nation-challenged-portraits-grief-victims-lives-remembered-families-friends-who.html" target="_blank">"Lives Remembered, by the Families and Friends Who Shared Them." <i>New York Times</i>, September 25, 2001</a>.
<br>[19] <a href="https://ws680.nist.gov/publication/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=101332" target="_blank">H. S. Lew, Richard W. Bukowski, and Nicholas J. Carino, <i>Design, Construction, and Maintenance of Structural and Life Safety Systems</i>. Gaithersburg, MD: National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2005, p. 169</a>.
<br>[20] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/16842002/NY-B8-Economic-Impact-Fdr-Interview-3-24-04-Judy-Wein-AON-409" target="_blank">"Interview With Judy Wein, AON, 3/24/04, Hollis Hills, Queens." 9/11 Commission, March 24, 2004</a>; <a href="https://ia801307.us.archive.org/20/items/NARA_9-11_Commission_Records_Misc_MFRs_Box_175/NARA_9-11_Commission_Records_Misc_MFRs_Box_175/NARA_RG_148_Records_of_the_911_Commission_Reference_Copy_Misc_WTC_MFRs_Master_Box_175/MFR04021802-MFR04021912/MFR%2004021873.PDF" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview of Judy Wein." 9/11 Commission, March 24, 2004</a>.
<br>[21] <a href="https://ws680.nist.gov/publication/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=101046" target="_blank">Jason D. Averill et al., <i>Occupant Behavior, Egress, and Emergency Communications</i>, p. 102</a>.
<br>[22] <a href="http://ws680.nist.gov/publication/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=861611" target="_blank">Therese P. McAllister et al., <i>Structural Fire Response and Probable Collapse Sequence of World Trade Center Building 7</i>, pp. 68-70</a>.
<br>[23] <a href="https://ws680.nist.gov/publication/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=860567" target="_blank"><i>June 2004 Progress Report on the Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster</i>. Gaithersburg, MD: National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2004, p. 93</a>; <a href="https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2017/05/09/WTC-Part-IV-Life-Safety-Final.pdf" target="_blank">"Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster, Part IV: Life Safety." National Institute of Standards and Technology, April 5, 2005</a>.
<br>[24] <a href="http://ws680.nist.gov/publication/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=861611" target="_blank">Therese P. McAllister et al., <i>Structural Fire Response and Probable Collapse Sequence of World Trade Center Building 7</i>, pp. 69-70</a>.
<br>[25] <a href="http://www2.ae911truth.org/twintowers.php" target="_blank">"The Twin Towers: Gallery of Evidence." Architects & Engineers for 9/11 Truth, n.d.</a>
<br>[26] <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u5IgqJXyLbg" target="_blank">"Tom Sullivan: Explosives Technician, Loader." Architects & Engineers for 9/11 Truth, March 19, 2011</a>; <a href="http://www1.ae911truth.org/en/news-section/41-articles/529-tom-sullivan-eso" target="_blank">"Explosives Technician Blows Away Official WTC Conspiracy Theory." Architects & Engineers for 9/11 Truth, June 15, 2011</a>.
<br>[27] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20030724202406/http:/www.usatoday.com/news/sept11/2001/12/19/usat-mechanics.htm" target="_blank">Dennis Cauchon, "Mechanics Left Towers Before Buildings Collapsed." <i>USA Today</i>, December 19, 2001</a>; <a href="http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/sept11/2002-09-04-elevator-usat_x.htm" target="_blank">Dennis Cauchon and Martha T. Moore, "Elevators Were Disaster Within Disaster"</a>; <a href="http://www.thrnewmedia.com/adayinseptember/jones.htm" target="_blank">Robert Jones, "The Elevator Man's Tale." <i>Times Herald-Record</i>, September 8, 2002</a>.
<br>[28] <a href="http://www.elevatorpreservation.com/wp_content/uploads/2009/06/historyofelevatorindustry1850_2001_wq.pdf" target="_blank">Patrick A. Carrajat, <i>The Past as Prologue: The History of the Elevator Industry in America, 1850-2001</i>. Privately printed, 2005, p. 162</a>.
<br>[29] <a href="http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/sept11/2002-09-04-elevator-usat_x.htm" target="_blank">Dennis Cauchon and Martha T. Moore, "Elevators Were Disaster Within Disaster."</a>
<br>[30] <a href="http://ws680.nist.gov/publication/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=861611" target="_blank">Therese P. McAllister et al., <i>Structural Fire Response and Probable Collapse Sequence of World Trade Center Building 7</i>, p. 69</a>.
<br>[31] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/19273744/Responding-to-Horror" target="_blank"><i>Responding to Horror: Operating Engineers in Action at the World Trade Center Disaster</i>. Washington, DC: International Union of Operating Engineers, 2003, p. 27</a>; <a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/OpaAPI/media/2609722/content/arcmedia/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00136.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Meeting With Mike Catalano, Former Head of Salomon Smith Barney Security, Building 7 WTC." 9/11 Commission, January 16, 2004</a>.
<br>[32] <a href="http://ws680.nist.gov/publication/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=861611" target="_blank">Therese P. McAllister et al., <i>Structural Fire Response and Probable Collapse Sequence of World Trade Center Building 7</i>, p. 69</a>.
Shoestringhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01534319150672667644noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2990970741097819876.post-32590326307807057092018-03-18T02:29:00.000-07:002018-03-18T02:29:53.779-07:00Media Business Middleman Was Shown an Unreleased Video, Which Revealed That 'Something Other Than a 757 Hit the Pentagon on 9/11'<br><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgrKAuvaQafkt_7PHxiH5oOdRl4ykIWfDBp2hIA8X9HU6U7ETNkg84EYm_IB0biman98OnsqqNPRmTo9Ptnfc-dH8g7n2ZlGKi6cp3HnSfb0nAQDb_JwPL0BrohGks3BrRvxxSgRS0lQxMk/s1600/PentagonCrashSite.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgrKAuvaQafkt_7PHxiH5oOdRl4ykIWfDBp2hIA8X9HU6U7ETNkg84EYm_IB0biman98OnsqqNPRmTo9Ptnfc-dH8g7n2ZlGKi6cp3HnSfb0nAQDb_JwPL0BrohGks3BrRvxxSgRS0lQxMk/s1600/PentagonCrashSite.jpg" alt="The Pentagon crash site" data-original-width="310" data-original-height="210" /></a></div><br>Larry Garrison, a leading "story broker" whose job is to deliver tabloid stories to television news programs, was sent a video in the months after 9/11, which clearly showed that the Pentagon was hit by something much smaller than a commercial airliner--perhaps a missile--on September 11, 2001. However, when he passed copies of this video on to news organizations, they refused to broadcast the footage and instead sternly warned him to cease trying to get it released.
<br><br>While a few videos showing the attack on the Pentagon have been released in the years since Garrison received this footage, they appear to be different to what Garrison was sent. Furthermore, none of them have been of sufficient quality to determine conclusively what hit the Pentagon on September 11. The type of aircraft involved in the attack has therefore remained a subject of controversy.
<br><br>If Garrison's account is accurate, though, and the video Garrison was sent was authentic, the implications could be huge. If the Pentagon was hit by something other than a Boeing 757--the kind of aircraft that, according to the official narrative of 9/11, crashed into it--this video could reveal that the public has been seriously deceived. And if the footage was made public, its release could lead to a complete reassessment of the 9/11 attacks.
<br><br><b>THE PENTAGON WAS SUPPOSEDLY HIT BY A HIJACKED 757</b>
<br>The Pentagon was hit at 9:37 a.m. on September 11 by American Airlines Flight 77, a Boeing 757-200, according to the official account of 9/11. [1] This plane had taken off from Dulles International Airport in Washington, DC, at 8:20 a.m. that morning, bound for Los Angeles. But at 8:51 a.m., the pilots communicated with air traffic controllers for the last time and in the next few minutes, it is believed, the plane was hijacked. [2] The five alleged hijackers were from Saudi Arabia and the hijacker who allegedly took over the plane's controls was a 29-year-old called Hani Hanjour. [3]
<br><br>After previously heading west, at 8:54 a.m. Flight 77 veered off its assigned course over the Ohio-Kentucky border and flew south. Two minutes later, radar contact with it was lost. Minutes after that, it turned eastward. Then, at 9:34 a.m., as it approached Washington, the plane began a 330-degree turn and descended toward the headquarters of the Department of Defense. Three minutes later, it crashed into the west wall of the Pentagon at the first-floor level, at approximately 530 miles per hour. [4]
<br><br>A total of 189 people died in the attack, 64 of them on the plane and 125 working at the Pentagon. [5]
<br><br>While this account seems quite straightforward and was accepted as true in the <i>9/11 Commission Report</i>, Garrison received a video that indicated it was false and something other than Flight 77 had crashed into the Pentagon on September 11.
<br><br><b>'STORY BROKER' WAS TOLD ABOUT A VIDEO THAT SHOWED A MISSILE FLYING INTO THE PENTAGON</b>
<br>Larry Garrison, president of SilverCreek Entertainment in Los Angeles, is what is known as a "story broker." Story brokers "place themselves as middlemen between the supply of human drama and the demand for it--so news organizations have to do business with them," according to the <i>New York Observer</i>. [6] Garrison "gets paid to bring tabloid stories to TV news programs," <i>The Atlantic</i> reported. [7]
<br><br>He is the "king" of his line of work, according to numerous sources at the ABC network. [8] He has decades of experience in the media business, and has produced and brokered major news stories for ABC News, CBS News, Fox News, NBC News, and other major media organizations. [9]
<br><br>In his memoir, <i>The NewsBreaker</i>, Garrison recalled that a few months after 9/11, he received a curious e-mail from someone who referred to himself by the pseudonym "Carl." Garrison was initially suspicious about Carl, assuming he was just a hoaxer trying to cash in on the tragic events of September 11. However, Garrison wrote, "when he told me he had a video of a missile flying into the Pentagon, not a passenger jet, I listened." Carl stated that he would like to meet Garrison and show him the video. He added, however, that "the FBI was trying to stop him from showing it to anyone."
<br><br>Although Carl's claim was extraordinary, Garrison felt this man was trustworthy. "For the most part, my 20-plus years of experience helps me weed out the fakes; this guy sounded real," he has commented. He apparently talked with Carl on the phone after receiving the e-mail and "could feel the sense of urgency in his voice, and the sincerity." [10]
<br><br>After researching the attack on the Pentagon and noting various anomalies that had been highlighted by commentators on the Internet, Garrison wanted to get hold of the video that Carl said he possessed. Although he was unable to persuade Carl to meet up in person, Carl did e-mail him a copy of the video. It turned out to be devastating.
<br><br>Although the footage was less clear than the story broker would have liked, Garrison recalled, "it left no doubt whatsoever that what hit the Pentagon on 9/11 wasn't a 757." While the quality of the image made it impossible to determine for sure what crashed into the Pentagon, the object in the video "looked like a smaller plane or [a] cruise missile."
<br><br>Upon consideration, Garrison decided it was more likely a missile, since he felt there had been greater damage to the reinforced walls of the Pentagon than a small plane could have caused. He concluded: "When I look at some of the news archives and compare the damage to the Pentagon to other concrete buildings that have been hit with a cruise missile, I have no doubt in my mind that something other than a 757 hit the Pentagon on 9/11." [11]
<br><br><b>NEWS ORGANIZATIONS REFUSED TO BROADCAST THE FOOTAGE</b>
<br>Garrison initially felt certain that once he passed on this astonishing video to the news networks, what it showed would become a major story and the "media machine" would then "mobilize all of its resources to discover, or uncover, what really happened." He soon found that his assumption was wrong.
<br><br>After receiving the video from Carl, he contacted a couple of major news organizations. When he explained to them what he had, the people he talked to replied enthusiastically: "Oh, my God! Get that tape over here right away!"
<br><br>He sent them copies of the video and then waited for a couple of days, expecting to see the footage appearing and being discussed on the news. Instead, however, the people at the news organizations called him back and warned him to abandon his efforts to get the video released to the public. He was told: "Larry, you need to listen to me on this. The video never existed. You never saw it. This could cause some real trouble if you pursue it any further." [12]
<br><br>Garrison had initially been determined to help the public understand what had happened on September 11. On the day of the terrorist attacks, he recalled, "The one thing I did know was that I would find answers sooner than most and I felt obligated to make sure that [the public] knew everything I knew." [13] But what he was now being told and the manner in which it was said led him to have a change of heart.
<br><br>"I remember hanging up the phone knowing that I could be putting my family and myself at risk if I tried to push the issue, and I knew there was no way to protect myself," he wrote. Therefore, he added, "I backed off." [14]
<br><br><b>VIDEOS OF THE PENTAGON ATTACK THAT HAVE BEEN RELEASED ARE UNCLEAR</b>
<br>In the years since Garrison was sent this revelatory footage of the Pentagon being hit on September 11, a number of videos that show, or relate to, the attack on the Pentagon have been released, but these appear to be different to what Garrison received. This means a crucial piece of evidence related to the 9/11 attacks is still being withheld from the public.
<br><br>Two videos showing the Pentagon being hit were officially released by the Department of Defense in May 2006. [15] They had been recorded by security cameras north of the crash site, at a checkpoint that cars went through on their way to a parking lot at the Pentagon. [16] However, Garrison apparently referred to these in his memoir and made clear they were different to the video he saw.
<br><br>He mentioned another video, besides the one Carl sent him, that had been "recently released" and showed "something that to many does not look like a plane" crashing into the Pentagon. [17] His memoir was published just a few months after these two videos were released and the videos indeed showed "something that to many does not look like a plane" hitting the Pentagon. The <i>Washington Post</i> described the object in them as "a silver speck low to the ground" while the Associated Press described it as just "a thin white blur." [18]
<br><br>Five frames from a video that showed the Pentagon being hit were released unofficially to news organizations in March 2002. [19] These, however, were just excerpted from one of the videos that were officially released in May 2006. [20] They were therefore unrelated to the video Garrison was sent.
<br><br>A few more videos related to the Pentagon attack were released by the FBI in late 2006, but these were also apparently different to the video Garrison received. Unlike Carl's video, they either didn't show the Pentagon being hit or didn't show the attacking aircraft--or missile--flying toward the building.
<br><br>Among them was footage, released in September 2006, recorded by six security cameras at a Citgo gas station near the Pentagon. [21] The video had been confiscated by the FBI within minutes of the Pentagon attack. A supervisor at the gas station had said the security cameras there were "close enough to the Pentagon to have recorded the moment of impact." [22] However, this was apparently not the case. Judicial Watch, the public interest group that obtained the videos from the FBI, noted that the videos showed that "the Citgo cameras did not seem to capture the actual attack." [23]
<br><br>The final video related to the Pentagon attack to be made public was recorded by a security camera on top of the Doubletree Hotel in Arlington, Virginia, and was released in December 2006. But this too failed to shed any light on what crashed into the building. The image quality was poor, and a "close examination" of the recording by CNN revealed only "the subsequent explosion and no image of the jet" that supposedly flew into the Pentagon. [24]
<br><br><b>LACK OF FOOTAGE OF THE PENTAGON ATTACK MADE GARRISON SUSPICIOUS</b>
<br>Larry Garrison's claim that something other than a Boeing 757 hit the Pentagon on September 11 is supported by various pieces of evidence, in addition to Carl's video, that cast doubt on the official account of the Pentagon attack. Indeed, Garrison has indicated that a reason why he wanted to see the video Carl described to him was that he had considered some of this evidence.
<br><br>He was suspicious that no footage had been released showing Flight 77 as it rapidly descended toward the Pentagon. "From the day of the attacks, I was bothered that not one picture or video was captured of the jet that flew at a very low altitude near our nation's capital and targeted the center of our country's military might," he wrote. While several people had come forward claiming to have witnessed the Pentagon attack, "not one piece of video for the networks to play over and over in the days after the attacks" had surfaced. Video that aired showed the aftermath of the Pentagon being hit but not the impact itself.
<br><br>Having visited Washington and its surrounding areas many times, Garrison commented that he felt "very safe in saying that there are more reporters, cameras, and video cameras per capita there than any place in the world." He therefore found it "hard to believe that not one camera captured the 757 screaming above a very densely populated area toward the Pentagon." [25]
<br><br>Garrison also questioned whether Hani Hanjour, the hijacker who allegedly flew Flight 77 into the Pentagon, had the necessary skills to carry out the attack and whether it was even possible to fly a Boeing 757 into the Pentagon in the way that supposedly occurred.
<br><br><b>757 PILOT SAID THERE WAS 'ZERO' CHANCE OF A NOVICE CARRYING OUT THE PENTAGON ATTACK</b>
<br>A few weeks before he received the e-mail from Carl, a man had phoned him and claimed that "he had evidence that it was impossible for the damage at the Pentagon to be caused by a passenger jet, because it was impossible for a plane of that size to fly at an altitude that low, at that speed."
<br><br>A few days later, Garrison questioned one of the pilots of a 757 he was about to board for a business trip. Garrison asked the pilot, who said he had accumulated thousands of hours of flying time in his career, "if he had the skill to fly a 757 10 to 20 feet off the ground at a speed of over 500 miles an hour," meaning in the way that Flight 77 was allegedly flown toward the Pentagon. "Chuck Yeager couldn't do that!" the pilot replied. (Chuck Yeager was a flying ace and test pilot who became the first man to fly faster than the speed of sound.)
<br><br>The pilot explained that planes the size of a passenger jet "do not react in an instant" and "the control inputs take longer to change the plane's altitude." The large surface areas and the weight of the plane "would make it impossible to have the degree of control you would have to have to fly at that altitude without crashing into the ground," he said. "I really don't think it would be possible," he concluded.
<br><br>Garrison then asked the pilot what he thought the chances were of a novice with very limited training--i.e. someone like Hanjour--being able to hit a target with pinpoint accuracy. "Zero," the pilot replied. He added that a passenger jet's autopilot "isn't even that good and, if it were on, it would not allow the plane to fly at a low altitude, let alone treetop level." [26]
<br><br><b>HIJACKER ALLEGEDLY AT THE CONTROLS OF FLIGHT 77 WAS AN INCOMPETENT PILOT</b>
<br>In fact, not only was Hanjour a novice who'd never flown a jet airliner before September 11, people who met him found him to be a hopeless pilot with nothing like the level of skill necessary to fly a commercial aircraft across America and then crash it into the side of the Pentagon.
<br><br>For example, a flight instructor who trained him for about four months in 1998 recalled that Hanjour had "a poor understanding of the basic principles of aviation and poor judgment, combined with poor technical skills." [27]
<br><br>Instructors at a flight school he attended early in 2001 found his piloting skills "so shoddy and his grasp of English so inadequate that they questioned whether his pilot's license was genuine," according to the <i>New York Times</i>. One person who worked at the flight school at the time commented: "I'm still to this day amazed that he could have flown into the Pentagon. He could not fly at all." [28]
<br><br>And an instructor at a flight school in the Washington area, which he arrived at just under a month before September 11, described him as a "poor student" who had "particular difficulty landing the aircraft." [29]
<br><br><b>PHOTOS OF THE CRASH SITE LOOKED 'LIKE A MISSILE HIT' THE PENTAGON</b>
<br>Garrison was also troubled by the fact that, in photos, the impact site at the Pentagon seemed inconsistent with how one might expect the location where a large plane had crashed to appear. To begin with, he wrote, "the grass right in front of the impact point was not burnt at all," even though "a hundred tons of plane and jet fuel had crashed and exploded a few yards away." "In fact," he commented, "it looked like the landscapers had just cut it."
<br><br>Secondly, he thought the hole in the building supposedly made when Flight 77 crashed into it appeared too small. "The jet's wingspan is over 123 feet," but, he wrote, "the hole isn't [that wide]--not even close." He noticed that windows were unbroken "where there should have been holes caused by the wings and engines."
<br><br>He spoke with experts about this anomaly and all of them told him that "it is impossible for there not to be any signs of impact points from the 12,000-pound engines on the side of the building." The photos of the Pentagon, he concluded, looked "like a missile hit, instead of a plane crash site."
<br><br>Garrison was also surprised at the lack of debris at the scene of the attack. "In the pictures that were broadcast of the Pentagon, there was very little of the aircraft shown," he noted. "In my mind, a plane weighing 220,000 pounds at takeoff should have left more than a few pieces of wreckage," he commented. [30]
<br><br>We can see that, aside from Carl's video, there are numerous reasons for questioning the official narrative of the Pentagon attack.
<br><br><b>MANY UNRELEASED VIDEOS RELATED TO THE PENTAGON ATTACK EXIST</b>
<br>A question worth considering is where was the camera that recorded the video Garrison was sent located? It has in fact been reported that dozens of videos related to the attack on the Pentagon exist, besides the two released by the Department of Defense in May 2006, and the videos from the Doubletree Hotel and the Citgo gas station.
<br><br>After the Defense Department officially released the two videos showing the attack, in May 2006, CNN Pentagon correspondent Jamie McIntyre reported that there were "at least 80 other tapes" related to the Pentagon attack "that the government is holding onto." Carl's video might have been one of these. CNN was told, however, that the videos "don't really show much." [31] Indeed, a list that has been released, of videos related to the 9/11 attacks that the FBI possesses, reveals that many of the videos related to the Pentagon attack were recorded only after the attack occurred. [32]
<br><br>However, "sources" told CNN that "at least one of the tapes from a security camera at a nearby hotel may have captured the plane [that hit the Pentagon] in the air." [33] Indeed, the <i>Washington Times</i> reported that a "security camera atop a hotel close to the Pentagon may have captured dramatic footage of the hijacked Boeing 757 airliner as it slammed into the western wall of the Pentagon," and the hotel's employees had "sat watching the film in shock and horror several times before the FBI confiscated the video as part of its investigation." [34] Whether this footage came from the Doubletree Hotel or another hotel near the Pentagon was unstated.
<br><br>Additionally, a camera operated by the Virginia Department of Transportation may have captured the attack, so this could have been the source of Carl's video. Reporter Sandra Jontz, who was at the Pentagon on September 11, was escorted out to an area in front of the crash site following the attack. While there, she recalled, she noticed "a Department of Transportation camera that monitors traffic backups pointed toward the crash site." [35]
<br><br><b>SOME SECURITY CAMERAS WERE DESTROYED WHEN THE PENTAGON WAS HIT</b>
<br>It is also plausible that, in addition to the two cameras at the checkpoint that cars went through on their way to a parking lot at the Pentagon, at least one more of the Pentagon's security cameras captured the crash. The <i>Washington Times</i> noted that the attack "occurred close to the Pentagon's heliport, an area that normally would be under 24-hour security surveillance, including video monitoring." [36]
<br><br>However, the camera on the building that was closest to the point of impact was destroyed when the Pentagon was hit. And a camera on the heliport was also destroyed when the attack occurred. These two cameras were found to provide no information related to the attack, according to Steve Pennington, a private consultant responsible for the Pentagon's security cameras. "We looked and there was nothing there," he said. [37]
<br><br>Connectivity to other cameras on the west side of the Pentagon that overlooked the area where the crash occurred was cut when the building was hit, according to John Jester, chief of the Defense Protective Service--the law enforcement agency that guarded the Pentagon. A colleague in his communication center, where the cameras were monitored, told him just after the building was hit that the cameras had been "knocked out." [38] It seems plausible, though, that at least one of these cameras could have captured the approaching aircraft--or missile--in the moments before the attack occurred, before getting disconnected, and this camera might therefore have been the source of Carl's video.
<br><br>Curiously, some of the Pentagon's security cameras, which were in the right positions to have possibly captured the attack, were out of operation on the morning of September 11, supposedly due to construction work that was taking place at the time. [39] "Other cameras would normally look at that area [where the attack occurred]," Pennington recalled, "but because that area was being renovated, a lot of the connectivity of those cameras and the infrastructure that allowed those cameras to be connected back to the building had been removed or destroyed." Consequently, he commented, these cameras "weren't capturing images and offering fields of view." [40]
<br><br><b>GARRISON'S ACCOUNT INDICATES WE HAVE BEEN MISLED ABOUT THE 9/11 ATTACKS</b>
<br>If Larry Garrison's account of being sent unreleased footage that disproved the official narrative of the Pentagon attack is true, the implications are devastating. It means an important video exists, which quite clearly shows the Pentagon being hit on September 11, but this video has been withheld from the public. It means the Pentagon was hit by something much smaller than the Boeing 757 that was officially claimed to have crashed into it, such as a missile. It implies that people who claimed they witnessed a large commercial aircraft crashing into the Pentagon were either mistaken or lying. And it means the public has been lied to about the events of September 11.
<br><br>If the video Garrison received indeed shows something other than a Boeing 757 crashing into the Pentagon, this gives rise to many questions that need to be addressed. In his memoir, Garrison stated some of these. For example, he asked, "What really happened to the 757 and its passengers that no one caught on tape or on film, crashing into the Pentagon?" [41]
<br><br>Partly based on his inability to get Carl's video shown on television, he asked, "Why would the media organizations refuse to report on valuable pieces of these important stories" such as the events of September 11? "Did the news programmers not believe the evidence that was put in front of them?" he wondered or, "Did higher-ups in the government put pressure on the networks to not follow up on these leads?"
<br><br>Clearly, Garrison's account could be explosive. "The implications that over 3,000 people lost their lives [in the 9/11 attacks], and the news that has and is still being delivered to the public may not be entirely true, is outrageous," Garrison wrote. The repercussions of members of the public finding out they have been seriously misled about the 9/11 attacks would likely be huge.
<br><br>All the same, if footage exists that disproves the official account of what hit the Pentagon on September 11, this footage needs to be released as a matter of urgency. "It is [the media's] responsibility, with the trust that we put in them, to report what the truth is, even if we don't like the answers," Garrison commented. [42] The FBI must be aware of the video that Carl sent to Garrison, if Carl's claim that the bureau "was trying to stop him from showing [the video] to anyone" was true. Presumably it has a copy of the video, which it could release to the public.
<br><br>Once members of public have seen this video, we will be able to decide for ourselves whether we think the official account of the Pentagon attack is correct.
<br><br><b>NOTES</b>
<br>[1] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20040203155704/http:/fire.nist.gov/bfrlpubs/build03/PDF/b03017.pdf" target="_blank">Paul F. Mlakar et al., <i>The Pentagon Building Performance Report</i>. Reston, VA: American Society of Civil Engineers, 2003, p. 12</a>; 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States</i>. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004, p. 10.
<br>[2] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 8.
<br>[3] <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1567815.stm" target="_blank">"The Hijack Suspects." BBC News, September 28, 2001</a>; <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2013/07/27/us/september-11th-hijackers-fast-facts/index.html" target="_blank">"September 11th Hijackers Fast Facts." CNN, August 28, 2017</a>.
<br>[4] <a href="http://arlingtonva.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/21/2014/04/after_report.pdf" target="_blank">Arlington County, Virginia, report, Titan Systems Corp., <i>Arlington County: After-Action Report on the Response to the September 11 Terrorist Attack on the Pentagon</i>. 2002, p. 9</a>; 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, pp. 9-10; Alfred Goldberg et al., <i>Pentagon 9/11</i>. Washington, DC: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2007, pp. 12-17.
<br>[5] <a href="https://nypost.com/2011/09/11/the-eleventh-day/" target="_blank">Anthony Summers, "The Eleventh Day." <i>New York Post</i>, September 11, 2011</a>.
<br>[6] <a href="http://observer.com/2006/10/fixer-story-broker-larry-garrison-books-ramseys-nonkiller-2/" target="_blank">Rebecca Dana, "Fixer, Story Broker Larry Garrison Books Ramsey's Non-Killer." <i>New York Observer</i>, October 16, 2006</a>.
<br>[7] <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/09/the-news-merchant/308194/" target="_blank">Sheelah Kolhatkar, "The News Merchant." <i>The Atlantic</i>, September 2010</a>.
<br>[8] <a href="http://observer.com/2006/10/fixer-story-broker-larry-garrison-books-ramseys-nonkiller-2/" target="_blank">Rebecca Dana, "Fixer, Story Broker Larry Garrison Books Ramsey's Non-Killer."</a>
<br>[9] <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/09/the-news-merchant/308194/" target="_blank">Sheelah Kolhatkar, "The News Merchant"</a>; <a href="http://silvercreekentertainment.net/" target="_blank">"SilverCreek Entertainment." SilverCreek Entertainment, n.d.</a>
<br>[10] Larry Garrison with Kent Walker, <i>The NewsBreaker: A Behind-the-Scenes Look at the News Media and Never-Before Told Details About Some of the Decade's Biggest Stories</i>. Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson, 2006, p. 103.
<br>[11] Ibid., pp. 105-107.
<br>[12] Ibid., p. 107.
<br>[13] Ibid., p. 102.
<br>[14] Ibid., pp. 107-108.
<br>[15] <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L75Gga92WO8" target="_blank">"Original September 11 Pentagon Video: 1 of 2." Judicial Watch, May 16, 2006</a>; <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TAaP4Z3zls8" target="_blank">"Judicial Watch September 11 Pentagon Video: 2 of 2." Judicial Watch, May 16, 2006</a>; <a href="https://www.deseretnews.com/article/635208085/Video-shows-plane-hitting-Pentagon.html" target="_blank">Robert Burns, "Video Shows Plane Hitting Pentagon." Associated Press, May 17, 2006</a>; <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/16/AR2006051600788.html" target="_blank">Jerry Markon, "Videos Released of Plane Crashing Into Pentagon." <i>Washington Post</i>, May 17, 2006</a>.
<br>[16] <a href="http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0605/20/tt.01.html" target="_blank">"The Stories Behind the Stories." <i>On the Story</i>, CNN, May 20, 2006</a>; Alfred Goldberg et al., <i>Pentagon 9/11</i>, p. 161; <a href="https://ia801306.us.archive.org/0/items/FAA_RADES_NORAD_FOIA_Data/FAA_RADES_NORAD_FOIA_Data/Pentagon_Images_And_Video/Pentagon_FBI_Video/fbi_videos.pdf" target="_blank">List of videos related to the 9/11 attacks. Federal Bureau of Investigation, n.d.</a>
<br>[17] Larry Garrison with Kent Walker, <i>The NewsBreaker</i>, p. 104.
<br>[18] <a href="https://www.deseretnews.com/article/635208085/Video-shows-plane-hitting-Pentagon.html" target="_blank">Robert Burns, "Video Shows Plane Hitting Pentagon"</a>; <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/16/AR2006051600788.html" target="_blank">Jerry Markon, "Videos Released of Plane Crashing Into Pentagon."</a>
<br>[19] <a href="http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0203/07/asb.00.html" target="_blank">"Bush Will Send Special Envoy Zinni Back to Mideast; Accusations of Greed Over 9/11 Fund." <i>NewsNight with Aaron Brown</i>, CNN, March 7, 2002</a>; <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20030306194451/http:/www.dailyherald.com/special/waronterrorism/story.asp?intID=3732377" target="_blank">"Pentagon Photos Released." Associated Press, March 8, 2002</a>.
<br>[20] <a href="https://www.deseretnews.com/article/635208085/Video-shows-plane-hitting-Pentagon.html" target="_blank">Robert Burns, "Video Shows Plane Hitting Pentagon"</a>; <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/16/AR2006051600788.html" target="_blank">Jerry Markon, "Videos Released of Plane Crashing Into Pentagon."</a>
<br>[21] <a href="https://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/cameras-near-pentagon-missed-911-attack-group-says" target="_blank">Randy Hall, "Cameras Near Pentagon Missed 9/11 Attack, Group Says." CNSNews.com, September 15, 2006</a>; <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20061002090336/http:/www.judicialwatch.org/5965.shtml" target="_blank">"Citgo Gas Station Cameras Near Pentagon Evidently Did Not Capture Attack." Judicial Watch, September 15, 2006</a>; <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2LJvFjsl6zk" target="_blank">"Judicial Watch September 11 Pentagon Citgo Video." Judicial Watch, September 15, 2006</a>.
<br>[22] <a href="https://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2001/12/1211_wirepentagon.html" target="_blank">Bill McKelway, "Three Months on, Tension Lingers Near the Pentagon." <i>Richmond Times-Dispatch</i>, December 11, 2001</a>.
<br>[23] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20061002090336/http:/www.judicialwatch.org/5965.shtml" target="_blank">"Citgo Gas Station Cameras Near Pentagon Evidently Did Not Capture Attack."</a>
<br>[24] <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/europe/12/02/saturday/index.html" target="_blank">"Hotel Security Video Shows 9/11 Pentagon Blast, But no Plane." CNN, December 3, 2006</a>; <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20080624232051/http:/www.kwtx.com/home/headlines/4821121.html" target="_blank">"FBI Releases New Footage of 9/11 Pentagon Attack." KWTX, December 4, 2006</a>; <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20070219053223/http:/www.judicialwatch.org/6068.shtml" target="_blank">"Judicial Watch Obtains Security Camera Videos From Doubletree Hotel That Show 9/11 Attack on Pentagon." Judicial Watch, December 7, 2006</a>; <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6wUXXgfN2fM" target="_blank">"Doubletree Hotel Video of 9/11 Pentagon Strike." YouTube video, April 6, 2007</a>.
<br>[25] Larry Garrison with Kent Walker, <i>The NewsBreaker</i>, pp. 103-104.
<br>[26] Ibid., pp. 104-105.
<br>[27] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16345043/T7-B18-Pilot-Training-Info-Fdr-Statement-of-Redacted-Re-Hani-Hanjour-539" target="_blank">Statement of [Name Redacted]. Canfield, Shapiro, Baer, Heller & Johnston, LLP, May 1, 2002</a>.
<br>[28] <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/04/us/a-trainee-noted-for-incompetence.html" target="_blank">Jim Yardley, "A Trainee Noted for Incompetence." <i>New York Times</i>, May 4, 2002</a>.
<br>[29] <a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/OpaAPI/media/2610139/content/arcmedia/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00547.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview of Benjamin L. Connor." 9/11 Commission, April 12, 2004</a>.
<br>[30] Larry Garrison with Kent Walker, <i>The NewsBreaker</i>, pp. 105-106.
<br>[31] <a href="http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0605/20/tt.01.html" target="_blank">"The Stories Behind the Stories."</a>
<br>[32] <a href="http://www.judicialwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/A_2006_doubletreeaffadavit.pdf" target="_blank">"Declaration of Jacqueline Maguire." <i>Scott Bingham v. United States Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of Investigation</i>, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, September 7, 2005</a>; <a href="https://ia801306.us.archive.org/0/items/FAA_RADES_NORAD_FOIA_Data/FAA_RADES_NORAD_FOIA_Data/Pentagon_Images_And_Video/Pentagon_FBI_Video/fbi_videos.pdf" target="_blank">List of videos related to the 9/11 attacks</a>.
<br>[33] <a href="http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0605/20/tt.01.html" target="_blank">"The Stories Behind the Stories."</a>
<br>[34] <a href="https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2001/sep/21/20010921-025534-8976r/" target="_blank">Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, "Inside the Ring." <i>Washington Times</i>, September 21, 2001</a>.
<br>[35] Chris Bull and Sam Erman (Editors), <i>At Ground Zero: 25 Stories From Young Reporters Who Were There</i>. New York: Thunder's Mouth Press, 2002, p. 281.
<br>[36] <a href="https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2001/sep/21/20010921-025534-8976r/" target="_blank">Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, "Inside the Ring."</a>
<br>[37] <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_AustinBrian%20Steve%20Pennington111-9-2006.pdf" target="_blank">Brian Austin and Steve Pennington, interview by Diane Putney. Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, November 9, 2006</a>; Alfred Goldberg et al., <i>Pentagon 9/11</i>, p. 153.
<br>[38] <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_JesterJohn%2010-19-2001.pdf" target="_blank">John Jester, interview by Alfred Goldberg, Diane Putney, and Stuart Rochester. Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, October 19, 2001</a>; <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_Jester%20John%201-31-2006.pdf" target="_blank">John Jester, interview by Diane Putney. Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, January 31, 2006</a>; Alfred Goldberg et al., <i>Pentagon 9/11</i>, p. 153.
<br>[39] Alfred Goldberg et al., <i>Pentagon 9/11</i>, p. 244.
<br>[40] <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_AustinBrian%20Steve%20Pennington111-9-2006.pdf" target="_blank">Brian Austin and Steve Pennington, interview by Diane Putney</a>.
<br>[41] Larry Garrison with Kent Walker, <i>The NewsBreaker</i>, p. 108.
<br>[42] Ibid., pp. 112-114.
Shoestringhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01534319150672667644noreply@blogger.com7tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2990970741097819876.post-71743067931033777592018-02-04T03:11:00.000-08:002018-02-04T03:11:14.328-08:00The Indifference and Inaction of Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz During the 9/11 Attacks<br><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhKEl6MUlG5h2T4IssMf8M3zqtoI_v9mHeRIPCzv94iuoSmYNjRimyljrxb4toilwVmM9kcSSDDkZWVj3AjHICeBW0Y3WPJOpHHE-Kzf3_QpEC_7TrPPS1_A-Q7KAhuGdBpixoZ_KU2PUwb/s1600/PaulWolfowitz.jpg" target="_blank" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhKEl6MUlG5h2T4IssMf8M3zqtoI_v9mHeRIPCzv94iuoSmYNjRimyljrxb4toilwVmM9kcSSDDkZWVj3AjHICeBW0Y3WPJOpHHE-Kzf3_QpEC_7TrPPS1_A-Q7KAhuGdBpixoZ_KU2PUwb/s1600/PaulWolfowitz.jpg" alt="Paul Wolfowitz" data-original-width="300" data-original-height="232" /></a></div><br>Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz had a crucial role to play in the military's response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and yet he did nothing to help protect his country until the attacks were over and it was too late for him to make a difference to the outcome of the crisis.
<br><br>As the second-highest-ranking official in the Department of Defense, Wolfowitz surely had critical duties to perform and should have promptly taken action when America came under attack. Furthermore, since he was at the Pentagon when the attacks occurred, he was in a good location to help the military respond to them. And yet he appears to have reacted to the catastrophic events with indifference.
<br><br>He continued with a previously scheduled meeting after he learned about the crashes at the World Trade Center. Even when the Pentagon was attacked, 34 minutes after the second crash at the World Trade Center occurred, he initially made no effort to help the military respond to the crisis, even though more attacks could have been imminent, which he should have been trying to prevent.
<br><br>Astonishingly, Wolfowitz has claimed that when he felt the Pentagon shake and heard a thud when it was hit, he did not realize an attack had taken place there. Instead, he said, he thought there had been an earthquake.
<br><br>He only became involved in the military's response to the crisis when, after initially being evacuated from the building, he went to the Pentagon's National Military Command Center (NMCC). But it appears that by the time he reached the center the attacks would have ended and so any actions he took would have been inconsequential.
<br><br>The indifference exhibited by the deputy secretary of defense when he learned of the attacks and his failure to take action when he should have been doing everything in his power to help protect America are quite chilling. And yet Wolfowitz has never had to explain his lack of response to the crisis on September 11. We therefore now need to look closely at his actions that day and contemplate why he behaved as he did.
<br><br>It is plausible that Wolfowitz's inaction was simply due to incompetence. However, statements Wolfowitz made in the years following 9/11 indicate that he actually felt the attacks were beneficial for the United States. We surely must consider, therefore, the disturbing possibility that he may have known in advance what was going to happen on September 11 and wanted the attacks to succeed. Consequently, when the attacks occurred, he deliberately avoided doing anything that might help stop them before all the intended targets were hit.
<br><br><b>WOLFOWITZ WAS AT THE PENTAGON WHEN THE ATTACKS BEGAN</b>
<br>Paul Wolfowitz was attending a meeting in Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's private dining room at the Pentagon when the attacks began on September 11. The meeting, which had commenced at 8:00 a.m., was attended by a number of members of Congress and various military officials, and was intended to discuss defense budget proposals. [1]
<br><br>Shortly before it ended, Rumsfeld was given a note, which informed him that a plane had crashed into the World Trade Center. (This plane was American Airlines Flight 11, which hit the North Tower at 8:46 a.m.) Rumsfeld has commented that he assumed at the time that the incident was an accident. [2] Therefore, the secretary of defense and those with him "went on with our breakfast." [3]
<br><br>None of the meeting's participants appear to have diverted from their schedules after the meeting ended, at around 9:00 a.m. "We all went on with the day's business," Secretary of the Army Thomas White recalled. [4] "We all proceeded back to our offices," Vice Admiral Edmund Giambastiani Jr., Rumsfeld's senior military assistant, said. [5]
<br><br>Wolfowitz went to his office, just a short walk away from Rumsfeld's office, where he was due to attend a routine meeting. It is unclear whether he was alerted to what had happened in New York during the meeting in Rumsfeld's private dining room. He was certainly informed about the incident, though, after he entered his office. Someone there mentioned that a plane had crashed into the World Trade Center. The television was turned on and, Wolfowitz described, those in the office "started seeing the scenes of what was taking place up in New York." [6]
<br><br>Even though the cause of the crash was unclear at that time, we might reasonably expect Wolfowitz to have taken a close interest in what had happened right away. While the crash may have turned out to have been an accident, he surely should have considered it possible that the incident was a terrorist attack and have acted accordingly.
<br><br>In fact, Victoria Clarke, the assistant secretary of defense for public affairs, noted, "Even in the accidental crash scenario, the military might be involved in some way." [7] And yet the deputy secretary of defense made no attempt to take action in response to the crash. "Like so many other people, I didn't quite believe what was really happening," he has remarked. [8]
<br><br><b>WOLOFWITZ SAW THE SECOND CRASH ON TV BUT CONTINUED HIS MEETING</b>
<br>Wolfowitz and those with him then saw the second hijacked plane, United Airlines Flight 175, crashing into the South Tower of the World Trade Center live on television, at 9:03 a.m. "We started seeing the shots of the second plane hitting," Wolfowitz recalled.
<br><br>It was then clear that America was under attack. And yet Wolfowitz still did nothing in response to the crisis. "I sat here thinking that something terrible was going on in New York," he recalled. "But," he commented, "it was up there, not here." He therefore continued his meeting as if nothing unusual had happened. "There didn't seem to be much to do about it immediately and we went on with whatever the meeting was," he said. Wolfowitz and those with him apparently carried on with the meeting until 9:37 a.m., when the Pentagon was attacked.
<br><br>Although his office was on the opposite side of the Pentagon to where the attack occurred, the deputy secretary of defense felt the building shake when it was hit and, he recalled, heard "a dull, thud-like noise." And yet Wolfowitz has claimed that, despite presumably having realized earlier on that America was under attack, it did not occur to him that the noise and the shaking were the result of the Pentagon being struck. Remarkably, he said, he initially thought they were caused by an earthquake. "I didn't put two and two together," he commented. "My first reaction was an earthquake," he said.
<br><br>And even though his country had been attacked three times in less than an hour, the deputy secretary of defense still made no attempt to get involved in the military's response to the crisis and apparently wanted to continue his business as if nothing unusual had occurred. "It was clear something had happened, but it still wasn't clear that there was anything to do," he has commented.
<br><br>Wolfowitz only got up to leave his office when he heard someone say a bomb had gone off on the other side of the building and the Pentagon needed to be evacuated. "Pretty quickly" after the attack on the Pentagon occurred, he recalled, a "few people" came into the office and told him to get out of there. He also recalled that the Marine sergeant who worked outside Donald Rumsfeld's office was "very anxious" to get him away from the Pentagon. He was evacuated from his office by his "security people" and taken out of the building. [9]
<br><br>General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has recalled bumping into Wolfowitz outside the Pentagon at this time and Wolfowitz saying he was "relocating for continuity reasons." [10] Wolfowitz was taken to the parade ground in front of the building, where many other Pentagon employees had gathered. From there, he presumably would have been unable to do much to help the military respond to the attacks, even if he had chosen to take action. But about 10 minutes after he left the building, he received an instruction, apparently from someone in Rumsfeld's office, to return to the Pentagon. [11]
<br><br><b>WOLFOWITZ RETURNED TO THE PENTAGON AFTER EVACUATING</b>
<br>After he re-entered the building, Wolfowitz may have gone to the Executive Support Center (ESC)--a secure communications hub with a video teleconference facility, located on the third floor of the Pentagon. The ESC is "the place where the building's top leadership goes to coordinate military operations during national emergencies," according to Victoria Clarke. [12] Clarke, who went to it following the attacks on the World Trade Center, said that Wolfowitz "came in" at some point that morning. [13]
<br><br>Wolfowitz has only recalled, however, that, after returning to the building, he went to the National Military Command Center. [14] The NMCC is "a communications hub, a switchboard connecting the Pentagon, the civilian government, and the combatant commanders," according to Myers. [15] It was also "the focal point within [the] Department of Defense for providing assistance" in response to hijackings in U.S. airspace, according to military instructions. [16] Other key officials, such as Rumsfeld and Myers, went to it in order to respond to the crisis that morning. [17]
<br><br>Once he was in the NMCC, Wolfowitz appears to have finally started taking action in response to the terrorist attacks. He became one of the "small number" of people who were in the "command group" in the center, he recalled, and he participated in "discussions by secure video conference." [18]
<br><br>However, the fourth and final plane to be hijacked that day--United Airlines Flight 93--apparently crashed in a field in Pennsylvania just after 10:00 a.m. Therefore, by the time Wolfowitz did anything to help protect his country, the attacks were likely already over and there would have been nothing the deputy secretary of defense could do to influence the outcome of the crisis.
<br><br><b>WOLFOWITZ WAS TAKEN TO A SECURE LOCATION</b>
<br>After spending some time in the NMCC, Wolfowitz told Donald Rumsfeld he ought to leave the Pentagon. But Rumsfeld refused to do so and ordered Wolfowitz to go instead. Wolfowitz was therefore flown by helicopter to Site R, the alternate command center inside Raven Rock Mountain, on the Pennsylvania-Maryland border. [19]
<br><br>Site R was a duplicate of the NMCC and was intended to serve as the Pentagon's primary command center if the NMCC was destroyed in an attack or needed to be evacuated. [20] Wolfowitz was unhappy about being sent there, though. [21] "He didn't want to leave" the Pentagon, Edmund Giambastiani commented. [22]
<br><br>Furthermore, after he reached the alternate command center, Wolfowitz had difficulty participating in the government's response to the attacks since, he described, "equipment [there] didn't work" and "communications didn't work." [23] He recalled that he consequently "spent most of the afternoon being virtually out of touch with everything that was going on." [24]
<br><br>At around 4:00 p.m., he decided that he "could be useful somewhere else" and suggested to Rumsfeld that he go to "Langley"--presumably referring to the CIA's headquarters in Langley, Virginia--and "get briefed on what we knew about what went on" during the attacks. Rumsfeld told him to go ahead and do this. Wolfowitz was therefore driven away from Site R, but he then decided he should just go home. He therefore went to his home and stayed there for the rest of the day. [25]
<br><br><b>WOLFOWITZ WAS SECOND IN COMMAND AT THE PENTAGON</b>
<br>Paul Wolfowitz, as we can see, appears to have only taken an active role in the military's response to the catastrophic events of September 11 after the terrorist attacks ended. His inaction before that time is particularly alarming because, as deputy secretary of defense--the second-highest-ranking official in the Department of Defense--he surely had critical duties he needed to attend to from the outset of the crisis.
<br><br>Deputy secretary of defense is a powerful position. By law the person who holds this post "takes precedence in the Department of Defense immediately after the secretary [of defense]." [26] According to the <i>United States Government Manual</i>--the official handbook of the federal government--while the secretary of defense "exercises authority, direction, and control over the Department of Defense," the deputy secretary "is delegated full power and authority to act for the secretary of defense and to exercise the powers of the secretary on any and all matters for which the secretary is authorized to act pursuant to law." [27] Roswell Gilpatric, deputy secretary of defense from 1961 to 1964, described the individual who holds this post as "a junior partner and alter ego for the secretary [of defense]." [28]
<br><br><b>WOLFOWITZ WAS FIRST IN THE 'LINE OF SUCCESSION' TO REPLACE RUMSFELD</b>
<br>Furthermore, it was crucial for Wolfowitz to promptly get involved in the military's response to the 9/11 attacks because if Donald Rumsfeld had been killed or incapacitated in the attacks he would have been required to take over the secretary of defense's duties. This is because the deputy secretary of defense is first in the "line of succession" to assume responsibility as the acting secretary of defense if this is ever necessary. The deputy secretary is required by law to "act for, and exercise the powers of, the secretary [of defense] when the secretary dies, resigns, or is otherwise unable to perform the functions and duties of the office." [29]
<br><br>It was in fact, reportedly, this requirement that led to Wolfowitz being ordered to leave the Pentagon and go to Site R on September 11. Journalist and author James Mann stated that the decision to activate the alternate command center and Rumsfeld's decision to send Wolfowitz there were "an echo" of what is known as the "continuity of government plan." [30] Rumsfeld explained that on September 11, "Defense Department officials executed our continuity of government plans ... to ensure that at least some of America's leadership in all branches of the federal government would survive an enemy attack." [31]
<br><br>"That's why [Wolfowitz] left, was to separate [Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz] ... to provide continuity," Kevin Kellems, Wolfowitz's special adviser, commented. [32] In other words, positioning Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld at different locations meant that at least one of them would be sure to survive and be able to carry out the duties of the secretary of defense if the Pentagon was attacked a second time.
<br><br>In light of this consideration, we can see that Wolfowitz's failure to promptly take action in response to the attacks could have had serious consequences for the military chain of command. In particular, because Wolfowitz stayed in his office after learning of the crashes at the World Trade Center instead of leaving the Pentagon or going to a more secure location within the building such as the ESC or the NMCC, he, along with Rumsfeld, could have been killed or incapacitated if the area of the building they were in had been hit when the Pentagon was attacked. (Rumsfeld, like Wolfowitz, stayed in his office after learning of the attacks on the World Trade Center. [33]) If both men had been killed or incapacitated when the Pentagon was hit, America could have been left without a secretary of defense to command the military at this critical time, while it was under attack.
<br><br>And since Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz both stayed at the Pentagon for at least an hour after it was hit (the decision to send Wolfowitz to Site R was only made "sometime after 10:37" a.m., according to Edmund Giambastiani [34]), both men could have been killed or incapacitated, thereby possibly leaving the country without a secretary of defense, if the building had been attacked a second time.
<br><br><b>WOLFOWITZ HAD YEARS OF EXPERIENCE WORKING FOR THE GOVERNMENT</b>
<br>We need to determine why Paul Wolfowitz failed to take action to protect his country on September 11. Surely the Pentagon's second in command should have been actively involved in the military's response from the outset of the crisis. Why then did he do nothing to help for the entire time the nation was under attack?
<br><br>It might be argued that Wolfowitz's inaction was simply due to incompetence. This possibility seems unlikely, though, since Wolfowitz had years of experience working for the government, which included serving in senior Pentagon positions, before 9/11. He was deputy assistant secretary of defense for regional programs from 1977 to 1980 and under secretary of defense for policy from 1989 to 1993. [35]
<br><br>Furthermore, just months before 9/11, he appeared to recognize that the U.S. needed to be prepared to deal with surprise attacks. During a speech on June 2, 2001, he discussed the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, in December 1941. He proposed that it was necessary to replace a "poverty of expectations" with "an anticipation of the unfamiliar and the unlikely." By doing so, he said, it would be possible to overcome "the complacency that is the greatest threat to our hopes for a peaceful future." [36] And yet despite having this remarkable foresight of the kinds of challenges that lay ahead for America, he displayed an apparent inability to deal with "the unfamiliar and the unlikely" when, little over three months later, the nation again came under attack.
<br><br>Since incompetence seems an unlikely reason for Wolfowitz's inadequate response to the 9/11 attacks, we need to consider if there is a more sinister explanation. For example, might Wolfowitz have known in advance what was going to happen on September 11 and wanted the attacks to succeed? If so, his inaction when the attacks occurred could have been a deliberate effort to do nothing that might help stop the attacks before all the intended targets were hit.
<br><br><b>WOLFOWITZ QUICKLY DETERMINED WHO WAS TO BLAME FOR 9/11</b>
<br>Supporting the possibility that Wolfowitz had foreknowledge of 9/11 is the fact that the deputy secretary of defense was apparently able to establish what had happened on September 11 and who, according to the official story, was to blame within hours of the attacks, before any proper investigation had taken place.
<br><br>This detail was revealed by Larry Di Rita, a special assistant to the secretary of defense who accompanied Wolfowitz to Site R on September 11. Di Rita recalled a video teleconference that Wolfowitz participated in while he was at the alternate command center and commented, "It is remarkable to me how much [the teleconference's participants] started to piece together in so short a period of time what [the attack] was and what the likely responses needed to be." He continued, "Not so much, 'We've got to go to war in Afghanistan,' but, 'This is very likely al-Qaeda.'" "It was quite impressive the degree to which these decision makers [and] policy makers had a sense of it," he remarked. [37]
<br><br>It is possible that Wolfowitz was able to "piece together in so short a period of time" what had happened and that al-Qaeda was supposedly to blame for the attacks due to quick thinking and well-informed analysis. It is also possible, though, that Wolfowitz's ability to rapidly determine what had happened was a result of the deputy secretary of defense having foreknowledge of what the attacks would entail and who would be blamed for them.
<br><br>A detail that supports the contention that Wolfowitz may have wanted the 9/11 attacks to succeed is the fact that he apparently wanted the U.S. to adopt a more aggressive military stance at that time. Wolfowitz is a "foreign policy hawk who believes the United States should use its superpower status to push for reforms in other nations," according to the Associated Press. [38] It is possible, therefore, that he wanted the U.S. to be attacked so as to create a pretext for military action.
<br><br>Di Rita described how Wolfowitz's desire for a more hawkish foreign policy was evident on September 11. Recalling the video teleconference Wolfowitz participated in while at Site R, he commented, "Everybody [on the teleconference] was operating with a clear sense that we had to respond in a very dramatic way." He also said that as early as the afternoon of September 11, while they were being transported from Site R back to Washington, DC, "[Wolfowitz] and I were doing rough sketches of what we thought we were going to need to prosecute a war in terms of the budget." [39]
<br><br><b>WOLFOWITZ CALLED 9/11 'AN EXTREMELY VALUABLE WAKE-UP CALL'</b>
<br>Furthermore, in the years after the attacks, Wolfowitz indicated that he thought 9/11 had some benefits for the U.S. He told the <i>San Francisco Chronicle</i>, "9/11 really was a wake-up call" and opined, "If we take proper advantage of this opportunity to prevent the future terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction, [then] it will have been an extremely valuable wake-up call." [40]
<br><br>And in an interview with James Mann, he similarly suggested that 9/11 could wake America up to the threat of terrorism and thereby lead to a bigger attack being prevented. "For me, September 11 was a transforming event," he said, "in the sense of seeing that terrorism had the potential to kill not just three thousand people, but three hundred thousand or three million." [41]
<br><br>If Wolfowitz had foreknowledge of 9/11 and felt, before September 11, that an attack on the U.S. would have some benefits, might he have decided to do what he could to ensure the 9/11 attacks were successful so as to bring about these supposed benefits? If so, this could help explain why he did nothing to help protect his country when the attacks occurred.
<br><br>Award-winning journalist Eric Boehlert has commented on Wolfowitz's striking lack of response to the attacks on September 11. "One peculiarity I've always wondered about is why Paul Wolfowitz ... was so completely clueless the morning of the deadly attacks," he wrote. "As the events unfolded live on television and senior administration officials scrambled to make sense of the horrific events, Wolfowitz appeared to be in a haze," he added. [42]
<br><br>Since Wolfowitz was one of the most powerful men at the Pentagon, his behavior on September 11 needs to be investigated thoroughly. We surely need to find out the reasons for this man's chilling inaction at probably the most important time of his professional life, when his country was under attack.
<br><br><b>NOTES</b>
<br>[1] <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_WolfowitzPaul4-19-2002.pdf" target="_blank">Paul Wolfowitz, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron. Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, April 19, 2002</a>; <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/interviews/wolfowitz.html" target="_blank">Paul Wolfowitz, interview by PBS, <i>Campaign Against Terror</i>. PBS, April 22, 2002</a>; <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_Giambastiani%20Edmund7-18-2002.pdf" target="_blank">Edmund P. Giambastiani Jr., interview by Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron, part I. Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, July 18, 2002</a>; <a href="http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2594" target="_blank">"Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz Interview With Sam Tannenhaus, Vanity Fair." U.S. Department of Defense, May 9, 2003</a>; Steve Vogel, <i>The Pentagon: A History</i>. New York: Random House, 2007, p. 428.
<br>[2] <a href="http://library.rumsfeld.com/doclib/sp/4500/The%20Agony%20of%20Surprise.pdf" target="_blank">Donald Rumsfeld, <i>Known and Unknown: A Memoir</i>. New York: Sentinel, 2011, pp. 334-335</a>.
<br>[3] Steve Vogel, <i>The Pentagon</i>, p. 428.
<br>[4] <a href="http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/pentagon/interviews/white.html" target="_blank">Thomas White, interview by PBS, <i>Rumsfeld's War</i>. PBS, August 12, 2004</a>.
<br>[5] <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_Giambastiani%20Edmund7-18-2002.pdf" target="_blank">Edmund P. Giambastiani Jr., interview by Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron, part I</a>.
<br>[6] <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_WolfowitzPaul4-19-2002.pdf" target="_blank">Paul Wolfowitz, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron</a>; <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/interviews/wolfowitz.html" target="_blank">Paul Wolfowitz, interview by PBS</a>; <a href="http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2594" target="_blank">"Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz Interview With Sam Tannenhaus, Vanity Fair."</a>
<br>[7] Torie Clarke, <i>Lipstick on a Pig: Winning in the No-Spin Era by Someone Who Knows the Game</i>. New York: Free Press, 2006, p. 218.
<br>[8] <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/interviews/wolfowitz.html" target="_blank">Paul Wolfowitz, interview by PBS</a>.
<br>[9] <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_WolfowitzPaul4-19-2002.pdf" target="_blank">Paul Wolfowitz, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron</a>; <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/interviews/wolfowitz.html" target="_blank">Paul Wolfowitz, interview by PBS</a>; <a href="http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2594" target="_blank">"Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz Interview With Sam Tannenhaus, Vanity Fair."</a>
<br>[10] <a href="https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2012-047-doc4.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview of General Richard Myers." 9/11 Commission, February 17, 2004</a>.
<br>[11] <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_WolfowitzPaul4-19-2002.pdf" target="_blank">Paul Wolfowitz, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron</a>; <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/interviews/wolfowitz.html" target="_blank">Paul Wolfowitz, interview by PBS</a>.
<br>[12] Torie Clarke, <i>Lipstick on a Pig</i>, p. 219.
<br>[13] <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_ClarkeVictoria7-2-2002.pdf" target="_blank">Victoria Clarke, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron. Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, July 2, 2002</a>.
<br>[14] <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_WolfowitzPaul4-19-2002.pdf" target="_blank">Paul Wolfowitz, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron</a>; <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/interviews/wolfowitz.html" target="_blank">Paul Wolfowitz, interview by PBS</a>.
<br>[15] Richard Myers with Malcolm McConnell, <i>Eyes on the Horizon: Serving on the Front Lines of National Security</i>. New York: Threshold Editions, 2009, p. 151.
<br>[16] <a href="http://www.serendipity.li/wot/pop_mech/3610_01a.pdf" target="_blank">Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, <i>CJCSI 3610.01A: Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking) and Destruction of Derelict Airborne Objects</i>. Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 1, 2001</a>.
<br>[17] <a href="https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2012-047-doc4.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview of General Richard Myers"</a>; 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States</i>. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004, pp. 43-44.
<br>[18] <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_WolfowitzPaul4-19-2002.pdf" target="_blank">Paul Wolfowitz, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron</a>; <a href="http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2594" target="_blank">"Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz Interview With Sam Tannenhaus, Vanity Fair."</a>
<br>[19] <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20020206003112/http:/www.thebulletin.org/issues/2001/nd01/nd01schwartz.html" target="_blank">Stephen I. Schwartz, "This is Not a Test." <i>Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists</i>, November/December 2001</a>; <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_WolfowitzPaul4-19-2002.pdf" target="_blank">Paul Wolfowitz, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron</a>; <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_Giambastiani%20Edmund7-18-2002.pdf" target="_blank">Edmund P. Giambastiani Jr., interview by Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron, part II. Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, August 1, 2002</a>; Steve Vogel, <i>The Pentagon</i>, p. 441.
<br>[20] Patrick Creed and Rick Newman, <i>Firefight: Inside the Battle to Save the Pentagon on 9/11</i>. New York: Presidio Press, 2008, p. 174.
<br>[21] <a href="http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2594" target="_blank">"Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz Interview With Sam Tannenhaus, Vanity Fair."</a>
<br>[22] <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_Giambastiani%20Edmund7-18-2002.pdf" target="_blank">Edmund P. Giambastiani Jr., interview by Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron, part II</a>.
<br>[23] <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_WolfowitzPaul4-19-2002.pdf" target="_blank">Paul Wolfowitz, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron</a>.
<br>[24] <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/interviews/wolfowitz.html" target="_blank">Paul Wolfowitz, interview by PBS</a>.
<br>[25] <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_WolfowitzPaul4-19-2002.pdf" target="_blank">Paul Wolfowitz, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron</a>.
<br>[26] <a href="http://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=(title:10%20section:132%20edition:prelim)" target="_blank">U.S. Code Title 10, 10 USC § 132 (2017)</a>.
<br>[27] <a href="https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GOVMAN-1999-06-01/pdf/GOVMAN-1999-06-01.pdf" target="_blank">Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, <i>The United States Government Manual 1999/2000</i>. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999, p. 177</a>.
<br>[28] <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/occasional_papers/DEPSECBrochureNov2017.pdf" target="_blank">Shannon E. Mohan and Erin R. Mahan, <i>Deputy Secretaries of Defense, 1949-2017</i>. Washington, DC: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2017, p. ii</a>.
<br>[29] <a href="http://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=(title:10%20section:132%20edition:prelim)" target="_blank">U.S. Code Title 10, 10 USC § 132</a>.
<br>[30] <a href="http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/story?id=128993" target="_blank">"Secret 'Armageddon Plan' in Motion on 9/11." ABC News, April 25, 2004</a>.
<br>[31] <a href="http://library.rumsfeld.com/doclib/sp/4500/The%20Agony%20of%20Surprise.pdf" target="_blank">Donald Rumsfeld, <i>Known and Unknown</i>, p. 338</a>.
<br>[32] <a href="http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2594" target="_blank">"Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz Interview With Sam Tannenhaus, Vanity Fair."</a>
<br>[33] <a href="http://shoestring911.blogspot.co.uk/2017/05/secretary-of-defense-donald-rumsfeld.html" target="_blank">"Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 'Deserted His Post' While America Was Under Attack on 9/11." Shoestring 9/11, May 25, 2017</a>.
<br>[34] <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_Giambastiani%20Edmund7-18-2002.pdf" target="_blank">Edmund P. Giambastiani Jr., interview by Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron, part II</a>.
<br>[35] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20060502184118/http:/www.defenselink.mil/bios/wolfowitz_bio.html" target="_blank">"Paul Wolfowitz: Deputy Secretary of Defense." U.S. Department of Defense, March 16, 2005</a>; <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2012/12/31/us/paul-wolfowitz---fast-facts/index.html" target="_blank">"Paul Wolfowitz Fast Facts." CNN, December 15, 2017</a>; <a href="https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/government/wolfowitz-bio.html" target="_blank">"Former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz." White House, n.d.</a>
<br>[36] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20070320150740/http:/www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=363" target="_blank">"Commencement Address at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point." U.S. Department of Defense, June 2, 2001</a>; James Mann, <i>Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet</i>. New York: Viking, 2004, p. 291.
<br>[37] <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_Di%20Rita%20Lawrence6-27-2002.pdf" target="_blank">Lawrence Di Rita, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Stuart Rochester. Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, June 27, 2002</a>.
<br>[38] <a href="http://www.gainesvillemoms.com/article/20050317/WIRE/203170322?Title=Bush-picks-Wolfowitz-to-head-World-Bank" target="_blank">"Bush Picks Wolfowitz to Head World Bank." Associated Press, March 17, 2005</a>.
<br>[39] <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_Di%20Rita%20Lawrence6-27-2002.pdf" target="_blank">Lawrence Di Rita, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Stuart Rochester</a>.
<br>[40] <a href="http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2806" target="_blank">"Wolfowitz Interview With the San Francisco Chronicle." U.S. Department of Defense, February 23, 2002</a>.
<br>[41] James Mann, <i>Rise of the Vulcans</i>, p. 363.
<br>[42] <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.com/eric-boehlert/why-was-wolfowitz-so-clue_b_29486.html" target="_blank">Eric Boehlert, "Why Was Wolfowitz so Clueless on the Morning of 9/11?" HuffPost, September 15, 2006</a>.
Shoestringhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01534319150672667644noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2990970741097819876.post-20399637125518441892017-12-03T01:16:00.000-08:002017-12-03T01:16:04.847-08:00Why Did the Top Army Officer in the U.S. Do So Little in Response to the 9/11 Attacks?<br><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjGAyHhOpiPX4wv1Srx69aJBRxFY0BBZX9rLDgNvnrM50KUMBuD6T0qtn3t7r0c6AHF43PKoocJOeVJfEanFk3sEEWGMkxIT4t7RjaqO7HV0yRFpP-Rkx6gPP0nHoDEBFEgFYfj4_wKSJjZ/s1600/JackKeane.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;" target="_blank"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjGAyHhOpiPX4wv1Srx69aJBRxFY0BBZX9rLDgNvnrM50KUMBuD6T0qtn3t7r0c6AHF43PKoocJOeVJfEanFk3sEEWGMkxIT4t7RjaqO7HV0yRFpP-Rkx6gPP0nHoDEBFEgFYfj4_wKSJjZ/s1600/JackKeane.jpg" data-original-width="300" data-original-height="252" alt="General Jack Keane"></a></div><br>General John M. "Jack" Keane was the most senior Army officer in the United States on September 11, 2001. Working at the Pentagon, he was ideally placed to respond promptly and effectively to the terrorist attacks that day. And yet he appears to have done alarmingly little while the attacks were underway.
<br><br>The only action he has recalled taking after learning about the crashes at the World Trade Center was ordering that the Army Operations Center (AOC) at the Pentagon be brought up to full manning. He apparently did not order the activation of the Army's Crisis Action Team (CAT), even though this was designed for dealing with emergencies like the one taking place at the time.
<br><br>When the Pentagon was hit, more than 50 minutes after the attacks began, Keane initially spent time helping people get out of the building--a task that anyone could have performed--instead of carrying out his duties as head of the Army. He only went to the AOC, a facility that was ideally equipped for dealing with the crisis, when one of his staffers pointed out that he should "leave the recovery to other people" and go and "take command of the Army."
<br><br>We need to consider why Keane, despite being an experienced military man, apparently performed very poorly in response to the crisis on September 11. Was his inaction due to incompetence or was there a more sinister reason for it? Might he have been confused because he mistook actual events for simulations, as part of a training exercise? Might he even have been to some degree complicit in what happened and so his inaction was intended to help ensure that the military was unable to stop the attacks before the targets were hit?
<br><br>Keane was one of a number of key officials who surely had essential duties to perform in coordinating the military's response to the 9/11 attacks but failed to get properly involved in responding to the crisis until it was too late to make a difference to the outcome of the attacks. His actions on September 11, though, have so far avoided serious scrutiny. We therefore need to examine what he did, and what he failed to do, while the attacks were underway.
<br><br><b>ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF WAS OUT OF THE COUNTRY ON SEPTEMBER 11</b>
<br>Jack Keane was vice chief of staff of the U.S. Army--the Army's second-highest-ranking officer--from 1999 to 2003. On September 11, however, General Eric Shinseki, chief of staff of the U.S. Army, was out of the country attending the Pacific Armies Management Seminar, a conference in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. [1] This meant Keane was the highest-ranking Army officer in the U.S. that day and presumably served as the acting chief of staff of the Army while Shinseki was away. [2] He would therefore likely have been responsible for taking charge of the Army's response to the terrorist attacks in New York and at the Pentagon, and his actions would surely have had a significant impact on how effectively the Army performed.
<br><br>The Army in fact had a unique and important role to play on September 11. As "executive agent" for the Department of Defense, it was responsible for coordinating with the Navy and the Air Force on "proposed action to support civilian authorities during emergencies involving mass casualties," according to the Defense Department's book about the Pentagon attack. [3] It was presumably, therefore, particularly important that Keane acted promptly and effectively in response to the attacks.
<br><br><b>KEANE IMMEDIATELY THOUGHT THE FIRST CRASH WAS AN ATTACK</b>
<br>Keane was at the Pentagon--the headquarters of the Department of Defense--on the morning of September 11. This was probably an ideal location from which to respond to the 9/11 attacks. And yet descriptions of his actions indicate that his reaction to the crisis was far less adequate than we might reasonably expect.
<br><br>He was in his office when the attacks began and was promptly alerted to the first crash at the World Trade Center. American Airlines Flight 11 flew into the North Tower at 8:46 a.m. and CNN started reporting the incident at 8:49 a.m. Apparently very shortly after this, a member of his staff ran into the room and said, "Sir, something terrible is going on in New York." She turned on the television and Keane then saw the reports stating that a plane had hit the Trade Center.
<br><br>Keane has recalled that, unlike many people, he realized right away that the incident was a terrorist attack. Noticing that it was a cloudless day, he thought, "Nobody could ever hit the World Trade Center on a day like that by accident." He also remembered that the Trade Center had been the target of a terrorist attack before, with a bomb going off in the underground parking garage there in February 1993. Therefore, he has commented, "I knew instinctively it had to be a terrorist attack and said as much."
<br><br>In response to the event, he called General Peter Chiarelli, the Army's director of operations, readiness, and mobilization, who was also at the Pentagon that morning, and ordered him to bring the Army Operations Center up to full manning. [4] The AOC, located in the Pentagon basement, was normally staffed by 35 to 40 men, but during a crisis the number of people working there would be significantly increased. [5]
<br><br>The AOC was "the Army's command and control center," Chiarelli has commented. [6] And yet, while Chiarelli headed to it after Keane called him, Keane remained in his office at that time. Even after he saw the second hijacked plane--United Airlines Flight 175--crashing into the World Trade Center on television, at 9:03 a.m., he stayed where he was.
<br><br><b>OFFICERS DISCUSSED EVACUATING BUILDINGS IN WASHINGTON</b>
<br>At some point after the second attack in New York occurred but before 9:37 a.m., when the Pentagon was hit, Chiarelli called Keane from the AOC. He reported that the Operations Center was fully manned and alerted Keane to a suspicious aircraft that had been noticed flying toward Washington, DC.
<br><br>He said he was monitoring Federal Aviation Administration communications and, Keane recalled, had learned that "a plane that took off from Washington, DC, had turned around in the vicinity of Ohio and approached DC from the south along I-95 before turning east, short of the city, and then south again." (He was presumably referring to American Airlines Flight 77, the plane that supposedly crashed into the Pentagon.) "We were obviously aware then that there was a plane targeting Washington," Keane has commented.
<br><br>Keane and Chiarelli started discussing the procedures for evacuating buildings in the capital. But then the Pentagon was hit. Keane felt his office shake violently, even though it was located far from the crash site, and, he recalled, the office "immediately" began to fill with smoke. He alerted Chiarelli to the incident right away. "Pete, that plane [that was approaching Washington] just hit us," he said.
<br><br>Even then, however, Keane apparently issued no orders or did anything else to help protect America and prevent further attacks. Instead, he recalled, he told Chiarelli "to tell the U.S. Army around the world what happened [at the Pentagon] and that, given the status of the AOC, which was unharmed, we would still maintain command and control of the Army."
<br><br><b>KEANE WENT TO HELP AT THE CRASH SITE</b>
<br>Keane told his staffers to evacuate at that time. But he stayed inside the Pentagon himself, keeping just his executive officer and his aide with him. However, rather than heading to the AOC, where he could have helped the Army respond to the crisis, he went toward the scene of the attack. "Let's go on down there and see if we can help some of these people," he told his aide and his executive officer.
<br><br>The three men made it to about 100 yards from the crash site, where they found the smoke becoming thicker. From there, they helped Pentagon employees get out of the building--"making sure they know what to do and where they're going, and that sort of thing," Keane described.
<br><br>Keane has not said exactly how much time they spent doing this. But after "a while," his executive officer told him the three men needed to go to the AOC, from where Keane could "take charge of the Army." Keane agreed and he then went to the Operations Center with his two colleagues. [7]
<br><br>Other senior Army leaders also went to the AOC after the Pentagon was hit. [8] The Operations Center became "a focal point for all Pentagon activities," according to Lieutenant Colonel Richard Kotch, an AOC staffer. [9]
<br><br>Personnel there worked throughout the attacks and their aftermath. [10] They "assured continuity of operations" after the Pentagon was hit, Kotch recalled. [11] They reportedly "spent much of 9/11 manning the phones; opening secure communications channels to the Army chief of staff, the National Command Authority, and the other Pentagon-based operation centers; and assessing the local and international situation for the senior command." [12] Keane stayed in the Operations Center until around 11:00 p.m. that night. [13]
<br><br><b>KEANE SHOULD HAVE GONE TO THE OPERATIONS CENTER AFTER THE FIRST CRASH</b>
<br>Analysis of Jack Keane's actions highlights numerous oddities around how the Army vice chief of staff reacted to the 9/11 attacks, which we need to examine. An important question to consider is why Keane remained in his office after he learned of the first crash, even though he would surely have been much better able to organize a response to the crisis in the Army Operations Center.
<br><br>Keane recognized immediately that an attack was underway when he learned that a plane had hit the World Trade Center. "I sensed it instinctively what had happened, that this was a terrorist act," he recalled. [14] He should presumably, therefore, have realized that he needed to respond quickly and effectively, in case more attacks were imminent--as indeed turned out to be the case.
<br><br>And since the Army was the Department of Defense's "executive agent" for providing support to civilian authorities during disasters involving mass casualties--like the one that had just occurred in New York--he should presumably have gone immediately to the most suitable location for organizing Army assistance in response to the crash.
<br><br>The AOC seems to have been the logical place for Keane to have gone to, where he could have most effectively carried out his duties as acting Army chief of staff. It was "the place that people will migrate" to during an emergency, according to General Clyde Vaughn, the Army's deputy director of operations, readiness, and mobilization. Keane would presumably, therefore, have been surrounded by colleagues there, who could have helped him respond to the attacks. [15]
<br><br>The facility was equipped with state-of-the-art communications equipment and television sets for monitoring news coverage. It also had four giant screens on the wall on which personnel were "monitoring all the activities that took place that day," Keane described. And there was a "watch team" there that monitored the world constantly.
<br><br>Keane surely needed to closely follow what was happening after he learned of the first crash, so he could immediately deal with the crisis and promptly respond to any additional emergencies if they arose. In the AOC, he would have had the resources necessary to do this. But, by staying in his office, he limited his capabilities.
<br><br>Furthermore, there was an "emergency action console" in the AOC that was "equipped with a sophisticated communications system that [allowed] the watch team instantaneous connections at the touch of a computer button to the White House, secretary of defense's office, and Army commands around the world," according to the <i>Washington Post</i>. [16] <i>Soldiers</i> magazine reported that the watch team could direct "hundreds of communications daily to the FBI, the State Department, the White House command center, local law enforcement agencies, and others." The watch team was therefore "the central point of contact during emergencies." [17]
<br><br>With such invaluable resources available at the facility, Keane would have been ideally positioned in the AOC to communicate with other senior officials and help them organize a response to the terrorist attacks. And yet, even when the Pentagon was hit, more than 50 minutes after the first attack took place, he did not initially go there.
<br><br><b>KEANE WAS ADVISED TO GO TO THE OPERATIONS CENTER TO 'TAKE CHARGE OF THE ARMY'</b>
<br>Instead, at that time, he headed toward the crash site, intending to assist people there. Along with his executive officer and his aide, he then spent time making sure that people were able to get out of the Pentagon.
<br><br>This course of action was inexplicable. There would have been plenty of people at the Pentagon who could have helped personnel find their way out of the building and so it was unnecessary for a top official like Keane to get involved with the task. But as the most senior Army officer in the country that day, Keane was irreplaceable and there were presumably specific duties he was required to carry out. While he was busy helping people evacuate, he would have been unable to carry out these duties.
<br><br>Keane's executive officer recognized the problem. At some point, he told Keane: "Look, you've got to take charge of the Army, so let's get to the Operations Center. We'll leave the recovery to other people." Strangely, Keane appears to have recognized the inappropriateness of his own response to the Pentagon attack. Referring to his executive officer's advice, he commented, "Of course, I knew immediately that he was right and [so] we joined my staff in the AOC." [18]
<br><br>Once he reached the Operations Center, Keane provided "leadership and guidance" to the personnel there, according to a report published by the Army. [19] But surely he should have provided leadership and guidance from the outset, by going to the AOC immediately after he learned of the first crash.
<br><br><b>KEANE WAS APPARENTLY UNCONCERNED FOR HIS OWN SAFETY</b>
<br>Keane's decision to stay in his office after he heard about the first crash and determined immediately that it was a terrorist attack is also puzzling because Keane should surely have realized that, if America was under attack, the Pentagon was a likely target.
<br><br>Indeed, numerous individuals who were at the Pentagon that morning have recalled being concerned that their building might be attacked. For example, after they learned about the first crash at the World Trade Center, Captain William Toti, special assistant to the vice chief of naval operations, and his colleagues started discussing whether there could be more attacks and, if there were, what the targets would be. Toti concluded, "The only building that makes sense is the Pentagon" and, "If [the terrorists] hit any place, they are going to hit this building." [20]
<br><br>Similarly, after he saw the second crash on television, Peter Chiarelli told a colleague, "If there are other aircraft up there that have been hijacked or if there are other aircraft getting ready to do this, this building [i.e. the Pentagon] has got to be a target." [21]
<br><br>Keane should surely have assumed from the outset that the Pentagon might be attacked. He should therefore have made his own safety a priority, so he would still be able to carry out his duties if it was hit.
<br><br>And yet, by staying in a vulnerable and exposed area of the Pentagon, he failed to do this. His office was on the third floor of the building's outer ring. [22] If terrorists attacked that area of the Pentagon, perhaps by crashing an aircraft into it or detonating a truck bomb outside of it, Keane could have been seriously injured or killed. He should have realized that he would be much safer in the AOC, which was on the lowest level of the Pentagon, inside a bunker reinforced by steel and concrete, 60 feet below the parking lot. [23]
<br><br>Keane stayed in his office after he saw the second plane crashing into the World Trade Center on television, even though it became clear then that the crisis involved more than an attack on just a single target. The possibility of the Pentagon being hit--and the need to go to a safer location--should have seemed increasingly great to him at that point.
<br><br>Keane's decision to stay in his office until after the Pentagon attack occurred is particularly astonishing considering that when Chiarelli called, before the Pentagon was hit, he told Keane a suspicious aircraft had been noticed flying toward Washington. Keane even seems to have thought at the time that this aircraft might be heading toward the Pentagon. He recalled that he and Chiarelli were "concluding it's heading for a building someplace in Washington," and he asked Chiarelli: "What's the plan to evacuate this building [i.e. the Pentagon]? Why isn't it being evacuated?"
<br><br>And yet he did not hurry out of his office, in case the approaching aircraft crashed into the part of the building he was in. Instead, he remained on the phone and was still talking with Chiarelli when the Pentagon was struck. "Right during that conversation, the plane hit the building; it was quite amazing," he has commented. [24]
<br><br>It is remarkable too that, in light of the possibility of the Pentagon being attacked, Keane made no attempt to send his staff to somewhere more secure. Surely, just as he should have ensured his own safety, he should have taken action to ensure the safety of his staffers. And yet he did nothing before the Pentagon was hit.
<br><br>After the Pentagon attack occurred, almost all Army personnel at the Pentagon evacuated the building. [25] Only at that time did Keane order his staffers, "Call your homes right now and make sure everybody knows you're alright, and then I want you to all to leave the building immediately." [26] By then, however, it was too late. If the area of the Pentagon in which they worked had been hit, members of Keane's staff could have been killed or seriously injured.
<br><br><b>KEANE APPARENTLY FAILED TO ACTIVATE THE CRISIS ACTION TEAM</b>
<br>An aspect of Jack Keane's behavior on September 11 that may be particularly significant was Keane's apparent failure to activate the Army's Crisis Action Team at the Pentagon.
<br><br>The CAT, according to author Robert Rossow, was "an organization of subject matter experts from throughout the Army" who would be "called to the AOC to man their battle stations when the CAT is activated." [27] It had "a dedicated 'hot' desk with classified and unclassified computers, and secure telephones for 24 separate Army staff sections," according to <i>Soldiers</i> magazine. [28]
<br><br>Keane, as the most senior Army officer in the U.S., should presumably have arranged for it to be activated as soon as possible on the morning of September 11, so the team could promptly respond to the attacks. He could perhaps have ordered Peter Chiarelli--who oversaw operations in the AOC--to activate it when he called him after he learned of the first crash. And yet the only action he took at that time, according to his own recollections, was to order Chiarelli to bring the AOC up to full manning.
<br><br>Chiarelli, in contrast, appears to have recognized right away the importance of activating the CAT, since he activated it of his own accord, apparently shortly after Keane called him. (Curiously, he made no mention of having any phone calls with Keane when he was interviewed by a military historian about his experiences on September 11, so the exact sequence of events is difficult to determine.)
<br><br>Chiarelli, according to his own recollections, started watching the coverage of the first crash at the World Trade Center at around 9:00 a.m. on September 11 on the television in his office, where he had been preparing to go to a meeting. Although he has said it was "unclear" to him at that point whether the crash was "a terrorist action," he realized that the incident was "a really serious situation." He therefore called Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Stramara--his chief of operations, who was responsible for the CAT--into his office.
<br><br>After Stramara entered, Chiarelli said to him, "We need to look at standing up a CAT because I believe we've got ourselves a possibility of a mass casualty [incident]." He told Stramara, "It's time to activate the CAT" and instructed him, "Get it set up." [29] Chiarelli explained, in a phone call later that morning, that he had activated the CAT "to respond to the contingency in New York if requested by state and local officials," because he had "anticipated that the World Trade Center disaster would require enormous rescue, firefighting, and recovery efforts." [30]
<br><br><b>KEANE HAD INCREASED POWERS IN THE HOURS AFTER THE ATTACKS</b>
<br>Keane, evidence suggests, failed to take any significant action in response to the 9/11 attacks while they were taking place. However, as a result of certain anomalous circumstances, he had a lot of power in the crucial hours after the attacks.
<br><br>The chief of staff of the U.S. Army in 2001 was Eric Shinseki. However, as previously noted, Shinseki was in Malaysia on September 11, for a conference of the chiefs of staff of Pacific nation armies. [31] He was promptly alerted to the news that a plane had crashed into the World Trade Center and, when he then saw the second crash live on television, realized it was a terrorist attack. But since he was on the other side of the world to where the attacks occurred, he was only able to participate in the military's response to the crisis over the phone.
<br><br>Most of the senior U.S. Army delegation in Malaysia prepared to head immediately back to America. However, on top of the long time it would take to fly to the United States, their journey was delayed because U.S. airspace was closed in response to the attacks. [32] Shinseki appears to have therefore only arrived in Washington, where he could resume his duties as Army chief of staff, on the night of September 12. [33] While he was away, Keane, as his second in charge, would presumably have carried out these duties.
<br><br>Another key official whose circumstances led to Keane having increased power in the hours following the attacks was Thomas White. As secretary of the Army, White was the top civilian leader for the U.S. Army, and was responsible for the effective and efficient functioning of the Army. [34] He was also the "top executive agent in the Pentagon hierarchy," the "coordinator of continuity for the Pentagon," and the "middleman for military support to civil authorities," according to military expert and author William Arkin. [35] However, due to an apparent mishap, he was away from Washington for several hours on September 11.
<br><br>White was at the Army Navy Country Club in Arlington, Virginia, where he had been scheduled to give a speech, when the Pentagon was hit and so, like Keane, he only arrived at the Army Operations Center sometime after the Pentagon attack took place. [36] Like Keane, he then provided "leadership and guidance" to the personnel in the AOC. [37]
<br><br>However, after he spent some time in the Operations Center, he was ordered to go to Raven Rock, a secure complex of buildings outside Washington. [38] He objected to being sent away from the Pentagon. But the officer in charge of the relocation and continuity of operations plan had explained to Peter Chiarelli--the man who told White he had to go: "[White] has no choice at this time. This has been directed and he must immediately proceed to leave here." When Chiarelli asked the officer if he was certain of this, he replied, "Yes, I'm sure."
<br><br>And yet the decision to send White to Raven Rock turned out to be a mistake. "We found out that it wasn't required for him to leave at that particular point in time, because the level of evacuation did not reach his level," Chiarelli explained. The person who said White had to leave "had misspoke over the phone," Chiarelli added. White was consequently allowed to return to the Pentagon about four hours after he left it. [39] But while he was away, Arkin noted, Keane was "in charge of the Army (and of decisions relating to military support to civil authorities)." [40]
<br><br><b>OTHER KEY OFFICIALS FAILED TO CARRY OUT THEIR DUTIES</b>
<br>While Keane's apparent lack of response to the 9/11 attacks may seem alarming, the Army vice chief of staff was in fact one of several key officials responsible for running the U.S. military whose actions meant they were unable to carry out their duties while the attacks were taking place.
<br><br>These officials included Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who, after learning about the crashes at the World Trade Center, insisted on continuing with a routine intelligence briefing. Then, after the Pentagon was hit, instead of helping the military respond to the crisis, he initially went to the crash site, simply to inspect the damage and help carry a stretcher. [41]
<br><br>Meanwhile, General Montague Winfield should have been on duty as the deputy director for operations in charge of the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon on the morning of September 11. However, he remained in a routine "personnel meeting," which apparently commenced before the attacks began, until sometime after the Pentagon was hit. While he was in the meeting, a colleague had to carry out his duties. [42]
<br><br>And General Ralph Eberhart, the commander of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), decided to drive from his office at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado, to the NORAD operations center in Cheyenne Mountain in the middle of the attacks, even though he knew there were "dead spots" in which he would be out of phone coverage for five to 10 minutes at a time during the journey. Consequently, he was out of communication with other officials for about 45 minutes at this critical time, while he traveled between the two locations. [43]
<br><br><b>KEANE ISSUED FEW ORDERS DURING THE ATTACKS</b>
<br>Since Jack Keane, as the most senior Army officer in the country, was such a key figure in the U.S. military on September 11, it is alarming to find, upon close scrutiny, that his behavior while the terrorist attacks took place that day appears so suspicious. He seems to have done remarkably little to protect his country at a time when he should surely have assumed that his prompt action might help make the difference between further attacks succeeding or being stopped.
<br><br>Important questions therefore need to be addressed. We need to know, for example, what exactly Keane's responsibilities were on September 11. What actions should Keane have taken in response to the attacks? And, in light of his responsibilities, what exactly did he do and what duties did he fail to carry out?
<br><br>We need to know what orders Keane issued while the attacks were underway. The only ones we know of, based on his recollections, were that the Army Operations Center be brought up to full manning and, after the Pentagon was hit, that his immediate staff should evacuate the building. Were these the only orders he gave?
<br><br>More specifically, why did Keane apparently fail to order Peter Chiarelli to activate the Crisis Action Team and instead just tell him to bring the AOC--where the members of the CAT would assemble in an emergency--up to full manning? As acting chief of staff of the Army, activating the CAT may have been one of his responsibilities that day. And yet it appears that, after Keane called him following the first crash, Chiarelli arranged to have the CAT activated on his own initiative, rather than based on an order from his superior.
<br><br>Eric Shinseki--the actual Army chief of staff in September 2001--has indicated that he understood the importance of activating the CAT. Even though he was out of the country when the attacks occurred, after he saw the second crash on television, he recalled, he "gave instructions for the Army staff to stand up the Crisis Action Team." [44] If Shinseki recognized the need to promptly activate the CAT, why was Keane apparently unable to do so?
<br><br><b>KEANE'S ACTIONS AFTER THE SECOND CRASH ARE UNKNOWN</b>
<br>Another issue to address regards the lack of available information about Keane's actions in the half-hour or so after the second crash at the World Trade Center occurred.
<br><br>Keane has described calling Chiarelli after he learned of the first crash and then seeing the second crash on television. That crash took place at 9:03 a.m., almost 35 minutes before the Pentagon was attacked. The next thing Keane has described doing is talking to Chiarelli again, when the officer called to let him know the AOC was fully manned and a suspicious aircraft had been noticed flying toward Washington. That call, though, appears to have begun shortly before the Pentagon was hit, since the two men were still talking to each other when the Pentagon attack occurred.
<br><br>Keane's recollections, therefore, appear to leave about half an hour unaccounted for. What, then, did Keane do during this critical period, immediately after the second attack took place?
<br><br>We also need to consider why Keane was apparently so unconcerned for his safety and for the safety of his staff after he learned of the first crash, considering that he immediately realized the incident was a terrorist attack. Surely, as previously mentioned, if the U.S. was under attack, the Pentagon--as a prominent symbol of American power--should have been considered a likely target. And, located on the third floor of the outer ring, Keane's office was presumably in one of the most exposed and vulnerable areas of the building.
<br><br>And yet Keane made no attempt to leave there and go to somewhere safer--such as the AOC--until after the Pentagon was attacked. And he only ordered his immediate staff to evacuate after the building was hit. [45]
<br><br>We need to know if there was a particular person who was responsible for Keane's safety. If there was, who was this individual? Surely, such a person should have made sure that Keane was promptly taken from his office to somewhere more secure in response to the attacks on the World Trade Center. Why, then, did they fail to do so?
<br><br><b>DID KEANE HELP PLAN THE ATTACKS?</b>
<br>What was the reason for Jack Keane's inaction while the 9/11 attacks were underway, when Keane should have been going out of his way to help the military respond to the crisis? Was Keane's poor performance simply due to incompetence or is there a more disturbing explanation for it?
<br><br>For example, might Keane have been confused because he thought information he received about the attacks was simulated, as part of a training exercise? Chiarelli has recalled that, on September 11, the Army was preparing an exercise for the CAT, which would be based around the scenario of a plane crashing into the World Trade Center. Although this exercise was scheduled to take place in the week after 9/11, it was a "no-notice exercise," which means its participants were not told beforehand exactly when it would occur. [46] Army personnel, including Keane, might therefore have mistakenly thought the exercise was taking place on September 11 when they learned a plane had crashed into the World Trade Center that day.
<br><br>Another possibility, which, though unsettling, needs to be considered is that Keane was in some way complicit in planning and carrying out the attacks. His failure to take effective action on the morning of September 11 might plausibly have been because he intended to help ensure that the attacks succeeded and the military was unable to intervene before the targets were hit. If this was the case, it would mean a group other than al-Qaeda was behind 9/11. Instead, the attacks might have been perpetrated by rogue individuals in the U.S. military and other government agencies.
<br><br>If Keane was involved in planning the attacks, he would presumably have known which part of the Pentagon would be hit and he would therefore have known that, along with his colleagues, he would be safe in his office on the morning of September 11. If he had such foreknowledge, this fact could explain why he was apparently so unconcerned for his own safety before the Pentagon attack took place.
<br><br>Keane was an important and powerful figure on September 11. And yet little has been revealed about what he did when the 9/11 attacks occurred and his behavior that day has avoided serious examination. He is therefore one of a number of senior military and government officials whose responses to the attacks ought to be the subject of particular scrutiny in a new investigation of 9/11.
<br><br><b>NOTES</b>
<br>[1] <a href="http://the.honoluluadvertiser.com/article/2001/Sep/10/mn/mn06a.html" target="_blank">"Army Officers Hold Meeting." <i>Honolulu Advertiser</i>, September 10, 2001</a>; <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20120926101551/http:/www.history.army.mil/html/books/101/101-31-2/CMH_Pub_101-32-1.pdf" target="_blank">Christopher N. Koontz, <i>Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 2001</i>. Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2011, p. 55</a>; <a href="https://www.army.mil/article/174926/former_csa_reflections_on_9_11_attacks" target="_blank">Lindsey M. Elder, "Former CSA Reflections on 9/11 Attacks." U.S. Army, September 10, 2016</a>.
<br>[2] Keane has not explicitly stated that he was the acting chief of staff of the Army on September 11. However, evidence indicates that because Shinseki was out of the country, he would have performed this role. Specifically, General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time, has explained how, because General Henry Shelton, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was away from the country on the morning of September 11, he was the acting chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when the 9/11 attacks occurred. "Shelton was airborne on his way to Europe for a NATO meeting and couldn't be back for hours," Myers wrote. Therefore, he continued, "By law, as vice chairman, I was designated acting chairman of the Joint Chiefs during his absence." Presumably, Shinseki's absence on September 11 similarly meant Keane was designated, by law, as the acting chief of staff of the Army that day. See Richard Myers with Malcolm McConnell, <i>Eyes on the Horizon: Serving on the Front Lines of National Security</i>. New York: Threshold Editions, 2009, p. 10.
<br>[3] Alfred Goldberg et al., <i>Pentagon 9/11</i>. Washington, DC: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2007, p. 134. See also <a href="https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=783767" target="_blank"><i>Department of Defense Directive 3025.1: Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA)</i>. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 15, 1993</a>.
<br>[4] <a href="https://news.fordham.edu/fordham-magazine/my-911-a-personal-reflection-by-general-jack-keane-former-vice-chief-of-staff-of-the-u-s-army/" target="_blank">Jack Keane, "My 9/11: A Personal Reflection by General Jack Keane, Former Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army." <i>Fordham Magazine</i>, September 10, 2016</a>; <a href="http://www.weeklystandard.com/gen.-jack-keane-remembers-911/article/2004279" target="_blank">Jim Swift, "Gen. Jack Keane Remembers 9/11." <i>Weekly Standard</i>, September 11, 2016</a>; <a href="http://media.wrko.com/a/116650506/mike-siegel-9-11-16.htm" target="_blank">"Mike Siegel 9-11-16." <i>Mike Siegel Show</i>, WRKO, September 11, 2016</a>.
<br>[5] <a href="http://news.rice.edu/2011/09/09/call-saved-rice-professor-on-911/" target="_blank">Mike Williams, "Call Saved Rice Professor on 9/11." Rice News, September 9, 2011</a>.
<br>[6] <a href="https://www.thefreelibrary.com/The+Army's+Nerve+Center.-a0139678487" target="_blank">William Schwab and Lorie Jewell, "The Army's Nerve Center." <i>Soldiers</i>, September 2004</a>.
<br>[7] <a href="https://news.fordham.edu/fordham-magazine/my-911-a-personal-reflection-by-general-jack-keane-former-vice-chief-of-staff-of-the-u-s-army/" target="_blank">Jack Keane, "My 9/11"</a>; <a href="http://www.weeklystandard.com/gen.-jack-keane-remembers-911/article/2004279" target="_blank">Jim Swift, "Gen. Jack Keane Remembers 9/11"</a>; <a href="http://media.wrko.com/a/116650506/mike-siegel-9-11-16.htm" target="_blank">"Mike Siegel 9-11-16."</a>
<br>[8] Robert Rossow III, <i>Uncommon Strength: The Story of the U.S. Army Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel During the Attack on the Pentagon, 11 September 2001</i>. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, 2003, p. 67.
<br>[9] <a href="http://www.stljewishlight.com/blogs/cohn/article_ac5f1054-208a-11e3-98b0-0019bb2963f4.html" target="_blank">Robert A. Cohn, "Remembering the 'First Yahrzeit' of 9/11." <i>St. Louis Jewish Light</i>, September 18, 2013</a>.
<br>[10] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/241809079/neit532" target="_blank">Pete Chiarelli, interview by Frank Shirer. U.S. Army Center of Military History, February 5, 2002</a>; Christopher N. Koontz, <i>Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 2001</i>, p. 56.
<br>[11] <a href="http://www.stljewishlight.com/blogs/cohn/article_19ece826-da51-11e0-8e0e-001cc4c002e0.html" target="_blank">Robert A. Cohn, "Cohnipedia: 9/11's Tenth Yahrtzeit." <i>St. Louis Jewish Light</i>, September 8, 2011</a>.
<br>[12] <a href="http://news.rice.edu/2011/09/09/call-saved-rice-professor-on-911/" target="_blank">Mike Williams, "Call Saved Rice Professor on 9/11."</a>
<br>[13] <a href="https://news.fordham.edu/fordham-magazine/my-911-a-personal-reflection-by-general-jack-keane-former-vice-chief-of-staff-of-the-u-s-army/" target="_blank">Jack Keane, "My 9/11"</a>; <a href="http://www.weeklystandard.com/gen.-jack-keane-remembers-911/article/2004279" target="_blank">Jim Swift, "Gen. Jack Keane Remembers 9/11."</a>
<br>[14] <a href="http://www.weeklystandard.com/gen.-jack-keane-remembers-911/article/2004279" target="_blank">Jim Swift, "Gen. Jack Keane Remembers 9/11."</a>
<br>[15] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/51226076/GSA-B115-RDOD03012869-Fdr-Entire-Contents-CMH-Intvw-2002-02-12-NEIT-542-Vaughn-Clyde-Pentagon-Impact-066" target="_blank">Clyde Vaughn, interview by Stephen Lofgren. U.S. Army Center of Military History, February 12, 2002</a>.
<br>[16] <a href="http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19951014&slug=2146768" target="_blank">Steve Vogel, "Crew in Pentagon Bunker is Army's Eyes and Ears: Watch Covers all From Crises to Baby-Sitting." <i>Washington Post</i>, October 14, 1995</a>; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/241809079/neit532" target="_blank">Pete Chiarelli, interview by Frank Shirer</a>; <a href="http://video.foxnews.com/v/5120472402001/" target="_blank">"Gen. Jack Keane Describes Being in the Pentagon on 9/11." Fox News, September 11, 2016</a>.
<br>[17] <a href="https://www.thefreelibrary.com/The+Army's+Nerve+Center.-a0139678487" target="_blank">William Schwab and Lorie Jewell, "The Army's Nerve Center."</a>
<br>[18] <a href="https://news.fordham.edu/fordham-magazine/my-911-a-personal-reflection-by-general-jack-keane-former-vice-chief-of-staff-of-the-u-s-army/" target="_blank">Jack Keane, "My 9/11"</a>; <a href="http://www.weeklystandard.com/gen.-jack-keane-remembers-911/article/2004279" target="_blank">Jim Swift, "Gen. Jack Keane Remembers 9/11"</a>; <a href="http://media.wrko.com/a/116650506/mike-siegel-9-11-16.htm" target="_blank">"Mike Siegel 9-11-16."</a>
<br>[19] Christopher N. Koontz, <i>Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 2001</i>, p. 56.
<br>[20] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/365443821/Fdr-Entire-Contents-NHC-Intvw-2001-10-10-Toti-William-Re-Pentagon-Pp-37-8-Misng" target="_blank">William Toti, interview by Mike McDaniel. U.S. Naval Historical Center, October 10, 2001</a>.
<br>[21] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/241809079/neit532" target="_blank">Pete Chiarelli, interview by Frank Shirer</a>.
<br>[22] Bob Woodward, <i>State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III</i>. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006, p. 141.
<br>[23] <a href="http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19951014&slug=2146768" target="_blank">Steve Vogel, "Crew in Pentagon Bunker is Army's Eyes and Ears"</a>; <a href="http://media.wrko.com/a/116650506/mike-siegel-9-11-16.htm" target="_blank">"Mike Siegel 9-11-16."</a>
<br>[24] <a href="https://news.fordham.edu/fordham-magazine/my-911-a-personal-reflection-by-general-jack-keane-former-vice-chief-of-staff-of-the-u-s-army/" target="_blank">Jack Keane, "My 9/11"</a>; <a href="http://www.weeklystandard.com/gen.-jack-keane-remembers-911/article/2004279" target="_blank">Jim Swift, "Gen. Jack Keane Remembers 9/11."</a>
<br>[25] Christopher N. Koontz, <i>Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 2001</i>, p. 56.
<br>[26] <a href="http://www.weeklystandard.com/gen.-jack-keane-remembers-911/article/2004279" target="_blank">Jim Swift, "Gen. Jack Keane Remembers 9/11."</a>
<br>[27] Robert Rossow III, <i>Uncommon Strength</i>, p. 64.
<br>[28] <a href="https://www.thefreelibrary.com/The+Army's+Nerve+Center.-a0139678487" target="_blank">William Schwab and Lorie Jewell, "The Army's Nerve Center."</a>
<br>[29] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/241809079/neit532" target="_blank">Pete Chiarelli, interview by Frank Shirer</a>; Robert Rossow III, <i>Uncommon Strength</i>, p. 65.
<br>[30] Alfred Goldberg et al., <i>Pentagon 9/11</i>, p. 134.
<br>[31] Christopher N. Koontz, <i>Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 2001</i>, p. 55.
<br>[32] Richard Halloran, <i>My Name is ... Shinseki ... and I am a Soldier</i>. Honolulu, HI: Hawaii Army Museum Society, 2004, p. 51; <a href="https://www.army.mil/article/174926/former_csa_reflections_on_9_11_attacks" target="_blank">Lindsey M. Elder, "Former CSA Reflections on 9/11 Attacks."</a>
<br>[33] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/241809079/neit532" target="_blank">Pete Chiarelli, interview by Frank Shirer</a>.
<br>[34] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20070911230538/http:/www.army.mil/leaders/leaders/go0203.pdf" target="_blank"><i>General Orders No. 3: Assignment of Functions and Responsibilities Within Headquarters, Department of the Army</i>. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, July 9, 2002</a>.
<br>[35] William M. Arkin, <i>American Coup: How a Terrified Government is Destroying the Constitution</i>. New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2013, p. 176.
<br>[36] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/241809079/neit532" target="_blank">Pete Chiarelli, interview by Frank Shirer</a>; <a href="http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/pentagon/interviews/white.html" target="_blank">Thomas White, interview by PBS, <i>Rumsfeld's War</i>. PBS, August 12, 2004</a>; Alfred Goldberg et al., <i>Pentagon 9/11</i>, p. 135.
<br>[37] Christopher N. Koontz, <i>Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 2001</i>, p. 56.
<br>[38] Alfred Goldberg et al., <i>Pentagon 9/11</i>, p. 135; William M. Arkin, <i>American Coup</i>, p. 176.
<br>[39] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/241809079/neit532" target="_blank">Pete Chiarelli, interview by Frank Shirer</a>.
<br>[40] William M. Arkin, <i>American Coup</i>, p. 176.
<br>[41] <a href="http://shoestring911.blogspot.co.uk/2017/05/secretary-of-defense-donald-rumsfeld.html" target="_blank">"Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 'Deserted His Post' While America Was Under Attack on 9/11." Shoestring 9/11, May 25, 2017</a>.
<br>[42] <a href="http://shoestring911.blogspot.co.uk/2010/11/repeatedly-delayed-responses-of.html" target="_blank">"The Repeatedly Delayed Responses of the Pentagon Command Center on 9/11." Shoestring 9/11, November 7, 2010</a>; <a href="http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=montague_winfield" target="_blank">"Profile: Montague Winfield." History Commons, n.d.</a>
<br>[43] <a href="http://shoestring911.blogspot.co.uk/2010/06/actions-and-inactions-of-commander-in.html" target="_blank">"The Actions and Inactions of the Commander in Charge of the U.S. Air Defense Failure on 9/11." Shoestring 9/11, June 18, 2010</a>; <a href="http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=ralph_eberhart" target="_blank">"Profile: Ralph Eberhart." History Commons, n.d.</a>
<br>[44] <a href="https://www.army.mil/article/174926/former_csa_reflections_on_9_11_attacks" target="_blank">Lindsey M. Elder, "Former CSA Reflections on 9/11 Attacks."</a>
<br>[45] <a href="https://news.fordham.edu/fordham-magazine/my-911-a-personal-reflection-by-general-jack-keane-former-vice-chief-of-staff-of-the-u-s-army/" target="_blank">Jack Keane, "My 9/11"</a>; <a href="http://www.weeklystandard.com/gen.-jack-keane-remembers-911/article/2004279" target="_blank">Jim Swift, "Gen. Jack Keane Remembers 9/11"</a>; <a href="http://media.wrko.com/a/116650506/mike-siegel-9-11-16.htm" target="_blank">"Mike Siegel 9-11-16."</a>
<br>[46] Stephen J. Lofgren (Editor), <i>Then Came the Fire: Personal Accounts From the Pentagon, 11 September 2001</i>. Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2011, pp. 95-97; <a href="http://shoestring911.blogspot.co.uk/2011/03/army-command-center-at-pentagon-planned.html" target="_blank">"Army Command Center at the Pentagon Planned to Hold Exercise in Week After 9/11 Based on a Plane Hitting the WTC." Shoestring 9/11, March 26, 2011</a>.
Shoestringhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01534319150672667644noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2990970741097819876.post-4163233469283794762017-05-25T02:50:00.000-07:002017-05-25T02:50:21.084-07:00Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 'Deserted His Post' While America Was Under Attack on 9/11<br><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh30EcOAn9OWhIvAcQssa5iQCiMYU-QEXugKDkRunKYsW_YI6eO6iKjHnBxKZqDY5cpWlokmloLxC9QLXkYFvEQsOsW2Kp_dOXcfPIN3YPoWxLwsrAwFj03YCdo4arKFgCuPimNCH4lxPux/s1600/RumsfeldPentagon.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;" target="_blank"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh30EcOAn9OWhIvAcQssa5iQCiMYU-QEXugKDkRunKYsW_YI6eO6iKjHnBxKZqDY5cpWlokmloLxC9QLXkYFvEQsOsW2Kp_dOXcfPIN3YPoWxLwsrAwFj03YCdo4arKFgCuPimNCH4lxPux/s1600/RumsfeldPentagon.jpg" data-original-width="300" data-original-height="242" alt="Donald Rumsfeld at the Pentagon on September 11"/></a></div><br>Donald Rumsfeld, the U.S. secretary of defense, proceeded as normal with his daily intelligence briefing at the Pentagon on the morning of September 11, 2001, despite learning that a second aircraft had hit the World Trade Center and America was clearly under attack. Even when the Pentagon was attacked, over 30 minutes later, he still did nothing to assist the military's response to the crisis and instead hurried outside to the crash site, simply to inspect the damage and help carry a stretcher. By the time that he became involved in defending his country, the terrorist attacks were over.
<br><br>Rumsfeld, as secretary of defense, had important responsibilities that day. And yet he repeatedly ignored the appeals of colleagues when they tried to get him involved with the military's response to the attacks. Remarkably, he rejected the advice of two aides to abandon his usual activities because, he told them, if he did so, "the terrorists have won."
<br><br>Some government and military officials, as well as journalists, have criticized Rumsfeld for effectively deserting his post at such a critical time, when he should have been focused on preventing possible further attacks. These commentators have made clear how unusual and unacceptable his actions were.
<br><br>In light of what is known about the defense secretary's actions on September 11, we need to consider whether Rumsfeld's behavior while the 9/11 attacks were taking place was simply due to negligence and recklessness or the result of something more disturbing. Might Rumsfeld perhaps have known in advance what was going to happen on September 11?
<br><br>If he had foreknowledge of 9/11, he would presumably have known he could get away with abandoning his responsibilities as secretary of defense while America was under attack. And if he knew what the targets would be, he would have known that the area of the building where his office was located would not be hit when the Pentagon was attacked, which meant it was safe for him to continue with his intelligence briefing. He would also have known there would be no second attack on the Pentagon and so he could safely go to the crash site after the building was hit.
<br><br>Official investigations have failed to thoroughly probe Rumsfeld's actions on September 11 and the media have never inquired why the secretary of defense acted so inappropriately in response to the terrorist attacks. It is important, therefore, that we now closely examine what Rumsfeld did that day.
<br><br><b>RUMSFELD THOUGHT THE FIRST CRASH WAS A 'TRAGIC ACCIDENT'</b>
<br>Donald Rumsfeld was hosting a breakfast meeting in his private dining room at the Pentagon, attended by several members of Congress, when the first hijacked plane--American Airlines Flight 11--crashed into the World Trade Center, at 8:46 a.m. on September 11. [1]
<br><br>He learned of the crash shortly after it occurred when Larry Di Rita, his special assistant, sent him a note telling him what had happened. [2] Vice Admiral Edmund Giambastiani, his senior military assistant, received the note and passed the message on to him while he was in the meeting. He assumed the incident was a "tragic accident," he has recalled, and took no action in response to the news. His meeting apparently therefore continued until 9:00 a.m., when it was scheduled to end. [3]
<br><br>He then went to his office for his intelligence briefing. [4] Giambastiani turned on the television and he then started watching the coverage of the burning World Trade Center. [5]
<br><br><b>RUMSFELD WENT AHEAD WITH HIS INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING, DESPITE KNOWING AMERICA WAS UNDER ATTACK</b>
<br>Rumsfeld received a daily intelligence briefing, similar to the one provided to the president each morning. [6] The briefing on September 11 was scheduled to run from 9:00 a.m. to 9:30 a.m. and was going to be delivered by DeNeige ("Denny") Watson, an analyst with the CIA. [7]
<br><br>Watson learned of the first crash at the World Trade Center when she arrived at the Pentagon that morning and saw people watching the coverage of it on television. She learned of the second crash, and presumably realized that America was under attack, before she went in to brief Rumsfeld, seeing the incident live on television, at 9:03 a.m., in the anteroom of Rumsfeld's office. She immediately called the operations center at CIA headquarters and asked what people there knew about what was going on. She was told there were 50 airborne planes still unaccounted for.
<br><br>In light of what was happening, Watson apparently expected Rumsfeld to cancel his schedule so he could focus on responding to the crisis. As she was about to go into his office, she "declined to even open her briefcase to pull out the PDB [President's Daily Brief], figuring it had been overtaken by events," author David Priess described. The secretary of defense, though, was determined to go ahead with the briefing.
<br><br>Inside Rumsfeld's office, Watson relayed what she had been told by the CIA's operations center. And yet, while this information surely indicated that more attacks might be imminent, Rumsfeld just nodded his head and started flipping through the copy of the PDB she had brought with her. [8]
<br><br><b>RUMSFELD WAS DETERMINED TO STICK TO HIS SCHEDULE</b>
<br>Around this time, while he was receiving the briefing, Rumsfeld was told about the second crash by Edmund Giambastiani. "Someone came in and said that another plane had hit a different tower of the World Trade Center," Rumsfeld recalled. [9] "I went in and informed the secretary [of the second crash]," Giambastiani said. [10] At that point, "it became clear that it was more than an accident," Rumsfeld commented. [11] "We knew there was a problem here," Giambastiani stated. [12] All the same, Rumsfeld continued with the briefing as if nothing unusual had happened.
<br><br>Minutes after Watson entered the office, two of Rumsfeld's aides came in: Victoria Clarke, Rumsfeld's spokeswoman, and Larry Di Rita.
<br><br>Clarke had been in her office at the Pentagon when she learned of the first crash from seeing the coverage of it on television. She'd called Di Rita to discuss the incident and, as the two were talking, they saw United Airlines Flight 175--the second hijacked plane--crashing into the World Trade Center live on their TVs. Realizing this was "clearly a terrorist attack of some kind," Clarke headed to Di Rita's office, down the hallway from Rumsfeld's office.
<br><br>On the way, she made some notes about what needed to be done in response to the crisis, such as contacting the president, the vice president, and the director of the CIA. She and Di Rita then went together to Rumsfeld's office to discuss "the kinds of things [Rumsfeld] needed to do in response to this," Clarke recalled. [13] Upon entering the office, they told Rumsfeld what they knew about the terrorist attacks and that the crisis management process was starting up. [14]
<br><br>Clarke and Di Rita wanted Rumsfeld to cancel his schedule, presumably so he could focus on responding to the attacks. "Sir, I think your <i>entire</i> schedule is going to be different today," Di Rita said. [15] But Rumsfeld refused to change his plans. [16]
<br><br>He told them to go to the Pentagon's Executive Support Center (ESC), which was well equipped to deal with crisis, and said he would join them later. At that time, he "wanted to make a few phone calls," Clarke recalled. The two aides therefore left the office and headed to the ESC. [17] Rumsfeld, meanwhile, went back to skimming through the PDB. [18]
<br><br><b>RUMSFELD WENT TO THE CRASH SITE AFTER THE PENTAGON WAS HIT</b>
<br>The secretary of defense was still in his office with Watson at 9:37 a.m., when the Pentagon was attacked, and felt the building shake from the impact. "I knew that only something truly massive could have made hundreds of thousands of tons of concrete shudder," he recalled.
<br><br>The attack on the Pentagon surely emphasized why he needed to get involved with responding to the crisis right away, as the extent of the emergency and the capability of the attackers became increasingly apparent. And yet he still did nothing to help the military react to the crisis. Instead, he rushed outside to the scene of the attack. [19] "I wanted to see what had happened; I wanted to see if people needed help," he has commented. [20]
<br><br>Rumsfeld went to the site accompanied by Officers Aubrey Davis and Gilbert Oldach of the Defense Protective Service--the Pentagon's police force; Joseph Wassel, his communications officer; plus Rick Kisling and Kevin Brown, the director and deputy director of security for his office. [21]
<br><br>Davis and Oldach had headed to Rumsfeld's office after Flight 175 hit the World Trade Center with the intention of moving the secretary of defense to a better-protected location. They'd encountered Rumsfeld outside his office just after the Pentagon was hit.
<br><br>Rumsfeld hurried toward the scene of the attack based on information Davis was receiving over his radio. Davis called on Oldach to join him as he accompanied the secretary of defense to the crash site and motioned to Kisling, Wassel, and Brown, who were in the personnel security office, to do the same. Davis protested that Rumsfeld should head back, but the secretary of defense ignored his objections.
<br><br>Rumsfeld and his entourage reached the crash site "by 9:40 at the latest," according to Davis. "It was not more than two or three minutes [after the building was hit] before we were actually on site," Davis said. [22]
<br><br><b>COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER DETERMINED THAT RUMSFELD SHOULD RETURN TO THE PENTAGON</b>
<br>Upon reaching the scene of the attack, Rumsfeld inspected the area and helped carry a survivor on a stretcher to where they could get medical attention. [23] But after he had been at the site for some time, Wassel decided it was unnecessary for the secretary of defense to be there and told him, "I really need to get you on the phone with the president." Rumsfeld asked, "Where do we go?" Wassel apparently said they should return to the Pentagon. He recalled that he determined that "the hit seemed to be localized and we should have good communications inside the building." [24]
<br><br>"At some moment, I decided I should be in [the Pentagon] figuring out what to do, because your brain begins to connect things," Rumsfeld has said. [25] He therefore announced, "Let's go" and led his group back inside.
<br><br>Rumsfeld returned to the building at around 9:56 a.m. to 10:00 a.m., according to Davis. Accompanied by Davis, Wassel, Oldach, Brown, and Kisling, he initially went to his office and talked briefly with President George W. Bush on the phone. [26]
<br><br>At around 10:10 a.m. to 10:15 a.m., he went to the ESC where a number of his colleagues had assembled. Those in the center included Stephen Cambone, a special assistant to Rumsfeld; William Haynes, the general counsel of the Department of Defense; Victoria Clarke; Larry Di Rita; and Edmund Giambastiani. [27]
<br><br>In the well-equipped facility, Rumsfeld was finally in a location suitable for responding to the crisis. He was able to participate in the White House video teleconference while he was there. [28] But by the time he reached the ESC, the last of the four planes that were hijacked that morning--United Airlines Flight 93--had already crashed, reportedly going down in a field in Pennsylvania at 10:03 a.m., and so the attacks were over.
<br><br>Rumsfeld then went to the Pentagon's National Military Command Center (NMCC), entering it at around 10:30 a.m. His "primary concern" once there was ensuring that the fighter pilots who had taken off to defend America's airspace "had a clear understanding of their rules of engagement," he told the 9/11 Commission. [29] He rapidly went to work on developing "some rules of engagement for what our military aircraft might do in the event another aircraft appeared to be heading into a large civilian structure or population," he said. [30]
<br><br>In the NMCC, which was particularly well-equipped for dealing with the crisis, Rumsfeld was able to participate in the air threat conference call, which had been set up in response to the attacks. [31] But by the time he reached the center, it was too late for his actions to make a difference to the outcome of the attacks.
<br><br><b>RUMSFELD THOUGHT THERE MIGHT BE ADDITIONAL ATTACKS</b>
<br>Donald Rumsfeld's failure to get involved with the military's response to the crisis until the terrorist attacks were over could have had serious consequences. However, according to retired Lieutenant Colonel Robert Darling, who was working for the White House Military Office on September 11, even if Rumsfeld had gone to the NMCC immediately after the second hijacked plane hit the World Trade Center, there is "no indication" that this action "would have changed the devastating outcome [of the attacks] for the better." [32]
<br><br>Rumsfeld, though, ought to have been unaware of this at the time and should surely have assumed that he needed to get involved with responding to the crisis as quickly as possible. If 9/11 was a surprise, as has been officially claimed, no one would have known how many attacks were planned. Terrorists may have intended to hit numerous additional targets beyond the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Indeed, Victoria Clarke recalled, "Everybody was fixated for the first few hours on what could be next." [33]
<br><br>Rumsfeld himself said he believed that additional attacks were possible. When asked, "Did you have a concern that the U.S. was about to be hit again in those early moments, those early hours?" he replied: "Sure. There's no question about it." Considering that three planes had crashed into buildings and other suspicious aircraft were still in the air, he explained, "you can't help but be very attentive to the possibility of another attack." [34]
<br><br>If more attacks had been planned, Rumsfeld's failure to promptly get involved with the military's response to the crisis could have cost many lives. An unnamed senior White House official who was in the White House Situation Room that morning, trying to coordinate a response to the attacks, has angrily criticized Rumsfeld in this regard. "How long does it take for something bad to happen?" the official asked. "No one knew what was happening," they pointed out. "What if this had been the opening shot of a coordinated attack by a hostile power?" [35]
<br><br><b>RUMSFELD WAS OUT OF COMMUNICATION WHILE HE VISITED THE CRASH SITE</b>
<br>A number of accounts have indicated that, regardless of its impact on the outcome of the attacks, Rumsfeld's decision to visit the scene of the Pentagon attack had a detrimental effect on the military's ability to respond to the crisis. It meant, for example, that in the 20 minutes between when Rumsfeld left his office and when he returned to the building, people who urgently needed to talk to him were unable to do so.
<br><br>Aubrey Davis kept receiving frantic calls over his radio while he was with Rumsfeld at the crash site, saying: "Where's the secretary? Where's the secretary?" But he was unable to answer the inquiries. "I kept saying, 'We've got him,' but the system was overloaded," he recalled, "so I couldn't get through and they went on asking." [36] In that 20-minute period, Rumsfeld was "completely out of touch," journalist and author Andrew Cockburn concluded.
<br><br>The situation was surely made worse because Rumsfeld failed to tell his command staff where he was going when he headed toward the crash site. [37] "He came out [of his office] and he didn't even talk to his staff," Joseph Wassel recalled. "His staff only found out where he was after the fact," Wassel said. [38]
<br><br>Rumsfeld's colleagues therefore didn't know where the secretary of defense was at this critical time. Davis heard people over his radio saying, "Doctor Cambone wants to know where the secretary is; Admiral Giambastiani wants to know where the secretary is." [39] Several times in the half-hour after the Pentagon was attacked, Victoria Clarke heard people in the ESC asking where Rumsfeld was. [40] And for 30 minutes, personnel in the NMCC "couldn't find him," Brigadier General Montague Winfield said. [41]
<br><br>Furthermore, because he went to the crash site, Rumsfeld was unable to join the Pentagon's air threat conference call when it commenced, at 9:37 a.m. Captain Charles Leidig, who ran the air threat conference, requested that the secretary of defense be brought into the conversation at the start of the call, but minutes later it was reported that Rumsfeld was nowhere to be found. [42] This meant that "the chain of command was broken," Cockburn concluded. [43] Rumsfeld only joined the conference call over 50 minutes after it began, once he arrived at the NMCC. [44]
<br><br><b>THE ESC AND THE NMCC WERE EQUIPPED TO DEAL WITH THE ATTACKS</b>
<br>Analysis of Donald Rumsfeld's behavior at the time of the 9/11 attacks gives rise to many concerns. Rumsfeld appears to have acted in a way that was inconsistent with his responsibilities as secretary of defense and inappropriate in light of the crisis that needed his urgent attention.
<br><br>He should surely have left his office right away after he learned a second plane had hit the World Trade Center and it became clear that America was under attack. To begin with, had he done so, he could have immediately gone to either the Executive Support Center or the National Military Command Center, where he would have been in a good position to respond to the attacks while they were still taking place.
<br><br>The ESC and the NMCC, unlike Rumsfeld's office, were equipped to deal with a crisis like what happened that day. Additionally, numerous key officials responded to the terrorist attacks from these facilities. In either of them, therefore, Rumsfeld could have conferred with these officials about what to do in response to the attacks.
<br><br>The ESC was a communications hub with a video teleconference facility, located on the third floor of the D ring--the second-outermost ring of the Pentagon. [45] It consisted of conference rooms that were secure against electronic eavesdropping. [46] People there had "instant access to satellite images and intelligence sources peering into every corner of the globe," Victoria Clarke described. [47] And "because it had so many communications in it," Joseph Wassel said, it could serve as a command center. [48]
<br><br>Clarke called the ESC "the Pentagon's war room" and said it was "the place where the building's top leadership goes to coordinate military operations during national emergencies." [49] In it, therefore, Rumsfeld would have been well placed to respond to the attacks.
<br><br>The NMCC, located in the Joint Staff area of the Pentagon, was a two-story complex of rooms that, Rumsfeld described, were "outfitted with televisions, computer terminals, and screens tracking military activities around the world." [50] It was equipped with numerous communications systems, including multiple screens for video conferences, and was staffed 24 hours a day by up to 200 employees. [51]
<br><br>General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on September 11, called it "a switchboard connecting the Pentagon, the civilian government, and the combatant commanders." [52] CNN called it the U.S. military's "worldwide nerve center." [53]
<br><br>The NMCC had a key role to play during an event like what happened on September 11. It was "the operational center for any and every crisis, from nuclear war to hijacked airliners," Andrew Cockburn wrote. [54] "The job of the NMCC in such an emergency" as occurred on September 11, according to the <i>9/11 Commission Report</i>, was "to gather the relevant parties and establish the chain of command between the National Command Authority--the president and the secretary of defense--and those who need to carry out their orders." [55]
<br><br>The NMCC would presumably have been an ideal location for the secretary of defense to go to immediately when he learned that America was under attack. Indeed, after he finally entered it at around 10:30 a.m. on September 11, the communications network there "enabled him to keep in touch with key government officials and military commanders," according to the Department of Defense's book about the Pentagon attack. [56] Rumsfeld said he gained "situational awareness" of what was happening after he arrived at the center. [57]
<br><br>Robert Darling, who spent much of September 11 responding to the crisis from the White House, wrote that he believed that "Rumsfeld's appointed place of duty" while the attacks were taking place "was at the helm in the NMCC." If the secretary of defense had gone to the NMCC earlier than he did, Darling wondered: "Could he have made a difference? What information would he have learned? What orders might he have given? Could there have been a better outcome?" [58]
<br><br><b>THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAD SPECIFIC RESPONSIBILITIES DURING A CRISIS</b>
<br>Rumsfeld should also have canceled his schedule and left his office after he learned of the second attack because, as secretary of defense, he had a unique role to play during a crisis like what occurred on September 11. He therefore needed to get involved with the military's response to the attacks as quickly as possible in order to carry out his duties.
<br><br>To begin with, he was part of the National Command Authority (NCA). The NCA consists of the president and the secretary of defense. [59] Directions for military operations originate from the NCA and, by law, no one else in the chain of command is permitted to authorize the execution of military action. [60] "No <i>offensive</i>, lethal military action will ever be taken by any component of the U.S. military without the direct consent of the president or the secretary of defense," Darling wrote. [61]
<br><br>Cockburn called the NCA "the ultimate source of military orders, uniquely empowered, among other things, to order the use of nuclear weapons." In times of war, he wrote, the secretary of defense "was effectively the president's partner, the direct link to the fighting forces, and all orders had to go through him." [62]
<br><br>As part of the NCA, Rumsfeld surely had a crucial role to play on September 11. But, Darling pointed out, "In the worst attack on American soil since Pearl Harbor, taking nearly 3,000 American lives, destroying billions of dollars' worth of property, sending Americans running in fear through our country's streets, and nearly crippling the world's largest financial system, no official National Command Authority response came until after the attacks had ended." [63]
<br><br><b>THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAD A KEY ROLE IN THE RESPONSE TO HIJACKINGS</b>
<br>Rumsfeld's prompt involvement with the military's efforts to respond to the crisis was also surely important because the secretary of defense had a unique role to play when an aircraft hijacking occurred. The key role of the secretary of defense had been laid out in military instructions dating back as far as 1997, if not earlier. [64] The defense secretary was usually required to give his approval before the military could take action in response to a hijacking, according to the most recent of these instructions prior to 9/11.
<br><br>The NMCC was the "focal point" within the Department of Defense for providing assistance in response to hijackings in U.S. airspace, the instruction stated. And upon being notified of a hijacking, the NMCC was, "with the exception of immediate responses," required "to forward requests for [Department of Defense] assistance to the secretary of defense for approval." [65]
<br><br>Major General Larry Arnold, commander of the Continental United States NORAD Region on September 11, confirmed the crucial role of the secretary of defense when he described the procedure for responding to hijackings. "The FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] contacts the National Military Command Center whenever there is a problem," he said. "They, in turn, go to NORAD [the North American Aerospace Defense Command] to see if assets are available. Then the secretary of defense grants approval to intercept a hijacked airplane." [66]
<br><br>Of course, the military should presumably have scrambled fighter jets in response to the four hijackings on September 11 even without Rumsfeld's approval simply due to factors such as the hijacked planes losing contact with air traffic control or deviating from their flight plans. The secretary of defense's permission was apparently unnecessary for responding to these kinds of emergencies. [67] All the same, in light of the defense secretary's unique responsibilities when a hijacking occurred, Rumsfeld should surely have become involved in the military's response to the crisis as soon as possible on September 11.
<br><br><b>RUMSFELD PUT HIMSELF IN DANGER BY STAYING IN HIS OFFICE</b>
<br>Another reason why Rumsfeld should have left his office after he learned about the second crash at the World Trade Center is that, since by then it was clear that America was under attack and the Pentagon was a potential target, he should have been concerned for his own safety. Indeed, some officials who were in the Pentagon that day--including Stephen Cambone, Edmund Giambastiani, and William Haynes--have recalled wondering if the Pentagon would be attacked after they learned of the crashes at the World Trade Center. [68]
<br><br>And yet Rumsfeld stayed in his office, simply for the sake of receiving a routine intelligence briefing, even though the office was in a vulnerable area of the Pentagon, on the third floor of its outer ring. He surely should have thought that he might be seriously injured or killed if terrorists attacked that part of the building by crashing an aircraft into it or by some other means, such as detonating a truck bomb outside of it.
<br><br>Some of Rumsfeld's colleagues certainly seem to have believed he might be unsafe in his office. These include Cambone and Giambastiani. Following the second attack on the World Trade Center, Cambone went to Giambastiani's office and told Giambastiani they needed to get Rumsfeld out of the building. When Giambastiani asked why, Cambone mentioned the planes that had flown into the World Trade Center and said that "there was no telling what would happen next." The two men discussed "what the evacuation plan should be for the secretary," according to Giambastiani. [69]
<br><br>Aubrey Davis and Gilbert Oldach also thought Rumsfeld might be in danger in his office. Davis recalled that after he saw Flight 175 crashing into the World Trade Center on television, at 9:03 a.m., he and his colleagues "looked at each other and knew that this was warning us to prepare to get Secretary Rumsfeld out of the building, and what measure we would utilize to transport Secretary Rumsfeld to a safe location." [70] Davis and Oldach then headed to Rumsfeld's office because they intended to take the secretary of defense to somewhere that was "better protected" than the office, according to Andrew Cockburn. They planned to take him "to some bunker somewhere." [71]
<br><br>Their boss, John Jester, chief of the Defense Protective Service, seems to have shared their concern. At some point before they set off to take the secretary of defense to a safer location, he came into the room and said to them, "Let's get prepared to get Secretary Rumsfeld out of here." [72]
<br><br>And Denny Watson appears to have recognized that Rumsfeld's office was in a vulnerable area of the Pentagon. After the building shook when it was attacked, Rumsfeld peered out of the window to look for signs of what had happened. Concerned at his action, Watson said, "Sir, everything in my training says you need to be back, away from those windows." [73]
<br><br>Even if he was determined to stay in the Pentagon, Rumsfeld would surely have been safer if he had gone to the ESC or the NMCC after he learned about the second crash at the World Trade Center, rather than remaining in his office at that time. The ESC was "a secure facility" and had "a secure door with a screening process," William Haynes described. [74] And the NMCC was in an area that was presumably much less likely to be damaged than Rumsfeld's office was if the building was attacked. It was in "a very secure location," CNN reported, in the basement of the Pentagon. [75]
<br><br>Although Rumsfeld did eventually leave his office, after the Pentagon was attacked, he then put himself in an even more vulnerable position by going to the crash site. He should surely have considered it possible that there would be additional attacks at the Pentagon, just like there had been a second attack at the World Trade Center. And if another attack occurred there, he would presumably have been most at risk of being killed or seriously injured outside the building, where there were no walls to protect him.
<br><br>Those who accompanied him to the scene of the attack certainly seem to have thought so. While he was at the crash site, they "were really preaching [to him] that it is really dangerous," Oldach recalled. [76]
<br><br><b>RUMSFELD'S VISIT TO THE CRASH SITE WAS BRIEF AND UNNECESSARY</b>
<br>Going to the scene of the attack, as well as putting the secretary of defense potentially in danger, was a pointless exercise. Although about 20 minutes passed between when Rumsfeld left his office to visit the crash site and when he returned to the building, the attack occurred on the opposite side of the Pentagon to his office. [77] Taking into account the time it would have taken to walk to and from the site, Rumsfeld could only have been at the crash scene for a few minutes. [78] This was presumably too little time for him to achieve anything meaningful while there.
<br><br>Visiting the crash site--where all he did was inspect the area and help carry a stretcher--also meant Rumsfeld was unable to attend to the tasks he was responsible for at that time. Whereas any Pentagon employee could have gone to the site and reported back to Rumsfeld what they saw, and there were trained medical personnel whose job it was to assist the wounded, Rumsfeld was irreplaceable as the secretary of defense. "He was the secretary of defense; the country was under attack; he actually had a job to do," Andrew Cockburn commented. [79]
<br><br>Rumsfeld offered a weak explanation for why he abandoned his responsibilities and went to the crash site, saying, "It was a funny thing for me to do, I suppose, and unusual, but I just felt I had to see what it was and what had happened, because no one knew." [80] Some of his colleagues, though, seem to have thought his actions were inappropriate. These include Stephen Cambone, who commented that Rumsfeld only stayed at the crash site for a short time because "his job was inside, not outside the building." [81]
<br><br>And Joseph Wassell urged Rumsfeld to go back into the Pentagon because he recognized the unnecessity of the secretary of defense being at the scene of the attack. He recalled that after Rumsfeld and his entourage had been at the site for some time, he "decided that there was probably already a mechanism in place to take care of this recovery effort."
<br><br>He therefore said to Rumsfeld, "Mr. Secretary, I know Doc Baxter [Colonel John Baxter, commander of the Air Force Flight Medicine Clinic] and I know that there is a mechanism." "This was going to be taken care of by the professionals," he has commented. He told Rumsfeld, "I really need to get you on the phone with the president." Rumsfeld agreed with his evaluation and subsequently headed back into the Pentagon. [82]
<br><br><b>RUMSFELD IGNORED ATTEMPTS TO GET HIM INVOLVED WITH THE RESPONSE TO THE ATTACKS</b>
<br>The failure of Donald Rumsfeld to help deal with the crisis after the second crash at the World Trade Center occurred is particularly alarming considering that some of his colleagues apparently tried to get him involved with the military's response to the attacks at that time, but he rejected their advice. This indicates that he made a conscious decision to do nothing.
<br><br>For example, when she entered his office to give him his intelligence briefing, Denny Watson told Rumsfeld: "Sir, you just need to cancel this [briefing]. You've got more important things to do." But he replied: "No, no. We're going to do this."
<br><br>And when Victoria Clarke and Larry Di Rita came in and tried to get Rumsfeld to cancel his schedule, he refused to do so. They advised him to cancel his appointments for the rest of the day, presumably so he could focus on responding to the attacks. But, astonishingly, he told them: "No! If I cancel my day, the terrorists have won."
<br><br>Even when Clarke and Di Rita pulled out a copy of his agenda, took him through it point by point, and showed him why each appointment could be canceled, Rumsfeld remained unmoved. His only response was to turn to the television on his desk and look at the coverage of the attacks in New York. After Clarke and Di Rita left the office, he just returned to skimming through the President's Daily Brief. [83]
<br><br>Rumsfeld still failed to do anything meaningful when he returned to the building following his visit to the scene of the Pentagon attack. Although he talked on the phone with President Bush shortly after 10:00 a.m., the call apparently did little, if anything, to help deal with the attacks. According to a 9/11 Commission staff statement, "No one can recall any content [of the call] beyond a general request to alert forces." Rumsfeld and Bush "did not discuss the use of force against hijacked airliners," the statement added. [84] Rumsfeld's only recollection of the call in his memoir was of telling the president what he knew about the extent of the damage to the Pentagon. [85]
<br><br>Then, after entering the ESC at around 10:10 a.m. to 10:15 a.m., rather than inquiring about the attacks or immediately issuing some orders, Rumsfeld "pulled out a yellow legal pad, took his seat at the head of a conference table, and wrote down three categories by which his thinking would be organized the rest of the day," according to Victoria Clarke. He wrote down "what we needed to do immediately, what would have to be underway quickly, and what the military response would be." [86]
<br><br>Although the secretary of defense became more involved in the military's response to the attacks after he entered the NMCC, at around 10:30 a.m., his attempt at developing "rules of engagement" for the fighter pilots who were defending America's airspace was "an irrelevant exercise," according to Andrew Cockburn, since he did not complete and issue the rules until 1:00 p.m., "hours after the last hijacker had died." [87]
<br><br><b>RUMSFELD CONTRIBUTED TO 'THE DYSFUNCTIONAL REACTION TO THE ATTACKS'</b>
<br>Donald Rumsfeld has been criticized by a number of officials and journalists for his blatant failure to help the military respond to the terrorist attacks on September 11 until it was too late to make a difference. These criticisms highlight the contrast between what Rumsfeld, as secretary of defense, should have done and what he actually did.
<br><br>He "contributed materially to the whole dysfunctional reaction to the attacks," Cockburn said, explaining: "He was in the wrong place. ... He didn't do his duty and concerned himself with irrelevant matters." [88] He "essentially was a bystander that morning, with little or no input in the crisis," journalist James Ridgeway noted. [89]
<br><br>Robert Darling expressed his concerns about Rumsfeld's actions, asking: "Why did Secretary Rumsfeld abandon his post that day by not responding to the National Military Command Center the moment the attack on our country was realized? Why didn't he attempt to contact the president sooner? Why was the National Command Authority so ineffective?" [90]
<br><br><b>RUMSFELD'S DECISION TO GO TO THE CRASH SITE WAS 'UNBELIEVABLY SHOCKING'</b>
<br>Rumsfeld has faced particular criticism for his decision to visit the crash site immediately after the Pentagon was hit. "The country was under attack and yet the secretary of defense disappears for 20 minutes," Cockburn remarked. "He abandons his wider responsibilities to go look at the fire." [91]
<br><br>"In the time that Rumsfeld had taken to go outside, he was out of the national command loop, out of touch with other high-level government officials who were trying frantically to figure out the nation's response," veteran <i>Washington Post</i> reporter Bradley Graham noted. He consequently "played no part in the urgent initial efforts to determine whether any additional air threats remained or in the decision to authorize military pilots to shoot down any menacing aircraft that refused to divert," Graham added. [92]
<br><br>John Jester complained that since Rumsfeld was "in the National Command Authority," he "should not have gone to the scene" of the attack. "One of my officers tried to stop him and he just brushed him off," Jester said, adding, "I told his staff that he should not have done that." [93]
<br><br>Darling criticized Rumsfeld's decision to leave the building and go to the crash site, saying: "His absence was unbelievably shocking. He should have been at his post in the national command structure organizing the defense of the country and instead he was outside helping the wounded." [94]
<br><br>An unnamed senior White House official had particularly harsh words for Rumsfeld. He angrily commented: "What was Rumsfeld doing on 9/11? He deserted his post. He disappeared. The country was under attack. Where was the guy who controls America's defense? Out of touch!" The official said it was "outrageous" for Rumsfeld "to abandon [his] responsibilities and go off and do what you don't need to be doing, grandstanding." [95]
<br><br>Rumsfeld, however, claimed his decision to visit the crash site was of little consequence. When asked if he thought his absence from the NMCC during the first minutes after the attack on the Pentagon had a detrimental effect, he replied: "I don't think so--who knows? My deputy was here. The chain of command was complete." [96]
<br><br><b>DID RUMSFELD HAVE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF 9/11?</b>
<br>Donald Rumsfeld should surely have assumed, when he learned about the crashes at the World Trade Center on September 11, that his actions might make a difference to the outcome of the crisis and have got involved with the response to it as quickly as possible. Why, then, did he continue with a routine intelligence briefing and make a pointless visit to the scene of the Pentagon attack when his job was to protect his country? His actions effectively meant that for the entire time America was under attack, the nation was without a secretary of defense.
<br><br>Furthermore, why was Rumsfeld apparently unconcerned for his own safety at the time of the attacks? If 9/11 was unforeseen, as has been officially claimed, he should surely have thought the Pentagon was a potential target after he learned what had happened at the World Trade Center.
<br><br>Why, then, did he apparently place himself in danger by remaining in his office, on the outer ring of the building, at that time rather than going to somewhere less vulnerable? And why did he leave the relative safety of the building to visit the crash site after the Pentagon was hit, even though it was possible that the Pentagon would be attacked again?
<br><br>It seems difficult to attribute Rumsfeld's actions to incompetence. Rumsfeld had been secretary of defense for eight months under President Bush when 9/11 occurred and previously served as defense secretary for 14 months during the presidency of Gerald Ford in the 1970s. [97] He should surely therefore have acquired a good understanding of his responsibilities in this important post and known what his duties were on September 11.
<br><br>A possible, albeit sinister, explanation for Rumsfeld's actions while the 9/11 attacks were taking place is that Rumsfeld had foreknowledge of what was going to happen on September 11. If this was the case, he presumably would have known he could get away with taking no action in response to the attacks until it was too late to make a difference. And if he knew in advance what the targets of the attacks were going to be, he would have known he would be safe in his office while he received his intelligence briefing and at the scene of the attack after the Pentagon was hit.
<br><br><b>VISITING THE CRASH SITE WAS 'VERY ASTUTE, POLITICALLY'</b>
<br>If Rumsfeld knew in advance what would happen on September 11, this could mean his decision to hurry to the scene of the Pentagon attack, where he was caught on video helping to carry a stretcher, may not have been spontaneous but could instead have been made beforehand, as a cynical way to exploit the catastrophe to improve his public image.
<br><br>The decision to go to the crash site, while making it impossible for colleagues to communicate with him and apparently placing him in danger at the time, certainly benefited Rumsfeld later on. One Pentagon official said he thought the decision was "very astute, politically." Andrew Cockburn commented that Rumsfeld's "dash to the crash site could inspire loyalty and support" among the Pentagon workforce. [98]
<br><br>Some people regarded Rumsfeld's "instinctive response" to the Pentagon attack as "a gutsy move that showed a basic humanity," according to Bradley Graham. Rumsfeld's "involvement, however brief, in the rescue efforts was a selfless act that won him a measure of appreciation and respect," Graham wrote. [99]
<br><br>The defense secretary's actions, according to Cockburn, meant, "On a day when the president was intermittently visible, only Rumsfeld, along with New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani, gave the country an image of decisive, courageous leadership." The few minutes he spent at the crash site "made Rumsfeld famous, changed him from a half-forgotten 20th-century political figure to America's 21st-century warlord." [100]
<br><br>If Rumsfeld decided before September 11 that he would go to the scene of the attack immediately after the Pentagon was hit, this might explain why he was dressed ready to go to the crash site when the attack occurred. Normally, according to Cockburn, when he was in his office, Rumsfeld "would take off his suit jacket and put on a sort of like a vest, because he found it chilly in the office." And yet just 15 to 20 seconds after there was a loud "boom" when the Pentagon was hit, he was seen by Aubrey Davis walking out of his door, "looking composed and wearing the jacket he normally discarded while in his office." It appeared as if, in the space of under 20 seconds, Rumsfeld "had time to change his clothes, put on his going-outside jacket, [and] come out," Cockburn commented. [101]
<br><br>If Rumsfeld indeed knew in advance what was going to happen on September 11, the question arises of how this came about. Did he know someone who had learned about the 9/11 attacks before they occurred or was involved in planning them and this person told him what was going to happen? Might Rumsfeld himself have been involved with planning the attacks, which would be falsely blamed on Islamic terrorists?
<br><br>While these are serious and unsettling possibilities to suggest, they need to be investigated. As has been pointed out, Rumsfeld "deserted his post" while America was under attack. His decision to visit the crash site immediately after the Pentagon was hit instead of helping to defend his country was "unbelievably shocking." We therefore need to find out exactly why he neglected his duties at such a critical time, on what was surely the most important day of his professional life.
<br><br><b>NOTES</b>
<br>[1] <a href="http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/archive/hearing8/9-11Commission_Hearing_2004-03-23.htm" target="_blank">"National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: Eighth Public Hearing." 9/11 Commission, March 23, 2004</a>; <a href="http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=760" target="_blank">Donna Miles, "Vice Chairman: 9/11 Underscored Importance of DoD Transformation." American Forces Press Service, September 8, 2006</a>; Alfred Goldberg et al., <i>Pentagon 9/11</i>. Washington, DC: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2007, p. 130; Steve Vogel, <i>The Pentagon: A History</i>. New York: Random House, 2007, p. 428.
<br>[2] <a href="http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2603" target="_blank">"Secretary Rumsfeld Interview With Larry King, CNN." <i>Larry King Live</i>, CNN, December 5, 2001</a>; Torie Clarke, <i>Lipstick on a Pig: Winning in the No-Spin Era by Someone Who Knows the Game</i>. New York: Free Press, 2006, p. 218; <a href="http://library.rumsfeld.com/doclib/sp/4500/The%20Agony%20of%20Surprise.pdf" target="_blank">Donald Rumsfeld, <i>Known and Unknown: A Memoir</i>. New York: Sentinel, 2011, pp. 334-335</a>.
<br>[3] <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_Giambastiani%20Edmund7-18-2002.pdf" target="_blank">Edmund P. Giambastiani Jr., interview by Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron, part I. Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, July 18, 2002</a>; <a href="http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=760" target="_blank">Donna Miles, "Vice Chairman: 9/11 Underscored Importance of DoD Transformation"</a>; Donald Rumsfeld, <i>Known and Unknown</i>, pp. 334-335.
<br>[4] <a href="http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=3644" target="_blank">"Secretary Rumsfeld Interview With John McWethy, ABC." U.S. Department of Defense, August 12, 2002</a>; 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States</i>. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004, p. 37; Steve Vogel, <i>The Pentagon</i>, p. 428.
<br>[5] Donald Rumsfeld, <i>Known and Unknown</i>, p. 335.
<br>[6] Ibid.
<br>[7] <a href="http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=3644" target="_blank">"Secretary Rumsfeld Interview With John McWethy, ABC"</a>; David Priess, <i>The President's Book of Secrets: The Untold Story of Intelligence Briefings to America's Presidents From Kennedy to Obama</i>. New York: PublicAffairs, 2016, pp. 243-244.
<br>[8] David Priess, <i>The President's Book of Secrets</i>, p. 244.
<br>[9] <a href="http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=3644" target="_blank">"Secretary Rumsfeld Interview With John McWethy, ABC."</a>
<br>[10] <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_Giambastiani%20Edmund7-18-2002.pdf" target="_blank">Edmund P. Giambastiani Jr., interview by Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron, part I</a>.
<br>[11] <a href="http://www.cbsnews.com/news/ftn-821109-08-02-part-1/" target="_blank"><i>Face the Nation</i>. CBS, September 8, 2002</a>.
<br>[12] <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_Giambastiani%20Edmund7-18-2002.pdf" target="_blank">Edmund P. Giambastiani Jr., interview by Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron, part I</a>.
<br>[13] <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_ClarkeVictoria7-2-2002.pdf" target="_blank">Victoria Clarke, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron. Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, July 2, 2002</a>; <a href="http://www.timesonline.com/area-native-recalls-events-at-pentagon/article_7ae768f6-c523-58ac-9175-7001462c01c2.html" target="_blank">Bill Vidonic, "Area Native Recalls Events at Pentagon." <i>Beaver County Times</i>, September 9, 2002</a>; Torie Clarke, <i>Lipstick on a Pig</i>, pp. 216-218.
<br>[14] <a href="http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=1884" target="_blank">"Assistant Secretary Clarke Interview With WBZ Boston." WBZ, September 15, 2001</a>; <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_ClarkeVictoria7-2-2002.pdf" target="_blank">Victoria Clarke, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron</a>.
<br>[15] Torie Clarke, <i>Lipstick on a Pig</i>, p. 219.
<br>[16] David Priess, <i>The President's Book of Secrets</i>, p. 244.
<br>[17] <a href="http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=1884" target="_blank">"Assistant Secretary Clarke Interview With WBZ Boston"</a>; <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_ClarkeVictoria7-2-2002.pdf" target="_blank">Victoria Clarke, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron</a>; Torie Clarke, <i>Lipstick on a Pig</i>, p. 219.
<br>[18] David Priess, <i>The President's Book of Secrets</i>, p. 244.
<br>[19] <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/25/books/chapters/0325-1st-cockb.html" target="_blank">Andrew Cockburn, <i>Rumsfeld: His Rise, Fall, and Catastrophic Legacy</i>. New York: Scribner, 2007, pp. 1-2</a>; Donald Rumsfeld, <i>Known and Unknown</i>, pp. 335-336.
<br>[20] <a href="http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2603" target="_blank">"Secretary Rumsfeld Interview With Larry King, CNN."</a>
<br>[21] <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_WasselJoseph4-9-2003.pdf" target="_blank">Joseph M. Wassel, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron. Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, April 9, 2003</a>; <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_DavisAubrey%20Gilbert%20Oldach7-20-2006.pdf" target="_blank">Aubrey Davis and Gilbert Oldach, interview by Diane Putney. Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, July 20, 2006</a>.
<br>[22] <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_DavisAubrey%20Gilbert%20Oldach7-20-2006.pdf" target="_blank">Aubrey Davis and Gilbert Oldach, interview by Diane Putney</a>; Andrew Cockburn, <i>Rumsfeld</i>, pp. 1-2.
<br>[23] Alfred Goldberg et al., <i>Pentagon 9/11</i>, p. 130; <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/september-11-attacks/8753250/911-anniversary-Donald-Rumsfeld-on-how-he-survived-the-September-11-Pentagon-attack.html" target="_blank">Toby Harnden, "Donald Rumsfeld on How He Survived the September 11 Pentagon Attack." <i>Daily Telegraph</i>, September 9, 2011</a>.
<br>[24] <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_WasselJoseph4-9-2003.pdf" target="_blank">Joseph M. Wassel, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron</a>.
<br>[25] <a href="http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=3845" target="_blank">"Secretary Rumsfeld Interview With Parade Magazine." U.S. Department of Defense, October 12, 2001</a>.
<br>[26] <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_WasselJoseph4-9-2003.pdf" target="_blank">Joseph M. Wassel, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron</a>; <a href="http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/archive/hearing8/9-11Commission_Hearing_2004-03-23.htm" target="_blank">"National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: Eighth Public Hearing"</a>; 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 43; <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_DavisAubrey%20Gilbert%20Oldach7-20-2006.pdf" target="_blank">Aubrey Davis and Gilbert Oldach, interview by Diane Putney</a>.
<br>[27] <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_Giambastiani%20Edmund7-18-2002.pdf" target="_blank">Edmund P. Giambastiani Jr., interview by Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron, part II. Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, August 1, 2002</a>; Torie Clarke, <i>Lipstick on a Pig</i>, pp. 219-221; <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_Di%20Rita%20Lawrence%20William%20Haynes5-16-2006.pdf" target="_blank">William Haynes and Lawrence Di Rita, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Welch. Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 16, 2006</a>; Andrew Cockburn, <i>Rumsfeld</i>, pp. 5-6.
<br>[28] <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_Giambastiani%20Edmund7-18-2002.pdf" target="_blank">Edmund P. Giambastiani Jr., interview by Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron, part II</a>; 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 43.
<br>[29] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, pp. 43-44; Donald Rumsfeld, <i>Known and Unknown</i>, p. 337.
<br>[30] <a href="http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=3644" target="_blank">"Secretary Rumsfeld Interview With John McWethy, ABC."</a>
<br>[31] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, pp. 37-38.
<br>[32] Robert J. Darling, <i>24 Hours Inside the President's Bunker: 9/11/01 The White House</i>. Bloomington, IN: iUniverse, 2010, pp. 106-108.
<br>[33] <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_ClarkeVictoria7-2-2002.pdf" target="_blank">Victoria Clarke, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron</a>.
<br>[34] <a href="http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=3644" target="_blank">"Secretary Rumsfeld Interview With John McWethy, ABC."</a>
<br>[35] Andrew Cockburn, <i>Rumsfeld</i>, pp. 3-4.
<br>[36] <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_DavisAubrey%20Gilbert%20Oldach7-20-2006.pdf" target="_blank">Aubrey Davis and Gilbert Oldach, interview by Diane Putney</a>; Andrew Cockburn, <i>Rumsfeld</i>, p. 2; <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20071025053428/http:/www.q-and-a.org/Transcript/?ProgramID=1116" target="_blank">"Andrew Cockburn: Author, 'Rumsfeld: His Rise, Fall, and Catastrophic Legacy.'" <i>Q&A</i>, C-SPAN, February 25, 2007</a>.
<br>[37] <a href="https://www.democracynow.org/2007/3/7/journalist_and_author_andrew_cockburn_on" target="_blank">"Journalist and Author Andrew Cockburn on Donald Rumsfeld: His Rise, Fall, and Catastrophic Legacy." <i>Democracy Now!</i> March 7, 2007</a>.
<br>[38] <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_WasselJoseph4-9-2003.pdf" target="_blank">Joseph M. Wassel, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron</a>.
<br>[39] <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_DavisAubrey%20Gilbert%20Oldach7-20-2006.pdf" target="_blank">Aubrey Davis and Gilbert Oldach, interview by Diane Putney</a>.
<br>[40] <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_ClarkeVictoria7-2-2002.pdf" target="_blank">Victoria Clarke, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron</a>.
<br>[41] <a href="https://s3.amazonaws.com/911timeline/2002/abcnews091102.html" target="_blank">"9/11: Interviews by Peter Jennings." ABC News, September 11, 2002</a>.
<br>[42] <a href="https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2012-076-doc1.pdf" target="_blank">Air Threat Conference and DDO Conference, Transcript. U.S. Department of Defense, September 11, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.oredigger61.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Air-Threat-Conference-Call-Hyde.pdf" target="_blank">Air Threat Conference Call, Transcript. U.S. Department of Defense, September 11, 2001</a>; 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 38.
<br>[43] Andrew Cockburn, <i>Rumsfeld</i>, p. 5.
<br>[44] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 38.
<br>[45] <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_Di%20Rita%20Lawrence6-27-2002.pdf" target="_blank">Lawrence Di Rita, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Stuart Rochester. Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, June 27, 2002</a>; Steve Vogel, <i>The Pentagon</i>, p. 440.
<br>[46] Andrew Cockburn, <i>Rumsfeld</i>, p. 5.
<br>[47] Torie Clarke, <i>Lipstick on a Pig</i>, p. 219.
<br>[48] <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_WasselJoseph4-9-2003.pdf" target="_blank">Joseph M. Wassel, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron</a>.
<br>[49] Torie Clarke, <i>Lipstick on a Pig</i>, p. 219.
<br>[50] Donald Rumsfeld, <i>Known and Unknown</i>, p. 337.
<br>[51] Andrew Cockburn, <i>Rumsfeld</i>, p. 5.
<br>[52] Richard B. Myers and Malcolm McConnell, <i>Eyes on the Horizon: Serving on the Front Lines of National Security</i>. New York: Threshold Editions, 2009, p. 151.
<br>[53] <a href="http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0209/04/ltm.11.html" target="_blank">"'The Pentagon Goes to War': National Military Command Center." <i>American Morning</i>, CNN, September 4, 2002</a>.
<br>[54] Andrew Cockburn, <i>Rumsfeld</i>, p. 5.
<br>[55] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 37.
<br>[56] Alfred Goldberg et al., <i>Pentagon 9/11</i>, p. 132.
<br>[57] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 44.
<br>[58] Robert J. Darling, <i>24 Hours Inside the President's Bunker</i>, pp. 104, 108.
<br>[59] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 17; Andrew Cockburn, <i>Rumsfeld</i>, p. 4.
<br>[60] <a href="https://www.aclu.org/files/projects/foiasearch/pdf/DODDOA008159.pdf" target="_blank"><i>Multiservice Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance Operations</i>. Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1994</a>; Geoffrey S. Corn, Rachel E. VanLandingham, and Shane R. Reeves (Editors), <i>U.S. Military Operations: Law, Policy, and Practice</i>. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 8; <a href="https://www.defense.gov/About/DoD-101/" target="_blank">"DoD 101: Overview of the Department of Defense." U.S. Department of Defense, n.d.</a>
<br>[61] Robert J. Darling, <i>24 Hours Inside the President's Bunker</i>, p. 103.
<br>[62] Andrew Cockburn, <i>Rumsfeld</i>, p. 4.
<br>[63] Robert J. Darling, <i>24 Hours Inside the President's Bunker</i>, p. 103.
<br>[64] See <a href="https://web-beta.archive.org/web/20040713234143/http:/www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/cjcsd/cjcsi/3610_01.pdf" target="_blank">Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, <i>CJCSI 3610.01: Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking) and Destruction of Derelict Airborne Objects</i>. Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 31, 1997</a>.
<br>[65] <a href="https://web-beta.archive.org/web/20040618173857/http:/www.dtic.mil:80/doctrine/jel/cjcsd/cjcsi/3610_01a.pdf" target="_blank">Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, <i>CJCSI 3610.01A: Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking) and Destruction of Derelict Airborne Objects</i>. Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 1, 2001</a>.
<br>[66] <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20031121154045/http:/www.codeonemagazine.com/archives/2002/articles/jan_02/defense/" target="_blank">"Conversation With Major General Larry Arnold, Commander, 1st Air Force, Tyndall AFB, Florida." <i>Code One</i>, January 2002</a>.
<br>[67] See <a href="http://s3.amazonaws.com/911timeline/2001/msnbc091201.html" target="_blank">Bob Arnot, "What Was Needed to Halt the Attacks?" MSNBC, September 12, 2001</a>; <a href="http://patriotsquestion911.com/Statement%20Hordon.html" target="_blank">"Statement of Robin Hordon, Former FAA Air Traffic Controller." Patriots Question 9/11, April 10, 2007</a>.
<br>[68] <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_Giambastiani%20Edmund7-18-2002.pdf" target="_blank">Edmund P. Giambastiani Jr., interview by Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron, part I</a>; <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_Haynes%20William4-8-2003.pdf" target="_blank">William J. Haynes II, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron, part I. Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, April 8, 2003</a>; <a href="http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=760" target="_blank">Donna Miles, "Vice Chairman: 9/11 Underscored Importance of DoD Transformation."</a>
<br>[69] <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_Cambone%20Stephen7-8-2002.pdf" target="_blank">Stephen Cambone, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron. Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, July 8, 2002</a>; <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_Giambastiani%20Edmund7-18-2002.pdf" target="_blank">Edmund P. Giambastiani Jr., interview by Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron, part I</a>; <a href="http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=760" target="_blank">Donna Miles, "Vice Chairman: 9/11 Underscored Importance of DoD Transformation."</a>
<br>[70] <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_DavisAubrey%20Gilbert%20Oldach7-20-2006.pdf" target="_blank">Aubrey Davis and Gilbert Oldach, interview by Diane Putney</a>.
<br>[71] Andrew Cockburn, <i>Rumsfeld</i>, p. 1; <a href="https://www.democracynow.org/2007/3/7/journalist_and_author_andrew_cockburn_on " target="_blank">"Journalist and Author Andrew Cockburn on Donald Rumsfeld: His Rise, Fall, and Catastrophic Legacy."</a>
<br>[72] <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_DavisAubrey%20Gilbert%20Oldach7-20-2006.pdf" target="_blank">Aubrey Davis and Gilbert Oldach, interview by Diane Putney</a>.
<br>[73] David Priess, <i>The President's Book of Secrets</i>, p. 245.
<br>[74] <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_Haynes%20William4-8-2003.pdf" target="_blank">William J. Haynes II, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron, part I</a>.
<br>[75] <a href="http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/Acquisition_Budget_and_Financial_Matters/Renovation_1March1997.pdf" target="_blank"><i>A Status Report to Congress: The Renovation of the Pentagon</i>. Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, March 1, 1997, p. 23</a>; <a href="http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0209/04/ltm.11.html" target="_blank">"'The Pentagon Goes to War': National Military Command Center."</a>
<br>[76] <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_DavisAubrey%20Gilbert%20Oldach7-20-2006.pdf" target="_blank">Aubrey Davis and Gilbert Oldach, interview by Diane Putney</a>.
<br>[77] <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20050511112300/http:/news1.iwon.com/top/article/id/163751%7Ctop%7C09-11-2001::15:54%7Creuters.html" target="_blank">Charles Aldinger, "Aircraft Crashes Into Pentagon, Triggering Chaos." Reuters, September 11, 2001</a>.
<br>[78] Andrew Cockburn, <i>Rumsfeld</i>, p. 3.
<br>[79] <a href="https://www.democracynow.org/2007/3/7/journalist_and_author_andrew_cockburn_on" target="_blank">"Journalist and Author Andrew Cockburn on Donald Rumsfeld: His Rise, Fall, and Catastrophic Legacy."</a>
<br>[80] Steve Vogel, <i>The Pentagon</i>, p. 439.
<br>[81] <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_Cambone%20Stephen7-8-2002.pdf" target="_blank">Stephen Cambone, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron</a>.
<br>[82] <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_WasselJoseph4-9-2003.pdf" target="_blank">Joseph M. Wassel, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron</a>.
<br>[83] David Priess, <i>The President's Book of Secrets</i>, p. 244.
<br>[84] <a href="http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff_statements/staff_statement_17.pdf" target="_blank">"Staff Statement No. 17: Improvising a Homeland Defense." 9/11 Commission, June 17, 2004</a>.
<br>[85] Donald Rumsfeld, <i>Known and Unknown</i>, p. 337.
<br>[86] Torie Clarke, <i>Lipstick on a Pig</i>, p. 222.
<br>[87] Andrew Cockburn, <i>Rumsfeld</i>, p. 7.
<br>[88] <a href="https://www.democracynow.org/2007/3/7/journalist_and_author_andrew_cockburn_on" target="_blank">"Journalist and Author Andrew Cockburn on Donald Rumsfeld: His Rise, Fall, and Catastrophic Legacy."</a>
<br>[89] <a href="http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2011/02/911-rumsfeld-fiddled-while-cheney-ran-country" target="_blank">James Ridgeway, "On 9/11, Rumsfeld Fiddled While Cheney Ran the Country." <i>Mother Jones</i>, February 9, 2011</a>.
<br>[90] Robert J. Darling, <i>24 Hours Inside the President's Bunker</i>, p. 109.
<br>[91] <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20071025053428/http:/www.q-and-a.org/Transcript/?ProgramID=1116" target="_blank">"Andrew Cockburn: Author, 'Rumsfeld: His Rise, Fall, and Catastrophic Legacy.'"</a>
<br>[92] Bradley Graham, <i>By His Own Rules: The Ambitions, Successes, and Ultimate Failures of Donald Rumsfeld</i>. New York: PublicAffairs, 2009, pp. 282-283.
<br>[93] <a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_JesterJohn%2010-19-2001.pdf" target="_blank">John Jester, interview by Alfred Goldberg, Diane Putney, and Stuart Rochester. Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, October 19, 2001</a>.
<br>[94] <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/september-11-attacks/8754394/911-How-the-drama-unfolded-in-the-skies-and-underground.html" target="_blank">Philip Sherwell, "How the Drama Unfolded Aboard Air Force One, Inside the White House Bunker and at the Pentagon." <i>Daily Telegraph</i>, September 10, 2011</a>.
<br>[95] Andrew Cockburn, <i>Rumsfeld</i>, pp. 3-4.
<br>[96] Steve Vogel, <i>The Pentagon</i>, p. 441.
<br>[97] <a href="http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/politics-july-dec00-rumsfeld_12-28/" target="_blank">"Secretary of Defense-Designate Donald Rumsfeld." PBS, December 28, 2000</a>; <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2010/Sep/29/2001329781/-1/-1/0/AFD-100929-011.pdf" target="_blank">George M. Watson Jr., <i>Secretaries and Chiefs of Staff of the United States Air Force: Biographical Sketches and Portraits</i>. Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, U.S. Air Force, 2001, p. 202</a>; <a href="http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/pentagon/etc/cronfeld.html" target="_blank">"Timeline: The Life & Times of Donald Rumsfeld." PBS, October 26, 2004</a>.
<br>[98] Andrew Cockburn, <i>Rumsfeld</i>, p. 3.
<br>[99] Bradley Graham, <i>By His Own Rules</i>, p. 283.
<br>[100] Andrew Cockburn, <i>Rumsfeld</i>, p. 3.
<br>[101] Ibid. p. 1; <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20071025053428/http:/www.q-and-a.org/Transcript/?ProgramID=1116" target="_blank">"Andrew Cockburn: Author, 'Rumsfeld: His Rise, Fall, and Catastrophic Legacy.'"</a>Shoestringhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01534319150672667644noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2990970741097819876.post-22267576295874128512017-03-04T01:28:00.000-08:002017-03-04T01:28:17.117-08:00Why Did the Secret Service Leave the President and a School Full of Children in Danger in the Middle of the 9/11 Attacks?<br><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiMQjZeAyPZ2bJQz1BRovrFOohVPW7gieElcE7BokRfDbC5PyXlTQNZsjlgNV6tTL33kyjY43LHW8JouydCCKFwIkQ9VPK133nmXaLkLqGC4-Dx6UoD9iNhyphenhyphene-SYcgpg7K7qIvndiw7dP9H/s1600/BushBooker.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;" target="_blank"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiMQjZeAyPZ2bJQz1BRovrFOohVPW7gieElcE7BokRfDbC5PyXlTQNZsjlgNV6tTL33kyjY43LHW8JouydCCKFwIkQ9VPK133nmXaLkLqGC4-Dx6UoD9iNhyphenhyphene-SYcgpg7K7qIvndiw7dP9H/s1600/BushBooker.jpg" alt="President Bush at the Booker Elementary School"></a></div><br>President George W. Bush was allowed to continue with a routine visit to a school when the terrorist attacks occurred on September 11, 2001. Remarkably, members of the Secret Service and other personnel responsible for protecting the president failed to evacuate him from the Emma E. Booker Elementary School in Sarasota, Florida, after they learned that a second plane had crashed into the World Trade Center and it became clear that America was under attack.
<br><br>As the nation's leader, Bush should have been considered a likely target for terrorists. Furthermore, his schedule had been publicized in advance and so terrorists could have found out where he would be on September 11.
<br><br>And yet, after arriving there shortly before 9:00 a.m. on September 11, Bush was allowed to stay at the Booker Elementary School until around 9:35 a.m.--almost 50 minutes after the first hijacked plane crashed into the World Trade Center and over 30 minutes after the second hijacked plane hit the Trade Center. He left the school just two or three minutes before a third attack occurred, when the Pentagon was struck.
<br><br>The Secret Service's failure to promptly evacuate Bush from the school is particularly baffling in light of the accounts of some key officials who were with the president that morning, in which these men recalled being worried that the school would be attacked. There were even concerns that terrorists might crash a plane into it. The failure to evacuate the school is also alarming in that it left hundreds of people there--not just the president--potentially in danger.
<br><br>It would be wrong to attribute the inaction of the Secret Service to incompetence. Agents who were in Sarasota for Bush's visit to the city were highly skilled individuals. They arranged extensive security measures for the visit, and they acted with great urgency and professionalism as they protected Bush after he left the school. They appear to have only failed to adequately protect the president for a period of about 40 minutes in the middle of the 9/11 attacks, after he arrived at the school.
<br><br>We need to consider, therefore, whether the inaction of the Secret Service at this critical time is evidence of something sinister. Could efforts have been made to somehow put the agents in Sarasota into a state of paralysis? They might, for example, have been tricked into thinking the reports they received about the terrorist attacks in New York were simulated, as part of a training exercise.
<br><br>The inaction of the Secret Service could in fact be evidence that, in contradiction to the official narrative of 9/11, rogue individuals in the U.S. government were involved in planning and perpetrating the terrorist attacks on September 11.
<br><br><b>NO ONE CALLED THE PRESIDENT ABOUT THE FIRST CRASH DURING THE DRIVE TO THE SCHOOL</b>
<br>On the morning of September 11, 2001, President Bush was scheduled to visit the Emma E. Booker Elementary School in Sarasota, Florida, where he planned to take part in a reading demonstration, and then talk to parents and teachers about his education policies. [1]
<br><br>His motorcade left the Colony Beach and Tennis Resort on Longboat Key, where he'd spent the previous night, at around 8:39 a.m. on September 11 and headed to the school. At 8:46 a.m., American Airlines Flight 11 crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center. [2] Numerous people in the motorcade, including White House officials, military officers, and journalists, learned about the crash as they were being driven to the school. [3] But no one called the president to tell him what had happened.
<br><br>Bush was first informed about the crash at around 8:55 a.m., when he arrived at the school. Navy Captain Deborah Loewer, director of the White House Situation Room, ran up to him and said, "Mr. President, the Situation Room is reporting that one of the World Trade Center towers has been hit by a plane." "This is all we know," she added. [4]
<br><br>Bush was told about the crash again by Karl Rove, his senior adviser, as he was shaking hands with members of the official greeting party outside the school. [5] He has recalled thinking at the time that the incident must have been "a terrible accident." [6]
<br><br>He then talked on the phone with National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, who was at the White House. She told him the plane that struck the World Trade Center was a commercial jetliner, not a light aircraft. But Bush still thought the crash was an accident and went ahead with the scheduled event. [7] At 9:02 a.m., he entered the second-grade classroom of teacher Sandra Kay Daniels to listen to the students reading. [8]
<br><br><b>BUSH CONTINUED WITH THE READING EVENT AFTER BEING TOLD, 'AMERICA IS UNDER ATTACK'</b>
<br>A minute later, United Airlines Flight 175 crashed into the South Tower of the World Trade Center. Bush was alerted to what had happened at around 9:05 a.m. to 9:07 a.m., when Andrew Card, his chief of staff, approached him and whispered in his ear: "A second plane hit the second tower. America is under attack." [9]
<br><br>Despite receiving this devastating news, Bush carried on as if nothing was wrong. "In the middle of a modern-day Pearl Harbor," author James Bamford commented, "he simply turned back to the matter at hand: the day's photo op." [10] Significantly, author Philip Melanson pointed out, "no [Secret Service] agents were there to surround the president and remove him instantly." [11]
<br><br>Bush listened to the children reading for five minutes, and then spent at least two minutes asking them questions and telling the school's principal about the second crash. [12] He left the classroom shortly before 9:15 a.m. [13] He was still sticking closely to his schedule, which specified that he would conclude his participation in the reading demonstration at 9:15 a.m. [14]
<br><br><b>BUSH GAVE A SPEECH THAT WAS SHOWN LIVE ON TV</b>
<br>Even then, with the demonstration over, no effort was made to get the president away from the school. Instead, Bush spent the next 15 minutes in the "staff hold," a room adjacent to Daniels' classroom, where he talked on the phone with officials in Washington, DC, and worked on a statement he wanted to give before leaving the school. [15]
<br><br>He entered the school library to deliver the statement at 9:30 a.m. This was the same time as he was originally set to address parents and teachers at the school. So, 44 minutes after the first attack on the World Trade Center and 27 minutes after the second, it was still apparently considered unnecessary to alter the president's schedule. The only change was that instead of discussing his education policies, Bush talked about the attacks in New York and announced that he would be heading back to Washington. [16]
<br><br>The short speech was broadcast live on television and watched by millions of Americans. [17] If any terrorists had been unaware of the president's location before then, if they were watching TV, they knew now.
<br><br>Bush only started to deviate from his schedule after he finished the speech. He was originally set to head out of the school at 9:55 a.m., with his limousine leaving there 10 minutes later and heading to the Sarasota-Bradenton International Airport. [18] But due to the extraordinary circumstances, his motorcade left the school and speeded toward the airport at around 9:35 a.m.
<br><br>During the journey to the airport, Bush talked on the phone with Condoleezza Rice and she told him the Pentagon had been attacked. [19] (The attack on the Pentagon took place at 9:37 a.m.) The motorcade reached the airport sometime between 9:42 a.m. and 9:45 a.m. Air Force One, the president's plane, took off without a fixed destination at around 9:55 a.m. [20]
<br><br><b>BUSH'S LOCATION WAS PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE</b>
<br>The fact that the president was allowed to stick to his schedule and stay at the Booker Elementary School for 40 minutes while America was under attack is particularly alarming since Bush's plans for September 11 were publicly announced four days in advance and had then been reported in the media. If terrorists had wanted to kill the president as part of the 9/11 attacks, therefore, they could have found out where he would be on September 11 and tried to attack him while he was there.
<br><br>On September 7, 2001, White House press secretary Ari Fleischer revealed in a press briefing that on the morning of September 11, Bush was going to be in Sarasota, where he would "continue his focus on reading and education." A transcript of the briefing would presumably have been published promptly on the White House website. [21] The president's plan to visit Sarasota was reported that day in newspapers such as the <i>Washington Post</i> and the <i>Florida Times-Union</i>. [22]
<br><br>The most informative reports, unsurprisingly, appeared in a newspaper for Sarasota, where the planned visit was "big news," according to journalist and author Mark Bowden. [23] The <i>Sarasota Herald-Tribune</i> reported on September 7 that Bush would "probably speak at a local school" when he visited Sarasota on September 11. [24] The following day, the newspaper revealed where the president would go during his visit. He planned to deliver "an education speech Tuesday morning at Emma E. Booker Elementary School," it reported. [25]
<br><br>Some people who were at the Booker Elementary School on September 11 recognized the danger that existed because Bush's plans for the day had been publicized in advance. "The fact that the president would be at Booker Elementary at this hour, on this day, had been public knowledge for days," Mike Morell, Bush's CIA briefer, wrote. [26] Therefore, he commented, "anyone could have known about it." [27]
<br><br>Karl Rove similarly stated: "The president's whereabouts were obviously known. Everybody knew exactly where he was, if you wanted to know." [28] Colonel Steve Burns of the Sarasota County Sheriff's Office remarked, "The [president's] itinerary was known at least for several days prior to his visit to Sarasota, so it was a real concern that maybe there was additional targets, even being the school or something." [29]
<br><br><b>MEMBERS OF BUSH'S ENTOURAGE WERE WORRIED THAT THE SCHOOL MIGHT BE ATTACKED</b>
<br>The failure of the Secret Service to promptly evacuate Bush from the Booker Elementary School in response to the attacks on the World Trade Center is also baffling considering that some members of his entourage believed at the time that the school might be attacked because of his presence there.
<br><br>Members of Bush's Secret Service detail were worried that the president could be a target, according to Dave Wilkinson, assistant special agent in charge of the presidential protection division. They were asking each other, "Is there any direction of interest towards the president ... or is this just an attack on New York?" he recalled. [30]
<br><br>Rove confirmed that the Secret Service thought the president could be a target while he was at the school. Bush's agents determined that the attacks "might be an effort to decapitate the government," he said. [31] This meant the terrorists wanted to "take all the leading officials and kill them." [32]
<br><br>Mike Morell recalled "growing increasingly concerned about [the president's] safety" while Bush was in the staff hold, after the reading demonstration ended. [33] Among the president's staff there was a "fear of the unknown," according to Brian Montgomery, the White House's director of advance. "We didn't know if someone had put a biological agent or chemical agent at the school," he said. [34]
<br><br>Some people were worried that terrorists would fly an aircraft into the school. Bush's Secret Service agents were concerned "that someone might fly an airplane into the Emma Booker Elementary School or there might be a ... suicide bomber nearby," Rove said. [35] Morell recalled that he was "really worried that someone was going to fly a plane into that school." [36] He contemplated telling Edward Marinzel, the head of Bush's Secret Service detail, about his concern, but decided not to after determining that Marinzel had probably already considered this scenario. [37]
<br><br>Even some teachers, students, and parents recognized the potential danger to the school. There was "a fear by many parents that Booker Elementary was now a target by terrorists because of the president's visit," Clesha Henry, a fifth-grade teacher at the school, recalled. [38] Derek Jenkins, another teacher, stated that after Bush left the school, "One of my thoughts shifted to the fact that Emma E. Booker is located only a few miles from the Sarasota-Bradenton International Airport and we could have very easily been a target as well." [39] Henry recalled a boy in her class saying: "I'm scared, Ms. Henry. Are we going to die?" [40]
<br><br><b>SOME OFFICIALS WANTED TO EVACUATE BUSH AFTER THE SECOND ATTACK OCCURRED</b>
<br>Not only were some members of Bush's entourage concerned that the Booker Elementary School might be attacked, at least two key officials--Major Paul Montanus and Edward Marinzel--wanted the president to be evacuated from the place immediately after they learned of the second crash in New York.
<br><br>Montanus, the military aide who accompanied Bush to the school, apparently called for an evacuation after seeing Flight 175 crashing into the World Trade Center on television, at 9:03 a.m. Just after 9:00 a.m., according to the <i>Sarasota Herald-Tribune</i>, Sarasota County Sheriff Bill Balkwill was approached at the school by "a Marine responsible for carrying Bush's phone." This person was presumably Montanus, a Marine Corps officer. Montanus had heard that a plane had crashed into the World Trade Center, but little else about the incident in New York. He asked Balkwill, "Can you get me to a television?"
<br><br>The two men, along with a SWAT team member and three Secret Service agents, went to an office at the school where there was a TV. There, they saw the coverage of Flight 175 hitting the South Tower. Presumably realizing that America was under attack, Montanus exclaimed, "We're out of here!" and asked, "Can you get everyone ready?" according to the <i>Sarasota Herald-Tribune</i>. According to his own recollection, he said: "What in God's name? We gotta get out of here!" [41]
<br><br>Montanus's words should presumably have led to the president and his entourage being evacuated from the school immediately. "While the Secret Service is charged with protecting the president's actual body," <i>Marist</i> magazine explained, "it is the president's military aide ... who directs any evacuation" and the White House Military Office, which oversees the president's military aides, "that executes [the president's] safe passage." [42] And yet no evacuation took place at this time.
<br><br>Marinzel appears to have been equally determined to get Bush away from the school after he learned about the second attack on the World Trade Center. After he was told about the second crash, he recalled: "Right then and there, things completely changed. We needed to figure out what we were going to do with the president." [43] Marinzel "wanted to get the hell out of [the school] as fast as possible," Mike Morell said. [44] He "was eager to get the president out of the school, to Air Force One, and airborne," Karl Rove described, and "immediately began making arrangements to beef up the motorcade and get it ready to move." [45]
<br><br>Even Bush appears to have realized that he needed to be evacuated from the school promptly. Describing the situation while he was in the staff hold after the reading demonstration ended, he commented, "One thing for certain: I needed to get out of where I was." [46] And yet, according to the <i>9/11 Commission Report</i>, while the Secret Service was "anxious to move the president to a safer location" at this time, it "did not think it imperative for him to run out the door." [47]
<br><br><b>SOME PEOPLE DELAYED BUSH'S DEPARTURE FROM THE SCHOOL</b>
<br>Why Bush was allowed to stay at the school after the second crash at the World Trade Center occurred, especially in light of the desire of Montanus and Marinzel to get him away from there, is unknown. A few accounts, though, describe people delaying his departure.
<br><br>Andrew Card apparently persuaded Secret Service agents to put off getting Bush away from the school until after the president had given his 9:30 a.m. speech from the library, according to Dave Wilkinson. After Marinzel told Bush, "We need to get you to Air Force One and get you airborne," Wilkinson recalled, the president's Secret Service agents "ended up with a compromise." This was because Card had said, "We have a whole auditorium full, waiting for the next event [i.e. Bush's speech]" and "there was no imminent threat there in Sarasota." It was therefore agreed that Bush could give his speech before leaving the school. [48]
<br><br>The president's departure from the school was delayed by Bush himself, according to Frank Brogan, lieutenant governor of Florida. Brogan recalled that when he was with Bush in the staff hold, after the reading demonstration, "The Secret Service tried to get the president to return to Air Force One immediately, but he refused, saying he was committed to staying on the ground long enough to write a statement about what was happening, read it to the nation, and lead a moment of silence for the victims." [49] Bush "was courageously insistent about remaining on the ground to make a statement to the people of America," Brogan commented. [50]
<br><br>Mark Rosenker, director of the White House Military Office, who was with the president at the school, indicated that Bush may have been allowed to stay at the school for such a long time because some people actually thought he was safe there. When asked in an interview, "In those early moments, there isn't a sense that the president could be in danger, is there?" he replied, "Not initially, the way we perceived it." The White House Military Office is "very conservative with the Secret Service," he added. [51]
<br><br><b>THE SECRET SERVICE'S MISSION WAS TO KEEP THE PRESIDENT SAFE</b>
<br>The Secret Service is responsible for the protection of the president. [52] Various accounts have indicated that this agency, more than any other, should have ensured that Bush was promptly evacuated from the Booker Elementary School when it became clear that the U.S. was under terrorist attack on September 11.
<br><br>The Secret Service is "responsible for protection of high-visibility officials and facilities that terrorists might target," a report by the Office of Management and Budget pointed out. [53] And in a "state of emergency"--like when America came under attack on September 11--its plan is "to get every protectee to a secure site," according to a National Geographic Channel documentary about the agency. [54]
<br><br>The agency should decide what actions to take to protect the president, regardless of the president's demands, according to Dave Wilkinson. "By federal law, the Secret Service has to protect the president," he said. "The wishes of that person that day are secondary to what the law expects of us. Theoretically it's not his call, it's our call." [55]
<br><br>The Secret Service should have evacuated Bush from the school immediately after the second attack took place, according to Philip Melanson, an expert on the agency. "With an unfolding terrorist attack, the procedure should have been to get the president to the closest secure location as quickly as possible, which clearly is not a school," Melanson stated. Bush would have been "safer in that presidential limo, which is bombproof and blastproof and bulletproof," he added. [56]
<br><br>Melanson contrasted the inaction of Bush's agents at the school to the procedure that would normally have been followed if the president was considered to be in danger. "When there is a threat or intrusion at the White House," he wrote, "agents rush into the Oval Office, the family quarters, or wherever the president is, and immediately surround him and shut down the comings or goings of anyone--thus 'crashing' the Oval Office or the entire West Wing." [57]
<br><br><b>GREAT CARE WAS TAKEN WITH THE PREPARATIONS FOR BUSH'S TRIP</b>
<br>The inaction of the Secret Service while Bush was at the Booker Elementary School in the middle of the 9/11 attacks stands out when we contrast it to the care with which the agency prepared for the president's visit to the school.
<br><br>Major Robert Darling, the White House airlift operations liaison officer who organized Bush's trip to Sarasota, described the preparations he initiated for the trip. He arranged to have "five hardened Secret Service cars, numerous pallets of communication gear, and more than 200 support personnel" flown to Sarasota "a full four days prior to the president's scheduled arrival."
<br><br>Secret Service agents and White House Military Office personnel consequently had "plenty of time to rehearse every aspect of the event, to include traveling the primary and alternate motorcade routes, practice landing in and taking off from the predetermined helicopter landing zones, as well as knowing the locations of all the local hospitals and their level of trauma capability so that when the president arrived on Air Force One, everyone was fully trained and prepared to safely transport and protect him as he executed his political agenda." [58]
<br><br>The Secret Service clearly prepared well for Bush's visit to the Booker Elementary School. Agents "took over" the school's campus five days before September 11, according to the <i>Sarasota Herald-Tribune</i>. [59] There were "men in dark suits scurrying around and through our campus, commandeering rooms, erecting funny antennas, conducting briefs and meetings, and tapping our phones," teacher Derek Jenkins described. [60]
<br><br>Care was even taken when deciding which room Bush would go to when he visited the school. The classroom of Sandra Kay Daniels was selected as the location for the reading demonstration because it was "situated next to the school's north door, making it easier to organize elaborate security," according to the <i>Tampa Tribune</i>. [61]
<br><br><b>BUSH WAS WELL PROTECTED THE NIGHT BEFORE 9/11</b>
<br>Bush was certainly well protected the night before September 11, while he stayed at the Colony Beach and Tennis Resort. Journalist and author Bill Sammon described: "Snipers kept watch over the president from the roofs of the Colony and adjacent structures. The Coast Guard and the Longboat Key Police Department manned boats that patrolled the surf in front of the resort all night. Security trucks with enough men and arms to stop a small army parked right on the beach. An Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) plane circled high overhead in the clear night sky." [62]
<br><br>The high level of care that usually went into protecting the president was evident at the Booker Elementary School when Bush arrived there on the morning of September 11. "School buses were lined up in front of the school to form a barricade," the <i>Sarasota Herald-Tribune</i> described. "Agents on horseback patrolled the campus. ... Snipers were on the roof. All the phone lines were tapped and one was linked directly to the White House." [63]
<br><br>The Secret Service, though, acted as if it was in a state of paralysis after the president arrived at the school. It allowed him to stay there for 40 minutes and stick to his schedule as if nothing unusual had happened in the middle of a major terrorist attack.
<br><br>But then, at around 9:35 a.m., the behavior of the president's protective detail suddenly changed and Bush's agents finally acted with the kind of urgency we would reasonably expect under the circumstances. Their skill and professionalism were evident as Bush was taken from the school to the Sarasota-Bradenton International Airport, and onto Air Force One.
<br><br><b>THE SECRET SERVICE ACTED WITH URGENCY AFTER BUSH LEFT THE SCHOOL</b>
<br>A Secret Service agent "ran out from the school and said, 'We're under terrorist attack, we have to go now,'" Officer Kevin Dowd of the Sarasota Police Department recalled. Bush's motorcade then traveled to the airport at about twice its normal speed. Whereas the vehicles were usually driven at around 40 to 45 miles per hour, they now moved at 80 to 85 miles per hour. Furthermore, during the journey, "the Secret Service agents all had weapon barrels that were visible and they were pointing up at the ready position in case they needed to be used," according to Dowd. [64]
<br><br>Bush's limousine was surrounded by police cars, positioned about a foot away from it on all four sides. [65] This was because Edward Marinzel had arranged for the Sarasota Police Department to mobilize every available patrol car. [66] The Secret Service was concerned that a suicide bomber might try to ram the limousine with a truck bomb or a car bomb, Marinzel later explained, and so it had the vehicle surrounded in the hope that the patrol cars would block any attack. [67]
<br><br>The Secret Service also "asked for double-motorcade blocks at the intersection, double and triple blocks," Dave Wilkinson recalled. This meant "not just motorcycle officers standing there with their arms up, but vehicles actually blocking the road." And for the entire journey to the airport, Wilkinson said, the Secret Service was "using the limos as a shell game, to keep the president safe." [68]
<br><br><b>PASSENGERS WERE CAREFULLY CHECKED BEFORE GETTING ON THE PRESIDENT'S PLANE</b>
<br>After the motorcade arrived at the airport, journalists, White House staffers, and others were subjected to unusually rigorous security checks before being allowed onto Air Force One. Getting on the plane was "different than it ever had been," White House education adviser Sandy Kress commented. Much attention was paid to the credentials of those boarding the aircraft. "We had to show ID and our badge, not just the badge," Kress said. "And this even though the crew knew most of us." [69]
<br><br>Secret Service agents and bomb-sniffing dogs checked every bag that was going onto the plane. [70] "Although everyone in the presidential motorcade had already been swept back at the school, the Secret Service was taking no chances," Bill Sammon described. "Even staffers who wore special lapel pins denoting their status as White House employees had their belongings checked by bomb-sniffing dogs," he wrote. [71] Agents even searched briefcases belonging to senior officials such as Andrew Card and Mike Morell. [72]
<br><br>Agents also shoved people onto Air Force One as quickly as possible. [73] They yelled, "Move it, move it, move it!" as people made their way onto the aircraft. [74] A military aide standing at the foot of the rear entrance to the plane snapped, "We gotta hurry up and get out of here!" [75]
<br><br>Air Force One took off at around 9:55 a.m., just 10 minutes after the motorcade reached the airport. [76] It took off unusually quickly. "I start hauling down the runway," Colonel Mark Tillman, the pilot, described. "Pull back, went up at about 8,000 feet per minute, and just put the plane on its tail, rolled it off towards the Gulf of Mexico," he said. [77]
<br><br>The plane took off "like a rocket," according to White House assistant press secretary Gordon Johndroe. [78] It "shot down the runway with a force I had never experienced," Karl Rove described. [79] "The objective," according to the <i>9/11 Commission Report</i>, "was to get up in the air--as fast and as high as possible--and then decide where to go." [80]
<br><br>The fact that the Secret Service was able to act with such care and skill in its preparations for Bush's visit to the Booker Elementary School, and in its efforts to protect the president after he left the school, rules out the possibility that its inaction while Bush was at the school was due to incompetence. Agents with the president for his visit to Sarasota were clearly highly capable professionals.
<br><br><b>AGENTS WERE NOT IMMEDIATELY ALERTED TO THE CRASHES AT THE WORLD TRADE CENTER</b>
<br>Another thing to consider when examining the Secret Service's inadequate protection of the president on September 11 is the apparent failure of agents in Washington to alert their colleagues in Sarasota to the attacks on the World Trade Center.
<br><br>Edward Marinzel, as head of Bush's Secret Service detail, should surely have been notified about the attacks as a matter of priority, so he could initiate actions to protect the president in response to them. And yet Secret Service agents in Washington apparently failed to contact him about both crashes at the World Trade Center.
<br><br>Marinzel heard about the first crash when Karl Rove told Bush about it after the president's motorcade arrived at the Booker Elementary School, at around 8:55 a.m. "As we were walking in, Karl Rove actually mentioned to the president that a plane had hit one of the Twin Towers," he recalled. [81]
<br><br>If this was the first time Marinzel heard about the crash, it means he only learned about the incident inadvertently, rather than being contacted about it by a colleague. And it means he learned about the crash at least nine minutes after it occurred and at least six minutes after it was first reported on television.
<br><br>Certainly, evidence suggests that no one contacted him about the crash while he was being driven to the school. It appears that Marinzel would have been with the president in his limousine for the journey to the school, although this has not been stated explicitly: Rove recalled that Marinzel rode in Bush's limousine when it left the school, at 9:35 a.m., so presumably Marinzel accompanied Bush in his limousine as a matter of course during the visit to Florida. [82]
<br><br>If Marinzel was alerted to the crash during the journey to the school, he therefore would surely have passed on the news to the president. But Bush was reportedly unaware of the crash when he arrived at the school, with the notification he received from Deborah Loewer being the first time he heard what had happened. It seems reasonable to assume, then, that no one contacted Marinzel and told him about the crash during the drive to the school.
<br><br><b>LEAD AGENT LEARNED OF THE SECOND CRASH FROM BUSH'S CHIEF OF STAFF</b>
<br>Subsequently, instead of being immediately alerted to the second attack, Marinzel only learned about Flight 175 hitting the World Trade Center minutes after the crash occurred. And rather than being informed about the attack by his colleagues in Washington, as presumably should have happened, he learned about it from Andrew Card.
<br><br>After Card walked across Sandra Kay Daniels' classroom and told Bush a second plane had hit the World Trade Center, Marinzel recalled, he "came over and whispered the same thing into my ear, and that was that we were under an attack." [83] Since Card told Bush about the second crash at around 9:05 a.m. to 9:07 a.m., Marinzel must have only heard about it several minutes after it happened.
<br><br>Secret Service agents in Washington apparently also failed to promptly inform other agents in Sarasota, besides Marinzel, about the attacks. Kevin Kenney of the Sarasota County Sheriff's Office recalled that after he saw the "breaking news coverage" of the first crash at the World Trade Center on television, he "immediately made contact with detectives that were co-located with the Secret Service detail and informed them of the news coverage."
<br><br>"Remarkably," Kenney continued, the detectives told him "that they were not aware of the incident at that point." [84] Members of the president's Secret Service detail would surely have immediately passed on the important news to the detectives with them if they had heard about the crash. The fact that they failed to do so presumably means they had not been contacted by their colleagues in Washington about it at the time when Kenney called the detectives.
<br><br>It is unclear whether Secret Service agents in Washington failed to contact their colleagues in Sarasota, besides Marinzel, about the second crash after it occurred. Certainly, accounts that are currently available make no mention of such contact being made.
<br><br><b>AGENT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PRESIDENT'S SECURITY DID NOT CALL HIS COLLEAGUES IN SARASOTA</b>
<br>In light of the apparent failure of Secret Service agents in Washington to contact their colleagues in Sarasota about the attacks on the World Trade Center, it is worth examining in particular the actions of Carl Truscott, a key Secret Service official who was in the Eisenhower Executive Office Building, next to the White House, when the attacks occurred. As special agent in charge of the presidential protective division, Truscott was responsible for the overall security of the president. [85] And yet there is no evidence that he made any attempt to contact Bush's detail while the president was at the Booker Elementary School.
<br><br>Truscott said in an interview shortly after 9/11 that he learned about the crisis on September 11 when he "observed the CNN broadcast of the aircraft crashing into the World Trade Center." (It is unclear from the report of the interview whether he was referring to the coverage of the first crash or the second crash.) But he made no mention of contacting Bush's detail in response to seeing the television coverage of the crashes.
<br><br>The only thing Truscott described doing at the time was calling several senior Secret Service agents to his office for a meeting "to discuss security enhancements at the White House." The meeting began at around 9:18 a.m. and the safety of the president was apparently not talked about. After he left the meeting, Truscott went to the Presidential Emergency Operations Center below the White House. [86]
<br><br>His first contact with Bush's detail that morning, according to currently available accounts, occurred sometime after 9:55 a.m., when Air Force One took off from Sarasota-Bradenton International Airport. At that time, according to a Secret Service document, one of Bush's agents was "successful in contacting" him and informed him of the president's situation. [87]
<br><br><b>SCHOOL WAS NOT EVACUATED, DESPITE BEING A POTENTIAL TERRORIST TARGET</b>
<br>While it is alarming that the president was allowed to stay at the Booker Elementary School for 40 minutes while the U.S. was in the middle of a major terrorist attack, it is also chilling that no effort was made to evacuate anyone else from the school on September 11. If terrorists had attacked the place, hundreds of people there could have been killed or seriously injured.
<br><br>Mike Morell certainly recognized the potential danger. On top of his concern for Bush, he recalled, he grew "increasingly concerned" about "the safety of others at the school," since "it had been public information for days that the president would be at Booker Elementary on 11 September." [88]
<br><br>But even after Bush left, no attempt was made to get people safely away from the school. Instead, "after learning of the tragedies, teachers tried to initiate 'teachable moments,'" the <i>Tampa Tribune</i> reported. "They pulled down maps, discussed terrorism, and talked about fears [with the pupils]." The school's administration permitted parents to pick up their children early if they wanted to, but according to the <i>Tribune</i>, "very few did." [89]
<br><br>Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Herman, a senior presidential communications officer, along with some Secret Service agents and a military aide, initially remained in Sarasota after Bush and his entourage left. [90] Surely one of these professionals should have recognized the possible danger and evacuated the school. And yet even White House personnel who stayed at the Booker Elementary School after the president was driven away were left vulnerable. These staffers were allowed to remain at the school for hours, and only headed back to the Colony Beach and Tennis Resort late that afternoon. [91]
<br><br>It is also strange that no one else, besides those who had come to Sarasota from Washington for the president's visit, ordered that the Booker Elementary School be evacuated. Remarkably, Wilma Hamilton, the superintendent of Sarasota County schools, refused to evacuate the school after being advised to do so.
<br><br>"Because the well-publicized event at the school assured Bush's location that day was no secret, the dense White House security urged school officials to send students home," the <i>Arlington Heights Daily Herald</i> reported. Hamilton, however, rejected the advice. "I couldn't see sending the children home," she recalled. "There'd be no one there. All they would have to look at were those images on television." [92]
<br><br><b>THE SECRET SERVICE FAILED TO KEEP THE PRESIDENT SAFE</b>
<br>By allowing Bush to follow his schedule and attend the reading demonstration at the Booker Elementary School while America was under attack, the Secret Service left the president in potentially life-threatening danger. What went wrong? Why did agents perform so poorly in the middle of the worst attack on American soil since the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941? Evidence described in this article gives rise to important questions about the actions of the Secret Service on September 11 that need to be addressed.
<br><br>Why, for example, did the president's protective detail wait for more than 30 minutes after the second crash at the World Trade Center occurred and it became clear that America was under attack before getting Bush away from the school? Why did the concerns of some personnel that the school might be attacked not lead to an immediate evacuation? And why did the Secret Service allow Bush to give a speech from the school that was broadcast live on television, thereby revealing his location to any terrorists who might be watching TV?
<br><br>Questions about the actions of other agencies and individuals who were with Bush in Sarasota need to be addressed too. For example, could someone other than a member of the Secret Service have ordered the evacuation of the president from the Booker Elementary School? The president's military aide was the person who would direct any evacuation of the president and the White House Military Office would implement the president's "safe passage," according to <i>Marist</i> magazine. [93] Could Paul Montanus, Bush's military aide at the school, or a White House Military Office official such as Mark Rosenker therefore have ordered an evacuation? If they could, why did they apparently fail to do so after the second attack on the World Trade Center took place?
<br><br>Also, who was responsible for evacuating the other people at the school, such as the students and teachers? Why didn't that person order an evacuation? Why, in particular, did Wilma Hamilton refuse to send the children at the school home after being urged by White House security personnel to do so?
<br><br>Additionally, were any decisions made to evacuate the president that were overruled? No evacuation occurred after a U.S. Marine, presumably Paul Montanus, announced, "We're out of here" and asked, "Can you get everyone ready?" when he saw the second crash on television. Did someone overrule the Marine's apparent instruction to evacuate the president? If so, who was this person and why did they do so?
<br><br>Events described in this article also give rise to questions about the actions of some Secret Service agents who were in Washington at the time of the 9/11 attacks. Why, for example, did agents in Washington apparently fail to contact their colleagues in Sarasota about the crashes at the World Trade Center, to let them know what had happened and discuss what to do in response? Why did Carl Truscott, in particular, as the agent responsible for the overall security of the president, apparently fail to contact members of Bush's detail? Why did he only communicate with them after Air Force One left Sarasota?
<br><br><b>WAS THE SECRET SERVICE'S RESPONSE TO THE ATTACKS SABOTAGED?</b>
<br>The Secret Service agents with the president in Sarasota appear to have been exceptionally skilled professionals, based on descriptions of their actions before and after Bush was at the Booker Elementary School. We consequently need to consider whether their inaction during the 40 minutes that Bush was at the school on September 11 was caused by someone, or some people, sabotaging their ability to respond to the 9/11 attacks.
<br><br>Might rogue individuals in the U.S. military and government have taken measures that prevented these agents from operating with the level of urgency they would usually exhibit in a situation where the president could be in danger? For example, could the agents have been tricked into mistakenly thinking that reports they received about the attacks on the World Trade Center were simulated, as part of a training exercise, and this was why they failed to react appropriately to them?
<br><br>Or were there rogue Secret Service agents involved with protecting the president who knew in advance what was going to happen on September 11? These agents could have known that the president and the Booker Elementary School were not targets, and so it was unnecessary to hurry Bush away from the school once it became clear that America was under attack.
<br><br>The failure of the Secret Service to adequately protect the president while he was in Sarasota could be strong evidence that rogue individuals in the military and government were involved in perpetrating the 9/11 attacks. Currently, though, only a limited amount of information is available about the actions of the Secret Service on September 11. Official investigations have failed to rigorously examine the suspicious behavior of agents in response to the terrorist attacks. This crucial aspect of 9/11 therefore needs to be thoroughly looked into as part of a new investigation of the attacks.
<br><br><b>NOTES</b>
<br>[1] <a href="http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/story?id=121331" target="_blank">"Bush Presses Education Agenda in Florida." ABC News, September 10, 2001</a>; James Bamford, <i>Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency</i>. New York: Anchor Books, 2002, p. 636; <a href="https://www.georgewbushlibrary.smu.edu/~/media/GWBL/Files/Digitized%20Content/2014-0422-F/t081-026j-460947-3-2014-0422-f.ashx" target="_blank">"The Visit of the President to Florida, Monday, September 10-Tuesday, September 11, 2001." President of the United States, n.d.</a>
<br>[2] <a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2002/oct/7/20021007-091935-5491r/" target="_blank">Bill Sammon, "Suddenly, a Time to Lead." <i>Washington Times</i>, October 7, 2002</a>; <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20040707003914/http:/www.sptimes.com/2004/07/04/Worldandnation/Of_fact__fiction__Bus.shtml" target="_blank">Susan Taylor Martin, "Of Fact, Fiction: Bush on 9/11." <i>St. Petersburg Times</i>, July 4, 2004</a>.
<br>[3] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/16063511/T3-B1-EOP-Press-Interviews-of-Staff-Fdr-Internal-Transcript-8-12-02-Rosenberg-Interview-of-Bartlett-951" target="_blank">White House transcript, interview of Director of Communications Dan Bartlett by Howard Rosenberg of ABC. White House, August 12, 2002</a>; <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20050305221316/http:/www.marist.edu/magazine/fall02/securing.html" target="_blank">Leslie Bates, "Securing the Nation." <i>Marist</i>, Fall 2002</a>; <a href="http://nl.newsbank.com/nl-search/we/Archives?p_product=DDNB&p_theme=ddnb&p_action=search&p_maxdocs=200&p_topdoc=1&p_text_direct-0=0FD0C85E5CD5B6B0&p_field_direct-0=document_id&p_perpage=10&p_sort=YMD_date:D" target="_blank">Dave Lance, "Born to Lead." <i>Dayton Daily News</i>, August 17, 2003</a>; <a href="https://www.rochester.edu/pr/Review/V67N1/feature1.html" target="_blank">Richard Keil, "With the President: A Reporter's Story of 9/11." <i>Rochester Review</i>, Fall 2004</a>.
<br>[4] <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20030208054750/http:/www.directsourceradio.com/links/1126200112ON.html" target="_blank">"Springfield Native Told President of Terrorist Attacks." Associated Press, November 26, 2001</a>; David Priess, <i>The President's Book of Secrets: The Untold Story of Intelligence Briefings to America's Presidents From Kennedy to Obama</i>. New York: PublicAffairs, 2016, p. 240.
<br>[5] Ari Fleischer, <i>Taking Heat: The President, the Press, and My Years in the White House</i>. New York: HarperCollins, 2005, pp. 138-139.
<br>[6] Bill Sammon, <i>Fighting Back: The War on Terrorism--From Inside the Bush White House</i>. Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2002, p. 42.
<br>[7] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States</i>. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004, p. 35; George W. Bush, <i>Decision Points</i>. New York: Crown, 2010, pp. 126-127.
<br>[8] Bill Sammon, <i>Fighting Back</i>, p. 43.
<br>[9] Ibid. pp. 50-51, 83; <a href="http://opprop911.no/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/9-11-Government-Inconsitencies.pdf" target="_blank">Scot J. Paltrow, "Government Accounts of 9/11 Reveal Gaps, Inconsistencies." <i>Wall Street Journal</i>, March 22, 2004</a>; 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 38.
<br>[10] James Bamford, <i>Body of Secrets</i>, p. 633.
<br>[11] Philip H. Melanson, <i>The Secret Service: The Hidden History of an Enigmatic Agency</i>. 2nd ed. New York: Carroll & Graf, 2005, pp. 330-331.
<br>[12] <a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2002/oct/7/20021007-091935-5491r/" target="_blank">Bill Sammon, "Suddenly, a Time to Lead"</a>; <a href="http://opprop911.no/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/9-11-Government-Inconsitencies.pdf" target="_blank">Scot J. Paltrow, "Government Accounts of 9/11 Reveal Gaps, Inconsistencies."</a>
<br>[13] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 39.
<br>[14] <a href="https://www.georgewbushlibrary.smu.edu/~/media/GWBL/Files/Digitized%20Content/2014-0422-F/t081-026j-460947-3-2014-0422-f.ashx" target="_blank">"The Visit of the President to Florida, Monday, September 10-Tuesday, September 11, 2001."</a>
<br>[15] <a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2002/oct/7/20021007-091935-5491r/" target="_blank">Bill Sammon, "Suddenly, a Time to Lead"</a>; 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 39.
<br>[16] <a href="https://www.georgewbushlibrary.smu.edu/~/media/GWBL/Files/Digitized%20Content/2014-0422-F/t081-026j-460947-3-2014-0422-f.ashx" target="_blank">"The Visit of the President to Florida, Monday, September 10-Tuesday, September 11, 2001"</a>; <a href="https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911.html" target="_blank">"Remarks by the President After Two Planes Crash Into World Trade Center." White House, September 11, 2001</a>; James Bamford, <i>Body of Secrets</i>, p. 636.
<br>[17] Michael K. Bohn, <i>Presidents in Crisis: Tough Decisions Inside the White House From Truman to Obama</i>. New York: Arcade Publishing, 2015, p. 215.
<br>[18] <a href="https://www.georgewbushlibrary.smu.edu/~/media/GWBL/Files/Digitized%20Content/2014-0422-F/t081-026j-460947-3-2014-0422-f.ashx" target="_blank">"The Visit of the President to Florida, Monday, September 10-Tuesday, September 11, 2001."</a>
<br>[19] <a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2002/oct/8/20021008-092019-5665r/" target="_blank">Bill Sammon, "'Right Decision.'" <i>Washington Times</i>, October 8, 2002</a>; 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 39; George W. Bush, <i>Decision Points</i>, p. 128.
<br>[20] <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/18/AR2006071801175_pf.html" target="_blank">Dan Balz and Bob Woodward, "America's Chaotic Road to War." <i>Washington Post</i>, January 27, 2002</a>; 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 39.
<br>[21] <a href="https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010907-1.html" target="_blank">"Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer." White House, September 7, 2001</a>.
<br>[22] <a href="http://jacksonville.com/tu-online/stories/090701/met_7217955.html" target="_blank">David DeCamp, "President Plans School Visit to Push Reading." <i>Florida Times-Union</i>, September 7, 2001</a>; <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20010917032335/http:/www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A54429-2001Sep6.html" target="_blank">Mike Allen and Michael A. Fletcher, "Bush Campaign Aims to Put Education Plan on Fast Track." <i>Washington Post</i>, September 7, 2001</a>.
<br>[23] Mark Bowden, <i>The Finish: The Killing of Osama bin Laden</i>. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2012, p. 3.
<br>[24] <a href="https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1755&dat=20010907&id=l4IfAAAAIBAJ&sjid=pH8EAAAAIBAJ&pg=2860,988190" target="_blank">Chad Binette, "Bush Will Talk Schools in Local Stop." <i>Sarasota Herald-Tribune</i>, September 7, 2001</a>.
<br>[25] <a href="https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=A7-hzOuI2KQC&dat=20010908&printsec=frontpage&hl=en" target="_blank">"The President's Visit." <i>Sarasota Herald-Tribune</i>, September 8, 2001</a>.
<br>[26] Michael Morell with Bill Harlow, <i>The Great War of Our Time: The CIA's Fight Against Terrorism From al Qa'ida to ISIS</i>. New York: Twelve, 2015, p. 49.
<br>[27] <a href="http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/09/were-the-only-plane-in-the-sky-214230" target="_blank">Garrett M. Graff, "'We're the Only Plane in the Sky.'" <i>Politico Magazine</i>, September 9, 2016</a>.
<br>[28] "Air Force One Pilot Mark Tillman and Senior Advisor Karl Rove." <i>At Issue</i>, KFDI, December 11, 2012.
<br>[29] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20130913015850/http:/www.wfla.com/story/23405307/sarasota-county-played-a-pivotal-role-in-911" target="_blank">John Rogers, "Sarasota County Played a Pivotal Role in 9/11." WFLA-TV, September 11, 2013</a>.
<br>[30] <a href="http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/09/were-the-only-plane-in-the-sky-214230" target="_blank">Garrett M. Graff, "'We're the Only Plane in the Sky.'"</a>
<br>[31] Ibid.
<br>[32] "Air Force One Pilot Mark Tillman and Senior Advisor Karl Rove."
<br>[33] <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001407035.pdf" target="_blank">Michael J. Morell, "11 September 2001: With the President." <i>Studies in Intelligence</i> 50, no. 3 (2006): 23-34</a>.
<br>[34] <a href="http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/09/were-the-only-plane-in-the-sky-214230" target="_blank">Garrett M. Graff, "'We're the Only Plane in the Sky.'"</a>
<br>[35] <a href="http://www.lbjlibrary.org/events/a-white-house-view-of-9-11" target="_blank">"A White House View of 9/11." LBJ Presidential Library, September 3, 2013</a>.
<br>[36] <a href="http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/09/were-the-only-plane-in-the-sky-214230" target="_blank">Garrett M. Graff, "'We're the Only Plane in the Sky.'"</a>
<br>[37] <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001407035.pdf" target="_blank">Michael J. Morell, "11 September 2001: With the President"</a>; Michael Morell with Bill Harlow, <i>The Great War of Our Time</i>, p. 49.
<br>[38] <a href="http://patch.com/florida/sarasota/teacher-recounts-being-at-booker-with-bush-on-911" target="_blank">William Mansell, "Teacher Recounts Being at Booker With Bush on 9/11." Sarasota Patch, September 9, 2011</a>.
<br>[39] <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20160316085927/http:/sarasotacountyschools.net/uploadedFiles/Elementary_Schools/Booker_Elementary/!Main_Navigation/Derek%20Jenkins.pdf" target="_blank">Derek Jenkins, "Derek Jenkins, EEB Classroom Teacher." Sarasota County Schools, n.d.</a>
<br>[40] <a href="http://patch.com/florida/sarasota/teacher-recounts-being-at-booker-with-bush-on-911" target="_blank">William Mansell, "Teacher Recounts Being at Booker With Bush on 9/11."</a>
<br>[41] <a href="http://www.heraldtribune.com/news/20020910/the-day-before-everything-changed-president-bush-touched-locals-lives" target="_blank">Tom Bayles, "The Day Before Everything Changed, President Bush Touched Locals' Lives." <i>Sarasota Herald-Tribune</i>, September 10, 2002</a>; <a href="http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/writer/dennis-dodd/19994463/navy-has-a-higher-purpose-heading-into-notre-dame-game" target="_blank">Dennis Dodd, "Navy Has a Higher Purpose Heading Into Notre Dame Game." CBS Sports, August 31, 2012</a>.
<br>[42] <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20050305221316/http:/www.marist.edu/magazine/fall02/securing.html" target="_blank">Leslie Bates, "Securing the Nation."</a>
<br>[43] <a href="http://www.wpxi.com/news/were-under-attack-native-pittsburgher-escorted-pre/201514634" target="_blank">"'We're Under Attack': Native Pittsburgher Escorted President on 9/11." WPXI-TV, September 7, 2011</a>.
<br>[44] <a href="http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/09/were-the-only-plane-in-the-sky-214230" target="_blank">Garrett M. Graff, "'We're the Only Plane in the Sky.'"</a>
<br>[45] Karl Rove, <i>Courage and Consequence: My Life as a Conservative in the Fight</i>. New York: Threshold Editions, 2010, p. 251.
<br>[46] Bill Sammon, <i>Fighting Back</i>, p. 93.
<br>[47] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 39.
<br>[48] <a href="http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/09/were-the-only-plane-in-the-sky-214230" target="_blank">Garrett M. Graff, "'We're the Only Plane in the Sky.'"</a>
<br>[49] <a href="http://www.upressonline.com/2003/09/737-days-after/" target="_blank">"737 Days After ..." <i>University Press</i>, September 17, 2003</a>.
<br>[50] <a href="http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2011-09-11/news/fl-brogan-9-11-stein-interview-0911-20110911_1_ear-moment-frank-brogan" target="_blank">"Frank Brogan Recounts His Moment in History With President Bush on Sept. 11, 2001." <i>South Florida Sun Sentinel</i>, September 11, 2011</a>.
<br>[51] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16063471/T3-B1-EOP-Press-Interviews-of-Staff-Fdr-Internal-Transcript-22902-CBS-Interview-of-Gen-Mark-v-Rosenker-White-House-Military-Office-Director-Ang" target="_blank">White House transcript, interview of General Mark V. Rosenker, director of the White House Military Office, by CBS. White House, August 29, 2002</a>.
<br>[52] <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20020607064100/http:/www.secretservice.gov/mission.shtml" target="_blank">"Mission Statement." United States Secret Service, 2002</a>.
<br>[53] <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20101107222311/http:/www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/legislative/nsd_annual_report2001.pdf" target="_blank">Office of Management and Budget, <i>Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism</i>. Washington, DC: Office of Management and Budget, July 2001, p. 81</a>.
<br>[54] <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BHkvtmEyas8" target="_blank"><i>Inside the U.S. Secret Service</i>. National Geographic Channel, October 24, 2004</a>.
<br>[55] <a href="http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/09/were-the-only-plane-in-the-sky-214230" target="_blank">Garrett M. Graff, "'We're the Only Plane in the Sky.'"</a>
<br>[56] <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20040707003914/http:/www.sptimes.com/2004/07/04/Worldandnation/Of_fact__fiction__Bus.shtml" target="_blank">Susan Taylor Martin, "Of Fact, Fiction."</a>
<br>[57] Philip H. Melanson, <i>The Secret Service</i>, pp. 330-331.
<br>[58] Robert J. Darling, <i>24 Hours Inside the President's Bunker: 9/11/01 The White House</i>. Bloomington, IN: iUniverse, 2010, p. 35.
<br>[59] <a href="http://www.heraldtribune.com/news/20020910/the-day-before-everything-changed-president-bush-touched-locals-lives" target="_blank">Tom Bayles, "The Day Before Everything Changed, President Bush Touched Locals' Lives."</a>
<br>[60] <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20160316085927/http:/sarasotacountyschools.net/uploadedFiles/Elementary_Schools/Booker_Elementary/!Main_Navigation/Derek%20Jenkins.pdf" target="_blank">Derek Jenkins, "Derek Jenkins, EEB Classroom Teacher."</a>
<br>[61] <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20020904193741/http:/tampatrib.com/nationworldnews/MGACHFUFK5D.html" target="_blank">Jennifer Barrs, "From a Whisper to a Tear." <i>Tampa Tribune</i>, September 1, 2002</a>.
<br>[62] Bill Sammon, <i>Fighting Back</i>, p. 25.
<br>[63] <a href="http://www.heraldtribune.com/news/20020910/the-day-before-everything-changed-president-bush-touched-locals-lives" target="_blank">Tom Bayles, "The Day Before Everything Changed, President Bush Touched Locals' Lives."</a>
<br>[64] <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20030116190007/http:/www.mnet.co.za/carteblanche/display/Display.asp?Id=2063" target="_blank"><i>Clear the Skies</i>. BBC, September 1, 2002</a>; "Air Force One Pilot Mark Tillman and Senior Advisor Karl Rove"; <a href="http://www.lbjlibrary.org/events/a-white-house-view-of-9-11" target="_blank">"A White House View of 9/11."</a>
<br>[65] "Air Force One Pilot Mark Tillman and Senior Advisor Karl Rove"; <a href="http://www.lbjlibrary.org/events/a-white-house-view-of-9-11" target="_blank">"A White House View of 9/11."</a>
<br>[66] Karl Rove, <i>Courage and Consequence</i>, p. 251, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1Q0cY9f7RiM" target="_blank">Karl Rove, Speech at the Reagan Ranch Center, Santa Barbara, CA. Young America's Foundation, April 30, 2010</a>.
<br>[67] "Air Force One Pilot Mark Tillman and Senior Advisor Karl Rove"; <a href="http://www.lbjlibrary.org/events/a-white-house-view-of-9-11" target="_blank">"A White House View of 9/11."</a>
<br>[68] <a href="http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/09/were-the-only-plane-in-the-sky-214230" target="_blank">Garrett M. Graff, "'We're the Only Plane in the Sky.'"</a>
<br>[69] Ibid.
<br>[70] <a href="http://emperors-clothes.com/9-11backups/ap912.htm" target="_blank">Sonya Ross, "Flying With President Bush on a Day Terrorists Hit Hard." Associated Press, September 12, 2001</a>; <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001407035.pdf" target="_blank">Michael J. Morell, "11 September 2001: With the President."</a>
<br>[71] Bill Sammon, <i>Fighting Back</i>, p. 99.
<br>[72] <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001407035.pdf" target="_blank">Michael J. Morell, "11 September 2001: With the President"</a>; <a href="http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/09/were-the-only-plane-in-the-sky-214230" target="_blank">Garrett M. Graff, "'We're the Only Plane in the Sky.'"</a>
<br>[73] Karl Rove, <i>Courage and Consequence</i>, p. 252.
<br>[74] <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20030116190007/http:/www.mnet.co.za/carteblanche/display/Display.asp?Id=2063" target="_blank"><i>Clear the Skies</i></a>.
<br>[75] Bill Sammon, <i>Fighting Back</i>, p. 99.
<br>[76] <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/18/AR2006071801175_pf.html" target="_blank">Dan Balz and Bob Woodward, "America's Chaotic Road to War"</a>; 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 39.
<br>[77] <a href="http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/Portals/7/documents/transcripts/air_force_one_transcript.pdf" target="_blank">Mark W. Tillman, "Air Force One: Zero Failure." Speech presented at the National Museum of the U.S. Air Force, Dayton, Ohio, February 29, 2012</a>.
<br>[78] <a href="http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/09/were-the-only-plane-in-the-sky-214230" target="_blank">Garrett M. Graff, "'We're the Only Plane in the Sky.'"</a>
<br>[79] Karl Rove, <i>Courage and Consequence</i>, p. 252.
<br>[80] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 39.
<br>[81] <a href="http://www.wpxi.com/news/were-under-attack-native-pittsburgher-escorted-pre/201514634" target="_blank">"'We're Under Attack': Native Pittsburgher Escorted President on 9/11."</a>
<br>[82] <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1Q0cY9f7RiM" target="_blank">Karl Rove, Speech at the Reagan Ranch Center, Santa Barbara, CA</a>.
<br>[83] <a href="http://www.wpxi.com/news/were-under-attack-native-pittsburgher-escorted-pre/201514634" target="_blank">"'We're Under Attack': Native Pittsburgher Escorted President on 9/11."</a>
<br>[84] <a href="http://www.ourdigitalmags.com/article/...I_could_see_Air_Force_One_accelerate_toward_me_and...takeoff..../832681/81407/article.html" target="_blank">Kevin Kenney, "... I Could See Air Force One Accelerate Toward Me and ... Takeoff. ..." <i>Sheriff</i>, September/October 2011</a>.
<br>[85] <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20050601063715/http:/www.secretservice.gov/press/pub0704.pdf" target="_blank">"Assistant Director Carl J. Truscott Announces Plans to Retire From the U.S. Secret Service." United States Secret Service press release, Washington, DC, April 1, 2004</a>.
<br>[86] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/30764772/Monaghan-FOIA-USSS-Memos-and-Timelines" target="_blank">USSS memo, interview with SAIC Carl Truscott. United States Secret Service, October 1, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/14353654/DH-B5-Secret-Service-Requests-Fdr-Entire-Contents-5-Withdrawal-Notice-Doc-Req-Notes-Garabito-Shortly-After-9am-FAA-Van-Steenbergen-Said-4-Planes" target="_blank">"USSS Statements and Interview Reports." 9/11 Commission, July 28, 2003</a>.
<br>[87] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/30764772/Monaghan-FOIA-USSS-Memos-and-Timelines" target="_blank">Untitled document. United States Secret Service, n.d.</a>
<br>[88] <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001407035.pdf" target="_blank">Michael J. Morell, "11 September 2001: With the President."</a>
<br>[89] <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20020904193741/http:/tampatrib.com/nationworldnews/MGACHFUFK5D.html" target="_blank">Jennifer Barrs, "From a Whisper to a Tear."</a>
<br>[90] <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20050305221316/http:/www.marist.edu/magazine/fall02/securing.html" target="_blank">Leslie Bates, "Securing the Nation."</a>
<br>[91] Scott McClellan, <i>What Happened: Inside the Bush White House and Washington's Culture of Deception</i>. New York: PublicAffairs, 2008, pp. 103-104.
<br>[92] Mike Riopell, "Educator's History Lesson." <i>Arlington Heights Daily Herald</i>, September 11, 2006.
<br>[93] <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20050305221316/http:/www.marist.edu/magazine/fall02/securing.html" target="_blank">Leslie Bates, "Securing the Nation."</a>
Shoestringhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01534319150672667644noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2990970741097819876.post-16526395307035329922016-10-31T02:26:00.001-07:002016-10-31T02:26:37.899-07:00The Million-Dollar Diamond Theft at the World Trade Center on 9/11<br><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjrzDFuV51klrCvIMLPK5g-ziRVEJP3SY1E878coIX6dP07Hpq0XOUcaY0r-wS00zaad8LHA57gIb6830EvCpThddFYAfdRDYz_IDSRe4JFsFTmPllaw1FJthjBbKbxBvDJxMWIUOQVvMYw/s1600/Diamonds.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;" target="_Blank" alt="Diamonds"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjrzDFuV51klrCvIMLPK5g-ziRVEJP3SY1E878coIX6dP07Hpq0XOUcaY0r-wS00zaad8LHA57gIb6830EvCpThddFYAfdRDYz_IDSRe4JFsFTmPllaw1FJthjBbKbxBvDJxMWIUOQVvMYw/s1600/Diamonds.jpg" /></a></div><br>Over a million dollars' worth of diamonds and bonds were apparently stolen from an armored truck in the basement of the World Trade Center when the terrorist attacks took place on September 11, 2001, which suggests that someone--or some people--may have had foreknowledge of the 9/11 attacks and exploited the chaos they knew the attacks would generate in order to commit their crime at a time when there was minimal risk of getting caught.
<br><br>Furthermore, there was an attempt to remove an unusually large amount of gold from vaults in the basement of the World Trade Center at the time of the attacks, which indicates that other people may have known in advance about the attacks and, based on their foreknowledge, tried to get the gold out before it became buried in the rubble of the Twin Towers. Whoever was transporting the gold away from the vaults apparently abandoned their vehicle and escaped to safety before the towers collapsed, which suggests they were warned in advance about the collapses and were consequently able to get away before the buildings came down.
<br><br>Only a limited amount of information has been reported about these incidents, which are described below, and so it is difficult to determine exactly what happened. However, the details that have been reported certainly seem suspicious and so there is surely a need to look into these events closely.
<br><br><b>DIAMONDS AND BONDS WERE APPARENTLY STOLEN FROM AN ARMORED TRUCK</b>
<br>The apparent theft of diamonds and bonds appears to have taken place on September 11 sometime between around 9:15 a.m. and 10:28 a.m., when the second of the Twin Towers collapsed. A Brink's armored truck, driven by 68-year-old Joseph Trombino, had arrived at the World Trade Center sometime before 8:46 a.m. that day. Trombino drove his vehicle down to the underground parking garage of the North Tower to drop off $14 million in cash.
<br><br>He stayed with the vehicle while three colleagues who were with him passed on the cash to some Bank of Nova Scotia guards, who put it into canvas carts to be taken to a vault in the tower. He was in the truck at 8:46 a.m., when American Airlines Flight 11--the first plane to be hijacked that day--crashed into the North Tower, many floors above him. [1]
<br><br>After the crash, Trombino's colleagues were evacuated from the tower. However, although he was parked just 100 feet from an exit, Trombino stayed with his vehicle. [2] He was in it at 9:03 a.m., when the second hijacked plane--United Airlines Flight 175--crashed into the South Tower. [3] The truck was still in the underground garage when the North Tower came down, at 10:28 a.m. Although Trombino had left the vehicle by then, he was killed in the collapse. [4]
<br><br><b>VALUABLES WERE FOUND TO BE MISSING FROM THE TRUCK</b>
<br>Recovery workers found the Brink's armored truck in the rubble of the World Trade Center just over three months later, on December 21, 2001. Lieutenant William Keegan, who was in charge of the Port Authority Police Department's nighttime rescue and recovery operation at Ground Zero, was promptly called and told about the discovery.
<br><br>Keegan immediately called Brink's and passed on the news. He was told during the call that the vehicle's driver, Trombino, was still missing. He was also told that the vehicle should have in it over a million dollars' worth of valuables, comprising $250,000 in diamonds and $750,000 in negotiable bonds. He then headed out to help recover the vehicle.
<br><br>After Keegan reached the location of the truck, recovery workers cleared away enough rubble to look into the cab, to see if Trombino's dead body was inside. They found that the cab was empty, thus showing that Trombino left the vehicle before the North Tower collapsed on September 11.
<br><br>Keegan then wanted to get into the back of the truck, to remove the diamonds and bonds. The back of the truck was presumably locked, since recovery workers cut into the roof with a circular saw and created an opening to get inside. A Port Authority Police Department officer went through the opening and into the vehicle to inspect it, and found it was empty. "No bonds. No diamonds. Nothing," Keegan described. [5]
<br><br>Trombino's body was subsequently found, although it is unclear when it was discovered. Trombino's wife, Jean Trombino, said in January 2002 that she had been told the body had been found but not where it was found. She said the family had asked where it was discovered but, she commented, "I guess we haven't gotten the right person yet." [6] Brink's reported in 2014 that the body was found near the water fountain between the Twin Towers, in the World Trade Center plaza. [7] This indicates that Trombino tried to get away from the North Tower after the South Tower collapsed, presumably fearing the North Tower would come down too, but was killed when the North Tower collapsed.
<br><br>The $14 million in cash that Trombino dropped off on September 11 was found in the rubble of the World Trade Center in February 2002. However, according to Keegan, the diamonds and bonds that had been in Trombino's truck were never recovered. [8]
<br><br><b>DRIVER CALLED HIS COMPANY FROM THE UNDERGROUND GARAGE</b>
<br>Trying to determine when and how the diamonds and bonds might have been taken from Trombino's truck is a difficult task, since Trombino's actions between when he dropped off the $14 million in cash and his death, when the North Tower collapsed, are unclear and accounts sometimes conflict.
<br><br>Trombino reportedly called the Brink's office in Brooklyn after Flight 11 hit the North Tower, at 8:46 a.m., to find out what was going on. [9] He said to the dispatcher: "Something's happening. What should I do?" [10] He called the company from a pay phone, according to his wife. [11] But his daughter, Bo Kirby, and Brink's have stated that he made the call on his radio. [12]
<br><br>Trombino made the call at 9:10 a.m., according to the <i>St. Petersburg Times</i>. [13] His daughter, though, said he made it at 9:15 a.m. This was the last time anyone heard from him, she said. [14] But Jack Walter, a friend of Trombino's, said the driver in fact made "several calls" to Brink's that morning. [15]
<br><br><b>DRIVER IGNORED THE ADVICE TO LEAVE THE BUILDING IMMEDIATELY</b>
<br>It is mysterious that Trombino stayed in the underground parking garage rather than promptly getting away to somewhere safer after Flight 11 crashed into the North Tower. The driver's three colleagues, who offloaded the $14 million in cash at the World Trade Center, were evacuated from the North Tower sometime after the plane hit it and got away unharmed. Trombino, though, remained with his vehicle. [16]
<br><br>In light of the conditions he described when he called Brink's, he should surely have thought he might be in danger and needed to get away from the North Tower as quickly as possible. He told the dispatcher that "the walls around him were starting to crumble and water was seeping into the garage," according to Walter. [17] Before the line went dead, he said the "building was shaking and water was cascading down," according to his wife. [18]
<br><br>It seems odder still that Trombino stayed in the underground garage when we take into consideration the advice that other people reportedly gave him. For example, a police officer instructed him to move his truck, he told the dispatcher. [19] The officer told him to do so because the North Tower was unstable, according to his daughter. [20] And the dispatcher advised him to leave his vehicle and get out of the building immediately, Brink's stated. [21]
<br><br>William Keegan suggested that Trombino may have stayed with his truck because he wanted to protect its cargo or he was unaware that his colleagues had been evacuated from the North Tower and he expected them to return to the vehicle. [22] These were just guesses, though. Certainly, if the truck was locked, it should have been unnecessary for Trombino to stay with it to protect the cargo. Trombino's family in fact said they thought that if the driver stayed with the vehicle, he would have done so not to guard the valuables in it but, instead, simply "because he thought his crew was coming back." [23]
<br><br><b>SOMEONE TRIED TO REMOVE GOLD FROM VAULTS UNDER THE WORLD TRADE CENTER</b>
<br>The attempt at removing gold from vaults in the basement of the World Trade Center appears to have taken place around the time the Twin Towers were attacked but before either of the buildings collapsed. The incident came to light weeks after September 11, when recovery workers unearthed millions of dollars' worth of gold bullion that had been abandoned in a tunnel under the World Trade Center. [24]
<br><br>Large quantities of gold and silver were stored in vaults, owned by the Comex metals trading division of the New York Mercantile Exchange, a few floors below ground at the World Trade Center site. Comex had $100 million worth of gold in the vaults, according to <i>The Times</i> of London. It also held $220 million worth of gold in the vaults on behalf of others and $430 million worth of silver. [25] To reach the vaults, armored trucks would drive through what were once the tunnels for the Hudson and Manhattan Railroad. [26]
<br><br>The gold unearthed by recovery workers was discovered around the end of October 2001 in a delivery tunnel under World Trade Center Building 5--a building northeast of the Twin Towers that was severely damaged when the towers collapsed. The bullion was found along with a 10-wheel truck, which had presumably been used to transport it away from the vaults, and some crushed cars. There were no dead bodies around, indicating that whoever tried to remove the gold abandoned their effort before the Twin Towers collapsed. The quantity of gold that was being removed is unreported, but it was clearly a large amount, since, after recovery workers found it, two trucks were required to transport it away from the tunnel. [27]
<br><br>Chicago Board of Trade insider Joyce Selander has explained why she found it suspicious that someone tried to take away so much gold at the time of the 9/11 attacks. She wrote that a person could normally pick up their gold from a vault like those under the World Trade Center by showing up at any time, without prior notification, with their vault receipts. "But so much [gold] that you needed a 10-wheeler?" she asked. In contrast, she noted that at the Chicago Board of Trade, a person would usually pull up their "car or small truck" to take their gold away. "Was someone warned of the imminent collapse of the South Tower, someone who loaded the gold and was ready to spirit it away?" she asked. [28]
<br><br>The scene that was unearthed in the delivery tunnel clearly looked suspicious. The evidence suggests that someone, or some people, may have known in advance that the World Trade Center was going to be attacked on September 11 and wanted to move the gold before it became buried in the rubble when the Twin Towers collapsed. They may have wanted to get the gold away specifically while the attacks were taking place, because the chaos that was sure to occur at that time would make it less likely that the removal of an unusually large quantity of gold would draw attention.
<br><br>Additionally, the fact that the gold was abandoned in the delivery tunnel before the Twin Towers came down indicates that whoever was trying to remove it may have been told to get away from the World Trade Center by someone who knew in advance that the buildings were going to collapse. If this was the case, it means the person who issued the warning likely knew that the 9/11 attacks were going to involve bringing down the Twin Towers.
<br><br><b>WHO TOOK THE DIAMONDS AND BONDS FROM THE BRINK'S TRUCK?</b>
<br>The information that has been reported about the apparent theft of diamonds and bonds from the Brink's armored truck and the attempted removal of gold from the basement of the World Trade Center on September 11 gives rise to many questions. For example, in his recollection of the discovery of the Brink's truck, William Keegan made no mention of any indications that the vehicle had been broken into. But if it was not broken into, someone must have unlocked it so the diamonds and bonds could be removed. Did the driver, Joseph Trombino, unlock the truck or was someone else involved?
<br><br>If someone other than Trombino unlocked the truck, who were they and how were they able to unlock the vehicle? If Trombino unlocked the truck, why did he do this? Did someone perhaps threaten him and force him to open the truck so they could steal the valuables from it?
<br><br>The information currently available, if accurate, suggests that someone other than Trombino took away the valuables from the truck. If Trombino had taken the diamonds and bonds with him when he left his vehicle, these would surely have been on him when his body was found. Instead, the only item found with him, according to Brink's, was his messenger bag. [29]
<br><br>It is conceivable that Trombino took the diamonds and bonds from his truck, perhaps so they wouldn't be buried in the rubble if the North Tower collapsed, and then these items were surreptitiously stolen by an opportunistic thief when Trombino's body was found. This scenario, however, seems unlikely in light of the tight security at the World Trade Center site in the months after 9/11.
<br><br>In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, the Port Authority Police Department, New York Police Department, National Guard, and other agencies established a "security perimeter" around the site, according to Charles Vitchers and Robert Gray, two workers involved in the recovery effort at Ground Zero. [30] There were "legions of police officers" preventing members of the public from approaching the site, the Associated Press reported. [31] Pastor C. H. Dyer described the "extremely tight security" he observed when he visited the site a few weeks after 9/11. "No piece of evidence, no body or even body part would leave the scene unexamined," he recalled. [32] Sneaking away a million dollars' worth of diamonds and bonds under these circumstances would surely have been extremely difficult.
<br><br><b>THEFT OF THE DIAMONDS AND BONDS MUST HAVE BEEN CAREFULLY PLANNED</b>
<br>If someone, or some people, other than Trombino took the diamonds and bonds from the Brink's truck, they presumably must have known beforehand that the vehicle would be at the World Trade Center on the morning of September 11. This fact would apparently have been quite easy to discover, since Trombino followed a regular routine. He and his co-workers would stop at the Trade Center every day, Brink's stated. [33] Trombino would then "leave his armored truck and deliver millions of dollars in securities on foot to numerous stops around Wall Street," according to the <i>New Jersey Star-Ledger</i>. [34] A person could therefore have learned where the Brink's truck would be on the morning of September 11 simply by surveilling Trombino's daily movements.
<br><br>If the diamonds and bonds were stolen from Trombino's truck, and those responsible decided specifically to commit their crime on September 11, this person, or persons, presumably had foreknowledge of the attacks on the World Trade Center and aimed to exploit the chaos the attacks would cause in order to steal the valuables when there would be minimal risk of getting caught. If this was the case, how did they learn the World Trade Center was going to be attacked on September 11?
<br><br><b>TIMING OF THE ATTEMPTED REMOVAL OF GOLD INDICATES FOREKNOWLEDGE OF THE 9/11 ATTACKS</b>
<br>The attempted removal of millions of dollars' worth of gold from vaults under the World Trade Center also needs to be carefully investigated. Discovering who was behind this incident ought to be a fairly straightforward task. Investigators could, for example, determine who owned the truck that was transporting the gold simply on the basis of the vehicle's license plate number.
<br><br>The fact that the removal of an unusually--and presumably suspiciously--large amount of gold from the vaults was attempted at the same time as the 9/11 attacks occurred seems unlikely to have been a coincidence. Those involved may therefore have known in advance what was going to happen on September 11 and specifically arranged to remove the gold when the attacks were underway. If this was the case, how did they get foreknowledge of the attacks?
<br><br>Additionally, the fact that the vehicles found in the delivery tunnel with the gold bullion had apparently been abandoned before the Twin Towers collapsed suggests that the drivers were warned in advance that the towers were going to come down. If this was the case, who gave them the warning? And how did that person know the towers were going to come down?
<br><br><b>HAVE INVESTIGATORS LOOKED INTO THESE INCIDENTS?</b>
<br>It would be helpful to know if the apparent theft of diamonds and bonds from the Brink's armored truck and the attempted removal of gold from vaults under the World Trade Center have ever been investigated. Has the FBI or any other government agency looked into these incidents? Did Brink's investigate the disappearance of diamonds and bonds from its truck? If these incidents have been investigated, what did the investigators find?
<br><br>William Keegan wrote that a "noncriminal investigation report--NCIR #05-02--was prepared and filed" sometime after Joseph Trombino's truck was unearthed. However, he gave no details of what was in the report. [35] Did it provide any details of who might have taken the valuables from the truck?
<br><br>Establishing what exactly happened and who was behind the two suspicious incidents described in this article would surely improve our understanding of the 9/11 attacks. Information already available suggests that these events may have come about as a result of some people having foreknowledge of the attacks, which they tried to use in order to gain financially.
<br><br>If this was the case, investigating who these people were and who informed them about what was going to happen on September 11 may help determine the identities of some of the people who planned the 9/11 attacks. This is crucial information that needs to be uncovered.
<br><br><b>NOTES</b>
<br>[1] <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/17/us/after-attack-portraits-grief-victims-still-alive-hearts-those-who-loved-them.html" target="_blank">"Still Alive in the Hearts of Those Who Loved Them." <i>New York Times</i>, September 17, 2001</a>; <a href="http://blog.nj.com/lives_remembered/2011/08/francis_j_trombino_survived_on.html" target="_blank">"Francis J. Trombino, Survived One Attack to Meet Another." <i>New Jersey Star-Ledger</i>, January 2, 2002</a>; William Keegan Jr. with Bart Davis, <i>Closure: The Untold Story of the Ground Zero Recovery Mission</i>. New York: Touchstone, 2006, p. 147.
<br>[2] <a href="http://www.sptimes.com/News/091601/Worldandnation/96_hours.shtml" target="_blank">Susan Taylor Martin, Bill Duryea, Michael Sandler, and Tom Drury, "96 Hours." <i>St. Petersburg Times</i>, September 16, 2001</a>; William Keegan Jr. with Bart Davis, <i>Closure</i>, pp. 147-148.
<br>[3] <a href="http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2001-09-22/news/0109220182_1_brink-truck-world-trade-center" target="_blank">Sean Gardiner, "Family Prays for Armored Car Driver." <i>Chicago Tribune</i>, September 22, 2001</a>.
<br>[4] William Keegan Jr. with Bart Davis, <i>Closure</i>, pp. 147-148.
<br>[5] Ibid. pp. 148-149.
<br>[6] <a href="http://blog.nj.com/lives_remembered/2011/08/francis_j_trombino_survived_on.html" target="_blank">"Francis J. Trombino, Survived One Attack to Meet Another."</a>
<br>[7] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20141014040837/http:/www.brinksblog.com/brinks-fallen-hero-a-911-tribute/" target="_blank">"Brink's Fallen Hero: A 9/11 Tribute." Brink's Blog, September 10, 2014</a>.
<br>[8] William Keegan Jr. with Bart Davis, <i>Closure</i>, p. 149.
<br>[9] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20141014040837/http:/www.brinksblog.com/brinks-fallen-hero-a-911-tribute/" target="_blank">"Brink's Fallen Hero: A 9/11 Tribute."</a>
<br>[10] <a href="http://www.sptimes.com/News/091601/Worldandnation/96_hours.shtml" target="_blank">Susan Taylor Martin, Bill Duryea, Michael Sandler, and Tom Drury, "96 Hours."</a>
<br>[11] <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/17/us/after-attack-portraits-grief-victims-still-alive-hearts-those-who-loved-them.html" target="_blank">"Still Alive in the Hearts of Those Who Loved Them."</a>
<br>[12] <a href="http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2001-09-22/news/0109220182_1_brink-truck-world-trade-center" target="_blank">Sean Gardiner, "Family Prays for Armored Car Driver"</a>; <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20141014040837/http:/www.brinksblog.com/brinks-fallen-hero-a-911-tribute/" target="_blank">"Brink's Fallen Hero: A 9/11 Tribute."</a>
<br>[13] <a href="http://www.sptimes.com/News/091601/Worldandnation/96_hours.shtml" target="_blank">Susan Taylor Martin, Bill Duryea, Michael Sandler, and Tom Drury, "96 Hours."</a>
<br>[14] <a href="http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2001-09-22/news/0109220182_1_brink-truck-world-trade-center" target="_blank">Sean Gardiner, "Family Prays for Armored Car Driver."</a>
<br>[15] <a href="http://blog.nj.com/lives_remembered/2011/08/francis_j_trombino_survived_on.html" target="_blank">"Francis J. Trombino, Survived One Attack to Meet Another."</a>
<br>[16] William Keegan Jr. with Bart Davis, <i>Closure</i>, pp. 147-148; <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20141014040837/http:/www.brinksblog.com/brinks-fallen-hero-a-911-tribute/" target="_blank">"Brink's Fallen Hero: A 9/11 Tribute."</a>
<br>[17] <a href="http://blog.nj.com/lives_remembered/2011/08/francis_j_trombino_survived_on.html" target="_blank">"Francis J. Trombino, Survived One Attack to Meet Another."</a>
<br>[18] <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/17/us/after-attack-portraits-grief-victims-still-alive-hearts-those-who-loved-them.html" target="_blank">"Still Alive in the Hearts of Those Who Loved Them."</a>
<br>[19] Ibid.
<br>[20] <a href="http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2001-09-22/news/0109220182_1_brink-truck-world-trade-center" target="_blank">Sean Gardiner, "Family Prays for Armored Car Driver."</a>
<br>[21] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20141014040837/http:/www.brinksblog.com/brinks-fallen-hero-a-911-tribute/" target="_blank">"Brink's Fallen Hero: A 9/11 Tribute."</a>
<br>[22] William Keegan Jr. with Bart Davis, <i>Closure</i>, pp. 147-148.
<br>[23] <a href="http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2001-09-22/news/0109220182_1_brink-truck-world-trade-center" target="_blank">Sean Gardiner, "Family Prays for Armored Car Driver."</a>
<br>[24] <a href="http://www.nydailynews.com/archives/news/cache-gold-found-wtc-truckloads-retrieved-tunnel-rubble-article-1.917973" target="_blank">Greg Gittrich, Thomas Zambito, and Leo Standora, "Cache of Gold Found at WTC." <i>New York Daily News</i>, October 31, 2001</a>; <a href="http://911research.wtc7.net/cache/wtc/evidence/timesonline_gold.html" target="_blank">Nicholas Wapshott, "Crushed Towers Give up Cache of Gold Ingots." <i>The Times</i>, November 1, 2001</a>; <a href="http://nymag.com/news/9-11/10th-anniversary/gold/" target="_blank">Geoffrey Gray, "The Towers' Buried Treasure." <i>New York</i>, August 27, 2011</a>.
<br>[25] <a href="http://v1.theglobeandmail.com/special/attack/pages/marketreaction_article31.html" target="_blank">Len Zehr, Allan Robinson, and Andrew Willis, "Fortune in Bullion Buried in Rubble." <i>Globe and Mail</i>, September 13, 2001</a>; <a href="http://911research.wtc7.net/cache/wtc/evidence/timesonline_gold.html" target="_blank">Nicholas Wapshott, "Crushed Towers Give up Cache of Gold Ingots"</a>; <a href="http://deltafarmpress.com/thanksgiving-ground-zero" target="_blank">Elton Robinson, "Thanksgiving at Ground Zero." <i>Delta Farm Press</i>, November 19, 2001</a>.
<br>[26] <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/01/nyregion/a-nation-challenged-the-vault-below-ground-zero-silver-and-gold.html" target="_blank">Jim Dwyer, "Below Ground Zero, Silver and Gold." <i>New York Times</i>, November 1, 2001</a>.
<br>[27] <a href="http://www.nydailynews.com/archives/news/cache-gold-found-wtc-truckloads-retrieved-tunnel-rubble-article-1.917973" target="_blank">Greg Gittrich, Thomas Zambito, and Leo Standora, "Cache of Gold Found at WTC."</a>
<br>[28] Joyce Selander, <i>Joyce, Queen of the Mountain: Female Courage and Hand-to-Hand Combat in the World's Largest Money Pit</i>. Bloomington, IN: iUniverse, 2011, p. 134.
<br>[29] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20141014040837/http:/www.brinksblog.com/brinks-fallen-hero-a-911-tribute/" target="_blank">"Brink's Fallen Hero: A 9/11 Tribute."</a>
<br>[30] Glenn Stout, Charles Vitchers, and Robert Gray, <i>Nine Months at Ground Zero: The Story of the Brotherhood of Workers Who Took on a Job Like no Other</i>. New York: Scribner, 2006, p. 43.
<br>[31] <a href="http://lang.sbsun.com/socal/terrorist/1001/06/terror15.asp" target="_blank">Alan Clendenning, "$200 Million in Gold, Silver Under the Trade Center." Associated Press, October 6, 2001</a>.
<br>[32] <a href="https://chdyer.net/2011/09/02/9-11/" target="_blank">C. H. Dyer, "September 11th: My Night at Ground Zero." C. H. Dyer: Thoughts and Visions From an Extreme Poverty Expert, September 2, 2011</a>.
<br>[33] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20141014040837/http:/www.brinksblog.com/brinks-fallen-hero-a-911-tribute/" target="_blank">"Brink's Fallen Hero: A 9/11 Tribute."</a>
<br>[34] <a href="http://blog.nj.com/lives_remembered/2011/08/francis_j_trombino_survived_on.html" target="_blank">"Francis J. Trombino, Survived One Attack to Meet Another."</a>
<br>[35] William Keegan Jr. with Bart Davis, <i>Closure</i>, p. 149.Shoestringhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01534319150672667644noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2990970741097819876.post-3819946654851053242016-09-06T04:25:00.000-07:002016-09-06T04:25:09.604-07:00Recovery Workers Reportedly Found the Black Boxes From the Planes That Hit the World Trade Center on 9/11, but Authorities Covered This Up<br><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhv-rtIkiPA8c_-Mzd8ReJNIKQh7DfMglSbJETx5rSrscLVn0GKuMzf_fWlbKN2QmXrK2f6yAagxeJV3lEpnEJpgJVHhL3VwIdtx0IGQivUvHu4KWpGSG4lz1EcaNY5GA1s93eiqd4k48LH/s1600/BlackBoxesWithBorder.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;" target="_blank"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhv-rtIkiPA8c_-Mzd8ReJNIKQh7DfMglSbJETx5rSrscLVn0GKuMzf_fWlbKN2QmXrK2f6yAagxeJV3lEpnEJpgJVHhL3VwIdtx0IGQivUvHu4KWpGSG4lz1EcaNY5GA1s93eiqd4k48LH/s1600/BlackBoxesWithBorder.jpg" alt="A poster depicting a plane's black boxes"/></a></div><br>The black boxes from the planes that crashed into the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, were found and retrieved in the weeks after the 9/11 attacks, a significant amount of evidence indicates. And yet government officials and the official investigation into the attacks have asserted that these devices were never recovered.
<br><br>A plane's two black boxes record important information about a flight. The black boxes from American Airlines Flight 11 and United Airlines Flight 175--the planes that hit the World Trade Center--could therefore have helped investigators determine what happened on these aircraft before they crashed on September 11.
<br><br>A number of people who were involved in the recovery effort in the weeks after 9/11 have said they saw or helped recover objects at the World Trade Center site that appeared to be black boxes from a plane. One worker unearthed an object that looked like a black box at Pier 25 on the Hudson River. FBI agents who inspected the object initially said enthusiastically that it appeared to be a black box, but subsequently said they didn't think it was one of these devices. A firefighter has described helping FBI agents retrieve three black boxes at Ground Zero and a colleague of his recalled seeing one of these being recovered.
<br><br>Additionally, investigators reportedly detected a signal that was being emitted by one of the black boxes from Flight 11 or Flight 175 and recovery workers were sent to search in the location where the signal was coming from.
<br><br>One government official actually said off the record that all four black boxes from Flight 11 and Flight 175 were recovered. This was certainly a reasonable assertion. It would in fact have been unusual if the devices were never found, since a plane's black boxes are made to survive extreme conditions, and so the black boxes on Flights 11 and 175 should have withstood the conditions they endured on September 11.
<br><br>Furthermore, experts have said they knew of no plane crashes, other than those at the World Trade Center, after which the black boxes weren't recovered. Indeed, the black boxes from the two other planes that were hijacked on September 11--American Airlines Flight 77 and United Airlines Flight 93--were recovered within a few days of the 9/11 attacks.
<br><br>If the accounts of the black boxes from Flights 11 and 175 being found are correct, we need to consider why the discoveries went unreported. And why has it been officially claimed that no black boxes were found at the World Trade Center site?
<br><br>Might it be because the information on the black boxes is inconsistent with the official account of the 9/11 attacks? Perhaps it indicates that rogue individuals in the U.S. government and military were involved in planning and carrying out the attacks. So in order to maintain the official account of 9/11, it has been necessary to prevent the information on the black boxes being made public.
<br><br><b>BLACK BOXES CAN HELP INVESTIGATORS DISCOVER WHY A PLANE CRASHED</b>
<br>All commercial aircraft carry two black boxes: a cockpit voice recorder and a flight data recorder. These devices record information while a plane is in flight, which, in the event of the plane crashing, can help investigators reconstruct the events that preceded the crash. The black boxes are each about the size of a shoe box and, despite the name, are colored bright orange, to make them more visible in the wreckage of a crash. They are located in the tail of a plane, since this is the area of an aircraft that usually survives a crash most intact. [1]
<br><br>The flight data recorder records details of a plane's operation. Sensors collect up to 700 different types of information, such as the plane's airspeed, altitude, cabin pressure, engine performance, direction, and fuel flow. Data that cover up to 25 hours of flight prior to a crash will have been stored. The cockpit voice recorder, meanwhile, records noises in a plane's cockpit, such as conversations and radio transmissions. The audio information is taken by up to four microphones, which are usually located on the pilots' headsets. Sounds from the last 30 minutes of a flight prior to a crash will have been stored. [2]
<br><br>The black boxes from the planes that were hijacked on September 11 could have provided investigators with invaluable information about these flights. At Ground Zero, finding the black boxes from Flights 11 and 175 was therefore considered a priority in the initial days of the recovery operation. Numerous posters showing what a plane's black boxes look like were put up around the World Trade Center site so people would recognize the devices if they came across one as they searched through the debris. [3] The accounts below strongly suggest that recovery workers did indeed find some or all of the black boxes from Flights 11 and 175.
<br><br><b>FBI AGENTS SAID AN OBJECT FOUND IN THE RUBBLE LOOKED LIKE A BLACK BOX, BUT THEN CHANGED THEIR MINDS</b>
<br>On October 12, 2001, an operating engineer unearthed what appeared to be a black box from a plane while he was scraping up a load of debris at Pier 25 on the Hudson River. [4] At Pier 25, a short distance from the World Trade Center site, debris was being loaded onto barges and then transported to the Fresh Kills landfill on Staten Island. [5] The operating engineer thought the object was the same shape as a black box. It was too badly burned and blackened, though, for him to tell if it had originally been bright orange, the color of a plane's black boxes. The crane operator at the pier inspected the object and he too thought it looked like a black box.
<br><br>The operating engineer made a call to report the discovery and got through to Lieutenant Ed Moss of the Port Authority Police Department (PAPD). In response to the call, Moss and his colleague, Lieutenant Bill Doubrawski, went to the pier and examined the object. Both men thought it appeared to be one of the black boxes. Excited at the discovery, Moss contacted Lieutenant William Keegan, who was in charge of the PAPD's nighttime rescue and recovery operation at Ground Zero, told him what had happened, and described the object that had been unearthed. Wanting to examine the object for himself, Keegan went to Pier 25.
<br><br>After comparing the object to some photos of the black boxes from a plane, Keegan agreed with his colleagues' assessment. He has recalled that he determined the object "was absolutely close enough to the pictures available to us to notify the FBI without delay." The PAPD officers promptly requested that some FBI agents working at Ground Zero meet them at the PAPD command post, in front of the Borough of Manhattan Community College.
<br><br>Twenty to 30 minutes later, two FBI agents arrived at the command post. They inspected the object and compared it to a diagram of a black box. Like the other people who examined it, they appear to have thought it was one of the black boxes from Flight 11 or Flight 175. They said words to the effect of "Wow, this looks like it!" and "It's the same shape!" according to Keegan. And yet for no obvious reason, after examining the object for a few more minutes, they apparently changed their opinion. They told the PAPD officers, "We don't think it's a black box."
<br><br>Keegan suggested to the two agents that if the object wasn't one of the black boxes, it could be thrown onto a barge to be taken to the Fresh Kills landfill, along with the other debris. But one of them quickly protested, saying, "No, no, we're going to take it with us." The agents then went away, taking the object with them. Keegan and his colleagues never subsequently received any information about the object and whether it was indeed one of the black boxes. [6]
<br><br><b>INVESTIGATORS DETECTED A SIGNAL THAT WAS THOUGHT TO BE FROM A BLACK BOX</b>
<br>Recovery workers searched for one of the black boxes from Flight 11 or Flight 175 after a signal thought to have been coming from the device was detected in the week after 9/11.
<br><br>A report published by the New York State Emergency Management Office on September 18, 2001, stated that investigators had "identified the signal from one of the black boxes" in the debris at Ground Zero. [7] The <i>New York Times</i> mentioned the discovery, reporting that on September 18, a law enforcement official said a signal from a plane's black box may have been detected. "They are picking up some pinging," the official said. "But," the official added, "there is so much stuff on top of it, including ironwork, that it will take some time for them to get to it." [8]
<br><br>Recovery workers searched for the black box in locations where the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)--the government agency that is responsible for operating the U.S. air traffic control system--told them the signal had been detected. FAA personnel initially said they thought the signal was coming from the corner of Liberty and Church Streets, which bordered the south and east edges of the World Trade Center site. Recovery workers were therefore sent to dig at this location.
<br><br><b>POLICE OFFICERS SEARCHED FOR A BLACK BOX ON THE ROOF OF A WORLD TRADE CENTER BUILDING</b>
<br>But a few days later, the FAA decided the signal originated from a different location. On Friday, September 21, it said the signal was coming from inside or directly below the roof of Building 5 of the World Trade Center. This building was in the northeast corner of the World Trade Center site, a significant distance from where the FAA previously said the signal originated.
<br><br>Three officers with the New York City Police Department's Emergency Service Unit (ESU) were sent to search the roof of Building 5. Once they made it up there, the officers looked around for a hole or a dent that would have been created if a black box had impacted the roof after being catapulted out of one of the planes that crashed into the World Trade Center. However, they found the roof to be intact, with no signs of any objects landing on it.
<br><br>One of the ESU officers, Steven Stefanakos, repeatedly tried contacting the FAA employee(s) responsible for finding the black boxes at Ground Zero, to request more details about the location of the black box, but received no response. Eventually, a voice came over his radio and told him: "The FAA aren't here. They went home for the weekend." Since it was only around five o'clock in the afternoon, Stefanakos and his two colleagues were astonished that the FAA employee(s) had left work early at such a critical time, when it was possible that one of the black boxes was about to be found. The three ESU officers then abandoned their search for the day. [9] Whether a black box was later found and retrieved from Building 5 is unknown.
<br><br>Strangely, the claim that a signal from a plane's black box had been detected at the World Trade Center site was subsequently denied. A report published by the New York City Office of Emergency Management on September 25, 2001, stated that the FAA had been "[u]nable to detect any pinging" from a black box at Ground Zero. [10] And while a team from the Army's Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM) that arrived at the World Trade Center site two days after 9/11 identified "some signals that could have emanated from the black boxes" using "radio frequency detectors," CECOM official Toni Quiroz said that "it was never determined" if any of these signals had come from one or more of the black boxes. [11]
<br><br><b>FIREFIGHTER SAID HE RETRIEVED THREE BLACK BOXES AT GROUND ZERO</b>
<br>One man who worked extensively at Ground Zero stated that he helped recover three black boxes from the rubble of the World Trade Center. Firefighter Nicholas DeMasi was assigned to take some FBI agents around the World Trade Center site in his all-terrain vehicle to search for the devices. "There were a total of four black boxes," he has commented, adding, "We found three." [12]
<br><br>Mike Bellone, a volunteer recovery worker at Ground Zero, supported DeMasi's account. He said he personally witnessed one of the black boxes being recovered. He recalled that around late September or early October 2001, he saw DeMasi escorting "these FBI agents into the area" to search for the black boxes. "They had found one [of the black boxes] that I know of, that I actually physically saw," he said. He described this object as "a box that appeared charred but was reddish-orange with two white stripes"--a description that fits a plane's black box.
<br><br>Bellone recalled that when DeMasi finished escorting the FBI agents around the World Trade Center site, the firefighter told him that "they had found two more" black boxes. "The FBI looked pretty happy about it," Bellone commented. The FBI agents took the three black boxes with them when they left the site, he said. [13]
<br><br><b>ALL FOUR BLACK BOXES WERE FOUND, ACCORDING TO ONE OFFICIAL</b>
<br>A government official stated that in fact all four black boxes from Flights 11 and 175 were found at the World Trade Center site.
<br><br>In an attempt to learn what happened to the black boxes from the planes that hit the Twin Towers, investigative reporter Dave Lindorff talked to someone from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)--the government agency that is responsible for investigating every civil aviation accident that occurs in the United States. Lindorff asked, "How many of these boxes did they actually ever find?" The NTSB official asked Lindorff if he wanted "the real answer or the official answer." Lindorff said he wanted the real answer and was told, "Well then, that has to be off the record." The official then said, "We got all four of them and ... they're now in the possession of the FBI, which took them away from us." [14]
<br><br><b>GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS CLAIMED NO BLACK BOXES WERE FOUND AT GROUND ZERO</b>
<br>Despite the evidence described above, which indicates that black boxes from Flights 11 and 175 were recovered in the weeks after 9/11, U.S. government officials have claimed that none of the black boxes from the planes that crashed into the World Trade Center were found.
<br><br>FBI spokesman Stephen Kodak stated: "To the best of my knowledge, the flight recording devices from the World Trade Center crashes were never recovered. At least we never had them." And Jim Margolin, a spokesman for the FBI's New York office, said, after checking with the leader of the bureau's Ground Zero investigation, that no black boxes were recovered from the wreckage of the World Trade Center.
<br><br>Ted Lopatkiewicz, a spokesman for the NTSB, said: "No recorders were recovered from the World Trade Center. At least none were delivered to us by the FBI." And New York City Fire Department spokesman Frank Gribbon said that "no one" in the Fire Department was "aware of the recovery of any of the airline black boxes" at the World Trade Center site. [15]
<br><br>Additionally, the final report of the 9/11 Commission--the official investigation into the 9/11 attacks--stated that the black boxes from Flights 11 and 175 "were not found." [16]
<br><br><b>BLACK BOXES ARE PRACTICALLY INDESTRUCTABLE AND HAD ALWAYS BEEN FOUND AFTER PREVIOUS PLANE CRASHES</b>
<br>It is in fact reasonable to expect that all four black boxes from Flights 11 and 175 would have been recovered after 9/11, for a number of reasons. To begin with, a plane's black boxes are virtually indestructible. They are made to survive extreme conditions. A part of them called the "crash survivable memory unit," in which the data is stored, is housed in a shell made of immensely strong materials and can withstand a crash impact many times the force of gravity, heat of up to 2,000 degrees Fahrenheit for one hour, and immersion in salt water for at least 30 days. [17]
<br><br>Furthermore, the black boxes on the planes that were hijacked on September 11 were modern solid-state models, which are more resistant to damage than older magnetic tape recorders. [18] The black boxes from Flights 11 and 175 should therefore have survived the crashes on September 11 and the collapses of the World Trade Center towers.
<br><br>Additionally, experts have clearly indicated that recovery workers should have been able to find the black boxes in the rubble of the World Trade Center. NTSB spokesman Ted Lopatkiewicz commented on the alleged failure to find the devices, saying, "I can't recall another domestic case in which we did not recover the recorders." [19]
<br><br>And veteran air crash investigator Dale Leppard said he was "quite surprised" when he heard the claim that no black boxes were found at the World Trade Center site. He noted that although the site was "a big mess" in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, a plane's black boxes are "very distinctive." "They're bright orange color and they're very easy to see," he said. When asked, "Have you ever been to a scene or heard of a scene where the black boxes were not recovered?" Leppard replied: "I have not. ... Never once." He said the odds of going to the scene of a crash and being unable to find the black boxes there were "almost zero." [20]
<br><br>Leppard has extensive relevant experience and so his opinion on this matter is particularly notable. He has been involved in aviation accident investigation since 1965, and has won several awards for his accident investigation and reconstruction activities. He has assisted the NTSB with over 25 field investigations and helped with the reconstruction of over 100 accidents. He has served as chairman of the Air Line Pilots Association National Accident Investigation Board and chairman of the International Federation of Air Line Pilots' Associations Accident Analysis Committee. [21]
<br><br>It is also worth noting that, in contrast to the alleged failure to find the black boxes from Flights 11 and 175, the black boxes from American Airlines Flight 77--the plane that reportedly crashed into the Pentagon on September 11--and United Airlines Flight 93--which supposedly crashed in a field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania, on September 11--were recovered within three days of the 9/11 attacks. [22]
<br><br><b>THE FBI TOLD A RECOVERY WORKER HE SHOULDN'T TALK ABOUT THE DISCOVERY OF THE BLACK BOXES</b>
<br>If the black boxes from Flights 11 and 175 were recovered, we need to consider why the discoveries went unreported when they occurred and authorities have, in the years since 9/11, claimed that no black boxes were found at the World Trade Center site.
<br><br>As well as denying that the black boxes were found, government officials instructed witnesses to keep quiet about the discoveries, according to Mike Bellone. Bellone said he "had a visit from an FBI agent that said I shouldn't discuss the matter" of the recovery of the black boxes. When he asked why he should keep quiet, the agent told him: "It's something that we really shouldn't discuss right now. You really shouldn't talk about it." [23]
<br><br>And yet this behavior appears to make no sense. Dave Lindorff commented: "Why would the main intelligence and law enforcement arm of the U.S. government want to hide from the public not just the available information about the two hijacked flights that provided the motivation and justification for the nation's 'war on terror,' and for its two wars against Afghanistan and Iraq, but even the fact that it has the devices which could contain that information?" [24] In other words, why would the government suppress information that should have strengthened its case for fighting the "war on terror"?
<br><br>The accounts of people who said they recovered black boxes at the World Trade Center site or were told that a signal from a black box had been detected at the site give rise to a lot of questions. Why, for example, did FBI agents say the object found at Pier 25 wasn't a black box, especially considering that they initially said it appeared to be a black box and they had no obvious reason to change their assessment?
<br><br>And if the agents genuinely believed the object wasn't a black box, why did they prevent William Keegan from throwing it onto a barge to be transported to the Fresh Kills landfill and instead take it away with them? A possible explanation for their behavior is that they did indeed think the object was a black box, but they had been told that if any of the black boxes were found, the discovery had to be kept quiet.
<br><br><b>THE FAA MADE CONFLICTING CLAIMS ABOUT A POSSIBLE SIGNAL FROM A BLACK BOX</b>
<br>Also, why did the FAA say on September 21, 2001, that a signal from a plane's black box was coming from World Trade Center Building 5 when it previously said the signal was coming from the corner of Liberty and Church Streets, a significant distance away from Building 5? Could the agency really have made such a major error about where the signal was coming from?
<br><br>And why did the FAA employee(s) responsible for finding the black boxes at Ground Zero leave work so early that day? Surely they would have wanted to be available to assist the recovery workers who were searching for a black box in the new location, especially since the workers may have been on the verge of retrieving one of the crucial devices.
<br><br>The police officers who searched for a black box on the roof of Building 5 clearly seem to have found this odd. According to author Anthea Appel, they complained to each other, "We've been workin' every day for 16 or 17 hours straight with no days off and here we are, inches away from the black box, and the FAA just get up and leave in the middle of a recovery just because they don't wanna screw up their weekend!" [25]
<br><br>Furthermore, why was it reported on September 25, 2001, that the FAA had been unable to detect a signal from a black box at Ground Zero, even though the agency previously told recovery workers the locations where a signal had been detected? Might it be because, by that time, the black box that emitted the signal had been recovered, but FAA personnel had been instructed to cover this fact up and act as if no black boxes had been found?
<br><br><b>INFORMATION ON THE BLACK BOXES MAY BE INCONSISTENT WITH THE OFFICIAL 9/11 STORY</b>
<br>If the black boxes from Flights 11 and 175 were found, a possible reason why this fact has been concealed is that the information on the devices is inconsistent with what is supposed to have happened on September 11, according to the official account of the 9/11 attacks. But if this is the reason, why were the discoveries of the black boxes from the two other planes that were hijacked on September 11--Flights 77 and 93--openly reported and never officially denied, when the information on these devices might also be inconsistent with the official account of the attacks?
<br><br>A possible explanation is that the people who planned the 9/11 attacks would ideally have liked to have claimed, after September 11, that none of the black boxes from the four hijacked planes were retrieved, since the information stored on the devices could, if made public, lead some people to question the official account of the attacks. They determined, however, that it would appear incredible and suspicious if it was claimed that no black boxes were found at the Pentagon and in Shanksville. At these crash sites, the devices would endure less severe conditions than would occur at the World Trade Center.
<br><br>The planners of the attacks could have decided they would at least be able to get away with claiming that no black boxes were found in the rubble of the World Trade Center, since the loss of the black boxes from Flights 11 and 175 would seem plausible, at least to the average member of the public. Considering the massive destruction that would occur when the World Trade Center towers collapsed and the huge amount of debris that would be created, they assumed it could be convincingly suggested that the black boxes were destroyed or lost.
<br><br><b>DETAILS OF WHAT IS ON THE BLACK BOXES FROM FLIGHTS 77 AND 93 MAY HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED</b>
<br>It is worth noting that although the recoveries of the black boxes from Flights 77 and 93 were openly reported and never denied, evidence suggests there may have been efforts to cover up the details of what is stored on some of these devices. For example, the cockpit voice recorder from Flight 77 was said to be "badly burned and not recoverable" in the <i>9/11 Commission Report</i>. [26] And yet, since black boxes are virtually indestructible, this claim seems dubious. Government sources in fact told CBS News something different: that Flight 77's cockpit voice recorder appeared to be "blank or erased." [27]
<br><br>And while a transcript of the cockpit voice recording from Flight 93 was released in 2006, the audio from Flight 93's cockpit voice recorder has never been made available to the general public, reportedly because "it would be broadcast repeatedly, something family members of those killed [on Flight 93] have objected to." [28]
<br><br>If there has indeed been a concerted effort to conceal details about the information stored on the black boxes from Flights 77 and 93, a possible reason for the cover-up is that the information is inconsistent with the official account of the 9/11 attacks and so, if it was made public, this could lead people to question that account.
<br><br><b>THE NTSB REPORTEDLY EXAMINED THE BLACK BOXES FROM FLIGHTS 11 AND 175</b>
<br>In light of the contradictions between the accounts of black boxes being recovered at the World Trade Center site and the official claim that no black boxes were found at the site, there is clearly a need to investigate what happened to the black boxes from Flight 11 and Flight 175 more closely.
<br><br>If these devices were indeed recovered, we need to know what information is stored on them. Dave Lindorff was told by his source at the NTSB, "We worked on them [the black boxes from Flights 11 and 175] here." [29] If this is true, the NTSB presumably has records of what information is on the black boxes, which could be released to the public.
<br><br>The information on the devices would surely give us a better understanding of what happened on September 11, 2001. And it might indicate that the truth about the terrorist attacks that day is very different from what we were led to believe.
<br><br><b>NOTES</b>
<br>[1] <a href="http://www.g4tv.com/articles/32673/the-tech-behind-black-boxes/" target="_blank">"The Tech Behind Black Boxes." TechTV, September 14, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.cbsnews.com/news/speed-likely-factor-in-wtc-collapse-25-02-2002/" target="_blank">Brian Dakss, "Speed Likely Factor in WTC Collapse." CBS News, February 25, 2002</a>; <a href="http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/aircrash/jetl-nf.html" target="_blank">"Anatomy of a Jetliner." PBS, February 17, 2004</a>.
<br>[2] <a href="http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2001-09-14/news/0109140350_1_flight-data-cockpit-voice-recorder-black-boxes" target="_blank">Jon Hilkevitch, "Flight Recorders Could Answer Key Questions." <i>Chicago Tribune</i>, September 14, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.g4tv.com/articles/32673/the-tech-behind-black-boxes/" target="_blank">"The Tech Behind Black Boxes"</a>; <a href="http://www.sptimes.com/News/091501/Worldandnation/FBI_analyzing_voice__.shtml" target="_blank">"FBI Analyzing Voice, Data Recorders From Two Flights." Associated Press, September 15, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/aircrash/jetl-nf.html" target="_blank">"Anatomy of a Jetliner."</a>
<br>[3] William Keegan Jr. with Bart Davis, <i>Closure: The Untold Story of the Ground Zero Recovery Mission</i>. New York: Touchstone, 2006, p. 94.
<br>[4] Ibid.
<br>[5] <a href="http://www.nydailynews.com/archives/news/anguished-search-traces-missing-grim-task-fresh-kills-article-1.482684" target="_blank">Richard T. Pienciak, "Anguished Search for Traces of the Missing." <i>New York Daily News</i>, January 6, 2002</a>.
<br>[6] William Keegan Jr. with Bart Davis, <i>Closure</i>, pp. 94-96.
<br>[7] <a href="http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/229899/oem-foil-sec-4.pdf" target="_blank">"World Trade Center Plane Crash." New York State Emergency Management Office, September 18, 2001, p. 1</a>.
<br>[8] <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/19/nyregion/a-nation-challenged-the-site-at-the-site-little-hope-of-uncovering-survivors.html" target="_blank">Susan Sachs, "At the Site, Little Hope of Uncovering Survivors." <i>New York Times</i>, September 19, 2001</a>.
<br>[9] Anthea Appel, <i>The First Responders: The Untold Story of the New York City Police Department & September 11th, 2001</i>. InnerCircle Publishing, 2009, pp. 281-282.
<br>[10] <a href="http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/229899/oem-foil-sec-4.pdf" target="_blank">"Situation Report #27." New York City Office of Emergency Management, September 25, 2001, pp. 17-18</a>.
<br>[11] <a href="http://209.235.252.76/publications/armymagazine/archive/2002/2/Documents/Kern_0202.pdf" target="_blank">Paul J. Kern, "AMC: Accelerating the Pace of Transformation." <i>Army Magazine</i>, February 2002</a>; <a href="https://fcw.com/articles/2002/09/16/lessons-worth-remembering.aspx" target="_blank">Dan Caterinicchia, "Lessons Worth Remembering." <i>FCW</i>, September 16, 2002</a>.
<br>[12] Gail Swanson, <i>Behind the Scenes, Ground Zero, World Trade Center, September 11, 2001: A Collection of Personal Accounts</i>. New York: TRAC Team, 2003, p. 108.
<br>[13] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20041117091214/http:/www.pnionline.com/dnblog/extra/archives/001139.html" target="_blank">Will Bunch, "9/11 'Black Box' Cover-Up at Ground Zero?" <i>Philadelphia Daily News</i>, October 28, 2004</a>; <a href="http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x22hq7s_conspiracy-theory-with-jesse-ventura-9-11_news" target="_blank">"9/11." <i>Conspiracy Theory With Jesse Ventura</i>, truTV, December 9, 2009</a>.
<br>[14] <a href="http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x22hq7s_conspiracy-theory-with-jesse-ventura-9-11_news" target="_blank">"9/11."</a>
<br>[15] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20041117091214/http:/www.pnionline.com/dnblog/extra/archives/001139.html" target="_blank">Will Bunch, "9/11 'Black Box' Cover-Up at Ground Zero?"</a>; <a href="http://www.counterpunch.org/2005/12/19/9-11-missing-black-boxes-in-world-trade-center-attacks-found-by-firefighters-analyzed-by-ntsb-concealed-by-fbi/" target="_blank">Dave Lindorff, "9/11: Missing Black Boxes in World Trade Center Attacks Found by Firefighters, Analyzed by NTSB, Concealed by FBI." <i>CounterPunch</i>, December 19, 2005</a>.
<br>[16] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States</i>. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004, p. 456.
<br>[17] <a href="http://www.g4tv.com/articles/32673/the-tech-behind-black-boxes/" target="_blank">"The Tech Behind Black Boxes"</a>; <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1543564.stm" target="_blank">"Setback Over Pittsburgh Black Box." BBC News, September 15, 2001</a>.
<br>[18] <a href="http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2001-09-14/news/0109140350_1_flight-data-cockpit-voice-recorder-black-boxes" target="_blank">Jon Hilkevitch, "Flight Recorders Could Answer Key Questions."</a>
<br>[19] <a href="http://www.cbsnews.com/news/speed-likely-factor-in-wtc-collapse-25-02-2002/" target="_blank">Brian Dakss, "Speed Likely Factor in WTC Collapse."</a>
<br>[20] <a href="http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x22hq7s_conspiracy-theory-with-jesse-ventura-9-11_news" target="_blank">"9/11."</a>
<br>[21] <a href="http://www.experts.com/content/d/cv/dale-leppard-aviation-aircraft-accident-expert-cv.htm" target="_blank">"Personal Record of Dale L. Leppard." Experts.com, n.d.</a>; <a href="http://www.jurispro.com/DaleLeppard" target="_blank">"Dale L. Leppard (Leppard Forensic Reconstruction)." JurisPro, n.d.</a>
<br>[22] <a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2001/sep/14/20010914-025404-6074r/" target="_blank">"'Black Boxes' Found at Pentagon." <i>Washington Times</i>, September 14, 2001</a>; <a href="http://old.post-gazette.com/headlines/20010915blackbox0915p3.asp" target="_blank">Matthew P. Smith, "Flight 93 Voice Recorder Found in Somerset County Crash Site." <i>Pittsburgh Post-Gazette</i>, September 15, 2001</a>.
<br>[23] <a href="http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x22hq7s_conspiracy-theory-with-jesse-ventura-9-11_news" target="_blank">"9/11."</a>
<br>[24] <a href="http://www.counterpunch.org/2005/12/19/9-11-missing-black-boxes-in-world-trade-center-attacks-found-by-firefighters-analyzed-by-ntsb-concealed-by-fbi/" target="_blank">Dave Lindorff, "9/11: Missing Black Boxes in World Trade Center Attacks Found by Firefighters, Analyzed by NTSB, Concealed by FBI."</a>
<br>[25] Anthea Appel, <i>The First Responders</i>, p. 282.
<br>[26] <a href="http://www.cbsnews.com/news/speed-likely-factor-in-wtc-collapse-25-02-2002/" target="_blank">Brian Dakss, "Speed Likely Factor in WTC Collapse"</a>; 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 456.
<br>[27] <a href="http://www.cbsnews.com/news/feds-would-have-shot-down-pa-jet/" target="_blank">"Feds Would Have Shot Down Pa. Jet." CBS News, September 12, 2001</a>.
<br>[28] <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2006/LAW/04/12/moussaoui.trial/" target="_blank">Phil Hirschkorn, "On Tape, Passengers Heard Trying to Retake Cockpit." CNN, April 13, 2006</a>; <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/13/us/13moussaoui.html" target="_blank">Neil A. Lewis, "Final Struggles on 9/11 Plane Fill Courtroom." <i>New York Times</i>, April 13, 2006</a>.
<br>[29] <a href="http://www.counterpunch.org/2005/12/19/9-11-missing-black-boxes-in-world-trade-center-attacks-found-by-firefighters-analyzed-by-ntsb-concealed-by-fbi/" target="_blank">Dave Lindorff, "9/11: Missing Black Boxes in World Trade Center Attacks Found by Firefighters, Analyzed by NTSB, Concealed by FBI."</a>Shoestringhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01534319150672667644noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2990970741097819876.post-55219105725219422512016-06-11T01:28:00.000-07:002016-06-11T01:28:44.711-07:00How Did Some Experts and Emergency Responders Know the Twin Towers Were Going to Collapse on 9/11?<br><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEii95cZEceMGLBe8AVdfIqev1VOiGW894Ntn3AG1A1MbFM3_oCF2PkL7oPCNmnPYRo3ahxsueuZsPUDeT2BtwiAdJclGsVjojCeK6X3WT8TQeXBnIi2MRY8_6S3znsNOjocq6TrKykaZYpR/s1600/SouthTower.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;" target="_blank"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEii95cZEceMGLBe8AVdfIqev1VOiGW894Ntn3AG1A1MbFM3_oCF2PkL7oPCNmnPYRo3ahxsueuZsPUDeT2BtwiAdJclGsVjojCeK6X3WT8TQeXBnIi2MRY8_6S3znsNOjocq6TrKykaZYpR/s1600/SouthTower.jpg" alt="The South Tower collapsing"></a></div><br>A number of individuals who worked in key positions apparently knew that the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center were going to collapse before the two buildings came down on September 11, 2001. These men talked with colleagues about their concern that the towers might come down, and some of them issued stark warnings about the danger and ordered people to get away from the World Trade Center.
<br><br>Although their warnings have, in some cases, been credited with saving lives, the behavior of these men is, on closer examination, surprising and quite suspicious. This is because the general opinion before September 11 was that the Twin Towers would survive being hit by planes and the outcomes of previous high-rise fires should have led the men to think the towers would easily endure the fires they suffered on September 11 without collapsing.
<br><br>Studies, which many firefighters and experts were aware of, had determined that the Twin Towers would withstand being hit by large jet aircraft. Furthermore, no steel-framed high-rise building had ever collapsed due to fire before 9/11. Steel-framed skyscrapers, like the Twin Towers, had survived fires that were larger and burned for longer than those that occurred on September 11. Unsurprisingly, then, it never occurred to most experts and most of the firefighters who responded to the plane crashes at the World Trade Center that the towers were in danger of coming down.
<br><br>If the collapses of the Twin Towers occurred without the use of explosives, as official accounts have claimed, then these events were unprecedented. Nothing remotely like them had happened before. Why then did some experts and emergency responders warn--sometimes with great conviction--that the towers were going to collapse?
<br><br>We clearly need to examine why these men predicted that the Twin Towers would come down after the hijacked planes crashed into them on September 11, especially since some of them had specific expertise or professional experience that should have made them less likely than most people to anticipate the collapses.
<br><br><b>DID THE MEN WHO PREDICTED THE COLLAPSES HAVE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF 9/11?</b>
<br>Did the men who thought the Twin Towers were in danger of collapsing just possess remarkable foresight, such that--unlike their colleagues and many experts--they were able to predict events unlike anything that had ever happened before? Or might some, or all, of them have had at least a degree of foreknowledge of what was going to happen on September 11? Did any of them know that there was going to be a terrorist attack that day, during which the Twin Towers would collapse?
<br><br>If this was the case, it would surely mean the towers were brought down with explosives that were planted before September 11. And the men who warned that the towers were going to collapse must have known, or learned enough to suspect, that explosives had been planted in the buildings.
<br><br>If the towers were brought down with explosives, it would mean that the official account of 9/11 is wrong. Secretly preparing the World Trade Center to be demolished would have been a sophisticated and complex operation, way beyond the capabilities of Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda terrorist network. The involvement of powerful, well-placed, and knowledgeable people would be necessary to obtain the materials required for the demolitions, evade security at the Trade Center, and plant the explosives. The plotters must have included rogue individuals in the U.S. military and other government agencies.
<br><br>We need to consider how the men who warned that the Twin Towers were in danger of collapsing might have learned about what was going to happen on September 11. It is plausible that at least some of them knew what was going to happen because they were part of the group that planned the 9/11 attacks. However, since these men appear to have been trying to save lives on the morning of September 11 and, in some cases, put themselves at great risk as they responded to the attacks, this seems unlikely.
<br><br>Alternatively, the men could have been coerced into helping the perpetrators of 9/11 plan and prepare for the attacks due to their job positions or because of expertise they possessed, and could have gained some knowledge of what was going to happen on September 11 while they were reluctantly giving their assistance.
<br><br>Or perhaps the men were tricked into assisting the perpetrators without realizing they were helping with the preparations for a terrorist attack. They may, for example, have been invited to help carry out what they thought was a study to examine the vulnerability of the World Trade Center to a terrorist attack. The study, however, could in reality have been intended to help those behind 9/11 plan the attacks. Among other things, it could have helped them work out how to bring down the Twin Towers with explosives and how to evade security so as to plant explosives in the towers.
<br><br>If this is what happened, the men may suddenly have understood how they had been deceived when they learned that planes had crashed into the World Trade Center on September 11. They may then have realized, based on the content of the study they had been involved with, that the Twin Towers were probably going to be demolished as part of the attacks. And upon this realization, they could have decided to try and save lives by alerting people to the impending collapses.
<br><br>In this article, I describe the actions of several men who thought the Twin Towers were going to collapse before the buildings came down. I also look at evidence that shows the towers should easily have withstood being hit by planes and suffering major fires. In light of this information, it seems inexplicable that any knowledgeable professional could have confidently predicted they were going to collapse. Indeed, as I reveal, most experts and emergency responders assumed that the towers would remain standing after the hijacked planes crashed into them.
<br><br>I discuss various ways in which the men who believed the Twin Towers might collapse could have learned what was going to happen on September 11. And I describe the particular knowledge and experience some of them had, which may have prompted those behind 9/11 to seek them out and make use of their expertise when planning the attacks.
<br><br><b>SENIOR OFFICIALS AND A DEMOLITIONS EXPERT WARNED ABOUT THE COLLAPSES</b>
<br>At least six men explicitly warned that the Twin Towers were going to--or at least might--collapse before the buildings came down. These were Lieutenant Joseph Torrillo, director of the New York City Fire Department (FDNY) Fire Safety Education Unit; an engineer with the New York City Department of Buildings; Mark Loizeaux, president of Controlled Demolition Inc., a company that specializes in using explosives to make buildings collapse; Captain Anthony Whitaker, the commanding officer at the World Trade Center for the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey Police Department (PAPD); Peter Guidetti of the FDNY; and Deputy Chief Ray Downey of the FDNY.
<br><br><b>DIRECTOR OF FIRE SAFETY EDUCATION WARNED PEOPLE TO GET AWAY FROM THE TWIN TOWERS</b>
<br>Lieutenant Joseph Torrillo, a former firefighter, was, at the time of the 9/11 attacks, director of the FDNY Fire Safety Education Unit, which teaches fire prevention and survival to various establishments, such as schools and senior citizens' centers. His behavior on September 11 is notable for the conviction with which he repeatedly warned people that the Twin Towers were going to collapse and his dogged efforts to get people away from the towers.
<br><br>On the morning of September 11, Torrillo was at his office at FDNY headquarters in Brooklyn when he was informed that a plane had crashed into the World Trade Center. (That plane, American Airlines Flight 11, hit the North Tower at 8:46 a.m.) After seeing the burning North Tower on television, he headed out with three fire cadets and drove toward the Trade Center.
<br><br>From about an eighth of a mile away from the center, Torrillo could see what appeared to be eight to 10 floors of the North Tower on fire. One of the cadets asked him, "What do you think?" and, with remarkable prescience, he replied: "Everyone on the top of that building is going to die! That building is going to collapse! Today will be like no other day anyone ever remembered about New York City!"
<br><br>Torrillo drove to his old firehouse, across the street from the Twin Towers. After putting on some firefighting clothing, he ran toward the South Tower, reaching the building as the second hijacked plane, United Airlines Flight 175, crashed into it at 9:03 a.m. He then ran toward the North Tower.
<br><br>"As [I was] running toward the North Tower ... one of [the] things [I was] saying to myself [was] that these buildings [were] going to collapse and that [I had] to let a lot of people know about it," Torrillo recalled. "It was very obvious to me that those buildings were going to collapse. ... I was positive," he said.
<br><br>Outside the North Tower, Lieutenant Anthony Mancuso, a friend of Torrillo's from the FDNY, pulled up near Torrillo and asked, "What's going on?" Torrillo replied: "Tony, look! Those buildings are going to collapse!" He also said, "We're going to lose all of the water around the Trade Center" and told Mancuso, "Take your engine and go about six blocks north, connect to a hydrant there, and bring the hoses back so we'll have water if we lose it here."
<br><br>Torrillo then repeated his warning, saying: "Listen to me! These buildings are going to collapse!" Mancuso took Torrillo's advice and moved his unit six blocks north. Perhaps at least partly due to Torrillo's warning, all of Mancuso's crew survived the collapses of the Twin Towers that day.
<br><br>Torrillo then ran to the corner of Liberty and West Streets, where he stopped ambulances that were heading to the World Trade Center from the Brooklyn-Battery Tunnel. He again warned that the Twin Towers were going to collapse, telling the drivers of the first two ambulances that the buildings would fall and they should make a U-turn, go back toward the tunnel, and park at the curb. The drivers passed Torrillo's instructions on to the other ambulances.
<br><br>Ladder Company 113 pulled up by Torrillo and Lieutenant Ray Brown asked, "Joe, what's going on?" After explaining the situation, Torrillo said: "Go back! Go back now!" Brown took Torrillo's advice and moved his ladder company about 100 feet away. All of the crew subsequently survived the collapses of the Twin Towers.
<br><br><b>FIRE SAFETY EDUCATION DIRECTOR THREATENED TO DRAG PEOPLE OUT OF THE SOUTH TOWER IF THEY DIDN'T LEAVE</b>
<br>Torrillo then noticed that, against his advice, an ambulance was racing toward the South Tower. He went and confronted the man in charge of it. The man retorted: "You don't have any authority! We don't work for you! We're going to set up a triage center in the lobby of the South Tower!" Torrillo warned him: "That building is going to fall! Get out of this building right now!"
<br><br>An emergency medical technician angrily said, "No!" and asked, "Who the hell are you?" Torrillo responded, "Either you get out of here or I will drag you out of here!" He instructed the members of the ambulance crew to set up a staging area about three blocks away from the Twin Towers. Finally, the men accepted his advice and drove away. Torrillo may have saved their lives because then, at 9:59 a.m., the South Tower collapsed. [1]
<br><br>Despite his efforts to warn others, however, Torrillo was caught in the collapse himself and suffered serious injuries from being hit by debris from the tower. [2]
<br><br>Torrillo has claimed that he thought it would take five or six hours before the Twin Towers came down. [3] He believed any collapse was "going to happen at two or three o'clock in the afternoon," he said. [4] However, if this is true, why did he instruct firefighters and ambulance crew members to get away from the towers immediately? Surely if he thought the towers would remain standing for five or six hours, he would have wanted emergency workers to respond normally while the buildings were stable and when their help at the World Trade Center was most urgently needed. He could have just warned emergency responders that they would need to get away from the towers later on, when, he claimed, he feared the towers were going to collapse.
<br><br>Torrillo also said he believed only the top floors of the towers--not the entire buildings--would come down. "I knew the amount of the fire would cause the tops of the buildings to twist and buckle," he commented. [5] But if this was the case, surely he could have just told firefighters and other emergency responders that they would need to remain inside the towers, where they could carry out their crucial work while staying safely away from any debris that would fall outside if the top floors came down.
<br><br>Torrillo's behavior, therefore, indicates that, contrary to what he claimed, Torrillo thought the collapses were imminent and would involve the buildings coming down completely, which would mean he had an accurate idea of what was going to happen that morning.
<br><br><b>ENGINEER THOUGHT THERE WAS AN 'IMMINENT DANGER OF COLLAPSE'</b>
<br>An unnamed engineer with the New York City Department of Buildings, like Torrillo, confidently predicted that the Twin Towers were going to collapse. Emergency Medical Service Division Chief John Peruggia recalled being alerted to the danger by this person while he was gathered with other emergency response officials in the lobby of World Trade Center Building 7, about 350 feet north of the Twin Towers.
<br><br>Sometime after the second hijacked plane crashed into the World Trade Center, one of these officials--an "engineer-type person" from the Department of Buildings--said that "it was believed that the structural damage that was suffered to the [Twin] Towers was quite significant and they were very confident that the building's stability was compromised," Peruggia described. "They felt that the North Tower, which was the first one to be struck, was going to be in imminent danger of collapse," he added. (The North Tower, however, was the second tower to collapse, coming down 29 minutes after the South Tower.)
<br><br>Peruggia grabbed Richard Zarillo, an emergency medical technician, and instructed him to go to the command post across the street from the North Tower and pass on the engineer's warning to Peter Ganci, the chief of the FDNY. Zarillo was to tell Ganci that "the building integrity is severely compromised and they believe the building is in danger of imminent collapse." [6]
<br><br>Zarillo went to the command post where he passed on Peruggia's message to Fire Marshal Steve Mosiello, Ganci's executive assistant, and then to Ganci. Although Ganci was surprised at the warning, about 30 seconds after he received it the South Tower started to collapse. [7]
<br><br><b>DEMOLITION ENGINEER TRIED PHONING PEOPLE TO WARN THEM ABOUT THE IMMINENT COLLAPSES</b>
<br>Another person who confidently predicted that the Twin Towers were going to collapse was Mark Loizeaux, president of Controlled Demolition Inc., a company based in Phoenix, Maryland, that specializes in using explosives to bring buildings down.
<br><br>Loizeaux recalled that when he saw the Twin Towers had been hit by planes, he knew right away they were going to come down. [8] He told his brother, Doug Loizeaux, the vice president of Controlled Demolition Inc., of his concern. "I told Doug immediately that the [North] Tower was coming down and when the second tower was hit, that it would follow," he said. [9] Loizeaux predicted that the South Tower would be the first building to collapse, even though it was hit by a plane 17 minutes after the North Tower was. "The second tower will fall first, because it was hit lower down," he said. [10]
<br><br>After seeing the second crash on television, the two Loizeaux brothers tried, initially without success, to alert people to the danger. Mark Loizeaux told his colleagues, "Start calling all the cell phones; tell them that the building is going to come down." [11]
<br><br>He wanted to contact the FDNY to tell it to pull its firefighters out of the Twin Towers. "I picked up the phone, dialed 411, got the number, and tried it," he recalled, but the line was busy. He then tried phoning the Mayor's Office of Emergency Management, in World Trade Center Building 7, but again was unsuccessful. "All circuits were busy; I couldn't get through," he said. [12] He was, though, able to contact a couple of members of the National Research Council committee that was involved in assessing the impact of explosives, to warn them about the impending collapses. [13]
<br><br>Loizeaux has claimed, since 9/11, that the Twin Towers came down due to the damage they suffered from being hit by planes and the ensuing fires. [14] And yet, if this is what he believed, why did he promptly call members of a committee that was involved in assessing the impact of explosives, following the crashes at the World Trade Center? Might it have been because, in truth, he thought there were explosives in the towers that were going to be used to bring the buildings down?
<br><br><b>POLICE CAPTAIN TOLD HIS MEN TO STAY OUT OF THE TWIN TOWERS, AS THEY COULD COLLAPSE</b>
<br>Captain Anthony Whitaker of the PAPD was one of several high-ranking officials who thought the Twin Towers were in danger of collapsing on September 11. As the commanding officer at the World Trade Center, he was responsible for all PAPD officers assigned to the center. [15]
<br><br>Two PAPD officers, Sergeant Quentin DeMarco and Daniel McCarthy, recalled Whitaker telling them the Twin Towers might collapse. DeMarco encountered Whitaker at the PAPD mobile command post, across the street from the North Tower, shortly before the first tower--the South Tower--came down. Whitaker told him that "no one is to enter the buildings," he said, because "they were structurally compromised and could collapse." [16]
<br><br>McCarthy was also at the mobile command post at the time. He recalled that Whitaker arrived "and advised all members of the department who were present not to enter the building." Whitaker told his men: "That building is not stable. I don't want any more of our guys going in there." McCarthy commented that he "strongly" believed Whitaker "was instrumental in saving the lives of approximately 40 more police officers" by issuing this warning. [17]
<br><br>After the South Tower came down, at 9:59 a.m., Whitaker warned people that the North Tower was also going to collapse. Joseph Morris, another senior PAPD officer, recalled that after the South Tower collapsed, Whitaker told his colleagues at the mobile command post, which was still parked across the street from the North Tower, "We have to get out of here." Morris asked, "Why?" and Whitaker replied, "The first tower came down and this [i.e. the North Tower] is going to come down too." [18]
<br><br>Whitaker may have warned that the North Tower was going to collapse because he believed that since it was enduring the conditions--damage from a plane crash and fires--that apparently caused the South Tower to come down, the North Tower would likely suffer the same fate as the South Tower. But it is also possible that he issued the warning because he had foreknowledge that the North Tower was going to collapse.
<br><br><b>POLICE CAPTAIN PROMPTLY ORDERED THE EVACUATION OF THE ENTIRE COMPLEX</b>
<br>Whitaker also exhibited considerable foresight by ordering the evacuation of every building in the World Trade Center complex in the time between Flight 11 crashing into the North Tower and Flight 175 crashing into the South Tower. This meant evacuating not just the Twin Towers, but also the five other buildings throughout the 16-acre complex.
<br><br>Transcripts of PAPD radio channel communications show that Whitaker ordered an evacuation at 9:00 a.m., three minutes before Flight 175 hit the South Tower. He said over his radio, "Let's begin an evacuation of the entire complex." [19] But Whitaker has said he ordered the evacuation of the entire complex twice before the South Tower was hit. He first ordered an evacuation, according to his recollections, very shortly after the North Tower was hit--apparently around 8:48 a.m.
<br><br>Whitaker was in the shopping mall beneath the Twin Towers when Flight 11 crashed into the North Tower, at 8:46 a.m. [20] He heard a "strange roar" and saw a "gigantic fireball" coming out of the lobby of the tower. He had "no idea what had just happened," he recalled, but he "knew it was bad." Although he was unaware that a plane had hit the North Tower, he promptly ordered an evacuation. He radioed the PAPD desk, in Building 5 of the World Trade Center, and "ordered the cop at the desk to begin a full-scale evacuation of the entire complex," he said. [21]
<br><br>Whitaker recalled that shortly before the South Tower was hit, while he was standing outside the North Tower and assessing the scene, he contacted the PAPD desk again and ordered "for the second time to evacuate the entire complex." [22] (He was presumably describing issuing the order that transcripts of radio communications show him giving at 9:00 a.m.)
<br><br>Although there were clearly exceptional circumstances at the time Whitaker ordered the evacuation of the World Trade Center complex, there are reasons to find Whitaker's actions unusual. To begin with, the order appears to have been quite a drastic measure. It meant evacuating "the mercantile exchange, offices of major investment banking concerns, and government agencies, including the FBI, the Secret Service, and the CIA," according to <i>New York Times</i> reporters Jim Dwyer and Kevin Flynn. "The consequences of such a decision would surely rattle through the highest levels of government and of the American free-market system," they wrote and commented, "Closing the Trade Center was not something anyone would dare order casually." [23]
<br><br>Additionally, when Whitaker gave the order, it was unclear whether the crash at the North Tower was part of a terrorist attack or due to something else, such as an accident. And at the time, Whitaker had received no information suggesting there would be additional attacks in New York. Furthermore, according to Dwyer and Flynn, "The authority to order an evacuation during a fire normally rests with the [New York] Fire Department, acting through the building's fire safety directors." [24] This suggests that Whitaker may have been going against protocol when he ordered the evacuation of the complex.
<br><br>Whitaker's astute and remarkably prompt decision to order the evacuation and thereby get people away from the vicinity of the Twin Towers may have been based simply on caution in an unprecedented crisis. It is worth considering, however, whether Whitaker made the decision because he knew the towers were going to be brought down that morning and he wanted to reduce how many people would be killed or injured when this happened.
<br><br>It certainly appears that some people were surprised that he ordered the evacuation of the entire World Trade Center complex so soon after the first crash. "After 9/11, I was repeatedly asked, 'Why did you give that order to evacuate at that particular time?'" Whitaker recalled. His rather vague explanation was: "It just occurred to me that whatever was going on--and I still didn't know what that was--was beyond my ability as a commanding officer of that facility to do anything about it. So it seemed to me that the only prudent thing to do was start a full-scale evacuation and get everybody out of there." [25]
<br><br><b>FIRE DEPARTMENT DRIVER ORDERED MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC TO GET AWAY FROM THE TWIN TOWERS</b>
<br>Peter Guidetti of the FDNY warned people, with conviction, that the Twin Towers were going to collapse before they came down. Although he was not himself a high-ranking official, Guidetti was the driver and personal aide of First Deputy Commissioner William Feehan, the second-highest official in the FDNY.
<br><br>Guidetti was at FDNY headquarters when he was informed that a plane had crashed into the World Trade Center. He was soon required to drive Feehan and three other FDNY officials to the Trade Center. He parked a couple of blocks away from the North Tower. Then, while Feehan and the other officials set off toward the Trade Center, he stayed with their car.
<br><br>Guidetti noticed members of the public around him who, he recalled, "just wanted to watch" the burning North Tower. He called out to them: "This building is coming down! Get out of here!" He later claimed he was unsure why he issued this warning. "Why I said that, I don't know," he commented. "I just really felt strongly about it."
<br><br>Flight 175 crashed into the South Tower a short time later. Guidetti subsequently set off to try and find Feehan, so he could stay by his side and provide assistance if necessary. As he got nearer to the World Trade Center, he looked up at the burning South Tower. He recalled that he immediately thought the building was, like the North Tower, going to collapse. "Don't go any further," he said to himself. "This fucking building is coming down." Seconds later, the South Tower began to collapse.
<br><br>Guidetti did not expect the Twin Towers to collapse completely, he has claimed. Instead, he said, he thought that "whatever was left above the plane crash in either tower would just give way and go this way, and come down into the street." [26]
<br><br><b>FIRE CHIEF SAID, 'THESE BUILDINGS CAN COLLAPSE'</b>
<br>Deputy Chief Ray Downey was another member of the FDNY who warned that the Twin Towers might collapse. Thomas Von Essen, the New York City fire commissioner, recalled that when be passed Downey in the lobby of the North Tower, reportedly at around 9:20 a.m. on September 11, Downey turned to him and matter-of-factly said, "You know, these buildings can collapse." [27] Downey in fact issued this warning "to several people," according to FDNY spokesman Frank Gribbon. [28]
<br><br>However, whereas other people who warned that the Twin Towers were in danger of collapsing have at least given the impression that they thought the buildings would come down due to the damage caused by the plane crashes and the ensuing fires, it appears that Downey suspected there were explosives in the towers that would be used to bring the buildings down. According to a book written by his nephew, before he encountered Von Essen, he checked in with the fire chiefs who were in charge at the World Trade Center and told them he was "worried about secondary devices in the towers, explosive devices that could hurt the firemen." [29] And Father John Delendick, an FDNY chaplain, recalled that when he met him after the South Tower collapsed, Downey said that "at that point he thought there were bombs up there [in the South Tower], because [its collapse] was too even." [30]
<br><br>Downey, who was greatly respected by his colleagues in the FDNY, was tragically killed when the North Tower collapsed at 10:28 a.m. [31]
<br><br><b>SENIOR FIREFIGHTERS DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITY OF THE NORTH TOWER COLLAPSING</b>
<br>At least three senior firefighters who went to the lobby of the North Tower in response to the first crash discussed among themselves the possibility that the North Tower could collapse. However, these men reportedly only thought the upper floors of the tower--presumably the floors above where the plane hit--might collapse and they apparently did not issue any explicit warnings about the possible danger. It is therefore harder to assess whether their concern indicates that any of them had foreknowledge of the collapses of the Twin Towers.
<br><br>Deputy Chief Peter Hayden, who had authority for the area of Manhattan in which the World Trade Center was located, helped set up and then presided over the command post in the lobby of the North Tower after Flight 11 crashed into the tower. [32] At the command post, he discussed the possibility of the North Tower collapsing with other senior firefighters. "We had a number of conferences with the staff chiefs about the possibility of collapse," he recalled. [33] "We discussed how much time we might have before the collapse and the amount of fire we had up there," he said. [34]
<br><br>Assistant Chief Joseph Callan, the citywide tour commander, arrived in the lobby shortly after Flight 175 crashed into the South Tower and took command of operations in the North Tower. [35] At some point after he arrived, he asked Hayden if the senior firefighters in the lobby were "thinking of collapse." (Hayden replied: "Yeah, we have to. A plane just struck the building.") [36]
<br><br>Callan recalled that subsequently, at around 9:30 a.m., he "made a decision that the building was no longer safe" and so he gave the order over radio for all fire department units to get out of the North Tower. [37] Among his reasons for giving the order, he said, "most importantly" was the fact that before he entered the lobby of the North Tower, he'd had "a good look at the plane crash damage and the extent of the fire on the upper floors," and he consequently "knew the building could collapse." [38]
<br><br>Deputy Assistant Chief Albert Turi, the FDNY chief of safety, arrived in the lobby shortly after the second crash. After arriving, "he discussed his concern about collapse," according to Hayden. [39] Turi recalled that, shortly before the South Tower came down, he thought there was a danger of a collapse occurring in the North Tower. [40]
<br><br>Hayden, Callan, and Turi were apparently only concerned about a localized or partial collapse occurring in the North Tower, rather than the entire building coming down. Hayden said the firefighters envisioned "a very limited type of collapse--the top 15 or 20 floors all folding in." [41] He said they believed there would be "a gradual collapse after a couple of hours of burning." [42] Turi, similarly, said he thought that "we would probably have some type of localized collapse up on the upper floors, especially in the core area of the building." He did not think there was any immediate danger. "I thought we would be pretty good for about three hours," he said. [43]
<br><br>The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) stated, based on interviews with firefighters, that none of the FDNY officials in the lobby of the North Tower "envisioned the magnitude or the type of collapse that occurred" and added, "There was no discussion of a total collapse of the WTC buildings." [44] "I don't think anybody anticipated a total cataclysmic collapse like the one that occurred," Hayden commented. [45]
<br><br><b>POLICE OFFICERS SAID THE TOWERS WERE GOING TO COLLAPSE</b>
<br>A few other emergency responders warned their colleagues or members of the public that the Twin Towers were in danger of collapsing. However, due to the lack of detail in the accounts of their actions, it is sometimes difficult to assess whether these individuals might have had foreknowledge of the collapses.
<br><br>Firefighter Richard Carletti arrived near the World Trade Center at around 9:15 a.m. on September 11 and noticed "a good 20 floors of fire in the South Tower." He turned to a colleague and told him, "This building is in danger of collapse." When he arrived at the command post a short time later, he told the fire chief there: "I think this building is in dire need. It's going to collapse." "In my opinion, I didn't think there was going to be a catastrophic collapse," Carletti has commented, "but from the fire load, there was no way." [46]
<br><br>Sergeant Joseph Poland of the PAPD promptly headed to the World Trade Center after being informed that it had been hit by a plane. As he approached it, he looked up at the North Tower. He then told a superior who was with him that the tower "was missing the whole northeast corner" and "looks like it is going to collapse." [47]
<br><br>Sergeant William Ross, another PAPD officer, was sent to the World Trade Center after the first crash. He arrived there at around 9:30 a.m. and saw both of the Twin Towers on fire. He recalled that a colleague of his, Sergeant Anthony Parlato, subsequently came up to him and the two men "started to discuss the possibility that the towers could come down." [48] Lieutenant John Murphy, also of the PAPD, went to the World Trade Center with Ross. Shortly before the South Tower collapsed, Ross said to him, "It's coming down." Murphy asked what was coming down and Ross replied, "The building." [49]
<br><br>Two people recalled police officers warning members of the public that the Twin Towers were in danger of collapsing. Shanthy Nambiar, a reporter, and Father James Nieckarz, a Catholic priest, were standing outside World Trade Center Building 7 shortly before the South Tower came down. "A couple of policemen came along," Nieckarz described. They were shouting to the people on the street: "Everyone run to the north. The tower is shaking and may come down." Nambiar recalled apparently the same incident, stating, "Police officers ordered people to start fleeing the area, saying the towers were in danger of collapse." [50] The <i>New York Times</i> described what appears to have been the same event. Before the South Tower collapsed, it reported, "Police officers warned people in the vicinity [of the Twin Towers] to move north, that the buildings could fall." [51] Whether the police officers who issued the warning belonged to the New York City Police Department or the PAPD is unstated.
<br><br><b>HIGH-RISES SUFFERED MAJOR FIRES BEFORE SEPTEMBER 11 WITHOUT COLLAPSING</b>
<br>The foresight displayed by the experts and emergency responders who thought the Twin Towers were going to collapse before the buildings came down is particularly curious because there was a significant amount of information, which was well known, that clearly indicated that the towers should have withstood the plane crashes and the fires they suffered on September 11.
<br><br>To begin with, steel-framed skyscrapers, like the Twin Towers, had previously suffered major fires without collapsing. In fact, as the <i>New York Times</i> reported, before 9/11, "no ... modern, steel-reinforced high-rise had ever collapsed because of an uncontrolled fire." [52] This fact would surely have been known to many firefighters and experts. "[A]ny experienced fire chief knew that no high-rise had ever collapsed from fire in the United States" before September 11, <i>Newsweek</i> commented. [53]
<br><br>Major high-rise fires before 9/11 included a fire in May 1988 at the First Interstate Bank building in Los Angeles--a 62-story high-rise--that burned for three and a half hours. [54] More than 120 firefighters responded to the incident and five of the building's floors sustained major fire damage. [55] All the same, the building remained standing.
<br><br>And in February 1991, One Meridian Plaza in Philadelphia--a 38-story high-rise--suffered a fire that lasted 19 hours. [56] Over 300 firefighters responded to the incident and nine of the building's floors were burned out by the fire. [57] It was "one of the worst high-rise fires in history," according to the <i>Philadelphia Inquirer</i>. [58] But, again, the building remained standing.
<br><br>A report by the Federal Emergency Management Agency noted that during these two fires, the buildings' steel columns "remained intact and sustained their load-carrying ability." [59] NIST described the two incidents as examples of "excellent overall structural integrity under adverse fire conditions." [60]
<br><br><b>THE WORLD TRADE CENTER SURVIVED A MAJOR FIRE IN 1975</b>
<br>The World Trade Center in fact suffered a major fire before 9/11 without any floors collapsing. The fire started late on the night of February 13, 1975, on the 11th floor of the North Tower. It spread through unprotected floor openings in the utility closets down to the 9th floor and up to the 19th floor. [61]
<br><br>A total of 132 firefighters fought the blaze and it took them three hours to put the fire out. [62] (In contrast, the fires in the Twin Towers on September 11 burned for 56 minutes and 1 hour 42 minutes before the buildings collapsed.) It was "a hot and stubborn fire to extinguish," W. Robert Powers, an investigator for the New York Board of Fire Underwriters, commented. [63] One firefighter said tackling it was "like fighting a blowtorch." [64]
<br><br>While the damage to most of the floors affected by the fire was confined to the utility closets, about 9,000 square feet of the contents on the 11th floor were destroyed or damaged. This was around 21 percent of the total area of the floor. [65] And yet the fire caused only minor structural damage. Specifically, four of the large steel trusses that supported the concrete floor were slightly buckled. [66] "There was no threat that the building would collapse," the <i>New York Times</i> noted. [67]
<br><br><b>THE TWIN TOWERS WERE DESIGNED TO WITHSTAND BEING HIT BY A LARGE AIRLINER</b>
<br>Not only should the Twin Towers have survived the fires they endured on September 11, they should also have withstood being hit by the planes that crashed into them. Engineers conducted two studies while the towers were being designed, which both concluded that the buildings would survive being hit by a Boeing 707--the largest commercial aircraft in operation at the time--without collapsing.
<br><br>The studies were performed by Worthington, Skilling, Helle & Jackson, the engineering firm that designed the Twin Towers. The first of them, conducted sometime before February 3, 1964, when its results were published in a white paper, considered the possible damage a Boeing 707 flying into one of the towers at 600 miles per hour would cause. The white paper reported: "Analysis indicates that such collision would result in only local damage, which could not cause collapse or substantial damage to the building, and would not endanger the lives and safety of occupants not in the immediate area of impact." The study in fact determined that the tower would have "a huge margin of reserve strength to help [it] survive the initial impact" of the plane, <i>New York Times</i> reporters James Glanz and Eric Lipton wrote. [68]
<br><br>The study found that the tightly spaced columns above the damage, connected to each other by spandrel plates, would spontaneously form an arch over the hole created by the plane. This arch would be so effective at strengthening the damaged structure that, according to Glanz and Lipton, "all the columns on one side of a tower could be cut, as well as the two corners and several columns on the adjacent sides, and the tower would still be strong enough to withstand 100-mile-per-hour winds." [69]
<br><br>The second study was carried out by Leslie Robertson, the lead structural engineer of the Twin Towers, who worked for Worthington, Skilling, Helle & Jackson, and is believed to have been conducted shortly after August 1964. Robertson calculated the effect of a Boeing 707 crashing into one of the towers at 180 miles per hour. He determined that the building would remain standing despite the force of the impact and the hole that would be created. [70]
<br><br>The Boeing 707 is only slightly smaller than the Boeing 767--the type of aircraft that crashed into the World Trade Center on September 11. It is 153 feet long and has a wingspan of 146 feet, whereas the Boeing 767 is 159 feet long and has a wingspan of 156 feet. [71] Flight 11 and Flight 175 crashed into the Twin Towers at around 440 miles per hour and 540 miles per hour, respectively, according to NIST--faster than the speed used in the second study but slower than the speed used in the first. [72]
<br><br><b>EXPERTS SAID THE TWIN TOWERS WOULD SURVIVE BEING HIT BY A PLANE</b>
<br>John Skilling, the partner in charge at Worthington, Skilling, Helle & Jackson, discussed his firm's studies in an interview in 1993. "Our analysis indicated the biggest problem would be the fact that all the fuel [from the plane] would dump into the building," he said. "There would be a horrendous fire; a lot of people would be killed." But, he said, "The building structure would still be there." [73]
<br><br>Leslie Robertson mentioned the findings of the studies at an event that took place in the week before 9/11. During a question-and-answer session at a conference in Frankfurt, Germany, he was asked what he had done to protect the Twin Towers from terrorist attacks. "I designed [the World Trade Center] for a 707 to smash into it," he answered. [74]
<br><br>Other experts made comments consistent with the findings of the studies. Architect Frank De Martini, the construction manager of the World Trade Center, when interviewed in January 2001 for a documentary about the Twin Towers, said, "The building was designed to have a fully loaded 707 crash into it." Furthermore, he said: "I believe that the [Twin Towers] probably could sustain multiple impacts of jetliners, because this structure is like the mosquito netting on your screen door--this intense grid--and the jet plane is just a pencil puncturing that screen netting. It really does nothing to the screen netting." [75] De Martini's wife has commented, "One of [Frank De Martini's] most repeated sayings about the towers is that they were built to take the impact of a light airplane." [76]
<br><br>De Martini's opinion is notable because De Martini had an exceptional knowledge of the World Trade Center. He "loved the [World Trade Center] and he knew it like no one else," Rick Zottola, a structural engineer who knew him, commented. [77] According to the <i>New Yorker</i>, "[F]ew people knew the [Twin Towers'] strength and resilience" better than De Martini did. [78] His brother recalled that he "would go into great detail about how the building was designed, its history ... to the slightest nuances of its architecture and strengths." [79]
<br><br>Charles Thornton, described by the <i>New York Times</i> as one of "the world's most renowned engineers," said the Twin Towers would be able to survive being hit by a Boeing 747--a plane two and a half times bigger than a Boeing 707. Interviewed for a television documentary, he said, "The largest aircraft flying today, at least commercially, the 747, fully loaded, is on the order of 300 tons." He continued: "So if you think about a 300-ton element crashing into a building that's been designed to carry 13,000 tons, you can see that an aircraft crashing into the World Trade Center would probably not do anything to the major building. It could affect localized structural elements, could knock out a column, and there could be some damage. But as far as a plane knocking a building over of that type, that would not happen." [80]
<br><br><b>FIREFIGHTERS BELIEVED THE TOWERS WOULD SURVIVE BEING HIT BY A PLANE</b>
<br>It is curious that some members of the FDNY thought the Twin Towers were in danger of collapsing on September 11, since many New York firefighters knew the towers had been designed to withstand being hit by a large airliner. John Peruggia recalled, "We were all told years ago [that] it was made to be hit by an airplane." He had attended presentations after the 1993 World Trade Center bombing in which he was told about the strength of the towers. At the presentations, he said: "We were always told by everyone, the experts, that these buildings could withstand direct hits from airplanes. That's the way they were designed." [81]
<br><br>Evidence suggests that other emergency responders in New York, such as members of the PAPD, may also have been told the towers had been designed to withstand being hit by a large aircraft. Specifically, Joseph Poland of the PAPD recalled that as he was approaching the World Trade Center on the morning of September 11, his colleague, Inspector Anthony Infante, told him the Twin Towers "would withstand a plane crashing into them and the [North Tower] would never collapse." [82]
<br><br>Even members of the public could learn this information. Britain's <i>Daily Telegraph</i> reported in September 2001, "Sightseers at the [Twin Towers] over the past few years would have seen a reassuring information panel at the top floor visitors' center, explaining how they should not worry about plane crashes as the building was made to withstand them." [83]
<br><br><b>MOST ENGINEERS THOUGHT THE TWIN TOWERS WOULD REMAIN STANDING ON SEPTEMBER 11</b>
<br>It is also curious that a few men with relevant expertise, like Mark Loizeaux, thought the Twin Towers were going to collapse, since it appears that most experts were sure that the buildings would remain standing after they saw the towers had been hit by planes on the morning of September 11. "In the first moments after the attacks, engineers confidently predicted that the towers would stand because of their tightly bunched perimeter columns," Knight Ridder reported. "The notion was that several columns could be lost but that the structures would remain standing." [84] "Perhaps no eyewitnesses were more shocked [at the collapses] than the engineers who understood the structural details that made the buildings nigh invincible," one reporter commented. [85]
<br><br>Charles Thornton, who was in downtown Manhattan when the 9/11 attacks occurred, recalled that when he saw a plane had crashed into one of the Twin Towers, his first thought had been: "It isn't so bad. It's only the top 12 floors." When he saw the towers collapse, he "couldn't believe it," he said. [86] Joseph Burns, a partner at Thornton's firm, Thornton-Tomasetti Engineers, said on September 11: "I'm in absolute shock over the whole thing. [The Twin Towers] just came straight down. I've seen buildings collapse like that, but they are buildings set for demolition." [87]
<br><br>Leslie Robertson--a man who helped design the Twin Towers--was in Hong Kong when the attacks occurred and followed events on television. "I didn't think the towers would fall," he has commented. "As designed, the weight of the floors above where the planes had hit was being transferred around the holes to the columns below." [88] Richard Garlock, a structural engineer at Robertson's firm, Leslie E. Robertson Associates, was standing outside the towers after the second hijacked plane crashed and looked up to assess the damage. "My immediate thoughts were that [the World Trade Center] was heavily damaged but that it was still standing," he recalled. "At that point in time, I did not feel that it was going to collapse," he said. [89]
<br><br>Jon Magnusson, who worked for John Skilling's engineering firm and was "one of the nation's top experts on tall buildings," according to the <i>Seattle Times</i>, recalled that after the first hijacked plane crashed into the World Trade Center, "about 20 engineers gathered in a conference room in the firm's office to watch the catastrophe unfold." Among the engineers in the room, Magnusson said, "nobody predicted the buildings would collapse." [90]
<br><br>Architect Roger Morse, who investigated the fireproofing in the Twin Towers between the early 1990s and June 2000, said that he "never imagined the buildings would collapse" on September 11. [91] Thomas Eagar, a professor of materials engineering and engineering systems, was asked in an interview: "After the planes struck [the World Trade Center] and you saw those raging fires, did you think the towers would collapse?" He replied: "No. In fact, I was surprised. So were most structural engineers." [92]
<br><br>A reporter with the <i>New Yorker</i>, while conducting research for an article about the World Trade Center, talked to "dozens of people ... who are experts in the construction of tall buildings." Out of these people, the reporter wrote, "only one said that he knew immediately, upon learning from TV of the planes hitting the buildings, that the towers were going to fall." That person was Mark Loizeaux, whose anomalous response to the crashes is described in this article. All the other experts presumably assumed the Twin Towers would remain standing. [93]
<br><br><b>MOST EMERGENCY RESPONDERS EXPECTED THE TWIN TOWERS TO REMAIN STANDING</b>
<br>The accounts of members of the FDNY and other emergency responders who thought the Twin Towers were going to collapse on the morning of September 11 stand out since it appears that nearly all of the emergency workers who responded to the crashes at the World Trade Center expected the towers to remain standing.
<br><br>NIST, which investigated the collapses of the Twin Towers between 2002 and 2005, reported that "[n]o first responder" it interviewed "thought that the WTC towers would collapse." [94] It stated that the "experience and training" of the senior firefighters it interviewed, "relative to past large high-rise fires within the city [of New York] or elsewhere in the world, did not lead the officers to expect a total collapse of either structure." [95]
<br><br>Of the FDNY chiefs who operated from the lobby of the North Tower following the first crash, "No one anticipated the possibility of a total collapse," the <i>9/11 Commission Report</i> stated. Furthermore, "To our knowledge," the report said, "none of the chiefs present" at the FDNY's outdoor command post "believed that a total collapse of either tower was possible." [96]
<br><br>Peter Guidetti recalled that of the members of the "upper echelon" of the FDNY he talked to after the Twin Towers collapsed, "nobody [had] thought the building was coming down." These men were "knowledgeable guys," he said. They were "fire officers." And, he recalled, they told him, "We did not think the building was coming down." [97]
<br><br>Battalion Chief Robert Ingram, who, along with other senior FDNY officials, set up a command post near the Twin Towers in response to the first crash, commented that when the first tower came down, "it was a complete surprise to everyone in the command post area." [98] Deputy Commissioner Lynn Tierney, who headed to the World Trade Center immediately after she learned of the first crash, encountered several senior FDNY officials at the scene. "No one ever thought the towers were going to come down," she recalled. [99]
<br><br>Firefighter Timothy Burke, who arrived with his unit at the World Trade Center shortly after Flight 175 crashed into the South Tower, has commented, "No one thought the buildings would come down or that they'd come down that fast." [100] And Judith Salgado, a borough supervisor who worked in the FDNY's Manhattan command center, recalled, "No one thought those buildings were going to come down." [101]
<br><br><b>EMERGENCY RESPONDERS WERE SHOCKED WHEN THEY WERE TOLD THE TOWERS WERE GOING TO COLLAPSE</b>
<br>Some emergency responders who were told the Twin Towers were going to collapse were astonished when they were given the warning. This suggests they found it unthinkable that the towers would come down. Joseph Torrillo recalled that when he told firefighters and other emergency responders that the towers were going to come down, these people "started looking at me cross-eyed, wondering, 'How the hell are two buildings going to collapse?'" [102] "Nobody could understand why I was saying that," he commented. [103]
<br><br>When Torrillo told his friend from the FDNY, Anthony Mancuso, that the towers were going to collapse and instructed him to move his engine away from them, Mancuso was "at first reluctant to leave the disaster scene, not knowing why [Torrillo] would have such insight," author Will Merrill described. Since "[n]o high-rise building had ever fallen before," Mancuso "was obviously hesitant to take the advice of a contemporary." [104]
<br><br>Firefighters Peter Ganci and Steve Mosiello were incredulous when they were given the message that the towers were going to collapse. After Richard Zarillo came to their command post and told them, "The buildings have been compromised; we need to evacuate; they're going to collapse," Mosiello gave "a very confused look," Zarillo recalled, and said, "Who told you that?" When Ganci heard the warning, he asked, "Who the fuck told you that?" [105]
<br><br><b>MEN WHO THOUGHT THE TOWERS WOULD COLLAPSE HAD EXPERTISE THAT SHOULD HAVE LED THEM TO BELIEVE OTHERWISE</b>
<br>The fact that a few experts and emergency responders thought the Twin Towers might collapse on the morning of September 11 is curious not only because these men's predictions went against conventional thinking but also because several of the men had particular expertise and/or experience that should have led them to think the towers would remain standing.
<br><br>Joseph Torrillo had, before he joined the FDNY, gained a degree in structural engineering. [106] He should presumably therefore have understood how buildings react to fire and structural damage.
<br><br>Furthermore, while he was studying for his degree, two of his professors "worked for the concrete contractor on the Twin Towers," and "were able to take me and the other engineering students down to the towers when they were [being built] so we could study them," he recalled. [107] Torrillo claimed his recollections of these visits led him to think the Twin Towers would collapse on September 11. [108] During the visits, he had "noticed the innovative construction process that used much less steel than other, more traditional skyscrapers," and observed "how lightweight and how flimsy these buildings were." [109]
<br><br>And yet the Twin Towers were "especially sturdy, with load-bearing, reinforced steel-mesh walls," according to Mark Loizeaux. [110] They had been designed to withstand earthquakes and hurricane-force winds. [111] According to NIST, "The wind loads used for the WTC towers, which governed the structural design of the external columns and provided the baseline capacity of the structures to withstand abnormal events such as major fires or impact damage, significantly exceeded the requirements of the New York City Building Code and other building codes" at the time the towers were built. [112]
<br><br>The Twin Towers were therefore anything but "flimsy," like Torrillo suggested. So surely his background in structural engineering should have led Torrillo to think they would remain standing after being hit by planes and suffering fires on September 11. And yet he confidently predicted that they were going to collapse.
<br><br>The New York City Department of Buildings engineer who warned that the North Tower was in danger of an "imminent collapse" may, too, have had particular knowledge and experience that should have led him to think the Twin Towers could withstand the damage and fires they suffered on September 11.
<br><br>The Department of Buildings is responsible for overseeing the construction of residential and commercial buildings in New York. It enforces the city's building code and its standards for how long the materials used in buildings should stand up in fires. Its activities include examining building plans and inspecting properties. [113] An employee of this department, therefore, may well have a good understanding of how buildings react in adverse conditions, such as fires.
<br><br>Additionally, his training and experience as an engineer could have given the Buildings Department employee who warned that the Twin Towers were going to collapse an understanding of the effects that fires have on buildings. If so, considering that no steel-framed high-rise had ever collapsed due to fire before, it seems odd that this man thought--with apparent certainty--that the towers were going to collapse on September 11.
<br><br>Mark Loizeaux would surely have understood, as the head of a company that specializes in using explosives to make buildings collapse, what was necessary to bring down steel-framed high-rises, like the Twin Towers. Additionally, he had studied architectural engineering at university. [114] During his studies, he actually produced a report on the World Trade Center. Consequently, he has commented, he "knew exactly how [the World Trade Center] was built." And yet the president of Controlled Demolition Inc. said he thought it was "inevitable" that the Twin Towers would collapse on September 11. [115]
<br><br>Peter Guidetti has admitted possessing knowledge that should have led him to think the Twin Towers would remain standing on September 11. About 20 years before 9/11, he recalled, he talked to an architectural engineer who helped build high-rises. He questioned the man about what would happen if a Boeing 747--the largest commercial aircraft in operation at the time--filled with jet fuel crashed into the 80th floor of one of the Twin Towers. Would the 30 floors above the area of impact topple off? The engineer replied: "Oh, no, it's not designed to do that. ... That would not happen." He said the effects of a large commercial aircraft hitting one of the towers had been taken into consideration when the World Trade Center was built. The towers "had been designed and constructed in such a way to prevent that kind of disaster," he told Guidetti.
<br><br>And yet, after he learned that the North Tower had been hit by a plane and then saw it on fire, Guidetti told members of the public that the building was going to collapse and they needed to get away from it. "I was amazed at why I thought [the Twin Towers] were coming down," he has commented. [116]
<br><br>Ray Downey, like Guidetti, knew the Twin Towers had been built to withstand the impact of a plane, according to Fire Chief Mike Antonucci, who had been a close friend of his. He appears to in fact have had a good general knowledge of the World Trade Center. Antonucci recalled that he and Downey talked about building structures "all the time" and had "numerous conversations about the Twin Towers." [117] Downey directed recovery work at the World Trade Center when it was bombed in February 1993, so would surely have gained valuable knowledge about the towers from this experience. [118]
<br><br>Downey was also an expert on building collapses. He was "probably the most knowledgeable person on building collapses there was," Antonucci said. [119] Robert Ingram called him "the premiere collapse expert in the country." [120]
<br><br>With his expertise, Downey presumably should have thought the Twin Towers would remain standing, despite the structural damage and fires they suffered on September 11. And yet he warned people that they might collapse. [121] (However, as previously mentioned, there is evidence that he thought there might be explosives planted in the towers, so this may be why he believed they could come down.)
<br><br><b>HAD THE MEN WHO THOUGHT THE TWIN TOWERS WOULD COLLAPSE LEARNED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN ON SEPTEMBER 11?</b>
<br>The collapses of the Twin Towers, if they occurred without the use of explosives, were freak incidents. Nothing like them had happened before September 11 and nothing like them has happened since then. So why did men like Joseph Torrillo, Mark Loizeaux, Anthony Whitaker, Peter Guidetti, Ray Downey, and the unnamed Department of Buildings engineer, whose actions are described in this article, predict--sometimes with apparent certainty--that the towers were going to collapse?
<br><br>Did they just possess remarkable foresight, such that they were able to envisage something their colleagues and many experts failed to anticipate? Or did they have at least some foreknowledge of what was going to happen on September 11? Did they know, for example, that explosives had been planted in the Twin Towers and there was a plan to bring down the towers as part of the 9/11 attacks?
<br><br>If any of these men knew in advance that the towers were going to collapse, there are various ways in which they could have acquired this foreknowledge. The men may all have learned the towers were going to collapse on September 11 via the same means or they may have learned about the planned collapses in different ways to each other.
<br><br><b>MEN COULD HAVE BEEN DECEIVED INTO ASSISTING THE PLANNING OF THE ATTACKS</b>
<br>While it is plausible that some or all of the men who predicted that the Twin Towers were going to collapse had foreknowledge of the collapses because they were willing participants in the planning and preparation of the 9/11 attacks, the fact that many of them worked hard to save lives at the World Trade Center makes this possibility seem unlikely.
<br><br>Perhaps, instead, some or all of them were coerced into helping with the planning and/or preparation of the attacks and thereby learned what was going to happen on September 11. The men could have been blackmailed or otherwise threatened into providing assistance. They may have warned people that the Twin Towers were in danger of collapsing after the hijacked planes crashed into them because they had been ordered to keep quiet about what they had learned but they also wanted to save lives. They told people they thought the towers were going to collapse, without mentioning the possibility of there being explosives in them, as a way of getting people safely away from the doomed buildings without revealing their foreknowledge of the attacks.
<br><br>Alternatively, the men could have been deceived into assisting the preparations for 9/11 without realizing they were helping rogue individuals plan an attack on the World Trade Center. Maybe they suddenly understood how they had been misled and realized the attacks would likely involve demolishing the Twin Towers when they saw that planes had crashed into the Trade Center on the morning of September 11. Upon this realization, they may have wanted to make use of their knowledge to try and save lives, by alerting people to the impending collapses.
<br><br>There are probably numerous ways in which the men could have been deceived into inadvertently helping with the planning of the 9/11 attacks. One possible method worth considering is that they were told that, for economic reasons, authorities were assessing whether it was possible to bring down the Twin Towers. The men may have been told that, due to their expertise, they would be able to help determine if and how the towers could be demolished.
<br><br>It would, of course, have been impossible to carry out a standard controlled demolition of the massive towers in such a densely populated area as Lower Manhattan. But the men could perhaps have been told that authorities wanted to know if the towers could be brought down a few floors a time, beginning with the uppermost floors. On the basis of this disinformation, they could have been tricked into helping to carry out a study of how to bring down the Twin Towers with explosives.
<br><br>The men could have been told that authorities wanted to get rid of the towers because the buildings were outdated and should ideally be replaced with something better suited to the modern world. This state of affairs was in fact described in a book about the Twin Towers published in 1999. In <i>Divided We Stand</i>, author Eric Darton opined that it was "inconceivable that the World Trade Center could be built today--or even for a moment considered a workable or desirable project." He wrote, "From an economic standpoint, the Trade Center--subsidized since its inception--has never functioned, nor was it intended to function, unprotected in the rough-and-tumble real estate marketplace."
<br><br>As early as 1993, when it was bombed by terrorists, the World Trade Center "was already passing its prime as office space, overtaken by a generation of more recent, cybernetically 'smart' buildings with higher ceilings and greater built-in electrical capacity," Darton wrote. [122]
<br><br><b>ANTI-TERRORISM RESEARCH COULD HAVE HELPED DETERMINE HOW TO ATTACK THE WORLD TRADE CENTER</b>
<br>Another method by which innocent men could have been tricked into inadvertently helping with the planning of the 9/11 attacks is that the men were invited to help conduct what they were told was a study to examine the vulnerability of the World Trade Center to a terrorist attack. The study could have examined such things as how terrorists might get past security and plant explosives in the Twin Towers. But, without the men's knowledge, it could have been intended to help those behind 9/11 plan the attacks. Among other things, it could have helped them work out how to bring down the towers with explosives and how to evade security at the Trade Center in order to plant the explosives.
<br><br>It is worth noting that at least two of the men who said the Twin Towers were in danger of collapsing on the morning of September 11--Mark Loizeaux and Ray Downey--had expertise in dealing with terrorism. Loizeaux provided consulting services on "antiterrorist measures to mitigate the effect of attacks on structures." [123] And Downey, as commander of the Special Operations Command, was responsible for planning the FDNY's response to terrorist attacks. According to a book written by his nephew, he "worked out various scenarios for terrorist attacks--who would be the first, second, and third of his companies on scene; what would each unit do. He studied floor plans of major landmarks, looked at aerial views of the city, thought about traffic routes, bridges, and tunnels." [124]
<br><br>Downey had taught some of his techniques for dealing with terrorists to senior commanders of the Marine Corps and the Navy. The training involved "running combat scenarios in high-rise buildings and sewers, some of them in the [World] Trade Center neighborhood," according to <i>Newsday</i>. [125] Additionally, he served on the Gilmore Commission, an advisory panel established in 1999 to assess America's capabilities for responding to domestic terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. [126] And in his spare time, he "traveled across the country, preaching the need to prepare for terrorism," Hal Bruno, chairman of the National Fallen Firefighters Foundation, said. [127] The <i>New York Daily News</i> actually called Downey "the world's leading expert in responding to terrorist attacks." [128]
<br><br>Loizeaux and Downey's expertise in dealing with terrorism may have been useful to rogue individuals who were planning a terrorist attack on the World Trade Center. For example, Downey could have provided information about what firefighters and other emergency responders would do if they learned an attack had occurred at the Trade Center. Their expertise in terrorism could therefore have led the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks to seek out the two men.
<br><br>And Loizeaux and Downey could have been encouraged to assist with a study that they were informed would examine the vulnerability of the World Trade Center to a terrorist attack by being told that they were being consulted due to their expertise. They could perhaps have been told that authorities wanted to make use of their knowledge about dealing with terrorism to help determine how to prevent an attack on the Trade Center.
<br><br><b>MEN COULD HAVE BEEN SOUGHT BY THE 9/11 PERPETRATORS DUE TO THEIR EXPERTISE</b>
<br>The perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks may also have sought out Loizeaux and Downey due to other expertise the two men had, especially if the attacks were going to involve bringing the Twin Towers down with explosives.
<br><br>Loizeaux had decades of experience in the field of explosive demolition. He had been personally responsible for the supervision of the demolition of over 1,200 structures. [129] He was, according to the <i>Washington Times</i>, "one of the nation's leading experts in demolition." [130]
<br><br>His firm, Controlled Demolition Inc., was "one of the world's leading demolition companies," according to the BBC. [131] It was reported in 1995 that, over five decades, the company had demolished 1,700 high-rise buildings. [132] The company was responsible for demolishing the tallest structural steel building ever to be imploded--the J. L. Hudson department store in Detroit, which it brought down in October 1998. [133]
<br><br>John Skilling, the partner in charge at the company that designed the structure of the Twin Towers, said in 1993 that he believed there were "people who do know enough about building demolition to bring a structure like the Trade Center down." "I would imagine that if you took the top expert in that type of work and gave him the assignment of bringing these buildings down with explosives, I would bet that he could do it," he said. [134] Loizeaux was surely a "top expert in that type of work" who, according to Skilling, was capable of bringing down the Twin Towers with explosives.
<br><br>As previously mentioned, on top of his expertise in demolishing buildings, Loizeaux had knowledge of the structure of the Twin Towers that he acquired from producing a report on the World Trade Center while at college. He has said that he "knew exactly how [the World Trade Center] was built." [135]
<br><br>Downey had a range of expertise and experience that would presumably have been useful to people who wanted to attack the World Trade Center. He was at the scene of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing immediately after the attack and served as rescue operations commander in response to it. Two years later, he served as rescue operations commander in response to the terrorist bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. [136]
<br><br>As previously mentioned, he was also a renowned expert on building collapses. [137] His hobby, according to his friend Mike Antonucci, was "to study building collapses." He examined "what affected the engineering of buildings" and "how they [would] weaken." Downey apparently also had knowledge of the structure of the World Trade Center. Antonucci said he and Downey talked about building structures "all the time" and had "numerous conversations about the Twin Towers." [138]
<br><br>Several of the other men who predicted the collapses of the Twin Towers, whose actions are described in this article, had expertise that would likely have been useful to those planning the 9/11 attacks or were in jobs in which they may have had access to information that would have been useful to the perpetrators of the attacks. Their expertise or their access to key information may therefore have led to these men being sought by the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks.
<br><br>For example, as previously mentioned, Joseph Torrillo, as well as being an experienced firefighter, had a degree in structural engineering. [139] And because two of his college professors were involved in the construction of the Twin Towers, Torrillo was taken to the towers when they were being built to study them. [140]
<br><br>Additionally, Torrillo's first firehouse, where he worked as a firefighter for 15 years, was Ten House, located directly across the street from the Twin Towers. Torrillo had taken "firefighters and captains to floors with exposed structural elements" during drills at the World Trade Center, according to the <i>Pittsburgh Tribune-Review</i>. "I would explain what was good and what was bad," he has commented. "I knew the design of those buildings inside and out," he said. [141]
<br><br>The engineer who told John Peruggia that the North Tower was in danger of an "imminent collapse" could have been sought by people who were planning an attack on the World Trade Center because his job with the New York City Department of Buildings gave him access to information that would be useful to them. Since the Department of Buildings is responsible for overseeing the construction of buildings in New York, and its activities include performing plan examinations and inspecting properties, it is possible that it had copies of the original plans for the World Trade Center or other documents that provided information about the Twin Towers. Some of its employees would presumably have had access to these documents, which would surely have been useful to people who wanted to bring down the towers with explosives.
<br><br>Anthony Whitaker may have been sought by the people who planned the 9/11 attacks because, due to his position in the PAPD, he knew about the security arrangements at the World Trade Center. Since the World Trade Center was a New York Port Authority property, the PAPD--the Port Authority's independent police agency--was, until September 11, 2001, responsible for providing security there. [142] As the commanding officer at the Trade Center, Whitaker was responsible for all PAPD officers assigned there. [143] He also had "expert knowledge" of the Trade Center, according to a Port Authority account. [144] He would presumably therefore have been able to provide information about vulnerabilities in the security of the center that could be exploited by people who wanted to secretly plant explosives in the Twin Towers.
<br><br>Peter Guidetti could have been sought because, apparently, he was based at FDNY headquarters, and may consequently have had access to the blueprints for the World Trade Center and other important documents. The MetroTech Center in Brooklyn, where FDNY headquarters is located, "housed the plans of virtually every structure" in New York, author Peter Lance wrote. Documents there included "blueprints that gave firefighters advance details ... of the entrance, egress, and floor plans of the buildings." [145] People who intended to attack the World Trade Center and bring down the Twin Towers with explosives would surely have wanted to examine any documents with information about the towers kept at FDNY headquarters, which Guidetti may have been able to obtain for them.
<br><br><b>MEN WHO WARNED OF THE COLLAPSES COULD HELP US UNDERSTAND WHAT HAPPENED ON SEPTEMBER 11</b>
<br>The accounts of the experts and emergency responders who predicted that the Twin Towers were going to collapse on September 11 give rise to numerous questions. Men like Joseph Torrillo, Mark Loizeaux, Anthony Whitaker, Peter Guidetti, and the unnamed Department of Buildings engineer, whose actions are described in this article, therefore ought to be questioned as part of a new investigation of the 9/11 attacks. Investigators need to find out why these men thought the Twin Towers were going to collapse, when their knowledge and experience should have led them to believe that the towers would remain standing.
<br><br>The men need to be asked what, if anything, they knew about the 9/11 attacks before September 11. Did they know the World Trade Center was going to be attacked? Did they learn that explosives were going to be planted in the Twin Towers and the buildings were going to be demolished?
<br><br>If they had any foreknowledge of what was going to happen, how did they acquire it? Were they coerced into helping with the planning of the 9/11 attacks and learned what was going to happen when they gave their assistance? Or were they perhaps involved with research, which they were told was intended to determine how to prevent terrorist attacks at the World Trade Center, but was in fact intended to help the perpetrators of 9/11 plan their attack?
<br><br>If the men who predicted that the Twin Towers were going to collapse on September 11 are able to speak openly, knowing it will be safe for them to do so, we may learn important new information about the 9/11 attacks.
<br><br><b>NOTES</b>
<br>[1] <a href="http://triblive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/news/regional/s_469687.html" target="_blank">Mike Wereschagin, "Buried in the Rubble." <i>Pittsburgh Tribune-Review</i>, September 10, 2006</a>, Will G. Merrill Jr., <i>9/11 Ordinary People: Extraordinary Heroes</i>. CreateSpace, 2011, pp. 77-82; <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HUOR8TnxqsA" target="_blank">"OEW Talks to Surviving 9/11 Firefighter." KLYC, June 6, 2011</a>; <a href="http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2011/09/11/courageous-911-firefighter-describes-miraculously-surviving-the-twin-towers-collapse/" target="_blank">Billy Hallowell, "Courageous 9/11 Firefighter Describes Miraculously Surviving the Twin Towers' Collapse." TheBlaze, September 11, 2011</a>.
<br>[2] <a href="http://articles.mcall.com/2002-09-11/news/3416380_1_tower-firehouse-billy-blazes" target="_blank">Tom Coombe, "'That Day Started as One of the Most Beautiful I Can Remember.'" <i>Allentown Morning Call</i>, September 11, 2002</a>; <a href="http://www.ottumwacourier.com/news/local_news/buried-and-back/article_916c3fb0-3f6e-5d0d-a074-e296caec3747.html" target="_blank">Mark Newman, "Buried and Back." <i>Ottumwa Courier</i>, March 28, 2014</a>; <a href="http://jacksonville.com/news/metro/2015-09-04/story/911-firefighter-who-survived-attack-tells-jacksonville-students-embrace" target="_blank">Clifford Davis, "9/11 Firefighter Who Survived Attack Tells Jacksonville Students to Embrace Life's Challenges." <i>Florida Times-Union</i>, September 4, 2015</a>.
<br>[3] Will G. Merrill Jr., <i>9/11 Ordinary People</i>, p. 82; <a href="http://jacksonville.com/news/metro/2015-09-04/story/911-firefighter-who-survived-attack-tells-jacksonville-students-embrace" target="_blank">Clifford Davis, "9/11 Firefighter Who Survived Attack Tells Jacksonville Students to Embrace Life's Challenges."</a>
<br>[4] <a href="http://triblive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/news/regional/s_469687.html" target="_blank">Mike Wereschagin, "Buried in the Rubble."</a>
<br>[5] Mitchell Fink and Lois Mathias, <i>Never Forget: An Oral History of September 11, 2001</i>. New York: HarperCollins, 2002, p. 122.
<br>[6] <a href="http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/nyregion/20050812_WTC_GRAPHIC/9110160.PDF" target="_blank">John Peruggia, interview by Ron Castorina and Tom McCourt. World Trade Center Task Force, October 25, 2001</a>; Jim Dwyer and Kevin Flynn, <i>102 Minutes: The Untold Story of the Fight to Survive Inside the Twin Towers</i>. New York: Times Books, 2005, pp. 203-204.
<br>[7] <a href="http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/nyregion/20050812_WTC_GRAPHIC/9110141.PDF" target="_blank">Steven Mosiello, interview by Kevin McAllister and James Drury. World Trade Center Task Force, October 23, 2001</a>; <a href="http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/nyregion/20050812_WTC_GRAPHIC/9110161.PDF" target="_blank">Richard Zarrillo, interview by Ron Castorina and Tom McCourt. World Trade Center Task Force, October 25, 2001</a>; Jim Dwyer and Kevin Flynn, <i>102 Minutes</i>, pp. 208, 210.
<br>[8] <a href="http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2001/11/19/the-tower-builder" target="_blank">John Seabrook, "The Tower Builder." <i>New Yorker</i>, November 19, 2001</a>.
<br>[9] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20071203220423/http:/www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/030630/30unbuild.htm" target="_blank">Michael Satchell, "Bringing Down the House." <i>U.S. News & World Report</i>, June 22, 2003</a>.
<br>[10] <a href="http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2001/11/19/the-tower-builder" target="_blank">John Seabrook, "The Tower Builder."</a>
<br>[11] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20071203220423/http:/www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/030630/30unbuild.htm" target="_blank">Michael Satchell, "Bringing Down the House"</a>; <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20040805093834/www.newscientist.com/opinion/opinterview.jsp?id=ns24571" target="_blank">Liz Else, "Baltimore Blasters." <i>New Scientist</i>, July 24, 2004</a>.
<br>[12] <a href="http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2001/11/19/the-tower-builder" target="_blank">John Seabrook, "The Tower Builder."</a>
<br>[13] <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20040805093834/www.newscientist.com/opinion/opinterview.jsp?id=ns24571" target="_blank">Liz Else, "Baltimore Blasters."</a>
<br>[14] <a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2001/sep/12/20010912-025348-4364r/" target="_blank">Cheryl Wetzstein, "Towers Leveled by Gravity, Fire." <i>Washington Times</i>, September 12, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2001/11/19/the-tower-builder" target="_blank">John Seabrook, "The Tower Builder."</a>
<br>[15] <a href="http://www.panynj.gov/press-room/press-item.cfm?headLine_id=223" target="_blank">"World Trade Center Heroes Urge Minorities and Women to Consider Careers With the Port Authority Police." Port Authority of New York and New Jersey press release, New York, NY, October 7, 2002</a>; <a href="http://www.panynj.gov/press-room/press-item.cfm?headLine_id=415" target="_blank">"Port Authority Police Inspector Sworn in as Chief of Department." Port Authority of New York and New Jersey press release, New York, NY, February 6, 2004</a>.
<br>[16] <a href="https://adam.pra.to/public/mir/www.thememoryhole.org/911/pa-transcripts/pa-police-reports01.pdf" target="_blank">Quentin D. DeMarco to Ed Gutch, memorandum regarding response to World Trade Center on 9/11/01. November 4, 2001, Port Authority of New York and New Jersey</a>.
<br>[17] <a href="https://adam.pra.to/public/mir/www.thememoryhole.org/911/pa-transcripts/pa-police-reports03.pdf" target="_blank">Daniel McCarthy to Ed Gutch, memorandum. November 10, 2001, Port Authority of New York and New Jersey</a>; <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/30/nyregion/port-authority-files-voices-officers-sept-11-accounts-catastrophe-details.html?pagewanted=all" target="_blank">Kevin Flynn and Jim Dwyer, "Officers' Sept. 11 Accounts: Catastrophe in the Details." <i>New York Times</i>, August 30, 2003</a>.
<br>[18] <a href="http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/hearings/hearing11/morris_statement.pdf" target="_blank">"Statement by Joseph Morris, Former Port Authority Police Chief of Department." 9/11 Commission, May 18, 2004</a>; <a href="http://undicisettembre.blogspot.co.uk/2016/01/world-trade-center-interview-with-port.html" target="_blank">Hammer, "World Trade Center: An Interview With Port Authority Commanding Officer Joe Morris." Undicisettembre.info, January 11, 2016</a>.
<br>[19] <a href="https://adam.pra.to/public/mir/www.thememoryhole.org/911/pa-transcripts/pa-police-reports01.pdf" target="_blank">Alan T. DeVona to Joseph M. Morris, memorandum regarding chronological report of the WTC radio transmissions on 09/11/01. November 12, 2001, Port Authority of New York and New Jersey</a>; 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States</i>. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004, p. 293; <a href="http://www.nist.gov/customcf/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=101049" target="_blank">J. Randall Lawson and Robert L. Vettori, <i>The Emergency Response Operations</i>. Gaithersburg, MD: National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2005, p. 201</a>.
<br>[20] Jim Dwyer and Kevin Flynn, <i>102 Minutes</i>, p. 78.
<br>[21] Mitchell Fink and Lois Mathias, <i>Never Forget</i>, pp. 23-24; Dean E. Murphy, <i>September 11: An Oral History</i>. New York: Doubleday, 2002, pp. 180-181.
<br>[22] Mitchell Fink and Lois Mathias, <i>Never Forget</i>, p. 25; Dean E. Murphy, <i>September 11: An Oral History</i>, pp. 184-185.
<br>[23] Jim Dwyer and Kevin Flynn, <i>102 Minutes</i>, pp. 78-79.
<br>[24] Ibid. p. 79.
<br>[25] Mitchell Fink and Lois Mathias, <i>Never Forget</i>, p. 24.
<br>[26] <a href="http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/nyregion/20050812_WTC_GRAPHIC/9110084.PDF" target="_blank">Pete Guidetti, interview by Kevin McAllister. World Trade Center Task Force, October 12, 2001</a>; <a href="http://europe.newsweek.com/day-changed-america-148319" target="_blank">Evan Thomas, "The Day That Changed America." <i>Newsweek</i>, December 31, 2001</a>.
<br>[27] Mitchell Fink and Lois Mathias, <i>Never Forget</i>, p. 229; Thomas Von Essen with Matt Murray, <i>Strong of Heart: Life and Death in the Fire Department of New York</i>. New York: Regan Books, 2002, p. 22; Tom Downey, <i>The Last Men Out: Life on the Edge at Rescue 2 Firehouse</i>. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2004, p. 233.
<br>[28] <a href="http://www.nydailynews.com/archives/news/fdny-boss-warned-collapse-article-1.923854" target="_blank">Joe Calderone, "FDNY Boss Warned of Collapse." <i>New York Daily News</i>, December 20, 2001</a>.
<br>[29] Tom Downey, <i>The Last Men Out</i>, p. 233.
<br>[30] <a href="http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/nyregion/20050812_WTC_GRAPHIC/9110230.PDF" target="_blank">John Delendick, interview by Mike Tambasco. World Trade Center Task Force, December 6, 2001</a>.
<br>[31] <a href="http://www.nydailynews.com/archives/news/fdny-boss-warned-collapse-article-1.923854" target="_blank">Joe Calderone, "FDNY Boss Warned of Collapse."</a>
<br>[32] <a href="http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/nyregion/20050812_WTC_GRAPHIC/9110139.PDF" target="_blank">Peter Hayden, interview by Ron Castorina and Tom McCourt. World Trade Center Task Force, October 23, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.nydailynews.com/archives/news/fdny-boss-warned-collapse-article-1.923854" target="_blank">Joe Calderone, "FDNY Boss Warned of Collapse."</a>
<br>[33] <a href="http://www.firehouse.com/article/10567885/deputy-chief-peter-hayden" target="_blank">"Deputy Chief Peter Hayden." <i>Firehouse</i>, April 2002</a>.
<br>[34] <a href="http://www.nydailynews.com/archives/news/fdny-boss-warned-collapse-article-1.923854" target="_blank">Joe Calderone, "FDNY Boss Warned of Collapse."</a>
<br>[35] <a href="http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/nyregion/20050812_WTC_GRAPHIC/9110195.PDF" target="_blank">Joseph Callan, interview by Michael Starace and Patrick Campbell. World Trade Center Task Force, November 2, 2001</a>.
<br>[36] <a href="http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/nyregion/20050812_WTC_GRAPHIC/9110139.PDF" target="_blank">Peter Hayden, interview by Ron Castorina and Tom McCourt</a>.
<br>[37] <a href="http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/nyregion/20050812_WTC_GRAPHIC/9110195.PDF" target="_blank">Joseph Callan, interview by Michael Starace and Patrick Campbell</a>; <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/07/nyregion/fatal-confusion-troubled-emergency-response-9-11-exposed-deadly-flaws-rescue.html?pagewanted=all" target="_blank">Jim Dwyer, Kevin Flynn, and Ford Fessenden, "A Troubled Emergency Response; 9/11 Exposed Deadly Flaws in Rescue Plan." <i>New York Times</i>, July 7, 2002</a>; <a href="http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0209/11/se.41.html" target="_blank"> "Better Communications Might Have Helped FDNY." <i>Live Event/Special</i>, CNN, September 11, 2002</a>.
<br>[38] <a href="http://www.nyfd.com/frontpage/911.pdf" target="_blank">Vincent Dunn, "Unanswered Questions About Fire Radios and Communications at the World Trade Center Terrorist Attack on 9/11." NYFD.com, n.d.</a>
<br>[39] <a href="http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/nyregion/20050812_WTC_GRAPHIC/9110139.PDF" target="_blank">Peter Hayden, interview by Ron Castorina and Tom McCourt</a>; Richard Bernstein, <i>Out of the Blue: The Story of September 11, 2001, From Jihad to Ground Zero</i>. New York: Times Books, 2002, p. 229.
<br>[40] <a href="http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/nyregion/20050812_WTC_GRAPHIC/9110142.PDF" target="_blank">Albert Turi, interview by Tom McCourt and James Drury. World Trade Center Task Force, October 23, 2001</a>.
<br>[41] Dennis Smith, <i>Report From Ground Zero: The Story of the Rescue Efforts at the World Trade Center</i>. New York: Viking, 2002, p. 33.
<br>[42] <a href="http://www.firehouse.com/article/10567885/deputy-chief-peter-hayden" target="_blank">"Deputy Chief Peter Hayden."</a>
<br>[43] <a href="http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/nyregion/20050812_WTC_GRAPHIC/9110142.PDF" target="_blank">Albert Turi, interview by Tom McCourt and James Drury</a>.
<br>[44] <a href="http://www.nist.gov/customcf/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=101049" target="_blank">J. Randall Lawson and Robert L. Vettori, <i>The Emergency Response Operations</i>, p. 75</a>.
<br>[45] <a href="http://www.nydailynews.com/archives/news/fdny-boss-warned-collapse-article-1.923854" target="_blank">Joe Calderone, "FDNY Boss Warned of Collapse."</a>
<br>[46] <a href="http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/nyregion/20050812_WTC_GRAPHIC/9110419.PDF" target="_blank">Richard Carletti, interview by Joseph Chiafari. World Trade Center Task Force, January 2, 2002</a>.
<br>[47] <a href="https://adam.pra.to/public/mir/www.thememoryhole.org/911/pa-transcripts/pa-police-reports02.pdf" target="_blank">Joseph Poland to Ed Gutch, memorandum regarding September 11, 2001. March 4, 2002, Port Authority of New York and New Jersey</a>; <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/30/nyregion/port-authority-files-voices-officers-sept-11-accounts-catastrophe-details.html?pagewanted=all" target="_blank">Kevin Flynn and Jim Dwyer, "Officers' Sept. 11 Accounts."</a>
<br>[48] <a href="https://adam.pra.to/public/mir/www.thememoryhole.org/911/pa-transcripts/pa-police-reports01.pdf" target="_blank">William Ross to Ed Gutch, memorandum regarding events: September 11, 2001. March 6, 2002, Port Authority of New York and New Jersey</a>; <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/30/nyregion/port-authority-files-voices-officers-sept-11-accounts-catastrophe-details.html?pagewanted=all" target="_blank">Kevin Flynn and Jim Dwyer, "Officers' Sept. 11 Accounts."</a>
<br>[49] <a href="https://adam.pra.to/public/mir/www.thememoryhole.org/911/pa-transcripts/pa-police-reports02.pdf" target="_blank">John Murphy to Timothy Norris, memorandum regarding September 11, 2001. January 4, 2002, Port Authority of New York and New Jersey</a>.
<br>[50] Ethan Casey (Editor), <i>09/11 8:48 a.m.: Documenting America's Greatest Tragedy</i>. Charleston, SC: BookSurge.com, 2001, p. 156; <a href="http://www.salon.com/2001/09/12/wtc_eyewitnesses/" target="_blank">Roman Milisic, "'Everything Went Black.'" Salon, September 12, 2001</a>; <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20030904034559/http:/www.usccb.org/vocations/WWT.PDF" target="_blank">"We Were There: Catholic Priests and How They Responded, in Their Own Words." United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, August 29, 2003, p. 15</a>.
<br>[51] <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/12/us/us-attacked-hijacked-jets-destroy-twin-towers-and-hit-pentagon-in-day-of-terror.html?pagewanted=all" target="_blank">N. R. Kleinfield, "Hijacked Jets Destroy Twin Towers and Hit Pentagon in Day of Terror." <i>New York Times</i>, September 12, 2001</a>.
<br>[52] <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/29/nyregion/29TOWE.html" target="_blank">James Glanz, "Engineers Suspect Diesel Fuel in Collapse of 7 World Trade Center." <i>New York Times</i>, November 29, 2001</a>.
<br>[53] <a href="http://europe.newsweek.com/brotherhood-now-144767" target="_blank">"The Brotherhood Now." <i>Newsweek</i>, September 9, 2002</a>.
<br>[54] <a href="http://www.fema.gov/pdf/library/fema403_apa.pdf" target="_blank">Therese McAllister (Editor), <i>World Trade Center Building Performance Study: Data Collection, Preliminary Observations, and Recommendations</i>. Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2002, pp. A9-A10</a>; <a href="http://www.firefighternation.com/article/news-2/first-interstate-bank-fire-25-years-later" target="_blank">"First Interstate Bank Fire: 25 Years Later." FirefighterNation.com, May 4, 2013</a>; <a href="http://cafr1.com/Beyond-Misinformation-2015.pdf" target="_blank">Ted Walter, <i>Beyond Misinformation: What Science Says About the Destruction of World Trade Center Buildings 1, 2, and 7</i>. Berkeley, CA: Architects & Engineers for 9/11 Truth, 2015, p. 6</a>.
<br>[55] <a href="http://articles.latimes.com/1988-05-05/news/mn-3609_1_skyscraper-fire" target="_blank">Cathleen Decker and Jill Stewart, "Blaze Races Through Tallest LA Skyscraper." <i>Los Angeles Times</i>, May 5, 1988</a>; <a href="http://articles.latimes.com/1988-05-06/news/mn-2971_1_structural-damage" target="_blank">Robert Welkos, "Tower May Have Escaped Serious Structural Damage." <i>Los Angeles Times</i>, May 6, 1988</a>.
<br>[56] <a href="http://www.fireengineering.com/articles/print/volume-157/issue-4/features/high-rise-fire-disasters-when-will-we-learn-our-lesson.html" target="_blank">Scott Holliday, "High-Rise Fire Disasters: When Will We Learn Our Lesson?" <i>Fire Engineering</i>, April 2004</a>; <a href="http://cafr1.com/Beyond-Misinformation-2015.pdf" target="_blank">Ted Walter, <i>Beyond Misinformation</i>, p. 6</a>.
<br>[57] <a href="http://www.fema.gov/pdf/library/fema403_apa.pdf" target="_blank">Therese McAllister (Editor), <i>World Trade Center Building Performance Study</i>, p. A9</a>; <a href="http://www.nist.gov/customcf/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=861631" target="_blank">Jesse Beitel and Nestor Iwankiw, <i>Analysis of Needs and Existing Capabilities for Full-Scale Fire Resistance Testing</i>. Gaithersburg, MD: National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2008, p. 18</a>; <a href="http://www.commandsafety.com/2009/10/21/remembering-the-one-meridian-plaza-high-rise-fire/" target="_blank">Christopher Naum, "Remembering the One Meridian Plaza High-Rise Fire." CommandSafety.com, October 21, 2009</a>.
<br>[58] <a href="http://articles.philly.com/1999-04-03/business/25520222_1_construction-crane-tower-demolition" target="_blank">Reid Kanaley, "Last Scorched Story: The 22d Floor at One Meridian Plaza is Dismantled." <i>Philadelphia Inquirer</i>, April 3, 1999</a>.
<br>[59] <a href="http://www.fema.gov/pdf/library/fema403_apa.pdf" target="_blank">Therese McAllister (Editor), <i>World Trade Center Building Performance Study</i>, p. A10</a>.
<br>[60] <a href="http://www.nist.gov/customcf/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=861631" target="_blank">Jesse Beitel and Nestor Iwankiw, <i>Analysis of Needs and Existing Capabilities for Full-Scale Fire Resistance Testing</i>, p. 18</a>.
<br>[61] <a href="https://archive.org/stream/wpijournal7778worc/wpijournal7778worc_djvu.txt" target="_blank">W. Robert Powers, "Fire up Above!" <i>WPI Journal</i>, August 1975</a>; <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=e0IrAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA135" target="_blank"><i>Fire Safety Aspects of Polymeric Materials, Volume 7: Buildings</i>. Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, 1979, p. 135</a>; <a href="http://www.nist.gov/customcf/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=101352" target="_blank">Erica D. Kuligowski, David D. Evans, and Richard D. Peacock, <i>Post-Construction Fires Prior to September 11, 2001</i>. Gaithersburg, MD: National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2005, p. 1</a>.
<br>[62] "Trade Center Hit by 6-Floor Fire." <i>New York Times</i>, February 14, 1975; James Glanz and Eric Lipton, <i>City in the Sky: The Rise and Fall of the World Trade Center</i>. New York: Times Books, 2003, p. 214.
<br>[63] <a href="https://archive.org/stream/wpijournal7778worc/wpijournal7778worc_djvu.txt" target="_blank">W. Robert Powers, "Fire up Above!"</a>
<br>[64] "Trade Center Hit by 6-Floor Fire"; James Glanz and Eric Lipton, <i>City in the Sky</i>, p. 214.
<br>[65] <a href="https://archive.org/stream/wpijournal7778worc/wpijournal7778worc_djvu.txt" target="_blank">W. Robert Powers, "Fire up Above"</a>; <a href="http://www.nist.gov/customcf/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=101352" target="_blank">Erica D. Kuligowski, David D. Evans, and Richard D. Peacock, <i>Post-Construction Fires Prior to September 11, 2001</i>, p. 1</a>.
<br>[66] <a href="https://archive.org/stream/wpijournal7778worc/wpijournal7778worc_djvu.txt" target="_blank">W. Robert Powers, "Fire up Above"</a>; <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=e0IrAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA135" target="_blank"><i>Fire Safety Aspects of Polymeric Materials, Volume 7: Buildings</i>, pp. 135-136</a>.
<br>[67] <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/08/magazine/08WTC6.html?pagewanted=all" target="_blank">James Glanz and Eric Lipton, "The Height of Ambition: Part Six." <i>New York Times</i>, September 8, 2002</a>.
<br>[68] James Glanz and Eric Lipton, <i>City in the Sky</i>, pp. 131-132; <a href="http://www.nist.gov/customcf/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=101012" target="_blank">Fahim Sadek, <i>Baseline Structural Performance and Aircraft Impact Damage Analysis of the World Trade Center Towers</i>. Gaithersburg, MD: National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2005, p. 4</a>.
<br>[69] James Glanz and Eric Lipton, <i>City in the Sky</i>, p. 133.
<br>[70] <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/08/magazine/the-height-of-ambition.html?pagewanted=all" target="_blank">James Glanz and Eric Lipton, "The Height of Ambition." <i>New York Times</i>, September 8, 2002</a>; James Glanz and Eric Lipton, <i>City in the Sky</i>, pp. 138-139, 366.
<br>[71] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20000408220912/http:/www.boeing.com/commercial/707family/product.html" target="_blank">"707 Specifications." Boeing, 2000</a>; <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20021002174817/http:/www.boeing.com/commercial/767family/pf/pf_200prod.html" target="_blank">"Technical Characteristics: Boeing 767-200ER." Boeing, 2002</a>.
<br>[72] <a href="http://www.nist.gov/customcf/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=909017" target="_blank"><i>Final Report on the Collapse of the World Trade Center Towers</i>. Gaithersburg, MD: National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2005, pp. 20, 38</a>.
<br>[73] <a href="http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19930227&slug=1687698" target="_blank">Eric Nalder, "Twin Towers Engineered to Withstand Jet Collision." <i>Seattle Times</i>, February 27, 1993</a>.
<br>[74] <a href="http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2001-09-11/news/0109120023_1_columns-and-beams-world-trade-center-steel-columns" target="_blank">"Towers Were Symbol of Might." <i>Chicago Tribune</i>, September 11, 2001</a>; <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20030426084855/http:/www.leadertelegram.com/specialreports/attack/storydetail.asp?ID=14" target="_blank">"Towers' Quick Collapse Surprises Engineers." Knight Ridder, September 12, 2001</a>.
<br>[75] <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1pvEge5HPJU" target="_blank"><i>World Trade Center: In Memoriam</i>. History Channel, 2002</a>; Jim Dwyer and Kevin Flynn, <i>102 Minutes</i>, p. 149.
<br>[76] <a href="http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2001/09/24/tuesday-and-after-talk-of-the-town" target="_blank">Hendrik Hertzberg, "Tuesday, and After." <i>New Yorker</i>, September 24, 2001</a>.
<br>[77] Damon DiMarco, <i>Tower Stories: An Oral History of 9/11</i>. Santa Monica, CA: Santa Monica Press, 2007, p. 350.
<br>[78] <a href="http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2001/09/24/tuesday-and-after-talk-of-the-town" target="_blank">Hendrik Hertzberg, "Tuesday, and After."</a>
<br>[79] <a href="http://articles.philly.com/2001-10-09/news/25303316_1_world-trade-center-port-authority-twin-towers" target="_blank">Joseph A. Gambardello, "Frank De Martini, Towers' Construction Manager." <i>Philadelphia Inquirer</i>, October 9, 2001</a>.
<br>[80] <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/23/nyregion/23TOWE.html" target="_blank">James Glanz, "Comparing 2 Sets of Twin Towers." <i>New York Times</i>, October 23, 2002</a>; <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p8Z_X8xgrF8" target="_blank">"WTC 1988 Charlie Thornton Interview." <i>YouTube</i> video, 0:50. December 17, 2007</a>.
<br>[81] <a href="http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/nyregion/20050812_WTC_GRAPHIC/9110160.PDF" target="_blank">John Peruggia, interview by Ron Castorina and Tom McCourt</a>; Jim Dwyer and Kevin Flynn, <i>102 Minutes</i>, p. 203.
<br>[82] <a href="https://adam.pra.to/public/mir/www.thememoryhole.org/911/pa-transcripts/pa-police-reports02.pdf" target="_blank">Joseph Poland to Ed Gutch, memorandum regarding September 11, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/30/nyregion/port-authority-files-voices-officers-sept-11-accounts-catastrophe-details.html?pagewanted=all" target="_blank">Kevin Flynn and Jim Dwyer, "Officers' Sept. 11 Accounts."</a>
<br>[83] <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1340225/Twin-towers-built-to-withstand-plane-crash.html" target="_blank">"Twin Towers 'Built to Withstand Plane Crash.'" <i>Daily Telegraph</i>, September 11, 2001</a>.
<br>[84] <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20030426084855/http:/www.leadertelegram.com/specialreports/attack/storydetail.asp?ID=14" target="_blank">"Towers' Quick Collapse Surprises Engineers."</a>
<br>[85] <a href="https://www.princeton.edu/engineering/eqnews/fall01/feature2.html" target="_blank">Sara Peters, "Engineers Search for Answers in Rubble of Collapsed World Trade Towers." <i>EQuad News</i>, Fall 2001</a>.
<br>[86] Ibid.
<br>[87] <a href="http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2001-09-11/news/0109120220_1_tallest-building-world-trade-center-petronas-twin-towers" target="_blank">Blair Kamin, "Damage too Great for Towers." <i>Chicago Tribune</i>, September 11, 2001</a>.
<br>[88] <a href="http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2011/09/the_world_trade_center_work_of.html" target="_blank">Eric Uhlfelder and William Abrams, "The World Trade Center: Work of Genius, Undone by the Unthinkable." <i>New Jersey Star-Ledger</i>, September 10, 2011</a>.
<br>[89] <a href="https://www.pbs.org/americarebuilds/profiles/profiles_garlock_t2.html" target="_blank">"America Rebuilds: A Year at Ground Zero, Richard Garlock Transcript." PBS, 2002</a>.
<br>[90] <a href="http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=20020912&slug=skilling12m" target="_blank">Alex Fryer, "Collapse of Twin Towers Still Haunting Engineer Whose Firm Did Design." <i>Seattle Times</i>, September 12, 2002</a>.
<br>[91] <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/13/nyregion/13TOWE.html?pagewanted=all" target="_blank">James Glanz with Michael Moss, "Faulty Fireproofing is Reviewed as Factor in Trade Center Collapse." <i>New York Times</i>, December 13, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.fireengineering.com/articles/print/volume-155/issue-10/world-trade-center-disaster/volume-ii-the-ruins-and-the-rebirth/fireproofing-at-the-wtc-towers.html" target="_blank">Roger G. Morse, "'Fireproofing' at the WTC Towers." <i>Fire Engineering</i>, October 2002</a>.
<br>[92] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20020601162355/http:/www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/wtc/collapse.html" target="_blank">"The Collapse: An Engineer's Perspective." PBS, April 30, 2002</a>.
<br>[93] <a href="http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2001/11/19/the-tower-builder" target="_blank">John Seabrook, "The Tower Builder."</a>
<br>[94] <a href="http://www.nist.gov/el/disasterstudies/wtc/upload/WTC-Part-IV-Life-Safety-Final.pdf" target="_blank">"Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster, Part IV: Life Safety." National Institute of Standards and Technology, April 5, 2005</a>.
<br>[95] <a href="http://www.nist.gov/customcf/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=101049" target="_blank">J. Randall Lawson and Robert L. Vettori, <i>The Emergency Response Operations</i>, p. 75</a>.
<br>[96] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, pp. 290-291, 302.
<br>[97] <a href="http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/nyregion/20050812_WTC_GRAPHIC/9110084.PDF" target="_blank">Pete Guidetti, interview by Kevin McAllister</a>.
<br>[98] <a href="http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/nyregion/20050812_WTC_GRAPHIC/9110268.PDF" target="_blank">Robert Ingram, interview by Robert Burns. World Trade Center Task Force, December 7, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.fireengineering.com/articles/print/volume-155/issue-9/world-trade-center-disaster/volume-i-initial-response/special-operations-and-haz-mat.html" target="_blank">Robert Ingram, "Special Operations and Haz Mat." <i>Fire Engineering</i>, September 2002</a>.
<br>[99] Mike Wereschagin, "Fire Commissioner Survives Ground Zero." <i>Pittsburgh Tribune-Review</i>, September 11, 2006; <a href="http://freepress60.1upprelaunch.com/Content/-bull-Special-Features/Special-Features/Article/Former-NYC-Fire-Dept-Deputy-Commissioner-Recalls-Events-of-9-11/52/78/41770" target="_blank">Andy O'Brien, "Former NYC Fire Dept. Deputy Commissioner Recalls Events of 9/11." <i>Rockland Free Press</i>, October 15, 2015</a>.
<br>[100] <a href="http://eng202lad101.tripod.com/mysocalledlife.html" target="_blank">Christopher Ketcham, "September 11, Through the Eyes of New York City Firefighter Timmy Burke." <i>Gear</i>, December 2001</a>.
<br>[101] <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/01/nyregion/01operator.html?pagewanted=all" target="_blank">Al Baker and James Glanz, "For 911 Operators, Sept. 11 Went Beyond All Training." <i>New York Times</i>, April 1, 2006</a>.
<br>[102] <a href="http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2011/09/11/courageous-911-firefighter-describes-miraculously-surviving-the-twin-towers-collapse/" target="_blank">Billy Hallowell, "Courageous 9/11 Firefighter Describes Miraculously Surviving the Twin Towers' Collapse."</a>
<br>[103] <a href="http://www.daytondailynews.com/news/news/local/retired-new-york-firefighter-honors-911-victims-wi/nMrtz/" target="_blank">Chris Stewart and Tim Tresslar, "Retired New York Firefighter Honors 9/11 Victims With Patriot Flag at Dayton Festival." <i>Dayton Daily News</i>, May 31, 2011</a>.
<br>[104] Will G. Merrill Jr., <i>9/11 Ordinary People</i>, pp. 80-81.
<br>[105] <a href="http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/nyregion/20050812_WTC_GRAPHIC/9110161.PDF" target="_blank">Richard Zarrillo, interview by Ron Castorina and Tom McCourt</a>; Jim Dwyer and Kevin Flynn, <i>102 Minutes</i>, p. 208.
<br>[106] <a href="http://www.iaff.org/11News/082211patriotflag.htm" target="_blank">"At IAFF Headquarters, Patriot Flag Flies in Honor of Those Who Died on September 11." IAFF Firefighters, August 22, 2011</a>.
<br>[107] <a href="http://jacksonville.com/news/metro/2015-09-04/story/911-firefighter-who-survived-attack-tells-jacksonville-students-embrace" target="_blank">Clifford Davis, "9/11 Firefighter Who Survived Attack Tells Jacksonville Students to Embrace Life's Challenges."</a>
<br>[108] <a href="http://www.uvureview.com/recent/news/911-firefighter-admonishes-students-to-be-heroes/" target="_blank">Josh Wartena, "9/11 Firefighter Admonishes Students to be Heroes." <i>UVU Review</i>, September 17, 2012</a>.
<br>[109] <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HUOR8TnxqsA" target="_blank">"OEW Talks to Surviving 9/11 Firefighter"</a>; <a href="http://jacksonville.com/news/metro/2015-09-04/story/911-firefighter-who-survived-attack-tells-jacksonville-students-embrace" target="_blank">Clifford Davis, "9/11 Firefighter Who Survived Attack Tells Jacksonville Students to Embrace Life's Challenges."</a>
<br>[110] <a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2001/sep/12/20010912-025348-4364r/" target="_blank">Cheryl Wetzstein, "Towers Leveled by Gravity, Fire."</a>
<br>[111] <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2001/09/12/AR2005033107985.html" target="_blank">Guy Gugliotta, "'Magnitude Beyond Anything We'd Seen Before.'" <i>Washington Post</i>, September 12, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/08/magazine/08WTC1.html" target="_blank">James Glanz and Eric Lipton, "The Height of Ambition: Part One." <i>New York Times</i>, September 8, 2002</a>.
<br>[112] <a href="http://www.nist.gov/el/disasterstudies/wtc/wtc_about.cfm" target="_blank">"About the NIST World Trade Center Investigation." National Institute of Standards and Technology, June 30, 2011</a>.
<br>[113] <a href="http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2001/11/19/the-tower-builder" target="_blank">John Seabrook, "The Tower Builder"</a>; <a href="http://www.gothamgazette.com/iotw/construction/" target="_blank">Rebecca Webber, "Department of Buildings." Gotham Gazette, February 18, 2002</a>; <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20050723000939/http:/www.nyc.gov/html/dob/html/about/about.shtml" target="_blank">"About the Buildings Department." New York City Department of Buildings, 2005</a>.
<br>[114] <a href="http://dlia.ir/Scientific/Magazines/Science/Scientific.American.Tech.Science/1995/Scientific.American.Vol.273.No.04.Oct.1995.pdf" target="_blank">J. Mark Loizeaux and Douglas K. Loizeaux, "Demolition by Implosion." <i>Scientific American</i>, October 1995</a>; Jeff Byles, <i>Rubble: Unearthing the History of Demolition</i>. New York: Harmony Books, 2005, p. 95.
<br>[115] <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20040805093834/www.newscientist.com/opinion/opinterview.jsp?id=ns24571" target="_blank">Liz Else, "Baltimore Blasters."</a>
<br>[116] <a href="http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/nyregion/20050812_WTC_GRAPHIC/9110084.PDF" target="_blank">Pete Guidetti, interview by Kevin McAllister</a>; <a href="http://europe.newsweek.com/day-changed-america-148319" target="_blank">Evan Thomas, "The Day That Changed America."</a>
<br>[117] Liset Marquez, "Upland Firefighters and Families Affected by 9/11 Tragedy." <i>Inland Valley Daily Bulletin</i>, September 7, 2006; <a href="http://www.searchdogfoundation.org/pdfs/Remembrance_Journal.pdf" target="_blank">Michael Antonucci, "The Bravest Man I Ever Knew." <i>National Disaster Search Dog Foundation Remembrance Journal</i>, September 2011</a>.
<br>[118] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20010919065433/http:/newsday.com/news/local/state/ny-iedown13.story" target="_blank">Elizabeth Moore, "A Legend's Family Keeps Hope for Him Alive." <i>Newsday</i>, September 13, 2001</a>.
<br>[119] Liset Marquez, "Upland Firefighters and Families Affected by 9/11 Tragedy."
<br>[120] <a href="https://bulk.resource.org/gpo.gov/hearings/107s/90624.txt" target="_blank">U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, <i>Statement of Robert Ingram, Battalion Chief, City of New York Fire Department</i>. 107th Cong., 1st sess., October 11, 2001</a>.
<br>[121] <a href="http://www.nydailynews.com/archives/news/fdny-boss-warned-collapse-article-1.923854" target="_blank">Joe Calderone, "FDNY Boss Warned of Collapse."</a>
<br>[122] <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2001-10-04/the-process-of-creating-a-ruin" target="_blank">Eric Darton, <i>Divided We Stand: A Biography of New York's World Trade Center</i>. New York: Basic Books, 1999, pp. 194-195</a>.
<br>[123] <a href="http://www.nap.edu/read/9861/chapter/8#43" target="_blank">Committee for Oversight and Assessment of Blast-Effects and Related Research et al., <i>Blast Mitigation for Structures: 1999 Status Report on the DTRA/TSWG Program</i>. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2000, p. 43</a>.
<br>[124] Tom Downey, <i>The Last Men Out</i>, pp. 222-223.
<br>[125] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20010919065433/http:/newsday.com/news/local/state/ny-iedown13.story" target="_blank">Elizabeth Moore, "A Legend's Family Keeps Hope for Him Alive."</a>
<br>[126] <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/22/obituaries/22DOWN.html" target="_blank">Richard Goldstein, "Raymond M. Downey Dies at 63, Headed Fire Rescue Units." <i>New York Times</i>, November 22, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.fireengineering.com/articles/print/volume-155/issue-3/features/deputy-chief-ray-downey-and-lieutenant-andy-fredericks-as-we-remember-them.html" target="_blank">"Deputy Chief Ray Downey and Lieutenant Andy Fredericks ... As We Remember Them." <i>Fire Engineering</i>, March 2002</a>.
<br>[127] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20010919065433/http:/newsday.com/news/local/state/ny-iedown13.story" target="_blank">Elizabeth Moore, "A Legend's Family Keeps Hope for Him Alive."</a>
<br>[128] <a href="http://www.nydailynews.com/archives/news/magnificent-fire-chief-call-duty-article-1.921875" target="_blank">Michael Daly, "Magnificent Fire Chief's Last Call to Duty." <i>New York Daily News</i>, September 13, 2001</a>.
<br>[129] <a href="http://www.nap.edu/read/9861/chapter/8#43" target="_blank">Committee for Oversight and Assessment of Blast-Effects and Related Research et al., <i>Blast Mitigation for Structures</i>, p. 43</a>.
<br>[130] <a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2001/sep/12/20010912-025348-4364r/" target="_blank">Cheryl Wetzstein, "Towers Leveled by Gravity, Fire."</a>
<br>[131] <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/conspiracy_files/7434230.stm" target="_blank">"Q&A: The Collapse of Tower 7." BBC News, July 4, 2008</a>.
<br>[132] <a href="http://dlia.ir/Scientific/Magazines/Science/Scientific.American.Tech.Science/1995/Scientific.American.Vol.273.No.04.Oct.1995.pdf" target="_blank">J. Mark Loizeaux and Douglas K. Loizeaux, "Demolition by Implosion."</a>
<br>[133] <a href="http://www.people.com/people/archive/article/0,,20126722,00.html" target="_blank">Bill Hewitt, "Sudden Impact." <i>People</i>, November 9, 1998</a>; <a href="http://articles.courant.com/2001-01-27/news/0101271457_1_douglas-k-loizeaux-building-oklahoma-city-bombing" target="_blank">Lynne Tuohy, "Razing Expectations." <i>Hartford Courant</i>, January 27, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.controlled-demolition.com/jl-hudson-department-store" target="_blank">"J. L. Hudson Department Store." Controlled Demolition Inc., n.d.</a>
<br>[134] <a href="http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19930227&slug=1687698" target="_blank">Eric Nalder, "Twin Towers Engineered to Withstand Jet Collision."</a>
<br>[135] <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20040805093834/www.newscientist.com/opinion/opinterview.jsp?id=ns24571" target="_blank">Liz Else, "Baltimore Blasters."</a>
<br>[136] <a href="http://fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1998_h/3-21-98downey.htm" target="_blank">U.S. Congress. House. Committee on National Security. <i>Witness Statement, Chief Raymond M. Downey, Special Operations Command, Fire Department, City of New York</i>. 105th Cong., 2nd sess., March 21, 1998</a>; <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/22/obituaries/22DOWN.html" target="_blank">Richard Goldstein, "Raymond M. Downey Dies at 63, Headed Fire Rescue Units"</a>; <a href="http://www.fireengineering.com/articles/print/volume-155/issue-3/features/deputy-chief-ray-downey-and-lieutenant-andy-fredericks-as-we-remember-them.html" target="_blank">"Deputy Chief Ray Downey and Lieutenant Andy Fredericks ... As We Remember Them."</a>
<br>[137] <a href="http://nypost.com/2010/01/16/elite-ny-team-finally-lands-in-stricken-haiti/" target="_blank">"Elite NY Team Finally Lands in Stricken Haiti." Associated Press, January 16, 2010</a>.
<br>[138] Liset Marquez, "Upland Firefighters and Families Affected by 9/11 Tragedy."
<br>[139] <a href="http://www.iaff.org/11News/082211patriotflag.htm" target="_blank">"At IAFF Headquarters, Patriot Flag Flies in Honor of Those Who Died on September 11."</a>
<br>[140] <a href="http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2011/09/11/courageous-911-firefighter-describes-miraculously-surviving-the-twin-towers-collapse/" target="_blank">Billy Hallowell, "Courageous 9/11 Firefighter Describes Miraculously Surviving the Twin Towers' Collapse"</a>; <a href="http://jacksonville.com/news/metro/2015-09-04/story/911-firefighter-who-survived-attack-tells-jacksonville-students-embrace" target="_blank">Clifford Davis, "9/11 Firefighter Who Survived Attack Tells Jacksonville Students to Embrace Life's Challenges."</a>
<br>[141] <a href="http://triblive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/news/regional/s_469687.html" target="_blank">Mike Wereschagin, "Buried in the Rubble"</a>; <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HUOR8TnxqsA" target="_blank">"OEW Talks to Surviving 9/11 Firefighter."</a>
<br>[142] Jim Dwyer and Kevin Flynn, <i>102 Minutes</i>, pp. 78, 277.
<br>[143] <a href="http://www.panynj.gov/press-room/press-item.cfm?headLine_id=223" target="_blank">"World Trade Center Heroes Urge Minorities and Women to Consider Careers With the Port Authority Police."</a>
<br>[144] <a href="https://adam.pra.to/public/mir/www.thememoryhole.org/911/pa-transcripts/911-awards-police.pdf" target="_blank">"September 11th, 2001, Special Awards Program Nomination Form: Police Captain Anthony Whitaker." Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, n.d.</a>
<br>[145] Peter Lance, <i>1,000 Years for Revenge: International Terrorism and the FBI, the Untold Story</i>. New York: Regan Books, 2003, p. 385; <a href="http://www.writerswrite.com/journal/oct03/1000-years-for-revenge-a-conversation-with-peter-lance-10034" target="_blank">Claire E. White, "1,000 Years for Revenge: A Conversation With Peter Lance." Internet Writing Journal, October 2003</a>.Shoestringhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01534319150672667644noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2990970741097819876.post-78295475956402327392015-12-28T01:31:00.000-08:002015-12-28T01:31:58.017-08:00United Airlines Held an Exercise So Realistic That Its Personnel Had to Be Reassured That the 9/11 Attacks Were 'Not a Drill'<br><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEja-zNdLyTmX0DdmXFvpJslvDTSEzlxMIi3AvQ_hdQ9oqve4vNro5c1o2DhYq6WAbj9CFQfL19UorYjW1MB74jz0dbyRdjQ4nuLno4-7Nx8QWpTbnzVgTwuGyfvVK1X4yzQ7Z8z3SENl-J9/s1600/UAL767.jpg" target="_blank" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEja-zNdLyTmX0DdmXFvpJslvDTSEzlxMIi3AvQ_hdQ9oqve4vNro5c1o2DhYq6WAbj9CFQfL19UorYjW1MB74jz0dbyRdjQ4nuLno4-7Nx8QWpTbnzVgTwuGyfvVK1X4yzQ7Z8z3SENl-J9/s1600/UAL767.jpg" alt="A United Airlines Boeing 767"/></a></div><br>United Airlines personnel were subjected to a surprise training exercise 12 days before 9/11 in which they were led to believe that one of their planes had crashed. The exercise was so realistic that some of them ended up in tears or became physically sick. Consequently, on September 11, 2001, when two United Airlines planes were hijacked and then crashed, the manager who organized the exercise apparently thought his employees had mistaken reports about the terrorist attacks for part of an exercise and therefore told them, "This is not a drill!"
<br><br>Furthermore, United Airlines had previously conducted other exercises that were based around scenarios resembling aspects of the 9/11 attacks, which may have caused its employees to be confused on September 11 over whether the crisis that day was real or simulated. The scenarios included hijackings and planes crashing into buildings.
<br><br>We need to consider whether these exercises hindered the ability of United Airlines personnel to respond to the attacks on September 11. If they did, was this intentional? Did people involved in planning the 9/11 attacks help organize exercises that would lead to confusion on September 11, so as to increase the likelihood that the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon would succeed?
<br><br><b>'NO-NOTICE' EXERCISE INVOLVED A PILOT INDICATING THAT HIS PLANE HAD CRASHED</b>
<br>The exercise held 12 days before 9/11 was arranged by Andy Studdert, United Airlines' chief operating officer, who was based at the airline's headquarters, near Chicago. Studdert has claimed that the exercise came about because he had been concerned that United Airlines hadn't had to deal with a "real accident" in over 15 years and was therefore unprepared to respond adequately should one occur.
<br><br>Around March 2001, he notified other managers at his airline that he intended to run a surprise exercise to address the problem. "One of these days, I'm gonna come in here and I'm gonna do a no-notice drill," he told them. [1] (A "no-notice" drill is an exercise that is conducted without its participants being given any formal advance notice of when it will occur. [2])
<br><br>Studdert ran this no-notice drill on August 30, 2001. [3] Only two people, apart from him, knew about it in advance: a pilot and a colleague of Studdert's who Studdert has only referred to as his "safety guy." (This "safety guy" may well have been Ed Soliday, United Airlines' vice president of safety and security.)
<br><br>After he arrived at work, Studdert told his "safety guy" to call the pilot of a United Airlines Boeing 747 that would be flying to Australia that day and tell him to simulate an emergency. Based on Studdert's instructions, the pilot was told to call in during his flight and say his plane had experienced an "uncontained number three engine failure, rapid descent, decompression." He was told that halfway through the word "decompression" he should stop talking and then remain silent. He was also told to turn off his plane's transponder around the time he stopped talking to ground personnel. [4] (A transponder is a device that sends an aircraft's identifying information, speed, and altitude to the radar screens of air traffic controllers. [5])
<br><br><b>AIRLINE'S CRISIS CENTER WAS OPENED DURING THE EXERCISE</b>
<br>The exercise took place in the afternoon. At around 2:00 p.m., Studdert's secretary rushed into Studdert's office and said a Boeing 747 had lost contact while flying over the Pacific Ocean. In response to the news, Studdert ran to the United Airlines operations center. [6] The operations center, located in a building adjacent to the headquarters building, was a room about the size of a football field in which a few hundred people worked, tracking planes and pulling up information relating to the airline's flights. [7]
<br><br>United Airlines' normal procedure when there was a crisis involving one of its planes was to isolate that aircraft and move the handling of it to the crisis center, so as to avoid disrupting operations in the rest of the system. Located just off the operations center, the crisis center was "a terraced, theater-like room that resembled NASA's Mission Control," according to journalist and author Jere Longman. On one of its walls, a large screen displayed the locations of United Airlines' flights. Other screens showed CNN and other television news channels. [8]
<br><br>After reaching the operations center, Studdert opened the crisis center so his personnel could respond to the simulated emergency from there. [9] This was a major action. "Opening a crisis center in an airline is <i>the</i> single most significant thing you do," Studdert has commented. When the crisis center was opened, Studdert said, everyone at United Airlines had "a second job, and that second job is to either run ... the rest of the airline or act to support the crisis." It meant 3,000 employees were "put on an immediate activation." [10] Once the center had been opened, a representative from every division of the airline's corporate structure was required to report there and carry out specific predetermined duties. [11]
<br><br><b>DEVASTATED EMPLOYEES THOUGHT THE SIMULATED EMERGENCY WAS REAL</b>
<br>Around the time Studdert opened the crisis center, employees in the operations center genuinely thought one of their planes had crashed. They presumably believed hundreds of people had died in the catastrophe. Some of them were extremely upset. "There [were] people throwing up in the hall; there [were] people crying; there [were] people just staring out the windows," Studdert recalled.
<br><br>And yet, despite this disturbing response to the simulated crisis, Studdert let his employees believe one of their planes had crashed for 30 minutes. He then went on the crisis center's communications link, which, he described, "has got 170 stations and people all over the country, all over the world," and revealed that the apparent catastrophe was just simulated. "This has been a no-notice drill," he announced. "There is no event. Everything's fine." [12]
<br><br>There was a furious response to what Studdert had done in the following days. The exercise was deemed inappropriately intense and emotionally damaging. "I had the board members calling; I had the unions demanding I be fired; I had people telling me I'm the most evil person in the world," Studdert recalled. [13] Some airline employees "wanted to kill me," he said. [14]
<br><br>Studdert's exercise must surely have been unprecedented in how realistic and intense it was. It seems unlikely that the exercise would have elicited such a severe response if United Airlines had conducted anything like it before. How curious it seems that United Airlines personnel were subjected to such a dramatic simulated emergency less than two weeks before September 11, when they had to respond to a genuine emergency involving two of their aircraft.
<br><br><b>EXERCISE HAD SIMILARITES TO INCIDENTS AIRLINE PERSONNEL DEALT WITH ON SEPTEMBER 11</b>
<br>Bearing in mind that Andy Studdert's exercise was very realistic, took place without participants knowing about it in advance, and involved United Airlines personnel having to respond to problems similar to those they faced on September 11, we should consider whether this exercise had a detrimental effect on United Airlines' response to the 9/11 attacks. Specifically, did it cause airline personnel to mistakenly think reports they received about the terrorist attacks on September 11 were part of an exercise?
<br><br>Studdert claimed that the response of United Airlines personnel to the 9/11 attacks was improved due to his exercise. He said the exercise revealed weaknesses that were quickly addressed. For example, out-of-date phone numbers were updated. [15] He also claimed that, despite the initial outcry, some airline employees were grateful after 9/11 for what he had done. "It's amazing, after 9/11 ... how many people came up to me and thanked me [for running the exercise], because we were ready [on September 11]," he said. [16]
<br><br>Some evidence, though, suggests that personnel who were in the United Airlines operations center on September 11 could have thought reports they received about the terrorist attacks that day were part of another no-notice exercise. If they indeed mistook events on September 11 for part of an exercise, their ability to respond to the attacks was presumably impeded as a result.
<br><br>There were certainly notable similarities between incidents United Airlines employees had to deal with during the 9/11 attacks and the simulated crisis they had faced in the exercise on August 30, which make it seem a genuine possibility that these people mistook events on September 11 for an exercise scenario.
<br><br>To begin with, in the exercise and on September 11, radio contact was lost with United Airlines planes. In the exercise, the plane involved was the Boeing 747 flying to Australia; on September 11, the planes involved were United Airlines Flight 175--the second aircraft to be hijacked that day--and United Airlines Flight 93--the fourth aircraft to be hijacked. [17]
<br><br>On both occasions, United Airlines personnel had to deal with alterations to the transponder signal from their planes. In the cases of the Boeing 747 involved in the exercise and Flight 93, the transponder went off; in the case of Flight 175, the transponder remained on but its signal changed. [18]
<br><br>On both occasions, airline personnel had to deal with plane crashes, albeit only a simulated crash in the exercise. And on both occasions, United Airlines' crisis center was activated. During the exercise, Studdert activated the crisis center after he arrived at the operations center. [19] On September 11, managers started activating the crisis center at around 9:00 a.m., after contact with Flight 175 was lost and operations center personnel were told by a supervisor at the United Airlines maintenance office in San Francisco that the plane had been reported as hijacked. [20]
<br><br><b>MANAGER TOLD HIS EMPLOYEES, 'THIS IS NOT A DRILL'</b>
<br>Although it is unclear whether United Airlines employees mistook events on September 11 for part of an exercise, Andy Studdert certainly appears to have been concerned at the time that this was the case.
<br><br>At 8:46 a.m. on September 11, when the first hijacked plane--American Airlines Flight 11--crashed into the World Trade Center, Studdert was in a meeting at United Airlines headquarters with Jim Goodwin, the airline's chairman and CEO, and several of his colleagues. Someone in the operations center called Studdert's secretary with the news about the crash and she interrupted Goodwin's meeting to pass on the information. Upon hearing what had happened, Studdert promptly headed across the United Airlines complex to the operations center.
<br><br>When he arrived there and asked for confirmation that an American Airlines plane had crashed into the World Trade Center, Studdert was told that contact had been lost with a United Airlines plane, Flight 175. [21] (This plane was hijacked sometime between 8:42 a.m. and 8:46 a.m., according to <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>. [22]) Then, at around 9:00 a.m., he was told about the call from the supervisor at the airline's maintenance office in San Francisco, in which the supervisor said Flight 175 had been reported as hijacked. [23]
<br><br>Aware now of the crisis that operations center personnel were facing, Studdert shouted out, "This is not a drill!" [24] Presumably his concern that employees might think the current situation was part of a drill was, to at least some degree, due to the fact that they had been confronted with such a dramatic and realistic simulated emergency in his exercise 12 days earlier.
<br><br>Patti Carson, United Airlines' vice president of human resources, also seems to have been concerned that airline personnel might have mistaken real events for part of an exercise. Carson followed Studdert to the operations center after he learned about Flight 11 crashing into the World Trade Center. After she saw the live television coverage of Flight 175 hitting the World Trade Center, at 9:03 a.m., she went into the crisis center and started making phone calls to the human resources leaders of the airline's other crisis centers around the United States. She told these people that "there had been an aircraft accident, possibly multiple ones." Notably, she has recalled, she told them that "[t]his was not a drill." [25] Might Carson have been concerned because the people she called had been deceived into thinking an air disaster had occurred when Studdert held his exercise on August 30 and she was therefore worried they might think the current crisis was also simulated as part of an exercise?
<br><br>Newspaper reports have been contradictory as to whether personnel at the United Airlines operations center thought the initial reports they received about the 9/11 attacks were genuine or part of an exercise. <i>USA Today</i> suggested that when Studdert announced that the crisis was "not a drill," operations center personnel already understood it was real. "[T]he staff already knows" this is not an exercise, it reported. [26] The <i>Chicago Tribune</i>, however, indicated that operations center staffers may indeed have thought the emergency they were learning about was part of an exercise. Studdert announced that the crisis was "not a drill" because he sensed "disbelief among his employees," it reported. [27]
<br><br><b>OTHER UNITED AIRLINES EXERCISES HAD SIMILARITIES TO THE 9/11 ATTACKS</b>
<br>The possibility that United Airlines personnel mistakenly thought the crisis on September 11 was part of an exercise seems more likely when we consider that other exercises they may have participated in, on top of the one on August 30, involved simulated emergencies that resembled incidents the airline had to deal with during the 9/11 attacks.
<br><br>United Airlines' crisis center held exercises four times a year before 9/11. These exercises included "security scenarios" and "hijacking scenarios," according to Ed Soliday. [28] Might their participation in exercises that involved hijacking scenarios have led United Airlines employees to mistakenly think the reported hijackings of their aircraft--Flight 175 and Flight 93--on September 11 were part of an exercise?
<br><br>Other scenarios in the exercises included "two planes crashing into one another, planes crashing into buildings," and "two planes crashing in separate incidents within a few hours of one another," according to John Kiker, United Airlines' vice president of worldwide communications at the time of the 9/11 attacks. [29] Might their participation in exercises based around the scenario of planes crashing into buildings have caused United Airlines personnel to think reports they received about planes hitting the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11 were simulated, since they knew their company would include these kinds of events in its exercises?
<br><br>Although we might assume that images of the World Trade Center on fire and other television coverage of the 9/11 attacks would have convinced United Airlines personnel that the crisis on September 11 was genuine and not part of an exercise, this may not necessarily have been the case, since United Airlines had previously used simulated television footage in its exercises, presumably to make them more realistic. For example, in October 1996, the airline held an exercise in which a group of its employees gathered in the crisis center to respond to the hypothetical crash of one of their airliners in Caracas, Venezuela. During the exercise, the employees saw simulated television coverage "of the burning airplane beamed onto a screen," according to the <i>Wall Street Journal</i>. [30] If United Airlines personnel were used to seeing simulated footage of air disasters during exercises, they could presumably have thought the television coverage they saw of the 9/11 attacks was also simulated, as part of an exercise.
<br><br>Furthermore, the likelihood that the crisis center's quarterly exercises led United Airlines personnel to mistake the 9/11 attacks for part of an exercise may have been increased due to the fact that many of these exercises were apparently no-notice drills. They were held "usually without warning," Kiker said. Kiker indicated that he usually only found out one of these exercises had been held after it had taken place. "Typically, I get a call informing me that there is a crisis test and outlining what just happened," he said. [31] So if United Airlines personnel had regularly been confronted with simulated emergencies without being told beforehand that an exercise was going to be held, surely they could have thought the crisis on September 11 was part of another exercise that they had not been told about in advance.
<br><br><b>DID UNITED AIRLINES PERSONNEL THINK THE 9/11 ATTACKS WERE PART OF AN EXERCISE?</b>
<br>Andy Studdert's exercise on August 30, 2001, and other exercises in which United Airlines employees faced simulated incidents that resembled real events they had to deal with on September 11 require closer scrutiny. Since two of the planes that were hijacked and crashed during the 9/11 attacks belonged to United Airlines, the ability of the airline's personnel to respond to the attacks is an important area of concern and anything that may have impaired it should be examined thoroughly.
<br><br>Many questions need to be addressed. Certainly, personnel who were in the United Airlines operations center on August 30, 2001, need to be questioned about their experiences during the exercise that day. Furthermore, who was the pilot who gave the impression that his plane had crashed in the exercise? Why did this pilot agree to go along with such a repulsive plan? Did he consider the devastation the simulated crash might cause among his airline's employees? He only learned about the exercise and received instructions on what to do on the day the exercise was held, according to Studdert. So why did he agree to take part in such a dramatic and apparently unprecedented deception at such short notice?
<br><br>Additionally, those who were working in the United Airlines operations center on September 11 need to be asked about their experiences that day. Did they ever think the crisis was part of a no-notice exercise? If they did, how long did it take before they realized the attacks were real?
<br><br>Although Studdert announced that the crisis was "not a drill" when he arrived at the operations center, did those in the center believe him? Studdert had demonstrated how deceptive he could be when he let his employees mistakenly think one of their planes had crashed in the exercise 12 days earlier. Many of these employees may consequently have considered him untrustworthy and have thought the crisis on September 11 was simulated, despite his assurance that it was real.
<br><br>And since United Airlines' crisis center had been activated during Studdert's exercise on August 30 and during other exercises, did airline personnel think the activation of the center on September 11 was again part of an exercise?
<br><br>It would also be worth investigating whether United Airlines personnel who worked at locations other than the airline's operations center were deceived into thinking one of their planes had crashed when Studdert held his exercise. According to one report, most of United Airlines' "extensive global staff" believed the apparent crash on August 30 was real. [32] And Studdert indicated this was the case. He said that on August 30, he announced that the apparent catastrophe had been just "a no-notice drill" over the crisis center's communications link, which had "170 stations and people all over the country, all over the world." [33] Presumably it would only have been necessary to notify personnel around the United States and around the world that the apparent emergency was just part of an exercise if airline employees at locations other than the operations center had been led to believe one of their planes had crashed.
<br><br>If United Airlines personnel at locations other than the operations center were indeed deceived during the exercise on August 30, did any of them consequently think, on September 11, that reports they received relating to the day's terrorist attacks were part of an exercise?
<br><br><b>WAS THE EXERCISE DESIGNED TO HELP THE 9/11 ATTACKS SUCCEED?</b>
<br>It is certainly intriguing that such a dramatic and realistic exercise took place just 12 days before September 11, when, like during the exercise, United Airlines personnel had to deal with the loss of contact with their aircraft, changes to their planes' transponder signals, and plane crashes. Andy Studdert's exercise almost appears as if it was designed to impede United Airlines' response to the 9/11 attacks, by causing employees to be confused over whether the attacks were real or simulated.
<br><br>Was the occurrence of this exercise so soon before 9/11 just a coincidence, then, or was the exercise conducted for malicious reasons? Could it have intentionally been held so as to cause confusion on September 11 and thereby increase the likelihood that the attacks that day would succeed? If this was the case, who exactly planned it? Was it Studdert on his own or were other people, whose roles have yet to be revealed, involved?
<br><br>Although some information about the exercise on August 30, 2001, and other United Airlines exercises before 9/11 has come to light, there is still much that is unknown. And yet it is possible that these exercises played a significant role in ensuring the 9/11 attacks were successful. It is important, therefore, that they are examined thoroughly as part of a new investigation of 9/11.
<br><br><b>NOTES</b>
<br>[1] <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WA219BM5oNs" target="_blank">Center for Values-Driven Leadership, "Preparing Your Organization for a Crisis: Lessons From United Airlines Emergency Preparation, Pre-9/11." YouTube video, 3:55, March 15, 2012</a>; <a href="http://www.cvdl.org/blog/how-to-prepare-for-a-crisis-lessons-from-uniteds-911-chief-of-operations/" target="_blank">Amber Johnson, "How to Prepare for a Crisis: Lessons From United's 9/11 Chief of Operations." Center for Values-Driven Leadership, April 26, 2012</a>.
<br>[2] <a href="http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2000/May/289ag.htm" target="_blank">"TOPOFF Exercise Activity Anticipated for Monday." United States Department of Justice, May 21, 2000</a>; <a href="http://cid.oxfordjournals.org/content/32/3/436.full" target="_blank">Thomas V. Inglesby, Rita Grossman, and Tara O'Toole, "A Plague on Your City: Observations From TOPOFF." <i>Clinical Infectious Diseases</i> 32, no. 3 (2001): 436-445</a>; <a href="https://orise.orau.gov/emi/training-products/exercisebuilder/support/help/step02.htm" target="_blank">"Step 2: Develop Scope." Exercise Builder, n.d.</a>
<br>[3] <a href="http://www.ipaf.org/fileadmin/user_upload/documents/en/What_Can_Aerials_Learn_from_Aviation.pdf" target="_blank">Andy Studdert, "What Can Aerials Learn From Aviation?" Presentation, IPAF Asia Conference, Kowloon, Hong Kong, May 26, 2015</a>.
<br>[4] <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WA219BM5oNs" target="_blank">Center for Values-Driven Leadership, "Preparing Your Organization for a Crisis"</a>; <a href="http://www.thonline.com/news/tri-state/article_fd7b343a-be73-5354-bbca-55628f290a65.html" target="_blank">Stacey Becker, "In Dubuque, Ex-Airline Executive Recounts 9/11 Crisis." <i>Dubuque Telegraph Herald</i>, November 12, 2015</a>.
<br>[5] <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/opinions/articles/sept_11_2001.html" target="_blank">David Maraniss, "September 11, 2001; Steve Miller Ate a Scone, Sheila Moody Did Paperwork, Edmund Glazer Boarded a Plane: Portrait of a Day That Began in Routine and Ended in Ashes." <i>Washington Post</i>, September 16, 2001</a>.
<br>[6] <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WA219BM5oNs" target="_blank">Center for Values-Driven Leadership, "Preparing Your Organization for a Crisis."</a>
<br>[7] Jere Longman, <i>Among the Heroes: United Flight 93 and the Passengers and Crew Who Fought Back</i>. New York: HarperCollins, 2002, p. 77; <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-ZAAKJzMKRo" target="_blank">Center for Values-Driven Leadership, "Leadership in the 9/11 Crisis Room." YouTube video, 6:10, April 23, 2012</a>.
<br>[8] Jere Longman, <i>Among the Heroes</i>, p. 77; <a href="http://www.usatoday.com/news/sept11/2002-08-12-clearskies_x.htm" target="_blank">Alan Levin, Marilyn Adams, and Blake Morrison, "Part I: Terror Attacks Brought Drastic Decision: Clear the Skies." <i>USA Today</i>, August 12, 2002</a>; <a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/2610699" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Briefing on the United Airlines System Operations Control Center and Crisis Center." 9/11 Commission, November 20, 2003</a>.
<br>[9] <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WA219BM5oNs" target="_blank">Center for Values-Driven Leadership, "Preparing Your Organization for a Crisis."</a>
<br>[10] <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-ZAAKJzMKRo" target="_blank">Center for Values-Driven Leadership, "Leadership in the 9/11 Crisis Room."</a>
<br>[11] <a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/2610699" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Briefing on the United Airlines System Operations Control Center and Crisis Center."</a>
<br>[12] <a href="http://www.usatoday.com/news/sept11/2002-08-12-clearskies_x.htm" target="_blank">Alan Levin, Marilyn Adams, and Blake Morrison, "Part I: Terror Attacks Brought Drastic Decision: Clear the Skies"</a>; <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WA219BM5oNs" target="_blank">Center for Values-Driven Leadership, "Preparing Your Organization for a Crisis"</a>; <a href="http://www.thonline.com/news/tri-state/article_fd7b343a-be73-5354-bbca-55628f290a65.html" target="_blank">Stacey Becker, "In Dubuque, Ex-Airline Executive Recounts 9/11 Crisis."</a>
<br>[13] <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WA219BM5oNs" target="_blank">Center for Values-Driven Leadership, "Preparing Your Organization for a Crisis"</a>; <a href="http://www.cvdl.org/blog/how-to-prepare-for-a-crisis-lessons-from-uniteds-911-chief-of-operations/" target="_blank">Amber Johnson, "How to Prepare for a Crisis."</a>
<br>[14] <a href="http://www.thonline.com/news/tri-state/article_fd7b343a-be73-5354-bbca-55628f290a65.html" target="_blank">Stacey Becker, "In Dubuque, Ex-Airline Executive Recounts 9/11 Crisis."</a>
<br>[15] Ibid.
<br>[16] <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WA219BM5oNs" target="_blank">Center for Values-Driven Leadership, "Preparing Your Organization for a Crisis."</a>
<br>[17] <a href="https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=484625" target="_blank"><i>Staff Report: The Four Flights</i>. 9/11 Commission, August 26, 2004, pp. 20-21, 38-39</a>; <a href="http://www.thonline.com/news/tri-state/article_fd7b343a-be73-5354-bbca-55628f290a65.html" target="_blank">Stacey Becker, "In Dubuque, Ex-Airline Executive Recounts 9/11 Crisis."</a>
<br>[18] <a href="https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=484625" target="_blank"><i>Staff Report: The Four Flights</i>, pp. 21, 43</a>; <a href="http://www.thonline.com/news/tri-state/article_fd7b343a-be73-5354-bbca-55628f290a65.html" target="_blank">Stacey Becker, "In Dubuque, Ex-Airline Executive Recounts 9/11 Crisis."</a>
<br>[19] <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WA219BM5oNs" target="_blank">Center for Values-Driven Leadership, "Preparing Your Organization for a Crisis."</a>
<br>[20] <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1003107853707953680" target="_blank">Scott McCartney and Susan Carey, "American, United Watched and Worked in Horror as Sept. 11 Hijackings Unfolded." <i>Wall Street Journal</i>, October 15, 2001</a>; <a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/2610693" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Rich Miles, UAL Manager of Station Operations Control." 9/11 Commission, November 21, 2003</a>; <a href="http://www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearing7/witness_studdert.htm" target="_blank">"Statement of Andrew P. Studdert to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States." 9/11 Commission, January 27, 2004</a>; <a href="https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=484625" target="_blank"><i>Staff Report: The Four Flights</i>, p. 22</a>.
<br>[21] <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1003107853707953680" target="_blank">Scott McCartney and Susan Carey, "American, United Watched and Worked in Horror as Sept. 11 Hijackings Unfolded"</a>; <a href="http://www.chicagolegalnet.com/cases-we-handle/united-airlines-employees/bankruptcy-provides-time-no-guarantees/" target="_blank">"Bankruptcy Provides Time, No Guarantees." <i>Chicago Tribune</i>, July 16, 2003</a>; <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-ZAAKJzMKRo" target="_blank">Center for Values-Driven Leadership, "Leadership in the 9/11 Crisis Room."</a>
<br>[22] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States</i>. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004, p. 7.
<br>[23] <a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/2610696" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Andy Studdert, Chief Operating Officer of United Airlines." 9/11 Commission, November 20, 2003</a>; <a href="https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=484625" target="_blank"><i>Staff Report: The Four Flights</i>, p. 22</a>.
<br>[24] <a href="http://www.usatoday.com/news/sept11/2002-08-12-clearskies_x.htm" target="_blank">Alan Levin, Marilyn Adams, and Blake Morrison, "Part I: Terror Attacks Brought Drastic Decision: Clear the Skies"</a>; <a href="http://www.chicagolegalnet.com/cases-we-handle/united-airlines-employees/bankruptcy-provides-time-no-guarantees/" target="_blank">"Bankruptcy Provides Time, No Guarantees."</a>
<br>[25] <a href="http://www.hr.com/SITEFORUM?&t=/Default/gateway&i=1116423256281&application=story&active=no&ParentID=1119278025992&StoryID=1119649792312" target="_blank">"Reality HR with Patti Carson." HR.com, July 1, 2005</a>.
<br>[26] <a href="http://www.usatoday.com/news/sept11/2002-08-12-clearskies_x.htm" target="_blank">Alan Levin, Marilyn Adams, and Blake Morrison, "Part I: Terror Attacks Brought Drastic Decision: Clear the Skies."</a>
<br>[27] <a href="http://www.chicagolegalnet.com/cases-we-handle/united-airlines-employees/bankruptcy-provides-time-no-guarantees/" target="_blank">"Bankruptcy Provides Time, No Guarantees."</a>
<br>[28] <a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/2610699" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Briefing on the United Airlines System Operations Control Center and Crisis Center"</a>; <a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/2610695" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Captain Ed Soliday, Former Vice President of Safety, Security and Quality Assurance for United Airlines (Part II)." 9/11 Commission, November 21, 2003</a>.
<br>[29] <a href="http://www.holmesreport.com/latest/article/for-united-airlines-a-crisis-without-precedent" target="_blank">Paul Holmes, "For United Airlines, a Crisis Without Precedent." Holmes Report, October 3, 2001</a>.
<br>[30] <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB848530581593177000" target="_blank">Susan Carey, "Recent Drills Help United Cope With Airport Collision." <i>Wall Street Journal</i>, November 21, 1996</a>.
<br>[31] <a href="http://www.holmesreport.com/latest/article/for-united-airlines-a-crisis-without-precedent" target="_blank">Paul Holmes, "For United Airlines, a Crisis Without Precedent."</a>
<br>[32] <a href="http://www.cvdl.org/blog/how-to-prepare-for-a-crisis-lessons-from-uniteds-911-chief-of-operations/" target="_blank">Amber Johnson, "How to Prepare for a Crisis."</a>
<br>[33] <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WA219BM5oNs" target="_blank">Center for Values-Driven Leadership, "Preparing Your Organization for a Crisis."</a>Shoestringhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01534319150672667644noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2990970741097819876.post-73562095741041000012015-09-17T03:44:00.000-07:002015-09-17T03:44:35.505-07:00Air Defense Exercise a Month Before 9/11 Was Based Around Osama Bin Laden Carrying Out an Aerial Attack on Washington<br><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh3bY_LO9KKipGXgofZ-WMstiYAgw9v0ubOIjiQFGxkR44GI27UYNjTiYlZbEV07MW8btcnXwjYck0RyVvxChDPVYxDArYTvuT6tf9fi_FkzqUPwwPKXzl0cVqQO_fI7LEc3XtSx2wb-yOy/s1600/BinLaden.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;" target="_blank"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh3bY_LO9KKipGXgofZ-WMstiYAgw9v0ubOIjiQFGxkR44GI27UYNjTiYlZbEV07MW8btcnXwjYck0RyVvxChDPVYxDArYTvuT6tf9fi_FkzqUPwwPKXzl0cVqQO_fI7LEc3XtSx2wb-yOy/s1600/BinLaden.jpg" alt="Osama bin Laden"/></a></div>
<br>NORAD's Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) held a training exercise just over a month before September 11, 2001, which had some uncanny similarities to the 9/11 attacks. The exercise, called Fertile Rice, was based around the scenario of Osama bin Laden--the man who supposedly ordered the 9/11 attacks--organizing an aerial attack on a high-profile government building in Washington, DC--one of the cities attacked on September 11.
<br><br>NEADS personnel were scheduled to take part in an exercise on September 11. We therefore need to consider whether the similarities between the scenario for the Fertile Rice exercise and some of the incidents they had to deal with on the morning of September 11 caused them to mistake real-world events for part of the day's exercise and thereby impaired their ability to respond to the 9/11 attacks.
<br><br><b>EXERCISE INVOLVED BIN LADEN PLANNING TO ATTACK WASHINGTON WITH A DRONE AIRCRAFT</b>
<br>NEADS, based in Rome, New York, was responsible for monitoring and defending the airspace in which the hijackings occurred on September 11, and was consequently responsible for coordinating the U.S. military's response to the 9/11 attacks. [1] It ran an exercise called Fertile Rice each week. [2] On August 4, 2001--five and a half weeks before 9/11--Fertile Rice was based around the scenario of Osama bin Laden's operatives attacking a target in Washington. [3]
<br><br>An information sheet on the exercise outlined the details. It stated that the scenario for the exercise involved an "Osama bin Laden threat to [the] U.S." Bin Laden had "reportedly acquired at least one and possibly two" unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The UAV he'd obtained was believed to be the Russian-developed "Colibri," which had been modified to be launched off a ship.
<br><br>Bin Laden's operatives intended to carry out an attack in the next 24 to 36 hours. Although their exact target was unknown, it was believed that they intended to strike a "highly visible U.S. government target" that was probably in the Washington area.
<br><br>The Colibri they would use to carry out the attack was a propeller-driven drone aircraft designed to perform various military and civilian missions. It was 4.25 meters long, had a wingspan of 5.9 meters, and its maximum speed was 155 miles per hour. It was fitted with sophisticated electronic jamming equipment, as well as equipment for monitoring electronic communications and radar.
<br><br>The ship transporting the Colibri to the Washington area had left a port in the Middle East and was set to rendezvous with one of the terrorists off the coast of Norfolk, Virginia, on August 4. This person would provide the final targeting information that would be programmed into the Colibri. The ship was believed to be carrying additional military equipment, including shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles, rocket-propelled grenades, automatic weapons, and plastic explosives.
<br><br>The Colibri's "weapon payload" was "reportedly some type of fuel-air explosive" that would be "activated with an altimeter device." [4] Fuel-air explosives are highly destructive weapons. They spray an explosive mist and then ignite the vapor, thereby creating a blast far larger than a conventional weapon produces. [5]
<br><br>The exact form that the Colibri's "weapon payload" would take in the scenario is unstated in the information sheet. It could perhaps have been a fuel-air bomb that the UAV would drop onto its target. Alternatively, the mock terrorists' intention may have been to fly the Colibri into its target such that the fuel-air explosive it carried would detonate on impact.
<br><br><b>AUGUST 4 EXERCISE HAD SIMILARITIES TO THE 9/11 ATTACKS</b>
<br>It is worth considering whether the similarities between the scenario for the Fertile Rice exercise on August 4 and some of the incidents NEADS had to deal with on September 11 had a detrimental effect on how NEADS personnel responded to the 9/11 attacks.
<br><br>NEADS personnel are known to have been in the middle of a major air defense exercise on September 11, called Vigilant Guardian, which simulated an attack on the United States. [6] Most of the staffers on the NEADS operations floor on the morning of September 11 had no idea what the exercise was going to involve that day, according to the <i>Utica Observer-Dispatch</i>. [7] They could presumably therefore have thought any suspicious reports they received were part of the exercise.
<br><br>We can see that the August 4 exercise resembled the 9/11 attacks--or at least the official account of the attacks--in several ways. These similarities may have caused NEADS personnel to mistakenly think events on September 11 were part of that day's exercise, since these personnel might have thought they were being tested on a similar scenario.
<br><br>The first similarity was that while Fertile Rice was based around a scenario in which Osama bin Laden's operatives attacked the United States, the attacks on the U.S. that occurred on September 11 were, according to the official account, ordered by bin Laden and carried out by members of his al-Qaeda terrorist network.
<br><br>Secondly, the scenario for Fertile Rice and the 9/11 attacks both involved America being attacked from the air. In the exercise, the simulated attack was going to be carried out using an unmanned drone aircraft; on September 11, the attacks were carried out using commercial aircraft.
<br><br>Thirdly, Fertile Rice and the 9/11 attacks both involved terrorists attacking prominent government buildings in the Washington area. In Fertile Rice, the exact target is unstated. However, the information sheet on the exercise specified that it was a "highly visible U.S. government target" that was likely in the Washington area. [8] This could well have been the Pentagon, the White House, or the Capitol building--three of the most "visible" government buildings in the Washington area.
<br><br>On September 11, meanwhile, the Pentagon was one of the buildings that were attacked. At 9:37 a.m., according to the official account, American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into its west wall. [9] And it has been claimed that either the White House or the Capitol building was the most likely target for United Airlines Flight 93--the fourth and final plane to be hijacked, which failed to reach its target and supposedly crashed in a field in Pennsylvania. [10]
<br><br><b>NEADS RECEIVED NUMEROUS REPORTS OF SUSPICIOUS AIRCRAFT IN THE WASHINGTON AREA ON SEPTEMBER 11</b>
<br>NEADS personnel were alerted to suspicious aircraft that were approaching or over Washington at least four times on the morning of September 11. Since these incidents presumably resembled the scenario they had encountered in Fertile Rice on August 4, we need to consider whether that exercise affected how they evaluated them. For example, did they think the reports of suspicious aircraft were simulated, as part of a scenario like the one they'd encountered in Fertile Rice?
<br><br>Some, or perhaps all, of the reports NEADS received of suspicious aircraft over or approaching Washington on September 11 might even have been part of the exercise taking place that day. Close analysis of these reports reveals many oddities, which indicate they may indeed have been related to the exercise, rather than to actual events.
<br><br><b>FLIGHT 11 WAS REPORTED AS FLYING TOWARD WASHINGTON LONG AFTER IT CRASHED</b>
<br>The first one of these reports came at around 9:21 a.m.--18 minutes after a second plane crashed into the World Trade Center and 16 minutes before the Pentagon was attacked.
<br><br>Colin Scoggins, the military liaison at the FAA's Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center, incorrectly told NEADS that American Airlines Flight 11--which crashed into the World Trade Center at 8:46 a.m.--was still airborne and was flying south toward Washington. "It was evidently another aircraft that hit the tower," he said. [11]
<br><br>Scoggins, however, had no solid evidence that Flight 11 was heading for the capital. Air traffic controllers "were never tracking an actual plane on the radar after losing American 11 near Manhattan," <i>Vanity Fair</i> magazine reported. But, "The plane's course, had it continued south past New York in the direction it was flying before it dipped below radar coverage, would have had it headed on a straight course toward DC." [12]
<br><br>The 9/11 Commission stated that it had "been unable to identify the source of this mistaken FAA information." [13] But according to <i>Vanity Fair</i>, "Colin Scoggins ... made the mistaken call." Scoggins told the magazine he had been monitoring a conference call between FAA centers "when the word came across--from whom or where isn't clear--that American 11 was thought to be headed for Washington." [14]
<br><br><b>NEADS WAS ALERTED TO AN AIRCRAFT FLYING AWAY FROM THE WHITE HOUSE</b>
<br>NEADS personnel were alerted to a suspicious aircraft flying over or toward Washington for a second time just before 9:36 a.m., about two minutes before the Pentagon was hit. Again, the source of the information was Colin Scoggins.
<br><br>Scoggins initially told ID technician Stacia Rountree that the "latest report" was of an aircraft "six miles southeast of the White House" that was "moving away" from the White House. But, seconds later, he said the aircraft was in fact six miles <i>southwest</i> of the White House and "deviating away." Asked if he knew the identity of the aircraft, he replied: "Nothing. ... I have no clue." He suggested that NEADS contact the FAA's Washington Center for more information.
<br><br>Rountree promptly called the Washington Center and asked about the suspicious aircraft, but the person who answered the call told her: "We don't know anything about that. ... It's probably just a rumor." They were surprised that Scoggins had alerted NEADS to the aircraft, since, they said, Boston Center's "airspace doesn't even come close to [Washington]." "I don't know how they got that information," they added.
<br><br>Scoggins had told Rountree that Boston Center controllers didn't even have a blip for the suspicious aircraft on their radar screens. Boston Center personnel had just heard about the aircraft over a teleconference and wanted to pass on the information to NEADS, he'd said. [15]
<br><br>The aircraft was later determined to have been Flight 77--the plane that supposedly crashed into the Pentagon at 9:37 a.m. [16]
<br><br><b>NEADS WAS ALERTED TO AN AIRCRAFT FLYING OUT OF CANADA</b>
<br>The third report of a suspicious aircraft approaching or over Washington came at around 10:00 a.m., when a NORAD unit in Canada contacted NEADS and told it an aircraft was heading south from Canada into the United States. [17]
<br><br>A member of staff at NEADS relayed the details to their colleagues. The aircraft, from an "unknown departure airport," was "heading towards Washington," they said, but nothing else was known about it. [18] Another member of staff at NEADS called the Canadian NORAD unit, seeking more information, but an officer at the unit could provide few details. He said he had seen "something on the chat." (He was presumably referring to NORAD's computer chat system.) The information he'd seen was that his unit's intelligence officers were "assessing that there's a possible aircraft." [19]
<br><br>The report turned out to be a false alarm. At around 10:10 a.m., the officer at the Canadian NORAD unit called NEADS and said his unit's intelligence officers were "not assessing that there is an actual aircraft problem." It was simply the case that "there could be problems from our area." "There's no actual aircraft that we suspect as being a danger," he added. [20]
<br><br><b>A SUSPICIOUS AIRCRAFT WAS REPORTEDLY FLYING OVER THE WHITE HOUSE</b>
<br>The fourth report alerted NEADS personnel to a suspicious aircraft that was supposedly flying over the White House. This report was received at 10:07 a.m.--four minutes after Flight 93, the final aircraft to be hijacked that day, supposedly crashed in Pennsylvania. So by then the terrorist attacks were already over.
<br><br>A pilot in one of three fighter jets that had taken off from Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, and were flying a combat air patrol over Washington called NEADS. He said a controller at the FAA's Washington Center was "saying something about an aircraft over the White House" and asked if NEADS had any instructions for him. NEADS immediately ordered him to intercept the aircraft and divert it away from the White House.
<br><br>While the fighters from Langley Air Force Base were heading toward the White House, a member of staff at NEADS suggested to his colleagues that the suspicious aircraft, which was flying "very low," was "probably a helicopter." But a few minutes later, NEADS personnel concluded that the aircraft was in fact one of the fighters from Langley Air Force Base, which the controller at the Washington Center had mistakenly reported because they were unaware fighters had been launched to protect the airspace over Washington. "It was our guys they saw, [Washington] Center saw," a member of staff at NEADS commented. [21]
<br><br>The evidence that these four reports were part of the exercise NEADS was participating in on September 11--and were presumably related to simulated attacks on Washington--is, of course, inconclusive. The 9:36 a.m. report, for example, may have related to real-world events, when an aircraft involved in the actual attacks was near Washington.
<br><br>Regardless of the reasons for the reports, though, the fact that Fertile Rice on August 4 included a simulated aerial attack on Washington would surely have increased the likelihood that NEADS personnel would think any reports of suspicious aircraft over or approaching Washington that they received on September 11 were part of the day's exercise.
<br><br><b>NEADS PERSONNEL SUGGESTED BIN LADEN WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE 9/11 ATTACKS BEFORE ANY BLAME HAD BEEN ATTRIBUTED</b>
<br>Some evidence suggests the Fertile Rice exercise on August 4 did indeed influence the reactions of NEADS personnel to the crisis on September 11. Specifically, the fact that its scenario involved an attack that would be perpetrated by Osama bin Laden and his operatives may have led NEADS personnel to attribute the events of September 11 to bin Laden and Arab terrorists before any official allocation of blame was made.
<br><br>Even while the terrorist attacks were taking place on the morning of September 11, at least one person at NEADS appears to have concluded that bin Laden was to blame for what was happening. At 9:28 a.m., Sergeant Steve Bianchi told his colleagues, "I think it's time we lost Osama bin Laden." [22] Later on, at 11:11 a.m., someone at NEADS told a colleague, "I think we're getting to the point we ought to start shooting all the ragheads." [23] ("Ragheads" is an offensive term for Muslims, Arabs, or Middle Easterners.)
<br><br>And yet at these times, NEADS personnel had apparently received no information indicating that bin Laden and his terrorist organization were responsible for the attacks. Transcripts of tape recordings of the NEADS operations floor from the morning of September 11 show no examples of personnel inquiring about who was behind the events they were dealing with or being told who was thought to be responsible for the attacks. [24]
<br><br>Furthermore, the first report on television firmly indicating that bin Laden and al-Qaeda were responsible appears to have only occurred just after 11:30 a.m. At that time, former NATO commander General Wesley Clark told CNN, "There is only one group that has ever indicated that it has this kind of ability [to carry out such a large-scale coordinated attack] and that's Osama bin Laden's." [25] A clear statement of blame appears to have first been made late that afternoon. At around 4:00 p.m., CNN correspondent David Ensor reported, "U.S. officials are saying that they now have new and specific information ... that people with links to Osama bin Laden may have been responsible for these attacks." [26]
<br><br>In light of this information, it is worth considering whether NEADS personnel indicated that they thought bin Laden and "the ragheads" were behind the terrorist attacks so early on September 11 because they remembered that bin Laden and his operatives were behind the simulated attack in the Fertile Rice exercise on August 4.
<br><br>It might also be worth considering whether the exercise NEADS was participating in on September 11 included a scenario, which, like the one in the August 4 exercise, involved an attack on the U.S. perpetrated by bin Laden and his terrorist organization. Even if it didn't, NEADS personnel may have mistakenly thought it did, based on their experiences in the August 4 exercise, in which bin Laden's operatives planned to attack "a highly visible U.S. government target" in the Washington area. The comments "I think it's time we lost Osama bin Laden" and "I think we're getting to the point we ought to start shooting all the ragheads" could therefore have reflected the fact that NEADS personnel thought the incidents they were dealing with on September 11 were part of an exercise scenario based around bin Laden launching an attack in the U.S.
<br><br><b>DID THE AUGUST 4 EXERCISE AFFECT HOW NEADS PERSONNEL RESPONDED TO THE EVENTS OF SEPTEMBER 11?</b>
<br>The similarities between the Fertile Rice exercise that NEADS personnel participated in on August 4, 2001, and the 9/11 attacks, five and a half weeks later, give rise to important questions.
<br><br>For example, were the similarities just a coincidence or were they the result of something more sinister? Might the exercise have been intended to, in some way, impair the ability of NEADS personnel to stop the 9/11 attacks? If so, this would indicate that rogue individuals in the U.S. military were involved with planning the 9/11 attacks and designed the August 4 exercise to increase the likelihood of the attacks being successfully carried out.
<br><br>We can certainly see several goals the exercise may have achieved toward facilitating the 9/11 attacks. To begin with, since it involved a hostile aircraft aiming for a target in Washington, Fertile Rice could have increased the likelihood that NEADS personnel would think any reports they received of suspicious aircraft approaching Washington or in the Washington area on September 11 were part of that day's exercise, rather than being attempts to alert them to real events. And if they thought any of the incidents they had to deal with on September 11 were simulated, NEADS personnel may have responded to them differently than if they knew they were real. They may, for example, have reacted with less urgency.
<br><br>Secondly, the exercise could have helped convince NEADS personnel that Osama bin Laden and his terrorist organization were capable of carrying out sophisticated attacks in the United States. Fertile Rice involved bin Laden organizing an elaborate and audacious aerial attack on a government building in Washington--an area that should have been particularly well protected. This may have led NEADS personnel to believe it had been determined that bin Laden was capable of carrying out highly sophisticated attacks in the U.S.
<br><br>If they believed this, they would presumably have been more likely to accept the official explanation of who was behind the 9/11 attacks and less likely to raise questions about the validity of this explanation. They would therefore have been less likely to wonder if a rogue group within the U.S. military and other government agencies was responsible for the attacks.
<br><br>NEADS personnel received a briefing in July 2001 that may have been intended to fulfill the same purpose--convincing them that bin Laden was capable of carrying out an aerial attack in the U.S. Lieutenant Colonel Mark Stuart, an intelligence officer at NEADS, told the 9/11 Commission that "the last Osama bin Laden [Continental United States NORAD Region] threat briefing" before 9/11 was on July 14, "as part of the increased threat warning during summer 2001." The increased threat level "was briefed at NEADS," he said. [27] Since the briefing was given to personnel whose job was to defend the airspace over North America, it presumably warned about the possibility of bin Laden specifically carrying out an aerial attack in the U.S.
<br><br><b>DID OTHER EXERCISES HAVE SIMILARITIES WITH THE 9/11 ATTACKS?</b>
<br>The details that are available about the Fertile Rice exercise held at NEADS on August 4, 2001, give rise to many questions. For example, did the similarities between the scenario around which Fertile Rice was based and some of the incidents they encountered on September 11 lead NEADS personnel to think these incidents were part of the Vigilant Guardian exercise taking place that day? Also, who came up with the scenario for the August 4 exercise and who was responsible for preparing the exercise?
<br><br>Fertile Rice exercises were held weekly at NEADS, so numerous scenarios must have been included in them in the months leading up to 9/11 besides the one in the August 4 exercise. What were these scenarios and did any of them resemble the 9/11 attacks? Master Sergeant Joe McCain, the mission crew commander technician at NEADS, indicated that Fertile Rice exercises prior to September 11 had at least some similarities to the 9/11 attacks. He said they included simulated hijackings, although only one plane would be hijacked in the scenarios. Occasionally, he said, the aircraft hijacked in the simulation had taken off from within the United States--like the four planes that were hijacked on September 11. [28] So did their participation in these exercises lead NEADS personnel to think the hijackings on September 11 were part of that day's exercise?
<br><br>Additionally, did NEADS conduct any other exercises in the months leading up to September 11, besides its Fertile Rice exercises, that were based around scenarios resembling the 9/11 attacks? It regularly held exercises called Fertile Spade, Fertile Angel, and Fertile Gain. [29] What scenarios did these exercises involve in the months before 9/11? If any of the scenarios resembled the 9/11 attacks, did this cause NEADS personnel to mistake events on September 11 for part of an exercise?
<br><br>Furthermore, were any of the reports of suspicious aircraft approaching or over Washington that NEADS received on September 11 part of an exercise, such as Vigilant Guardian? If so, this would mean the exercise was allowed to continue after the second hijacked plane crashed into the World Trade Center--at 9:03 a.m.--and it became obvious that the U.S. was under attack. The exercise may in fact have still been going on at 10:07 a.m., when NEADS was alerted to a supposedly suspicious aircraft flying over the White House. If the exercise did indeed continue even though the U.S. was clearly under attack, why was this? Whose job should it have been to cancel it?
<br><br>A new investigation of 9/11 is necessary to address questions like these. Investigators would need to have access to all relevant documents, and individuals who worked at NEADS on September 11 and in the months before then would need to be able to speak freely about their experiences. Examination of military training exercises and their possible connections to what happened on September 11 may reveal a lot of important information about the 9/11 attacks and who was responsible for them.
<br><br><b>NOTES</b>
<br>[1] James Bamford, <i>A Pretext for War: 9/11, Iraq, and the Abuse of America's Intelligence Agencies</i>. New York: Doubleday, 2004, pp. 3-4; <a href="http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2006/08/norad200608" target="_blank">Michael Bronner, "9/11 Live: The NORAD Tapes." <i>Vanity Fair</i>, August 2006</a>; Philip Shenon, <i>The Commission: The Uncensored History of the 9/11 Investigation</i>. New York: Twelve, 2008, p. 203.
<br>[2] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/241753675/2011-048-Larson-Release-Document-07" target="_blank">Interview with Master Sergeant Joe McCain, written notes. 9/11 Commission, October 28, 2003</a>; <a href="http://media.nara.gov/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00761.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With MSgt. Joe McCain." 9/11 Commission, October 28, 2003</a>.
<br>[3] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/272442755/2013-002-doc-010" target="_blank">"Exercise Fertile Rice: Startex Intel Summary." Northeast Air Defense Sector, August 4, 2001</a>; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/241754169/2012-042-Larson-Release-Document-23" target="_blank">Interview with Col. Mark E. Stuart, written notes. 9/11 Commission, October 30, 2003</a>; <a href="http://media.nara.gov/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00779.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Lt. Col. Mark E. Stuart, USAF, Intelligence Officer, Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS)." 9/11 Commission, October 30, 2003</a>.
<br>[4] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/272442755/2013-002-doc-010" target="_blank">"Exercise Fertile Rice"</a>; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/272442747/2013-002-doc-009" target="_blank">"Intelligence Update: Exercise: Fertile Rice." Northeast Air Defense Sector, August 5, 2001</a>.
<br>[5] <a href="http://articles.philly.com/1991-02-16/news/25772583_1_northern-saudi-desert-gulf-war-ground-war" target="_blank">Tom Fiedler and Mark Thompson, "Despite Iraq's Offer, Gulf War Rages." <i>Philadelphia Inquirer</i>, February 16, 1991</a>.
<br>[6] Leslie Filson, <i>Air War Over America: Sept. 11 Alters Face of Air Defense Mission</i>. Tyndall Air Force Base, FL: 1st Air Force, 2003, p. 122; 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States</i>. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004, p. 458; James Bamford, <i>A Pretext for War</i>, p. 4; William M. Arkin, <i>Code Names: Deciphering U.S. Military Plans, Programs, and Operations in the 9/11 World</i>. Hanover, NH: Steerforth Press, 2005, p. 545.
<br>[7] Elizabeth Cooper, "NEADS on 9/11: Professionalism and Helplessness." <i>Utica Observer-Dispatch</i>, August 5, 2004.
<br>[8] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/272442755/2013-002-doc-010" target="_blank">"Exercise Fertile Rice."</a>
<br>[9] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 314.
<br>[10] <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/3083428.stm" target="_blank">Rachel Clarke, "The Ambassadors of Flight 93." BBC News, September 5, 2003</a>; 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 14; <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/14/fashion/a-moment-in-time-captured-in-pieces.html" target="_blank">Guy Trebay, "A Moment in Time Captured in Pieces." <i>New York Times</i>, August 13, 2014</a>; <a href="http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-fire-flight-93-memorial-arson-20141005-story.html" target="_blank">Lauren Raab and James Queally, "No Indication of Arson Found at Flight 93 Memorial." <i>Los Angeles Times</i>, October 5, 2014</a>.
<br>[11] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 26; <a href="http://www.afhso.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-120905-022.pdf" target="_blank">Priscilla D. Jones, <i>The First 109 Minutes: 9/11 and the U.S. Air Force</i>. Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 2011, p. 37</a>.
<br>[12] <a href="http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2006/08/norad200608" target="_blank">Michael Bronner, "9/11 Live."</a>
<br>[13] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 26.
<br>[14] <a href="http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2006/08/norad200608" target="_blank">Michael Bronner, "9/11 Live."</a>
<br>[15] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/33866491/t8-b8-Kara-hyde-Work-Files-4-Dod-Fdr-Transcript-Neads-Drm-1-Dat-2-Ch-7-Id-Op" target="_blank">NEADS Audio File, Identification Technician Position, Channel 7. North American Aerospace Defense Command, September 11, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2006/08/norad200608" target="_blank">Michael Bronner, "9/11 Live."</a>
<br>[16] Priscilla D. Jones, <i>The First 109 Minutes</i>, p. 39.
<br>[17] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/14142009/NYC-Box-2-NEADS-Transcript-Rome-NY-Fdr-Transcript-Pgs-182-12371417" target="_blank">"Transcripts From Voice Recorder, 11 September 2001 1227Z-1417Z, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Rome, NY." North American Aerospace Defense Command, September 11, 2001</a>; Priscilla D. Jones, <i>The First 109 Minutes</i>, p. 44.
<br>[18] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/14142047/NYC-Box-3-Neadsconrnorad-Fdr-Transcript-Neads-Channel-2-Mcc-Upside-006" target="_blank">NEADS Audio File, Mission Crew Commander Position, Channel 2. North American Aerospace Defense Command, September 11, 2001</a>.
<br>[19] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/14142075/NYC-Box-3-Neadsconrnorad-Fdr-Transcript-Neads-Channel-4-Id-Op" target="_blank">NEADS Audio File, Identification Technician Position, Channel 4. North American Aerospace Defense Command, September 11, 2001</a>.
<br>[20] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/14142023/NYC-Box-3-Neadsconrnorad-Fdr-Transcript-Atcscc-Channel-5-Id-Tk" target="_blank">NEADS Audio File, Identification Technician Position, Channel 5. North American Aerospace Defense Command, September 11, 2001</a>.
<br>[21] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/14142060/NYC-Box-3-Neads-conr-norad-Fdr-Transcript-Neads-Channel-3-Wd1-3-Tk-wav" target="_blank">NEADS Audio File, Weapons Director Position, Channel 3. North American Aerospace Defense Command, September 11, 2001</a>; <a href=http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2006/08/norad200608 target="_blank>Michael Bronner, "9/11 Live."</a>
<br>[22] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/14142075/NYC-Box-3-Neadsconrnorad-Fdr-Transcript-Neads-Channel-4-Id-Op" target="_blank">NEADS Audio File, Identification Technician Position, Channel 4</a>.
<br>[23] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/14142026/NYC-Box-3-Neads-conr-norad-Fdr-Transcript-Atcscc-Channel-21-Tt-Op-010" target="_blank">NEADS Audio File, Tracking Technician Position, Channel 21. North American Aerospace Defense Command, September 11, 2001</a>.
<br>[24] Transcripts available at the <a href="https://www.scribd.com/911DocumentArchive" target="_blank">9/11 Document Archive</a>.
<br>[25] <a href="https://archive.org/details/cnn200109111053-1134" target="_blank">"10:53 a.m.-11:34 a.m." CNN, September 11, 2001</a>; <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0109/11/bn.10.html" target="_blank">"Gen. Wesley Clark Discusses Ongoing Terrorist Situation." <i>Breaking News</i>, CNN, September 11, 2001</a>; <a href="http://whatreallyhappened.com/WRHARTICLES/911timeline.html" target="_blank">"Timeline of Chaos." <i>Ottawa Citizen</i>, September 11, 2001</a>.
<br>[26] <a href="https://archive.org/details/cnn200109111545-1626" target="_blank">"3:45 p.m.-4:26 p.m." CNN, September 11, 2001</a>; <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0109/11/bn.52.html" target="_blank">"Karen Hughes Delivers Remarks on Terrorist Attacks." <i>Breaking News</i>, CNN, September 11, 2001</a>; <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/11/chronology.attack/" target="_blank">"September 11: Chronology of Terror." CNN, September 12, 2001</a>.
<br>[27] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/241754169/2012-042-Larson-Release-Document-23" target="_blank">Interview with Col. Mark E. Stuart, written notes</a>; <a href="http://media.nara.gov/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00779.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Lt. Col. Mark E. Stuart, USAF, Intelligence Officer, Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS)."</a>
<br>[28] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/241753675/2011-048-Larson-Release-Document-07" target="_blank">Interview with Master Sergeant Joe McCain, written notes</a>; <a href="http://media.nara.gov/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00761.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With MSgt. Joe McCain."</a>
<br>[29] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/26080491/GSA-B116-RDOD-03013146-147-Fdr-Entire-Contents-NORAD-Fertile-Gain-Fertile-Spade-759" target="_blank">"Memorandum: Fertile Spade 97-26." Northeast Air Defense Sector, June 18, 1997</a>; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/26080491/GSA-B116-RDOD-03013146-147-Fdr-Entire-Contents-NORAD-Fertile-Gain-Fertile-Spade-759" target="_blank">"Memorandum: No-Notice Air Defense Exercise, Fertile Angel 99-01 and Fertile Spade 99-07." Northeast Air Defense Sector, November 30, 1998</a>; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/26080491/GSA-B116-RDOD-03013146-147-Fdr-Entire-Contents-NORAD-Fertile-Gain-Fertile-Spade-759" target="_blank">"Memorandum: Fertile Gain 99-05 After-Action Report." Northeast Air Defense Sector, September 21, 1999</a>.Shoestringhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01534319150672667644noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2990970741097819876.post-90369507225897934052015-07-17T01:49:00.000-07:002015-07-17T02:14:12.842-07:00U.S. Officials Gave Eerily Prophetic Warnings of an Attack in the Days Before 9/11<br><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEirPvJPogqyfon_0lRYxIW9mXuEn6Tf1_AWpknYubUlC4DURcuBA-B7g4z4ly4qEb9dBVgOB6IWUEULR8226FfFhfVea3alyL89cxjNUW_5wnuUTR6av9mHozDhyng28dPWmWLeoauEryxs/s1600/911-PearlHarbor.jpg" target="_blank" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEirPvJPogqyfon_0lRYxIW9mXuEn6Tf1_AWpknYubUlC4DURcuBA-B7g4z4ly4qEb9dBVgOB6IWUEULR8226FfFhfVea3alyL89cxjNUW_5wnuUTR6av9mHozDhyng28dPWmWLeoauEryxs/s1600/911-PearlHarbor.jpg" alt="9/11 and the Attack on Pearl Harbor"/></a></div><br>
A number of senior officials in the United States government and military gave warnings in the week before September 11, 2001, or early on the morning of September 11, that seem to have predicted the 9/11 attacks with chilling accuracy.
<br><br>These men--as is described below--voiced concerns that Osama bin Laden would carry out an attack in the U.S. in the near future; warned that an al-Qaeda attack that resulted in the deaths of hundreds of Americans could happen "at any time"; expressed concern that terrorists would attack the World Trade Center; warned about a "seminal event" occurring in the U.S. in which "hundreds, if not thousands" of Americans would be killed; said that "someone [is] going to attack us in a fashion we did not anticipate"; warned that "something big" was about to happen; and suggested the possibility of an attack taking place that would be equivalent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, in which over 2,400 Americans died.
<br><br>The six officials who issued these warnings were Charles Nemfakos, deputy under secretary of the Navy; Tommy Franks, head of the U.S. Central Command; John O'Neill, head of security at the World Trade Center who had previously been a senior FBI agent; Richard Clarke, the White House counterterrorism chief; Kirk Lippold, commander of the USS <i>Cole</i> when it was attacked by terrorists in October 2000; and Donald Rumsfeld, the secretary of defense.
<br><br>The accuracy of these men's warnings and the fact that the warnings were given so soon before 9/11 certainly appears suspicious. We need to consider, therefore, if the content and timing of the warnings, in relation to the 9/11 attacks, was just a coincidence or the result of something more sinister. Were the men who gave the warnings perhaps just very perceptive? Or did at least some of them know that a major attack was about to take place?
<br><br>If any of these officials knew in advance that a terrorist attack was going to take place in the U.S. on September 11, the imminent catastrophe would surely have been on their minds in the days leading up to it. They may therefore have been inclined to--perhaps inadvertently--make indirect references to what they knew was about to happen and this could be why they gave warnings that appear to have been prescient of the 9/11 attacks.
<br><br><b>NAVY OFFICIAL TALKED ABOUT THE NEED FOR 'AN EVENT EQUIVALENT TO PEARL HARBOR'</b>
<br>The day before 9/11, Charles Nemfakos, deputy under secretary of the Navy, said that before it addressed the weaknesses in its defense policy, the United States would need to suffer an attack equivalent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, in 1941 that led America to enter World War II.
<br><br>On September 10, 2001, Nemfakos--the "number three official in the Navy," according to <i>Defense Week</i> magazine--gave a briefing to a group of civilian employees of the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) in Crane, Indiana. The NSWC employees had come to Washington, DC, to interact with some of the Navy's top officials and complete a program for a certificate in public management.
<br><br>During the briefing, one of the NSWC employees has recalled, someone asked Nemfakos "what it would take for America's defense policy to be clear and concise in the 21st century." In response, Nemfakos said that "he felt an event equivalent to Pearl Harbor, either terrorist or military, would be the only event that would awaken the United States from the complacency and security they have had since the end of the Vietnam [War] era." [1]
<br><br>The fact that Nemfakos made this comment on September 10 is quite chilling, since the attack on the U.S. the following day was immediately likened to the attack on Pearl Harbor. The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were, for example, described as "another Pearl Harbor," "the second Pearl Harbor," "the Pearl Harbor of American terrorism," and an event that "rivals if not exceeds the attack on Pearl Harbor." [2] An Internet search by the <i>San Francisco Chronicle</i> two days after 9/11 found "747 stories in newspapers and other publications mentioning both the World Trade Center and Pearl Harbor." [3] Among the similarities between the two events, the death tolls were relatively close. In the attack on Pearl Harbor, 2,403 Americans and 64 Japanese died. [4] In the 9/11 attacks, 2,996 people died. [5]
<br><br><b>NAVY OFFICIAL ATTENDED WAR GAMES AT THE WORLD TRADE CENTER</b>
<br>Nemfakos was a powerful man. He "exerted more day-to-day influence than anyone else in the Navy during the latter half of the 1990s," <i>Defense Week</i> reported. Betty Welch, then-deputy assistant secretary of the Navy for civilian personnel and equal employment opportunity, said in 2000, "It's Charlie Nemfakos who controls the Navy probably more than anybody else." [6]
<br><br>Interestingly, in the 12 months before September 11, Nemfakos attended some "high-powered war games" that took place at the World Trade Center and seem to have helped prepare the American financial and national security communities for the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. The war games were part of an initiative called the "New Rule Sets Project."
<br><br>The New Rule Sets Project was a research partnership between Wall Street bond firm Cantor Fitzgerald and the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. [7] It brought together "divergent groups of experts" in order to "assess global issues that will affect U.S. national security in coming decades," <i>Defense News</i> reported. [8] Thomas Barnett, the project's director, said it "explored the future of globalization and what could threaten globalization, and what would be new definitions of international instability and crisis."
<br><br>The project involved the running of a number of sophisticated war game workshops. Three of these were held at Windows on the World, the restaurant on the 107th floor of the North Tower of the World Trade Center. [9] Each workshop was attended by about 30 participants, including "Wall Street CEOs, subject matter experts from academia and think tanks, and national security heavyweights from the White House and from the Pentagon," according to Barnett. Nemfakos was listed as a participant at the second and third of the workshops at Windows on the World, held in October 2000 and June 2001 respectively. [10]
<br><br>The New Rule Sets Project apparently served as good preparation for the challenges of the post-9/11 world. Barnett has commented that the shock of the 9/11 attacks effectively told the U.S. political system and national security community, "Hey, here's a new way of thinking about crisis and instability and threats in the world, and we have got to have new rules for dealing with this." [11] He said that after 9/11, his research with the New Rule Sets Project "immediately shifted from grand theory to grand strategy." [12]
<br><br><b>ARMY GENERAL TALKED ABOUT HIS FEAR OF TERRORISTS ATTACKING THE WORLD TRADE CENTER</b>
<br>Three days before Charles Nemfakos talked about the need for "an event equivalent to Pearl Harbor," Army General Tommy Franks, commander in chief of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), made equally prophetic remarks. Specifically, he said his biggest fear was that there would be a terrorist attack against the World Trade Center.
<br><br>On September 7, 2001, Franks talked to his intelligence staff at CENTCOM headquarters in Tampa, Florida, about what he considered to be the major threats facing America throughout the Middle East and Central Asia. After he finished his presentation, a young sergeant asked him, "General, what keeps you up at night?"
<br><br>Franks replied, "The thought of one tower of the World Trade Center collapsing into the other tower, killing thousands of people," according to <i>Computerworld</i> magazine. In his memoir, Franks described giving a slightly different answer. He wrote that he replied, "A terrorist attack against the World Trade Center in New York." [13] As Canada's <i>Globe and Mail</i> noted, "Four days later, that's exactly what happened." [14]
<br><br>What is more, Franks had made other remarks that were apparently prescient of 9/11 a few months earlier. In a speech to the Operations Security Professionals Society in late June 2001, he warned, "The asymmetric threat is serious, and deserves our focused thought and preparation." ("Asymmetric warfare threats," according to the <i>Washington Times</i>, "include efforts by weaker powers to defeat stronger ones using attacks that can include weapons of mass destruction, the use of computer-based information warfare, and terrorism.") Franks continued, "The point is to avoid another Pearl Harbor-like event by recognizing the threat and preparing to meet this growing challenge." [15]
<br><br>Less than three months after Franks made these comments, the U.S. suffered an attack that, according to the official account, was an example of "asymmetric warfare" and was immediately compared to the attack on Pearl Harbor. On the evening of September 11, according to his own recollections, Franks actually thought to himself, "Today is like Pearl Harbor." [16]
<br><br>After 9/11, Franks became "one of three men running the Bush administration's military campaign against Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda organization," ABC News reported. [17] He led the invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 and the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. [18]
<br><br><b>FORMER SENIOR FBI AGENT WARNED THAT BIN LADEN WOULD ATTACK THE WORLD TRADE CENTER</b>
<br>One man, John O'Neill, gave two separate warnings on the day before 9/11 that were chillingly prophetic of what happened on September 11.
<br><br>O'Neill had, since August 23, 2001, been director of security at the World Trade Center. Prior to that, he spent 25 years as an FBI agent and, from January 1997, had been special agent in charge of the national security division of the FBI's New York office. While at the FBI, according to the <i>New Yorker</i>, he "became the bureau's most committed tracker of Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda network of terrorists." He was at the World Trade Center on September 11 and, unfortunately, was killed when the Twin Towers collapsed. [19]
<br><br>On the morning of September 10, 2001, O'Neill met Raymond Powers, the director of security at the Rockefeller Center, to discuss various security issues. The two men's conversation eventually turned to the subject of Osama bin Laden. According to journalist and author Murray Weiss, O'Neill told Powers that "he was sure bin Laden would attack on American soil and expected him to target the Twin Towers again." "It's going to happen," he said. "And it looks like something big is brewing." [20]
<br><br>O'Neill again expressed his fear of an imminent al-Qaeda attack that evening, when he went out with a couple of his friends: Robert Tucker, a security company executive, and Jerome Hauer, the former director of New York's Office of Emergency Management.
<br><br>At one point in the evening, the three men talked about bin Laden. According to Hauer, O'Neill said: "We're due. And we're due for something big." He added: "Some things have happened in Afghanistan. I don't like the way things are lining up in Afghanistan." He then said, "I sense a shift and I think things are going to happen." Asked when they would happen, he replied, "I don't know, but soon." [21]
<br><br>O'Neill had made similar predictions on earlier occasions. In October 2000, for example, while he was in Yemen, he talked several times with FBI agent Pat Patterson about what bin Laden's next target might be. He said he believed the World Trade Center--which was bombed by terrorists in 1993--would be attacked again. "John was convinced of it," Patterson has recalled. He'd said, "They definitely want to bring that building down." [22]
<br><br>O'Neill voiced his concerns again around August 2001, when he talked with his friend Chris Isham. When O'Neill said he had just got the job as head of security at the World Trade Center, Isham joked: "That will be an easy job. They're not going to bomb that place again." But O'Neill retorted: "Actually, they've always wanted to finish that job. I think they're going to try again." [23]
<br><br><b>FBI AGENT DISMISSED CONCERNS ABOUT THREATS TO AVIATION</b>
<br>Strangely, despite his apparent concern about al-Qaeda carrying out an attack in the United States, O'Neill told Congressional staffers there was no threat to aviation. Cathal Flynn recalled that at some unstated time between 1993 and 2000, when he was head of security for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Senate Intelligence Committee asked the FAA, the FBI, and the director of central intelligence about threats to civil aviation. O'Neill went to the Hart Senate Office Building in Washington, DC, to respond on behalf of the FBI. But when Senate Intelligence Committee staffers asked, "What are the threats to aviation?" according to Flynn, "John O'Neill said there are none."
<br><br>Flynn was surprised at O'Neill's answer, because there had been a "few indications the FBI had received," such as information about a suspicious individual who had tried to get "a job with airport access" at Los Angeles International Airport. Flynn wrote O'Neill a note asking about this incident. But, Flynn recalled, O'Neill "looked at the note" and "still didn't say anything, didn't change what he had said." As the two men left the meeting, Flynn again asked O'Neill about the incident and O'Neill told him there was "nothing to it." [24]
<br><br>Bruce Butterworth, the FAA's director of civil aviation security operations from 1995 to 2000, has described the same event. He said he remembered O'Neill's "testimony to the Senate Intelligence Committee wherein he was unwilling to corroborate FAA claims about credible threats to civil aviation." [25]
<br><br><b>COUNTERTERRORISM CHIEF WARNED OF AN AL-QAEDA ATTACK THAT WOULD CAUSE THE DEATHS OF 'HUNDREDS OF AMERICANS'</b>
<br>Richard Clarke, the White House counterterrorism chief, warned that a major terrorist attack could take place in the United States in a memo he sent to National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice a week before 9/11.
<br><br>On September 4, 2001, the National Security Council's principals committee--a group of senior officials who advise the president on issues of national security policy--met to discuss al-Qaeda. That day, before the meeting took place, Clarke sent Rice a memo in which he expressed his frustrations with U.S. counterterrorism efforts.
<br><br>The "real question" the principals committee needed to address, Clarke wrote in the memo, was, "[A]re we serious about dealing with the al-Qaeda threat?" He suggested, "Decision makers should imagine themselves on a future day when the [White House Counterterrorism Security Group] has not succeeded in stopping al-Qaeda attacks and hundreds of Americans lay dead in several countries, including the U.S." "That future day could happen at any time," he added. Clarke warned that without more funding for dealing with al-Qaeda, "You are left waiting for the big attack, with lots of casualties, after which some major U.S. retaliation will be in order." [26]
<br><br>A week after Clarke's memo was sent, a "big attack, with lots of casualties," did indeed occur and this was followed by "major U.S. retaliation," in the form of the invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001.
<br><br>Clarke had issued warnings on previous occasions, which, like the warning he gave in his memo to Rice on September 4, seem to have been prescient of the 9/11 attacks. He gave one such warning on July 5, 2001, during a meeting at the White House. At the meeting, which was attended by officials from a dozen government agencies, including the FAA, the FBI, and the Secret Service, a senior CIA counterterrorism expert said the CIA believed that al-Qaeda was planning "something spectacular," which would probably take place in Israel or Saudi Arabia.
<br><br>Clarke, according to his own recollections, then told the meeting's participants he agreed that al-Qaeda was planning a major attack. But, he said: "Maybe [the attack] will be here [in the U.S.]. Just because there is no evidence that says that it will be here, does not mean it will be overseas." He added that al-Qaeda "may try to hit us at home. You have to assume that is what they are going to try to do." He said, "Something really spectacular is going to happen here and it's going to happen soon," according to two officials who attended the meeting. [27]
<br><br>A number of steps that agencies should take to address the threat posed by al-Qaeda were agreed upon at the meeting. An e-mail Clarke sent to Rice the day after the meeting stated that several agencies, including the FBI, the CIA, and the Department of Defense, had been directed to develop "detailed response plans in the event of three to five simultaneous attacks." [28] This was presumably quite fortuitous, since, just over two months later--on September 11--these agencies had to respond to four near-simultaneous attacks.
<br><br><b>NAVY COMMANDER TALKED ABOUT A POSSIBLE 'SEMINAL EVENT' CAUSED BY BIN LADEN</b>
<br>Navy Commander Kirk Lippold voiced his concerns about a major terrorist attack taking place in the United States just minutes before the first hijacked plane crashed into the World Trade Center on September 11.
<br><br>Lippold was the commanding officer of the USS <i>Cole</i> when, in October 2000, suicide bombers attacked the ship while it was refueling at a port in Yemen, killing 17 members of the crew. Investigators attributed the attack to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. [29]
<br><br>On the morning of September 11, Lippold went to CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, to meet Charles Allen, the CIA's assistant director for collection; John Russack, Allen's deputy; and Donald Kerr, the CIA's deputy director for science and technology. During the meeting, Allen briefed Lippold on what the CIA knew about bin Laden and al-Qaeda.
<br><br>As the meeting was coming to an end, at around 8:30 a.m., Lippold said to Allen: "It means an awful lot for me to understand what our country is doing to try to catch [bin Laden]. But I don't think America understands." According to his own recollections, Lippold then said, "I believe it is going to take a seminal event, probably in this country, where hundreds, if not thousands, are going to have to die, before Americans realize that we're at war with this guy."
<br><br>Lippold and Russack left Allen's office and went to talk to some of Russack's colleagues. The two men noticed the coverage of the first crash at the World Trade Center--which happened at 8:46 a.m.--on a television at CIA headquarters and, at 9:03 a.m., saw the second hijacked plane crashing into the World Trade Center as it happened.
<br><br>Allen then called them back to his office. When they arrived there, according to Lippold, he said, "Kirk, I can't believe you said what you did this morning." George Tenet, then-director of the CIA, has written that Allen told Lippold, "The seminal event just happened." [30]
<br><br><b>SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SAID THE U.S. WAS GOING TO BE ATTACKED 'IN A FASHION WE DID NOT ANTICIPATE'</b>
<br>Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, like Lippold, warned about the possibility of a catastrophic event taking place minutes before the first hijacked plane crashed into the World Trade Center. He said a surprise event--such as a terrorist attack--would occur in the near future.
<br><br>On the morning of September 11, Rumsfeld hosted a breakfast meeting in his private dining room at the Pentagon that was attended by 11 members of Congress and a number of key Department of Defense officials. [31] The meeting was intended to discuss the Quadrennial Defense Review. [32]
<br><br>Representative Christopher Cox recalled that Rumsfeld said at the meeting that the United States needed to "focus on the real threat facing us in the 21st century: terrorism, and the unexpected." He said Congress had to give the president "the tools he needs to move forward with a defense of America against ballistic missiles--the ultimate terrorist weapons."
<br><br>But he cautioned, "If we remain vulnerable to missile attack, a terrorist group or rogue state that demonstrates the capacity to strike the U.S. or its allies from long range could have the power to hold our entire country hostage to nuclear or other blackmail.'' He then warned: "Let me tell you, I've been around the block a few times. There will be another event." For emphasis, he repeated, "There will be another event." [33]
<br><br>David Chu, under secretary of defense for personnel and readiness, described Rumsfeld giving this warning. In response to a question from one of the members of Congress at the meeting, Chu recalled, Rumsfeld "said something to the effect that someone was going to attack us in a fashion we did not anticipate and we would wish we had done something about it." He "leaned across the table and lectured [the member of Congress] in his most decisive manner that we would in some future date look back and weep that we hadn't taken action." [34]
<br><br>According to Representative John Mica, Rumsfeld "was interested in ... what we were going to do about a situation if we had another--the word used was 'incident.'" He "was trying to make certain that we were prepared for something that we might not expect." [35]
<br><br>Rumsfeld has recalled saying at the meeting that "sometime in the next two, four, six, eight, 10, 12 months there would be an event that would occur in the world that would be sufficiently shocking that it would remind people again how important it is to have a strong, healthy Defense Department that ... underpins peace and stability in our world." [36]
<br><br>Cox has noted that "within minutes" of Rumsfeld giving his warning, the secretary of defense's words "proved tragically prophetic." [37] As the meeting was coming to an end, someone handed Rumsfeld a note, informing him that a plane had crashed into the World Trade Center. [38] "Little did we know that within a few minutes of the end of our conversation ... our world would change and that incident that we talked about would be happening," Mica has commented. [39]
<br><br><b>DID U.S. OFFICIALS HAVE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF 9/11?</b>
<br>The evidence above, while suspicious, does not in itself prove that any of the men who gave these remarkably accurate warnings in the week before 9/11 had foreknowledge of the impending terrorist attacks. The possibility that some or all of them did indeed know in advance about the attacks should, however, be investigated.
<br><br>If any of these men knew beforehand what was going to happen on September 11, we need to discover how they came across this information. Furthermore, if any of them had foreknowledge of 9/11, we need to find out why the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon weren't prevented. Could these powerful officials have used their influence to stop the attacks? If they could have but didn't, why was this?
<br><br>It is possible that other officials, besides the six mentioned in this article, gave warnings that were apparently prescient of the 9/11 attacks shortly before September 11, but their comments have not yet been reported, or have not been widely reported and so are little known. This possibility is something that could be looked into as well.
<br><br>The fact that 14 years after the event, key questions--such as those regarding the possibility of senior U.S. officials having foreknowledge of the attacks--remain unaddressed, shows why it is so important that we have a new investigation of 9/11.
<br><br><b>NOTES</b>
<br>[1] <a href="http://www.gcdailyworld.com/story/1275485.html" target="_blank">Chris Pruett, "Eric Moody Recalls His 'Escape From the Pentagon.'" <i>Greene County Daily World</i>, September 14, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.indiana.edu/~ocmhptst/091401/text/execed.html" target="_blank">Susan Williams, "'Come to My Voice and Keep Your Arm Against the Wall.'" <i>IU Home Pages</i>, September 14, 2001</a>; <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20031112081651/http://www.indstate.edu/news/archive/2002/sept/crane_pentagon.html" target="_blank">Dave Taylor, "Forever Changed: ISU Alumnus Experienced First-Hand the Terrorist Attack on the Pentagon." <i>Campus Connection</i>, September 25, 2002</a>.
<br>[2] <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0109/11/bn.28.html" target="_blank">"Christopher Dodd Discusses the Terrorist Attack." <i>Breaking News</i>, CNN, September 11, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/pb/archive/politics/2001/09/11/attacks-were-an-act-of-war-but-whos-the-enemy/12e7a304-3830-4b5f-80c1-034c3feb46d6/" target="_blank">Steven Mufson, "Attacks Were an Act of War--But Who's the Enemy?" <i>Washington Post</i>, September 11, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/12/news/12iht-assess_ed3__0.html" target="_blank">Joseph Fitchett, "Like the Attack in 1941, Air Terrorism Could Provoke Severe Repercussions: For Washington, a Modern Pearl Harbor." <i>New York Times</i>, September 12, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/12/us/a-day-of-terror-the-warnings-years-of-unheeded-alarms.html" target="_blank">David E. Rosenbaum, "Years of Unheeded Alarms." <i>New York Times</i>, September 12, 2001</a>.
<br>[3] <a href="http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/ECHOES-OF-THE-PAST-A-different-day-of-infamy-2878059.php" target="_blank">Annie Nakao and Carol Ness, "A Different Day of Infamy: Comparisons to Pearl Harbor Recall Another Time and Place." <i>San Francisco Chronicle</i>, September 14, 2001</a>.
<br>[4] <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/16/opinion/fighting-an-elusive-enemy.html" target="_blank">David M. Kennedy, "Fighting an Elusive Enemy." <i>New York Times</i>, September 16, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2010/12/remembering_pearl_harbor_a_rea.html" target="_blank">Chris Mautner, "Remembering Pearl Harbor: A Reader's Guide." PennLive.com, December 7, 2010</a>.
<br>[5] <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/09/11/nine-facts-about-terrorism-in-the-united-states-since-911/" target="_blank">Brad Plumer, "Nine Facts About Terrorism in the United States Since 9/11." <i>Washington Post</i>, September 11, 2013</a>.
<br>[6] <a href="http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/735634/posts" target="_blank">John M. Donnelly, "Top Navy Execs Tried to Bilk Retirement System." <i>Defense Week</i>, August 19, 2002</a>.
<br>[7] Thomas P. M. Barnett, <i>The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century</i>. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 2004, pp. 5, 46.
<br>[8] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20010503001556/http:/www.nwc.navy.mil/NewRuleSets/art_defensenews.htm" target="_blank">Robert Holzer, "Divergent Groups View U.S. Security in New Way: Unique Exercise Assesses Impact of Global Issues." <i>Defense News</i>, December 4, 2000</a>.
<br>[9] <a href="http://www.booknotes.org/FullPage.aspx?SID=182064-1" target="_blank">"The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century." <i>Booknotes</i>, C-SPAN, May 30, 2004</a>; <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20040703171952/http:/thomaspmbarnett.com/projects/newrulesset/nrs_index.html" target="_blank">"NewRuleSets.Project: Project History." Thomas P. M. Barnett, July 3, 2004</a>; <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20070610014358/http:/www.wws.princeton.edu/events/pressreleases/20041104barnett.html" target="_blank">"Senior Strategic Researcher and Professor at the U.S. Naval War College to Speak at WWS, November 4th." Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, November 4, 2004</a>.
<br>[10] <a href="http://thomaspmbarnett.com/globlogization/2010/8/11/blast-from-my-past-foreign-direct-investment-decision-event.html" target="_blank">Thomas P. M. Barnett et al., <i>Foreign Direct Investment: Decision Event Report II of the NewRuleSets.Project</i>. Newport, RI: Naval War College, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Decision Strategies Department, 2001</a>; <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20041130050723/http:/www.thomaspmbarnett.com/projects/newrulesset/Asian%20Environmental%20Solutions%20Read-ahead.htm" target="_blank">"Asian Environmental Solutions: Decision Event Read-Ahead." Thomas P. M. Barnett, November 30, 2004</a>; <a href="http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people5/Barnett/barnett-con3.html" target="_blank">Thomas P. M. Barnett, interview by Harry Kreisler, Institute of International Studies, March 8, 2005</a>.
<br>[11] <a href="http://www.booknotes.org/FullPage.aspx?SID=182064-1" target="_blank">"The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century."</a>
<br>[12] Thomas P. M. Barnett, <i>The Pentagon's New Map</i>, pp. 5-6.
<br>[13] <a href="http://www.computerworld.com/article/2572573/it-careers/former-centcom-commander-advises-it-sector-on-leadership.html" target="_blank">Dan Verton, "Former CENTCOM Commander Advises IT Sector on Leadership." <i>Computerworld</i>, October 21, 2003</a>; Tommy Franks and Malcolm McConnell, <i>American Soldier</i>. New York: HarperCollins, 2004, p. 236.
<br>[14] <a href="http://www.theglobeandmail.com/arts/my-country-right-or-right/article714761/" target="_blank">Scott Taylor, "My Country, Right or Right." <i>Globe and Mail</i>, October 9, 2004</a>.
<br>[15] <a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2001/jun/22/20010622-023903-7410r/" target="_blank">Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, "Inside the Ring." <i>Washington Times</i>, June 22, 2001</a>.
<br>[16] Tommy Franks and Malcolm McConnell, <i>American Soldier</i>, p. 246.
<br>[17] <a href="http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=90785" target="_blank">"Bush's War Room: Gen. Tommy Franks." ABC News, January 7, 2006</a>.
<br>[18] <a href="http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2004/08/17/US-general-CIA-chose-Karzai/87361092774698/" target="_blank">Anwar Iqbal, "U.S. General: CIA Chose Karzai." UPI, August 17, 2004</a>.
<br>[19] <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/19/us/fbi-is-investigating-a-senior-counterterrorism-agent.html" target="_blank">David Johnston and James Risen, "FBI is Investigating a Senior Counterterrorism Agent." <i>New York Times</i>, August 19, 2001</a>; <a href="http://securitysolutions.com/mag/security_wtc_tragedy_took/" target="_blank">"WTC Tragedy Took Away Security's Finest." <i>Access Control & Security Systems</i>, October 1, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2002/01/14/the-counter-terrorist" target="_blank">Lawrence Wright, "The Counter-Terrorist." <i>New Yorker</i>, January 14, 2002</a>; <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/staging-area-facility-at-ramstein-air-base-to-be-dedicated-to-the-memory-of-john-p.-o2019neill" target="_blank">"Staging Area Facility at Ramstein Air Base to be Dedicated to the Memory of John P. O'Neill." Federal Bureau of Investigation, September 11, 2006</a>.
<br>[20] Murray Weiss, <i>The Man Who Warned America: The Life and Death of John O'Neill, the FBI's Embattled Counterterror Warrior</i>. New York: Regan Books, 2003, pp. 355, 359-360; <a href="http://nypost.com/2003/08/10/flashy-fed-foresaw-bin-ladens-terror/" target="_blank">Murray Weiss, "Flashy Fed Foresaw Bin Laden's Terror." <i>New York Post</i>, August 10, 2003</a>.
<br>[21] <a href="http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2002/01/14/the-counter-terrorist" target="_blank">Lawrence Wright, "The Counter-Terrorist"</a>; <a href="http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/knew/etc/script.html" target="_blank">"The Man Who Knew." <i>Frontline</i>, PBS, October 3, 2002</a>; Murray Weiss, <i>The Man Who Warned America</i>, p. 362.
<br>[22] Murray Weiss, <i>The Man Who Warned America</i>, p. 321.
<br>[23] <a href="http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/knew/interviews/isham.html" target="_blank">Chris Isham, interview by <i>Frontline</i>, PBS, May 31, 2002</a>.
<br>[24] <a href="http://media.nara.gov/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00552.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Rear Admiral Cathal 'Irish' Flynn, USN (Ret.)." 9/11 Commission, September 9, 2003</a>; <a href="http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/archive/hearing7/9-11Commission_Hearing_2004-01-27.htm" target="_blank">"National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: Public Hearing." 9/11 Commission, January 27, 2004</a>.
<br>[25] <a href="http://media.nara.gov/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00084.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Bruce Butterworth, Former Director for Policy and Planning (ACS-1) at the FAA." 9/11 Commission, September 29, 2003</a>.
<br>[26] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States</i>. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004, pp. 212-213; <a href="http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff_statements/staff_statement_8.pdf" target="_blank">"National Policy Coordination: Staff Statement No. 8." 9/11 Commission, March 24, 2004</a>.
<br>[27] <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2002/05/17/before-sept-11-unshared-clues-and-unshaped-policy/2bbbf7f0-ece7-4b48-a3a2-26ae27670e97/" target="_blank">Barton Gellman, "Before Sept. 11, Unshared Clues and Unshaped Policy." <i>Washington Post</i>, May 17, 2002</a>; <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/08/05/time.history/" target="_blank">Michael Elliott, "They Had a Plan." <i>Time</i>, August 12, 2002</a>; Richard A. Clarke, <i>Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror</i>. New York: Free Press, 2004, p. 236.
<br>[28] <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/04/politics/04SUMM.html" target="_blank">David Johnston and Eric Schmitt, "Uneven Response Seen on Terror in Summer of 2001." <i>New York Times</i>, April 4, 2004</a>.
<br>[29] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 190; <a href="http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/profiles/uss_cole_bombing.htm" target="_blank">"USS <i>Cole</i> Bombing." GlobalSecurity.org, October 11, 2006</a>; <a href="http://thescoopblog.dallasnews.com/2012/06/a-qa-with-kirk-lippold-commander-of-the-uss-cole.html/" target="_blank">Bruce Tomaso, "A Q&A With Kirk Lippold, Commander of the USS <i>Cole</i>." <i>Dallas Morning News</i>, June 6, 2012</a>; <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/history/famous-cases/uss-cole" target="_blank">"The USS <i>Cole</i> Bombing." Federal Bureau of Investigation, n.d.</a>
<br>[30] George Tenet and Bill Harlow, <i>At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA</i>. New York: HarperCollins, 2007, pp. 162-163; Kirk S. Lippold, <i>Front Burner: Al-Qaeda's Attack on the USS Cole</i>. Philadelphia, PA: PublicAffairs, 2012, pp. xxii-xxvi; <a href="http://www.c-span.org/video/transcript/?id=8332" target="_blank">"Q&A With Kirk Lippold." <i>Q&A</i>, C-SPAN, June 13, 2012</a>.
<br>[31] <a href="http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/special_Collections/Rumsfeld/10-F-1229_Rumsfeld_Breakfast_Sept_11_w_MOCs.pdf" target="_blank">"SecDef Breakfast With House Supporters." U.S. Department of Defense, September 10, 2001</a>; <a href="http://cjonline.com/stories/091101/ter_rumsfeld.shtml" target="_blank">Robert Burns, "Pentagon Attack Came Minutes After Rumsfeld Predicted: 'There Will be Another Event.'" Associated Press, September 11, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/special_Collections/Rumsfeld/10-F-1229_Rumsfeld_Breakfast_Sept_11_w_MOCs.pdf" target="_blank">Powell A. Moore to Donald Rumsfeld, memorandum, September 19, 2003</a>.
<br>[32] <a href="http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?id=760" target="_blank">Donna Miles, "Vice Chairman: 9/11 Underscored Importance of DoD Transformation." American Forces Press Service, September 8, 2006</a>.
<br>[33] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20021012164243/http:/cox.house.gov/html/release.cfm?id=33" target="_blank">Christopher Cox, "Chairman Cox's Statement on the Terrorist Attack on America." U.S. House of Representatives, September 11, 2001</a>.
<br>[34] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/51086799/GSA-B115-RDOD03012846-Fdr-Entire-Contents-Intvw-2002-02-01-Chu-David-056" target="_blank">David Chu, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron. Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, February 1, 2002</a>.
<br>[35] <a href="http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg41930/html/CHRG-110hhrg41930.htm" target="_blank">U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, <i>The Tillman Fratricide, What the Leadership of the Defense Department Knew: Hearing Before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform</i>. 110th Cong., 1st sess., August 1, 2007</a>.
<br>[36] <a href="http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0112/05/lkl.00.html" target="_blank">"Interview With Donald Rumsfeld." <i>Larry King Live</i>, CNN, December 5, 2001</a>.
<br>[37] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20021012164243/http:/cox.house.gov/html/release.cfm?id=33" target="_blank">Christopher Cox, "Chairman Cox's Statement on the Terrorist Attack on America."</a>
<br>[38] <a href="http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/archive/hearing8/9-11Commission_Hearing_2004-03-23.htm" target="_blank">"National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: Eighth Public Hearing." 9/11 Commission, March 23, 2004</a>; <a href="http://library.rumsfeld.com/doclib/sp/4500/The%20Agony%20of%20Surprise.pdf" target="_blank">Donald Rumsfeld, <i>Known and Unknown: A Memoir</i>. New York: Sentinel, 2011, pp. 334-335</a>.
<br>[39] <a href="http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2377" target="_blank">"Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's Remarks at Pentagon's Riverfront Entrance." U.S. Department of Defense, September 10, 2004</a>.Shoestringhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01534319150672667644noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2990970741097819876.post-70457402433499184672015-06-14T03:10:00.000-07:002015-06-14T03:10:15.637-07:00Why Did Navy Staffers at the Pentagon Fail to Respond to the Attacks on the World Trade Center on 9/11?<br><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhUJIZ55OWu3RiRmBIenU9Gwq9fdNaSy1e3jsBb_7GtaKnEtLyq7ImqkLkBE3DntmBNNetUGmn0FhpZSuUEgLEZrowpp0JLN88JJVyQFeJGF9-XPlcMzyob2cT3Jn4wTRwHGQD9BZbsflo_/s1600/PentagonDamage.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhUJIZ55OWu3RiRmBIenU9Gwq9fdNaSy1e3jsBb_7GtaKnEtLyq7ImqkLkBE3DntmBNNetUGmn0FhpZSuUEgLEZrowpp0JLN88JJVyQFeJGF9-XPlcMzyob2cT3Jn4wTRwHGQD9BZbsflo_/s1600/PentagonDamage.jpg" alt="The Pentagon on September 11"></a></div>
<br><div align="right"><i>"Readiness is the name of the game and the ability
<br>of our people to respond is the second part of it."</i>
<br><br>- Admiral Robert Natter, commander of the U.S.
<br>Navy's Atlantic Fleet on September 11, 2001 [1]</div>
<br>Navy personnel at the Pentagon on the morning of September 11, 2001, including some key officials, appear to have acted with a surprising lack of urgency after they learned of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center.
<br><br>Even though the Navy--along with the rest of the United States military--was responsible for protecting America if it was under attack, its personnel at the Pentagon seem to have done nothing, or very little, to help defend the country after they learned of the plane crashes at the World Trade Center. Remarkably, many of them continued with their normal work duties as if nothing unusual had happened. Furthermore, the Navy's top officials appear to have issued no orders to their personnel, regarding what to do in response to the crashes.
<br><br>The failure of Navy staffers at the Pentagon to promptly initiate a military response to the attacks is particularly significant because, among other things, the Navy had assets--including fighter jets--that could help defend the Northeast U.S. A quick response was critical so these assets could be deployed as soon as possible.
<br><br>Navy personnel should also have responded immediately when they learned what had happened at the World Trade Center because their department would have been responsible for helping the rescue efforts in New York. The Navy was supposed to coordinate with the Army and the Air Force "on proposed action to support civilian authorities during emergencies involving mass casualties," according to the Department of Defense's book about the Pentagon attack. [2]
<br><br>What is more, even before 9/11, the Pentagon was considered a likely target for terrorists. And yet, on September 11, Navy personnel--many of whose offices were damaged or destroyed when the Pentagon was hit--received no orders to evacuate and made no attempts to get out of the building of their own accord before it was attacked. And, apparently, no attempts were made to move the most senior Navy officials away to safer locations prior to the attack on the Pentagon. [3]
<br><br>Unfortunately, the failure to take effective action quickly enough to prevent the attack on the Pentagon had serious consequences for the Navy. Percentage-wise, it lost more of its spaces at the Pentagon than any other military department did on September 11. [4] And a third of the 125 Pentagon employees who died when their building was hit worked for the Navy. [5]
<br><br>In this article, I examine the actions of several senior Navy officials who were at the Pentagon on September 11. These include Admiral Vern Clark, the chief of naval operations; Vice Admiral Timothy Keating, deputy chief of naval operations for plans, policy, and operations; and Susan Livingstone, under secretary of the Navy. These officials all appear to have failed to respond appropriately after they learned of the crashes in New York.
<br><br>I look at the goings-on in several key spaces in the Pentagon, such as the Navy Command Center and the office of the vice chief of naval operations. Like the senior officials whose actions I examine, personnel in these spaces appear to have responded to the crashes at the World Trade Center in a way that is far from what we might reasonably have expected.
<br><br>I also look at a possible reason for the inaction of Navy personnel at the Pentagon. Specifically, I consider whether the Navy was involved in a training exercise on September 11 and this led to its staffers mistakenly thinking the crashes at the World Trade Center were simulated, rather than genuine attacks. If this was the case, it would indicate that rogue individuals in the U.S. military were involved in planning and perpetrating the 9/11 attacks, and deliberately created confusion that caused the Navy to respond so inadequately to the attacks.
<br><br><b>CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS CONTINUED A BUDGET MEETING INSTEAD OF RESPONDING TO THE CRASHES</b>
<br>On September 11, Admiral Vern Clark, chief of naval operations, was in a meeting in his office on the fourth floor of the Pentagon's E ring, discussing budget issues, when the attacks on the World Trade Center occurred. [6] (The Pentagon is a five-story building--which also has two basements--consisting of five concentric rings of offices. These rings are labeled alphabetically from A to E, with the A ring being the innermost ring and the E ring the outer ring. Clark's office was therefore in the outer ring of the Pentagon.)
<br><br>Vice Admiral Mike Mullen, deputy chief of naval operations for resources, requirements, and assessments, was with Clark in the meeting. [7] Admiral William Fallon, vice chief of naval operations, appears to have been there too. [8]
<br><br>Although Clark had a television in his office that would have shown what had happened at the World Trade Center as soon as the coverage of the first plane crash--which occurred at 8:46 a.m.--began, that day the television was off. All the same, members of his staff reportedly "kept him informed of events at the World Trade Center." Clark has commented that he also "knew that my Command Center ... would keep me apprised of what was going on there."
<br><br>He has recalled that, after he learned of the second crash at the World Trade Center, which took place at 9:03 a.m., he "knew now that we had in fact witnessed an unprecedented act of terrorism." And yet he appears to have done almost nothing in response to the attacks in New York. [9]
<br><br>Clark said, on one occasion, that in the minutes just after he learned of the second crash, he "got up from this meeting, went over to my red phone, made a few telephone calls, talked to leaders in a couple of places." [10] According to Mullen, a few minutes before the Pentagon was hit, Clark phoned Army General Henry Shelton, then-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "to query what we were doing," since "it appeared that we were under attack." Shelton replied that he had been notified that a plane was heading toward Washington, DC. [11]
<br><br>Clark, however, appears to have done nothing to help initiate a military response to the attacks. He said, on one occasion, that after he learned of the second crash, he simply continued his meeting about budget issues. He said: "I'm embarrassed to say I didn't even think about [the terrorists] coming to get us at the Pentagon. I had at other times. But at that moment I was focused on what was going on in New York. So we went back to work, and a few minutes later we heard this incredible explosion ... and the Pentagon was hit." And <i>Sea Power</i> magazine reported that Clark was still receiving his budget briefing when the Pentagon was attacked.
<br><br>Furthermore, even though Clark, as chief of naval operations, was the most senior uniformed officer in the Navy, his staffers only came to evacuate him from his office after 9:37 a.m., when the Pentagon was hit. [12] And yet surely they should have wanted to get such a key official moved away to somewhere safer when it became obvious the U.S. was under attack--i.e. immediately after the second World Trade Center tower was hit--if not before then. Since Clark's office was on the Pentagon's fourth floor and in its outer ring, they should have realized that Clark was in an area of the building that would be particularly vulnerable--as compared to, say, a room in the basement--if the terrorists planned to attack the Pentagon.
<br><br><b>DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS WENT AHEAD WITH AN UNIMPORTANT MEETING AFTER LEARNING OF THE CRASHES</b>
<br>Another key official who was at the Pentagon when the attacks on the World Trade Center took place was Vice Admiral Timothy Keating, deputy chief of naval operations for plans, policy, and operations. [13]
<br><br>Keating learned of the first crash during the "operations update"--his daily intelligence briefing, held in the Navy Command Center on the first floor of the Pentagon. "We couldn't understand how a pilot could make such a significant navigational error on a day when the skies were crystal clear blue," he has recalled. But although they were "perplexed," Keating and those with him "just kept going" with the briefing.
<br><br>When the briefing ended, Keating went to his office, on the fourth floor of the Pentagon, and saw the second crash on television. Keating has claimed that, even then, he didn't realize a major terrorist attack was underway. "It still didn't occur to us what was happening, that this was a large-scale attack with catastrophic consequences," he commented. [14]
<br><br>In his office, Keating met with Edmund James Hull, the ambassador-designate to Yemen. Their previously scheduled meeting appears to have started shortly after 9:00 a.m.: Hull said it began about 30 minutes before the Pentagon was attacked, which would have been sometime around 9:07 a.m. The two men apparently ignored the fact that the U.S. was under attack. "We went ahead with the meeting nevertheless," Hull recalled. [15]
<br><br>The main topic of their discussion, according to <i>Sea Power</i>, was "the first anniversary of the terrorist attack on the guided-missile destroyer USS <i>Cole</i> on 12 October 2000 during a port visit to Aden, Yemen," which had been "masterminded by Osama bin Laden's terrorist network" and caused the deaths of 17 American sailors. [16] Hull recalled: "We briefly noted the events of New York but then proceeded to discuss future collaboration in Yemen. ... I stressed my commitment to successfully completing the investigation of the <i>Cole</i> attack and bringing its perpetrators to justice." [17]
<br><br>Keating and Hull were still discussing the anniversary of the attack on the USS <i>Cole</i> when the Pentagon was hit, almost 35 minutes after the second attack in New York occurred. "We were discussing the fact that the <i>Cole</i> attack was coming up on a year's anniversary--those were almost our exact words at the moment the plane impacted," Keating recalled. [18] Just before the Pentagon was hit, Hull has written, "[W]e reviewed the situation [in Yemen] and our upcoming responsibilities." [19]
<br><br>Keating's lack of action in response to the attacks on the World Trade Center seems particularly odd considering that, according to <i>Sea Power</i>, one of Keating's responsibilities was to oversee day-to-day operations in the Navy Command Center. [20] The Command Center was responsible, among other things, for monitoring significant international events and keeping senior Navy officials informed of important developments. [21] In a situation like what occurred on September 11, then, it was surely more important for Keating to follow what was going on in this critical hub than discuss the anniversary of the attack on the USS <i>Cole</i> with Hull.
<br><br>Hull's inaction in response to the crashes also seems particularly odd since, in the two years before 9/11, Hull had been the principal deputy coordinator for counterterrorism at the State Department and had represented the State Department on Richard Clarke's Counterterrorism Security Group. [22] He should therefore have been an expert on terrorism and have had a better understanding than most of the seriousness of the situation on September 11. Indeed, Hull has said that after he learned of the second crash, he had "the thought in mind that al-Qaeda had definitely undertaken a new operation in the U.S." [23] And yet he proceeded with his unnecessary meeting with Keating as if nothing unusual had happened.
<br><br>Furthermore, according to <i>Shipmate</i> magazine, even though Keating and Hull had "witnessed the devastating news of the attacks in New York," they "didn't question their own security" at the Pentagon. [24] They consequently made no attempt to get out of the building, despite it being a likely target for terrorists.
<br><br>Keating has estimated that his office was "about 150 feet" from where the Pentagon was hit at 9:37 a.m. But his staffers only came and advised him and Hull to get out of the Pentagon shortly after the attack there took place. [25]
<br><br><b>UNDER SECRETARY OF THE NAVY WENT AHEAD WITH A BRIEFING FOR A GROUP OF VISITORS AFTER LEARNING OF THE ATTACKS</b>
<br>A further important official whose actions at the time of the 9/11 attacks deserve scrutiny is Susan Livingstone. As under secretary of the Navy, Livingstone was the second-highest-ranking civilian in the Navy. On the morning of September 11, she was scheduled to hold a briefing for a group of 30 civilian employees of the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) in Crane, Indiana.
<br><br>The NSWC employees were in Washington, DC, to complete a program for a certificate in public management and this involved meeting with Livingstone, who was going to talk to them about defense policy in the 21st century. The briefing was set to take place in a conference room on the fifth floor of the Pentagon's E ring and was supposed to begin at 9:00 a.m. [26]
<br><br>Livingstone and her executive assistant, Captain Dennis Kern, learned about the crashes in New York before the NSWC group arrived for the briefing. "Someone called to let us know two planes had hit the World Trade Center," Kern recalled. [27] The NSWC employees, meanwhile, were delayed. Their bus was almost 20 minutes late and so they were traveling to the Pentagon when the attacks on the World Trade Center took place. They arrived at the conference room where the briefing was going to be held at about 9:10 a.m. At that time--around seven minutes after the second attack occurred--they were still unaware of the crashes in New York. But after they arrived, they were told what had happened. [28]
<br><br>Livingstone said to them that "terrorists had attacked the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City just a few minutes earlier by hijacking two planes and flying them into the two towers," according to Eric Moody, one of the NSWC employees. She also said that "she would have to cut her talk short due to another important meeting." [29] Jim Buher, another member of the visiting group, recalled that Livingstone said, "I have to cut my presentation short today, because planes have hit the World Trade Center and I have to go to the Command Center at 9:30." [30]
<br><br>The members of the NSWC group were "all in shock" upon hearing the news, Dusty Wilson recalled. And yet Livingstone went ahead with the briefing. [31] She apparently discussed the information she'd originally intended to cover, without being influenced by what had happened in New York. Moody recalled that she talked about "her administration's frustration stemming from the lack of effective strategic planning since the fall of the Berlin Wall." [32]
<br><br>Livingstone's behavior appears to make no sense. Why did Livingstone continue with the briefing as if nothing abnormal had happened? Surely her attention should have been focused on dealing with the terrorist attacks. The meeting with the NSWC group could easily have been postponed. Furthermore, since the Pentagon was considered a likely terrorist target, surely Livingstone and Kern should have immediately arranged to get the NSWC group members moved to somewhere safer after they arrived at the conference room.
<br><br><b>VISITORS WERE CONCERNED FOR THEIR OWN SAFETY</b>
<br>Some of the NSWC employees actually suspected they were in danger at the Pentagon after they learned what had happened at the World Trade Center. Greg Smith has commented, "It occurred to me, and probably others, that Washington, DC, would also be a terrorist target." [33] Moody recalled that "it suddenly dawned on him that by sitting in the top military operations center in the country, the building they were in could be a targeted area." [34] He said he had therefore thought his group "might be in danger" and had "said a short prayer, as I often do, 'Dear God, please keep us safe.'" [35]
<br><br>Doris Richardson was similarly concerned. She recalled: "I know I wasn't the only one in that room who stopped to say a prayer. Mine went as it always does, 'Lord, not my will but thine be done.'" [36] If these visitors realized the danger they were all in at the Pentagon, surely Livingstone and Kern should have too.
<br><br>In fact, since Livingstone was the second-highest-ranking civilian in the Navy, it seems odd that her colleagues allowed her to remain on the top floor of the Pentagon's outer ring--probably one of the most vulnerable areas of the building--when the U.S. was under attack. Why did no one come and take her to somewhere safer? Why did Kern, who, as her executive assistant, presumably bore some responsibility for her safety, allow her to go ahead with the briefing?
<br><br>The conference room where the briefing took place was directly above the area of the building that was struck when the Pentagon was attacked. [37] It was "not more than 50 feet away from the area of impact," according to Moody. [38]
<br><br>When the Pentagon was hit--about 27 minutes after Livingstone's briefing began--those in the conference room heard "a tremendous noise like dynamite" and felt the room rock. [39] Moody described: "A large blast shook the entire room. Several of the ceiling panels from the suspended ceiling fell to the floor and the light fixture in the middle of the room came crashing down on the conference room table. Smoke immediately began filling the room from the light fixtures and vents in the ceiling." [40]
<br><br>Although, by going ahead with the briefing, Livingstone had acted as if she was unaware of any danger to those at the Pentagon, when the building was hit she immediately realized what had happened. She told the others in the conference room, "It must be terrorists." [41] Only then did she tell the group of NSWC employees to evacuate. Moody recalled that she "calmly but firmly stated that we were under a terrorist attack and we should immediately leave the building." [42] Livingstone and Kern then led the NSWC employees out of the conference room. [43]
<br><br>They all made it out of the Pentagon without injury. But Livingstone's going ahead with the briefing when the U.S. was in the middle of a major terrorist attack could have had catastrophic consequences. "We all agree that we were extremely fortunate to survive this devastating situation," Moody has commented. [44]
<br><br><b>VICE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS' STAFFERS COULD ONLY 'WATCH, LISTEN, AND PRAY' AFTER THEY LEARNED OF THE CRASHES</b>
<br>We can see a pattern of military personnel failing to respond appropriately and effectively to the attacks on the World Trade Center when we examine the behavior of Navy staffers in some key spaces in the Pentagon. This pattern of behavior was, for example, exhibited by personnel in the office of Admiral William Fallon, vice chief of naval operations, on the fourth floor of the E ring.
<br><br>When the attacks on the World Trade Center took place, Fallon was in the meeting in Vern Clark's office, down the hallway from his own office, in which budget issues were being discussed. [45] But members of his staff were in his office, available to respond to the crashes.
<br><br>One of them, Captain William Toti, special assistant to the vice chief of naval operations, learned of the first crash from the coverage of it on television. It occurred to him immediately that the crash must have been a deliberate act. He has commented that he and his colleagues "knew from the first moments that it was an act of terrorism."
<br><br>However, instead of taking action to initiate a military response, they started discussing where the terrorists would strike next if an organized attack was taking place. (Toti actually concluded that the terrorists would attack the Pentagon.) Seeing the second crash on television "confirmed what we already knew," Toti has commented. And yet the staffers still did nothing toward implementing a military response. [46]
<br><br>Lieutenant Kelly Ennis, aide-de-camp to the vice chief of naval operations, has confirmed the lack of response among Fallon's personnel. Ennis had gone across the hallway from his own office to Fallon's office in time to see the second hijacked plane crashing into the World Trade Center live on television. "All I could think is that we needed to get some help in New York," he has commented. And yet, he said, "All we could do at that time was watch, listen, and pray for our family members there." [47]
<br><br>Toti even found time to call his wife. He recalled that because he knew the country was under attack and the Pentagon was a likely target, he wanted to call her while he still had a chance. She was not at home so he left a message telling her "to take the kids out of school, stay at home, and leave the phone lines open." [48] But why did Toti call his wife when the U.S. was in the middle of a serious terrorist attack? Surely he should have realized that the promptness of the military's response might determine whether any further attacks were successful and so his attention needed to be focused on his military duties. Surely phoning his wife could have waited?
<br><br>As well as apparently failing to take action toward implementing a military response to the attacks in New York, it seems that Fallon's staffers did not go down the hallway to check that their boss knew what was going on or bring him back to his office. In fact, considering that Fallon's staffers supposedly realized "from the first moments" that the crashes in New York were "an act of terrorism" and had determined that the Pentagon was likely to be the next target, surely they should have been concerned that, in an office on the fourth floor of the Pentagon's outer ring, Fallon might be in danger. And so surely they should have wanted to move such an important official to a safer location.
<br><br>And yet it appears they did nothing toward that end. Rear Admiral William Crowder, Fallon's executive assistant, only left Fallon's office and went down the hallway to talk to the vice chief of naval operations about what was happening just before the Pentagon was hit--about 30 seconds before the attack occurred, according to Toti. [49]
<br><br><b>OFFICER WAS TOLD TO KEEP QUIET ABOUT THE SUSPICIOUS PLANE FLYING TOWARD WASHINGTON</b>
<br>Toti's recollections of the events of September 11 reveal other examples of suspicious behavior exhibited by Navy personnel. For example, after he saw the second crash on television but before the Pentagon was hit, Toti was concerned that the Navy Command Center had not called his office to provide it with information about what was happening. Someone from the Command Center finally contacted his office just before the Pentagon was attacked.
<br><br>But why did it take them so long to get in touch? Surely Command Center personnel should have wanted to promptly tell Navy officers what they knew about the crisis. Toti certainly appears to have found their failure to contact his office odd: Just before the Command Center called, he was about to head there to find out what was going on, but was stopped by Crowder. [50]
<br><br>Another suspicious incident occurred when the person at the Command Center contacted Fallon's office. Crowder answered the call from the Command Center and was informed that a hijacked plane was heading toward Washington, DC. Commander David Radi, deputy executive assistant to the vice chief of naval operations, listened in on the call, as he was required to do, and so he heard the news. However, Crowder then instructed Radi: "That's close hold. Don't tell anybody what you just heard."
<br><br>Why did he say this? Surely it was imperative that people at the Pentagon be informed that a suspicious plane was heading in their direction, so they could mount a defense against an attack or get out of their offices and move to somewhere safer.
<br><br>Toti has noted the oddness of Crowder's request. "In retrospect, I wonder what the hell was close hold about that fact that there was a hijacked airplane coming in towards the Pentagon. If anything, it would have been nice to alert people of that," he commented. "That stuck out in [my] mind at the time as kind of a peculiar thing [for Crowder] to say," he added. [51]
<br><br><b>COMMAND CENTER PERSONNEL CONTINUED THEIR USUAL WORK AFTER LEARNING OF THE CRASHES</b>
<br>Another area of the Pentagon where personnel failed to respond appropriately and effectively to the attacks on the World Trade Center is the Navy Command Center. The Navy Command Center was on the first floor of the D ring, on the Pentagon's southwest face. It was manned 24 hours a day by 40 to 50 people.
<br><br>The Command Center played an important role in the Navy's operations. It was "the sophisticated, round-the-clock hub that monitors Navy activities, plots movements for 317 ships, and keeps an eye on political events around the world," according to the <i>Washington Post</i>. Timothy Keating described it as "a nerve center." [52]
<br><br>Its mission was "to constantly monitor global events while keeping up with the latest status of all U.S. naval assets operating worldwide," according to Lieutenant Kevin Shaeffer, an action officer in the Navy's Strategic Concepts Branch. Staffers in the Command Center were responsible for "keeping our Navy leadership updated with exactly what's happening in the world, as it directly relates to Navy operations and other geopolitical security and military issues," Shaeffer said. [53]
<br><br>The Chief of Naval Operations Intelligence Plot (CNO-IP) was housed in the Command Center. The CNO-IP was responsible for keeping "a round-the-clock watch on geopolitical developments and military movements that could threaten American forces," according to the <i>Washington Post</i>. [54]
<br><br>And yet, despite their capabilities and responsibilities, personnel in the Command Center apparently did not immediately learn that a suspected hijacking was taking place on September 11. American Airlines Flight 11 was hijacked at around 8:14 a.m. that day, according to the <i>9/11 Commission Report</i>, and between 8:25 a.m. and 8:32 a.m., managers at the Federal Aviation Administration's Boston Center started notifying their chain of command that a suspected hijacking was in progress. [55] But while this was going on, it was just a "routine morning" in the Command Center, according to journalist and author Steve Vogel. [56]
<br><br>Command Center staffers only learned something was wrong at the same time as the public did. A member of staff in the center noticed the coverage of the burning World Trade Center on television and promptly alerted his colleagues to it. People then quickly gathered around the center's television sets. [57] The images from New York "held the attention of every individual in the bustling center," Shaeffer recalled. [58] When the second hijacked plane hit the World Trade Center at 9:03 a.m., "a tense, audible gasp erupted throughout the space," he said. [59] Those in the Command Center "knew it wasn't an accident." [60]
<br><br><b>STAFFERS RETURNED TO THEIR DESKS</b>
<br>Sometime after the second crash occurred, someone in the Command Center said out loud, "This is war." [61] And yet the actions of the center's personnel were hardly what we might reasonably have expected from military staffers who considered themselves to be at war. Those in the Command Center appear to have taken no action toward implementing a military response to the attacks in New York and they seem to have acted with an astonishing lack of urgency, considering they were in a situation where anything could happen next and the speed of their reaction might determine whether any further attacks succeeded.
<br><br>According to the <i>Washington Post</i>, even though a "few old hands muttered to themselves that the Pentagon was probably next" when they saw the coverage of the burning World Trade Center on television, "work had to continue." Therefore, Shaeffer recalled, "As the minutes passed, most of us returned to our desks." [62] Instead of responding to the crashes, it appears that many Command Center personnel continued with their usual duties and were still doing so when the Pentagon was hit, 48 minutes after CNN first reported that a plane had hit the World Trade Center.
<br><br>For example, after he saw the second crash on television, Shaeffer "returned to his cubicle, where he and his three neighbors spent a few minutes discussing what they'd seen," according to the <i>Virginian-Pilot</i>. They "wondered aloud how many people worked in those buildings, whether they were still straggling in when the planes hit. ... What was it like inside those towers right now?" Even though Shaeffer thought the crashes were an "attack on American soil," he apparently intended to continue his usual duties as if nothing abnormal had happened. "He tried to return to work," the <i>Virginian-Pilot</i> reported, although he "couldn't keep his mind on it." [63]
<br><br>Another staffer, Wallace "Trip" Lloyd, watched the coverage of the attacks on television for some time, according to his own recollections, and then "went back to my desk and sat down, getting ready to do some financial work." [64] But why would Shaeffer and Lloyd want to continue with their usual work when their country was under attack? Surely responding to the crashes should have been their only concern.
<br><br><b>STAFFERS MADE UNNECESSARY PHONE CALLS</b>
<br>Furthermore, after they saw the second crash on television, some of the personnel in the Command Center were "intent on calling loved ones," Shaeffer has written. [65] For example, Petty Officer Charles Lewis "frantically tried to call his mother," according to the <i>Chicago Tribune</i>. [66] And yet, under the circumstances, surely everyone should have been focused on their military duties. Calling relatives could have been put off until the crisis was over.
<br><br>Similarly, just before the Pentagon was hit, Jarrell Henson, who was in charge of a seven-person staff in the Command Center "that coordinated Navy efforts in counterdrug operations and emergency relief," made a call to cancel a hotel reservation. [67] Henson described, "I had just come from [the Office of the Secretary of Defense] about the budget events that were fairly significant, so I picked up the phone and called down to Norfolk, to the Hampton Inn, to cancel a reservation for a meeting that we had planned." [68] But why did Henson carry out such an unimportant task--something he could have done at any time--in the middle of a terrorist attack, when every minute was precious?
<br><br>Another person in the Command Center, Richard Sandelli, who worked for a Navy anti-drug task force, appears to have responded to the attacks on the World Trade Center with an alarming lack of urgency. Sometime after the second crash occurred, he received a call from the Army Operations Center (AOC) at the Pentagon, in which he was asked to come to the center. The AOC, Sandelli has said, "coordinates Department of Defense assets to assist civilian tragedy, and the Army Operations Center asks each service to provide a member to come down to their office and coordinate that service's specific ... assets to assist the folks in New York City, which they expected would happen based on the events." Sandelli was therefore wanted at the AOC as a representative of the Navy.
<br><br>Sandelli told the caller that he would report to the AOC at "about 9:45," as he "wanted to make sure there were additional personnel to help us down in the Navy Operations Center and downstairs in the Army Operations Center, and I wanted to make a few last phone calls." In other words, he said he would arrive in the AOC around 42 minutes after the second World Trade Center tower was hit. This hardly seems to be the level of urgency we might reasonably expect at a time when the U.S. was under attack.
<br><br>Sandelli even spared several minutes to talk on the phone with his wife. At around 9:15 a.m. to 9:20 a.m., she called him because she wanted to know if he had seen what was on the news. Sandelli recalled that he and his wife "talked for a few minutes." [69]
<br><br><b>ROUTINE MEETING CONTINUED AFTER ITS ATTENDEES LEARNED OF THE CRASHES</b>
<br>Individuals who were attending a staff meeting in a conference room in the Command Center also appear to have reacted to the news of the crashes in New York with an alarming lack of urgency. Lieutenant Commander Dale Rielage, deputy executive assistant to the director of naval intelligence, who was in the meeting, recalled, "The usual routine of the meeting was quickly interrupted as the intelligence watch brought news of the successive attacks on the World Trade Center." But instead of ending immediately in response to the events in New York, according to Rielage, the staff meeting continued until 9:30 a.m.--27 minutes after the second crash occurred. [70]
<br><br>Why did Rielage and those with him continue their meeting when they should have responded immediately to the attacks? And why did no one else come into the conference room and insist that they end the meeting at once so as to deal with the attacks?
<br><br>Furthermore, despite the important role the Command Center played in the Navy's operations, personnel there apparently received no orders from their department's top officials about what they should do in response to the attacks on the World Trade Center. According to Shaeffer, "Events were happening so quickly that no formal tasking on exactly what to do came down." [71] And yet over 50 minutes passed between the first hijacked plane crashing into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon being hit. Surely that was more than enough time for senior Navy officials to issue the center's personnel with "formal tasking on exactly what to do."
<br><br><b>SOME STAFFERS TRIED TO GATHER INFORMATION ABOUT THE CRASHES</b>
<br>At least a few staffers in the Command Center are reported to have taken action in response to the crashes at the World Trade Center. However, it appears that the most any of them did was try to gather information about what had happened, and they seem to have had only limited success in their efforts.
<br><br>For example, according to Shaeffer, the Command Center "stood up a watch team to start logging events and tracking things for the Navy" after personnel there learned of the first crash. [72] Just before the Pentagon was hit, Shaeffer noticed that the "watch section and watch leaders" were still "actively engaged in logging and recording the events in New York City." [73]
<br><br>Meanwhile, Petty Officer Jason Lhuillier and his colleagues in the CNO-IP were "soon building the intelligence picture and liaising with the CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security [Agency], and the U.S. Navy's sister services" after they learned of the second crash, according to the London <i>Telegraph</i>. [74] However, when David Radi called the CNO-IP sometime after the second crash occurred and asked, "What do we know?" all he was told was, "We're working it." [75]
<br><br>Lieutenant Nancy McKeown, who was in charge of the Meteorology and Oceanography section of the Command Center, instructed her technicians, Petty Officers Edward Earhart and Matthew Flocco, "to bring up their computers and to start doing some research to see what we could find out" about what had happened, after she saw the television coverage of the burning World Trade Center. However, it is unclear how much relevant information the two technicians were able to discover. McKeown has only said that just before the Pentagon was hit, Flocco and Earhart were still "diligently working." [76]
<br><br>And Seaman Sarah Cole reportedly "knew her superiors would want more information" after she heard about the crashes at the World Trade Center, "so she began downloading photos from the Internet." [77]
<br><br>Like other Navy personnel at the Pentagon, those in the Command Center received no instructions to evacuate. Sometime after the second crash occurred, Jarrell Henson was called by his wife, who asked him if he and his colleagues had "gotten any advice to vacate or to get out of the building." Henson told her, "No, everything is being reacted to here, but we haven't had any guidance yet." [78]
<br><br>Unfortunately, the failure to evacuate had tragic consequences. Much of the Navy Command Center was destroyed in the attack on the Pentagon. [79] All of the 42 Navy employees at the Pentagon who died in the attack were in the Command Center. Only eight of the 50 people who were in the Command Center when the Pentagon was hit survived. [80]
<br><br><b>COMMANDER TOLD HIS STAFFERS TO 'GET A CUP OF COFFEE TOGETHER' AFTER LEARNING OF THE CRASHES</b>
<br>Accounts of the actions of numerous individuals, in addition to those mentioned above, provide more evidence that Navy personnel at the Pentagon consistently failed to respond appropriately and effectively to the attacks on the World Trade Center. These accounts describe Navy staffers acting with an alarming lack of urgency after they learned of the crashes, doing little if anything toward implementing a military response to them, and continuing their normal activities as if nothing unusual had happened.
<br><br>A good example is the account of Commander Frank Thorp, special assistant for public affairs to the chief of naval operations. Thorp was in his office at the Pentagon when the World Trade Center was attacked. But even though he had seen the coverage of the burning Twin Towers on television, he instructed his staffers to resume their usual duties. "After some period of time watching it," he described, "I came to realize, 'Hey, we've got this big project due.'" He therefore told his staffers, "Hey, everybody, let's get back to work."
<br><br>Thorp then continued to act without any urgency. "For the first time in my life, I said, 'But first, let's all go get a cup of coffee together,'" he recalled. Thorp and his workers therefore "got up ... walked out of the office, walked down the hallway, and the plane hit [the Pentagon] about a tractor-trailer's length away from my office." [81]
<br><br><b>STAFFERS DECIDED 'WE NEEDED TO GET BACK TO OUR JOB' AFTER THEY REALIZED 'IT WAS A TERRORIST ATTACK'</b>
<br>Navy personnel in room 4C453, on the fourth floor of the C ring, also continued their usual duties after they learned of the attacks on the World Trade Center.
<br><br>Commander Joan Zitterkopf, a helicopter pilot assigned to a training aircraft redesign group who was in room 4C453 on September 11, recalled that she learned about the first crash when "the chief came out of the admiral's outer office and said he'd gotten a phone call [in which he was told] that there had been an airplane crash into the World Trade Center." The person who'd called, who was in the Navy Command Center, had wanted to know if Zitterkopf's department was missing an aircraft and had wondered if the plane that hit the World Trade Center could be one of theirs.
<br><br>The television in Zitterkopf's office was then turned on and about eight members of staff subsequently saw the second hijacked plane hitting the World Trade Center as it happened. "There was just [a] kind of a gasp in the room because, obviously, we knew at that point in time [that] it was a terrorist attack," Zitterkopf recalled. She and her colleagues "were relatively dumbfounded" and "watched in almost a silent horror for a few minutes." And yet they then "decided we needed to get back to our job." Zitterkopf returned to her desk and started preparing for a previously scheduled meeting that was set to take place at 11:00 a.m.
<br><br>Zitterkopf was then called to the front office to discuss whether the 11:00 a.m. meeting should be rescheduled. Some senior Navy officers who were in a meeting downstairs were on the phone. "They were trying to decide whether we were going to continue with our meeting or whether we were going to do something different," Zitterkopf described. She said she "thought we should cancel the meeting until things calm down." However, Zitterkopf recalled: "They said: 'No, we're going to go ahead and have the meeting. Call down to the people that are coming and tell them we're going to go ahead with the meeting.'" (It is unclear from Zitterkopf's account if the people who said this were the senior officers in the meeting downstairs or some co-workers who were with Zitterkopf in the front office.) [82]
<br><br>But how could anyone have decided to go ahead with a previously scheduled meeting that was unrelated to the crashes in New York at such a critical time? Surely, those organizing the 11:00 a.m. meeting should have wanted Navy personnel to focus all their attention on dealing with the attacks, without having to worry about attending any unnecessary meetings.
<br><br><b>AIR WARFARE DIVISION PERSONNEL 'WENT BACK TO WORK' AFTER WATCHING THE TV COVERAGE OF THE CRASHES</b>
<br>Like Zitterkopf and her colleagues, Navy personnel in room 5D453, on the fifth floor of the D ring, appear to have continued their usual work after they learned of the crashes at the World Trade Center.
<br><br>In this office, where most of the Air Warfare Division's spaces were located, Captain Timothy Tibbits and his colleagues had been watching the television coverage of the first crash and then saw the second crash live at 9:03 a.m. They then "knew that things had just changed for the worse and that the day would be a long one in the Pentagon," Commander Don Braswell described. Some of the staffers expressed concern that the Pentagon might be attacked. "[A] few bubbas had mentioned that the Pentagon, White House, and the Capitol building were probably targets," Braswell recalled.
<br><br>And yet those in room 5D453 apparently did nothing toward implementing a military response to the attacks on the World Trade Center, and they made no moves toward getting out of their office and to somewhere safer. Instead, it appears they eventually just returned to their normal duties. "They stared at the [television] set for a half-hour, and asked why it happened and how it happened," the <i>Everett Herald</i> reported. "Then, everyone went back to work."
<br><br>Room 5D453 was directly above the area of the Pentagon that was hit at 9:37 a.m., and when the attack took place, the office's floor shook and "a huge explosion sucked the air out of the room." [83]
<br><br><b>OFFICER PLANNED HIS DAILY RUN AFTER BEING TOLD THE U.S. WAS UNDER ATTACK</b>
<br>Captain Tom Joyce, a deputy for naval aviation, also returned to his usual duties after he learned of the crashes at the World Trade Center and even spent time planning his daily run, instead of taking action in response to the attacks. His apparent indifference to what happened in New York is astonishing.
<br><br>Joyce, who worked in an office on the fifth floor of the D ring along with about 100 other people, learned about the attacks on the World Trade Center from the coverage on television. After those in his office saw the second crash on TV, one of his colleagues called a friend in the Pentagon's National Military Command Center and asked him what he knew. The friend said: "We've got other planes that are hijacked. We're under attack. We don't know from who." Joyce and his colleagues looked at each other and said, "We've got to be a target [at the Pentagon]."
<br><br>All of the admirals who worked in Joyce's office were away for a meeting and so Joyce was "the senior guy" in the office at the time. And yet he then continued his normal duties as if nothing unusual had happened. "What do you do?" he has commented. "We were there to work that day and I went back to work."
<br><br>Joyce phoned his wife, to tell her what was going on. Then he spent time thinking. "I tried to focus my thoughts on what might happen and what our responses should be in various scenarios," he recalled. At that time, Joyce would go for a daily run in the area around the Pentagon. So he also spent time "just looking out the window and kind of mapping in my mind my route" for his run that day. The reason he did this, he said, was, "I just needed to clear my mind from everything I had seen on TV."
<br><br>Joyce was still looking out the window, planning his run, when the Pentagon was hit. His office was directly above the area of the building that was struck and some of his colleagues were injured by debris that flew across the room as a result of the impact. [84]
<br><br><b>OFFICER STARTED DOING RESEARCH FOR A PROJECT AFTER HE LEARNED OF THE CRASHES</b>
<br>Chief Warrant Officer John Gregorowicz similarly continued his usual work after he learned of the attacks on the World Trade Center. Gregorowicz, who was temporarily stationed at the Pentagon so as to organize a meeting of navies from around the world, learned of the crashes at the World Trade Center from the coverage on television. "It was unbelievable what we saw on TV," he has commented. And yet he carried on with his work as if nothing out of the ordinary had happened. "We could only watch so much of it, I guess," he said, and so he "just went back to work and started to do some research on my project that I had to do there."
<br><br>Gregorowicz subsequently left his office in the A ring and headed toward the C ring to get a cup of coffee. The Pentagon was hit as he was leaving the A ring and he saw "a fireball coming right down the quarter right at us." [85]
<br><br>Jim Stewart, a Navy staff assessment director, and his colleagues, who were in an office on the fourth floor of the C ring, also appear to have carried on with their normal duties and done nothing toward implementing a military response after learning of the crashes at the World Trade Center. After Stewart learned of the crashes, he took the time to phone his wife to tell her what had happened. And, he has recalled, although they thought what had happened was "horrendous," he and the other people in his office were "trying to carry on with their responsibilities" when their building was attacked at 9:37 a.m. [86]
<br><br><b>INTELLIGENCE OFFICER WENT AHEAD WITH A PRESENTATION DESPITE KNOWING ABOUT THE ATTACKS</b>
<br>Tanya Edwards, who worked for the director of naval intelligence, apparently continued with her scheduled activities after she learned about the crashes in New York. On the morning of September 11, she was attending meetings in the Pentagon related to the movement of the intelligence staff while the Pentagon was being renovated. She knew about the attacks on the World Trade Center, having seen the coverage of them on television. And yet she went ahead with a presentation that was apparently unrelated to the crisis that was taking place. "When the plane hit [the Pentagon]," Edwards recalled, "I was giving a presentation to several different divisions, and many of us fell to the floor because of the impact of the plane hitting the building." [87]
<br><br>Meanwhile, an officer went ahead with a reenlistment, despite having just spent time following the television coverage of the attacks. Dewitt Roseborough, the chief of naval operations' photographer, has recalled that he was covering a reenlistment in the secretary of the Navy's mess at the Pentagon on September 11. The reenlisting officer was running 20 minutes late that morning because he had been watching CNN's coverage of the crashes in New York. When the officer finally arrived at the mess, at 9:20 a.m., he told the people assembled there what had happened at the World Trade Center. And yet he then continued with his work as if nothing out of the ordinary had happened. Roseborough recalled that even though "there were a lot of people in shock, we proceeded with the reenlistment." [88]
<br><br><b>TRAINING DIRECTOR'S PERSONNEL WATCHED ATTACKS ON TV BUT DID NOT RESPOND TO THEM</b>
<br>As a final example of the Navy's inaction on September 11, Navy employees who worked for Allen Zeman, director of naval training and education, appear to have done practically nothing in response to the attacks on the World Trade Center and instead spent their time watching the television coverage of the crashes.
<br><br>Christopher Howk, an administrator who worked for Zeman, was at his desk when his wife called and alerted him to the first crash. He then went with some colleagues into Zeman's office to watch the television coverage of the crash and saw the second crash when it occurred. Howk has recalled that he and his colleagues then realized that what had happened "wasn't possibly a mistake." A lieutenant in the room commented, "I wonder when we're going to get hit [at the Pentagon]?"
<br><br>And yet Howk and his colleagues, who were responsible for planning the movement of Navy personnel, appear to have taken no action toward implementing a military response to the crashes. Instead, they just speculated about what the Navy might do. "We stayed glued to our posts in the office and discussed how we'd 'spin the fleet up' to do what was needed," Howk said.
<br><br>When one of their co-workers, Yeoman Melissa Barnes, arrived at work at 9:30 a.m., she found her office was "mysteriously empty." At that time--only seven minutes before the Pentagon was hit--all of her colleagues were huddled around the television in Zeman's office. "[E]veryone in the office was standing there watching," <i>All Hands</i> magazine reported. [89]
<br><br><b>SOME STAFFERS JOKED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF THE PENTAGON BEING HIT</b>
<br>As well as failing to initiate a military response to the attacks and continuing with their usual duties, Navy personnel reacted inappropriately in other ways after they learned about the crashes at the World Trade Center. Some of them actually joked about the possibility of the Pentagon being attacked.
<br><br>Joan Zitterkopf described an example of this behavior. "I remember distinctly, at one point in time, someone commenting that the roof of the Pentagon was five concentric circles," she recalled. In response, she had "joked and said, 'Yeah, if we painted them red, we'd just be a big bull's-eye!'" Zitterkopf recalled that she and her colleagues "joked about [the fact that] we probably were 'sitting in the middle of a bull's-eye,'" and then "went on back to what we were doing." [90]
<br><br>Timothy Tibbits described another such incident. He said that, at some point after the World Trade Center towers were hit, his father-in-law left a phone message for him, in which he advised Tibbits to turn on a television and warned, "I don't know if anybody's talking about it, but the Pentagon could be a target." Tibbits recalled that "the warning made his co-workers laugh." [91]
<br><br>This is baffling. Why would Navy staffers laugh about the attacks when many people had just been killed at the World Trade Center and the lives of those at the Pentagon might be in danger?
<br><br><b>OVER 40 NAVY STAFFERS DIED IN THE PENTAGON ATTACK</b>
<br>The attack on the Pentagon at 9:37 a.m. on September 11 had catastrophic consequences for the Navy. The department lost 70 percent of its offices in the Pentagon as a result of the attack. [92]
<br><br>The Navy Communications Center and the Navy Budget Office were totally destroyed, while the Navy Command Center was mostly destroyed. [93] According to William Toti, "The Navy was reduced to 11 percent of its footprint." Percentage-wise, this was "by far the biggest hit of any service or agency" at the Pentagon. [94]
<br><br>Tragically, 42 Navy personnel were killed--about a third of the 125 Department of Defense employees who died in the attack on the Pentagon. [95]
<br><br>Remarkably, considering the apparently poor response of Navy personnel at the Pentagon to the crashes at the World Trade Center, Admiral Robert Natter, commander of the Navy's Atlantic Fleet at the time of the 9/11 attacks, claimed that on September 11, the Navy was "responsive to something that came out of the clear blue" and "naval forces reacted to it the way the taxpayers would have wanted." Vern Clark claimed that the Navy was "thinking about the immediate protection of the United States of America" that day. [96]
<br><br><b>THE NAVY HAD FIGHTERS AVAILABLE BUT PROVIDED NO AIR DEFENSE OVER NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON</b>
<br>The poor response of Navy personnel at the Pentagon to the attacks on the World Trade Center is particularly noteworthy considering that the Navy had fighter jets that may have been able to provide air defense over New York and Washington, DC. This fact alone should have necessitated that Navy personnel respond as quickly as possible to the crisis on September 11.
<br><br>In fact, if the Navy was indeed capable of providing fighters to protect these cities, this gives rise to the possibility that, had it been alerted to the hijackings quickly enough, its aircraft might have stopped at least one or two of the attacks that day. And yet the Navy apparently failed to provide any air cover over New York and Washington on the morning of September 11.
<br><br>The Navy had fighters at Naval Air Station Oceana in Norfolk, Virginia, at Naval Air Facility Washington, DC, about 10 miles from the capital, and at Naval Air Station Patuxent River in Maryland, 65 miles southeast of the Pentagon. At NAS Oceana, F-14 Tomcats and F/A-18 Hornets were available. [97] At NAF Washington, F/A-18 Hornets were available. [98] And at NAS Patuxent River, F/A-18E Super Hornets were available. [99]
<br><br>Rudy Washington, one of New York's deputy mayors, clearly seems to have thought the Navy was capable of protecting the airspace over his city. Immediately after he first saw the burning World Trade Center as he was being driven into downtown Manhattan on September 11, he called Robert Natter and requested air cover over New York. [100]
<br><br>Washington told Natter, "I need some air protection here." Natter has recalled that in response to Washington's request, he "had the staff call out to Naval Air Station Oceana, where we have our fighters based, and told them to arm some of the fighters with Sidewinder missiles." [101] However, it is unclear whether any of the Navy's fighters arrived over New York that morning. [102]
<br><br>And Captain G. J. Fenton, who was at NAS Patuxent River at the time of the 9/11 attacks, has indicated that his base may have been able to provide fighters to protect the airspace over Washington and the Pentagon. Fenton recalled that he "was assigned the task of providing air defense for Patuxent River" on September 11. Although, he said, "most of our aircraft weren't configured to fire live missiles or shoot live guns" and the base only "had a total of two live A-9 Sidewinders to mount on our aircraft," personnel at the base "set up a few aircraft to be launched at a moment's notice to defend us in case we were called." "Our nation was under attack and we had some tools to do something about it in case the attacks continued," Fenton commented. [103]
<br><br>Since NAS Patuxent River was capable of providing at least some air defense for its surrounding area, then, could it have provided air defense for Washington and the Pentagon, as it was only 65 miles from the capital? And might it have been able to get some of its fighters airborne before the Pentagon was hit?
<br><br><b>THE NAVY HAD MANY ASSETS IT COULD USE TO DEFEND THE U.S.</b>
<br>The extent of the Navy's capability to respond to a crisis like the 9/11 attacks becomes clearer when we read a couple of accounts that describe the actions the Navy took later on the day of September 11, apparently after the attacks were over. These accounts highlight the significance of the lack of response of Navy personnel at the Pentagon to the crashes at the World Trade Center. They show that the Navy had numerous assets it could use to protect the U.S. It was therefore imperative that Navy personnel respond immediately to the crisis, so these assets could be called into action as quickly as possible.
<br><br>One of the accounts is a speech given by Vern Clark in March 2002. On September 11, Clark said, "Cruisers and destroyers with the Aegis weapon systems immediately took off from Washington, DC, and then moved up to New York to provide for air defense." Navy radar aircraft also "took to the skies immediately." [104]
<br><br>The other account, an article in <i>Sea Power</i>, described: "The aircraft carrier USS <i>George Washington</i>, operating off the Virginia Capes, was dispatched to New York following the recovery of armed F-14 Tomcats and F/A-18 Hornets from Naval Air Station Oceana, Virginia. The carrier USS <i>John F. Kennedy</i>, departing Mayport, Florida, was ordered to patrol the waters off Hampton Roads, Virginia, to protect the Navy's vast shore complex in Norfolk."
<br><br>"Within three hours," <i>Sea Power</i> reported, "an undisclosed number of Aegis guided-missile cruisers and destroyers also were underway, their magazines loaded with Standard 2 surface-to-air missiles." These warships, which were positioned off New York and Norfolk, and along the Gulf Coast, "provided robust early-warning and air defense capabilities to help ensure against follow-on terrorist attacks." Additionally, as well as launching fighters, the Navy "pressed into service" E-2C Hawkeye early warning aircraft "to monitor U.S. airspace." [105]
<br><br><b>NAVY PERSONNEL RECEIVED NO ORDERS TO EVACUATE</b>
<br>An aspect of the Navy's lack of response to the crashes at the World Trade Center that deserves particular attention is the failure of Navy personnel at the Pentagon to evacuate from their building before it was attacked. As well as making no attempt to get out of their own accord, Navy personnel, like everyone else at the Pentagon, received no orders to evacuate before the attack took place, at 9:37 a.m. [106] An order to evacuate only went out over the Pentagon's public address system shortly after the building was hit. [107]
<br><br>A document published by the Defense Protective Service--the law enforcement agency that guards the Pentagon--in October 2001 outlined who was responsible for ordering an evacuation. It stated, "Normally, the decision to activate the Pentagon evacuation plan is made by the director, Washington Headquarters Service (WHS), or their designee, who is typically the on-duty watch commander for the Defense Protective Service."
<br><br>However, the document noted, "this does not preclude Department of Defense components from ordering an evacuation from their office spaces in the event of emergency." Furthermore, the document stated, "Building occupants do not have to wait to evacuate" in an emergency. The overriding principle was that "common sense should prevail." [108]
<br><br>In other words, in line with official guidelines, senior Navy officials could have ordered their personnel to evacuate from the Pentagon and/or personnel could have evacuated of their own accord on September 11. Why then did no evacuation take place before the Pentagon was hit?
<br><br>Defense Department officials blamed the failure to evacuate on "[c]onfusion, uncertainty, poor communication, and a general lack of preparedness," according to the <i>Washington Post</i>. [109] Pentagon spokesman Glenn Flood tried to explain the failure, saying: "To call for a general evacuation at that point [i.e. after the second hijacked plane hit the World Trade Center], it would have been just guessing. We evacuate when we know something is a real threat to us." He also said an evacuation could have put Pentagon employees at risk by moving them outside the protection provided by the building's walls. [110]
<br><br>But are these explanations credible, considering that on the morning of September 11 the U.S. was under attack, anything could have happened next, and those in the Pentagon could have been injured or killed if their building was a target--as it indeed turned out to be?
<br><br><b>THE PENTAGON WAS REGARDED AS A LIKELY TERRORIST TARGET</b>
<br>The failure to evacuate any military personnel from the Pentagon before it was attacked is remarkable considering that, even before 9/11, the building was considered a likely target for terrorists. Several people have indicated that the danger was well known.
<br><br>Christopher Howk, for example, commented, "We at the Pentagon know we're one of the top targets in the country and [before September 11] we knew it wasn't a matter of if, it was a matter of when [the Pentagon would be attacked]." Howk and his colleagues reportedly "knew the Pentagon, as headquarters of the world's most powerful military as well as the world's largest office complex, had been in the crosshairs of terrorists for years." [111]
<br><br>Stacie Condrell, a senior Pentagon Renovation Project planner, said in October 2001, "I have known for some time that the Pentagon was vying with some other building--the Capitol or the White House--for being the number one or two terrorist target in the world." She said she assumed the Pentagon had been designated as one of the top terrorist targets "based on some actual intelligence that indicates the likelihood of attack." [112]
<br><br>Army Lieutenant Colonel Ted Anderson, a Congressional liaison, commented that before 9/11, "We had talked about what a tremendous target the Pentagon was and how vulnerable we were [at the Pentagon]." [113] And when Donald Rumsfeld--the secretary of defense on September 11--was asked if he had ever thought, before 9/11, that it was possible that terrorists would attack the Pentagon, he replied, "Obviously the Pentagon is a target, like any large important government building in the United States ... so I had thought about those kinds of problems in general." [114]
<br><br>Furthermore, a software system commissioned by the Department of Defense had determined that the Pentagon "was in danger from a terrorist attack." According to popular science writer Keith Devlin, the software, called Site Profiler, "worked by combining different data sources to draw inferences about the risk of terrorism" and "provided site commanders with tools to help assess terrorist risks so that they could develop appropriate countermeasures."
<br><br>Site Profiler's developers "carried out a number of simulations, based on hypothetical threat scenarios." [115] Their initial evaluation, conducted in 2000, "included a scenario involving a terrorist attack on the Pentagon by means of a mortar shot from the Potomac River." In the evaluation, "the model results indicated that the Pentagon was vulnerable to terrorist attack." [116]
<br><br><b>SOME AT THE PENTAGON THOUGHT THEIR BUILDING MIGHT BE ATTACKED</b>
<br>Not only was the Pentagon considered a likely terrorist target, some people at the Pentagon actually said out loud, after they learned of the crashes at the World Trade Center, that they thought their building might be attacked next. For example, Vice Admiral Edmund Giambastiani Jr., Donald Rumsfeld's senior military assistant, talked with Stephen Cambone, Rumsfeld's closest aide, after the second hijacked plane hit the World Trade Center and the two men discussed whether the Pentagon might be struck as well. They talked about "the idea that the Pentagon could be a target," according to Giambastiani. [117]
<br><br>Christopher Howk recalled that one of his colleagues said, after seeing the second crash on television, "I wonder when we're going to get hit [at the Pentagon]?" [118] Pentagon employee John King told his colleagues that the Pentagon was "probably the next target" after he saw the second crash on television. [119] Don Braswell recalled that, as they watched the television coverage of the crashes in New York, some of the Navy staffers with him "mentioned that the Pentagon, White House, and the Capitol building were probably targets." [120] And Tom Joyce recalled that, after they saw the second crash on TV, he and his colleagues said to each other, "We've got to be a target [at the Pentagon]." [121]
<br><br>Meanwhile, in the Navy Command Center, after they learned of the attacks on the World Trade Center, "A few old hands muttered to themselves that the Pentagon was probably next," the <i>Washington Post</i> reported. [122] Paul Brady told two of his colleagues, "Well, I guess that we will be the next on their target list." [123] And Charles Lewis heard a colleague say, "If it could happen there [i.e. at the World Trade Center], what could stop it from happening here?" [124]
<br><br>In the office of the vice chief of naval operations, William Toti and his colleagues realized immediately that the first crash at the World Trade Center was an act of terrorism, and started discussing where the terrorists would strike next if the crash was part of an organized attack. Toti quickly determined that "the only building that makes sense is the Pentagon." [125]
<br><br>Furthermore, at some point after the second crash occurred, Army Deputy Administrative Assistant Sandra Riley phoned the chief of the Defense Protective Service and asked him, "What do we have in place to protect [the Pentagon] from an airplane?" So at least one person appears to have thought the Pentagon might be attacked from the air. (The chief of the Defense Protective Service reportedly replied, "Nothing.") [126]
<br><br>In fact, some Navy employees specifically thought that people needed to get out of the Pentagon. For example, when Yeoman Cean Whitmarsh, who worked in the office of the director of surface warfare, saw the television coverage of the crashes at the World Trade Center, "His first thought was that he needed to get out of the Pentagon," according to the <i>Fort Worth Star-Telegram</i>. [127] And, after she learned of the crashes, Joan Zitterkopf said out loud: "I think we really ought to be getting out of here. I just don't think we ought to be in this building." [128]
<br><br><b>PROTECTIVE SERVICE OFFICERS DID NOT INCREASE THE THREAT LEVEL AT THE PENTAGON</b>
<br>The failure to evacuate at least some people from the Pentagon before the attack there took place appears to make no sense. But one thing that may have been a factor in why no evacuation took place is the failure of the Defense Protective Service (DPS) to raise the threat level at the Pentagon following the attacks on the World Trade Center. The actions of senior DPS personnel in fact seem inexplicable.
<br><br>John Jester, chief of the DPS on September 11, has stated that, after he learned of the crashes at the World Trade Center, even though he realized these crashes were a "terrible attack," it didn't occur to him that a similar thing could happen at the Pentagon. [129] Remarkably, after the second hijacked plane hit the World Trade Center, he instructed Lieutenant Michael Nesbitt, who ran the day-to-day operations in the DPS Communications Center, to send a message to the building's Real Estate and Facilities Directorate, reassuring everyone that the Pentagon was secure and its Terrorist Threat Condition was staying at "Normal"--the lowest level on a five-tier scale--which meant there was no present threat of terrorist activity. [130]
<br><br>Jester eventually issued the order to raise the state of alert at the Pentagon, but he only did this just before the building was attacked. And even then, he only ordered that it be raised one level. He instructed his deputy, John Pugrud, to tell the DPS Communications Center to raise the Terrorist Threat Condition from Normal to Alpha, which meant a general threat of possible terrorist activity existed that required enhanced security. It meant spot inspections of vehicles and increased police patrols were required. But Pugrud was still in the process of phoning the DPS Communications Center about raising the threat level at the time the Pentagon was hit. The Terrorist Threat Condition would therefore still have been at Normal when the attack occurred. [131]
<br><br>The DPS's failure to raise the threat level is particularly notable considering that official books and documents have indicated that the DPS had a key role to play in ordering the evacuation of the Pentagon. For example, as previously mentioned, a document published by the DPS in October 2001 stated, "Normally, the decision to activate the Pentagon evacuation plan is made by the director, Washington Headquarters Service (WHS), or their designee, who is typically the on-duty watch commander for the Defense Protective Service." [132] (The director of the WHS on September 11 was David O. "Doc" Cooke, but it is unclear who the on-duty watch commander for the DPS was.)
<br><br>A handout for Pentagon employees published by the DPS in August 2000 stated that the DPS was responsible for "[o]rdering evacuations, when circumstances require an evacuation and when an evacuation has not already been ordered." [133] And the Department of Defense's book about the Pentagon attack stated that the DPS, along with the Pentagon Building Management Office, was responsible for the "orderly evacuation" of the Pentagon. [134]
<br><br><b>WHY DID THE NAVY RESPOND SO POORLY TO THE ATTACKS ON THE WORLD TRADE CENTER?</b>
<br>The failure of Navy personnel at the Pentagon to take action toward implementing a military response to the attacks or evacuate from their building after they learned of the crashes at the World Trade Center gives rise to many questions.
<br><br>For example, why did Navy personnel apparently do so little in response to what had happened in New York, considering that the Navy, along with the rest of the U.S. military, was responsible for protecting America if it were attacked? Why did Navy personnel just watch the coverage of the crashes on television or phone their relatives when their attention should have been focused on responding to the crisis? Why did some of them continue with their normal duties as if nothing unusual had happened?
<br><br>The accounts examined in this article indicate that Navy staffers received no orders from their department's senior officials about what to do in response to the attacks on the World Trade Center. Why was this? Surely the Navy's leaders should have taken charge of the situation immediately so as to ensure a prompt, coordinated, and effective response to the crisis.
<br><br>Additionally, why was no attempt made to evacuate Navy personnel--or, indeed, anyone else--from the Pentagon before the attack there took place, especially considering that the building was regarded as a likely target for terrorists? And why were some Navy staffers able to joke about the possibility of the Pentagon being attacked? Surely they should have realized the seriousness of what had happened at the World Trade Center and that many people had just lost their lives. They should hardly have felt like joking.
<br><br><b>DID NAVY PERSONNEL THINK THE CRASHES WERE PART OF AN EXERCISE?</b>
<br>A possible reason for the apparently inexplicable behavior of Navy personnel at the Pentagon is that these individuals mistakenly thought the reported attacks on the World Trade Center were simulations, as part of a training exercise.
<br><br>Whether the Navy was conducting an exercise on September 11 is unknown. However, other military agencies are known to have been running or preparing for exercises at the time of the 9/11 attacks, which may have created confusion among their personnel over what was "real-world" and what was simulated. And Major Don Arias, the North American Aerospace Defense Command's public affairs officer on September 11, has stated: "[I]t's common practice, when we have exercises, to get as much bang for the buck as we can. So sometimes we'll have different organizations participating in the same exercise for different reasons." [135]
<br><br>On the basis of this evidence, it certainly seems possible that, on September 11, the Navy was participating in one of the exercises run by other agencies or holding its own exercise that was intentionally scheduled to take place at the same time as other agencies conducted theirs.
<br><br><b>AIR DEFENSE EXERCISE HAD SIMILARITIES TO THE 9/11 ATTACKS</b>
<br>The exercises conducted by other military agencies include "Vigilant Guardian," which the North American Aerospace Defense Command was in the middle of running on September 11. This has been described as "an air defense exercise simulating an attack on the United States" and, two days before 9/11, it included a scenario in which terrorists planned to blow up a hijacked airliner over New York. [136] Therefore, since it had similarities to the 9/11 attacks, Vigilant Guardian presumably could have led to confusion among military personnel over what was real and what was simulated when those attacks took place.
<br><br>Another exercise was "Global Guardian," which the U.S. Strategic Command was in the middle of running on September 11. Global Guardian involved America fighting a fictional nuclear war. It "posited that a rogue nation called Slumonia would attack the United States with nuclear weapons," according to journalists Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker. [137]
<br><br>And at the time of the 9/11 attacks, the Army was preparing an exercise for its Crisis Action Team at the Pentagon, which was set to take place in the week after September 11 and was based around the scenario of a plane crashing into the World Trade Center. [138] The existence of this exercise may well have caused confusion among Army staffers over what was real and what was simulated when planes crashed into the World Trade Center on September 11.
<br><br><b>PARTICIPANTS IN AN ARMY EXERCISE THOUGHT THE TV COVERAGE OF THE ATTACKS WAS SIMULATED</b>
<br>If the Navy was indeed running or participating in a training exercise on September 11 and its personnel failed to respond to the attacks on the World Trade Center because they thought these were simulated, this would imply that Navy staffers thought the television coverage of the crashes was simulated, i.e. it was video that had been created to make the exercise feel more realistic. Although it might seem difficult to believe this could have happened, evidence indicates that it may have been the case. Specifically, reports have described how participants in one military exercise taking place on September 11 did indeed mistakenly think that television coverage of the crashes at the World Trade Center was video that had been created for their exercise.
<br><br>At Fort Monmouth, an Army base about 50 miles south of New York, preparations were underway on the morning of September 11 for the exercise "Timely Alert II," which was intended to test the base's response to a biochemical terrorist attack. When the director of this exercise told a group of participating volunteers that a plane had crashed into the World Trade Center, the volunteers reportedly "pretended to be horrified and upset, never believing the story to be anything but part of the simulation" for the exercise. A senior officer at the base has recalled that "people on post told him, when they first saw live footage of the events unfolding at the World Trade Center, they thought it was some elaborate training video to accompany the exercise." One person, referring to the television coverage of the crashes, told a fire department training officer, "You really outdid yourself this time." [139]
<br><br>If these people thought the television coverage of the attacks was video created for an exercise, surely Navy personnel at the Pentagon could have made the same mistake.
<br><br><b>THE NAVY'S LACK OF RESPONSE MAKES SENSE IF PERSONNEL THOUGHT THE ATTACKS WERE PART OF AN EXERCISE</b>
<br>If the Navy was running or participating in a training exercise on September 11, this could help explain the apparent lack of urgency of its personnel at the Pentagon after they learned about the crashes at the World Trade Center, since these individuals may have mistakenly thought the crashes were a simulated scenario in the exercise.
<br><br>For example, if Navy personnel thought the crashes were simulated, they presumably would have felt it was unnecessary to promptly implement a military response to them, and this could be why they failed to take action immediately. They may also have felt they had time to phone their relatives--as some of them did--even though, in reality, their attention should have been focused on dealing with the crisis.
<br><br>Navy personnel who knew an exercise was taking place but were not participating in it themselves would presumably have felt it was alright to carry on with their usual duties, as some of them did, since the exercise--unlike a real-world attack--was of no concern to them.
<br><br>Personnel would have felt it was unnecessary to get out of the Pentagon if they thought the reports indicating that America was under attack were part of an exercise. If they thought the reported attacks were just simulated, they would have felt they were safe at the Pentagon, even though the building was considered a likely target for terrorists.
<br><br>They would also presumably have felt it was acceptable to make jokes about the Pentagon being a possible target, as some of them did, since they would have thought no one had actually died at the World Trade Center and they were in no real danger at the Pentagon.
<br><br>And if senior Navy officials thought the reported attacks were simulated, they may have failed to promptly issue orders to their personnel regarding how to respond because they felt it was unnecessary to do so simply for an exercise.
<br><br><b>INVESTIGATORS NEED TO PROBE THE ACTIONS OF NAVY PERSONNEL ON SEPTEMBER 11</b>
<br>The actions of Navy personnel at the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, need to be examined as part of a new investigation of the 9/11 attacks, so as to address questions like those raised in this article. In particular, the possibility that the Navy was involved in a training exercise on September 11 should be investigated.
<br><br>If the Navy was indeed participating in or running an exercise that day, investigators need to find out exactly what the exercise involved. They also need to examine whether it prevented Navy staffers from effectively responding to the terrorist attacks, such as by causing them to mistake actual events for a simulated scenario.
<br><br>Additionally, investigators should consider whether rogue individuals in the U.S. military were involved with preparing and running the exercise. Such individuals could have intentionally designed and arranged an exercise that would create confusion, and ensure that honest military personnel were unable to stop the 9/11 attacks before the targets in New York and Washington were hit.
<br><br>By addressing these issues, investigators will take us closer to knowing the full truth about what happened on September 11 and who was responsible for the attacks that day. Crucially, by doing so, they will help bring the perpetrators to justice.
<br><br><b>NOTES</b>
<br> [1] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20071020053401/http:/www.navyleague.org/sea_power/almanac_jan_02_02.php" target="_blank">Gordon I. Peterson, "Bush: 'The Might of Our Navy is Needed Again.' Readiness Improvements Prove Critical in War on Terrorism, but Future Navy is at Risk." <i>Sea Power</i>, January 2002</a>.
<br>[2] Alfred Goldberg et al., <i>Pentagon 9/11</i>. Washington, DC: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2007, p. 134.
<br>[3] <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20011118192054/http:/www.newsday.com/ny-uspent232380681sep23.story" target="_blank">Sylvia Adcock, Brian Donovan, and Craig Gordon, "Air Attack on Pentagon Indicates Weaknesses." <i>Newsday</i>, September 23, 2001</a>; Steve Vogel, <i>The Pentagon: A History</i>. New York: Random House, 2007, p. 429.
<br>[4] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/51154580/GSA-B115-RDOD03012867-Fdr-Entire-Contents-NHC-Intvw-2001-10-10-Toti-William-Re-Pentagon-Pp-37-8-Misng" target="_blank">William Toti, interview by Mike McDaniel. U.S. Naval Historical Center, October 10, 2001</a>.
<br>[5] Alfred Goldberg et al., <i>Pentagon 9/11</i>, p. 34.
<br>[6] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20071020053401/http:/www.navyleague.org/sea_power/almanac_jan_02_02.php" target="_blank">Gordon I. Peterson, "Bush: 'The Might of Our Navy is Needed Again'"</a>; <a href="http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/speeches/clark-hdtran020326.txt" target="_blank">Vern Clark, "Meeting the Homeland Defense Challenge: Maritime and Other Critical Dimensions." Remarks at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Cambridge, MA, March 26, 2002</a>; <a href="https://www.regent.edu/publications/impact/issues/impact-sept-2011.pdf" target="_blank">"Regent Remembers 9/11." <i>Impact</i>, September 2011</a>.
<br>[7] <a href="http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=11086566" target="_blank">Tom Bowman, "Joint Chiefs Nominee Mullen a 'Problem Solver.'" NPR, June 14, 2007</a>.
<br>[8] <a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2001/sep/17/20010917-025432-2148r/" target="_blank">Ellen Sorokin, "Cardinal Urges Trust in God for Dark Days." <i>Washington Times</i>, September 17, 2001</a>; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/51154580/GSA-B115-RDOD03012867-Fdr-Entire-Contents-NHC-Intvw-2001-10-10-Toti-William-Re-Pentagon-Pp-37-8-Misng" target="_blank">William Toti, interview by Mike McDaniel</a>.
<br>[9] <a href="http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/speeches/clark-hdtran020326.txt" target="_blank">Vern Clark, "Meeting the Homeland Defense Challenge"</a>; <a href="https://www.regent.edu/publications/impact/issues/impact-sept-2011.pdf" target="_blank">"Regent Remembers 9/11."</a>
<br>[10] <a href="http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/speeches/clark-hdtran020326.txt" target="_blank">Vern Clark, "Meeting the Homeland Defense Challenge."</a>
<br>[11] <a href="http://www.af.mil/News/ArticleDisplay/tabid/223/Article/112428/mullen-world-changed-forever-as-jet-hit-pentagon.aspx" target="_blank">Cheryl Pellerin, "Mullen: World Changed Forever as Jet Hit Pentagon." American Forces Press Service, September 9, 2011</a>; <a href="http://www.military-money-matters.com/remembering-september-11.html" target="_blank">"Remembering September 11." Military Money Matters, September 10, 2011</a>.
<br>[12] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20071020053401/http:/www.navyleague.org/sea_power/almanac_jan_02_02.php" target="_blank">Gordon I. Peterson, "Bush: 'The Might of Our Navy is Needed Again'"</a>; <a href="http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/speeches/clark-hdtran020326.txt" target="_blank">Vern Clark, "Meeting the Homeland Defense Challenge"</a>; <a href="https://www.regent.edu/publications/impact/issues/impact-sept-2011.pdf" target="_blank">"Regent Remembers 9/11."</a>
<br>[13] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20071020053401/http:/www.navyleague.org/sea_power/almanac_jan_02_02.php" target="_blank">Gordon I. Peterson, "Bush: 'The Might of Our Navy is Needed Again.'"</a>
<br>[14] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20060925214307/http:/www.taps.org/press/Naval%20Academy%20Shipmate.pdf" target="_blank">Rachel F. Goldberg, "A Different War." <i>Shipmate</i>, September 2006</a>; <a href="http://www.defense.gov/news/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=786" target="_blank">Jim Garamone, "Northern Command Chief Talks of 9/11 Experiences, State of Defense Today." American Forces Press Service, September 11, 2006</a>; <a href="http://archives.midweek.com/content/story/midweek_coverstory/we_want_them_to_know_we_know_what_they_are_up_to/" target="_blank">Steve Murray, "We Want Them to Know We Know What They Are up To ..." <i>MidWeek</i>, May 30, 2007</a>.
<br>[15] <a href="http://adst.org/2014/09/the-worst-day-911-and-the-international-response/" target="_blank">Edmund James Hull, interview by Charles Stuart Kennedy. Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, October 2005</a>.
<br>[16] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20071020053401/http:/www.navyleague.org/sea_power/almanac_jan_02_02.php" target="_blank">Gordon I. Peterson, "Bush: 'The Might of Our Navy is Needed Again.'"</a>
<br>[17] Edmund James Hull, <i>High-Value Target: Countering Al-Qaeda in Yemen</i>. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2011, p. 3.
<br>[18] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20071020053401/http:/www.navyleague.org/sea_power/almanac_jan_02_02.php" target="_blank">Gordon I. Peterson, "Bush: 'The Might of Our Navy is Needed Again.'"</a>
<br>[19] Edmund James Hull, <i>High-Value Target</i>, p. 4.
<br>[20] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20071020053401/http:/www.navyleague.org/sea_power/almanac_jan_02_02.php" target="_blank">Gordon I. Peterson, "Bush: 'The Might of Our Navy is Needed Again.'"</a>
<br>[21] Alfred Goldberg et al., <i>Pentagon 9/11</i>, p. 30.
<br>[22] <a href="http://media.nara.gov/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00622.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Edmund Hull." 9/11 Commission, October 18, 2003</a>; Edmund James Hull, <i>High-Value Target</i>, p. 1.
<br>[23] <a href="http://adst.org/2014/09/the-worst-day-911-and-the-international-response/" target="_blank">Edmund James Hull, interview by Charles Stuart Kennedy</a>.
<br>[24] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20060925214307/http:/www.taps.org/press/Naval%20Academy%20Shipmate.pdf" target="_blank">Rachel F. Goldberg, "A Different War."</a>
<br>[25] <a href="http://archives.midweek.com/content/story/midweek_coverstory/we_want_them_to_know_we_know_what_they_are_up_to/" target="_blank">Steve Murray, "We Want Them to Know We Know What They Are up To ..."</a>; Edmund James Hull, <i>High-Value Target</i>, p. 4; <a href="http://adst.org/2014/09/the-worst-day-911-and-the-international-response/" target="_blank">Edmund James Hull, interview by Charles Stuart Kennedy</a>.
<br>[26] <a href="http://www.gcdailyworld.com/story/1275485.html" target="_blank">Chris Pruett, "Eric Moody Recalls His 'Escape From the Pentagon.'" <i>Greene County Daily World</i>, September 14, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.indiana.edu/~ocmhptst/091401/text/execed.html" target="_blank">Susan Williams, "'Come to My Voice and Keep Your Arm Against the Wall.'" Indiana University, September 14, 2001</a>; Alfred Goldberg et al., <i>Pentagon 9/11</i>, p. 47.
<br>[27] <a href="http://ww2.fairfaxtimes.com/cms/archivestory.php?id=152509" target="_blank">Michelle Zimmermann, "An Unassuming Patriot Dennis Kern: Navy Pilot to RCC Chief." <i>Fairfax County Times</i>, July 1, 2002</a>.
<br>[28] <a href="http://www.gcdailyworld.com/story/1275485.html" target="_blank">Chris Pruett, "Eric Moody Recalls His 'Escape From the Pentagon'"</a>; <a href="http://ww.heraldtimesonline.com/stories/2001/09/17/TM.new.30208.sto" target="_blank">Dottie Duncan, "Crane Employee Recalls Story of Pentagon Attack." <i>Bloomington Herald-Times</i>, September 17, 2001</a>; <a href="https://vimeo.com/60328559" target="_blank">Jim Buher, "In the Pentagon on September 11, 2001." Presentation at the Lawrence County Museum of History, Bedford, IN, September 2012</a>.
<br>[29] <a href="http://www.gcdailyworld.com/story/1275485.html" target="_blank">Chris Pruett, "Eric Moody Recalls His 'Escape From the Pentagon.'"</a>
<br>[30] <a href="https://vimeo.com/60328559" target="_blank">Jim Buher, "In the Pentagon on September 11, 2001."</a>
<br>[31] <a href="http://www.gcdailyworld.com/story/1272086.html" target="_blank">Lana Robertson, "Sept. 11 Changed the Life of Dusty Wilson, His Family." <i>Greene County Daily World</i>, September 11, 2002</a>.
<br>[32] <a href="http://www.gcdailyworld.com/story/1275485.html" target="_blank">Chris Pruett, "Eric Moody Recalls His 'Escape From the Pentagon.'"</a>
<br>[33] <a href="http://www.indstate.edu/news/archive/2002/sept/crane_pentagon.html" target="_blank">Dave Taylor, "Forever Changed: ISU Alumnus Experienced First-Hand the Terrorist Attack on the Pentagon." Indiana State University, September 25, 2002</a>.
<br>[34] <a href="http://www.gcdailyworld.com/story/1761156.html" target="_blank">Nick Schneider, "Remembering 9/11: Rural Bloomfield Man Was There at the Pentagon When the Plane Hit." <i>Greene County Daily World</i>, September 9, 2011</a>.
<br>[35] <a href="http://www.gcdailyworld.com/story/1275485.html" target="_blank">Chris Pruett, "Eric Moody Recalls His 'Escape From the Pentagon.'"</a>
<br>[36] <a href="http://www.gcdailyworld.com/story/1272085.html" target="_blank">Jo Chiparo, "Crane Employees Recall Sept. 11, 2001 at Pentagon." <i>Greene County Daily World</i>, September 11, 2002</a>.
<br>[37] <a href="http://ww2.fairfaxtimes.com/cms/archivestory.php?id=152509" target="_blank">Michelle Zimmermann, "An Unassuming Patriot Dennis Kern"</a>; <a href="http://ww.tmnews.com/stories/2002/09/08/archive.332453.tms" target="_blank">Loretta Brown, "Crane Employees Remember Attack." <i>Bedford Times-Mail</i>, September 8, 2002</a>.
<br>[38] <a href="http://www.gcdailyworld.com/story/1275485.html" target="_blank">Chris Pruett, "Eric Moody Recalls His 'Escape From the Pentagon.'"</a>
<br>[39] <a href="http://www.indiana.edu/~ocmhptst/091401/text/execed.html" target="_blank">Susan Williams, "'Come to My Voice and Keep Your Arm Against the Wall.'"</a>
<br>[40] <a href="http://www.gcdailyworld.com/story/1275485.html" target="_blank">Chris Pruett, "Eric Moody Recalls His 'Escape From the Pentagon.'"</a>
<br>[41] <a href="http://www.indiana.edu/~ocmhptst/091401/text/execed.html" target="_blank">Susan Williams, "'Come to My Voice and Keep Your Arm Against the Wall.'"</a>
<br>[42] <a href="http://www.gcdailyworld.com/story/1275485.html" target="_blank">Chris Pruett, "Eric Moody Recalls His 'Escape From the Pentagon.'"</a>
<br>[43] <a href="http://ww2.fairfaxtimes.com/cms/archivestory.php?id=152509" target="_blank">Michelle Zimmermann, "An Unassuming Patriot Dennis Kern"</a>; Alfred Goldberg et al., <i>Pentagon 9/11</i>, p. 47.
<br>[44] <a href="http://www.gcdailyworld.com/story/1275485.html" target="_blank">Chris Pruett, "Eric Moody Recalls His 'Escape From the Pentagon.'"</a>
<br>[45] <a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2001/sep/17/20010917-025432-2148r/" target="_blank">Ellen Sorokin, "Cardinal Urges Trust in God for Dark Days"</a>; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/51154580/GSA-B115-RDOD03012867-Fdr-Entire-Contents-NHC-Intvw-2001-10-10-Toti-William-Re-Pentagon-Pp-37-8-Misng" target="_blank">William Toti, interview by Mike McDaniel</a>.
<br>[46] <a href="http://www.terminalrun.com/news2.htm" target="_blank">William Toti, "Pentagon First-Hand Personal Account." TerminalRun.com, September 18, 2001</a>; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/51154580/GSA-B115-RDOD03012867-Fdr-Entire-Contents-NHC-Intvw-2001-10-10-Toti-William-Re-Pentagon-Pp-37-8-Misng" target="_blank">William Toti, interview by Mike McDaniel</a>; <a href="http://www.usna79.com/PDF_files/Proceedings_Toti_article.htm" target="_blank">William Toti, "One Year Later: Frozen in Time." <i>Proceedings</i>, September 2002</a>.
<br>[47] <a href="http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=3523" target="_blank">Roger L. Dutcher, "Essex Sailors, Marines Pause to Honor 9/11 Victims." Navy News Service, September 13, 2002</a>.
<br>[48] <a href="http://www.usna79.com/PDF_files/Proceedings_Toti_article.htm" target="_blank">William Toti, "One Year Later"</a>; <a href="http://starlocalmedia.com/mckinneycouriergazette/news/remembrance-ceremony/article_351f7a17-dd1c-59ff-8867-3e47a436faff.html" target="_blank">Danny Gallagher, "Remembrance Ceremony." <i>McKinney Courier-Gazette</i>, September 12, 2008</a>.
<br>[49] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/51154580/GSA-B115-RDOD03012867-Fdr-Entire-Contents-NHC-Intvw-2001-10-10-Toti-William-Re-Pentagon-Pp-37-8-Misng" target="_blank">William Toti, interview by Mike McDaniel</a>.
<br>[50] <a href="http://www.terminalrun.com/news2.htm" target="_blank">William Toti, "Pentagon First-Hand Personal Account"</a>; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/51154580/GSA-B115-RDOD03012867-Fdr-Entire-Contents-NHC-Intvw-2001-10-10-Toti-William-Re-Pentagon-Pp-37-8-Misng" target="_blank">William Toti, interview by Mike McDaniel</a>; <a href="http://www.usna79.com/PDF_files/Proceedings_Toti_article.htm" target="_blank">William Toti, "One Year Later."</a>
<br>[51] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/51154580/GSA-B115-RDOD03012867-Fdr-Entire-Contents-NHC-Intvw-2001-10-10-Toti-William-Re-Pentagon-Pp-37-8-Misng" target="_blank">William Toti, interview by Mike McDaniel</a>.
<br>[52] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20010921195542/http:/www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/news/news_stories/pent-wppost.html" target="_blank">Jo Becker, Steve Vogel, and Michael E. Ruane, "Aboard Room 1D457: Smart Young Kids, Grizzled Veterans Stood Watch, and Some Died." <i>Washington Post</i>, September 16, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=1438" target="_blank">Scott D. Hallford, "Naval Officer After Attacks on Pentagon: 'I'm Alive, I Made It.'" Navy News Service, April 24, 2002</a>.
<br>[53] <a href="http://www.doncio.navy.mil/chips/ArticleDetails.aspx?ID=3428" target="_blank">"Talking With Retired Lt. Kevin Shaeffer, USN, and Lt. Blanca Shaeffer, USN." <i>CHIPS</i>, April-June 2003</a>.
<br>[54] <a href="http://www.socnet.com/archive/index.php/t-12755.html" target="_blank">Richard Leiby, "The Last Watch." <i>Washington Post</i>, January 20, 2002</a>.
<br>[55] <a href="http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB165/faa7.pdf" target="_blank">"Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events: September 11, 2001." Federal Aviation Administration, September 17, 2001</a>; 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States</i>. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004, pp. 4, 19.
<br>[56] Steve Vogel, <i>The Pentagon</i>, p. 427.
<br>[57] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20010921195542/http:/www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/news/news_stories/pent-wppost.html" target="_blank">Jo Becker, Steve Vogel, and Michael E. Ruane, "Aboard Room 1D457."</a>
<br>[58] <a href="http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2011-09/never-forget" target="_blank">Kevin P. Shaeffer, "'Never Forget.'" <i>Proceedings</i>, September 2011</a>.
<br>[59] Steve Vogel, <i>The Pentagon</i>, p. 428.
<br>[60] <a href="http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=1438" target="_blank">Scott D. Hallford, "Naval Officer After Attacks on Pentagon."</a>
<br>[61] <a href="http://hamptonroads.com/2011/09/out-nowhere-part-1-sept-11-pentagon" target="_blank">Earl Swift, "Out of Nowhere: Inside the Pentagon on 9/11." <i>Virginian-Pilot</i>, September 7, 2002</a>.
<br>[62] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20010921195542/http:/www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/news/news_stories/pent-wppost.html" target="_blank">Jo Becker, Steve Vogel, and Michael E. Ruane, "Aboard Room 1D457"</a>; <a href="http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2011-09/never-forget" target="_blank">Kevin P. Shaeffer, "'Never Forget.'"</a>
<br>[63] <a href="http://hamptonroads.com/2011/09/out-nowhere-part-1-sept-11-pentagon" target="_blank">Earl Swift, "Out of Nowhere."</a>
<br>[64] <a href="http://hereisnewyorkv911.org/2011/wallace-lloyd/" target="_blank">"Wallace Lloyd." Voices of 9/11, January 29, 2003</a>.
<br>[65] <a href="http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2011-09/never-forget" target="_blank">Kevin P. Shaeffer, "'Never Forget.'"</a>
<br>[66] <a href="http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2001-09-11/news/0109120022_1_pentagon-world-trade-center-federal-buildings" target="_blank">"Nation's Capital Shut Down." <i>Chicago Tribune</i>, September 11, 2001</a>.
<br>[67] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20041013233901/http:/www.militaryupdate.com/remember_this_name.htm" target="_blank">Tom Philpott, "Remember This Name." <i>Washingtonian</i>, December 2001</a>.
<br>[68] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/51086798/GSA-B113-RDOD03012742-Fdr-Entire-Contents-NHC-Intvw-2002-01-23-Henson-Jerry-Re-Pentagon-027" target="_blank">Jarrell Henson, interview by Michael McDaniel and Gary Hall. U.S. Naval Historical Center, January 23, 2002</a>.
<br>[69] <a href="http://hereisnewyorkv911.org/2011/richard-sandelli/" target="_blank">"Richard Sandelli." Voices of 9/11, January 30, 2003</a>.
<br>[70] <a href="http://enquirer.com/editions/2001/09/27/loc_training_kicked_in.html" target="_blank">Tom O'Neill, "Training Kicked in After Pentagon Attack." <i>Cincinnati Enquirer</i>, September 27, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.fireengineering.com/articles/print/volume-155/issue-11/features/the-pentagon-attack-on-9-11-a-view-from-the-courtyard.html" target="_blank">Dale C. Rielage, "The Pentagon Attack on 9/11: A View From the Courtyard." <i>Fire Engineering</i>, November 2002</a>.
<br>[71] <a href="http://www.doncio.navy.mil/chips/ArticleDetails.aspx?ID=3428" target="_blank">"Talking With Retired Lt. Kevin Shaeffer, USN, and Lt. Blanca Shaeffer, USN."</a>
<br>[72] <a href="http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=1438" target="_blank">Scott D. Hallford, "Naval Officer After Attacks on Pentagon."</a>
<br>[73] <a href="http://www.doncio.navy.mil/chips/ArticleDetails.aspx?ID=3428" target="_blank">"Talking With Retired Lt. Kevin Shaeffer, USN, and Lt. Blanca Shaeffer, USN."</a>
<br>[74] <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1400412/Special-bonds-forged-in-the-fires.html" target="_blank">Toby Harnden, Sam Leith, and Simon English, "Special Bonds Forged in the Fires." <i>The Telegraph</i>, September 11, 2002</a>.
<br>[75] <a href="http://www.socnet.com/archive/index.php/t-12755.html" target="_blank">Richard Leiby, "The Last Watch."</a>
<br>[76] <a href="http://www.911myths.com/images/f/f8/Moussaoui_Trial_Transcript_April_11_2006.pdf" target="_blank"><i>United States of America v. Zacarias Moussaoui</i>. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, April 11, 2006</a>.
<br>[77] <a href="http://www2.kumc.edu/publications/inthecenter/pdf/092001.pdf" target="_blank">"Pentagon Tragedy Hits Close to Home for KUMC Staff." <i>In the Center</i>, September 20, 2001</a>.
<br>[78] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/51086798/GSA-B113-RDOD03012742-Fdr-Entire-Contents-NHC-Intvw-2002-01-23-Henson-Jerry-Re-Pentagon-027" target="_blank">Jarrell Henson, interview by Michael McDaniel and Gary Hall</a>; <a href="http://hereisnewyorkv911.org/2011/jarrell-henson/" target="_blank">"Jarrell Henson." Voices of 9/11, January 28, 2003</a>.
<br>[79] <a href="http://www.socnet.com/archive/index.php/t-12755.html" target="_blank">Richard Leiby, "The Last Watch."</a>
<br>[80] <a href="http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2003/June/Pages/A_Personal3838.aspx" target="_blank">Harold Kennedy, "A Personal Interest in Security." <i>National Defense</i>, June 2003</a>; Alfred Goldberg et al., <i>Pentagon 9/11</i>, p. 34.
<br>[81] <a href="http://www.cbsnews.com/news/two-very-different-9-11-pentagon-tales-of-fate/" target="_blank">David Martin, "Two Very Different 9/11 Pentagon Tales of Fate." CBS News, September 10, 2011</a>.
<br>[82] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/51087101/GSA-B113-RDOD03012743-Fdr-Entire-Contents-NHC-Intvw-2001-11-27-Zitterkopf-Joan-re-Pentagon-028" target="_blank">Joan Zitterkopf, interview by Mike McDaniel and Karen Loftus. U.S. Naval Historical Center, November 27, 2001</a>.
<br>[83] <a href="http://www.freedomfiles.org/war/pwdigest_octnov2001a.pdf" target="_blank">Don Braswell, "... Nothing but Fireballs." <i>Public Works Digest</i>, October/November 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.zoominfo.com/CachedPage/?archive_id=0&page_id=820624482&page_url=//www.heraldnet.com/stories/04/09/11/loc_tibbits001.cfm&page_last_updated=2004-09-11T21:02:54" target="_blank">Brian Kelly, "Attack Vivid in Memory." <i>Everett Herald</i>, September 11, 2004</a>.
<br>[84] Jane Hampton Cook, Jocelyn Green, and John Croushorn, <i>Stories of Faith and Courage From the War in Iraq & Afghanistan</i>. Chattanooga, TN: God and Country Press, 2009; <a href="http://dateline.radioamerica.org/?p=6623" target="_blank">"9/11 Remembered." <i>Dateline: Washington</i>, Radio America, September 10, 2010</a>; <a href="http://issuu.com/risenmagazine/docs/fallissue2011" target="_blank">Patti Gillespie, "Tom Joyce." <i>Risen</i>, Fall 2011</a>.
<br>[85] <a href="http://bloomsburgasd.schoolwires.com/Page/1696" target="_blank">Sean Hogue and Matt Dostick, "The Pentagon by John Gregorowicz." Bloomsburg Area High School, Spring 2003</a>.
<br>[86] <a href="http://www.bpnews.net/11829/navy-commander-at-pentagon-ponders-unfathomable-loss" target="_blank">Rhonda Reese, "Navy Commander at Pentagon Ponders 'Unfathomable' Loss." Baptist Press, September 27, 2001</a>.
<br>[87] <a href="http://hereisnewyorkv911.org/2011/tanya-edwards/" target="_blank">"Tanya Edwards." Voices of 9/11, January 29, 2003</a>.
<br>[88] <a href="http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Forever+changed.-a093449441" target="_blank">Trent Gilliam, "Forever Changed: Land All Planes." <i>All Hands</i>, September 2002</a>.
<br>[89] <a href="http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Five+sides+of+terror%3A+Pentagon+sailors+of+9%2F11.-a091086351" target="_blank">"Five Sides of Terror: Pentagon Sailors of 9/11." <i>All Hands</i>, July 2002</a>; <a href="http://poststar.com/news/local/local-man-in-pentagon-for-attack/article_ee1d1853-b00e-55a8-bf14-7c63f4c3407d.html" target="_blank">Thom Randall, "Local Man in Pentagon for Attack." <i>Glens Falls Post-Star</i>, September 2, 2002</a>.
<br>[90] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/51087101/GSA-B113-RDOD03012743-Fdr-Entire-Contents-NHC-Intvw-2001-11-27-Zitterkopf-Joan-re-Pentagon-028" target="_blank">Joan Zitterkopf, interview by Mike McDaniel and Karen Loftus</a>.
<br>[91] <a href="http://www.zoominfo.com/CachedPage/?archive_id=0&page_id=820624482&page_url=//www.heraldnet.com/stories/04/09/11/loc_tibbits001.cfm&page_last_updated=2004-09-11T21:02:54" target="_blank">Brian Kelly, "Attack Vivid in Memory."</a>
<br>[92] <a href="http://gcn.com/articles/2001/10/04/navy-staff-moves-out-while-pentagon-rebuilds.aspx" target="_blank">Dawn S. Onley, "Navy Staff Moves Out While Pentagon Rebuilds." <i>Government Computer News</i>, October 4, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Government-IT/Navy-Turns-to-EDS-NMCI-for-Help" target="_blank">Paula Musich, "Navy Turns to EDS, NMCI for Help." <i>eWEEK</i>, October 29, 2001</a>; <a href="http://fas.org/sgp/crs/RL31542.pdf" target="_blank">Jeffrey W. Seifert, <i>Homeland Security--Reducing the Vulnerability of Public and Private Information Infrastructures to Terrorism: An Overview</i>. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, December 12, 2002, p. 7</a>.
<br>[93] <a href="https://cno.ahf.nmci.navy.mil/dns/a_webdoc01.nsf/(vwDocsByID)/DL060918190076?OpenDocument" target="_blank">"Department of the Navy's Crisis Recovery Efforts: An Information Technology Perspective." U.S. Navy, September 23, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.socnet.com/archive/index.php/t-12755.html" target="_blank">Richard Leiby, "The Last Watch."</a>
<br>[94] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/51154580/GSA-B115-RDOD03012867-Fdr-Entire-Contents-NHC-Intvw-2001-10-10-Toti-William-Re-Pentagon-Pp-37-8-Misng" target="_blank">William Toti, interview by Mike McDaniel</a>.
<br>[95] <a href="http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2003/June/Pages/A_Personal3838.aspx" target="_blank">Harold Kennedy, "A Personal Interest in Security"</a>; Alfred Goldberg et al., <i>Pentagon 9/11</i>, p. 34.
<br>[96] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20071020053401/http:/www.navyleague.org/sea_power/almanac_jan_02_02.php" target="_blank">Gordon I. Peterson, "Bush: 'The Might of Our Navy is Needed Again.'"</a>
<br>[97] <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20011128153422/www.nasoceana.navy.mil/History.htm" target="_blank">"History of Naval Air Station Oceana." Naval Air Station Oceana, April 3, 2001</a>; <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20011128153711/www.nasoceana.navy.mil/Stats.htm" target="_blank">"Vital Statistics." Naval Air Station Oceana, April 3, 2001</a>; <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20011127100325/http:/www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/oceana.htm" target="_blank">"Naval Air Station (NAS) Oceana." GlobalSecurity.org, November 15, 2001</a>.
<br>[98] <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20011117002146/http:/www.dcmilitary.com/baseguides/airforce/andrews/partnerunits.html" target="_blank">"Andrews Air Force Base: Partner Units." DCMilitary.com, Summer 2001</a>.
<br>[99] <a href="http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=69490" target="_blank">William Pittman, "George Washington Remembers 9/11 With Patriot Day Celebration." Navy News Service, September 11, 2012</a>.
<br>[100] <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20050307090610/http:/www.nydailynews.com/news/special/story/195289p-168509c.html" target="_blank">Stanley Crouch, "Forgotten Man of 9/11 Played Enormous Role." <i>New York Daily News</i>, May 20, 2004</a>; <a href="http://magazine.nd.edu/news/9869-called-to-ground-zero-web-only-expanded-story/" target="_blank">Patrick Burns, "Called to Ground Zero." <i>Notre Dame Magazine</i>, Spring 2007</a>.
<br>[101] <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1309/08/se.02.html" target="_blank">"Find the Flag." <i>Live Event/Special</i>, CNN, September 8, 2013</a>.
<br>[102] See <a href="http://shoestring911.blogspot.co.uk/2007/09/navy-jets-that-never-arrived-on-911.html" target="_blank">"The Navy Jets That Never Arrived on 9/11." Shoestring 9/11, September 28, 2007</a>.
<br>[103] <a href="http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=69490" target="_blank">William Pittman, "George Washington Remembers 9/11 With Patriot Day Celebration."</a>
<br>[104] <a href="http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/speeches/clark-hdtran020326.txt" target="_blank">Vern Clark, "Meeting the Homeland Defense Challenge."</a>
<br>[105] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20071020053401/http:/www.navyleague.org/sea_power/almanac_jan_02_02.php" target="_blank">Gordon I. Peterson, "Bush: 'The Might of Our Navy is Needed Again.'"</a>
<br>[106] <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20011118192054/http:/www.newsday.com/ny-uspent232380681sep23.story" target="_blank">Sylvia Adcock, Brian Donovan, and Craig Gordon, "Air Attack on Pentagon Indicates Weaknesses"</a>; Steve Vogel, <i>The Pentagon</i>, p. 429.
<br>[107] Alfred Goldberg et al., <i>Pentagon 9/11</i>, pp. 137-138.
<br>[108] <a href="https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=441741" target="_blank"><i>Pentagon Evacuation Planning Guide</i>. Washington, DC: Defense Protective Service, October 2001, p. 3</a>.
<br>[109] <a href="http://jime.ieej.or.jp/htm/extra/2001/09/13/20010916/wp-1.html" target="_blank">Bradley Graham, "At the Pentagon: Response Hampered by Confusion, Lack of Preparedness." <i>Washington Post</i>, September 16, 2001</a>.
<br>[110] <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20011118192054/http:/www.newsday.com/ny-uspent232380681sep23.story" target="_blank">Sylvia Adcock, Brian Donovan, and Craig Gordon, "Air Attack on Pentagon Indicates Weaknesses."</a>
<br>[111] <a href="http://poststar.com/news/local/local-man-in-pentagon-for-attack/article_ee1d1853-b00e-55a8-bf14-7c63f4c3407d.html" target="_blank">Thom Randall, "Local Man in Pentagon for Attack."</a>
<br>[112] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/51086912/GSA-B114-RDOD03012787-Fdr-Entire-Contents-Intvw-2001-10-30-Condrell-Stacie-Re-Pentagon-033" target="_blank">Stacie Condrell, interview by Ronald Landa and Rebecca Cameron. Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, October 30, 2001</a>.
<br>[113] Mitchell Fink and Lois Mathias, <i>Never Forget: An Oral History of September 11, 2001</i>. New York: HarperCollins, 2002, p. 145.
<br>[114] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/51086828/GSA-B115-RDOD03012828-Fdr-Entire-Contents-Intvw-2002-12-23-Rumsfeld-Donald-H-Less-Redacted-044" target="_blank">Donald Rumsfeld, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron. Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, December 23, 2002</a>.
<br>[115] Keith Devlin, <i>The Unfinished Game: Pascal, Fermat, and the Seventeenth-Century Letter That Made the World Modern</i>. Philadelphia, PA: Basic Books, 2008, pp. 150-151.
<br>[116] Olivier Pourret, Patrick Naim, and Bruce Marcot, <i>Bayesian Networks: A Practical Guide to Applications</i>. Chichester: Wiley & Sons, 2008, p. 253.
<br>[117] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/51154709/GSA-B115-RDOD03012847-Fdr-Entire-Contents-Intvw-2002-07-18-n-2002-08-01-Giumbastiani-Jr-Ed-057" target="_blank">Edmund Giambastiani Jr., interview by Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron. Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, July 18, 2002</a>; <a href="http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?id=760" target="_blank">Donna Miles, "Vice Chairman: 9/11 Underscored Importance of DoD Transformation." American Forces Press Service, September 8, 2006</a>.
<br>[118] <a href="http://poststar.com/news/local/local-man-in-pentagon-for-attack/article_ee1d1853-b00e-55a8-bf14-7c63f4c3407d.html" target="_blank">Thom Randall, "Local Man in Pentagon for Attack."</a>
<br>[119] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20010923181109/http:/www.avpress.com/n/sp/attack/sty46.hts" target="_blank">John King, "Pentagon Employee Details Jet Crash." <i>Antelope Valley Press</i>, September 16, 2001</a>.
<br>[120] <a href="http://www.freedomfiles.org/war/pwdigest_octnov2001a.pdf" target="_blank">Don Braswell, "... Nothing but Fireballs."</a>
<br>[121] Jane Hampton Cook, Jocelyn Green, and John Croushorn, <i>Stories of Faith and Courage From the War in Iraq & Afghanistan</i>.
<br>[122] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20010921195542/http:/www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/news/news_stories/pent-wppost.html" target="_blank">Jo Becker, Steve Vogel, and Michael E. Ruane, "Aboard Room 1D457."</a>
<br>[123] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20050917141556/http:/www.hqda.army.mil/chaplain/default.htm" target="_blank">Paul Brady, "Chaplain's Corner: September 2005." Pentagon Chaplain, August 29, 2005</a>.
<br>[124] <a href="http://articles.latimes.com/print/2001/sep/13/news/mn-45270" target="_blank">Warren Vieth, Edmund Sanders, and Richard T. Cooper, "After Pentagon Terror, a Waiting Ordeal." <i>Los Angeles Times</i>, September 13, 2001</a>.
<br>[125] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/51154580/GSA-B115-RDOD03012867-Fdr-Entire-Contents-NHC-Intvw-2001-10-10-Toti-William-Re-Pentagon-Pp-37-8-Misng" target="_blank">William Toti, interview by Mike McDaniel</a>.
<br>[126] Alfred Goldberg et al., <i>Pentagon 9/11</i>, p. 152.
<br>[127] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20020111211535/http:/web.star-telegram.com/content/fortworth/2001/11/07/nenews/fw010413-1107-XB002-2.htm" target="_blank">Jessica DeLeón, "Irving High School Lauds Alum as Lifesaver." <i>Fort Worth Star-Telegram</i>, November 7, 2001</a>.
<br>[128] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/51087101/GSA-B113-RDOD03012743-Fdr-Entire-Contents-NHC-Intvw-2001-11-27-Zitterkopf-Joan-re-Pentagon-028" target="_blank">Joan Zitterkopf, interview by Mike McDaniel and Karen Loftus</a>.
<br>[129] Dean E. Murphy, <i>September 11: An Oral History</i>. New York: Doubleday, 2002, p. 244.
<br>[130] Alfred Goldberg et al., <i>Pentagon 9/11</i>, pp. 151-152.
<br>[131] <a href="http://jime.ieej.or.jp/htm/extra/2001/09/13/20010916/wp-1.html" target="_blank">Bradley Graham, "At the Pentagon: Response Hampered by Confusion, Lack of Preparedness"</a>; Alfred Goldberg et al., <i>Pentagon 9/11</i>, p. 152.
<br>[132] <a href="https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=441741" target="_blank"><i>Pentagon Evacuation Planning Guide</i>, p. 3</a>.
<br>[133] <a href="https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=441740" target="_blank"><i>Pentagon Building Security & Emergency Procedures Guide</i>. Washington, DC: Defense Protective Service, August 2000, p. 19</a>.
<br>[134] Alfred Goldberg et al., <i>Pentagon 9/11</i>, p. 155.
<br>[135] Michael C. Ruppert, <i>Crossing the Rubicon: The Decline of the American Empire at the End of the Age of Oil</i>. Gabriola Island, BC: New Society Publishers, 2004, p. 367.
<br>[136] Leslie Filson, <i>Air War Over America: Sept. 11 Alters Face of Air Defense Mission</i>. Tyndall Air Force Base, FL: 1st Air Force, 2003, p. 122; 9/11 Commission, The <i>9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 458; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/16411947/NORAD-Exercises-Hijack-Summary" target="_blank">"NORAD Exercises: Hijack Summary." 9/11 Commission, n.d.</a> For more details, see <a href="http://shoestring911.blogspot.co.uk/2012/03/real-world-or-exercise-did-us-military.html" target="_blank">"'Real-World or Exercise': Did the U.S. Military Mistake the 9/11 Attacks for a Training Scenario?" Shoestring 9/11, March 22, 2012</a>.
<br>[137] <a href="http://us.macmillan.com/excerpt?isbn=9781429973106" target="_blank">Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, <i>Counterstrike: The Untold Story of America's Secret Campaign Against Al-Qaeda</i>. New York: Times Books, 2011, p. 22</a>; <a href="http://www.kvnonews.com/2011/09/military-insiders-recall-bushs-911-stop-at-stratcom/" target="_blank">Bill Kelly, "Military Insiders Recall Bush's 9/11 Stop at Stratcom." NET News, September 7, 2011</a>. For more details, see <a href="http://shoestring911.blogspot.co.uk/2011/11/on-911-us-military-was-preparing-for.html" target="_blank">"On 9/11, the U.S. Military Was Preparing for a Simulated Nuclear War." Shoestring 9/11, November 19, 2011</a>.
<br>[138] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/51154680/GSA-B115-RDOD03012858-Fdr-Entire-Contents-CMH-Intvw-2002-02-05-NEIT-532-Chiarelli-Pete-063" target="_blank">Pete Chiarelli, interview by Frank Shirer. U.S. Army Center of Military History, February 5, 2002</a>; <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/51226076/GSA-B115-RDOD03012869-Fdr-Entire-Contents-CMH-Intvw-2002-02-12-NEIT-542-Vaughn-Clyde-Pentagon-Impact-066" target="_blank">Clyde Vaughn, interview by Stephen J. Lofgren. U.S. Army Center of Military History, February 12, 2002</a>; Stephen J. Lofgren (Editor), <i>Then Came the Fire: Personal Accounts From the Pentagon, 11 September 2001</i>. Washington, DC: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 2011, pp. 95-97. For more details, see <a href="http://shoestring911.blogspot.co.uk/2011/03/army-command-center-at-pentagon-planned.html" target="_blank">"Army Command Center at the Pentagon Planned to Hold Exercise in Week After 9/11 Based on a Plane Hitting the WTC." Shoestring 9/11, March 26, 2011</a>.
<br>[139] <a href="http://hub.gmnews.com/news/2001-09-21/Front_Page/008.html" target="_blank">Sherry Conohan, "Training Exercise Quickly Became Reality." <i>The Hub</i>, September 21, 2001</a>; <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20030114093455/http:/www.monmouth.army.mil/monmessg/newmonmsg/sep212001/m38front.htm" target="_blank">Debbie Sheehan, "Force Protection Plan a 'Timely Alert.'" <i>Monmouth Message</i>, September 21, 2001</a>; <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20041123173707/http:/www.monmouth.army.mil/cecom/pae/historian/updates/concisehistory.pdf" target="_blank">Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, U.S. Army Communications-Electronics Command, <i>A Concise History of the Communications-Electronics Command and Fort Monmouth, New Jersey</i>. Fort Monmouth, NJ: Fort Monmouth, 2003, p. 71</a>.Shoestringhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01534319150672667644noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2990970741097819876.post-22703159069820565942015-03-06T01:32:00.001-08:002015-03-06T01:40:10.411-08:00Why Did No One Tell Army Officials at the Pentagon That the U.S. Was Under Attack on 9/11?<br><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhRKtTP2wWJnFLgl0CFHZ70HB-qhyphenhyphenoeQU-5eK2EDsEsFGbsnwLfCYvpoGR15bPmjpwZnBkNxlEaup6SX-w6EawpuYHasjgGm_CnNnDozYt0TAVlCO5_P-nNB8GGy-xMYX7-eOf6f8EEgf3s/s1600/PentagonWall.jpg" target="_blank" alt="The west wall of the Pentagon on September 11" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhRKtTP2wWJnFLgl0CFHZ70HB-qhyphenhyphenoeQU-5eK2EDsEsFGbsnwLfCYvpoGR15bPmjpwZnBkNxlEaup6SX-w6EawpuYHasjgGm_CnNnDozYt0TAVlCO5_P-nNB8GGy-xMYX7-eOf6f8EEgf3s/s1600/PentagonWall.jpg" /></a></div>
<br>A dozen Army personnel, including many senior officers, went ahead with a routine, previously scheduled meeting at 9:00 a.m. on September 11, 2001, in an area of the Pentagon that was severely damaged when the building was attacked at 9:37 a.m., even though a hijacked plane had crashed into the World Trade Center 14 minutes earlier and this incident had been reported on television since 8:49 a.m. Strangely, the officers were unaware of the crash when they went into their meeting and no one interrupted the meeting to let them know the U.S. was under attack after a second hijacked aircraft hit the World Trade Center at 9:03 a.m. They were consequently still continuing their meeting as if nothing was wrong, oblivious to the crisis that was taking place, when the Pentagon was hit and a huge fireball erupted into their room.
<br><br>Furthermore, as well as failing to alert the officers in the meeting to what had happened at the World Trade Center, the officers' colleagues appear to have failed to do anything significant toward implementing a military response to the attacks in New York. Instead, many of them continued their usual duties after learning two aircraft had crashed into the World Trade Center and it became clear that the U.S. was in the middle of a major terrorist attack. Additionally, they appear to have made no attempt to get out of the Pentagon and to somewhere safer, even though the building was a likely target for terrorists.
<br><br><b>OFFICERS DISCUSSED ROUTINE ISSUES DURING THEIR MEETING</b>
<br>The 9:00 a.m. meeting was attended by the executive officers for the various directorates and operating agencies of the Army's Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (ODCSPER). The executive officers' meeting was held every other Tuesday and usually took place in the ODCSPER conference room, as was the case on September 11. [1]
<br><br>The ODCSPER "develops Army-wide personnel policies, programs, and systems to facilitate the manning, well-being, and readiness of the Army," according to author Robert Rossow. Its workforce, comprising 185 military and 90 civilian personnel, had, in June 2001, moved to a new office space on the west side of the Pentagon. This space, on the building's second floor, had just been renovated and had enhanced safety features, such as emergency-activated smoke doors, water sprinklers, and blast-resistant windows. The space, about an acre in size, comprised mostly of a "bay" of 138 cubicles in which ODCSPER employees worked. It also included the conference room, enclosed offices, and spaces for contractors. [2]
<br><br>The executive officers' meeting on September 11 was chaired by Colonel Philip McNair and attended by 11 other Army employees. These included Martha Carden, Lieutenant Colonel Marion Ward, Lieutenant Colonel Marilyn Wills, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Grunewald, Lieutenant Colonel Dennis Johnson, Major Stephen Long, Major Regina Grant, and Lois Stevens. Max Beilke attended the start of the meeting but left early to go to another meeting. There were also two visitors attending--Colonel Larry Thomas and Lieutenant Colonel Curtis Nutbrown--who were there to give a presentation at the end of the meeting. [3]
<br><br>During the meeting, those attending took turns to give a brief update on recent activities. Matters discussed that day were "routine stuff," according to authors Patrick Creed and Rick Newman, such as a retirement party and an upcoming conference. [4]
<br><br><b>PERSONNEL ONLY LEARNED OF THE CRASH AT THE WORLD TRADE CENTER SHORTLY AFTER 9:00 A.M.</b>
<br>When the 12 Army staffers went into the executive officers' meeting at 9:00 a.m., they were unaware that a plane had crashed into the World Trade Center, even though American Airlines Flight 11 flew into the North Tower at 8:46 a.m. and the incident had been reported on television since 8:49 a.m. [5]
<br><br>News of the crash only began to circulate in the cubicle bay outside the conference room shortly after the door closed on the meeting. [6] Around 20 ODCSPER employees started watching CNN's coverage of the crash on the television in Brigadier General Harry Axson's office. [7] Others followed the coverage on the television in the cubicle of Marian Serva, a congressional affairs contact officer. [8]
<br><br>Since the matters discussed at the executive officers' meeting that day were "routine stuff," ODCSPER personnel in the cubicle bay should have had no concerns about interrupting a meeting of particular importance. And yet no one went to the conference room to alert the executive officers to what had happened at the World Trade Center. [9]
<br><br>ODCSPER personnel realized the U.S. was under attack after they saw United Airlines Flight 175 crashing into the South Tower of the World Trade Center live on television at 9:03 a.m. "When the second plane hit, all of us knew this was a terrorist action going on," Patrick Smith has commented. [10]
<br><br>Staffers were taking significant notice of what had happened. Antwan Williams has recalled "seeing people in the hallway and at their cubicles talking about what was happening in New York." [11] "Everyone around me was talking about it," Lieutenant Colonel Victor Correa described. [12] And yet no one interrupted the executive officers' meeting to tell its participants that America was under attack.
<br><br><b>STAFFERS LEARNED THAT THE ARMY'S CRISIS TEAM HAD BEEN ACTIVATED</b>
<br>The seriousness of the situation should have become even more apparent to ODCSPER personnel when some of them were informed that the Army's Crisis Action Team (CAT) had been activated. For example, Lieutenant Colonel Michael Beans "heard of the CAT activation" just before Flight 175 crashed into the World Trade Center, according to Robert Rossow. [13] Some time after the second crash occurred, Colonel Karl Knoblauch bumped into Major Linda Herbert and Major Roberta Baynes, and was told by them that Major General Peter Chiarelli, the Army's director of operations, readiness, and mobilization, "had activated the CAT" and that the two women "had been called down to man their positions." [14]
<br><br>Also after the second crash occurred, Lieutenant Colonel Karen Wagner and Major Sherry Sargent heard from the colonel in charge of them that "an emergency operations center was being set up in the basement," according to <i>Texas Monthly</i> magazine. [15] And Lieutenant Colonel Isabelle Slifer recalled that at around 9:36 a.m., Lieutenant Colonel Reginald Jordan informed her and a few of her colleagues "that the Crisis Action Team had stood up." [16]
<br><br>The CAT, according to Rossow, is "an organization of subject matter experts from throughout the Army staff who assemble in times of emergency in a special area within the AOC"--the Army Operations Center in the basement of the Pentagon. [17] Brigadier General Clyde Vaughn, the Army's deputy director of operations, readiness, and mobilization, described the CAT as "the place that people will migrate" to during an emergency. [18]
<br><br>And yet, despite learning that the CAT had been activated and, therefore, that the situation must have been considered an emergency, ODCSPER personnel apparently still did not think they needed to interrupt the executive officers' meeting to alert its participants to what had happened at the World Trade Center.
<br><br><b>STAFFERS RECEIVED NO ORDERS FROM THEIR SUPERIORS</b>
<br>Furthermore, Lieutenant General Timothy Maude, the Army's deputy chief of staff for personnel--the man who ran the ODCSPER--was informed about the first crash at around 9:00 a.m. and then turned on a television to follow what was happening. [19] He should therefore have seen Flight 175 crashing into the World Trade Center at 9:03 a.m. and have then realized that America was under attack. And yet it appears he did not issue any orders to his employees about what they should do in response to the crashes: Sergeant Major Tony Rose recalled that he and his colleagues in the ODCSPER did not receive "any directive or caution" from their "higher command" following the attacks on the World Trade Center. [20] Nor, it appears, did Maude interrupt the executive officers' meeting, to call on his employees there to assist the Army's response to the attacks.
<br><br>Additionally, Nancy McNair--the wife of Philip McNair, the chair of the executive officers' meeting--phoned Maude's secretary, Deborah Ramsaur, after seeing the coverage of the crashes on television, to alert her to what had happened. According to Philip McNair, Nancy McNair asked Ramsaur, "Hey Deb, are you watching what's going on?" Ramsaur wasn't watching TV and so didn't know what had happened in New York. Nancy McNair therefore "filled her in." According to Philip McNair, Ramsaur then asked, "Do you think I ought to go across the hall and tell Phil?" The two women debated whether Ramsaur should interrupt the executive officers' meeting and pass on the news, but decided against her doing so. "They kind of went back and forth and debated it, and decided not to," Philip McNair described. "They didn't have an idea that somebody was gonna hit the Pentagon, necessarily, so they thought they weren't gonna interrupt the meetings that were going on." [21] And so another opportunity to alert the executive officers to the crisis was lost.
<br><br><b>STAFFERS CONTINUED THEIR USUAL WORK INSTEAD OF INITIATING A MILITARY RESPONSE TO THE ATTACKS</b>
<br>Instead of taking immediate action to implement a military response, ODCSPER employees appear to have initially reacted with alarming indifference to the events of September 11. What is notable is their failure to take appropriate action in response to the attacks in New York.
<br><br>Most of the individuals who watched the second hijacked plane hitting the World Trade Center on the television in Harry Axson's office subsequently just returned to their cubicles and some of them then phoned their families. Tony Rose recalled that after they saw the second crash, those in Axson's office "started filtering out of the office and went back to our cubicle area." [22] Isabelle Slifer recalled that after watching the second crash, "the majority of us walked out of General Axson's office back into our cubicles, and I know for a fact that a couple of my colleagues were making phone calls home." [23] Slifer herself called her husband and told him what had happened in New York. [24]
<br><br>Strangely, some ODCSPER employees continued their usual, routine work, as if nothing important had happened, after they learned about the second crash and should have realized the U.S. was in the middle of a serious terrorist attack.
<br><br>For example, Major John Thurman learned about the second crash when someone came into his office and announced what had happened. But instead of joining some of his colleagues and going to watch the coverage of the crashes on TV, Thurman decided to stay at his desk. He did this, he said, because "there were some documents and some work that I wanted to get done." [25] Linda Herbert heard that two commercial aircraft had hit the World Trade Center when a colleague announced the news. But while her co-workers went to see what had happened on TV, Herbert initially stayed at her desk, since, she recalled, "a pile of paperwork demanded my attention." A superior officer subsequently persuaded her to go and watch the coverage of the attacks on TV. But after a while, Herbert "decided to return to my desk and finish my work in expectation of new orders." [26]
<br><br>Roberta Baynes recalled that after she was told a plane had hit the World Trade Center, she went and "watched TV for a few minutes to see what was happening with the Twin Towers." But she then told her colleague, Karen Wagner, "I have a lot of work to do; I'm going back to my desk," and returned to her desk to continue her usual work. [27] Wagner, after seeing the coverage of the crashes on the TV in Harry Axson's office and being told that "an emergency operations center was being set up in the basement," looked around the room and said, "Okay, let's get back to work," according to <i>Texas Monthly</i>. She then returned to her desk. [28]
<br><br>Ann Parham saw the second crash on a TV near her cubicle, and heard some of her colleagues commenting "that we were at war and that the Pentagon was at ground zero in that fight." And yet she then returned to her desk and continued her usual duties. She did this, she said, because she "was leaving that Saturday for a trip home to Georgia and work has a way of beckoning when you're trying to get out of town." [29]
<br><br>Antwan Williams continued putting together and delivering information packets for a forthcoming meeting, even though, he said, upon learning of the second crash, he realized that "something more than an accident" had taken place at the World Trade Center. [30] After watching the television coverage of the crashes for a few minutes, John Yates phoned his wife to see if she knew what had happened and then reportedly "turned to go to a regular morning meeting elsewhere in the building." [31] And after he saw the second crash on TV, Michael Beans "decided he could do nothing and started back to his office." [32]
<br><br>Furthermore, Williams has said that at around 9:30 a.m.--over 25 minutes after the second crash occurred--Deborah Ramsaur was making jokes, even though, by that time, she was presumably aware of the crashes at the World Trade Center. Williams recalled that when he was talking with her, Ramsaur asked him if he would be going to the executive officers' meeting. He said he couldn't attend it, because he needed to deliver the information packets for a forthcoming meeting. Williams recalled: "I remember she joked with me and said, 'It must be nice being a captain and getting to choose which meetings you want to go to.' And in her typical, playful demeanor she said, 'Just kidding, I know you are very busy today,' and gave me her friendly smile." It seems odd that Ramsaur could have been casually joking with a colleague under such tragic circumstances. [33]
<br><br><b>STAFFERS THOUGHT THE PENTAGON MIGHT BE ATTACKED, BUT DID NOT EVACUATE</b>
<br>Some ODCSPER employees thought, after learning of the crashes at the World Trade Center, that the Pentagon could also be the target of a terrorist attack that day and a number of them stated this concern out loud.
<br><br>Patrick Smith, for example, has commented that he "just had a kind of sinking feeling in my gut that we could be the next target," after he watched the television coverage of the attacks in New York. [34] He recalled that "there was a thought in the back of his mind that the Pentagon, a major symbol of U.S. military power, could be targeted." [35] Sometime after the second attack in New York occurred, Major John Jessup told Victor Correa, who was sitting next to him: "You know what happened at the Trade Center? We are just as vulnerable, because we wouldn't be expecting an attack like that here." [36]
<br><br>When Lieutenant Colonel Gregory Fritz entered the office of Colonel Mark Lewis, shortly after 9:30 a.m., he heard someone there who had seen the television coverage of the attacks on the World Trade Center asking, "What's to stop them from doing the same thing right here at the Pentagon?" [37] And after watching the second crash on TV, Tony Rose told a colleague that they all needed to be "careful" at the Pentagon. [38]
<br><br>If the Pentagon was a possible terrorist target, as these individuals correctly noted, everyone in the ODCSPER (and those elsewhere in the building) was in danger. And yet no attempt was made to evacuate the ODCSPER and get its employees to somewhere safer before the Pentagon was hit that morning.
<br><br>Unfortunately, the failure of ODCSPER employees to respond appropriately to the news of the attacks in New York had tragic consequences: Twenty-nine of these employees were killed and 27 were injured in the attack on the Pentagon. Stephen Long and Dennis Johnson, who were in the executive officers' meeting when the Pentagon was hit, were among those killed. [39]
<br><br><b>OFFICERS' MEETING WAS RUNNING LATE AND SO WAS STILL TAKING PLACE WHEN THE PENTAGON WAS HIT</b>
<br>Curiously, the ODCSPER executive officers' meeting went on for longer than usual on September 11, which meant it was still taking place when the Pentagon was attacked. The meeting usually lasted "30 minutes or so," according to Martha Carden, and so it should have ended at around 9:30 a.m. [40] But at 9:36 a.m., one of its participants, Marilyn Wills, looked at her watch and noticed it was running late that day. [41]
<br><br>A minute later, as Robert Grunewald described, the meeting's participants heard a "huge explosion" and "a large fireball came into the room." [42] The Pentagon was hit at 9:37 a.m. The attacking aircraft crashed into the building one floor below the conference room where the executive officers' meeting was taking place and passed within 20 feet of the room. [43]
<br><br>Had the meeting ended on time, the executive officers would have learned about the attacks in New York and may have been able to take appropriate action in response to them before the Pentagon was hit. They may have realized their building was a likely target and may therefore have tried to get away from their office space to somewhere safer. But instead, they were unaware of what had happened in New York and that the U.S. was under attack. "We did not know about the World Trade Center. We had no clue," Martha Carden commented. [44] Consequently, the executive officers had no idea what had caused the explosion and created the fireball that erupted into their room.
<br><br><b>SOME STAFFERS THOUGHT THE EXPLOSION AT THE PENTAGON WAS THE RESULT OF AN ACCIDENT</b>
<br>Some of the meeting participants thought there had been an industrial accident when the Pentagon was attacked. "I thought an electrician was working, a gas person was working, a phone company person was working, and severed a line," Grunewald recalled. [45] "We were in this newly renovated area," Carden said. "Workmen were still there every day doing stuff. And so many of the people in the conference room thought that, 'Oh, geez, one of the workers hit a gas line.'" Others thought a bomb had gone off. "I thought that a bomb had probably been detonated outside the conference room, in the E-ring hallway," Philip McNair said. "My first thought was that it was a bomb," Carden recalled. [46]
<br><br>Strangely, some ODCSPER personnel outside the conference room, who knew what had happened at the World Trade Center, thought the explosion they heard when the Pentagon was hit was the result of an accident, even though they should have realized by then that the U.S. was under attack and should therefore have wondered right away if the Pentagon had been hit as part of the attack. Karl Knoblauch, for example, thought that "the explosion might be an industrial accident associated with the renovation" and asked a colleague, "Do they have gas in this building?" [47] Victor Correa recalled, "Since it had been a new construction area, I thought someone hit a gas line and caused an explosion." [48] And while some of the staffers in Harry Axson's office were certain that the deafening noise they'd heard "was part of the attack," others "thought there might have been an explosion at the helipad" outside the Pentagon, according to <i>Texas Monthly</i>. [49]
<br><br>Other ODCSPER personnel outside the conference room thought the explosion was the result of an attack, but not one involving a plane. Thomas Cleary described: "Until I got outside, I was thinking, 'How the hell did they get a truck over the railing to get that close?' I honestly was thinking 'Oklahoma City' [referring to the terrorist truck bombing there in 1995]. It didn't connect in my mind. Two planes have flown [into] the World Trade Center. I didn't think there was another plane out there." [50] And Isabelle Slifer thought the Pentagon had been hit by a "chemical missile." [51] In other words, even though they knew the World Trade Center had just been attacked two times in a row using planes, it apparently did not occur to these individuals that the Pentagon might have been attacked in a similar way. "I had no idea it was a plane," Cleary commented. [52]
<br><br><b>THE ODCSPER'S RESPONSE TO THE 9/11 ATTACKS NEEDS TO BE INVESTIGATED</b>
<br>The evidence detailed above gives rise to serious questions. To begin with, why did ODCSPER employees only learn about the first crash at the World Trade Center shortly after 9:00 a.m., even though the crash occurred at 8:46 a.m. and had been reported on television since 8:49 a.m.? Surely the crash should have been brought to the attention of Army personnel as a matter of urgency, since the military would be responsible for protecting America if it turned out to be part of an attack, as was indeed the case. Even if the crash had been something other than a terrorist attack, the Army may have been needed right away to assist any rescue efforts. Peter Chiarelli stated as much when he talked on the phone that morning to General Eric Shinseki, the Army chief of staff. He said the reason he had activated the Army's Crisis Action Team was so that it could "respond to the contingency in New York if requested by state and local officials," since he "anticipated that the World Trade Center disaster would require enormous rescue, firefighting, and recovery efforts." [53]
<br><br>Why did ODCSPER employees apparently do little, if anything, toward implementing a military response to the crashes at the World Trade Center prior to the Pentagon being attacked? This was the most important day of their professional lives. Surely they should have been desperate to find out more about what was happening, should have wanted to closely monitor events, and should have wanted to respond immediately to the crisis. And yet many ODCSPER employees continued their usual duties or took the time to phone family members, even after they learned that a second plane had crashed and it should have been obvious to them that the U.S. was in the middle of a major terrorist attack.
<br><br>Why did ODCSPER employees fail to alert their colleagues in the executive officers' meeting to what had happened at the World Trade Center? Surely they should have felt it necessary to interrupt the meeting right away, so the executive officers could help the military respond to the attacks. In particular, why did Deborah Ramsaur fail to interrupt the meeting after the wife of its chair called and alerted her to the crashes at the World Trade Center, even though the two women specifically discussed whether she should interrupt it to pass on the news? Surely it should have been obvious to Ramsaur that she needed to interrupt the meeting.
<br><br>Why did ODCSPER employees stay where they were instead of moving to a safer location after they realized the U.S. was under attack, considering that the Pentagon was a likely terrorist target?
<br><br>Why did Timothy Maude--the man in charge of the ODCSPER--apparently fail to issue any orders to his employees regarding what they should do in response to the attacks? Surely he should have ordered them to take immediate action after he learned about the crashes at the World Trade Center, and/or he should have been concerned about their security and should therefore have instructed them to move to somewhere safer.
<br><br>And why did some ODCSPER employees think the explosion at the Pentagon at 9:37 a.m. was the result of an accident? Surely their first thought should have been that it was part of the attack.
<br><br>These questions need to be addressed as part of a new investigation of 9/11. We can, however, consider possible explanations for why ODCSPER employees acted as they did on September 11 based on the currently available evidence.
<br><br><b>WAS THE ARMY RUNNING A TRAINING EXERCISE AT THE PENTAGON ON SEPTEMBER 11?</b>
<br>A possibility worth considering is that when ODCSPER personnel heard about planes crashing into the World Trade Center, they mistakenly thought the crashes were simulated, as part of an Army training exercise taking place at the Pentagon that morning. With this possibility in mind, it is worth noting that on September 11, the Army is known to have been preparing for an exercise based on the scenario of a plane crashing into the World Trade Center. [54]
<br><br>Peter Chiarelli had decided to hold an exercise for the Army's Crisis Action Team in the days after September 11. (Chiarelli has implied that the exercise was scheduled to take place on September 17. However, when he interviewed one of Chiarelli's colleagues, Army historian Stephen Lofgren mentioned that the exercise was going to take place "a couple of days" after September 11, meaning on September 13. [55])
<br><br>Chiarelli had taken over as the Army's director of operations, readiness, and mobilization about a month before September 11, and one of his earliest concerns after starting in the position was the CAT, which, he'd learned, had not been significantly exercised for about 10 years. He had therefore decided to run a "no-notice exercise" (an exercise that is conducted without its participants having prior knowledge of when it will occur) for it.
<br><br>About a week before 9/11, Raymond Robinson Jr., Mark Lewis, and Major Corrina Boggess from the ODCSPER Operations Division briefed Chiarelli on a new mass casualty standard operating procedure (SOP) for the Army that they had been directed to put together. "The real amazing thing of that SOP," Chiarelli recalled, "is that the scenario was an aircraft crashing into the World Trade Center." He told Robinson, Lewis, and Boggess, "Hey, not only is this a good SOP and a good plan, but at the same time, to really make this good, what we need to do is exercise it." Chiarelli recalled that since he "needed a driver for my exercise," the four of them "decided to integrate a scenario like that into my first CAT exercise." [56]
<br><br>Further details of the exercise are unknown. For example, Chiarelli has not revealed what type of aircraft was envisaged hitting the World Trade Center in the scenario, whether the exercise would have involved just one aircraft or more than one aircraft hitting the World Trade Center, or whether the aircraft in the scenario would have been hijacked or would have crashed into the World Trade Center accidentally.
<br><br>All the same, if the Army was conducting an exercise at the Pentagon on September 11, it could plausibly have been Chiarelli's exercise, moved forward to take place a few days earlier than originally planned, or it may just have been another exercise.
<br><br><b>ACTIONS OF ODCSPER PERSONNEL MAKE SENSE IF STAFFERS THOUGHT THE ATTACKS WERE SIMULATED</b>
<br>If an Army exercise was indeed taking place at the Pentagon on September 11, which included the scenario of planes crashing into the World Trade Center, this might explain why ODCSPER personnel only learned about a plane hitting the World Trade Center at around 9:00 a.m., even though the crash of Flight 11 had been reported on television since 8:49 a.m. The reason for the delay could be that the exercise involved the scenario of a plane crashing into the World Trade Center at 9:00 a.m., whereas the real-world crash took place at 8:46 a.m. What ODCSPER personnel learned about shortly after 9:00 a.m. may in fact have been a simulated plane crash. If this was the case, it could mean that ODCSPER personnel were never told about the actual crash at the World Trade Center.
<br><br>If the Army was running an exercise at the Pentagon that morning, this could also explain the apparent indifference of some individuals to the crashes at the World Trade Center and could explain why ODCSPER personnel failed to respond to the attacks.
<br><br>This could be why, instead of promptly responding to the attacks, some ODCSPER employees continued their usual, routine work after they learned of the planes crashing into the World Trade Center. If they thought the crashes were simulated for an exercise, they may have felt it was unnecessary to respond immediately, if at all.
<br><br>This could be why ODCSPER employees failed to alert the senior personnel in the executive officers' meeting to the crashes. If ODCSPER employees thought the attacks were real, surely someone would have interrupted the meeting to tell its participants what was happening, so they could start monitoring events and responding to the crisis. But if ODCSPER employees thought the crashes were simulated, they would presumably have been reluctant to disturb a meeting of senior personnel when this may have been unnecessary.
<br><br>This could be why ODCSPER employees made no attempt to get out of the Pentagon before it was hit, even though the U.S. was under attack and their building, as "a major symbol of U.S. military power," was a likely target. If they thought the attacks on the World Trade Center were simulated, they would have thought workers at the Pentagon were safe.
<br><br>This could explain why Deborah Ramsaur was able to joke with Antwan Williams, even though she'd likely just been informed about the planes hitting the World Trade Center. If she thought the crashes were genuine, Ramsaur would surely have been upset and in no mood for jokes. But this would presumably not have been the case if she thought they were part of an exercise.
<br><br>Incidentally, it is worth keeping in mind that the exercise Peter Chiarelli had been planning was going to involve the Army's Crisis Action Team. So if ODCSPER personnel were aware of this, when they heard on September 11 that the CAT had been activated, the information may have reinforced the impression that an exercise was taking place.
<br><br><b>STAFFERS MUST HAVE THOUGHT THE TV COVERAGE OF THE ATTACKS WAS SIMULATED</b>
<br>For ODCSPER personnel to have thought the crashes at the World Trade Center were a scenario in a training exercise, however, they must have believed the television coverage of the crashes they were watching was simulated. But surely they would have realized it was authentic? Unless, perhaps, they had seen realistic, well-produced simulated TV reports about terrorist attacks in previous exercises and this led them to mistake the genuine reports on September 11 for simulated reports.
<br><br>Another possibility is that the video ODCSPER personnel were watching on September 11 was simulated television coverage, which had been created for an exercise, to make it feel more realistic. This simulated television coverage might, for example, have been created for Peter Chiarelli's exercise, which is known to have included the scenario of a plane crashing into the World Trade Center. If ODCSPER personnel were indeed watching simulated television coverage, they may have been able to tell that it was artificial and this realization could have reinforced any belief they had that the attacks on the World Trade Center were part of an exercise.
<br><br>Furthermore, if ODCSPER personnel were watching television coverage that was simulated, this might explain the curious descriptions some of them have given of what they saw on TV. Isabelle Slifer, for example, described the coverage of the second plane hitting the World Trade Center as "a surreal and almost movie-like production." [57] Gregory Fritz reportedly "thought what he had seen must be a movie promotion, until informed of what had been happening," after he saw the second crash on TV. [58]
<br><br>And if ODCSPER personnel were watching simulated television coverage, this might explain the reaction to the crashes described by Tony Rose. Rose was watching the TV in Harry Axson's office, along with about 17 of his colleagues. In response to what they saw, he recalled: "Most people were saying, 'I can't believe this!' 'This can't be real.' 'Are you sure this is really happening?'" "None of us could believe it," he commented. [59]
<br><br>Curiously, it appears that no one from the ODCSPER has mentioned seeing President Bush delivering his speech from the Emma E. Booker Elementary School in Sarasota, Florida, in which he declared, "Two airplanes have crashed into the World Trade Center in an apparent terrorist attack on our country," even though this speech was shown live on CNN, CBS, ABC, NBC, and Fox at 9:30 a.m. on September 11, when many ODCSPER employees were presumably still watching TV. [60] Is this because ODCSPER employees have simply failed to mention seeing this speech when interviewed about their experiences on September 11? Or is it because they were watching simulated television coverage that morning, and this simulated coverage did not include Bush giving his speech?
<br><br><b>INVESTIGATORS NEED TO FIND OUT ABOUT ANY ARMY EXERCISES ON SEPTEMBER 11</b>
<br>If the Army was indeed running a training exercise at the Pentagon on the morning of September 11, this gives rise to other important questions, especially if the exercise included the scenario of planes crashing into the World Trade Center.
<br><br>For example, what specifically did the exercise involve? Who exactly came up with the idea for it? Which specific individuals planned it and who was running it on September 11? And why wasn't it called off after 8:46 a.m., when a plane actually did crash into the World Trade Center?
<br><br>Additionally, is it just a coincidence that an exercise based around the scenario of planes crashing into the World Trade Center was being conducted at the same time as planes really did crash into the World Trade Center or is there a more sinister explanation for this concurrence of events? Might the exercise have been intended to prevent honest and dedicated Army personnel from effectively responding to the 9/11 attacks, by causing them to mistake actual events for part of an exercise? If so, this would indicate that rogue individuals in the U.S. military were involved in creating the deception.
<br><br>Clearly we need a rigorous and unrestrained new investigation of 9/11 to address these questions, and find out exactly what happened at the Pentagon on September 11.
<br><br><b>NOTES</b>
<br>[1] Robert Rossow III, <i>Uncommon Strength: The Story of the U.S. Army Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel During the Attack on the Pentagon, 11 September 2001</i>. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, 2003, p. 39; Stephen J. Lofgren (Editor), <i>Then Came the Fire: Personal Accounts From the Pentagon, 11 September 2001</i>. Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2011, p. 137.
<br>[2] Robert Rossow III, <i>Uncommon Strength</i>, pp. iv, viii-ix; <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20040922023105/http:/www.christianitytoday.com/tcw/2004/005/4.28.html" target="_blank">Linda Herbert, "The Day I'll Never Forget." <i>Today's Christian Woman</i>, September/October 2004</a>; Alfred Goldberg et al., <i>Pentagon 9/11</i>. Washington, DC: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2007, p. 36.
<br>[3] Robert Rossow III, <i>Uncommon Strength</i>, p. 39; Stephen J. Lofgren (Editor), <i>Then Came the Fire</i>, pp. 137-138.
<br>[4] Patrick Creed and Rick Newman, <i>Firefight: Inside the Battle to Save the Pentagon on 9/11</i>. New York: Presidio Press, 2008, p. 18.
<br>[5] <a href="https://archive.org/details/cnn200109110848-0929" target="_blank">"8:48 a.m.-9:29 a.m." CNN, September 11, 2001</a>; Alfred Goldberg et al., <i>Pentagon 9/11</i>, pp. 40-41; Patrick Creed and Rick Newman, <i>Firefight</i>, p. 19.
<br>[6] Robert Rossow III, <i>Uncommon Strength</i>, p. 35.
<br>[7] Stephen J. Lofgren (Editor), <i>Then Came the Fire</i>, pp. 135, 162; <a href="http://www.texasmonthly.com/story/karen-wagners-life?fullpage=1" target="_blank">John Spong, "Karen Wagner's Life." <i>Texas Monthly</i>, September 2011</a>.
<br>[8] <a href="http://hamptonroads.com/2011/09/out-nowhere-part-1-sept-11-pentagon" target="_blank">Earl Swift, "Out of Nowhere: Inside the Pentagon on 9/11." <i>Virginian-Pilot</i>, September 7, 2002</a>; Robert Rossow III, <i>Uncommon Strength</i>, p. 21.
<br>[9] Patrick Creed and Rick Newman, <i>Firefight</i>, pp. 18-19.
<br>[10] <a href="http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=51005" target="_blank">John J. Kruzel, "Survivor Recalls Memories of Pentagon Attack." American Forces Press Service, September 2, 2008</a>.
<br>[11] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20130225221121/http:/www.arsouth.army.mil/news/newsarchive/3220-10-years-of-memories-arsouth-officer-recalls-tragic-day-for-first-time-since-attack.html" target="_blank">Antwan C. Williams, "10 Years of Memories: ARSOUTH Officer Recalls Tragic Day for First Time Since Attack." United States Army South, October 7, 2011</a>.
<br>[12] Dean E. Murphy, <i>September 11: An Oral History</i>. New York: Doubleday, 2002, p. 230.
<br>[13] Robert Rossow III, <i>Uncommon Strength</i>, p. 33.
<br>[14] Ibid. p. 51; <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20040922023105/http:/www.christianitytoday.com/tcw/2004/005/4.28.html" target="_blank">Linda Herbert, "The Day I'll Never Forget."</a>
<br>[15] <a href="http://www.texasmonthly.com/story/karen-wagners-life?fullpage=1" target="_blank">John Spong, "Karen Wagner's Life."</a>
<br>[16] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20130219060336/http:/www.usar.army.mil/ourstory/History/Documents/Pentagon%20Monograph-final.pdf" target="_blank">Kathryn Roe Coker, David T. Zabecki, and Deborah Foster-King (Editors), <i>The Role of the Army Reserve in the 11 September Attacks: The Pentagon</i>. Fort McPherson, GA: Office of Army Reserve History, 2003, p. 3</a>.
<br>[17] Robert Rossow III, <i>Uncommon Strength</i>, p. 64.
<br>[18] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/51226076/GSA-B115-RDOD03012869-Fdr-Entire-Contents-CMH-Intvw-2002-02-12-NEIT-542-Vaughn-Clyde-Pentagon-Impact-066" target="_blank">Clyde Vaughn, interview by Stephen Lofgren. U.S. Army Center of Military History, February 12, 2002</a>.
<br>[19] Robert Rossow III, <i>Uncommon Strength</i>, p. 51.
<br>[20] Stephen J. Lofgren (Editor), <i>Then Came the Fire</i>, pp. 162-163.
<br>[21] <a href="http://apus-stream.com/remembering-911/" target="_blank">"Remembering 9/11: Reflecting on the Day When Heroes Stood up Against Terror." American Military University, September 7, 2011</a>.
<br>[22] Stephen J. Lofgren (Editor), <i>Then Came the Fire</i>, p. 162.
<br>[23] Ibid. pp. 135-136.
<br>[24] <a href="http://pentagonmemorial.org/explore/remembering-the-heroes/isabelle-slifer-shares-her-story" target="_blank">"Isabelle Slifer Shares Her Story." National 9/11 Pentagon Memorial, n.d.</a>
<br>[25] <a href="http://www.911myths.com/images/f/f8/Moussaoui_Trial_Transcript_April_11_2006.pdf" target="_blank"><i>United States of America v. Zacarias Moussaoui</i>. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, April 11, 2006</a>.
<br>[26] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20040922023105/http:/www.christianitytoday.com/tcw/2004/005/4.28.html" target="_blank">Linda Herbert, "The Day I'll Never Forget."</a>
<br>[27] <a href="http://www.army.mil/article/65490/Pentagon_survivors_tell_their_stories/" target="_blank">Bernard W. Tate, "Pentagon Survivors Tell Their Stories." U.S. Army, September 14, 2011</a>.
<br>[28] <a href="http://www.texasmonthly.com/story/karen-wagners-life?fullpage=1" target="_blank">John Spong, "Karen Wagner's Life."</a>
<br>[29] <a href="http://articles.latimes.com/2002/sep/11/nation/na-911parham11" target="_blank">"Myrtis Ann Parham." <i>Los Angeles Times</i>, September 11, 2002</a>.
<br>[30] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20130225221121/http:/www.arsouth.army.mil/news/newsarchive/3220-10-years-of-memories-arsouth-officer-recalls-tragic-day-for-first-time-since-attack.html" target="_blank">Antwan C. Williams, "10 Years of Memories."</a>
<br>[31] <a href="http://www.fredericksburg.com/local/we-can-never-forget/article_c7b483b9-b9dd-534d-ae24-f69289a0bd25.html" target="_blank">Laura Moyer, "'We Can Never Forget.'" <i>Fredericksburg Free Lance-Star</i>, September 10, 2006</a>; Stephen J. Lofgren (Editor), <i>Then Came the Fire</i>, p. 171.
<br>[32] Robert Rossow III, <i>Uncommon Strength</i>, p. 33.
<br>[33] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20130225221121/http:/www.arsouth.army.mil/news/newsarchive/3220-10-years-of-memories-arsouth-officer-recalls-tragic-day-for-first-time-since-attack.html" target="_blank">Antwan C. Williams, "10 Years of Memories."</a>
<br>[34] <a href="http://articles.latimes.com/2001/sep/12/news/mn-44935" target="_blank">Richard T. Cooper, "Outside Pentagon, a Defenseless Feeling." <i>Los Angeles Times</i>, September 12, 2001</a>.
<br>[35] <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/09/10/us-usa-sept11-pentagon-idUSN1042799820080910" target="_blank">Andrew Gray, "Pentagon Sept. 11 Memorial Revives Painful Memories." Reuters, September 10, 2008</a>.
<br>[36] Dean E. Murphy, <i>September 11: An Oral History</i>, p. 230; <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/11/nationchallenged/11WHERE.html?pagewanted=all" target="_blank">"Frozen in Memory, the First Moments of a Transformed World." <i>New York Times</i>, September 11, 2002</a>.
<br>[37] Robert Rossow III, <i>Uncommon Strength</i>, p. 21.
<br>[38] Stephen J. Lofgren (Editor), <i>Then Came the Fire</i>, pp. 162-163.
<br>[39] Robert Rossow III, <i>Uncommon Strength</i>, p. 129; Alfred Goldberg et al., <i>Pentagon 9/11</i>, pp. 42-43.
<br>[40] Stephen J. Lofgren (Editor), <i>Then Came the Fire</i>, p. 145.
<br>[41] Robert Rossow III, <i>Uncommon Strength</i>, pp. 39-40; Patrick Creed and Rick Newman, <i>Firefight</i>, pp. 18-19.
<br>[42] <a href="http://wamu.org/programs/metro_connection/11/12/29/a_pentagon_survivor_remembers_and_mourns_transcript" target="_blank">"A 9/11 Pentagon Survivor Remembers and Mourns." <i>Metro Connection</i>, WAMU, September 9, 2011</a>.
<br>[43] Steve Vogel, <i>The Pentagon: A History</i>. New York: Random House, 2007, p. 436.
<br>[44] Stephen J. Lofgren (Editor), <i>Then Came the Fire</i>, p. 148.
<br>[45] <a href="http://wamu.org/programs/metro_connection/11/12/29/a_pentagon_survivor_remembers_and_mourns_transcript" target="_blank">"A 9/11 Pentagon Survivor Remembers and Mourns."</a>
<br>[46] Stephen J. Lofgren (Editor), <i>Then Came the Fire</i>, pp. 138, 148.
<br>[47] Robert Rossow III, <i>Uncommon Strength</i>, p. 54.
<br>[48] <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/11/nationchallenged/11WHERE.html?pagewanted=all" target="_blank">"Frozen in Memory, the First Moments of a Transformed World."</a>
<br>[49] <a href="http://www.texasmonthly.com/story/karen-wagners-life?fullpage=1" target="_blank">John Spong, "Karen Wagner's Life."</a>
<br>[50] Stephen J. Lofgren (Editor), <i>Then Came the Fire</i>, p. 66.
<br>[51] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20130219060336/http:/www.usar.army.mil/ourstory/History/Documents/Pentagon%20Monograph-final.pdf" target="_blank">Kathryn Roe Coker, David T. Zabecki, and Deborah Foster-King (Editors), <i>The Role of the Army Reserve in the 11 September Attacks: The Pentagon</i>, p. 4</a>.
<br>[52] Stephen J. Lofgren (Editor), <i>Then Came the Fire</i>, p. 66.
<br>[53] Alfred Goldberg et al., <i>Pentagon 9/11</i>, p. 134.
<br>[54] See <a href="http://shoestring911.blogspot.co.uk/2011/03/army-command-center-at-pentagon-planned.html" target="_blank">"Army Command Center at the Pentagon Planned to Hold Exercise in Week After 9/11 Based on a Plane Hitting the WTC." Shoestring 9/11, March 26, 2011</a>.
<br>[55] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/51154680/GSA-B115-RDOD03012858-Fdr-Entire-Contents-CMH-Intvw-2002-02-05-NEIT-532-Chiarelli-Pete-063" target="_blank">Pete Chiarelli, interview by Frank Shirer. U.S. Army Center of Military History, February 5, 2002</a>; <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/51226076/GSA-B115-RDOD03012869-Fdr-Entire-Contents-CMH-Intvw-2002-02-12-NEIT-542-Vaughn-Clyde-Pentagon-Impact-066" target="_blank">Clyde Vaughn, interview by Stephen Lofgren</a>.
<br>[56] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/51154680/GSA-B115-RDOD03012858-Fdr-Entire-Contents-CMH-Intvw-2002-02-05-NEIT-532-Chiarelli-Pete-063" target="_blank">Pete Chiarelli, interview by Frank Shirer</a>; Robert Rossow III, <i>Uncommon Strength</i>, pp. 64-65; Stephen J. Lofgren (Editor), <i>Then Came the Fire</i>, pp. 95-97.
<br>[57] Stephen J. Lofgren (Editor), <i>Then Came the Fire</i>, p. 135.
<br>[58] Robert Rossow III, <i>Uncommon Strength</i>, p. 21.
<br>[59] Stephen J. Lofgren (Editor), <i>Then Came the Fire</i>, p. 162.
<br>[60] <a href="https://archive.org/details/abc200109110912-0954" target="_blank">"9:12 a.m.-9:54 a.m." ABC News, September 11, 2001</a>; <a href="https://archive.org/details/cbs200109110912-0954" target="_blank">"9:12 a.m.-9:54 a.m." CBS News, September 11, 2001</a>; <a href="https://archive.org/details/fox5200109110912-0954" target="_blank">"9:12 a.m.-9:54 a.m." Fox News, September 11, 2001</a>; <a href="https://archive.org/details/nbc200109110912-0954" target="_blank">"9:12 a.m.-9:54 a.m." NBC News, September 11, 2001</a>; <a href="https://archive.org/details/cnn200109110929-1011" target="_blank">"9:29 a.m.-10:11 a.m." CNN, September 11, 2001</a>.Shoestringhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01534319150672667644noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2990970741097819876.post-77319864442201870782015-01-14T01:38:00.001-08:002015-01-14T01:39:45.862-08:00Why Did the Air Force's Top Officials at the Pentagon Delay Responding to the 9/11 Attacks?<br />
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The immediate response to the 9/11 attacks of dozens of the most senior U.S. Air Force officials at the Pentagon who were together in a meeting when the attacks began appears to have been far from what we might reasonably expect, considering the serious and unprecedented crisis the officials had to deal with and the Air Force's key role in responding to it. Evidence suggests that after the first plane crash at the World Trade Center was reported on television on September 11, 2001, there was a delay of over 10 minutes before the officials' meeting was interrupted and the officials were alerted to the incident. The subsequent response of the officials appears to have been slow and lacking urgency.
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Even after they saw the second hijacked plane crashing into the World Trade Center live on television, the officials reportedly spent several minutes just watching the news coverage of the attacks and then continued with their routine meeting, instead of immediately halting what they were doing and getting involved with responding to the crisis. [1] Furthermore, when the meeting finally adjourned, instead of helping with the response to the attacks, the Air Force's most senior uniformed officer initially took the time to go upstairs, simply to bring a colleague down from his office to the Pentagon's basement. [2]
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Some evidence suggests that the officials in the meeting may have failed to realize the seriousness of what was taking place when they learned of the attacks on the World Trade Center, and this was why they reacted so slowly. They could, perhaps, have mistakenly thought that what they were hearing about was a simulated scenario in a training exercise. Indeed, one of the officials has recalled that when they learned of the first crash, "At first we thought it was part of the briefing." [3] The officials may therefore have felt it was unnecessary for them to respond immediately.
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If the officials were indeed confused about whether the attacks were real or simulated, might their slow response have been the intended result of an attempt by some of the people who planned and perpetrated the attacks to paralyze America's defenses, so as to ensure the attacks were successful? Might these planners--presumably rogue individuals within the U.S. military--have arranged what would happen on September 11 so that these key Air Force officials would initially fail to realize that a real-world crisis was taking place, which they needed to respond to immediately?
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The tactics used to prevent these officials from responding quickly could have been part of an effort to ensure key individuals from various military and government agencies, who might have organized a successful response to the attacks, were "out of the loop"--unavailable or unable to respond--when the attacks took place.
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The evidence currently available is limited and inconclusive. But the behavior of the Air Force's leaders when the 9/11 attacks began certainly deserves further scrutiny.
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<b>AIR FORCE LEADERS WERE BEING BRIEFED ABOUT TERRORISM</b>
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At the time the World Trade Center towers were hit, around 40 senior Air Force officers were together in a room in the basement of the Pentagon, attending a staff meeting chaired by General John Jumper. This was Jumper's first staff meeting since he took over as Air Force chief of staff five days earlier. [4]
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The regular meeting, known as the "Ready Brief," was where the highest levels of the military would be updated on worldwide issues. [5] The briefing on September 11, as was always the case on the second Tuesday of each month, was about "black world activities"--things that would not usually be in the news. That day, it happened to be on the subject of anti- and counterterrorism. It included descriptions of terrorist incidents, and the faces of terrorists were being shown on the presentation screen. (Whether Osama bin Laden--the man who supposedly ordered the 9/11 attacks--was among the terrorists depicted is unreported.) [6]
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Jumper's meeting was attended by "all the Air Force senior staff who are in the Pentagon," one of the participants has recalled. [7] Participants included Colonel Jack Egginton, executive officer to the Air Force chief of staff; Tim Green, assistant executive to the Air Force chief of staff; Lieutenant General Lance Lord, assistant vice chief of staff of the Air Force; Lee-Volker Cox, executive officer to the assistant vice chief of staff of the Air Force; Brigadier General Paul Kimmel, chief operating officer of the Air National Guard; Lieutenant Colonel Pierre Powell, deputy chief of the secretary of the Air Force's action group; Brigadier General Robert Duignan, deputy to the chief of the Air Force Reserve; Lieutenant General Paul Carlton, surgeon general of the Air Force; and Brigadier General Charles Baldwin, the Air Force's deputy chief of chaplains. [8]
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The officers at the meeting should presumably have been promptly alerted to the crisis taking place in U.S. airspace and should then have immediately become involved in the Air Force's response to it. And yet it appears this did not happen.
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<b>AIR FORCE OFFICERS LEARNED OF THE FIRST CRASH AND 'INSTINCTIVELY' KNEW WHAT HAD HAPPENED</b>
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To begin with, there seems to have been a delay of over 10 minutes before these key officials were alerted to the first crash at the World Trade Center, which occurred at 8:46 a.m. The officials should surely have been made aware of the crash promptly after it was first reported on television, at 8:49 a.m. Instead, reports have stated, they learned about it at around 9:00 a.m. [9]
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At that time, about halfway through Jumper's meeting, an officer entered and quietly spoke to Pierre Powell, who was briefing the others in the room, presumably telling him what had happened in New York. Powell then stopped the briefing and announced that the screen was going to switch to live coverage from CNN, because a plane had crashed into one of the World Trade Center towers. [10] The large screen that had been showing briefing slides then switched to showing the CNN coverage of the burning North Tower of the World Trade Center. [11] "Right in the middle of the intelligence briefing, the big screens go black, they transfer from the intelligence briefing to live video feed from New York," Lee-Volker Cox has described. [12]
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The dozens of experienced Air Force officers in the room immediately realized the crash must have been something other than an accident, according to John Jumper. "There was a conference table full of airmen who looked at that dark blue sky on CNN, then looked at each other, and we knew right away that it wasn't a navigation mistake," Jumper recalled. [13] "Every airman in the room stiffened, because we knew exactly--instinctively--what was going on," he commented. [14] And yet the meeting was not halted.
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<b>OFFICERS WATCHED THE SECOND CRASH ON TV BUT THEN CONTINUED THEIR MEETING</b>
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A short time later, the officers watched the second hijacked plane, United Airlines Flight 175, crashing into the South Tower of the World Trade Center live on television, at 9:03 a.m. [15] "We started watching a live feed and probably within 30 seconds, the second tower got hit," Tim Green recalled. [16] "The room just became totally silent," Cox described. [17] According to Green, "Everyone in the room knew instantly that we were at war." [18]
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The 9/11 attacks were "what we are trained for," Jumper has commented. "You are trained to not be taken by surprise and to react in a logical, calm way, especially when you are in a leadership position," he said. "You've got to organize your thoughts quickly and get your people organized." [19] Indeed, some of the officers who attended his meeting have claimed that immediately after they all watched Flight 175 hitting the World Trade Center, the meeting ended and its participants started responding to the crisis. "We all sat there in stunned disbelief for a few seconds, then we quickly went back to our offices," Lance Lord said. [20] "We immediately adjourned," Charles Baldwin said. [21] "It's amazing to watch people in that situation," Green recalled. "They immediately shift gears from whatever they were doing, to do what needed to be done." [22]
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Other evidence, however, casts doubt on these accounts, and suggests that after they saw Flight 175 crashing and it became obvious that the U.S. was under attack, the officers in Jumper's meeting reacted with alarming complacency.
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According to the Department of Defense's book about the Pentagon attack, the officers watched the TV coverage of the attacks in New York "for about eight minutes" and then "Jumper resumed the meeting." He supposedly concluded it "quickly." [23] But according to an article in the <i>Daytona Beach News-Journal</i> based around an interview with Paul Kimmel, who was at the meeting, the meeting adjourned at 9:20 a.m.--around 20 minutes after its participants were alerted to the first crash at the World Trade Center and 17 minutes after they watched the second hijacked plane crashing live on television.
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At that time, according to Kimmel, Jumper announced: "Well, ladies and gentlemen, I think the meeting is adjourned. We have some work to do." [24] According to Cox, Jumper ended the meeting saying: "New York needs your help. Let's go back to our offices and see what we have to do." [25] The officers in the meeting then left the room and headed upstairs to their offices. [26]
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If these accounts are correct--meaning that while the worst crisis possible was taking place, dozens of key Air Force officials spent several minutes just watching television and then wasted more time continuing their unnecessary and routine meeting--then this is astonishing. The need to respond to the attacks should have superseded anything the men were doing. Surely, at the very least, they should have wanted up-to-the-minute updates on what was happening. But they could do nothing while they were watching television or continuing a staff meeting.
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Even if these men failed to respond appropriately, surely someone else should have gone into the room and made sure the meeting ended at once, and the officers helped the Air Force respond to the attacks. And yet that did not happen either.
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<b>OFFICERS INITIALLY THOUGHT THE REPORTED CRASH WAS 'PART OF THE BRIEFING'</b>
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Why did these experienced Air Force officers apparently respond so inappropriately when they saw their country was under attack? Clearly, a new investigation of 9/11 is necessary to properly answer this question. But we can at least consider possible explanations based on the currently available evidence.
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Paul Kimmel has recalled that when he and the other officers in John Jumper's meeting learned of the first crash at the World Trade Center, and the screen that had been showing briefing slides switched to showing the burning North Tower, "At first we thought it was part of the briefing." [27] Could this be a clue as to why the officers failed to take action right away? If they thought the report of the crash and the TV coverage of the burning World Trade Center were simulated, they might have felt it was unnecessary for them to respond to the incident immediately.
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It seems incredible, though, that the officers could have mistaken the TV coverage for part of the briefing. Surely it should have been obvious to them that the coverage was genuine. Unless, perhaps, they were used to seeing expensively produced, realistic video footage of simulated terrorist attacks in their training exercises or briefings, such that they could mistake genuine TV coverage of an attack for simulated coverage.
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<b>WHY WAS THERE A DELAY BEFORE THE OFFICERS WERE ALERTED TO THE FIRST CRASH?</b>
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If it is correct that the officials in Jumper's meeting were only alerted to the first crash at the World Trade Center at around 9:00 a.m., then this gives rise to further questions.
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The crash was first reported on television at 8:49 a.m. At that time, CNN announced that there were "unconfirmed reports this morning that a plane has crashed into one of the towers of the World Trade Center." A CNN producer then reported from New York, "I just witnessed a plane that appeared to be cruising at slightly lower than normal altitude over New York City and ... it hit directly in the middle of one of the World Trade Center towers." The plane, according to the producer, "looked like a two-engine jet, maybe a 737. ... A large passenger commercial jet." [28]
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Since this critical information would presumably have been of particular interest to the leaders of the Air Force, Jumper's meeting should surely have been interrupted and its participants alerted to the crash right away after it was first reported. The information was certainly considered important enough to be passed on to the meeting participants at around 9:00 a.m. So surely it was important enough to be passed on to them 11 minutes earlier, when CNN first announced what had happened.
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But could the meeting have been interrupted even earlier than that, to notify its participants that American Airlines Flight 11--the first plane to hit the World Trade Center--had been hijacked? The hijacking, according to <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, occurred at around 8:14 a.m. [29] Between 8:25 a.m. and 8:32 a.m., managers at the Federal Aviation Administration's Boston Center started notifying their chain of command that a suspected hijacking was in progress. The U.S. military was first alerted to the hijacking at 8:37 a.m., when the Boston Center contacted NORAD's Northeast Air Defense Sector about it. [30] But it appears that no attempt was made to pass on the report of a suspected hijacking to the Air Force leaders in Jumper's meeting. The first notification they received that anything was wrong apparently came when they learned of the first crash at the World Trade Center.
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<b>CHIEF OF STAFF HEADED UPSTAIRS INSTEAD OF STAYING IN THE OPERATIONS CENTER</b>
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Even after his staff meeting adjourned, John Jumper appears to have continued acting inappropriately, as if he was still unaware of the seriousness of the situation.
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The staff meeting was held in a room that was part of the Air Force Operations Center, in the basement of the Pentagon, according to veteran military journalist Richard Whittle. [31] Jumper eventually settled in the Operations Center, where he was able to respond to the attacks. [32] But when his meeting ended, he first headed to the office of James Roche, the secretary of the Air Force, which was on the fourth floor of the Pentagon. Jumper did this, he said, because he wanted to bring Roche down to the Operations Center. [33] But surely, as the Air Force's most senior uniformed officer, he should have stayed in the Operations Center when his meeting ended, so he could immediately become involved with monitoring events and helping to organize the Air Force's response to the attacks. Someone of lower rank could easily have arranged for Roche to be brought down to the Operations Center.
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The Operations Center would certainly have been a more appropriate place than Roche's office for Jumper to be at such a critical time. The fact that it was located deep underground in the basement surely made it one of the safest parts of the Pentagon to be in during an attack on the U.S.--much safer than an office on the fourth floor. Additionally, the Air Force's Crisis Action Team (CAT) at the Pentagon was operating from there. [34] The CAT was a "disaster response group," which, according to the <i>Dover Post</i>, "coordinates Air Force reaction to anything that might be a threat to the United States." [35] As it responded to the crisis, the CAT became "the eyes and ears of the Air Force," according to Major Harry Brosofsky, who was in the Operations Center on September 11. [36] In the Operations Center, therefore, Jumper would have been in an ideal position to help organize the Air Force's response to the attacks.
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But by taking time out to walk up to the fourth floor and fetch Roche down to the basement, Jumper may have left himself "out of the loop"--such that he could not receive the most accurate and timely updates on the crisis, and other officials could not communicate with him--during a critical period in the middle of the attacks.
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<b>COLLEAGUES ALLOWED CHIEF OF STAFF TO LEAVE THE OPERATIONS CENTER, DESPITE SAFETY CONCERNS</b>
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It is surprising too that Jumper's colleagues allowed such an important official to leave the safety of the basement and go up to the more vulnerable fourth floor of the building when the U.S. was in the middle of a serious terrorist attack and anything could have happened next.
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Tim Green, for example, who had been in the staff meeting with Jumper, "knew his main directive was to secure Jumper and make sure he could communicate with other officials" after the Pentagon was attacked at 9:37 a.m., according to the <i>Midland Reporter-Telegram</i>. [37] But surely if he genuinely realized the U.S. was under attack earlier on, when he learned of the crashes at the World Trade Center during Jumper's meeting, Green would have made sure that Jumper stayed in the Operations Center after his staff meeting ended, for his safety and so he could communicate with other officials.
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As it was, Jumper, along with Roche, only headed from Roche's office down to the Operations Center after the Pentagon was attacked. At that time, Philip Breedlove, who was with the two men in Roche's office, promptly arranged for them to be taken to the Operations Center. He "hit the duress button and security forces were almost immediately in the room," according to <i>Air Force Magazine</i>. The security officers were told, "We need to get to the bunker; we need to get down to our operations area."
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Jumper and Roche's journey to the Operations Center was likely delayed in the crowded corridors, where the two men were "faced with hundreds of people going the other direction, trying to get out of the building." [38] By the time they entered the Operations Center, it must have been close to 10:00 a.m. This means that by the time Jumper was finally in a position to get involved with the Air Force's response to the 9/11 attacks, the attacks were practically over. (United Airlines Flight 93--the fourth and final aircraft to be hijacked on September 11--supposedly crashed in a field in Pennsylvania at 10:03 a.m.)
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Some of the officers who were with Jumper in his staff meeting may also have continued acting inappropriately after the meeting ended, as if they were still unaware of the seriousness of the situation. Officers reportedly "ran upstairs to their offices" after the meeting adjourned. [39] Some of these men were presumably among the "various generals and other brass" who subsequently gathered in the Operations Center. [40] (Lance Lord, for example, is reported to have gone to the Operations Center after the Pentagon was hit. [41]) But surely, when the meeting ended, these officers, like Jumper, should have simply stayed in the Operations Center, where they would presumably have been in the ideal location to respond to the ongoing attacks.
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<br />
<b>THE AIR FORCE WORKED WITH NORAD AND THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION TO RESPOND TO THE ATTACKS</b>
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The alarmingly slow response of these top Air Force officials to the 9/11 attacks is particularly notable considering the important role the Air Force had to play on September 11. Although the Air Force's leaders were "not the command authority" that day, according to <i>Air Force Magazine</i>, with the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) primarily responsible for operational control of the situation, Air Force personnel clearly seem to have been engaged in important activities in response to the attacks. [42]
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<br />
For example, after the second hijacked plane crashed into the World Trade Center, the Air Force Operations Center was reportedly "a flurry of activity as Air Force officials worked to gather information, both from the media and from their own intelligence sources." [43] James Roche has recalled that after they arrived at the Operations Center, he and John Jumper tried to "hook up" with NORAD. [44] And the Air Force CAT coordinated with NORAD to put fighter jets on alert in Alaska and Hawaii. It also worked with the Federal Aviation Administration to monitor flight activity over the continental United States. [45]
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<br />
Furthermore, a representative from the Air Force Operations Center participated in the Pentagon's critical "air threat conference call," which lasted more than eight hours and was joined by numerous high-level government and military officials. [46] And CAT members activated a team to focus on "continuity of operations," which is the effort to ensure that the Air Force is able to continue its essential functions in an emergency. [47]
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<br />
Since Air Force personnel eventually played a significant role in responding to the 9/11 attacks, then, surely the key Air Force officials in Jumper's meeting should have been responding to the attacks from the outset.
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<br />
<b>WHAT EFFECT DID THE AIR FORCE LEADERS' SLOW RESPONSE TO THE ATTACKS HAVE?</b>
<br />
The behavior of the officials in John Jumper's staff meeting and some of their colleagues at the time of the 9/11 attacks gives rise to some serious questions. For example, why did it take until about 9:00 a.m. for the officials to be alerted to the first crash at the World Trade Center when the crash had been reported on television since 8:49 a.m.?
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<br />
Why, after they learned of the crashes at the World Trade Center, did the officials continue with their routine meeting, instead of responding immediately to the attacks? And did their slowness to respond affect the overall response of the Air Force to the attacks? Did it, for example, slow down the setting up of the CAT, since the CAT is under the command of the Air Force chief of staff--i.e. John Jumper? [48]
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Furthermore, why did no one else in the Air Force interrupt Jumper's meeting and demand that the officials attending it start responding to the attacks right away?
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<br />
<b>WAS THE AIR FORCE INVOLVED IN A TRAINING EXERCISE ON SEPTEMBER 11?</b>
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It is important to find out if Air Force personnel were scheduled to participate in a training exercise on September 11. If so, did the officials in Jumper's meeting think the reports of the crashes at the World Trade Center were part of that exercise? Is this why they apparently failed to respond with an appropriate level of urgency?
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<br />
In support of this possibility is the fact that Lieutenant Colonel Matt Swanson, who was in charge of the CAT on September 11, is reported to have indeed mistaken events that morning for an exercise scenario. After he learned about the first crash at the World Trade Center, Swanson received a call on the phone in his office at the Pentagon in which he was instructed to go and join the CAT. But he reportedly only "realized this was no exercise" when he reached the Operations Center, and "was greeted by both the chief of staff and the secretary of the Air Force, along with various generals and other brass." [49] Did Swanson misinterpret the situation because he thought the Air Force was going to be involved in an exercise that morning, maybe based around a simulated terrorist attack?
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<br />
We also need to determine if it was simply a coincidence that at exactly the time when the Air Force had to respond to an actual terrorist attack, its leaders at the Pentagon were receiving a briefing about terrorism, which included descriptions of terrorist incidents and slides depicting the faces of terrorists. Or was there a more sinister reason for this concurrence of events?
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<br />
Might the briefing on the subject of terrorism perhaps have been put together by rogue individuals, with the intention of causing confusion when the 9/11 attacks occurred, since those receiving the briefing might think any reports about the attacks in New York were part of it? Was the briefing therefore intended to hinder the Air Force's response to the attacks? If so, who was responsible for deciding what its contents would be?
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<br />
And if, as Paul Kimmel stated, the officials at Jumper's meeting initially thought the news of the first crash at the World Trade Center was part of the briefing, when did they realize for certain that this was not the case and that a real incident had occurred?
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<br />
<b>ANOTHER AIR FORCE MEETING CONTINUED DESPITE THE ATTACKS ON THE WORLD TRADE CENTER</b>
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It is worth noting that the failure to immediately adjourn John Jumper's meeting in response to the attacks on the World Trade Center was apparently not an isolated incident. Another meeting held by the Air Force that was taking place in the Pentagon when the attacks began appears to have only ended some time after 9:30 a.m.
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<br />
Few details of this meeting have been reported, but it has been described as a "closed-door personnel meeting convened by the Air Force to discuss the rating of Air Force officers" and as "a U.S. Air Force-convened session for general officers who rated Air Force officers." Because he was attending this meeting, Army Brigadier General Montague Winfield was absent from his position as deputy director for operations (DDO) in the National Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon when the terrorist attacks were taking place. [50]
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The meeting appears to have only adjourned some time after 9:30 a.m., since Colonel Susan Kuehl, who supervised the operations of the NMCC, and Captain Charles Leidig, who took Winfield's place as DDO in the NMCC during the attacks, have both recalled that Winfield only arrived in the NMCC after leaving it after 9:37 a.m., when the Pentagon attack took place.
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<br />
<b>OFFICERS WERE IN A 'DO NOT DISTURB' MEETING</b>
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It is unclear why the meeting went on until this time, considering it had been obvious since 9:03 a.m. that the U.S. was suffering a major terrorist attack. Kuehl said the meeting had been a "do not disturb" meeting, and according to a 9/11 Commission memorandum, "Such meetings are generally not disturbed unless the reason is significant." [51] The attacks in New York were surely a significant enough reason for someone to have interrupted the meeting and demanded that it be brought to an end immediately. All the same, it appears that the meeting was allowed to continue after the two hijacked planes crashed into the World Trade Center.
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<br />
Like John Jumper's staff meeting, then, this was a previously scheduled meeting held by the Air Force and attended by senior officers, which failed to adjourn promptly in response to the attacks on the World Trade Center and resulted in high-level officials being unavailable to immediately respond to the attacks.
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<br />
Was some of what we know about this meeting also true of Jumper's meeting, then? Was Jumper's meeting a "do not disturb" meeting of the kind that was "generally not disturbed unless the reason is significant"?
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<br />
This question, like the other questions raised in this article, requires further examination and should be addressed in any new investigation of the 9/11 attacks.
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<br />
<b>NOTES</b>
<br />
[1] Alfred Goldberg et al., <i>Pentagon 9/11</i>. Washington, DC: Defense Department, Office of the Secretary, Historical Office, 2007, p. 136.
<br />
[2] <a href="http://www.c-span.org/video/?168770-2/us-air-force-budget" target="_blank">"U.S. Air Force Budget." <i>Washington Journal</i>, C-SPAN, February 21, 2002</a>; Richard Whittle, <i>Predator: The Secret Origins of the Drone Revolution</i>. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2014, p. 234.
<br />
[3] <a href="http://www.eleanoreosborne.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Feech-Sept-11-Recalled.pdf" target="_blank">Eleanore Osborne, "Sept. 11 Stirs up Retiree's Memories." <i>Daytona Beach News-Journal</i>, September 7, 2004</a>.
<br />
[4] Alfred Goldberg et al., <i>Pentagon 9/11</i>, p. 136; <a href="http://archive.9news.com/rss/story.aspx?storyid=216198" target="_blank">Jack Maher, "Pentagon Survivor Shares Sept. 11 Memories." 9News, August 30, 2011</a>; Richard Whittle, <i>Predator: The Secret Origins of the Drone Revolution</i>, pp. 233-234.
<br />
[5] <a href="http://archive.9news.com/rss/story.aspx?storyid=216198" target="_blank">Jack Maher, "Pentagon Survivor Shares Sept. 11 Memories."</a>
<br />
[6] <a href="http://www.eleanoreosborne.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Feech-Sept-11-Recalled.pdf" target="_blank">Eleanore Osborne, "Sept. 11 Stirs up Retiree's Memories."</a>
<br />
[7] <a href="http://health.keyt.com/story/19516515/former-pentagon-staffer-shares-memories-of-911-attack" target="_blank">Keith Carls, "Former Pentagon Staffer Shares Memories of 9/11 Attack." KEYT NewsChannel 3, September 11, 2012</a>.
<br />
[8] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20010918104434/http:/www.af.mil/news/Sep2001/n20010914_1294.shtml" target="_blank">A. J. Bosker, "Surgeon General, X-Ray Tech Work Together During Rescue Efforts." Air Force Print News, September 14, 2001</a>; Dean E. Murphy, <i>September 11: An Oral History</i>. New York: Doubleday, 2002, p. 216; <a href="http://www.mrt.com/import/article_cc040376-6067-560d-b065-e8e709814a61.html" target="_blank">Hillary S. Condon, "Former West Texan Was in Pentagon on September 11." <i>Midland Reporter-Telegram</i>, April 2, 2002</a>; <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20030126055441/http:/www.peterson.af.mil/hqafspc/News/News_Asp/nws_tmp.asp?storyid=02-214" target="_blank">Lance Lord, "A Year Ago, a Lifetime Ago." Air Force Space Command News Service, September 5, 2002</a>; <a href="http://www.af.mil/News/ArticleDisplay/tabid/223/Article/138554/airmen-remember-pain-of-sept-11.aspx" target="_blank">William J. Sharp, "Airmen Remember Pain of Sept. 11." Air Force Print News, September 11, 2003</a>; <a href="http://www.eleanoreosborne.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Feech-Sept-11-Recalled.pdf" target="_blank">Eleanore Osborne, "Sept. 11 Stirs up Retiree's Memories"</a>; <a href="http://caseforprayer.com/a-life-saving-latte/" target="_blank">Jane Hampton Cook, Jocelyn Green, and John Croushorn, <i>Stories of Faith and Courage From the War in Iraq & Afghanistan</i>. Chattanooga, TN: God and Country Press, 2009</a>; <a href="http://www.ksby.com/news/vandenberg-airman-remembers-being-in-pentagon-with-top-brass-on-9-11/" target="_blank">Nancy Chen, "Vandenberg Airman Remembers Being in Pentagon With Top Brass on 9/11." KSBY 6, September 10, 2011</a>; <a href="http://www.postandcourier.com/article/20110911/ARCHIVES/309119926" target="_blank">Adam Parker, "Q&A With Rev. Charles Baldwin, 9/11 Pentagon Chaplain." <i>Charleston Post and Courier</i>, September 11, 2011</a>; <a href="http://airman.dodlive.mil/2011/09/first-day/" target="_blank">Randy Roughton, "First Day." <i>Airman</i>, September 15, 2011</a>; <a href="http://www.dvidshub.net/publication/481/turning-point-911-air-force-reserve" target="_blank">Betty R. Kennedy (Editor), <i>Turning Point 9/11: Air Force Reserve in the 21st Century, 2001-2011</i>. Robins AFB, GA: HQ Air Force Reserve Command, Directorate of Historical Services, 2012, p. 53</a>.
<br />
[9] <a href="http://www.eleanoreosborne.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Feech-Sept-11-Recalled.pdf" target="_blank">Eleanore Osborne, "Sept. 11 Stirs up Retiree's Memories"</a>; Alfred Goldberg et al., <i>Pentagon 9/11</i>, p. 136.
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[10] <a href="http://airman.dodlive.mil/2011/09/first-day/" target="_blank">Randy Roughton, "First Day"</a>; Richard Whittle, <i>Predator: The Secret Origins of the Drone Revolution</i>, p. 234.
<br />
[11] <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20030126055441/http:/www.peterson.af.mil/hqafspc/News/News_Asp/nws_tmp.asp?storyid=02-214" target="_blank">Lance Lord, "A Year Ago, a Lifetime Ago"</a>; <a href="http://lompocrecord.com/news/local/lt-col-lee-volker-cox-was-there/article_d1f7a23d-6ee8-5467-bde4-44aed1131154.html" target="_blank">Janene Scully, "Lt. Col. Lee-Volker Cox Was There." <i>Lompoc Record</i>, September 11, 2003</a>.
<br />
[12] <a href="http://health.keyt.com/story/19516515/former-pentagon-staffer-shares-memories-of-911-attack" target="_blank">Keith Carls, "Former Pentagon Staffer Shares Memories of 9/11 Attack."</a>
<br />
[13] <a href="http://airman.dodlive.mil/2011/09/first-day/" target="_blank">Randy Roughton, "First Day."</a>
<br />
[14] <a href="http://www.c-span.org/video/?168770-2/us-air-force-budget" target="_blank">"U.S. Air Force Budget."</a>
<br />
[15] <a href="http://airman.dodlive.mil/2011/09/first-day/" target="_blank">Randy Roughton, "First Day"</a>; Richard Whittle, <i>Predator: The Secret Origins of the Drone Revolution</i>, p. 234.
<br />
[16] <a href="http://www.mrt.com/import/article_cc040376-6067-560d-b065-e8e709814a61.html" target="_blank">Hillary S. Condon, "Former West Texan Was in Pentagon on September 11."</a>
<br />
[17] <a href="http://health.keyt.com/story/19516515/former-pentagon-staffer-shares-memories-of-911-attack" target="_blank">Keith Carls, "Former Pentagon Staffer Shares Memories of 9/11 Attack."</a>
<br />
[18] <a href="http://www.mrt.com/import/article_cc040376-6067-560d-b065-e8e709814a61.html" target="_blank">Hillary S. Condon, "Former West Texan Was in Pentagon on September 11."</a>
<br />
[19] <a href="http://issuu.com/vmi_alumni_agencies/docs/2014-1_online" target="_blank">George Abry, "Jumper '66: A Leader in High Demand Values VMI's Contribution to the Nation." <i>VMI Alumni Review</i>, 2014</a>.
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[20] <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20030126055441/http:/www.peterson.af.mil/hqafspc/News/News_Asp/nws_tmp.asp?storyid=02-214" target="_blank">Lance Lord, "A Year Ago, a Lifetime Ago."</a>
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[21] <a href="http://caseforprayer.com/a-life-saving-latte/" target="_blank">Jane Hampton Cook, Jocelyn Green, and John Croushorn, <i>Stories of Faith and Courage From the War in Iraq & Afghanistan</i></a>.
<br />
[22] <a href="http://www.mrt.com/import/article_cc040376-6067-560d-b065-e8e709814a61.html" target="_blank">Hillary S. Condon, "Former West Texan Was in Pentagon on September 11."</a>
<br />
[23] Alfred Goldberg et al., <i>Pentagon 9/11</i>, p. 136.
<br />
[24] <a href="http://www.eleanoreosborne.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Feech-Sept-11-Recalled.pdf" target="_blank">Eleanore Osborne, "Sept. 11 Stirs up Retiree's Memories."</a>
<br />
[25] <a href="http://www.ksby.com/news/vandenberg-airman-remembers-being-in-pentagon-with-top-brass-on-9-11/" target="_blank">Nancy Chen, "Vandenberg Airman Remembers Being in Pentagon With Top Brass on 9/11."</a>
<br />
[26] <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20030126055441/http:/www.peterson.af.mil/hqafspc/News/News_Asp/nws_tmp.asp?storyid=02-214" target="_blank">Lance Lord, "A Year Ago, a Lifetime Ago"</a>; <a href="http://lompocrecord.com/news/local/lt-col-lee-volker-cox-was-there/article_d1f7a23d-6ee8-5467-bde4-44aed1131154.html" target="_blank">Janene Scully, "Lt. Col. Lee-Volker Cox Was There"</a>; <a href="http://airman.dodlive.mil/2011/09/first-day/" target="_blank">Randy Roughton, "First Day."</a>
<br />
[27] <a href="http://www.eleanoreosborne.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Feech-Sept-11-Recalled.pdf" target="_blank">Eleanore Osborne, "Sept. 11 Stirs up Retiree's Memories."</a>
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[28] <a href="https://archive.org/details/cnn200109110848-0929" target="_blank">"8:48 a.m.-9:29 a.m." CNN, September 11, 2001</a>; <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0109/11/bn.01.html" target="_blank">"Terrorist Attack on United States." <i>Breaking News</i>, CNN, September 11, 2001</a>; James Bamford, <i>A Pretext for War: 9/11, Iraq, and the Abuse of America's Intelligence Agencies</i>. New York: Doubleday, 2004, pp. 16-17.
<br />
[29] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States</i>. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004, p. 4.
<br />
[30] <a href="http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB165/faa7.pdf" target="_blank">"Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events: September 11, 2001." Federal Aviation Administration, September 17, 2001</a>; 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, pp. 19-20.
<br />
[31] Richard Whittle, <i>Predator: The Secret Origins of the Drone Revolution</i>, pp. 233-234.
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[32] <a href="http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0110/10/lkl.00.html" target="_blank">"Florida Anthrax Scare." <i>Larry King Live</i>, CNN, October 10, 2001</a>; Alfred Goldberg et al., <i>Pentagon 9/11</i>, p. 136.
<br />
[33] <a href="http://www.c-span.org/video/?168770-2/us-air-force-budget" target="_blank">"U.S. Air Force Budget"</a>; <a href="http://airman.dodlive.mil/2011/09/first-day/" target="_blank">Randy Roughton, "First Day"</a>; Richard Whittle, <i>Predator: The Secret Origins of the Drone Revolution</i>, p. 234.
<br />
[34] <a href="http://sumagazine.syr.edu/archive/winter01-02/time/timepg9.html" target="_blank">Christine Yackel, "Hostile Intent." <i>Syracuse University Magazine</i>, Winter 2001-02</a>; <a href="http://www.mrt.com/import/article_cc040376-6067-560d-b065-e8e709814a61.html" target="_blank">Hillary S. Condon, "Former West Texan Was in Pentagon on September 11."</a>
<br />
[35] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20050219094556/http:/www.doverpost.com/PostArchives/09-19-01/pages/pentagon.html" target="_blank">Jeff Brown, "USAF Reserve Officer, Two Former DAFB Officers in Pentagon the Day of the Strike." <i>Dover Post</i>, September 19, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.faasafety.gov/SPANS/event_details.aspx?eid=40336" target="_blank">"Event Details and Registration: Remembering 9/11--Pentagon." Federal Aviation Administration, September 11, 2011</a>.
<br />
[36] <a href="http://sumagazine.syr.edu/archive/winter01-02/time/timepg9.html" target="_blank">Christine Yackel, "Hostile Intent."</a>
<br />
[37] <a href="http://www.mrt.com/import/article_cc040376-6067-560d-b065-e8e709814a61.html" target="_blank">Hillary S. Condon, "Former West Texan Was in Pentagon on September 11."</a>
<br />
[38] <a href="http://www.airforcemag.com/magazinearchive/magazine%20documents/2011/september%202011/0911airmen.pdf" target="_blank">Adam J. Hebert, "Airmen on 9/11: Col. Philip Breedlove." <i>Air Force Magazine</i>, September 2011</a>.
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[39] <a href="http://airman.dodlive.mil/2011/09/first-day/" target="_blank">Randy Roughton, "First Day."</a>
<br />
[40] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20080306021319/http:/www.bus.iastate.edu/Prospectus/2006/Fall/ProspectusFall06.pdf" target="_blank">"Reflections on 2 Days." <i>Prospectus</i>, Fall 2006</a>.
<br />
[41] <a href="http://lompocrecord.com/news/local/lt-col-lee-volker-cox-was-there/article_d1f7a23d-6ee8-5467-bde4-44aed1131154.html" target="_blank">Janene Scully, "Lt. Col. Lee-Volker Cox Was There."</a>
<br />
[42] <a href="http://www.airforcemag.com/magazinearchive/magazine%20documents/2011/september%202011/0911airmen.pdf" target="_blank">Adam J. Hebert, "Airmen on 9/11: Col. Philip Breedlove."</a>
<br />
[43] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20050219094556/http:/www.doverpost.com/PostArchives/09-19-01/pages/pentagon.html" target="_blank">Jeff Brown, "USAF Reserve Officer, Two Former DAFB Officers in Pentagon the Day of the Strike."</a>
<br />
[44] <a href="http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0110/10/lkl.00.html" target="_blank">"Florida Anthrax Scare."</a>
<br />
[45] <a href="http://sumagazine.syr.edu/archive/winter01-02/time/timepg9.html" target="_blank">Christine Yackel, "Hostile Intent."</a>
<br />
[46] <a href="http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/homeland_defense/september11/Transcript.pdf" target="_blank">Air Threat Conference and DDO Conference, Transcript. U.S. Department of Defense, September 11, 2001</a>; 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 37.
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[47] <a href="http://fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/doctrine/dod/dodd-3020_26.htm" target="_blank">"DODD 3020.26: Continuity of Operations (COOP) Policy and Planning." U.S. Department of Defense, May 26, 1995</a>; Alfred Goldberg et al., <i>Pentagon 9/11</i>, p. 136; <a href="http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/afmc/publication/afmci10-208/afmci10-208.pdf" target="_blank">"AFMCI 10-208: Continuity of Operations (COOP) Program." Air Force Materiel Command, October 16, 2013</a>.
<br />
[48] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20050219094556/http:/www.doverpost.com/PostArchives/09-19-01/pages/pentagon.html" target="_blank">Jeff Brown, "USAF Reserve Officer, Two Former DAFB Officers in Pentagon the Day of the Strike."</a>
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[49] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20080306021319/http:/www.bus.iastate.edu/Prospectus/2006/Fall/ProspectusFall06.pdf" target="_blank">"Reflections on 2 Days."</a>
<br />
[50] <a href="http://media.nara.gov/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00756.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Orientation and Tour of the National Military Command Center (NMCC) and National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC)." 9/11 Commission, July 21, 2003</a>; <a href="http://media.nara.gov/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00684.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Captain Charles Joseph Leidig, USN, Commandant of Midshipmen, U.S. Naval Academy." 9/11 Commission, April 29, 2004</a>; <a href="http://www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearing12/leidig_statement.pdf" target="_blank">"Statement of Capt. Charles J. Leidig, Jr., Commandant of Midshipmen, United States Naval Academy, Before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States." 9/11 Commission, June 17, 2004</a>.
<br />
[51] <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/241753685/2011-048-Larson-Release-Document-21" target="_blank">Interview with Colonel Susan Kuehl, written notes. 9/11 Commission, April 2, 2004</a>; <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/241754175/2012-042-Larson-Release-Document-26-pdf" target="_blank">Interview with Captain Charles Joseph Leidig, written notes. 9/11 Commission, April 29, 2004</a>; <a href="http://media.nara.gov/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00684.pdf" target="_blank">"Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Captain Charles Joseph Leidig, USN, Commandant of Midshipmen, U.S. Naval Academy."</a>Shoestringhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01534319150672667644noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2990970741097819876.post-75645655959560440962014-08-22T04:20:00.000-07:002014-08-22T04:20:07.400-07:00Over 350 Passengers Canceled Their Reservations or Didn't Show Up for the Hijacked 9/11 Flights<br><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjeXAmN8FQVomNT6qOpSZFpPFnlKcKKCvqB4YLGAiWBgjvj1rygnPR8pWbApwNuaVnHQo7y9D9sRHOU6a6Y8xxy-fIpYx9AFYkM1ywcF6337dtOZ152yiXW5rw1OdogfONwf55X7ghOnvy1/s1600/Boeing767.jpg" target="_blank" alt="A United Airlines Boeing 767" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjeXAmN8FQVomNT6qOpSZFpPFnlKcKKCvqB4YLGAiWBgjvj1rygnPR8pWbApwNuaVnHQo7y9D9sRHOU6a6Y8xxy-fIpYx9AFYkM1ywcF6337dtOZ152yiXW5rw1OdogfONwf55X7ghOnvy1/s1600/Boeing767.jpg" /></a></div>
<br>More than 350 people who were originally scheduled to be on the four airliners hijacked in the 9/11 attacks either changed their plans and canceled their reservations--in many cases at the last minute--or simply failed to show up for the flights on the morning of September 11, 2001. While these individuals came from a variety of backgrounds, a remarkable number of them worked in, or had close connections to, Hollywood or other areas of the entertainment industry. Some of them were very well-known personalities.
<br><br>For example, among the individuals who had reservations for American Airlines Flight 11--the first plane to be hijacked--were Seth Macfarlane, the creator of the cartoon <i>Family Guy</i>; actor Mark Wahlberg, the star of movies such as <i>Boogie Nights</i> and <i>The Fighter</i>; Bobby Farrelly, the writer and director of comedy movies such as <i>Dumb & Dumber</i> and <i>There's Something About Mary</i>; and Julia Child, the renowned chef and television personality. Sam Mendes, the director of <i>American Beauty</i> and the latest James Bond movie, <i>Skyfall</i>, was originally scheduled to be on American Airlines Flight 77, the third plane to be hijacked. And Robert Redford, the world-famous actor and director, narrowly avoided being on United Airlines Flight 93, the fourth plane to be hijacked.
<br><br>Interestingly, one man who was originally booked on Flight 77--Erik Nelson--was later the executive producer of a National Geographic Channel documentary that attempted to debunk claims of U.S. government involvement in the 9/11 attacks.
<br><br>It is also perhaps notable that a fair number of people who were originally scheduled to be on the hijacked flights but canceled their reservations or failed to turn up for their flights worked in professional sport. These included major league baseball player Brad Thomas, ice hockey coach Bruce Boudreau, and legendary basketball coach John Thompson.
<br><br>Summarized in this article are accounts found in books, news articles, FBI documents, websites, or Internet blogs, of these individuals who were originally booked on the flights hijacked on September 11, but canceled their reservations or simply failed to show up for their flights.
<br><br>A few of these accounts are vague or ambiguous, so it is difficult to say with certainty that the individuals described in them were indeed originally booked on one of the hijacked flights. All the same, from an analysis of the accounts in this article, along with evidence compiled by the FBI, I have calculated that over 350 people who were originally booked on the hijacked flights canceled their reservations or failed to show up for the flights.
<br><br>Furthermore, there were presumably people who canceled reservations for the hijacked flights whose accounts are as yet unreported or whose accounts I have not come across. There were therefore likely <i>even more people</i> who canceled their reservations or failed to turn up for the hijacked flights than the already high number described in this article.
<br><br>The FBI appears to have considered the large number of people who canceled their reservations or failed to turn up for the hijacked flights to have been suspicious. In the aftermath of 9/11, its agents in fact interviewed some of these people. However, from accounts of the interviews that are available on the Internet, it appears the agency's investigation was limited in scope. Investigators seem to have focused on determining whether these people had any connections to the alleged hijackers and their associates, and appear to have taken no action to verify the explanations that were given as to why these people canceled their reservations or missed their flights.
<br><br><b>DID SOME PEOPLE HAVE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF THE 9/11 ATTACKS?</b>
<br>People who canceled their reservations or failed to show up for the flights hijacked on September 11 have offered various innocuous explanations for why they avoided being on those aircraft. The possibility needs to be investigated, though, that the real reasons they missed the flights were different to what they claimed. A person could perhaps have given a false explanation because they felt it necessary to withhold the truth about how they avoided being on one of the hijacked planes.
<br><br>It is worth considering whether some of the canceled reservations and failures to show up for the hijacked flights were in truth the result of individuals having some degree of foreknowledge of the 9/11 attacks. Supporting this possibility is the fact that news reports have clearly suggested some people did indeed know beforehand that it would be dangerous to travel on September 11.
<br><br>For example, San Francisco Mayor Willie Brown, who was scheduled to fly from San Francisco to New York on the morning of September 11, was reportedly warned on the evening of September 10 that "Americans should be cautious about their air travel." [1] Similarly, "a particularly urgent warning" was reportedly received on the night of September 10, which led some senior Pentagon officials to cancel a trip scheduled for the morning of September 11. [2]
<br><br>A person with a ticket for one of the hijacked flights who canceled their reservation or failed to show up for their flight need not have had any foreknowledge of the impending terrorist attacks themselves. They could have instead perhaps changed their travel plans as a consequence of an associate of theirs, such as a friend or a work colleague, having some degree of foreknowledge of the 9/11 attacks. That associate might have deliberately made arrangements that led to the person changing their plans.
<br><br>As one possible example, a <i>Los Angeles Times</i> journalist was scheduled to be on Flight 11 but missed it due to a last-minute change of plans. The journalist, according to his ex-wife, "was in line to board [Flight 11] when the <i>LA Times</i> called and said, 'We need you to go to Atlanta; do you have time to switch?'" It was therefore the decisions of this man's bosses that led to him missing Flight 11, rather than his own decisions. [3]
<br><br>Another possible example is the experience of businessman Benjamin Gordon, who was originally booked on United Airlines Flight 175--the second plane to be hijacked--but missed it, he said, because his girlfriend convinced him to switch to a flight on September 12, since September 11 was his birthday and she could cook him a birthday dinner that day before he flew out to California. [4] So, according to Gordon's account, it was the decisions of his girlfriend, rather than his own decisions, that led to him missing Flight 175.
<br><br>It is also worth keeping in mind that some of the canceled reservations and failures to show up for the hijacked flights could simply have been due to chance. No doubt, the experience of coming so close to being a victim of the 9/11 attacks would have been very upsetting for many of the individuals involved. What is most suspicious, therefore, is not any particular account, but the <i>large number</i> of people who canceled their reservations or failed to show up for the flights.
<br><br>Furthermore, a few people have said they missed being on one of the hijacked flights because they were assigned to that flight for the return leg of a journey for which they only intended to travel one way. They bought a round-trip ticket because it was cheaper than a one-way ticket and never intended to be on the flight that was hijacked. This explanation would seem to rule out the possibility of these people receiving some kind of warning of what would happen on September 11. It would be worth investigating, though, if there was any particular reason they were assigned to the flights that were hijacked for their return journeys or if the assignments were just random.
<br><br><b>DID PLOTTERS AIM TO INFLUENCE WHO WOULD BE ON THE HIJACKED FLIGHTS?</b>
<br>As well as the possibility of some individuals having foreknowledge of what would happen on September 11, other explanations for the large number of people who canceled their reservations or failed to show up for the hijacked flights need to be considered.
<br><br>The 9/11 Commission stated that it found "no evidence to indicate that the hijackers manipulated the passenger loads on the aircraft they hijacked," and added, "Financial records did not reveal the purchase of any tickets beyond those the hijackers used for themselves." [5] But could individuals other than the men who supposedly hijacked the four airliners on September 11 have been involved? These individuals could, for example, have been rogue members of the U.S. military or intelligence services. Might these people have wanted to influence how many passengers would be on the hijacked flights and which particular individuals would be on those flights?
<br><br>Certainly, what happened on September 11 would have been quite different without so many people canceling their reservations or failing to turn up for the flights that would be hijacked. Flight 11 and Flight 77 carried the same or slightly more passengers on September 11 than the average number of passengers they had carried in the previous three months, according to the <i>9/11 Commission Report</i>. (Fifty-one percent of the seats on Flight 11 and 33 percent of the seats on Flight 77 were occupied that day.) [6] But without so many people canceling their reservations or missing the flights, these planes would have carried far more passengers than average and may have even been filled to capacity on September 11.
<br><br>Flight 175 and Flight 93, meanwhile, were found to have carried considerably less passengers on September 11 than the average numbers of passengers they had carried in the previous three months. (Thirty-three percent of the seats on Flight 175 and 20 percent of the seats on Flight 93 were occupied that day.) [7] This would not have been the case without so many people canceling their reservations or missing the flights. These planes, too, may instead have carried far more passengers than average and perhaps even have been filled to capacity.
<br><br>As well as all the people who were originally scheduled to be passengers on the hijacked flights but avoided being on the planes, numerous pilots and flight attendants who were originally going to be on these flights changed their plans and consequently avoided being killed in the 9/11 attacks.
<br><br>And curiously, not only did many people who would have been on the hijacked planes miss the flights because they changed their travel plans, but also many of the pilots, flight attendants, and passengers who actually were on the hijacked flights on September 11 were only booked on those flights at the last minute. [8]
<br><br><b>CANCELED RESERVATIONS REQUIRE FURTHER INVESTIGATION</b>
<br>The accounts below, of people who were booked on the flights hijacked on September 11 but missed those flights, raise many questions. Could it really just be coincidence that so many people who were scheduled to take four particular flights on the same day canceled their reservations or failed to show up for their flights, or are these accounts evidence of something more sinister? And was it just a coincidence that so many flight attendants and pilots who were originally scheduled to be on the four hijacked planes changed their plans and avoided being on those flights?
<br><br>Are these accounts a reflection of some individuals having foreknowledge of the 9/11 attacks, or are they perhaps evidence of a sophisticated attempt to influence how many people--and which people--would be on the hijacked aircraft?
<br><br>And surely it is abnormal for so many people involved in the entertainment industry to have planned to take the same--usually quiet--flights, and to have then canceled their reservations at the last minute or failed to show up for their flights. But if this situation was something other than a coincidence, how was it achieved and what purpose did it serve?
<br><br>Questions like these clearly need to be addressed as part of a thorough and unrestrained new investigation of the 9/11 attacks.
<br><br><b>MANY PEOPLE CANCELED THEIR RESERVATIONS OR FAILED TO SHOW UP FOR FLIGHT 11</b>
<br>American Airlines Flight 11 was the first plane to be hijacked on September 11, 2001. The Boeing 767 took off from Logan International Airport in Boston at 7:59 a.m., bound for Los Angeles, but crashed into the World Trade Center in New York at 8:46 a.m.
<br><br>The plane had a capacity of 158 passengers but had 81 on board that day. [9] However, many people who had reservations for Flight 11 had either canceled their reservations or failed to turn up for the flight. And, as previously mentioned, among these people were a striking number of individuals who worked in, or had close connections to, the entertainment industry. The most widely reported examples are Seth MacFarlane and Mark Wahlberg.
<br><br>Seth MacFarlane is the creator of the Fox network cartoon sitcom <i>Family Guy</i> and is also well known for having hosted the 2013 Oscars. On the evening of September 10, he gave a lecture at his old college in Rhode Island, after which he went out with some faculty members and "had a few pints." He was therefore hung over on the morning of September 11. Furthermore, MacFarlane has said that his travel agent mistakenly told him Flight 11 was scheduled to take off at 8:15 a.m., instead of 7:45 a.m. Consequently, when he arrived at Logan Airport the gate had already closed, so he exchanged his ticket for a seat on another flight later in the morning and avoided being on the hijacked plane. "I missed it by 10 minutes," MacFarlane has commented. "It was very, very fortunate." [10]
<br><br>Curiously, Macfarlane's account is contradicted by an FBI document that lists many passengers who canceled reservations for Flight 11. While MacFarlane suggested that he intended to take Flight 11 but arrived at the airport too late, the document states that he actually canceled his reservation at 6:34 a.m. on September 11, more than an hour before the plane was scheduled to take off. [11]
<br><br>Mark Wahlberg is a Hollywood actor famous for starring in such movies as <i>Boogie Nights</i>, <i>The Perfect Storm</i>, <i>The Fighter</i>, and <i>Ted</i>. Just before 9/11, he was in Boston for a children's charity he ran and was scheduled to return to Los Angeles on September 11 on Flight 11. But, a friend of his told the <i>National Enquirer</i>, "The day before, he changed his mind." Therefore, "Instead of flying to LA on Tuesday, he decided to leave Boston Monday night, flying to New York to spend time with friends before flying back to LA." That last-minute change of plans meant Wahlberg avoided being on the hijacked plane. [12]
<br><br>Another celebrity, television personality Julie Stoffer--a former cast member of MTV's reality show <i>The Real World</i>--was in Boston for a public appearance and was due to take Flight 11 to visit her boyfriend in Los Angeles. After arguing with him on the phone on September 10, though, she considered canceling the trip but then changed her mind. Stoffer called a friend on the morning of September 11 and asked to be taken to the airport, but the friend persuaded her not to go and see her boyfriend, and so she avoided taking Flight 11. [13]
<br><br>Eva LaRue, who starred in the ABC soap opera <i>All My Children</i> and, more recently, <i>CSI: Miami</i>, was booked on one of the planes that hit the World Trade Center, apparently along with her then-husband, fellow actor John Callahan, as she intended to visit her family in California. (LaRue has not specified whether their plane would have been Flight 11 or Flight 175.) But on the night of September 10, the couple decided to switch to an afternoon flight. LaRue, who was pregnant at the time, has said the reason for this was simply that she "didn't wanna get up early and fly on the 8 o'clock flight." [14]
<br><br>Actor Edward James Olmos, who'd starred in the TV show <i>Miami Vice</i> and the 1988 movie <i>Stand and Deliver</i>, was in Boston on September 10, giving a public appearance. He was due to take Flight 11 the next morning as he was scheduled to appear at the Latin Grammy Awards on the evening of September 11. But he decided to take a flight on September 10 instead as he was feeling exhausted. [15]
<br><br>It is possible that actress Anne Heche, who starred in movies such as <i>Donnie Brasco</i> and <i>Volcano</i>, was originally going to be on Flight 11 along with her new husband Coley Laffoon, a freelance videographer and editor, although this hasn't been stated explicitly. Heche had been in Massachusetts for a book signing event. She had "considered taking that very flight [i.e. Flight 11] back to Los Angeles," a "source close to the actress" told the <i>National Enquirer</i>. But after the book signing in Massachusetts, Heche "was asked to do a book signing in Toronto as well." Consequently, "Instead of heading home to California, Anne went to Toronto" on September 11. "Now she shudders at the thought of how close she came to death," the source added. [16]
<br><br>Actress Jaime Pressly also appears to have been booked on Flight 11, but canceled her reservation at the last minute. Pressly, who starred in films such as <i>Ringmaster</i> and <i>Not Another Teen Movie</i>, and, more recently, starred in the NBC comedy series <i>My Name is Earl</i>, told <i>Esquire</i> magazine she had been in North Carolina and needed to go to Los Angeles. "To get there, I had three different options, none of which were direct flights," she said. "One of the options was Raleigh to Boston to LA." She was apparently booked on Flight 11, as she recalled: "I canceled it last minute. And that turned out to be the first plane to hit the World Trade Center." The reasons she canceled her reservation, she said, were, "a) I don't want to get up that early, and b) it's stupid to go around your ass to get to your thumb." [17]
<br><br>British comedian Sacha Baron Cohen, the star of movies such as <i>Borat</i> and <i>Brüno</i>, was reportedly booked on one of the aircraft hijacked on September 11, although which one is unstated. According to the British newspaper the <i>Sunday People</i>, Baron Cohen "told friends how he was booked on a tragic September 11 flight, but luckily missed it." [18]
<br><br>Ventriloquist Jay Johnson, who starred in the TV shows <i>Soap</i> and <i>Broken Badges</i>, was scheduled to perform for an insurance company in Boston on September 10 and was booked to fly home to Los Angeles the next morning on Flight 11. But a week before the performance, the insurance company called and asked if he could perform for it on the morning of September 11 instead of on September 10. Johnson agreed to do so and his manager moved him to another flight. "That change in schedule saved my life," Johnson has commented. [19]
<br><br>Julia Child, the famous chef and television personality, was booked on Flight 11, along with her personal assistant Stephanie Hersh, because she was moving from Massachusetts to a retirement community in California. As they were making their final preparations for the move, Child and Hersh "already had their plane tickets, an American Airlines flight to Los Angeles, leaving from Boston's Logan Airport on Tuesday, September 11, 2001," Child's biographer Bob Spitz wrote. But Geof Drummond, Child's TV producer, had agreed to shoot a video of Child in her kitchen for the Smithsonian's National Museum of American History and the only day all the filming crew could make it was September 11. Child therefore instructed Hersh to reschedule their flight for the end of the week. [20]
<br><br>Bobby Farrelly, the writer, director, and producer of hit movies including <i>Dumb & Dumber</i>, <i>There's Something About Mary</i>, and <i>Me, Myself & Irene</i>, was living in Boston and made a reservation on Flight 11 because he had to attend a test screening of his latest movie in California on the night of September 11. But on September 9, he was phoned by Tom Sherak, a partner at Revolution Studios, who invited Farrelly to attend his annual dinner benefiting the National Multiple Sclerosis Society, which would take place in Los Angeles on the night of September 10. Farrelly agreed to go, and so he called American Airlines and arranged to fly to Los Angeles on the morning of September 10 instead of September 11. This change to his schedule, Farrelly has commented, meant Sherak "saved my life." [21]
<br><br>Fridrik Thor Fridriksson, an Oscar-nominated Icelandic producer and director, was booked on Flight 11 in order to go and meet actor Keith Carradine before they started filming a movie together. Fridriksson was in Toronto at the time, but it was cheaper for him to travel to Los Angeles via Boston rather than directly from Toronto. But on September 9, he paid an extra $150 and changed his booking to take a direct flight from Toronto. The change "came purely out of necessity and not through a premonition," Fridriksson said. [22]
<br><br>Production designer Tom Duffield flew to Boston on the weekend before September 11 to scout a location for the movie <i>The Ring</i> and was scheduled to return to Los Angeles on Flight 11. "Luckily," the <i>Boston Herald</i> reported, "he switched his plans at the last minute and extended his stay in Boston a few more days." [23]
<br><br>Steve Thompson, an assistant animator at the Walt Disney Company, had participated in the Canada-to-U.S. AIDS Vaccine Bike Trek along with a group of his friends. The ride ended in Portland, Maine, and the quickest way for the group to get from there to their homes in Los Angeles was by taking a flight from Maine to Boston and then flying from Boston to Los Angeles. After finishing the ride on September 9, Thompson and his friends intended to relax in Portland on September 10 and then fly home the following morning. Consequently, according to Rick Andreoli, now Thompson's husband, the group planned "to fly back on American Airlines Flight 11 on September 11." However, the pop star Madonna had, at the last minute, arranged an additional concert in Los Angeles for her Drowned World Tour that coincided with the completion of the bike ride. Therefore, in order to see "their favorite diva" in concert, Thompson and his then-boyfriend hurriedly bought tickets for the new show and changed their plans, which meant they flew to Los Angeles on September 10 and avoided being on the hijacked plane. Remarkably, everyone else in Thompson's group also avoided being on Flight 11. Their reasons, according to Andreoli, included "oversleeping, not feeling well, [and] Madonna tickets." [24]
<br><br>Talicia Raggs, who worked for a Hollywood production company, appears to have also taken part in the AIDS Vaccine Bike Trek. In September 2001, she was reportedly "traveling ... after participating in a bike-a-thon to raise funds for HIV research." She too had a ticket for Flight 11. But she flew to Los Angeles on September 10 because her office called and said it needed her to come back a day earlier than she'd planned. [25]
<br><br>Lisa Beach, a casting director for feature films and television, originally had a reservation on Flight 11. She planned to take a short trip to Massachusetts on September 6, returning to Los Angeles on September 11. But on the weekend before the trip, she was invited to a party at the home of a producer she'd just worked with on a movie and decided to cancel her trip in order to attend. "That decision saved my life," Beach has commented. On September 11, when she heard the plane that hit the North Tower of the World Trade Center was Flight 11, Beach "raced upstairs to look at my E-ticket, which confirmed that I would have indeed been on that flight had I not changed my plans." [26]
<br><br>Lisi Harrison has recalled that she was "supposed to be on one of the planes that crashed into the World Trade Center," although she did not specify whether this was Flight 11 or Flight 175. But, she said, "I changed my reservation at the last minute." [27] Harrison, now a bestselling author of young adult novels, was at the time working for MTV in New York. [28]
<br><br>Tom Werner was in a meeting in Boston on the afternoon of September 10 to discuss his interest in buying the Boston Red Sox baseball team and had booked a seat on Flight 11 the next morning. [29] Werner was a partner and co-founder of Carsey-Werner-Mandabach, Hollywood's largest independent TV studio, and is also a longtime friend of Bill and Hillary Clinton. [30] The meeting ended earlier than Werner expected, so he arranged to fly to New York to spend the evening with his girlfriend, television host Katie Couric. Consequently, according to journalist and author Seth Mnookin, instead of taking Flight 11, he flew to Los Angeles from New York on September 11. [31] However, the FBI document that lists passengers who canceled reservations for Flight 11 contradicts this account, according to which Werner changed his plans late in the afternoon of September 10. Instead, it states that Werner's reservation on Flight 11 was canceled on the afternoon of September 6. [32]
<br><br>Paris Barclay, an award-winning television producer and director who'd worked on shows such as <i>NYPD Blue</i>, was booked on Flight 11 along with his partner Christopher Mason, an executive in the food industry. The couple was due to return to Los Angeles on September 11 after spending a month in Boston. But at the last minute they decided to fly back early, on the night of September 10. "We thought, 'Why hang around another day?'" Mason has recalled. [33]
<br><br><b>PEOPLE CONNECTED TO THE MUSIC INDUSTRY NARROWLY AVOIDED BEING ON FLIGHT 11</b>
<br>Some individuals with connections to the music industry were booked on Flight 11, but their lives were saved due to changes to their schedules. One such person was Leighanne Littrell, the wife of Brian Littrell, a member of the Backstreet Boys, one of the most successful boy bands of all time. The Backstreet Boys were in Boston in the days before 9/11 for their Black and Blue tour. While the band was going to head on to Toronto, Leighanne was set to go to Los Angeles on September 11 on Flight 11. But on September 10, she told her husband she did not want to take the flight. She said: "I feel really, really bad about going. I don't know what it is." Brian told her she needed to take the flight, but, Leighanne has recalled, "Something kept telling me, 'You can't go.'" She finally broke down and said, "I can't do it." Brian therefore told her, "God, if you feel that strongly about it, cancel it," and so, fortunately, she avoided being on the hijacked plane. [34]
<br><br>The members of an up-and-coming teen R&B group called Code 5 reportedly "lived to tell about their good luck because their original travel plans to take the ill-fated American Airlines Flight 11 from Boston to Los Angeles were scrapped at the last minute." To save money, Steve Salem, their manager, had switched the band to a cheaper flight out of Boston on September 11 that had a stopover in Minneapolis. [35]
<br><br>The acclaimed jazz pianist and composer Danilo Pérez was scheduled to appear at the Latin Grammy Awards on the evening of September 11. He was consequently scheduled to fly to Los Angeles that morning "on one of the planes out of Logan International Airport that crashed into the World Trade Center," according to the <i>Boston Herald</i>. Whether that plane would have been Flight 11 or Flight 175 is unstated. But Pérez "canceled his reservation on the Los Angeles-bound flight ... a few weeks before." [36]
<br><br>A few other individuals with links to the entertainment industry were also originally booked either on Flight 11 or an unspecified one of the hijacked flights. Erica Ferencik, a real estate agent who also wrote and performed standup comedy and wrote jokes for late-night television host David Letterman, was, along with her husband, booked on "one of the planes that were hijacked by terrorists and crashed into the World Trade Center," according to the <i>Boston Business Journal</i>. Whether that was Flight 11 or Flight 175 is unstated. But, "Wanting to avoid an early morning, Ferencik convinced her husband to switch their tickets to a later flight just days before September 11." [37]
<br><br>An unnamed television sound engineer told Canadian journalist Jonathan Kay, while Kay was in California working on a TV project, that he "had been booked on one of the hijacked 9/11 airliners." (Kay has not stated which of the hijacked flights the man was booked on.) But the sound engineer missed the flight. "He was a no show, thanks to a last-minute assignment," Kay wrote. [38]
<br><br>A couple of well-known actors have said friends of theirs were booked on Flight 11 but missed the flight. Although it is not certain, there is surely a fair chance that these unnamed individuals worked in the entertainment industry. Academy Award-winning actress Helen Hunt, the star of movies such as <i>What Women Want</i> and <i>As Good as it Gets</i>, recalled, "I had a friend booked on Flight 11, but who, an hour earlier, decided to take another flight." [39] And Tom Sizemore, who starred in <i>Natural Born Killers</i> and <i>Saving Private Ryan</i>, said, "I had a friend who was supposed to be on Flight 11, but his mother wanted him to visit her one more day," and so he missed the doomed flight. [40]
<br><br><b>SPORTSMEN AND JOURNALISTS WERE SCHEDULED TO TAKE FLIGHT 11</b>
<br>A couple of people who canceled reservations for Flight 11 worked in professional sport. Brad Thomas, a member of the New Britain Rock Cats baseball team, and his future wife, Kylie, had tickets for Flight 11, as they intended to fly home to Australia via Los Angeles at the end of the baseball season. But the Rock Cats advanced to the Eastern League finals, which were scheduled to begin on September 11, and so they no longer needed to take Flight 11. [41]
<br><br>And Al Skinner, head coach of the Boston College Eagles basketball team, was scheduled to fly to Los Angeles on Flight 11 on a recruiting trip. But on the night of September 10, Bobby Jones, the player he was going to try and recruit, called and asked him if he could reschedule the trip, and so Skinner avoided being on the hijacked plane. [42]
<br><br>Several reporters were also originally booked on Flight 11. Charlene Smith, a South African journalist and author, wrote that her ex-husband, who worked as a journalist for the <i>Los Angeles Times</i>, had been visiting relatives in Boston and was due to return to Los Angeles on Flight 11. But, Smith wrote, "He was in line to board when the <i>LA Times</i> called and said, 'We need you to go to Atlanta; do you have time to switch?'" Her ex-husband therefore "stepped out of the line" and took a flight to Atlanta. [43]
<br><br>Diane Pucin, a sports writer at the <i>Los Angeles Times</i>, has written that she "was briefly booked on American Flight 11." She was due to fly from Boston to Los Angeles on September 10 after covering the U.S. Open tennis tournament, but on September 8 an editor called her and asked if she could stay on the East Coast for an extra day and write from a baseball game on the night of September 10. Pucin agreed and then called American Airlines to change her reservation to September 11. She was offered a morning flight--Flight 11--or an afternoon flight. She decided to take Flight 11. However, Pucin wrote, "At the very last moment, just as the agent was giving me the new itinerary, I apologized and asked if I could change to the afternoon flight." Pucin's reason for wanting to change flights, she wrote, was that she was "inherently not a morning person and because the precious sticker upgrade that I had gotten on Flight 11 was also available on the later flight." The agent said Pucin could switch to the afternoon flight and changed her reservation. [44]
<br><br>Ben Elkin, an editor at NPR, was staying with his girlfriend, Brooke, in Los Angeles at the start of September 2001. He wanted to go to Boston to complete a training course he was taking, so he booked a flight there on September 6; his return flight was Flight 11 on September 11. But when Elkin reminded Brooke about his planned trip a couple of days before he was scheduled to fly out, she said she didn't want him to go. She just had a "bad feeling," she said, but Elkin should go if he wanted to. "I thought about it for a second and decided not to." Elkin has recalled. [45]
<br><br><b>PEOPLE FROM VARIOUS BACKGROUNDS WERE ORIGINALLY BOOKED ON FLIGHT 11</b>
<br>Other people who canceled reservations for Flight 11 or kept their reservations but still missed the flight came from a variety of backgrounds.
<br><br>Sheila Donnelly Theroux, the owner of a public relations firm in Hawaii, was booked on Flight 11, but reportedly changed her booking on the night of September 10 "due to a non-related development in Cape Cod, where she was staying." [46] Sheila Donnelly Theroux is the wife of the best-selling novelist and travel writer Paul Theroux, author of more than 40 books including <i>The Mosquito Coast</i> and <i>The Great Railway Bazaar</i>. Paul Theroux has recalled that he was traveling with his wife in the week before 9/11 and arrived with her in Boston on September 9. He has not stated whether he too was originally booked on Flight 11. [47]
<br><br>Elisabeth Allison was booked on Flight 11 but, for unstated reasons, "changed the booking at the last minute to the following day." [48] Elisabeth Allison is the wife of Graham Allison, who is described as "a leading analyst of U.S. national security and defense policy with a special interest in nuclear weapons, terrorism, and decision-making." He served as an assistant secretary of defense under President Clinton, as special adviser to the secretary of defense under President Reagan, and as a member of the Defense Policy Board. He has also been a director of the Council on Foreign Relations and was a founding member of the Trilateral Commission. [49]
<br><br>Gerry Moylan, who was a popular disc jockey at major radio stations in the 1980s and co-founded a successful Internet consulting company in the 1990s, was booked on Flight 11 but, late on the afternoon of September 10, changed his reservation to a flight at 11:00 a.m. on September 11. [50]
<br><br>Andy Ellis, chief security officer at Internet content delivery company Akamai Technologies, was originally booked on Flight 11. But, reportedly, "His travel arrangements were rescheduled, putting him on a September 12 flight." [51]
<br><br>A group from Arnold Worldwide, Boston's biggest advertising agency, was scheduled to be on Flight 11 but switched to a flight on September 10, because "the client wanted them to come a day earlier." [52]
<br><br>Boston real estate developer Stephen Weiner and his wife, Roberta, were "booked to fly on one of the two California-bound flights from Boston that crashed into the World Trade Center towers on September 11," according to publicist George Regan, but missed the flight. Regan did not say whether the Weiners were booked on Flight 11 or Flight 175. [53]
<br><br>Herbert Zarkin, chairman of BJ's Wholesale Club, had a ticket for Flight 11 but canceled it on September 8, according to <i>CFO</i> magazine. [54] But according to the FBI document that lists passengers who canceled their reservations for Flight 11, Zarkin did not cancel his reservation but simply failed to turn up for the flight on September 11. [55]
<br><br>Tom Christo and his wife, Ellen, a pair of lawyers and longtime Republican Party activists, were scheduled to be on Flight 11. But, Christo said, "At the last moment, we rescheduled and took a flight out of Boston to Chicago instead." [56]
<br><br>Nicholas Reihner, a legal assistant, was meant to be on Flight 11 but missed the flight because he had "twisted his ankle while hiking during a vacation to Bar Harbor, Maine." [57]
<br><br>Susan Yahn, a real estate agent, and her husband Peter MacPherson, a sales manager for a software company, had planned a trip to Hawaii and intended to fly there via Los Angeles. "With three kids to take care of, they don't fly together, just in case," the <i>Boston Globe</i> reported. Yahn was therefore booked on Flight 11 and MacPherson was booked on "a United Airlines flight" on September 11. Presumably his plane was Flight 175, although this has not been stated explicitly. Fortunately, MacPherson decided to change his plans and fly on September 10, and Yahn decided to take a later flight so she could see her children off at the school bus stop on September 11. Yahn told the <i>Boston Globe</i> that "she felt as though both she and her husband narrowly escaped death." [58]
<br><br>Greg Miller, an information technology consultant in Los Angeles, went to New York with his wife, Meredith, and two daughters on September 8 for a family reunion. Meredith, who "always makes the flight arrangements," had arranged for them to fly home early on the morning of September 11 via Boston. The Millers had therefore been booked on Flight 11. But Miller has recalled that he told his wife he "didn't want to get up early on the last day of our trip" and so he "asked her to change the flight to a later time in the day." Even though Meredith "had already booked the tickets, she took the extra effort and changed them." [59]
<br><br>Jacob Herbst, the founder and CEO of software development company FilesX, was in Boston on business and, on September 11, was booked on Flight 11 so he could visit friends in Los Angeles and then head to Silicon Valley. But on September 10, a friend of his suggested he meet with a potential employee for his company. Herbst met that man at 6:00 a.m. the next morning. However, according to Herbst, the meeting lasted longer than he'd expected and he then got delayed in traffic on the way to Logan Airport. He consequently was too late to catch Flight 11. [60]
<br><br>Rick Morin, a senior consultant in the wireless telecommunications industry, was originally scheduled to be on Flight 11. But Ron Gerber, the CEO of IT event company Angelbeat, invited him to speak at a trade show in Los Angeles. Therefore, to attend the show, Morin changed his plans at the last minute and flew to Los Angeles on September 10. [61]
<br><br>Gerry Zimmerman, vice president of product assurance at Raytheon, a defense and aerospace systems company, was scheduled to be on Flight 11. But, reportedly, "A last-minute change of corporate plans sent her to Florida." [62]
<br><br>Joseph Jareck, vice president and general manager of an independent distributor of electronic components, was scheduled to fly from Islip, New York, to Boston on September 10 and then take Flight 11 the following day. But "because there was wheel trouble with the flight out of Islip, the airline put Jareck in a taxi to New York's JFK International Airport, where he flew to Los Angeles on Monday [September 10] instead." [63]
<br><br>Deborah Bernstein, a management consultant at PricewaterhouseCoopers, was "supposed to be on one of the LA-bound planes," according to the <i>Boston Globe</i>. Whether this was Flight 11 or Flight 175 is unstated. But the meeting she was meant to attend in California "was canceled and she stayed in Boston." [64]
<br><br>Max Mandle, a product manager for workforce management software and services company Kronos Incorporated, "had tickets on one of the four flights that were hijacked" on September 11, according to Andy Wenzel, a friend and former work colleague of his. Mandle's intended flight, according to Wenzel, was "one from Boston to LA," although whether this was Flight 11 or Flight 175 is unstated. But, Wenzel wrote, "Max switched flights at the last minute." This was because "some meeting details couldn't be worked out before his trip" and so "he decided to fly out earlier" than September 11. [65]
<br><br>Eric McNulty, a writer, speaker, and adviser, was scheduled to be on Flight 11 on September 11 but changed his plans and flew on September 10 instead. "My trip was moved a day because of when the Jewish holidays fell," McNulty has written. [66]
<br><br>Mike Marshall from Carlsbad, California, had gone with his baby daughter to visit relatives in Massachusetts at the start of September 2001. The two were scheduled to fly home on September 10 along with Marshall's mother, but on September 9 the daughter came down with an ear infection. Not wanting her to fly while she was sick, Marshall booked a "backup flight," getting tickets for himself, his daughter, and his mother on a later flight: Flight 11 on September 11. But on September 10, the daughter reportedly woke up fully recovered and so the Marshalls caught their original flight to California later that day. [67]
<br><br>Craig Sanders was supposed to be on Flight 11, his father, Lewis Sanders, said, but "didn't get on the flight because it was full." Lewis Sanders said that when his son "got to Logan Airport and prepared to board Flight 11, he was told the flight has been oversold and all seats were taken." (And yet, supposedly, only 51 percent of the seats on Flight 11 were taken.) Craig was instead put on a flight to New York that left shortly after Flight 11. [68]
<br><br>Ally Carnes was reportedly scheduled to be on "the flight from Boston to Los Angeles ... that crashed into the World Trade Center." Whether this was Flight 11 or Flight 175 is unstated. But, she said, "I wanted to get out earlier and be in LA earlier, so I switched to a flight an hour earlier." "My entire family thought I was dead" on September 11, she added. [69]
<br><br>Los Angeles resident Craig McFarland was supposed to be on Flight 11, but he "exchanged his ticket at the last minute and saved his life." [70]
<br><br>Neil Johnson, from Mansfield, Massachusetts, was originally meant to be on Flight 11, but reportedly "changed his flight, a decision that saved his life." [71]
<br><br>Chris Olney reported that "he was booked on Flight 11 on September 11, but had his meeting canceled at the last minute." [72]
<br><br>Ernie Gerbasi originally made a reservation on Flight 11. But on September 6, he switched to Delta Air Lines Flight 1989, another flight from Boston to Los Angeles, which took off shortly after Flight 11 and Flight 175 on September 11. Gerbasi changed flights, he has written, "to preserve my air miles." [73]
<br><br>Nick Colarossi was scheduled to take Flight 11 in order to attend a business meeting in California, but changed his plans and avoided being on the doomed flight. His explanation for doing so was: "I had just gotten back from a trip. It was my wife's birthday. It was my little one's first full day of school and I didn't want to miss all that. I just didn't feel like going." "My boss wasn't too happy with me," he added. [74]
<br><br>Alice Seltzer was on vacation in Austria with her daughter in the days before 9/11. For her journey home she was scheduled to fly to Boston on September 10 and then take Flight 11 from there to Los Angeles the following morning. But while she was in Austria, Seltzer asked her daughter to change her September 11 flight to a flight on September 10. This was because she had decided not to spend the night of September 10 in Boston. "I didn't want to unpack my luggage and then pack it again at the hotel," she has explained. Consequently, on September 10, Seltzer flew from Austria to Atlanta, Georgia, and then from there to Los Angeles. [75]
<br><br>Jason Greene, a firefighter from Exeter, New Hampshire, and his fiancée, Valerie, were scheduled to take Flight 11 to Los Angeles, from where they would take another flight to Las Vegas, where they planned to get married. Jason's parents, Fred and Donna Greene, were going to travel with them. But a "last-minute change in travel plans" reportedly "saved their lives." According to Valerie, they all switched to a flight out of Manchester, New Hampshire, after they learned it would be "not only more convenient for them, but also less expensive." [76]
<br><br>Tom Johnston and his wife, Peggy, spent the weekend before 9/11 in Massachusetts so Tom could attend his high school reunion. Tom had booked the couple on Flight 11 for their journey home, but Peggy wanted to take a later flight. "They actually got in a big fight," their daughter, Kim Sullivan, said. "She basically wanted to spend another day with her mom" who lived in Massachusetts. Therefore, on September 9, the couple changed their return flight to one that left Logan Airport at 5:30 p.m. on September 11. [77]
<br><br>John Frechette, who worked for the Los Angeles Visitors Bureau, was a frequent flier on Flight 11. He was scheduled to take the flight on September 11, but decided to cancel. He told his mother he did so because he needed a break from his exhausting routine. "He had never canceled before," his mother has said. [78]
<br><br>David Anders, from Honolulu, was booked on Flight 11, but called American Airlines and paid an extra $100 to fly out of Boston on September 8 instead of September 11. "I decided I had nothing really to keep me there," Anders has explained. [79]
<br><br>Doyin and Shola Richards, twin brothers living on the East Coast, planned to visit Los Angeles from September 11 to September 14 and were booked on Flight 11 to get there. But on September 8 Shola told his brother he wanted to fly out a day earlier than planned so they could spend an extra day in Los Angeles. Despite Doyin's opposition to the idea, Shola paid the extra fees and changed their reservations. "We would be dead today if he didn't change our departure date from Tuesday to Monday," Doyin has commented. [80]
<br><br>Carmen Gutierrez said her son, Manuel, who was in the Army and lived in Texas, was meant to be on one of the planes that crashed into the World Trade Center. Whether that plane was Flight 11 or Flight 175 is unreported. But, Manuel told his mother, he made a last-minute business-related phone call before boarding and consequently, by the time he went to check in for the flight, the plane had already taken off. [81]
<br><br>Ashley Ezell recalled that her uncle was "scheduled to fly on the plane that hit the first tower" of the World Trade Center, presumably referring to Flight 11. But he reportedly "missed the flight by 10 minutes." [82]
<br><br>Olivia Putihrai recalled that on September 11, her brother "was about to take a flight from Boston to LA." Whether this was Flight 11 or Flight 175 is unstated. But, she said, "He canceled at the last minute because he broke up with his girlfriend." A friend of her brother's who was traveling with him reportedly "died on that flight." [83]
<br><br>Susan Kagel from Montrose, California, said that her "mother and sister were supposed to be on one of the planes" that was hijacked. That plane was reportedly one of the flights that took off from Boston, but whether it was Flight 11 or Flight 175 is unstated. But some time after the second tower of the World Trade Center was hit, Kagel "got word that her mother and sister had changed their flight." They had reportedly switched to a later flight. [84]
<br><br>Columnist Beverly Beckham wrote that the husband of her longtime friend, "Rosemary," had been "scheduled to take Flight 11." However, "He changed his plans" and flew out of Providence, Rhode Island, "because the airfare was cheaper." [85]
<br><br>Len Emmons, former boys' soccer coach at Masconomet Regional High School in Topsfield, Massachusetts, recalled that on September 11, "One player, keeper David Doucette, heard from his father who was originally booked on one of the planes that were flown into the World Trade Center." Whether that was Flight 11 or Flight 175 is unstated. Fortunately, Doucette's father "decided to switch it up and go to a meeting in Canada." [86]
<br><br><b>SOME PILOTS AND FLIGHT ATTENDANTS CHANGED THEIR PLANS AND AVOIDED WORKING FLIGHT 11</b>
<br>Several individuals who were originally scheduled to be crew members on Flight 11 changed their plans and--like these passengers--avoided being on the doomed flight.
<br><br>Walter Sorenson was going to be the pilot of Flight 11 on September 11. But, reportedly, he was replaced at the "last minute" by John Ogonowski. This was because Ogonowski "requested to fly that day" and "had seniority over Sorenson." [87]
<br><br>Flight attendant Halle Cameron was scheduled to work Flight 11. But on September 10, when she returned home after playing in a golf tournament, she felt unwell. Consequently, she called American Airlines' automated scheduling line that night and withdrew from the flight. [88]
<br><br>Ann Moreland was contacted by American Airlines on September 9 and asked to be the purser (the chief flight attendant) on Flight 11. She agreed and was therefore scheduled to work the flight on September 11. However, the airline subsequently called her again and said it had found another purser for Flight 11, so she could take a mini-leave until she was scheduled. [89]
<br><br>Marilyn Gates was supposed to be a flight attendant on Flight 11. But she "switched her schedule so she could take her father to a doctor's appointment." [90]
<br><br>And flight attendant Joyce Olver was scheduled to work Flight 11. But in April 2001, a passenger had stepped on her foot. Olver waited several months before having it checked out. Her doctor found her foot had been broken and, on September 5, told her to take time off work until she could have surgery. Olver was therefore safe at home on September 11. [91]
<br><br><b>SEVEN PEOPLE RESERVED SEATS THROUGH A PAKISTANI TRAVEL AGENCY, THEN MISSED THE PLANE</b>
<br>The FBI learned, shortly after 9/11, of a particularly notable instance of people booking seats on Flight 11 but then missing the flight. Linda Emley, an employee of a company that operates an airline reservation website used by travel agencies, had noticed a suspicious occurrence of seven individuals reserving seats but then failing to turn up for the flight.
<br><br>Emley found that Interavia Pakistan Ltd., a travel agency based in Karachi, had booked seven seats on Flight 11 on the night of September 10. These were for individuals with the names Mr. K. Cooper, Mrs. S. Cooper, Ms. A. Cooper, Ms. P. Cooper, Ms. O. Noris, Ms. E. Noris, and Ms. W. Noris. At the same time, reservations had been made for these seven individuals on another aircraft, TWA Flight 342, from Los Angeles to St. Louis, which was set to depart on September 11 at 7:55 a.m. Pacific Standard Time and arrive at 1:24 p.m. Central Standard Time. As this plane would have been in the air at the same time as Flight 11, the seven individuals could not possibly have made use of both of their reservations.
<br><br>The FBI, which interviewed Emley, identified a number of oddities with the reservations that, it stated, required "further inquiry." These include the fact that no first names were given for any of the seven people who made the reservations, in violation of standard American Airlines policy; no information regarding credit cards, addresses, or telephone numbers was contained in the passenger name record for any of the individuals--again against standard American Airlines practice; although the reservations were made through a Pakistani travel agency, none of the individuals had surnames normally associated with Pakistan; none of them had any previous travel history with American Airlines; and all of the tickets reserved were one-way only, without a return flight. [92]
<br><br>Whether the FBI conducted any "further inquiry" into this matter and, if so, what was discovered is unknown.
<br><br><b>THE FBI INVESTIGATED PEOPLE WHO WERE ORIGINALLY BOOKED ON FLIGHT 11 BUT MISSED THE PLANE</b>
<br>The FBI appears to have had suspicions about the large number of people who canceled their reservations for Flight 11 or had reservations but failed to turn up for the flight (it referred to these individuals as "no shows"). In the early stages of its investigation of the 9/11 attacks, its Dallas, Texas, office actually examined how many people canceled their reservations or were no shows for Flight 11 and tried to determine if any of these individuals had links to the alleged 9/11 hijackers or their associates.
<br><br>The FBI reported that information it received from American Airlines reservation records indicated that 164 reservations were made for Flight 11. Of these, 65 individuals canceled their reservations prior to the plane departing from Logan Airport on September 11 and 17 individuals were no shows for the flight. There were 82 passengers on the plane, according to the FBI. [93] However, the 9/11 Commission later determined that there were 81 passengers on Flight 11. [94]
<br><br>The Dallas FBI office compiled a database that supposedly included all the available information on the people who'd had reservations, or were noted on the manifest, for Flight 11. This list included everyone who was actually on the plane, those who canceled their reservation prior to departure, and those who were no shows.
<br><br>The FBI's list can be viewed on the Internet. [95] It shows that some individuals canceled their reservations for Flight 11 several months before September 11--a few people canceled as early as April or May 2001. Other individuals canceled their reservations later on, such as early in September or even on the morning of September 11.
<br><br>While the list includes the names of some of the individuals whose accounts I have described above--such as Seth MacFarlane, Tom Werner, and Tom Duffield--most of the people it describes as having canceled their reservations or being no shows are additional to those I have mentioned. Furthermore, most of the individuals whose accounts I have described are not mentioned in the FBI's list.
<br><br>This suggests that the actual numbers of people who canceled their reservations or were no shows for Flight 11 were significantly higher than the FBI determined. The reason for this is unknown. Did American Airlines perhaps withhold information from the FBI?
<br><br>Furthermore, a few individuals--such as David Angell, Antonio Montoya, and Xavier Suarez--are described as having canceled their reservations for Flight 11, even though they were on the plane on September 11. The reason for this is also unknown.
<br><br><b>MANY PEOPLE CANCELED THEIR RESERVATIONS OR WERE 'NO SHOWS' FOR FLIGHT 175</b>
<br>United Airlines Flight 175, the second plane to be hijacked on September 11, was, like Flight 11, a Boeing 767 bound from Logan International Airport in Boston to Los Angeles. It took off from Logan Airport at 8:14 a.m. and crashed into the World Trade Center at 9:03 a.m.
<br><br>The plane had a capacity of 168 passengers but had 56 on board that day. As with Flight 11, many people who had reservations for Flight 175 either canceled their reservations or failed to turn up for the flight. Nine passengers with reservations failed to turn up for Flight 175, according to the <i>9/11 Commission Report</i>. [96] The accounts below describe many other individuals who also avoided being on the plane.
<br><br>Numerous people who had reservations for Flight 175 but missed the flight were interviewed by the FBI as part of its investigation of the 9/11 attacks. Some of these people said they were booked on Flight 175 because they were assigned to the flight for the return leg of a journey for which they only intended to travel one way. They had bought a round-trip ticket because it was cheaper than a one-way ticket.
<br><br>Emily Dunkel had a reservation on Flight 175 that was made by her mother, Patricia Dunkel. Emily only required a one-way flight from California to Massachusetts, on August 30. But her mother told the FBI she had bought a round-trip ticket as it was cheaper than a one-way flight. She said she "never expected her daughter to actually take the 9/11/2001 return flight." [97]
<br><br>Kelly Kawahara, a student from Hawaii, bought a round-trip ticket from Honolulu to Boston. She told the FBI that "the travel agent arbitrarily chose the return leg to be United Airlines Flight 175 on September 11." She said that "she never had any intention of returning on September 11 and planned to use that portion of the ticket to return for either Thanksgiving or Christmas." It was "merely coincidental that she was booked to fly on Flight 175 on September 11," she said. [98]
<br><br>Charles Marcus was booked on Flight 175, but, he told the FBI, he never intended to take the flight. He had to travel from Los Angeles to Boston on September 7. Although he only needed a one-way ticket, he purchased a round-trip ticket as it was significantly cheaper, which was why he had a reservation on Flight 175. Marcus told the FBI that this process, known as "inside-out" ticketing in the airline industry, "was frowned upon by the airlines, but was still a common way to save on the cost of one-way airfares." [99]
<br><br>Renee Yong purchased a round-trip ticket from Los Angeles to Boston, as she was going to start studying at a school in Boston on September 4. She bought a round-trip ticket simply because it was cheaper than a one-way ticket. She selected September 11 as her return date, but had no intention of using the return ticket, which was for Flight 175. [100]
<br><br>Elizabeth Swain originally had a reservation on Flight 175 because, in early August 2001, she'd booked a round-trip ticket from Los Angeles to Boston. She'd flown to Boston on August 17 or 18 and was scheduled to return to Los Angeles on September 11 on Flight 175. However, a business client of hers called and asked if she could come to California to meet some time earlier than September 11. Swain agreed and consequently flew back to California on September 9, thereby avoiding being on the hijacked flight. Swain's husband, Thomas, and daughter, Megan, flew to Boston with her in August and also had reservations on Flight 175, but they didn't use these. [101] Thomas Swain told the FBI that neither he nor Megan intended to fly to Los Angeles on September 11, but they had round-trip tickets as these were cheaper than one-way tickets. They were consequently no shows for the flight on September 11. [102]
<br><br>Other people who made reservations on Flight 175 but missed the flight had--at least originally--intended to take the flight on September 11.
<br><br>Barry Bycoff, CEO of the security software company Netegrity, was booked on Flight 175 in order to attend a conference in California, but missed the flight due to various delays on the way to and at the airport. These included "a truck breakdown in Weymouth, a six-car accident on the Expressway at East Milton Square, and a work crew on the access road to the Ted Williams Tunnel," Bycoff told the FBI. After he arrived at the airport, Bycoff was delayed by a security officer who wanted to check his briefcase. By the time he reached the departure gate, it had already closed. [103]
<br><br>John Caney, who worked for a company that sold photographic studio lighting equipment, was scheduled to be on Flight 175 along with his wife, Deborah, as he had to meet some clients in Los Angeles. But his clients were unable to meet him until later in the week of September 11, so in the week before 9/11, he rescheduled his flight to September 13. [104]
<br><br>Iain Cockburn, an economist, was scheduled to be on Flight 175 as he was set to testify at a trial in Los Angeles on behalf of Watson Pharmaceuticals. But on September 9, he received an e-mail, which stated that the lawsuit had been settled and so he was no longer needed in Los Angeles. Cockburn therefore canceled his reservation on Flight 175. [105]
<br><br>Someone called Tatchui Soo, who had lived in Australia, was originally scheduled to be on Flight 175, but changed to another flight. The FBI was unable to locate Soo and find out why they'd changed their reservation. [106]
<br><br>A person from Singapore called Litchen Liew had a reservation on Flight 175 but changed to another flight. The FBI was similarly apparently unable to make contact with Liew after September 11 to determine why they changed their reservation. [107]
<br><br>Brad Thompson was originally scheduled to be on Flight 175 but changed to another flight. The FBI was apparently unable to locate him after September 11 to question him about this. [108]
<br><br>Henry Stern was booked on Flight 175 but changed to another flight. The FBI was similarly unable to locate Stern to ask him about why he did this. [109]
<br><br>And the FBI was unable to locate Lindsey Harper, who was also booked on Flight 175 but changed to another flight. [110]
<br><br>Scott Lange and his friend Eddie Seileh were in Boston on vacation at the start of September 2001, and were scheduled to fly home to California on Flight 175. But Lange received a phone call from his mother and, apparently based on what she said (which is unstated), he and Seileh decided to return to California on the next available flight. They consequently avoided being on the hijacked plane. [111]
<br><br>Caroline Soeung was due to take Flight 175 after visiting her parents in Rhode Island. But she woke up on September 11 with the flu, and her mother did not want her to leave so early to catch her flight while she was feeling ill. Soeung therefore changed her reservation to a flight late that afternoon. [112]
<br><br>William Travers and his wife, Joanne, planned to go to a wedding in Vermont on September 8 and then meet with friends in Boston on September 10 before flying home to California on Flight 175 the following day. But on September 7, the contractor who was building their new home told Travers he intended to begin groundbreaking on the home on September 13. Travers therefore changed his plans and, with his wife, flew back to California on September 10, so he could attend the groundbreaking. [113]
<br><br>Wilbert Lick traveled to Vermont around September 6 to visit his sister and was originally scheduled to return home to California on Flight 175 after visiting friends in Boston on the night of September 10. But Lick ended up visiting his friends on September 9 and so he decided to fly home a day early, on September 10. [114]
<br><br>Poyi Huang flew from California to Boston to visit some friends and was originally booked on Flight 175 for his return journey, but changed to another flight. However, when questioned by the FBI after September 11, Huang appeared unclear about why he had done this. He said that he "recalled leaving the San Francisco airport on the Monday before September 11, 2001, but was unsure of the exact day he traveled." He added that he "does not recall being scheduled for UA Flight 175, nor does he recall why he changed his return flight." [115]
<br><br>The FBI contacted Sadie Ann Herrera after September 11 because it had "information suggesting that she was scheduled on UA Flight 175 on September 11." Herrera, though, was apparently unaware of this. She told the FBI that on September 11, she "was scheduled to travel on United Airlines Flight 174 [i.e. not Flight 175] from Los Angeles to Boston, to depart at 8:05 a.m. and arrive at 4:33 p.m.," in order to attend a business meeting in Massachusetts on September 12. She was set to return to California on September 13, on United Airlines Flight 51. [116]
<br><br>Ormande Brown was similarly apparently booked on Flight 175 but unaware of this. Brown told the FBI that on September 11 he in fact traveled on United Airlines Flight 1689, which left Boston at 8:05 a.m. for Denver, Colorado. He said he knew "nothing about having been booked on United Airlines Flight 175" and that "he did not change his reservation." [117]
<br><br>Thomas Iandiorio was visiting the East Coast in September 2001 for his sister's graduation and was scheduled to return to California on Flight 175, but apparently his reservation was canceled. Iandiorio explained to the FBI that when he checked in at the United Airlines ticket counter at the airport, "he was informed that he was bumped from his flight to another UA flight that left at the same time as UA Flight 175." That flight, he said, had a stopover in Denver and arrived in Los Angeles about 20 minutes earlier than Flight 175 would have. Iandiorio told the FBI that he had "been wondering ever since September 11, 2001, why he was bumped [from Flight 175] for no reason at all." [118]
<br><br>Howard Englander was originally booked on Flight 175 but changed to another flight. Englander told the FBI he had a home in California he regularly visited and he also traveled extensively for his business, but he had no knowledge of being booked on Flight 175. A woman who said she often changed flight arrangements for Englander, but whose name is unstated, told the FBI she had canceled Englander's reservation on Flight 175, although she apparently did not say why. With the credit from this flight, she said, she booked him on another flight with a different destination. [119]
<br><br>Dennis McCarthy, a sales manager for a company that handles convenience store products, had flown to Boston to see his broker and was scheduled to take Flight 175 for his return journey. But his business with his broker finished early and so, on September 7, he changed his reservation and traveled to Los Angeles on an earlier flight. [120]
<br><br>Jennifer Fisher had to go to California for a photography shoot. She was meant to attend a meeting in Massachusetts on September 10 and was scheduled to fly out on Flight 175 the following day. But the meeting was canceled, and so Fisher changed her reservation and flew to Los Angeles a day early, on September 10. [121]
<br><br>Shelagh Kelly, who worked for Viant Corp., an Internet consulting company, was scheduled to travel to California on Flight 175 for a business trip. But she changed to another flight on September 10 because it was cheaper. [122]
<br><br>Alfred Schwartzer and his wife, Rose Schwartzer, were booked on Flight 175 as they intended to visit their daughter in California. However, according to their son, David Schwartzer, Rose "was not ready to travel to California" at that time and so she canceled their reservations. [123]
<br><br>Paul Connolly, a salesman, was scheduled to fly from Boston to Los Angeles on Flight 175 for a business trip. However, several weeks before September 11, he moved to a new home. He therefore switched to a flight out of Manchester, New Hampshire, which was nearer to his new home than Boston was. [124]
<br><br>Matthew McRoberts, who worked in marketing, was booked on Flight 175 as he was meant to attend a meeting in California. However, because he needed to attend another meeting in Boston, he had to change his flight to one that departed later on September 11. [125]
<br><br>Christopher Kozloski, a salesman, was booked on Flight 175 so he could attend a meeting in California on September 11. But on September 7 the meeting was rescheduled for September 10. Kozloski therefore changed to a flight on September 9. Curiously, as an "alternate flight," Kozloski's travel agent also made a reservation for him on Flight 11. But, according to the FBI document that lists passengers who canceled reservations for Flight 11, that reservation was canceled on August 30. [126]
<br><br>Retiree Joseph Braga and his aunt, Maria Chaves, were originally booked on Flight 175. But they changed their reservations to a Southwest Airlines flight that took off from Providence, Rhode Island, on September 11 because, Braga said, the tickets were over $200 cheaper. [127]
<br><br>Christie Turner was scheduled to be on Flight 175 but, she told the FBI, had to change her plans and go to Minneapolis because her father-in-law had died. She therefore took a Northwest Airlines flight to Minneapolis on September 11. [128]
<br><br>Laila Partridge originally had a reservation on Flight 175 because she had to go to California for a business meeting. But she canceled her reservation, she said, because the meeting was postponed and she had other business she was attending to on the East Coast. [129]
<br><br>Thomas Haugen, who worked in the trading industry, was scheduled to be on Flight 175. He told the FBI he missed the flight because a meeting he was meant to attend in Boston on the morning of September 11 "was postponed due to a client running late." (Presumably the meeting was meant to have taken place very early, and so, had it occurred at the scheduled time, Haugen would have had time to make Flight 175 after it ended.) [130]
<br><br>While the FBI investigated and, when possible, questioned the individuals described above who'd had reservations for Flight 175 but missed the flight, whether it also interviewed the individuals described below who'd had reservations for Flight 175 is unstated.
<br><br><b>INDIVIDUALS FROM VARIOUS BACKGROUNDS WERE ORIGINALLY BOOKED ON FLIGHT 175, BUT MISSED THE FLIGHT</b>
<br>Martin Wilson and Angie Smith, a director and a producer who ran Soul Films, an Australian film production company, were booked on Flight 175. But, for unknown reasons, they changed their reservations and flew a day earlier than originally planned, on September 10. [131]
<br><br>Arlene Burns reserved a seat on Flight 175 but canceled it a few days before September 11 in order to meet with an old friend that day. Burns is a world-class kayaker and had spent much of the decade before 9/11 working as a freelance broadcaster for ESPN, NBC, PBS, National Geographic, and other TV networks. "I may have been destined to die that day and I somehow sidestepped my own fate," she has commented. [132]
<br><br>Ruth Denison, a Buddhist elder who was one of the first teachers to bring Vipassana meditation to the West, had been teaching at the Insight Meditation Society in Massachusetts and was booked on Flight 175 for her trip home to California. But she has recalled that on September 10, "She decided to delay her departure in order to do some sightseeing in Boston," and so she "missed that plane." [133]
<br><br>Muffet McGraw, the coach of the Notre Dame women's basketball team, was booked on Flight 175 for a recruiting trip to California. But the week before 9/11, her assistant coach Kevin McGuff convinced her to change her plans and join him on a flight out of Providence, Rhode Island. "He was pretty stubborn," McGraw has recalled. "Had it been another assistant, I would have gotten on the plane [i.e. Flight 175]." [134]
<br><br>Bruce Boudreau, head coach of the American Hockey League team the Manchester Monarchs, and assistant coach Bobby Jay were booked on Flight 175 so they could get to Los Angeles for the start of the Los Angeles Kings training camp. (The Manchester Monarchs are the Los Angeles Kings' American Hockey League affiliate.) But Andy Murray, head coach of the Los Angeles Kings, scheduled a pre-camp meeting and dinner with all the coaches in the organization for the night of September 10. Therefore, about five days before 9/11, John Wolf, the Kings' assistant to the general manager, switched Boudreau and Jay to a flight on September 10 so they could attend. [135]
<br><br>Mary Lou Bohn, vice president of Titleist Golf Ball Marketing and Communications, was scheduled to be on Flight 175 on September 11 for a business trip to the West Coast. But she reportedly "felt she needed more time to prepare" and so she arranged to fly out to California on another day. [136]
<br><br>William Fung, CEO of Li & Fung, the world's largest sourcing company, was booked on Flight 175 but at the last minute changed his plans and boarded a plane bound for San Francisco instead. The reason, according to <i>Fortune</i> magazine, was that he had woken up on the morning of September 11 "with an inexplicable urge to meet his sister, who lives in San Francisco, for lunch at their favorite sushi restaurant there." "The sushi craving saved his life," <i>Fortune</i> commented. [137]
<br><br>Tricia Brennan, an "intuitive counselor," has described the experiences of one of her clients who had been booked on Flight 175 but switched to an earlier flight. Her client, "Alec" (not his real name), was a millionaire property developer who lived in California. In early September 2001, Alec was in Boston on business. On the morning of September 10, according to Brennan, while glancing over a newspaper, he became disturbed by all the violence he was reading about and concerned at how it could affect his children. Feeling the sudden urge to be with his family, he arranged to fly home to California that day, instead of on September 11, and consequently avoided being on Flight 175. [138]
<br><br>Jennifer Keller, one of California's top lawyers, was scheduled to visit Boston and had a reservation on Flight 175 for her return journey. But a trial in California she was involved with lasted longer than expected, and so she postponed her trip to Boston and thereby avoided being on the hijacked flight. [139]
<br><br>Otis D. Wright, then a civil litigator in Los Angeles, was booked on Flight 175, but, by a "fluke," changed his plans at the last minute and missed the flight. "I was in Boston defending our client's deposition," Wright has recalled. "The deposition started on September 10, 2001, and almost immediately became quite contentious." Therefore, Wright said, "The plaintiff's attorney called off the deposition and we returned to the hotel, each making reservations to fly back to LA first thing the next morning." Wright's reservation was on Flight 175. However, Wright and the plaintiff's attorney ran into each other in the hotel dining room later that evening. "By then we had both cooled off," Wright recalled. Therefore, he said, "We decided to resume the depositions and see how far we could get." That decision, to stay in Boston and attempt to resolve the situation, meant Wright avoided taking Flight 175 the following morning. "It's just a fluke that I didn't get on that United Airlines flight in Boston to LA on 9/11," he commented. [140]
<br><br>Donato Tramuto, a restaurant owner in Maine, was scheduled to be on Flight 175 along with two of his friends and their adopted son. But he woke up on September 10 with a toothache and so he arranged an emergency dental appointment in Boston. While in Boston, Tramuto decided to fly to California that night and thereby avoided being on the hijacked plane the following morning. Tragically, his two friends and their adopted son died when Flight 175 hit the World Trade Center. [141]
<br><br>Benjamin Gordon, the founder of 3PLex, a web-based transportation management systems company, was booked on Flight 175 as he was scheduled to give a speech at a conference in California on September 12. But a week before 9/11, his girlfriend convinced him to change to a flight a day later than he'd planned. Her reason was that September 11 was his birthday. "Stay home," she told Gordon. "I'll cook you a birthday dinner and you can fly out the next morning, just in time for your speech." [142]
<br><br>Robert Corrigan was booked on Flight 175 as he was scheduled to work at a trade show in San Diego in the week of September 11. But he reportedly overslept and consequently, he said, "reached the boarding gate just a few minutes after the plane pulled away from the jetway." [143]
<br><br>Michelle Wollmann, a national sales manager for a wholesale gift and home decor company, was in Boston for a trade show. Along with a friend, who was with her for the trade show, she was scheduled to leave Boston on September 11 on Flight 175. But on the night of September 10, Wollmann and her friend "had a little too much wine." Therefore, Wollmann said, "Instead of calling for a wake-up call," the friend "set the alarm, and when it went off in the morning, she thought she had hit [the] snooze button, but she actually turned it off." The two women consequently "missed our flight." [144]
<br><br>Lewis Graham, a scientist and shaman, had a ticket to travel from London, England, to Los Angeles via Boston on September 11, which meant he should have been on Flight 175. However, Graham has written that when he checked in at the United Airlines counter at London's Heathrow Airport, he "felt a spontaneous and inexplicable urge to remain in Boston--which I've always enjoyed--for a day or two before continuing on to LA on the 12th or 13th." But when he asked if he could do this, he was told it would be impossible. "Then I blurted out, much to my own surprise, that I wished to skip Boston altogether and <i>needed</i> a direct flight from London to LA," Graham wrote. He was allowed to have this and so avoided being on Flight 175. [145]
<br><br>Monica McCarty, now the bestselling author of numerous historical romance novels, has described how her mother, who had been visiting the East Coast, originally intended to take a flight from Boston to California later in the morning of September 11 than Flight 175. But because McCarty's sister had a problem arranging childcare, her mother was going to take the earlier Flight 175, presumably so she would be able to look after the children. "But," McCarty wrote, "at the last minute, my sister found someone [to look after her children] and my mom kept her original flight for later that morning." [146]
<br><br>Erin Khar has written that her father was originally booked on Flight 175. She was hugely relieved on September 11 when she learned that he had, "at the very last minute, changed his flight and boarded an alternate plane the night before." [147]
<br><br><b>FLIGHT ATTENDANTS CHANGED THEIR PLANS AND AVOIDED WORKING FLIGHT 175</b>
<br>As was the case with Flight 11, a number of flight attendants who were originally scheduled to be on Flight 175 changed their plans and consequently avoided being on the hijacked plane on September 11.
<br><br>Elise O'Kane would have been a flight attendant on Flight 175, but she accidentally changed her schedule for September 11. O'Kane had been "flying the Boston-to-LA route on Tuesday mornings for several years," she has said. But on August 17, 2001, when she was signing up for her schedule for September, she reportedly "incorrectly entered her schedule code, a typo that changed her normal flights for the month." "It's a mistake I'd never made in nearly 20 years of flying," O'Kane has said. On the weekend before 9/11, she went online and repeatedly tried to swap to Flight 175. However, she kept receiving an error message. This meant that instead of being on Flight 175, she was on a flight to Denver on September 11. [148]
<br><br>Lauren Gurskis was scheduled to work Flight 175. But in August 2001 she switched assignments so she could drive her son to his first day of kindergarten. Her place on Flight 175 was plugged back into the airline's scheduling computer and taken by another flight attendant. [149]
<br><br>In mid-August 2001, Rebecca Tripp put in her bid to work Flight 175 on September 11. Soon afterward, though, she was called by a friend who suggested she change her bid. "United Airlines had prearranged contracts with thousands of hotels and each contract was tied to a flight," Tripp has written. "When you chose your flight, you also chose your layover hotel." Tripp's friend said he had just laid over at a hotel in Santa Monica, California, that was much nicer than the hotel attached to Flight 175. He suggested that Tripp "could make it a spa weekend" at that hotel. Tripp "loved the idea" and changed her schedule so that she flew out of Boston on September 10 instead of on September 11. [150]
<br><br>Barbara McFarland should have been on Flight 175, she has said. But she reportedly "decided to spend an extra day with her son," and so she swapped shifts with another flight attendant. [151]
<br><br>And Elaine Lawrence was scheduled to work Flight 175. But because she was going on vacation, she traded shifts with a colleague. [152]
<br><br><b>MANY CANCELED THEIR RESERVATIONS OR WERE NO SHOWS FOR FLIGHT 77</b>
<br>American Airlines Flight 77, the third plane to be hijacked on September 11, was a Boeing 757 bound from Dulles International Airport in Washington, DC, to Los Angeles. It took off from Dulles Airport at 8:20 a.m. and reportedly crashed into the Pentagon at 9:37 a.m.
<br><br>Flight 77 had a capacity of 176 passengers but had 58 on board that day. [153] Like what occurred with Flights 11 and 175, many people booked on Flight 77 either canceled their reservations or failed to turn up for the flight. And as was markedly the case with Flight 11, a number of these individuals worked in the entertainment industry.
<br><br>Probably the most well-known of them was Sam Mendes, who directed <i>Skyfall</i>, the latest James Bond movie, and won an Academy Award for best director for the 1999 movie <i>American Beauty</i>. Mendes was originally booked on Flight 77, but, according to the London <i>Mail on Sunday</i>, his "plans changed and he was not on the flight." [154]
<br><br>Television director Erik Nelson and National Park Service historian Daniel Martinez were originally scheduled to be on Flight 77. But they changed to another flight because, on September 11, they were working on the final day of filming for a Discovery Channel documentary about the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. Interestingly, Nelson was, in 2009, the executive producer of a National Geographic Channel documentary called <i>9/11: Science and Conspiracy</i>, which supposedly debunked many of the "conspiracy theories" surrounding the 9/11 attacks. [155]
<br><br>Rituparna Sengupta, a highly successful Bengali film actress, was scheduled to be on Flight 77 along with her husband, Sanjay Chakrabarty, the president and CEO of MobiApps, a U.S.- based wireless applications company. However, Sengupta recalled, "We decided against it and thought we would take the Dulles-San Diego flight that afternoon." "It is sheer divine intervention that we are alive today," she commented. [156]
<br><br>Clare O'Shea, an actress and singer, was scheduled to be on Flight 77, but changed her reservation on September 10 and thereby avoided being on the hijacked plane. "It's by the grace of God that I am alive," she later commented. [157] In the 1980s, O'Shea appeared in TV shows such as <i>Falcon Crest</i> and <i>Charlie's Angels</i>, and in blockbuster movies such as <i>Splash</i> and <i>Teen Wolf</i>. [158]
<br><br>Joe Dobrow, a senior marketing executive who worked in Maryland for the website of the Discovery Channel, was scheduled to attend a meeting in Berkeley that would begin on the afternoon of September 11. His trip to California for the meeting would involve taking Flight 77 to Los Angeles and then another flight from there to San Francisco. He bought a ticket for his girlfriend, so she could accompany him. But a week or two before 9/11, it occurred to Dobrow that he might be able to fly directly to San Francisco if he flew out of Baltimore instead of Washington, DC. He found he could do this, and so canceled his and his girlfriend's reservations on Flight 77 and booked seats on another flight. [159]
<br><br><b>INDIVIDUALS WITH PROMINENT JOBS WERE ORIGINALLY BOOKED ON FLIGHT 77</b>
<br>Other individuals who canceled their reservations or were no shows for Flight 77 were unconnected to the entertainment industry, although some of them did have prominent jobs.
<br><br>These include Joe Andrew, a Washington lawyer and former chairman of the Democratic National Committee, and Brad Queisser, who worked for a governmental affairs firm and has held several positions within the Democratic National Committee. Andrew and Queisser had tickets for Flight 77 because they had to go to Los Angeles for a business meeting. But although they had spent an "enormous amount of time" preparing for the meeting, Queisser has recalled, "It was my recommendation to Joe that we needed more time to lock down the schedule." Therefore, Queisser said, "At the last minute--late the evening before--Joe concurred and we moved the flight to somewhere early in the afternoon" of September 11. [160]
<br><br>Kerri Toloczko, a public policy analyst and widely published opinion writer, was originally booked on Flight 77 so she could be in Los Angeles to appear on ABC's <i>Politically Incorrect With Bill Maher</i> on the evening of September 11. She had agreed to appear on the show even though the appearance would have conflicted with a conference she was meant to be co-hosting in Washington, DC. But she subsequently decided she should be at the conference and so canceled her trip to Los Angeles. Toloczko was apparently going to be replaced on <i>Politically Incorrect</i> by the conservative commentator Barbara Olson, who died on Flight 77. [161]
<br><br>Marianne McInerney, who was "a stickler for not paying more than $1,000 for business flights," had booked a ticket on Flight 77. But on the Friday before 9/11, she found a less expensive flight out of Washington's Ronald Reagan National Airport and switched to it. Ironically, McInerney, who was executive director of the National Business Travel Association, had "spent years advocating tighter security controls at U.S. airports," according to the <i>Wall Street Journal</i>. [162]
<br><br>Richard Nummi was originally booked on Flight 77. But according to the <i>Washington Post</i>, "He woke up early on September 11 and decided to fly to the West Coast from Baltimore" instead. Nummi was at the time a senior attorney at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, and he had previously served in the U.S. Navy in naval aviation and naval intelligence. [163]
<br><br>John Thompson, former head coach of the Georgetown Hoyas basketball team, was scheduled to take Flight 77 to Los Angeles so he could be interviewed on Jim Rome's Fox Sports Net TV show. Thompson had to go to Las Vegas on September 13 for a friend's birthday party and was determined to go to Los Angeles on September 11 so he could leave for Las Vegas on September 12. But because it was not possible for him to be interviewed on September 11, Danny Swartz, the TV show's producer, insisted that Thompson fly to Los Angeles on September 12 and promised he would make arrangements to ensure Thompson could go straight to Las Vegas after the interview. But Thompson told Swartz: "Under no circumstances do I want to fly that day. I want to come out on the 11th." Thompson has commented that he was "antagonistic in those days," but as a result of Swartz's patience and persistence, he eventually agreed to change to a September 12 flight. "If that guy had not been that persuasive," Thompson remarked, "if we had come at each [other] the wrong way, I would have said, 'Hell no, I'm not going to do it; I need to go the 11th.' Damn sure I would've said that." [164]
<br><br>Major General Stephen Cortright, adjutant general of the Oklahoma National Guard, was in Washington, DC, on the weekend before 9/11, attending meetings, and was scheduled to take Flight 77 on September 11 to meet his wife in Los Angeles. However, he switched to another flight. "I could change to [Reagan National Airport] and fly to Philadelphia, then to LA, and I would get in LA about the same time as my wife," Cortright has recalled. "I changed my flight because the meetings lasted until late Sunday," he explained. "Since [Flight 77] was an 8 a.m. flight, I would've had to get up at 4 a.m." [165]
<br><br>Mackenzie Gregory, a retired Royal Australian Navy lieutenant commander, and his wife, Denise, had been booked on Flight 77 but missed it due to a late change of plans. The couple attended a ceremony in Washington, DC, on September 10 attended by President Bush and Australian Prime Minister John Howard. After the ceremony, Howard invited them to join him when he visited Arlington National Cemetery the following day and they agreed. The change of plans meant the couple would have to miss their scheduled flight to Los Angeles on September 11. "On September 12, we learned we had been booked on American Airlines Flight 77," Gregory has recalled. "John Howard, by inviting us to visit Arlington, had caused us to be pulled off that flight and he thus saved our lives." [166]
<br><br><b>PEOPLE FROM VARIOUS BACKGROUNDS WERE ORIGINALLY BOOKED ON FLIGHT 77</b>
<br>Most of the people who were booked on Flight 77 but canceled their reservations or were no shows for the flight came from less prominent backgrounds.
<br><br>Carol Mikules lived in California but had been in Virginia where a company she co-owned was located, and was scheduled to return to California on Flight 77. But, for unspecified reasons, she flew home a day early. She had reportedly "spoken with her husband several times about returning a day early, but one thing or another kept her from changing her travel plans. Finally, late in the afternoon [of September 10], she boarded a plane for the West Coast." [167]
<br><br>Bob McBride, the owner of a metal plating company in California, planned to fly to Washington, DC, on September 8 to attend an annual symposium and was scheduled to return to California on Flight 77. But his company had just installed a new line for chrome plating on aluminum that had started having some problems and he was concerned about this. Therefore, on the evening of September 7, his wife urged him to stay home. McBride finally agreed to do so and canceled his trip the following day, which meant he missed Flight 77 on September 11. [168]
<br><br>Bruce Van Horn has written that he was originally "supposed to have been on American Airlines Flight 77." But in the week before 9/11, he made a change to his schedule and consequently took a Delta Air Lines flight to Los Angeles on September 11. [169]
<br><br>Vince Kelly and William Collins, the CFO and CEO respectively of Metrocall Inc., a paging services provider based in Alexandria, Virginia, were scheduled to be on Flight 77 so they could attend a conference in Los Angeles. They missed the flight, however, because at the last minute they were called out to a meeting in Baltimore. [170]
<br><br>Matt Powers, a senior producer in the video games industry, flew from Los Angeles to Washington, DC, on September 9 for a meeting the following day, and had been scheduled to fly back to Los Angeles on September 11. But on September 7, he'd decided to stay an extra day in Washington "to get more work done," so he'd rescheduled his return flight to September 12. Powers has written that he was originally scheduled to be on Flight 11, although it appears his plane would actually have been Flight 77, since he stated that it went to Los Angeles from Dulles Airport. [171]
<br><br>Joe Ganley, a software engineer, was briefly booked on Flight 77, but switched to an earlier flight. Ganley has written that he was originally going to fly to California on "Sunday evening, but was called for jury duty on Monday"--presumably meaning September 10. He therefore booked a seat on Flight 77 on September 11. But Ganley wrote that he "called the recorded juror line on Monday morning and learned that I was not needed for jury duty after all." He therefore decided to fly to California on the evening of September 10. "Had I been needed for jury duty after all, it would have been one of the last things I ever did," Ganley commented. [172]
<br><br>Mark Martinez, a professor of political science at California State University, Bakersfield, was also briefly booked on Flight 77. Martinez had been in Washington, DC, for an academic conference and was scheduled to fly home to California on September 9. But he ran into an old friend who persuaded him to stay and visit the friend's cousin, who worked for the Pentagon and lived in the Washington area. Martinez therefore arranged to travel to Los Angeles on a later flight and was consequently booked on Flight 77. But after he had dinner, he decided he needed to get home to help look after his two young children. He therefore called the airline and switched back to his original flight, on September 9. [173]
<br><br>Jason Kerben, a lawyer, "was planning to take American Airlines Flight 77 to Los Angeles for a business conference he attends every year," according to the <i>Washington Post</i>. But two or three weeks before 9/11, with his wife pregnant with their second child, Kerben "got the idea that the couple should combine the business trip with a mini-vacation, using the frequent-flier tickets they had, as it turned out, on another airline." As a result, on September 11, Kerben--along with his wife--was scheduled to take a U.S. Airways flight out of Baltimore, instead of Flight 77. "Had it not been that I wanted my wife to come with me, I would have been on the Dulles flight," Kerben commented. [174]
<br><br>Bridget Skjoldal, who worked for a public accounting firm, was scheduled to be on Flight 77 for a business trip, but at the last minute switched to a later flight. Skjoldal usually drove her own car to the airport, but made a last-minute decision to use a car service for her September 11 trip. "Because of the timing of when I could get the car service, I needed to adjust my flight time," she recalled. "So, the day before the trip, I called the travel agent and ... changed my flight to the next one, which was only 20 to 30 minutes later [than Flight 77]." [175]
<br><br>Tracy Reynolds, manager of corporate affairs at the National Association of State Credit Union Supervisors (NASCUS), had reserved a seat on Flight 77 so she could attend NASCUS's annual conference in Dana Point, California, which was set to begin on September 13. But a few weeks before 9/11, she canceled her reservation and instead flew from Reagan National Airport to John Wayne Airport in Orange County on September 11. Reynolds explained why she did so, saying that while it at first seemed more convenient for her to fly to Los Angeles and then rent a car to drive down to the conference site, the more she thought about it, "the more it made sense just to fly out of National, which is much closer to my home, and into John Wayne, since that is so much closer to the site." [176]
<br><br>Darrell Fogan and 23 other members of his martial arts team were originally booked on Flight 77, but a last-minute change of schedule saved their lives. They were set to go to Beijing on September 11 for a month of intense training at a kung fu academy, and were going to take Flight 77 from Washington to Los Angeles and then another flight from Los Angeles to China. "A few days before their departure," the <i>Washington Post</i> described, "one of the men had to drop out, which in turn enabled the Beijing academy to accommodate the rest of the group for an extra day of training." Fogan's team consequently flew out a day earlier than planned, on September 10. [177]
<br><br>Randy Potts, a neighbor of Charles Burlingame, the pilot of Flight 77, in Fairfax County, Virginia, was originally booked on Flight 77 for a business trip to the West Coast. But at the last minute, he changed to a flight to Seattle via Dallas that left Dulles Airport at around the same time as Flight 77 did, from an adjacent gate. The reason he did so, according to the <i>Washington Post</i>, was that he "wanted additional frequent flier miles." [178]
<br><br>Dan Kammer had gone to Washington, DC, to attend a family event. He was originally scheduled to fly home to California on Flight 77. But, he has stated, "Circumstances had me leaving a day early." [179]
<br><br>Ahmed Mustafa from Webster, New York, has recalled that he was "supposed to be on the plane that went [in]to the Pentagon." "I was actually booked on that flight," he said. But "because of my son's first day of school," he said, he had canceled his reservation and booked himself on a flight on September 12. [180]
<br><br>Members of the Siegert family from Hawaii were scheduled to be on Flight 77. But because their dog "needed to change planes due to quarantine laws," the <i>Maui Weekly</i> reported, "the family changed planes also." [181]
<br><br>The mother and sister of Air Force Major Kathleen Cook were scheduled to be on Flight 77. But, reportedly, "A timely knee injury kept them on the ground." [182]
<br><br>In addition to these passengers, at least two people who were originally scheduled to be crew members on Flight 77 are known to have changed their plans and thereby avoided being on the hijacked plane.
<br><br>Bill Cheng, a pilot with American Airlines, usually flew Flight 77. But in late August 2001, he changed his plans and applied for time off on September 11 so he could go camping. His request was accepted when another pilot signed up for the slot. [183]
<br><br>And Gary Indiana, the novelist, playwright, and art critic, revealed that his brother "was supposed to have been the pilot on the plane that went into the Pentagon." But he "changed his flight schedule" and missed Flight 77 on September 11 "because he had to move that day." For a day, Indiana thought his brother had died in the 9/11 attacks. [184] Before becoming a commercial pilot, Indiana's brother, whose name is unstated, was an Air Force pilot who had flown Air Force Two--the vice president's plane--through three presidential administrations. [185]
<br><br><b>THE FBI INVESTIGATED PEOPLE WHO WERE ORIGINALLY BOOKED ON FLIGHT 77 BUT MISSED THE PLANE</b>
<br>As it did with Flight 11, the FBI in Dallas looked into the apparently low number of passengers on Flight 77. It examined passengers who canceled their reservations or failed to show up for the flight, to determine whether any of them had links to the alleged hijackers and their associates.
<br><br>The FBI reported that information it received from American Airlines reservation records indicated that 116 reservations were made for Flight 77. Of these, 55 individuals canceled their reservations prior to the plane departing from Dulles Airport on September 11 and three individuals were no shows for the flight. There were 59 passengers on the plane, according to the FBI. [186] However, the 9/11 Commission determined there were 58 passengers on Flight 77. [187]
<br><br>As it did for Flight 11, the Dallas FBI office compiled a database that supposedly included all the available information on the people who'd had reservations, or were noted on the manifest, for Flight 77. The list included everyone who was actually on the plane, those who canceled their reservation prior to departure, and those who were no shows. [188]
<br><br>The FBI's list reveals that a couple of individuals canceled their reservations for Flight 77 several months before September 11, in April 2001. A few canceled their reservations in June or July, while others canceled their reservations later on, such as early in September or--in a few cases--on the morning of September 11.
<br><br>While the list includes the name of at least one person whose account I have described above--Carol Mikules--most of the people it describes as having canceled their reservations or being no shows are additional to those I have mentioned. Since nearly all of the individuals whose accounts I have described are not mentioned in the FBI's list, this suggests the actual numbers of cancelations and no shows for Flight 77 were significantly higher than the FBI determined.
<br><br>Curiously, as is the case with Flight 11, a few individuals are listed as having canceled their reservations for Flight 77, even though they were on the plane on September 11. These include Charles Falkenberg, his wife Leslie Whittington, and their two daughters, Dana and Zoe; Norma Khan; and Ian Gray. The reason for this oddity is unknown.
<br><br><b>MANY CANCELED THEIR RESERVATIONS OR FAILED TO SHOW UP FOR FLIGHT 93</b>
<br>United Airlines Flight 93, the fourth plane to be hijacked on September 11, was a Boeing 757 bound from Newark Liberty International Airport to San Francisco. It took off from Newark Airport at 8:42 a.m. and reportedly crashed into a field in rural Pennsylvania at 10:03 a.m.
<br><br>The plane had a capacity of 182 passengers but had 37 on board on September 11. As with the other hijacked flights, many people who had reservations for Flight 93 either canceled their reservations or failed to turn up for the flight. Five passengers with reservations failed to turn up for Flight 93, according to the <i>9/11 Commission Report</i>. [189] But the accounts below describe many other people who avoided being on the hijacked plane.
<br><br>Among these individuals were several people who worked in the entertainment industry. By far the most famous of them was Robert Redford, the actor and Academy Award-winning director, who starred in such classic movies as <i>Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid</i> and <i>The Sting</i>. Redford was in New York on September 10 for a business meeting. Flight 93 was "the early morning flight from Newark to San Francisco that he normally favored" when returning to the West Coast, according to his biographer, Michael Feeney Callan. But the meeting ended earlier than scheduled and so he flew back to California on September 10. "I would have been on [Flight 93] had I not finished my business," Redford has commented. [190]
<br><br>Alysia Reiner, an award-winning actress who has appeared in TV shows such as <i>Law & Order</i> and <i>The Sopranos</i>, and movies such as <i>Sideways</i>, may have been booked on Flight 93 but switched to an earlier flight, although this has not been stated explicitly. Reiner flew "from Newark" on September 10, the <i>Hartford Courant</i> reported, "changing her original plans from September 11, her intended day of departure." [191]
<br><br>Another actress, Forbes Riley, has said she was originally booked on Flight 93, although she also said the flight she was booked on was scheduled to go "from Washington, DC, to LA," which was the intended route of Flight 77--not Flight 93--on September 11. Riley, who had appeared in TV shows such as <i>The Pretender</i>, <i>The Practice</i>, and <i>Boy Meets World</i>, was at an airport in New York on the night of September 10, intending to fly from there to Washington and then from Washington to California the following morning. The woman at the ticket counter asked her, "Where are you going to stay tonight?" The woman pointed out that Riley would be "on a 5 o'clock flight into DC" and asked, "Do you have a hotel?" Riley was not booked to stay at a hotel and so the woman suggested, "Why don't I just reroute you through Denver?" "That one decision by an agent whose name I don't even know completely saved my life," Riley has commented. "I did not get on that flight," she said. "And as you know, everyone who did perished." [192]
<br><br>Patti Austin, a Grammy Award-winning singer, was booked on Flight 93, but at the last minute switched to an earlier flight. Austin was supposed to attend the second night of the Michael Jackson: 30th Anniversary Celebration concert in New York on September 10 and then fly to San Francisco the following morning, on Flight 93. But her mother had suffered a stroke and so Austin attended the first night of the concert, on September 7, and then flew to California on September 10. [193]
<br><br>Kelli Richards planned to go to New York to see the Michael Jackson: 30th Anniversary Celebration concert and was scheduled to return to California on Flight 93. But, she has said, because she "had a terrible feeling about going to New York," she canceled her trip. Richards was--and still is--the CEO of The All Access Group, a company that facilitates "strategic business opportunities in digital distribution between technology companies, established artists and celebrities, film studios, record labels, and consumer brand companies." [194]
<br><br>Merl Saunders was scheduled to travel to San Francisco on Flight 93, but reportedly decided to take an earlier flight so he would be home in time to watch the San Francisco 49ers on <i>Monday Night Football</i>. Saunders was a keyboardist best known for his longtime collaboration with the Grateful Dead and Jerry Garcia, the band's singer and lead guitarist. [195]
<br><br>Steve Maney, a radio host in Charlotte, North Carolina, had made a reservation on Flight 93. However, he changed to a later flight because he knew he would be up late on the night of September 10 at a concert. [196]
<br><br><b>MOST WHO HAD RESERVATIONS FOR FLIGHT 93 BUT MISSED THE PLANE WERE UNCONNECTED TO THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY</b>
<br>As the accounts below make clear, most of the people who canceled reservations or were no shows for Flight 93 were unconnected to the entertainment industry. Several of these individuals are known to have been interviewed by the FBI as part of its investigation of the 9/11 attacks.
<br><br>Yu Nakagawa from Japan had a reservation on Flight 93 but never intended to use it. He had gone to the U.S. in August 2001 to study at Drew University in New Jersey. He explained to the FBI that "when he arrived at San Francisco from Japan, a round-trip San Francisco-Newark ticket was cheaper than a one-way ticket, so he booked the round-trip reservation but did not use the September 11, 2001, return half." [197]
<br><br>Kevin Dougherty had been booked on Flight 93 but was delayed on the way to the airport and missed the plane. Dougherty explained to the FBI that while traveling to the airport, he had driven up the New Jersey Turnpike, but his truck became disabled while he was exiting the ramp at Exit 14 because a nut had been lodged in the drive shaft, causing it to snap. A tow truck came and took away his truck. Dougherty then went to the long-term parking lot for Newark Airport, where he caught a shuttle bus to the airport. However, he only arrived at the United Airlines terminal at 8:05 a.m., five minutes after the plane left its gate. [198]
<br><br>George Gutierrez and his wife, Bonnie Gutierrez, had reservations on Flight 93 but traveled to San Francisco on an earlier flight. The couple had been on a cruise and their ship arrived in New York on the morning of September 10. They were supposed to travel from Newark Airport to San Francisco that afternoon, on United Airlines Flight 75, but were told this flight was delayed. After waiting for many hours, the couple decided to fly out the following morning and so they made reservations on Flight 93. However, before leaving the airport, Bonnie called the airline one more time to inquire about Flight 75, and was told the flight was still on and would likely be departing at around 7:45 p.m. The couple decided to take their original flight and so avoided being on Flight 93 the next day. [199]
<br><br>Patricia Breese and her granddaughter had also been booked on Flight 75 for September 10. But when Breese was told by airline personnel that the plane was delayed and might be canceled, she made reservations for herself and her granddaughter on Flight 93 the following morning. Because Flight 75 finally arrived at Newark Airport, they were able to fly to San Francisco on the evening of September 10. Breese, however, neglected to cancel their reservations on Flight 93. [200]
<br><br>Stephen Weiss, a managing director at Wall Street investment bank Lehman Brothers, had been booked on Flight 93. But at "virtually the last minute," he has written, he "decided to postpone that trip and focus on pressing work at the office in Lehman's downtown New York headquarters." [201] Weiss was questioned by the FBI, four months after 9/11, about why he failed to show up for Flight 93. "I had never realized I was to be on that flight that day until the FBI told my family," he has commented. [202]
<br><br>Frank Andrews, a well-known psychic, said his adopted son was booked on Flight 93 so he could go and see his girlfriend in California. But Andrews planned to go away to upstate New York on the night of September 10 and so he told his adopted son to cancel his trip to California. (Andrews presumably expected his adopted son to accompany him to upstate New York.) The adopted son acceded and canceled his reservation on Flight 93. The FBI subsequently "came to the door and they wanted to know why he canceled his flight," Andrews has recalled. [203]
<br><br><b>MANY WHO WERE ORIGINALLY BOOKED ON FLIGHT 93 MAY NOT HAVE BEEN QUESTIONED BY THE FBI AFTER 9/11</b>
<br>While the FBI questioned the individuals described above who'd had reservations for Flight 93 but missed the flight, whether it also interviewed the individuals described below is unstated.
<br><br>Catherine Patterson who worked for McCann New York, a leading advertising agency, was reportedly booked on Flight 93, "but she developed strep throat and had to cancel." [204]
<br><br>Bernard Whalen, a senior manager in the financial services industry, was apparently originally booked on Flight 93 but changed his plans and flew on another plane on September 11. He has written that on September 11, his wife thought "that I was dead because she thought I was on a United flight when I had changed my itinerary and landed safely on a flight in Pittsburgh, instead of crashing near it in Shanksville, Pennsylvania." [205]
<br><br>Michael Prinz zu Salm-Salm, founder and managing partner of Salm-Salm & Partner, an investment and real estate consulting company, was originally booked on Flight 93, but changed his plans and flew to Chicago on September 11. He was in New York on September 10 attending the German Wine Information Bureau's annual vintage tasting of German wines. He originally intended to go to San Francisco on September 11 to attend a similar event on September 13, and his secretary had booked him on Flight 93 to get there. However, a convention of the Christian Democratic Union party, of which he was the chairman in his district, was being held in his home town on September 15 and he needed to attend this. Prinz zu Salm-Salm felt it would be running things too close if he attended the event in San Francisco and then had to make his way back to Germany for the convention afterward. Therefore, in mid-August, he asked his secretary to change his schedule. Instead of flying to San Francisco, he would go to Chicago to visit some customers on September 11. He has said that he only learned he had originally been booked on Flight 93 when he arrived back in Germany after 9/11. [206]
<br><br>Curtis Smolar and his wife Rebecca Eisenberg, a pair of San Francisco lawyers, were supposed to be on Flight 93 but switched to a flight on September 10. The couple had been staying with Smolar's father, who had recently been diagnosed with cancer, and planned to travel home to San Francisco on Flight 93. But Smolar's father insisted that they fly home a day early. "I want you guys to go back and live your lives," he told them. [207]
<br><br>Frank Robertazzi, vice president of worldwide distribution sales at test and measurement firm Agilent Technologies Inc., was scheduled to travel on Flight 93 because he had to attend a meeting at his company's headquarters in San Francisco, but at the last minute he switched to a later flight. The reason, he said, was that his "five-year-old daughter was just starting kindergarten and he was having so much fun with her, he made a decision to take another flight." He booked himself on a 9:30 a.m. flight so he could have breakfast with his daughter and take her to kindergarten, and thereby avoided being on Flight 93. [208]
<br><br>Alan Brigish, an online publishing entrepreneur and documentary photographer, was booked on Flight 93 for a business trip. But on September 10, he has recalled, "I changed my reservation to American Airlines for no reason other than I had a mileage plan with American." [209]
<br><br>Daniel Belardinelli, a lawyer and artist, was scheduled to be on Flight 93 along with his uncle, so they could visit Yosemite National Park in California. However, Belardinelli has said that a week before 9/11, "Something came up that I just could not juggle." He therefore had to back out of the trip. His uncle, William Cashman, unfortunately died on Flight 93. [210]
<br><br>Heather Ross Ogle was booked on Flight 93 but overslept and missed the plane. Ogle, a staff physician at Stanford Hospital, had gone to the East Coast to attend a friend's wedding on September 9, and then went to stay with her parents just outside New York. She was meant to travel home on Flight 93 but stayed up late on the night of September 10, and so her father was unable to get her out of bed the following morning to go to the airport. When he tried to get her up, she said, "The heck with it, I'm not going to take that flight." [211]
<br><br>Marge Kranzfelder had gone to the East Coast on business and was scheduled to travel home to California on Flight 93. But, for unspecified reasons, she missed the flight and was at her hotel near Newark Airport when the 9/11 attacks occurred. [212]
<br><br>Donald Rubbo, a pioneer in mind-body medicine, was supposed to be on Flight 93 but switched to an earlier flight. Rubbo went to New York in early September 2001 to be with his mother while she underwent surgery. "A few days later," he wrote, "she was well enough ... that I felt confident about my mother's health." He therefore asked his wife to arrange for him to fly home earlier than planned. She changed his ticket and he consequently flew back to San Francisco on September 8 instead of September 11. [213]
<br><br>Leah Stone, a professional musician and vocal coach, appears to have been briefly booked on Flight 93 before switching to another flight. Stone had made a late decision to visit New York to see the Michael Jackson: 30th Anniversary Celebration concert. She used her father's air miles when she was booking her flights and her father had told her to use his United Airlines air miles. But, "As I was in the process of booking my flight with United Flight 93" to bring her home from the East Coast, she has written, "my father was inspired to tell me to change my ticket and use his Continental [Airlines air] miles instead." On September 11, when Stone called members of her family, she found they were "an emotional wreck, unaware if I was alive or on a hijacked flight." [214]
<br><br>Mikey Koffman, who works in the fashion industry, had a ticket for Flight 93. However, when she arrived at Newark Airport on September 11 along with her partner, Raquel Castaneda, she reportedly "discovered that Raquel could not get on because the flight was oversold." (However, only 20 percent of the seats on Flight 93 were supposedly taken.) Koffman and Castaneda therefore avoided taking the doomed flight. But Koffman has said she "lost $30,000 of samples," which were loaded onto Flight 93, "because my bags had already been checked in." [215]
<br><br>Brian Backus had gone to New York to attend a business conference and was originally scheduled to travel back to San Francisco on Flight 93. However, he has written, he had "rescheduled a few days before [September 11] so I could go to a dinner party and not have to get up too early." [216]
<br><br>John Grieves, a top executive at the multinational consumer goods company Unilever, was supposed to be on Flight 93, but changed his plans at the last minute. The hijacked plane, Grieves has said, "was my flight, which I canceled to be at a [school] parents' evening." [217]
<br><br>Jiri Kulik, who worked in marketing, was scheduled to be on Flight 93, but changed his booking to another flight about five days before 9/11. Kulik regularly flew from Newark to San Francisco because his company's offices were in New Jersey and he was working with a company in San Francisco at that time. But, Kulik has written, "A company from Bethesda, Maryland, gave me [a] better offer and I decided to go with them, and for that reason I changed my flight." Therefore, instead of taking Flight 93, he went to visit that company, E-centives, on September 11. [218]
<br><br>Nelly Reifler, a novelist and short story writer, needed to book a flight to California after she learned, on September 9, that a friend in Oakland had been murdered. She wanted to join other friends in California to mourn with them. Because a hurricane was predicted for September 10, Reifler decided she would fly out on September 11 and consequently made a reservation on Flight 93. She then called a friend in San Francisco who would be collecting her from the airport. Reifler has written that her friend "reminded me that there was an airport in Oakland." Reifler "could tell that it would be better for her if I landed there." She found there was a cheap JetBlue Airways flight going to Oakland, but when she called the airline, she was told no seats were available. But Reifler "called the JetBlue toll-free number over and over" until, at around 7:00 p.m. on September 10, "a family of three let go of their seats on an early morning flight to Oakland" on September 11. Reifler took one of the seats and was then able to cancel her reservation on Flight 93. [219]
<br><br>Brian Harrington, who worked in sports marketing, was scheduled to be on Flight 93 in order to go and meet with a client. But on September 7, the client called and canceled the meeting, and so Harrington avoided being on the hijacked plane. [220]
<br><br>Sylvana Joseph was booked on Flight 93 as she had to go to the West Coast to attend a business conference. But she decided to go and see some old friends in New Orleans before she headed to the conference, and consequently, a few days before September 11, switched to another flight. [221]
<br><br>James Canton, a renowned futurist and business adviser, was in New York in the days before 9/11 to speak to a group of CEOs, and had a reservation to fly home to San Francisco on Flight 93. But Canton has written that he "decided at the last minute to leave early." He therefore changed his reservation and flew home on September 10. [222] Canton runs the Institute for Global Futures, a think tank that advises government leaders and many Fortune 1000 companies about the key trends that will shape the future. [223]
<br><br>Dave Mandelkern, executive vice president and chief technology officer of Docent, a company that provided e-learning software, has written that his "colleague"--who he did not name--"had a boarding pass for United Flight 93 with his name on it." But the colleague missed the doomed flight because Mandelkern "had persuaded him to take a later flight" so he could attend a business meeting in Manhattan, along with Mandelkern, on the morning of September 11. [224]
<br><br>John Talley flew to the East Coast on September 9 to begin testing oil skimmers for the Navy at a facility in New Jersey and was originally scheduled to return to California on September 14. But after he finished work on September 10, he decided to fly home early because of ill health. He therefore made a reservation on Flight 93 so he could go home the following morning. But Talley has written that late on the night of September 10, "My colleague called me and convinced me to cancel my flight and work one more day." [225]
<br><br>Elaine Taylor, a travel agent in Morristown, New Jersey, was scheduled to be on Flight 93. But, for unspecified reasons, she "changed her plans and rescheduled the trip to September 12." [226]
<br><br>Evelyn Brooks, a ticket sales agent for United Airlines in Mexico City, spent the weekend before 9/11 in New York and had been booked on Flight 93. However, United Airlines requested that she return to Mexico a day earlier than planned. This meant she had to fly out of Newark on September 10 instead of September 11. [227]
<br><br>Cholene Espinoza, a pilot with United Airlines who lived in New York, was scheduled to be a passenger on Flight 93. She was set to pilot a plane out of San Francisco on September 12 and planned to take Flight 93 to get her to the city. But, she recalled, "A few days before September 11 the crew desk called me and said, 'Your trip has been changed because you flew too much this week, so we'll just start you off in Chicago.'" It was therefore unnecessary for Espinoza to travel to San Francisco on Flight 93. [228]
<br><br>Michael Jones, a chef in Carmel Valley, California, was in New York on September 10 for his brother's funeral and was scheduled to return to California the next day on Flight 93. But after the funeral, Jones brought the guests back to the hotel he was staying at, and then stayed up late and got "drunk on good Champagne and great Calvados." As a result, he overslept and missed Flight 93 the following morning. [229]
<br><br>Thomas Soohoo from New York was apparently scheduled to be on Flight 93 but arrived at Newark Airport early, and so he took United Airlines Flight 81--which also went to San Francisco--instead. He stated that he would have been on Flight 93 if he hadn't made "some last-minute chance decisions." A man called Anthony Soohoo, who is presumably Thomas Soohoo's brother, has confirmed that Thomas Soohoo was supposed to have been on Flight 93. He wrote on Twitter that his brother "was about to board Flight 93, but changed his plans at the airport." Flight 81, which took off at 7:00 a.m., was the flight immediately before Flight 93, according to Thomas Soohoo. "Luck played a major role in my fate," he commented. "I got to the gate at 6:50 a.m. I was the last passenger to board and just minutes away from having the plane leave without me." "I would have been on Flight 93 for sure if I had taken any longer to get to the airport," he added. Curiously, Thomas Soohoo stated: "There were numberous stories, including my own, of folks who ended up on the 7 a.m. flight [i.e. Flight 81] by chance. There were so many of us who would have been on that ill-fated flight [i.e. Flight 93] if we hadn't made some last-minute chance decisions." [230]
<br><br>Donna Garton appears to have been one of the people who also ended up on Flight 81 "by chance." Garton, a development officer at Stanford University, had gone to the East Coast to help her daughter, who was starting university, and had a ticket for Flight 93 for her journey back to California. But she had trouble sleeping on the night of September 10 and so she headed to the airport early the next morning. At the check-in counter, Garton was told there were seats available on a flight leaving at 7:00 a.m., an hour earlier than Flight 93 was scheduled to depart. She reportedly "knew the change wasn't going to save her any time, because she was still going to have to sit in San Francisco and wait for the same flight to Sacramento." She "considered staying in Newark and having a relaxed breakfast before getting on Flight 93." But according to her husband, Michael, "For some reason, she decided to come a little bit closer to home" and accepted a seat on the earlier flight. [231]
<br><br>A couple of individuals who narrowly avoided taking Flight 93 have posted descriptions of their experiences at the September 11 Digital Archive website. Eric Clamage had a ticket for Flight 93. However, on September 7, his boss called and asked if he could get to California to be at work a day earlier than planned. Clamage could, and so he flew out from Newark on September 10 instead of September 11. [232] Michelle Mahler from Oakland, California, flew out on September 1 for a vacation. She initially spent a week with her family in Pennsylvania. She had made plans to fly on to Washington, DC, on September 7 for a few days of sightseeing and was scheduled to return to California four days later on Flight 93. But while she was in Pennsylvania, she had a major argument over the phone with her husband about her being away for so long. "Instead of being the hard-headed bitch I normally can be when he tries to tell me what to do," Mahler has written, "I attempted to keep the peace and changed my return flight to the 7th from Pittsburgh, and skipped going to Washington altogether." This meant she avoided taking Flight 93 on September 11. [233]
<br><br>Several individuals have described how relatives of theirs narrowly avoided being passengers on Flight 93.
<br><br>Anne Stub Civitano recalled that her husband, Tony, had gone from California to New York for a business trip and was originally scheduled to travel home on Flight 93. Tony, however, avoided the doomed flight because he "returned a day early." [234]
<br><br>Michelle Dennedy, a lawyer working for Sun Microsystems at the time of the 9/11 attacks, recalled how her mother narrowly avoided being on Flight 93. Dennedy had a baby shortly before September 11. "I had also booked my mom who lives in Princeton, New Jersey, on Flight 93 to come out and help us with the new baby," she has written. The baby, though, had been born later than expected, and so Dennedy phoned her mother and said, "You know, don't come on the Tuesday, Mom; why don't you come on the Friday, and don't come on September 11." Dennedy's mother therefore postponed her trip and missed Flight 93. [235]
<br><br>Shevaughn Cash recalled that her mother, too, "was supposed to be on Flight 93," in order to see her husband in California. But Cash's mother "wanted to stay an extra day in Newark" and so she decided not to fly on September 11. [236]
<br><br>Colson Andrews wrote that his father "had a ticket for, and was scheduled to board, Flight 93." "It was only because of the cancelation of a meeting that he was to have had that day in San Francisco," Andrews continued, "that he was able to miss that flight." [237]
<br><br>Thomas McGann wrote that on September 11, his brother, Kevin, "was to travel from Newark International to San Francisco." After being unable to contact Kevin for hours, the McGann family finally "received a call that he had missed his flight (93) and had landed safely in Detroit." "God had truly answered our prayers," Thomas McGann commented. [238]
<br><br>Kelly-Ann Speers from Quebec, Canada, has written that her younger brother, a businessman, was supposed to be on Flight 93 but canceled his reservation on the night of September 10. He had done so, he said, because "he just had a feeling." [239]
<br><br>Jeannette Sacman wrote that her sister had been in New Jersey on business at the time of the 9/11 attacks and was "supposed to be on Flight 93." But, according to Sacman, "Her project was delayed and she had to spend an extra day or two in New Jersey." [240]
<br><br>Juliana Mathews wrote that on September 11, her sister, who had been "working a trade show in New York City," was "scheduled to return on Flight 93." But fortunately, "Some blessed delay caused her to change to a later flight." [241]
<br><br>An unnamed officer in the U.S. Army was originally scheduled to be on Flight 93. But according to his uncle, Thomas Bucher, "A miracle happened: he had to change his flight because he had to attend a meeting." [242]
<br><br><b>PILOTS AND FLIGHT ATTENDANTS AVOIDED WORKING FLIGHT 93 DUE TO CHANGES IN THEIR PLANS</b>
<br>Numerous individuals who were originally scheduled to be crew members on Flight 93 changed their plans and consequently avoided being on the hijacked plane.
<br><br>Edward Sarkisian, a captain with United Airlines, was reportedly going to be a pilot on Flight 93. But "at the last minute" he decided to take a later flight, "so he could first drop his son at school" on September 11. [243]
<br><br>Colleen Kerins said her uncle was also scheduled to be a pilot on Flight 93, but he got a phone call on the night of September 10, asking him to switch to another flight. [244]
<br><br>Flight attendant Richard Harris was scheduled to work Flight 93, but, for unspecified reasons, he changed his schedule to work another flight. [245]
<br><br>Flight attendant Diane McCusker was scheduled to work Flight 93, but she had been tired after a family trip and asked to take the day of September 11 off. Another flight attendant therefore took her place on Flight 93. [246]
<br><br>Kim Stroka had been assigned to be a flight attendant on Flight 93. On September 6, though, she requested that she be given September 11 off because her ex-husband was working that day and so she needed to be able to collect her daughter from school. Stroka's request was granted and she therefore avoided being on the hijacked flight. [247]
<br><br>Tina Mosier was scheduled to be a flight attendant on Flight 93, but a friend had encouraged her to take a couple of days off work after she learned that a dog she had rescued and nursed back to health six months earlier had died. Mosier therefore called in sick and missed Flight 93. [248]
<br><br>And Sina Lewis, another flight attendant who was scheduled to work Flight 93, missed the flight because she wanted a couple of days off work so she could go shopping with her mother. She had therefore persuaded her roommate to switch flights with her. [249]
<br><br>As previously mentioned, it is likely there were other passengers and crew members who were originally scheduled to be on the flights hijacked on September 11 but missed the planes beyond those whose accounts are described above. Their accounts are either unreported or I simply have not discovered them. But the number of passengers and crew members whose accounts are described in this article is still so high as to appear very suspicious. The need for this matter to be properly investigated is therefore already obvious.
<br><br><b>NOTES</b>
<br>[1] <a href="http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/matier-ross/article/Willie-Brown-got-low-key-early-warning-about-air-3314754.php" target="_blank">Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross, "Willie Brown Got Low-Key Early Warning About Air Travel." <i>San Francisco Chronicle</i>, September 12, 2001</a>.
<br>[2] <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/weve-hit-targets-151759" target="_blank">Michael Hirsh, "'We've Hit the Targets.'" <i>Newsweek</i>, September 13, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/bush-were-war-152089" target="_blank">Mark Hosenball, "Bush: 'We're at War.'" <i>Newsweek</i>, September 24, 2001</a>.
<br>[3] <a href="http://charlene-smith.blogspot.co.uk/2011/09/my-story-about-september-11-2001-what.html" target="_blank">Charlene Smith, "My Story About September 11, 2001--What is Yours?" Finding America, September 10, 2011</a>.
<br>[4] <a href="http://www.examiner.com/article/bgsa-ceo-ben-gordon-recounts-his-recent-fdny-tribute-flight-experience" target="_blank">Adam Taxin, "BGSA CEO Ben Gordon Recounts His Recent FDNY-Tribute Flight Experience." Examiner.com, September 12, 2011</a>.
<br>[5] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States</i>. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004, p. 452.
<br>[6] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 452; <a href="http://www.archives.gov/research/9-11/staff-report.pdf" target="_blank"><i>Staff Report: The Four Flights</i>. 9/11 Commission, August 26, 2004, pp. 6-7, 28</a>.
<br>[7] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 452; <a href="http://www.archives.gov/research/9-11/staff-report.pdf" target="_blank"><i>Staff Report: The Four Flights</i>, pp. 19, 36</a>.
<br>[8] For more information, see <a href="http://shoestring911.blogspot.com/2008/03/last-minute-pilots-passengers-and.html" target="_blank">"Last-Minute Pilots, Passengers, and Flight Attendants: The Unexplained Oddity of 9/11." Shoestring 9/11, March 31, 2008</a>; <a href="http://shoestring911.blogspot.com/2012/02/new-evidence-reveals-half-of-pilots.html" target="_blank">"New Evidence Reveals Half of Pilots Were Only Assigned to 9/11 Flights at the Last Minute." Shoestring 9/11, February 10, 2012</a>.
<br>[9] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, pp. 4, 7; <a href="http://www.archives.gov/research/9-11/staff-report.pdf" target="_blank"><i>Staff Report: The Four Flights</i>, pp. 6-7, 15</a>.
<br>[10] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20040310195021/http:/www.bupipedream.com/091903/release/r1.htm" target="_blank">Matt Chayes, "All in the Family Guy: MacFarlane Tells All." <i>Pipe Dream</i>, September 19, 2003</a>; <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/07/arts/young-guy-family-guy-30-year-old-s-cartoon-hit-makes-unexpected-comeback.html" target="_blank">Bernard Weinraub, "The Young Guy of 'Family Guy'; A 30-Year-Old's Cartoon Hit Makes an Unexpected Comeback." <i>New York Times</i>, July 7, 2004</a>; <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2011/SHOWBIZ/10/05/seth.macfarlane.pmt/" target="_blank">Katie McLaughlin, "MacFarlane: Angry Jon Stewart Call an 'Odd Hollywood Moment.'" CNN, October 7, 2011</a>.
<br>[11] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16762117/T7-B20-Flights-77-and-11-No-Show-Fdr-Entire-Contents-Notes-and-FBI-Reports-223" target="_blank">"AA Group: On List and Cancelations for Flights 11 and 77." Federal Bureau of Investigation, October 2, 2001</a>.
<br>[12] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20010914234348/http:/www.bostonherald.com/news/inside_track/track09132001.htm" target="_blank">Gayle Fee and Laura Raposa, "Anthony Perkins' Widow Was on Doomed Flight 11." <i>Boston Herald</i>, September 13, 2001</a>; <a href="http://web.nationalenquirer.com/crime-investigation/terrorism-touches-hollywood" target="_blank">Michael Glynn, John South, and Patricia Towle, "Terrorism Touches Hollywood." <i>National Enquirer</i>, September 19, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.nydailynews.com/entertainment/gossip/mark-wahlberg-apologizes-suggesting-prevented-9-11-attack-landed-flight-safely-article-1.1008205" target="_blank">Nancy Dillon, "Mark Wahlberg Apologizes for Suggesting he Could Have Prevented 9/11 Attack, Landed Flight Safely." <i>New York Daily News</i>, January 18, 2012</a>.
<br>[13] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20010916000336/http:/www.jsonline.com/news/wauk/sep01/julie15091401a.asp" target="_blank">Scott Williams, "MTV Celebrity Skips Doomed Flight." <i>Milwaukee Journal Sentinel</i>, September 15, 2001</a>; <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20011004005310/http:/www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,34480,00.html" target="_blank">"Ex-Real World Cast Member Nearly Took Doomed Flight." Associated Press, September 17, 2001</a>.
<br>[14] <a href="https://twitter.com/ImEvaLaRue/status/112975527861694464" target="_blank">Eva LaRue, Twitter post, September 11, 2011</a>; <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8cfFvojQ5uE" target="_blank">"MyFox Los Angeles With Maria Quiban." FOX 11, October 10, 2012</a>.
<br>[15] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20011130084223/http:/web.seguingazette.com/story.lasso?-datasource=seguin&-table=newsc&-keyfield=ID&-op=eq&ID=402&-search" target="_blank">Elaine Hernandez Soto, "Olmos Captivates Crowd With Speech." <i>Seguin Gazette-Enterprise</i>, September 20, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.people.com/people/article/0,,20135397,00.html" target="_blank">"With One Voice." <i>People</i>, September 24, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.casamai.com/EJOSIU.html" target="_blank">Nora Mai, "EJO at FPCC." Casa Mai, n.d.</a>
<br>[16] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20010914234348/http:/www.bostonherald.com/news/inside_track/track09132001.htm" target="_blank">Gayle Fee and Laura Raposa, "Anthony Perkins' Widow Was on Doomed Flight 11"</a>; <a href="http://web.nationalenquirer.com/crime-investigation/terrorism-touches-hollywood" target="_blank">Michael Glynn, John South, and Patricia Towle, "Terrorism Touches Hollywood."</a>
<br>[17] <a href="http://www.esquire.com/features/what-ive-learned/ESQ0107jaimepressly" target="_blank">Mike Sager, "What I've Learned: Jaime Pressly." <i>Esquire</i>, February 20, 2007</a>.
<br>[18] <a href="http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-96104598.html" target="_blank">Sean O'Brien, "Hot People: Sacha Baron-Cohen." <i>Sunday People</i>, January 5, 2003</a>.
<br>[19] <a href="http://hellandhayes.blogspot.co.uk/2013/09/september-11-remembered.html" target="_blank">Jay K. Johnson, "September 11 Remembered ..." The World is a Stage, September 11, 2008</a>.
<br>[20] Bob Spitz, <i>Dearie: The Remarkable Life of Julia Child</i>. New York: Knopf, 2012, p. 520; <a href="http://www.bostonglobe.com/arts/books/2012/08/11/review-dearie-julia-child-biography-bob-spitz/WsvvWbTOGVh0GOor0iwSVO/story.html" target="_blank">Devra First, "'Dearie,' the Julia Child Biography by Bob Spitz." <i>Boston Globe</i>, August 11, 2012</a>.
<br>[21] <a href="http://variety.com/2014/biz/news/bobby-farrelly-tom-sherak-literally-saved-my-life-1201085207/" target="_blank">Bobby Farrelly, "Bobby Farrelly: I Was Supposed to be on 9/11 Flight." <i>Variety</i>, February 4, 2014</a>.
<br>[22] <a href="http://www.m2.com/m2/web/story.php/2001175CEC9CA3F2E9C280256AC600358B39" target="_blank">"Icelandic Filmmaker Had Been Booked on Hijacked Flight." <i>Nordic Business Report</i>, September 13, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/cynthia-ellis/post_846_b_717113.html" target="_blank">Cynthia Ellis, "Icelandic Director Fridrik Thor Fridriksson: 'Filmmaking is the Greatest Strip-Tease of All.'" Huffington Post, September 16, 2010</a>.
<br>[23] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20020414234143/http:/www2.bostonherald.com/news/inside_track/track09242001.htm" target="_blank">Gayle Fee and Laura Raposa, "Hollywood Brass Ring off on $60M Film in Hub." <i>Boston Herald</i>, September 24, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.ew.com/ew/article/0,,384188,00.html" target="_blank">Rebecca Ascher-Walsh, "Vicious Circle." <i>Entertainment Weekly</i>, November 1, 2002</a>.
<br>[24] <a href="http://www.gay.net/news/2011/09/11/gay-911-story-starring-madonna" target="_blank">Rick Andreoli, "A Gay 9/11 Story ... Starring Madonna." Gay.net, September 11, 2011</a>.
<br>[25] <a href="http://www.nwitimes.com/uncategorized/thankful-tell-tales-of-lives-spared/article_b4ad1f99-f0ef-54aa-b3fe-a9dd3e7ee7be.html" target="_blank">"Thankful Tell Tales of Lives Spared." <i>Northwest Indiana Times</i>, September 13, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.nwitimes.com/uncategorized/amazing-siblings-vie-for-million/article_31384972-8c71-5737-8968-c0743c48c48b.html" target="_blank">Alison Skertic, "'Amazing' Siblings Vie for $1 Million." <i>Northwest Indiana Times</i>, September 21, 2002</a>.
<br>[26] <a href="http://www.harvardwood.org/?HH200805" target="_blank">Stacey Collins, "Member Profile: Lisa Beach '80." <i>Harvardwood Highlights</i>, May 2008</a>; <a href="http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-911memories-htmlstory.html" target="_blank">"9/11: Where Were You? Readers Share Their Stories." <i>Los Angeles Times</i>, April 26, 2013</a>.
<br>[27] <a href="http://www.booksandswoons.com/2013/10/yallfest-author-interview-lisi-harrison.html" target="_blank">"YALLFest Author Interview: Lisi Harrison." Books and Swoons, October 11, 2013</a>.
<br>[28] <a href="http://www.coastlinepilot.com/news/tn-cpt-0415-harrison-20110414,0,5004850.story" target="_blank">Joanna Clay, "Hard to Write in Beautiful Laguna, but Write She Does." <i>Laguna Beach Coastline Pilot</i>, April 14, 2011</a>; <a href="http://lisiharrison.com/about/" target="_blank">"About." Lisi Harrison, n.d.</a>
<br>[29] <a href="http://www.broadcastingcable.com/news/news-articles/scene/86229" target="_blank">Susanne Ault, "The Lucky One." <i>Broadcasting & Cable</i>, September 16, 2001</a>; Seth Mnookin, <i>Feeding the Monster: How Money, Smarts, and Nerve Took a Team to the Top</i>. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006, p. 101.
<br>[30] <a href="http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/tom-werner-joins-board-legendary-628453" target="_blank">Alex Ben Block, "Tom Werner Joins Board of Legendary Entertainment." <i>Hollywood Reporter</i>, September 12, 2013</a>.
<br>[31] Seth Mnookin, <i>Feeding the Monster</i>, p. 101.
<br>[32] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16762117/T7-B20-Flights-77-and-11-No-Show-Fdr-Entire-Contents-Notes-and-FBI-Reports-223" target="_blank">"AA Group: On List and Cancelations for Flights 11 and 77."</a>
<br>[33] <a href="http://www.advocate.com/politics/marriage-equality/2008/10/08/love-stories-paris-barclay-and-christopher-mason" target="_blank">Anne Stockwell, "Love Stories: Paris Barclay and Christopher Mason." <i>The Advocate</i>, October 8, 2008</a>; <a href="http://issuu.com/lalumiereschool/docs/2010_la_lumiere_magazine" target="_blank">"A Conversation With Paris Barclay '74." <i>La Lumiére Magazine</i>, Fall 2010</a>.
<br>[34] <a href="http://www.kentucky.com/2006/09/10/10835/backstreet-boy-feels-victims-families.html" target="_blank">Rich Copley, "Backstreet Boy Feels Victims' Families' Pain." <i>Lexington Herald-Leader</i>, September 10, 2006</a>; <a href="http://okmagazine.com/uncategorized/backstreet-boy-brian-littrell-talks-vow-renewal/" target="_blank">"Backstreet Boy Brian Littrell Talks Vow Renewal." <i>OK!</i>, September 27, 2010</a>.
<br>[35] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20010913195121/http:/w3.bostonherald.com/news/national/ausnear09132001.htm" target="_blank">Kay Lazar and Robin Washington, "Luck Was With Those Who Narrowly Escaped Death." <i>Boston Herald</i>, September 13, 2001</a>.
<br>[36] <a href="http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-108496267.html" target="_blank">Bob Young, "Life Lessons Play Into Perez's Music." <i>Boston Herald</i>, October 3, 2003</a>.
<br>[37] <a href="http://www.bizjournals.com/boston/stories/2002/07/01/focus4.html?page=all" target="_blank">Portland Helmich, "Gone Are the Days of Planning for a Care-Free Summer." <i>Boston Business Journal</i>, July 1, 2002</a>; <a href="http://eferencik.wordpress.com/" target="_blank">"About." Erica Ferencik, n.d.</a>
<br>[38] <a href="http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2013/06/14/we-all-have-something-to-hide-from-big-brother-we-just-dont-know-it-yet/" target="_blank">Jonathan Kay, "We All Have Something to Hide From Big Brother, We Just Don't Know it Yet." <i>National Post</i>, June 14, 2013</a>.
<br>[39] <a href="http://www.thefreelibrary.com/AFTER+THE+FALL+WITH+%60THE+GUYS,'+THE+FIRST+DRAMATIC+PIECE+ABOUT+9%2F11K,...-a088642764" target="_blank">Evan Henerson, "After the Fall; With 'The Guys,' the First Dramatic Piece About 9/11, Tim Robbins and Helen Hunt Seek to Help Audiences Heal." <i>Los Angeles Daily News</i>, July 9, 2002</a>.
<br>[40] <a href="http://www.smokemag.com/0302/cover.htm" target="_blank">Joan Tarshis, "Tom Sizemore is Huge!" <i>Smoke</i>, Spring 2002</a>.
<br>[41] <a href="http://www.startribune.com/sports/twins/129593363.html" target="_blank">Joe Christensen, "Fortune, Cuddyer Kept Former Twin off Flight 11." <i>Minneapolis Star Tribune</i>, September 11, 2011</a>; <a href="http://sports.yahoo.com/mlb/blog/big_league_stew/post/Brad-Thomas-Michael-Cuddyer-8216-saved-our-li?urn=mlb-wp19130" target="_blank">Ian Casselberry, "Brad Thomas: Michael Cuddyer 'Saved Our Lives' on 9/11." Yahoo! Sports, September 11, 2011</a>.
<br>[42] <a href="http://www.nydailynews.com/archives/sports/victories-horror-n-y-sports-world-finds-reason-article-1.931583" target="_blank">Wayne Coffey, "Amid Horror, NY Sports World Finds Reason to Believe." <i>New York Daily News</i>, September 16, 2001</a>.
<br>[43] <a href="http://charlene-smith.blogspot.co.uk/2011/09/my-story-about-september-11-2001-what.html" target="_blank">Charlene Smith, "My Story About September 11, 2001--What is Yours?"</a>
<br>[44] <a href="http://articles.latimes.com/print/2001/sep/16/sports/sp-46359" target="_blank">Diane Pucin, "Terrorism Can't Defeat Heroism." <i>Los Angeles Times</i>, September 16, 2001</a>; <a href="http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/sports_blog/2009/09/us-open-tennis-911.html" target="_blank">Diane Pucin, "Changing Plane Reservation at the U.S. Open." <i>Los Angeles Times</i>, September 12, 2009</a>; <a href="https://usc.rivals.com/content.asp?CID=1124732" target="_blank">Dan Weber, "We All Have Our 9/11 Heroes Today." TrojanSports.com, September 11, 2010</a>.
<br>[45] <a href="http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1428049" target="_blank">"Commentary: A Reason to Hope." <i>Tavis Smiley Show</i>, NPR, September 11, 2003</a>.
<br>[46] <a href="http://archives.starbulletin.com/2001/09/13/features/donnelly.html" target="_blank">Dave Donnelly, "Close to Home." <i>Honolulu Star-Bulletin</i>, September 13, 2001</a>; <a href="http://archives.starbulletin.com/2001/09/18/features/donnelly.html" target="_blank">Dave Donnelly, "PR Can be Perilous, Traveling Localites Find." <i>Honolulu Star-Bulletin</i>, September 18, 2001</a>.
<br>[47] <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/september-11-attacks/8722089/Paul-Theroux-911-ten-years-on.html" target="_blank">Paul Theroux, "9/11 Ten Years On." <i>The Telegraph</i>, September 11, 2011</a>.
<br>[48] <a href="http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2011/09/it%E2%80%99s-time-for-diplomacy/" target="_blank">James F. Smith, "It's Time for Diplomacy." Harvard Gazette, September 7, 2011</a>.
<br>[49] <a href="http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/experts/199/graham_allison.html" target="_blank">"Graham Allison." Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, n.d.</a>
<br>[50] <a href="http://www.boston.com/ae/radio/blog/2012/09/podcast_cheating_death_on_911.html" target="_blank">"Cheating Death on 9/11." RadioBDC, September 11, 2012</a>; <a href="http://gerrymoylan.blogspot.co.uk/" target="_blank">Gerry Moylan, "The Second Chance That Almost Wasn't." Home to Phillip, April 24, 2014</a>.
<br>[51] <a href="https://blogs.akamai.com/2013/09/9-11-anniversary-danny-lewins-life-and-legacy.html" target="_blank">Bill Brenner, "9/11 Anniversary: Danny Lewin's Life and Legacy." Akamai Blog, September 10, 2013</a>.
<br>[52] <a href="http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-8684595.html" target="_blank">John Koch, "Tom Lawson, a Managing Partner of Boston's Biggest Ad Agency, Arnold Worldwide." <i>Boston Globe</i>, October 21, 2001</a>.
<br>[53] <a href="http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-85874293.html" target="_blank">Jules Crittenden and Dana Bisbee, "Bullet Sails Into Black-Tie Hub Gala." <i>Boston Herald</i>, May 11, 2002</a>.
<br>[54] <a href="http://ww2.cfo.com/risk-compliance/2001/11/what-works-when-disaster-strikes/" target="_blank">Tim Reason, "What Works When Disaster Strikes." <i>CFO</i>, November 1, 2001</a>.
<br>[55] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16762117/T7-B20-Flights-77-and-11-No-Show-Fdr-Entire-Contents-Notes-and-FBI-Reports-223" target="_blank">"AA Group: On List and Cancelations for Flights 11 and 77."</a>
<br>[56] <a href="http://www.seacoastonline.com/articles/20070406-NEWS-704060375" target="_blank">Sheila Tanguay, "Rudy Giuliani Visits Hampton Falls." <i>Hampton Union</i>, April 6, 2007</a>; <a href="http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1120&dat=20071227&id=8po8AAAAIBAJ&sjid=KPcFAAAAIBAJ&pg=1647,8329053" target="_blank">Mark Ouellette, "Freshmen Get Lesson in Civics." <i>Milford Cabinet</i>, December 27, 2007</a>.
<br>[57] <a href="http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000350609928131063" target="_blank">Robert Tomsho, Barbara Carton, and Jerry Guidera, "For Some, Avoiding Tragedy Seemed Like Pure Chance." <i>Wall Street Journal</i>, September 13, 2001</a>.
<br>[58] <a href="http://www.boston.com/news/packages/underattack/globe_stories/0912/Couple_altered_itinerary+.shtml" target="_blank">Michael Paulson, "Couple Altered Itinerary." <i>Boston Globe</i>, September 12, 2001</a>.
<br>[59] Dean E. Murphy, <i>September 11: An Oral History</i>. New York: Doubleday, 2002, pp. 197-198.
<br>[60] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20040329200852/http:/www.crn.com/sections/BreakingNews/dailyarchives.asp?ArticleID=29785" target="_blank">Joseph F. Kovar, "Last-Minute Breakfast Meeting Saves Storage Exec's Life." <i>CRN</i>, September 12, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.jewishmag.com/79mag/jacob/jacob.htm" target="_blank">Arlene Uslander, "Jacob! Jacob! Reborn September 11, 2001." <i>Jewish Magazine</i>, May 2004</a>.
<br>[61] <a href="http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-78785991.html" target="_blank">"Show Attendees React to America's Tragedy." <i>Wireless Week</i>, September 17, 2001</a>; <a href="http://briancharlson.com/?p=351" target="_blank">Rick Morin, "Fairwell to Yankee Stadium." The Mind of Brian Charlson, October 3, 2008</a>.
<br>[62] <a href="http://www.countytimes.com/articles/2009/09/10/community_news/20368166.txt?viewmode=fullstory" target="_blank">Jaime Ferris, "State 9/11 Exhibit in Brookfield." <i>Litchfield County Times</i>, September 10, 2009</a>.
<br>[63] <a href="http://www.eetimes.com/document.asp?doc_id=1130781" target="_blank">Corinne Bernstein, "For Some, Hand of Fate Intervened." <i>EE Times</i>, September 17, 2001</a>.
<br>[64] <a href="http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2008/06/12/healing_wounds_in_paradise/?page=full" target="_blank">Kathleen Burge, "Healing Wounds in Paradise." <i>Boston Globe</i>, June 12, 2008</a>.
<br>[65] <a href="http://tropichunt.blogspot.co.uk/2008/05/another-max.html" target="_blank">Andy Wenzel, "Another Max ..." PinkFloyd/TropicHunt's Blog ..., May 8, 2008</a>.
<br>[66] <a href="http://www.wbur.org/2011/09/04/your-sept-11-stories" target="_blank">"Your Sept. 11 Stories." WBUR, September 4, 2011</a>; <a href="http://richerearth.com/2011/09/remembering-911/" target="_blank">Eric McNulty, "Remembering 9/11." Eric J. McNulty: Leadership & Resilience Catalyst, September 11, 2011</a>.
<br>[67] <a href="http://patch.com/california/carlsbad/911-reminds-carlsbad-man-to-treasure-each-day" target="_blank">Deanne Goodman, "9/11 Reminds Carlsbad Man to Treasure Each Day." Carlsbad Patch, September 1, 2011</a>; <a href="http://www.cbs8.com/story/15436701/local-family-shares-miraculous-story-of-love-and-luck" target="_blank">"Local Family Shares Miraculous Story of Love and Luck." CBS 8, September 12, 2011</a>.
<br>[68] <a href="http://blog.pressrepublican.com/archive/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8307:ticonderoga_native_misses_flight_11_but_sees_it_crash&catid=34:news-articles" target="_blank">Lohr McKinstry, "Ticonderoga Native Misses Flight 11 but Sees it Crash." <i>Plattsburgh Press-Republican</i>, September 12, 2001</a>.
<br>[69] <a href="https://www.michigandaily.com/content/higher-education-notes-3" target="_blank">"Woman Would Have Been on Hijacked Flight." <i>Michigan Daily</i>, September 11, 2001</a>.
<br>[70] <a href="http://www.thefreelibrary.com/New+York+Terrorist+Attacks%3A+I+was+due+on+doomed+towers+flight.-a078160913" target="_blank">"I Was Due on Doomed Towers Flight." <i>Daily Record</i>, September 12, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.deseretnews.com/article/700177907/Sept-11-attacks-cast-long-shadow-across-Mass.html?pg=all" target="_blank">Steve LeBlanc, "Sept. 11 Attacks Cast Long Shadow Across Mass." Associated Press, September 10, 2011</a>.
<br>[71] <a href="http://www.wickedlocal.com/x462613868/EDITORIAL-A-day-to-remember" target="_blank">"A Day to Remember." Wicked Local Mansfield, September 9, 2011</a>.
<br>[72] <a href="http://archive.org/stream/archonspr2002dumm/archonspr2002dumm_djvu.txt" target="_blank">"Class Notes." <i>The Archon</i>, Spring 2002</a>.
<br>[73] <a href="http://bigwig.phanfare.com/5495821" target="_blank">Ernie Gerbasi, "Ernie Gerbasi: Eyewitness to 9/11." Ernie's Albums, September 11, 2001</a>; <a href="http://bigwig.phanfare.com/5495924" target="_blank">Ernie Gerbasi, "Sept. 11: Time Line." Ernie's Albums, September 30, 2001</a>.
<br>[74] <a href="http://roslindale.wickedlocal.com/article/20101202/NEWS/312029115/0/SEARCH" target="_blank">Joe McGonegal, "For Catholic Memorial Director, 'The Guys' Takes on Added Meaning." <i>Roslindale Transcript</i>, December 2, 2010</a>; <a href="http://saugus.wickedlocal.com/article/20101229/NEWS/312299818/0/SEARCH" target="_blank">Sarah Phelan, "Catholic Memorial Play Has Special Meaning for Drama Director." <i>Saugus Advertiser</i>, December 29, 2010</a>.
<br>[75] <a href="http://articles.dailypilot.com/2006-09-10/news/dpt-peeps10_1_flight-american-muslim-muslim-faith" target="_blank">Ana Facio Contreras, "3,000 Miles Away, but Too Close to Home." <i>Costa Mesa Daily Pilot</i>, September 10, 2006</a>.
<br>[76] <a href="http://www.seacoastonline.com/articles/20010928-NEWS-309289957?cid=sitesearch" target="_blank">Karen Dandurant, "Attack Alters Wedding Plans." Seacoast Online, September 28, 2001</a>.
<br>[77] <a href="http://www.vcstar.com/news/spat-saves-to-couple-from-doomed-flight" target="_blank">Brad Smith, "Spat Saves TO Couple From Doomed Flight." <i>Ventura County Star</i>, September 14, 2001</a>.
<br>[78] <a href="http://www.capecodonline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20011007/NEWS01/310079981" target="_blank">"Realizing the Weight of Simple Decisions." <i>Cape Cod Times</i>, October 7, 2001</a>.
<br>[79] Ibid.
<br>[80] <a href="http://patch.com/california/culvercity/bp--blog-i-achieving-happy" target="_blank">Doyin Richards, "Achieving Happy." Culver City Patch, August 23, 2012</a>; <a href="http://www.smitaphotoblog.com/2012/10/santa-monica-family-photography-richards-family/" target="_blank">"Destiny and Fate." Smita Photography, October 24, 2012</a>.
<br>[81] <a href="http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-5971225.html" target="_blank">Eric Gorski and Anslee Willett, "Ripples of Tragedy Reach Relatives, Friends Living in Colorado." <i>Colorado Springs Gazette</i>, September 13, 2001</a>.
<br>[82] <a href="http://www.dallasnews.com/sports/high-schools/headlines/20120220-plano-swimmers-inspired-to-serve-country-trio-heading-to-state-meet-different-military-academies.ece" target="_blank">Mark Dent, "Plano Swimmers Inspired to Serve Country: Trio Heading to State Meet, Different Military Academies." <i>Dallas Morning News</i>, February 20, 2012</a>.
<br>[83] <a href="http://issuu.com/sasnf/docs/islander_2002_iss/15" target="_blank">"September 11: Horror Changes Perspectives on Security." <i>Singapore American School Islander</i>, 2002</a>.
<br>[84] <a href="http://www.crescentavalleyweekly.com/news/09/11/2011/9-11-remembered-in-cv/" target="_blank">Mary O'Keefe, "9/11 Remembered in CV." <i>Crescenta Valley Weekly</i>, September 11, 2011</a>.
<br>[85] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20010914212746/http:/www.bostonherald.com/news/columnists/bev09122001.htm" target="_blank">Beverly Beckham, "Sheer Luck is All That Saved Some of Us." <i>Boston Herald</i>, September 12, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-7956044.html" target="_blank">Beverly Beckham, "Friend's Love Cannot Calm a Mother's Fear." <i>Boston Globe</i>, May 7, 2006</a>.
<br>[86] <a href="http://www.wickedlocal.com/article/20110908/News/309089608" target="_blank">Joshua Boyd, "'Don't Worry About This Football Thing': North Shore High School Sports on 9/11." Wicked Local Amesbury, September 8, 2011</a>.
<br>[87] Sally Applegate, "Flight 11 Crew Not Forgotten." <i>Georgetown Record</i>, September 18, 2003; "A Time to Reflect." <i>Georgetown Record</i>, September 7, 2005.
<br>[88] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/14094215/T7-B17-FBI-302s-of-Interest-Flight-11-Fdr-Entire-Contents" target="_blank">Halle Cameron, interview by the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation, September 12, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2011/09/06/the_rarely_noticed_casualties_of_sept_11/?page=full" target="_blank">Eric Moskowitz, "Little Noted or Known, They Bear Scars of That Day." <i>Boston Globe</i>, September 6, 2011</a>.
<br>[89] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/14094215/T7-B17-FBI-302s-of-Interest-Flight-11-Fdr-Entire-Contents" target="_blank">Ann Moreland, interview by the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation, September 11, 2001</a>; <a href="http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1356&dat=20020911&id=NuJPAAAAIBAJ&sjid=0AgEAAAAIBAJ&pg=4280,4406298" target="_blank">Marian Rizzo, "Tragedy Changes People's Lives." <i>Ocala Star-Banner</i>, September 11, 2002</a>; <a href="http://www.ocala.com/article/20110910/ARTICLES/110919981?p=all&tc=pgall" target="_blank">Joe Callahan, "Amid the Death and Destruction, Life Went on--and a Little Girl Was Born." <i>Ocala Star-Banner</i>, September 10, 2011</a>.
<br>[90] <a href="http://www.capecodonline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20011007/NEWS01/310079981" target="_blank">"Realizing the Weight of Simple Decisions"</a>; <a href="http://www.seacoastonline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20060329/NEWS/303299985" target="_blank">"Fremont Woman Dies in Car Crash." Associated Press, March 29, 2006</a>.
<br>[91] <a href="http://www.gazettetimes.com/news/local/spared-on---amid-tragedy-faith-swells/article_3162efe0-5e25-55cc-bacb-b168c909eb7d.html" target="_blank">Patrick Lair, "Spared on 9/11: Amid Tragedy, Faith Swells." <i>Corvallis Gazette-Times</i>, April 13, 2006</a>; <a href="http://www.bakercityherald.com/Local-News/Flight-attendant-was-scheduled-to-fly-on-Sept-11" target="_blank">Lisa Britton, "Flight Attendant Was Scheduled to Fly on Sept. 11." <i>Baker City Herald</i>, September 10, 2006</a>.
<br>[92] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/18662914/T5-B70-Saudi-Flights-FBI-Docs-1-of-4-Fdr-Investigation-of-911-Bookings-Other-Than-Hijackers-Tab-Entire-Contents-FBI-Doc-Req-29-and-Reports-684" target="_blank">Linda Emley, interview by the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation, September 15, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16762117/T7-B20-Flights-77-and-11-No-Show-Fdr-Entire-Contents-Notes-and-FBI-Reports-223" target="_blank">"For Informational Purposes and to Set Lead for Chicago Division Legat Islamabad." Federal Bureau of Investigation, October 2, 2001</a>.
<br>[93] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16762117/T7-B20-Flights-77-and-11-No-Show-Fdr-Entire-Contents-Notes-and-FBI-Reports-223" target="_blank">"For Informational Purposes and to Set Lead for Chicago Division Legat Islamabad."</a>
<br>[94] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 4; <a href="http://www.archives.gov/research/9-11/staff-report.pdf" target="_blank"><i>Staff Report: The Four Flights</i>, p. 6</a>.
<br>[95] See <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16762117/T7-B20-Flights-77-and-11-No-Show-Fdr-Entire-Contents-Notes-and-FBI-Reports-223" target="_blank">"AA Group: On List and Cancelations for Flights 11 and 77."</a>
<br>[96] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, pp. 7-8, 454; <a href="http://www.archives.gov/research/9-11/staff-report.pdf" target="_blank"><i>Staff Report: The Four Flights</i>, pp. 18-19, 24</a>.
<br>[97] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16762117/T7-B20-Flights-77-and-11-No-Show-Fdr-Entire-Contents-Notes-and-FBI-Reports-223" target="_blank">Patricia Dunkel, interview by the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation, September 26, 2001</a>.
<br>[98] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16762105/T7-B20-Flights-77-175-and-93-No-Show-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-Reports-224" target="_blank">Kelly Kawahara, interview by the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation, November 19, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16762105/T7-B20-Flights-77-175-and-93-No-Show-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-Reports-224" target="_blank">"To Report Coverage of Lead." Federal Bureau of Investigation, November 27, 2001</a>.
<br>[99] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16762117/T7-B20-Flights-77-and-11-No-Show-Fdr-Entire-Contents-Notes-and-FBI-Reports-223" target="_blank">Charles Marcus, interview by the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation, October 2, 2001</a>.
<br>[100] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16762105/T7-B20-Flights-77-175-and-93-No-Show-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-Reports-224" target="_blank">Fai Hung Yong, interview by the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation, October 9, 2001</a>.
<br>[101] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16762117/T7-B20-Flights-77-and-11-No-Show-Fdr-Entire-Contents-Notes-and-FBI-Reports-223" target="_blank">"Report Coverage of the Following Leads, All of Which Are Related to the Interview of Thomas and Megan Swain." Federal Bureau of Investigation, September 28, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16762117/T7-B20-Flights-77-and-11-No-Show-Fdr-Entire-Contents-Notes-and-FBI-Reports-223" target="_blank">Elizabeth Swain, interview by the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation, October 25, 2001</a>.
<br>[102] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16762105/T7-B20-Flights-77-175-and-93-No-Show-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-Reports-224" target="_blank">Thomas Swain, interview by the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation, October 9, 2001</a>.
<br>[103] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20011212203903/http:/www.boston.com/news/packages/underattack/globe_stories/0913/After_tragedy_executives_feel_invincible_no_more+.shtml" target="_blank">Liz Kowalczyk and Beth Healy, "After Tragedy, Executives Feel Invincible no More." <i>Boston Globe</i>, September 13, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.networkworld.com/archive/2001/125332_09-17-2001.html" target="_blank">John Fontana, "Tragedy Claims High-Tech Executives." <i>Network World</i>, September 17, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16762117/T7-B20-Flights-77-and-11-No-Show-Fdr-Entire-Contents-Notes-and-FBI-Reports-223" target="_blank">Barry Bycoff, interview by the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation, September 26, 2001</a>.
<br>[104] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16762117/T7-B20-Flights-77-and-11-No-Show-Fdr-Entire-Contents-Notes-and-FBI-Reports-223" target="_blank">John Caney, interview by the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation, October 1, 2001</a>.
<br>[105] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16762117/T7-B20-Flights-77-and-11-No-Show-Fdr-Entire-Contents-Notes-and-FBI-Reports-223" target="_blank">Iain Cockburn, interview by the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation, October 2, 2001</a>.
<br>[106] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16762105/T7-B20-Flights-77-175-and-93-No-Show-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-Reports-224" target="_blank">"To Request Listed Previously Scheduled United Airlines Passengers From Flight 175 on September 11, 2001 be Interviewed." Federal Bureau of Investigation, January 16, 2002</a>; <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16762105/T7-B20-Flights-77-175-and-93-No-Show-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-Reports-224" target="_blank">"To Respond to Lead Requesting Interview of Tatchui Soo." Federal Bureau of Investigation, February 1, 2002</a>.
<br>[107] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16762105/T7-B20-Flights-77-175-and-93-No-Show-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-Reports-224" target="_blank">Acting Legal Attaché, American Embassy, Singapore, letter. Federal Bureau of Investigation, May 14, 2004</a>; <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16762105/T7-B20-Flights-77-175-and-93-No-Show-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-Reports-224" target="_blank">Assistant Legal Attaché, American Embassy, Singapore, letter. Federal Bureau of Investigation, May 14, 2004</a>; <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16762105/T7-B20-Flights-77-175-and-93-No-Show-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-Reports-224" target="_blank">Assistant Legal Attaché, American Embassy, Singapore, letter. Federal Bureau of Investigation, May 14, 2004</a>.
<br>[108] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16762105/T7-B20-Flights-77-175-and-93-No-Show-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-Reports-224" target="_blank">"To Request Listed Previously Scheduled United Airlines Passengers From Flight 175 on September 11, 2001 be Interviewed"</a>; <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16762105/T7-B20-Flights-77-175-and-93-No-Show-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-Reports-224" target="_blank">"Lead 3 Covered; Lead 11 Investigation Continuing." Federal Bureau of Investigation, May 23, 2002</a>.
<br>[109] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16762105/T7-B20-Flights-77-175-and-93-No-Show-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-Reports-224" target="_blank">"Los Angeles Covers Lead in Captioned Investigation." Federal Bureau of Investigation, March 18, 2002</a>.
<br>[110] Ibid.
<br>[111] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16762105/T7-B20-Flights-77-175-and-93-No-Show-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-Reports-224" target="_blank">Scott K. Lange, interview by the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation, January 30, 2002</a>.
<br>[112] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16762105/T7-B20-Flights-77-175-and-93-No-Show-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-Reports-224" target="_blank">Caroline Soeung, interview by the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation, February 15, 2002</a>.
<br>[113] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16762105/T7-B20-Flights-77-175-and-93-No-Show-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-Reports-224" target="_blank">William B. Travers, interview by the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation, March 14, 2002</a>.
<br>[114] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16762105/T7-B20-Flights-77-175-and-93-No-Show-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-Reports-224" target="_blank">Wilbert James Lick, interview by the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation, March 20, 2002</a>.
<br>[115] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16762105/T7-B20-Flights-77-175-and-93-No-Show-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-Reports-224" target="_blank">Poyi Huang, interview by the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation, March 28, 2002</a>.
<br>[116] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16762105/T7-B20-Flights-77-175-and-93-No-Show-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-Reports-224" target="_blank">Sadie Ann Herrera, interview by the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation, April 1, 2002</a>.
<br>[117] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16762105/T7-B20-Flights-77-175-and-93-No-Show-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-Reports-224" target="_blank">Ormande Lincoln Brown, interview by the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation, May 21, 2002</a>.
<br>[118] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16762105/T7-B20-Flights-77-175-and-93-No-Show-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-Reports-224" target="_blank">Thomas Iandiorio, interview by the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation, April 2-3, 2002</a>.
<br>[119] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16762105/T7-B20-Flights-77-175-and-93-No-Show-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-Reports-224" target="_blank">Howard Englander, interview by the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation, March 29, 2002</a>.
<br>[120] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16762105/T7-B20-Flights-77-175-and-93-No-Show-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-Reports-224" target="_blank">Dennis McCarthy, interview by the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation, May 17, 2002</a>.
<br>[121] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16762105/T7-B20-Flights-77-175-and-93-No-Show-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-Reports-224" target="_blank">Jennifer Fisher, interview by the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation, May 21, 2002</a>.
<br>[122] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16762105/T7-B20-Flights-77-175-and-93-No-Show-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-Reports-224" target="_blank">Jeanne Kelly, interview by the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation, May 21, 2002</a>.
<br>[123] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16762105/T7-B20-Flights-77-175-and-93-No-Show-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-Reports-224" target="_blank">David Schwartzer, interview by the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation, May 21, 2002</a>.
<br>[124] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16762105/T7-B20-Flights-77-175-and-93-No-Show-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-Reports-224" target="_blank">Paul E. Connolly, interview by the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation, May 21, 2002</a>.
<br>[125] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16762105/T7-B20-Flights-77-175-and-93-No-Show-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-Reports-224" target="_blank">Matthew McRoberts, interview by the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation, May 21, 2002</a>.
<br>[126] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16762117/T7-B20-Flights-77-and-11-No-Show-Fdr-Entire-Contents-Notes-and-FBI-Reports-223" target="_blank">"AA Group: On List and Cancelations for Flights 11 and 77"</a>; <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16762105/T7-B20-Flights-77-175-and-93-No-Show-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-Reports-224" target="_blank">Christopher Kozloski, interview by the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation, May 22, 2002</a>.
<br>[127] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16762105/T7-B20-Flights-77-175-and-93-No-Show-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-Reports-224" target="_blank">Joseph E. Braga, interview by the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation, May 23, 2002</a>.
<br>[128] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16762105/T7-B20-Flights-77-175-and-93-No-Show-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-Reports-224" target="_blank">"Lead 6659.1 Covered at SD." Federal Bureau of Investigation, June 24, 2002</a>.
<br>[129] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16762105/T7-B20-Flights-77-175-and-93-No-Show-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-Reports-224" target="_blank">Laila Partridge, interview by the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation, December 19, 2002</a>.
<br>[130] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16762105/T7-B20-Flights-77-175-and-93-No-Show-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-Reports-224" target="_blank">Thomas Haugen, interview by the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation, February 6, 2003</a>.
<br>[131] <a href="http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-79113971.html" target="_blank">"Narrow Escape Gives Film-Makers Focus." <i>Australasian Business Intelligence</i>, October 14, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.soulfilms.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/TheAustralian5603.jpg" target="_blank">David King and Belinda Hickman, "Spared by Fate, Soul Mates Now on a Roll." <i>The Australian</i>, June 5, 2003</a>; <a href="http://www.soulfilms.com.au/who-are-we/martin-wilson/" target="_blank">"Martin Wilson." Soul Films, n.d.</a>
<br>[132] <a href="http://www.hoodrivernews.com/news/2002/sep/10/the-indecision-of-a-lifetime/" target="_blank">"The Indecision of a Lifetime." <i>Hood River News</i>, September 10, 2002</a>.
<br>[133] Sandy Boucher, <i>Dancing in the Dharma: The Life and Teachings of Ruth Denison</i>. Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2005, pp. 225-226.
<br>[134] <a href="http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/columnist/lopresti/story/2011-09-05/Notre-Dame-coach-McGraw-recalls-her-close-call-on-Sept-11/50268278/1" target="_blank">Mike Lopresti, "Notre Dame Coach McGraw's Twist of Fate on Sept. 11." <i>USA Today</i>, September 6, 2011</a>; <a href="http://www.seattlepi.com/news/article/Near-miss-for-Notre-Dame-coach-1065951.php" target="_blank">"Near-Miss for Notre Dame Coach." <i>Seattle Post-Intelligencer</i>, September 16, 2001</a>.
<br>[135] <a href="http://www.japersrink.com/2009/8/19/991565/excerpts-from-gabby-confessions-of" target="_blank">Bruce Boudreau and Tim Leone, <i>Gabby: Confessions of a Hockey Lifer</i>. Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2009, p. 79</a>; <a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/sep/8/a-life-saving-flight-change/?page=all" target="_blank">Stephen Whyno, "For Boudreau, a Life-Saving Flight Change." <i>Washington Times</i>, September 8, 2011</a>; <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/john-thompson-bruce-boudreau-share-harrowing-sept-11-memories/2011/09/08/gIQA40HEDK_story.html" target="_blank">Mike Wise, "John Thompson, Bruce Boudreau Share Harrowing Sept. 11 Memories." <i>Washington Post</i>, September 8, 2011</a>.
<br>[136] <a href="http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-8673491.html" target="_blank">Jim McCabe, "Johnson in a Scramble, With Exemption the Prize." <i>Boston Globe</i>, October 10, 2001</a>.
<br>[137] <a href="http://archive.fortune.com/2009/12/07/news/international/li_fung.fortune/index.htm" target="_blank">Suzanne Kapner, "The Unstoppable Fung Brothers." <i>Fortune</i>, December 9, 2009</a>.
<br>[138] Tricia Brennan, <i>Looking Beyond the Mirror: Twelve Steps to Overcoming Self-Doubt</i>. Sydney: New Holland, 2005, pp. 41-42.
<br>[139] <a href="http://articles.latimes.com/2001/sep/25/local/me-49628" target="_blank">Stuart Pfeifer and Jack Leonard, "Law School Deceived Students, Jury Says." <i>Los Angeles Times</i>, September 25, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.foxnews.com/story/2002/11/26/robert-blake-gets-new-lawyers-for-trial-on-charges-killing-his-wife/" target="_blank">"Robert Blake Gets New Lawyers for Trial on Charges of Killing His Wife." Associated Press, November 26, 2002</a>.
<br>[140] <a href="http://www.wilsonelser.com/files/repository/Wemedia_Winter2006.pdf" target="_blank">"Former LA Partner Sees 'Public Service' as His New Calling in Life." <i>Wemedia</i>, Winter 2006</a>; <a href="http://www.metnews.com/articles/2006/wrig090706.htm" target="_blank">"Bush Nominates Judges to Central District." <i>Metropolitan News-Enterprise</i>, September 7, 2006</a>; <a href="http://www.swlaw.edu/about/alumprofiles/wrightqanda" target="_blank">"Alumni Q&A With Hon. Otis D. Wright II '80." Southwestern Law School, n.d.</a>
<br>[141] <a href="http://www.seacoastonline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20110908/NEWS/109080356" target="_blank">Samantha Stephens, "'Why Wasn't it Me?'" Seacoast Online, September 8, 2011</a>; <a href="http://www.pressherald.com/2011/10/02/work-inspired-by-9_11-recognized_2011-10-02/" target="_blank">Edward D. Murphy, "Work Inspired by 9/11 Recognized." <i>Portland Press Herald</i>, October 2, 2011</a>; <a href="http://www.tramutofoundation.com/story.html" target="_blank">"Story." Tramuto Foundation, n.d.</a>
<br>[142] <a href="http://www.examiner.com/article/bgsa-ceo-ben-gordon-recounts-his-recent-fdny-tribute-flight-experience" target="_blank">Adam Taxin, "BGSA CEO Ben Gordon Recounts His Recent FDNY-Tribute Flight Experience."</a>
<br>[143] <a href="http://www.dotnews.com/2001/narrow-escape-clam-points-bobby-corrigan-missed-deadly-flight" target="_blank">Bill Forry, "Narrow Escape; Clam Point's Bobby Corrigan Missed Deadly Flight." <i>Dorchester Reporter</i>, September 18, 2001</a>.
<br>[144] <a href="http://www.solatechonline.com/marketing/Michelle_Wollmann_Transcript.pdf" target="_blank">Michelle Wollmann, interview by Ray Soltis. <i>Solatech Newsletter</i>, June 9, 2011</a>.
<br>[145] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/138900082/FOREWORD-by-Dr-Lewis-E-Graham" target="_blank">Mark Grant, <i>A Tale of Two Synchronicities</i>. 2nd ed., CreateSpace, 2013, pp. ii-iii</a>.
<br>[146] <a href="http://monicamccarty.blogspot.co.uk/2011/09/remembering-on-september-11-2001-i-was.html" target="_blank">Monica McCarty, "Remembering." Romancing the Highlander, September 11, 2011</a>.
<br>[147] <a href="http://rarelywrongerin.blogspot.co.uk/2011/09/i-wasnt-sure-i-wanted-to-write-this.html" target="_blank">Erin Khar, "I Wasn't Sure I Wanted to Write This ..." RarelyWrongErin, September 8, 2011</a>.
<br>[148] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20110719023850/http://www.eagletribune.com/local/x1876265833/Theflight-she-never-made-Series-of-events-kept-attendant-off-9-11-flight-saved-her-life" target="_blank">Mike LaBella, "The Flight She Never Made: Series of Events Kept Attendant off 9/11 Flight, Saved Her Life." <i>North Andover Eagle-Tribune</i>, September 11, 2006</a>; <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2011/US/09/03/near.death.decisions/" target="_blank">Madison Park, "Small Choices, Saved Lives: Near Misses of 9/11." CNN, September 5, 2011</a>; <a href="http://staugustine.com/news/local-news/2011-09-10/elise-okane-gets-saved-typo" target="_blank">Sheldon Gardner, "Elise O'Kane Gets Saved by a Typo." <i>St. Augustine Record</i>, September 11, 2011</a>.
<br>[149] <a href="http://cache.boston.com/news/packages/sept11/anniversary/globe_stories/090802_sixlives_gurskis.htm" target="_blank">Joseph P. Kahn, "The Flight not Taken." <i>Boston Globe</i>, September 8, 2002</a>.
<br>[150] Rebecca Tripp with Bryna René, <i>Secrets of a Metaphysical Flight Attendant</i>. Bloomington, IN: Balboa Press, 2014, p. 213.
<br>[151] <a href="http://www.capecodonline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20010914/NEWS01/309149985" target="_blank">Meg Murphy, "Flight Workers: 'It Could Have Been Any of Us.'" <i>Cape Cod Times</i>, September 14, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.capecodonline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20020310/NEWS01/303109950" target="_blank">Meg Murphy, "Three Cape Flight Attendants Reflect on Returning to Air." <i>Cape Cod Times</i>, March 10, 2002</a>.
<br>[152] <a href="http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Airline-passengers-keeping-eyes-peeled-Tour-of-2865480.php" target="_blank">Michael Taylor, "Airline Passengers Keeping Eyes Peeled." <i>San Francisco Chronicle</i>, October 23, 2001</a>.
<br>[153] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, pp. 8, 10; <a href="http://www.archives.gov/research/9-11/staff-report.pdf" target="_blank"><i>Staff Report: The Four Flights</i>, pp. 28-29, 34</a>.
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<br>[156] <a href="http://www.tribuneindia.com/2001/20010914/edit.htm" target="_blank">"Actress' Providential Escape." <i>Chandigarh Tribune</i>, September 14, 2001</a>.
<br>[157] <a href="http://issuu.com/chesapeakecurrent/docs/cc_092211_final/18" target="_blank">"9/11 Ten Years Later." <i>Chesapeake Current</i>, September 22, 2011</a>.
<br>[158] <a href="http://issuu.com/chesapeakecurrent/docs/chesapeake_current_11-04-2010_finished" target="_blank">Jonathan Pugh, "Local Singer to Audition for 'America's Got Talent.'" <i>Chesapeake Current</i>, November 4, 2010</a>. Note that O'Shea appeared in these productions under the name Clare Peck.
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<br>[161] <a href="http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2011/09/12/The-Promise-of-9-11-Is-Within-Each-of-Us" target="_blank">Kerri Toloczko, "The Promise of 9/11 is Within Each of Us." Breitbart.com, September 12, 2011</a>.
<br>[162] <a href="http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000350609928131063" target="_blank">Robert Tomsho, Barbara Carton, and Jerry Guidera, "For Some, Avoiding Tragedy Seemed Like Pure Chance"</a>; <a href="http://www.autonews.com/article/20030414/ANA/304140780/aiada-president-brings-wide-range-of-experience" target="_blank">Harry Stoffer, "AIADA President Brings Wide Range of Experience." <i>Automotive News</i>, April 14, 2003</a>.
<br>[163] <a href="http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-493192.html" target="_blank">"Living on the Edge." <i>Washington Post</i>, October 30, 2001</a>; <a href="http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/person.asp?personId=36439155" target="_blank">"Executive Profile: Richard M. Nummi Esq." <i>Bloomberg Businessweek</i>, n.d.</a>
<br>[164] <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/john-thompson-bruce-boudreau-share-harrowing-sept-11-memories/2011/09/08/gIQA40HEDK_story.html" target="_blank">Mike Wise, "John Thompson, Bruce Boudreau Share Harrowing Sept. 11 Memories"</a>; <a href="http://www.foxsports.com/collegebasketball/story/Former-Georgetown-coach-John-Thompson-talked-out-of-doomed-flight-091211" target="_blank">"Thompson Was Talked out of 9/11 Flight." Fox Sports, September 12, 2011</a>.
<br>[165] <a href="http://www.tulsaworld.com/business/aerospace/tsa-officers-help-secure-the-air/article_9da2505a-026f-51bd-aa29-8b645be45cfb.html" target="_blank">D. R. Stewart, "TSA Officers Help Secure the Air." <i>Tulsa World</i>, August 21, 2011</a>.
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<br>[168] <a href="http://www.pfonline.com/articles/10-years-after-sept-11-platers-recall-tragic-day" target="_blank">Tim Pennington, "10 Years After Sept. 11: Platers Recall Tragic Day." <i>Products Finishing</i>, September 1, 2011</a>.
<br>[169] <a href="http://www.brucevanhorn.com/september-11-2001-strong-memories-11-years-later/" target="_blank">Bruce Van Horn, "September 11, 2001: Strong Memories 11 Years Later." Bruce Van Horn, September 11, 2012</a>; <a href="http://www.brucevanhorn.com/lifethoughts-41/" target="_blank">Bruce Van Horn, "LifeThought: Don't Let the Miracles That Haven't Happened Yet Blind You to the Ones That Already Have!" Bruce Van Horn, February 24, 2014</a>.
<br>[170] <a href="http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-459330.html" target="_blank">Cynthia L. Webb and Yuki Noguchi, "When Phones Failed, New Technology Filled the Void." <i>Washington Post</i>, September 13, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2001/sep/17/20010917-025428-9235r/" target="_blank">"Staffers Remember COO Killed in Attack." <i>Washington Times</i>, September 17, 2001</a>.
<br>[171] <a href="http://www.gamasutra.com/blogs/MattPowers/20140401/214271/Oh_The_Places_Ive_Been.php" target="_blank">Matt Powers, "Oh! The Places I've Been!" Gamasutra, April 1, 2014</a>.
<br>[172] <a href="http://ganley.org/2004/09/my-911.shtml" target="_blank">Joe Ganley, "My 9/11." Joe Ganley, September 23, 2004</a>.
<br>[173] <a href="http://markmartinezshow.blogspot.co.uk/2011/09/no-more-bad-days-my-911-moment.html" target="_blank">Mark Martinez, "No More Bad Days ... My 9/11 Moment." Mark Martinez' Blog, September 1, 2011</a>; <a href="http://markmartinezshow.blogspot.co.uk/2013/09/my-911-thoughts.html" target="_blank">Mark Martinez, "My 9/11 Thoughts ..." Mark Martinez' Blog, September 10, 2013</a>.
<br>[174] <a href="http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-466672.html" target="_blank">Donna St. George, "Lives Spared Through Mysterious Good Fortune." <i>Washington Post</i>, September 15, 2001</a>.
<br>[175] <a href="http://www.belvoireagle.com/news/article_c2485a51-e408-512a-9134-93d2123dc474.html" target="_blank">Dianne Ryder, "Defense Logistics Agency Employee Reflects on Near-Miss on 9/11." <i>Belvoir Eagle</i>, September 16, 2010</a>.
<br>[176] <a href="http://www.cutimes.com/2002/09/11/credit-union-association-employee-almost-took-hijacked-plane" target="_blank">"Credit Union Association Employee Almost Took Hijacked Plane." <i>Credit Union Times</i>, September 11, 2002</a>.
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<br>[178] <a href="http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-368564.html" target="_blank">Stephen C. Fehr, "Neighborhood Finds Close Connection in Airline Pilot's Death." <i>Washington Post</i>, September 5, 2002</a>.
<br>[179] <a href="http://www.ihigh.com/clearcreekhighschool/article_12465.html" target="_blank">Chris Kirkham and Lauren DeFrank, "Never Forget September 11: A Retrospective." <i>Clear Creek HiLife</i>, September 10, 2009</a>.
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<br>[183] <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/13/us/after-the-attacks-american-flight-77-a-route-out-of-washington-horribly-changed.html" target="_blank">Elaine Sciolino and John H. Cushman Jr., "A Route out of Washington, Horribly Changed." <i>New York Times</i>, September 13, 2001</a>.
<br>[184] Karen Finley, <i>The Reality Shows</i>. New York: Feminist Press at the City University of New York, 2011, p. 30.
<br>[185] <a href="http://articles.latimes.com/print/1997/aug/10/news/ls-20997" target="_blank">Charlotte Innes, "His Gift is Finding the Bad in Everything." <i>Los Angeles Times</i>, August 10, 1997</a>; <a href="http://galleristny.com/2014/04/sleep-when-im-dead-gary-indiana-might-be-out-of-print-but-hes-still-going-strong/" target="_blank">M. H. Miller, "Sleep When I'm Dead: Gary Indiana Might be out of Print, but He's Still Going Strong." Gallerist, April 22, 2014</a>.
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<br>[187] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 8; <a href="http://www.archives.gov/research/9-11/staff-report.pdf" target="_blank"><i>Staff Report: The Four Flights</i>, p. 28</a>.
<br>[188] The FBI's list can be viewed on the Internet. See: <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16762117/T7-B20-Flights-77-and-11-No-Show-Fdr-Entire-Contents-Notes-and-FBI-Reports-223" target="_blank">"AA Group: On List and Cancelations for Flights 11 and 77."</a>
<br>[189] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, pp. 10, 14, 456; <a href="http://www.archives.gov/research/9-11/staff-report.pdf" target="_blank"><i>Staff Report: The Four Flights</i>, pp. 35-36, 46</a>.
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<br>[191] <a href="http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-145061445.html" target="_blank">Patricia Seremet, "West Hartford's Basche Plays Hero in 'United 93.'" <i>Hartford Courant</i>, April 28, 2006</a>.
<br>[192] <a href="http://thesop.org/story/20120216/forbes-riley-tells-judyth-piazza-i-was-supposed-to-be-on-united-flight-93.html" target="_blank">Judyth Piazza, "Forbes Riley Tells Judyth Piazza 'I Was Supposed to be on United Flight 93.'" theSOP, February 16, 2012</a>; <a href="http://www.entrepreneuronfire.com/podcast/forbes-riley-interview-with-john-lee-dumas-of-entrepreneur-on-fire/" target="_blank">"Forbes Riley." EntrepreneurOnFire, January 11, 2013</a>; <a href="http://issuu.com/southmagazine/docs/50_full" target="_blank">Paula S. Fogarty,"Who is Forbes Riley?" <i>South</i>, June/July 2014</a>.
<br>[193] <a href="http://www.cbsnews.com/news/following-in-ellas-footsteps/" target="_blank">Mary-Jayne McKay, "Following in Ella's Footsteps." CBS News, January 14, 2003</a>; <a href="http://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/Singer-Patti-Austin-Just-Missed-Flight-93-129472663.html" target="_blank">Beverly White and Julie Brayton, "Singer Patti Austin Just Missed Flight 93." NBC Bay Area, September 8, 2011</a>.
<br>[194] <a href=" http://www.allaccessgroup.com/the-gifts-of-the-digital-age-%E2%80%93-remember-911/" target="_blank">Kelli Richards, "The Gifts of the Digital Age: Remember 9/11." All Access Group, September 11, 2011</a>; <a href=" http://www.allaccessgroup.com/newsletter/kc-mar12.htm" target="_blank">Kelli Richards, "Life and the Love We Make." Kelli Connects, March 2012</a>.
<br>[195] <a href=" http://www.sfgate.com/entertainment/article/Silenced-by-a-stroke-Merl-Saunders-is-grateful-2729036.php" target="_blank">Joel Selvin, "Silenced by a Stroke, Merl Saunders is Grateful to be Grooving. His Son Tony Has Helped Him Find a New Voice." <i>San Francisco Chronicle</i>, September 1, 2004</a>; <a href=" http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/former-grateful-dead-keyboardist-merl-saunders-dies-20081024" target="_blank">John Clarke, "Former Grateful Dead Keyboardist Merl Saunders Dies." <i>Rolling Stone</i>, October 24, 2008</a>; <a href=" http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Star-keyboardist-Merl-Saunders-dies-3264217.php" target="_blank">Joel Selvin, "Star Keyboardist Merl Saunders Dies." <i>San Francisco Chronicle</i>, October 25, 2008</a>.
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<br>[197] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16762117/T7-B20-Flights-77-and-11-No-Show-Fdr-Entire-Contents-Notes-and-FBI-Reports-223" target="_blank">"Cover Lead." Federal Bureau of Investigation, October 4, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16762105/T7-B20-Flights-77-175-and-93-No-Show-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-Reports-224" target="_blank">Yu Nakagawa, interview by the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation, March 8, 2002</a>.
<br>[198] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16762117/T7-B20-Flights-77-and-11-No-Show-Fdr-Entire-Contents-Notes-and-FBI-Reports-223" target="_blank">Kevin Dougherty, interview by the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation, September 28, 2001</a>.
<br>[199] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16762117/T7-B20-Flights-77-and-11-No-Show-Fdr-Entire-Contents-Notes-and-FBI-Reports-223" target="_blank">George Gutierrez, interview by the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation, September 27, 2001</a>.
<br>[200] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16762105/T7-B20-Flights-77-175-and-93-No-Show-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-Reports-224" target="_blank">Patricia Breese, interview by the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation, September 28, 2001</a>.
<br>[201] <a href=" http://download.e-bookshelf.de/download/0000/5753/33/L-G-0000575333-0002383017.pdf" target="_blank">Stephen L. Weiss, <i>The Billion Dollar Mistake: Learning the Art of Investing Through the Missteps of Legendary Investors</i>. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley & Sons, 2010, p. 5</a>.
<br>[202] <a href=" http://www.cnbc.com/id/42879820" target="_blank">"One Wall Streeter: Why I Won't Trade on Bin Laden." CNBC, May 3, 2011</a>.
<br>[203] <a href=" http://www.starpulse.com/news/Fresh_Tracks_Marketing/2011/05/19/meital_dohan_frank_andrews_interview_" target="_blank">Meital Dohan, "Frank Andrews Interview Part 2." Starpulse.com, May 19, 2011</a>.
<br>[204] <a href=" https://www.mediabistro.com/agencyspy/joyce-king-thomas-quits-mccann_b6613" target="_blank">Kiran Aditham, "Joyce King Thomas Quits McCann." AgencySpy, May 28, 2010</a>.
<br>[205] <a href=" http://www.forbes.com/sites/troyonink/2011/09/10/are-you-alive-one-familys-911-reflections/" target="_blank">Troy Onink, "Are You Alive? One Family's 9/11 Reflections." <i>Forbes</i>, September 10, 2011</a>.
<br>[206] <a href=" http://www.winespectator.com/webfeature/show/id/German-Wine-Institute-Executive-Dies-in-Hijacked-Plane-Crash_21015" target="_blank">Bruce Sanderson, "German Wine Institute Executive Dies in Hijacked Plane Crash." <i>Wine Spectator</i>, September 18, 2001</a>; <a href=" http://www.welt.de/print/die_welt/wirtschaft/article13596351/Wie-ich-9-11-erlebte.html" target="_blank">Michael zu Salm-Salm, "Wie Ich '9/11' Erlebte." <i>Die Welt</i>, September 10, 2011</a>.
<br>[207] <a href=" http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-82056161.html" target="_blank">Julia Prodis Sulek, "Spared Death, Air Travelers Face Life With New Outlook." Knight Ridder, January 22, 2002</a>.
<br>[208] <a href=" http://www.eetimes.com/document.asp?doc_id=1130781" target="_blank">Corinne Bernstein, "For Some, Hand of Fate Intervened"</a>; <a href=" http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/story?id=1556671" target="_blank">"9/11 Twists of Fate." ABC News, January 30, 2006</a>; <a href=" http://www.suffolknewsherald.com/2006/02/03/some-phrases-and-quotes-are-supported-by-true-stories/" target="_blank">"Some Phrases and Quotes Are Supported by True Stories." <i>Suffolk News-Herald</i>, February 3, 2006</a>.
<br>[209] <a href=" https://web.archive.org/web/20090613000006/http:/www.mvtimes.com/marthas-vineyard/calendar/2009/05/28/alan-brigish.php" target="_blank">Jack Shea, "The World Through a Wide-Angle Lens." <i>Martha's Vineyard Times</i>, May 28, 2009</a>.
<br>[210] <a href=" http://old.post-gazette.com/ae/20030716chiz0716fnp5.asp" target="_blank">Leslie Hoffman, "Self-Taught Artist's Childlike Works Convey Brutal Honesty." <i>Pittsburgh Post-Gazette</i>, July 16, 2003</a>; <a href=" http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/story?id=1556671" target="_blank">"9/11 Twists of Fate"</a>; <a href="http://www.deccanherald.com/content/190283/break-routine-saved-their-lives.html" target="_blank">"Break From Routine Saved Their Lives." Press Trust of India, September 11, 2011</a>.
<br>[211] <a href="http://news.stanford.edu/news/2001/september19/hijack.html" target="_blank">Ruthann Richter, "Stanford Physician Misses Hijacked Flight." <i>Stanford Report</i>, September 19, 2001</a>; <a href=" http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/story?id=1556671" target="_blank">"9/11 Twists of Fate."</a>
<br>[212] <a href=" http://www.dailyrepublic.com/news/suisuncity/suisun-city-a-piece-of-paper-away-from-getting-world-trade-center-artifacts/" target="_blank">Ian Thompson, "Suisun City a Piece of Paper Away From Getting WTC Artifacts." <i>Fairfield Daily Republic</i>, August 26, 2011</a>; <a href=" http://www.dailyrepublic.com/featured-stories/eyewitness-to-911-attack-shares-her-account-at-suisun-ceremony/" target="_blank">David DeBolt, "Eyewitness to 9/11 Attack Shares Her Account at Suisun Ceremony." <i>Fairfield Daily Republic</i>, September 11, 2011</a>.
<br>[213] <a href="http://rubbos2.com/2013/03/25/thanks-and-prayers-at-flight-93-national-memorial/" target="_blank">Donald Rubbo,"Thanks and Prayers at Flight 93 National Memorial." Rubbo Art of Energy, March 25, 2013</a>.
<br>[214] <a href="http://paulandleah-stone.blogspot.co.uk/2011/05/day-to-remember.html" target="_blank">Leah Stone, "A Day to Remember: Justice for America." A Bicycle Built for Two, May 1, 2011</a>.
<br>[215] <a href="http://upstart.bizjournals.com/companies/rebel-brands/2010/09/23/mikey-koffman-of-the-real-l-word-talks-fame-reality-tv-and-fashion.html?page=all" target="_blank">Romy Ribitzky, "A Real Lesson in Entrepreneurship." Upstart Business Journal, September 23, 2010</a>; <a href="http://stylebydesign.tv/runway-rockstar/" target="_blank">"Runway Rockstar." Style by Design, March 21, 2012</a>.
<br>[216] <a href="http://blog.sfgate.com/twocents/2006/09/09/part-1-how-did-sept-11-affect-your-life/" target="_blank">Heidi Swillinger, "Part 1: How Did Sept. 11 Affect Your Life?" <i>San Francisco Chronicle</i>, September 9, 2006</a>.
<br>[217] <a href="http://www.shieldsgazette.com/news/local-news/i-was-due-on-flight-to-terror-1-1255715" target="_blank">"I Was Due on Flight to Terror." <i>Shields Gazette</i>, n.d.</a>
<br>[218] <a href="http://adage.com/article/digital/digital-marketing-rekindle-growth-reckitt-benckiser/149075/" target="_blank">Jack Neff, "Can Digital Marketing Rekindle Growth at Reckitt Benckiser?" <i>Advertising Age</i>, February 27, 2011</a>; <a href="http://ireport.cnn.com/docs/DOC-672068" target="_blank">Jiri Kulik, "I Live Second Life: I Was Booked on the UA Flight ..." CNN, September 11, 2011</a>.
<br>[219] <a href="http://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-life-and-religion/1313/leaps-of-faith" target="_blank">Nelly Reifler, "Leaps of Faith." Tablet, November 9, 2006</a>; <a href="http://www.theweeklings.com/nreifler/2013/09/20/blue-spark-part-ii/" target="_blank">Nelly Reifler, "Blue Spark, Part II." The Weeklings, September 20, 2013</a>.
<br>[220] <a href="http://fordhamsports.com/news/2012/3/14/031412aab_518.aspx" target="_blank">"Five Squash Student-Athletes Honored at Ninth Annual Breakfast for Champions." Fordham University Athletics, March 14, 2012</a>; <a href="http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10000872396390443404004577581413786155588" target="_blank">Melanie Grayce West, "Providing for Sick Children in Pain." <i>Wall Street Journal</i>, August 10, 2012</a>.
<br>[221] <a href="http://www.womansday.com/life/how-to-be-lucky" target="_blank">Rebecca Webber, "Habits of Lucky People." <i>Woman's Day</i>, January 16, 2012</a>.
<br>[222] James Canton, <i>The Extreme Future: The Top Trends That Will Reshape the World for the Next 5, 10, and 20 Years</i>. New York: Dutton, 2006, p. 214.
<br>[223] Ibid. p. 3; <a href="http://globalfuturist.com/speaking-toolkit/introduction/dr-james-canton.html" target="_blank">"Dr. James Canton Ph.D." Institute for Global Futures, n.d.</a>
<br>[224] <a href="http://www.tricalifornia.com/blog/post.cfm/let-s-try-this-again-triathlon-at-pacific-grove" target="_blank">Dave Mandelkern, "Let's Try This AGAIN--Triathlon at Pacific Grove." Exercise With Purpose, September 7, 2011</a>.
<br>[225] <a href="http://www.vcstar.com/opinion/talley-an-unused-flight-93-ticket" target="_blank">John Talley, "An Unused Flight 93 Ticket." <i>Ventura County Star</i>, September 10, 2011</a>.
<br>[226] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20140822111243/http://archive.dailyrecord.com/article/20090330/COLUMNISTS20/903300330/Fate-kept-travel-agent-off-Flight-93" target="_blank">"Fate Kept Travel Agent off Flight 93." <i>Morris County Daily Record</i>, March 30, 2009</a>.
<br>[227] <a href="http://www.washingtonian.com/blogs/shoparound/dc-designers/dc-designers-evelyn-brooks.php" target="_blank">Sonia Harmon, "DC Designers: Evelyn Brooks." <i>Washingtonian</i>, December 29, 2008</a>; <a href="http://www.ebrooksdesigns.com/media/latina-style-may-2011.pdf" target="_blank">Evelyn Brooks, "The Significance of Perseverance." <i>Latina Style</i>, 2011</a>; <a href="http://twoworldsonechica.com/2013/09/11/evelyn-brooks-designs-my-story-about-social-responsibility/" target="_blank">Evelyn Brooks, "My Story About Social Responsibility." Two Worlds One Chica, September 11, 2013</a>.
<br>[228] <a href="http://www.beyondthebookcast.com/wp-images/Book%20Expo%202006_CholeneEspinoza_Only.pdf" target="_blank">"Book Expo 2006--Books of Inspiration: Cholene Espinoza." Beyond the Book, 2006</a>; <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/13/jobs/13wcol.html" target="_blank">Lisa Belkin, "From a Dark Past, a Spirit Renewed." <i>New York Times</i>, August 13, 2006</a>; <a href="http://www.wnd.com/2011/09/344245/" target="_blank">Ellen Ratner, "A Lesson From United Flight 93." WorldNetDaily, September 11, 2011</a>.
<br>[229] <a href="http://www.montereycountyweekly.com/news/cover/article_fe2aba23-f7ac-5ca3-ba4b-69259841da98.html" target="_blank">Mark C. Anderson, "Michael Jones' Mercurial Personality Feels Larger Than Life--Just Like His Food." <i>Monterey County Weekly</i>, September 25, 2008</a>; <a href="http://cachaguastore.blogspot.co.uk/2013/02/lets-roll.html" target="_blank">Michael Jones, "Let's Roll ..." Cachagua Store, February 2, 2013</a>.
<br>[230] <a href="http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/SF-Gate-9-11-Stories-2772041.php" target="_blank">"9/11 Stories." <i>San Francisco Chronicle</i>, September 4, 2002</a>; <a href="https://twitter.com/anthonysoohoo/status/112906082569043968" target="_blank">Anthony Soohoo, Twitter post, September 11, 2011</a>.
<br>[231] <a href="http://alumni.stanford.edu/get/page/magazine/article/?article_id=38527" target="_blank">"Touched by Tragedy." <i>Stanford Magazine</i>, November 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/rites-comfort-149855" target="_blank">Jerry Adler, "Rites of Comfort." <i>Newsweek</i>, November 26, 2001</a>; <a href="http://allmyshannonigans.wordpress.com/2011/09/16/ten-years-ago-everything-changed/" target="_blank">Shannon Carroll, "Ten Years Ago, Everything Changed." <i>Granite Bay Gazette</i>, September 16, 2011</a>.
<br>[232] <a href="http://old.911digitalarchive.org/stories/details/7487" target="_blank">Eric Clamage, Story #7487. September 11 Digital Archive, September 15, 2002</a>.
<br>[233] <a href="http://old.911digitalarchive.org/stories/details/10626" target="_blank">Michelle Mahler, Story #10626. September 11 Digital Archive, May 31, 2004</a>.
<br>[234] <a href="http://annestubcivitano.com/writing/non-fiction-personal-essays/18-ten-years-later-91111/" target="_blank">Anne Stub Civitano, "Ten Years Later, 9/11/11." <i>Winston-Salem Journal</i>, September 11, 2011</a>.
<br>[235] <a href="http://zurb.com/soapbox/events/43/Michelle-Dennedy-ZURBsoapbox" target="_blank">Michelle Dennedy, "Baking Privacy Into Product Design." Zurb, n.d.</a>
<br>[236] <a href="http://www.pointparknewsservice.com/2012/09/12/point-park-community-gathers-in-silence-respect-of-911-victims/" target="_blank">Pete Bridge, "Point Park Community Gathers in Silence, Respect of 9/11 Victims." Point Park News Service, September 12, 2012</a>.
<br>[237] <a href="http://inside.episcopalacademy.org/drum/ms/Inthemiddle/document%20links%201213/colson%20andrews-Faith%20Paper%20(Final%20Draft).pdf" target="_blank">Colson Andrews, "Faith Paper." Episcopal Academy, November 20, 2012</a>.
<br>[238] <a href="http://www.aohdivision4.com/Sept11_News_Letter.pdf" target="_blank">Thomas McGann, "President's Message." Newsletter of the Ancient Order of Hibernians, Division 4 of Montgomery County, PA, September 2011</a>.
<br>[239] <a href="http://www.canada.com/Kelly+Speers+Hull+Quebec/5384946/story.html" target="_blank">"Kelly-Ann Speers, Hull, Quebec." Postmedia News, September 11, 2011</a>.
<br>[240] <a href="http://insurancemaven.wordpress.com/2009/09/11/911-a-day-of-remembrance/" target="_blank">Jeannette Sacman, "9/11: A Day of Remembrance." Insurance Maven, September 11, 2009</a>.
<br>[241] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20130518002931/http:/news.yahoo.com/september-11th-silver-linings-220400202.html" target="_blank">Juliana Mathews, "My September 11 Silver Linings." Yahoo! News, August 30, 2011</a>.
<br>[242] <a href="http://articles.southbendtribune.com/2011-09-03/news/30111594_1_happy-birthday-heck-miracle" target="_blank">"Where Were You on 9/11?" <i>South Bend Tribune</i>, September 3, 2011</a>.
<br>[243] <a href="http://brigadeair.org/assets/docs/Newsletter_Spring_2014.pdf" target="_blank">"United We Stand." Brigade Air newsletter, Spring 2014</a>.
<br>[244] <a href="http://www.lasalle.edu/collegian/features/articles/06/sept13/sept11.html" target="_blank">"La Salle Community Reflects on 9/11." <i>La Salle Collegian</i>, September 13, 2006</a>.
<br>[245] <a href="http://patch.com/new-jersey/westorange/11-years-after-9-11-essex-county-remembers" target="_blank">Mike D'Onofrio, "11 Years After 9/11: 'Essex County Remembers.'" West Orange Patch, September 11, 2012</a>.
<br>[246] <a href="http://centrecounty.remembers911.com/articles/attendant-missed-fatal-flight/" target="_blank">"Attendant Missed Fatal Flight." Centre Daily Times, September 12, 2011</a>.
<br>[247] <a href="http://www.apnewsarchive.com/2003/No-9-11-Compensation-for-Flight-Attendant/id-a79efb6252a255b89d2e5ed31ea89568" target="_blank">"No 9/11 Compensation for Flight Attendant." Associated Press, November 27, 2003</a>; <a href="http://www.app.com/article/99999999/WTC06/60902034/Post-crash-trauma-grounds-United-flight-attendant" target="_blank">Michael L. Diamond, "Post-Crash Trauma Grounds United Flight Attendant." <i>Asbury Park Press</i>, September 2, 2006</a>; <a href="http://caselaw.findlaw.com/nj-superior-court-appellate-division/1452956.html" target="_blank">"Stroka v. United Airlines." FindLaw, n.d.</a>
<br>[248] <a href="http://www.jacksonsun.com/article/20110911/NEWS01/110913021/-NEVER-FORGET-West-Tennesseans-survived-helped-respond-terror-attacks-Pentagon-Ground-Zero" target="_blank">Tracie Simer, "West Tennesseans Survived, Helped Respond to Terror Attacks at the Pentagon, Ground Zero." <i>Jackson Sun</i>, September 13, 2011</a>.
<br>[249] <a href="http://www.kentuckynewera.com/article_88a8879d-be6f-5e02-aedf-15bd022e8a1c.html" target="_blank">E. L. Gold, "Luck Keeps Residents' Loved Ones From Becoming Victims." <i>Kentucky New Era</i>, September 14, 2001</a>.Shoestringhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01534319150672667644noreply@blogger.com15tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2990970741097819876.post-30778479979097572332014-01-21T01:49:00.000-08:002014-01-21T01:49:40.403-08:00Targeting the President: Evidence of U.S. Government Training Exercises on 9/11<br><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjmj2ljtV5M8nEPUfSEPXklam8v9haXEf7fSAeB1B5RjSTK9L-SYNGapb7XzhwqR8gV2S7tf7vVjYD2i5Jo14E9SiX9mtkrh7BhXfuEoxhTK8IrK9paHyUMkMC1nDYQBT_RnQkWHNQvNsdV/s1600/BushBooker.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;" target="_blank"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjmj2ljtV5M8nEPUfSEPXklam8v9haXEf7fSAeB1B5RjSTK9L-SYNGapb7XzhwqR8gV2S7tf7vVjYD2i5Jo14E9SiX9mtkrh7BhXfuEoxhTK8IrK9paHyUMkMC1nDYQBT_RnQkWHNQvNsdV/s1600/BushBooker.jpg" alt="President Bush at the Booker Elementary School in Sarasota"/></a></div><br>A significant number of apparent terrorist incidents occurred on September 11, 2001, in which President Bush or locations associated with him, like the White House and Camp David, seemed to be the target. And yet for all these incidents, the apparent threat was subsequently claimed to be unfounded, perhaps having come about due to a misunderstanding. A possibility that has remained unexamined, however, is that the incidents were in fact scenarios in training exercises taking place that day.
<br><br>It seems reasonable to assume that if the incidents were indeed exercise scenarios, the Secret Service, as the agency responsible for protecting the president and the White House, would have been participating in them. Alarmingly, though, the times at which some of the incidents occurred indicates that if they were scenarios in training exercises, these exercises were not canceled in response to the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, but instead continued until well after the real-world crisis ended. If the Secret Service was indeed involved in exercises at the time of the 9/11 attacks, then, we surely need to consider what effect these exercises had on the agency's ability to respond to the attacks.
<br><br>Below are descriptions of eight apparent terrorist incidents that occurred around the time of the 9/11 attacks, in which the president or a location associated with the president appeared to be the target. The first two incidents involved the president himself seeming to be the terrorists' target; the next three involved Air Force One, the president's plane, being the apparent target; and the final incidents involved the places where President Bush lived, such as the White House, being the apparent target.
<br><br><b>POLICE WERE ALERTED TO A MAN WHO COULD HAVE BEEN A DANGER TO THE PRESIDENT WHILE HE WAS IN FLORIDA</b>
<br>One of the apparent threats which involved President Bush himself seeming to be a terrorist target came to light early on the morning of September 11, when a Sudanese man called Zainelabdeen Ibrahim Omer contacted the police in Sarasota, Florida--the city Bush was scheduled to visit later that day--and alerted them to the possible danger. When police officers visited him shortly after 4:00 a.m., Omer told them a friend of his, who he referred to as "Gandi," was in Sarasota with two companions, and he feared they might be a danger to Bush.
<br><br>Gandi, Omer said, had "made several remarks in the past that indicated extremely violent thoughts." Gandi, it was later reported, also had links to the Sudan People's Liberation Army, a guerrilla group. Omer told the police officers that considering the man's "past inclinations," the fact that Gandi was in Sarasota at the same time as Bush was visiting the area "might not be coincidental."
<br><br>The police contacted the Secret Service to pass on Omer's warning. Police officers and Secret Service agents then visited an address in Sarasota, where they found 11 Arab men. One of the men had a card for a club located near the resort in Longboat Key where Bush had been spending the night.
<br><br>The men were questioned and held until Bush left Sarasota, and then released. An unnamed law enforcement source later told authors Anthony Summers and Robbyn Swan there was no evidence indicating the men were linked to the 9/11 plotters. [1] Despite occurring on September 11, the incident received almost no publicity and is still largely unknown.
<br><br>It certainly seems plausible that this series of events came about because of a training exercise run by the Secret Service. Omer's report to the police, which was passed on to the Secret Service, could have been intended to test the ability of police officers and Secret Service agents to respond to a potential threat to the president, and the 11 men found at the address in Sarasota could have been actors in the exercise, playing potential terrorists.
<br><br><b>INCIDENT AT THE PRESIDENT'S HOTEL RESEMBLED A RECENT ASSASSINATION</b>
<br>Another suspicious incident reportedly occurred while President Bush was staying on Longboat Key, prior to his visit to Sarasota. Either during the evening of September 10 or early on the morning of September 11, a group of Middle Eastern men turned up at the Colony Beach and Tennis Resort on Longboat Key, near Sarasota, while Bush was staying there and falsely claimed to have an interview with the president, but they were turned away from the resort.
<br><br>The men arrived in a van and said they were reporters who had an interview arranged with Bush. They also asked for a particular Secret Service agent by name. Security guards at the resort called reception to pass on their request, but the receptionist knew nothing about a planned interview with the president or the Secret Service agent the men had asked for. She passed the phone to a Secret Service agent, who also knew nothing about the interview and had not heard of the Secret Service agent the men asked for. The agent had the men turned away from the premises. [2]
<br><br>Some people have noted the resemblance of this incident to the way Ahmad Shah Massoud, the leader of the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, was assassinated on September 9, 2001, and have wondered if the Middle Eastern men intended to kill Bush in a similar fashion. [3] Massoud was killed by a bomb hidden in the video camera of two Arab men who said they were journalists who wanted to interview him. [4]
<br><br>The incident at the Colony Beach and Tennis Resort came to light because Carroll Mooneyhan, a local fire marshal, overheard a receptionist and a security guard discussing it at the front desk of the resort at around 6:00 a.m. on September 11, and a reporter later heard Mooneyhan describing what they'd said to another firefighter. [5]
<br><br>The alleged incident, however, was subsequently denied. Longboat Key Police Chief John Kintz said: "There wasn't a single person who could confirm that it happened. We never found anyone who worked at the gate who could tell us that that happened." [6] The day after the incident was first reported in a local newspaper, Mooneyhan reportedly "went silent" about it. [7] "How did [the newspaper] get that information from me if I didn't know it?" he later said. [8] Secret Service agents visited the newspaper and told it to "back off the story." [9]
<br><br>Might the incident have been denied, though, because it was part of a Secret Service training exercise and this fact had to be concealed? The exercise could have been intended to test how Secret Service agents would respond to a possible attempt to assassinate the president.
<br><br><b>MAN POSSIBLY CARRYING A GUN WAS SEEN AT THE AIRPORT AS THE PRESIDENT WAS ABOUT TO TAKE OFF</b>
<br>Several apparent terrorist incidents occurred as President Bush was leaving Sarasota, after visiting the Emma E. Booker Elementary School there. The first of these took place shortly before 10:00 a.m., as Air Force One was taxiing out at the Sarasota airport with Bush on board.
<br><br>The Secret Service noticed a man standing by the fence at the end of the runway carrying some kind of device, which they thought might be a long gun. "Shooters" had the unidentified man in their sights and were reportedly ready to "take him down" if he moved. Colonel Mark Tillman, the pilot of Air Force One, was alerted to the man and instructed to take off in the opposite direction to what had been planned, so as to stay away from him. [10]
<br><br>Tillman climbed Air Force One steeply, so any potential shooter would not have a correct line of sight to fire at it. [11] The plane took off "like a rocket," White House communications director Dan Bartlett, who was on board, has recalled. [12]
<br><br>The incident, though, was a false alarm. According to Tillman, the person at the end of the runway, possibly with a gun, turned out to be a man who had come to the airport with his children to watch Air Force One leaving, and the device he was carrying was just a video camera. [13]
<br><br>However, might what happened instead have been a scenario in a training exercise intended to test the ability of Secret Service agents to spot and respond to a possible threat to the president and Air Force One? The suspicious man at the airport could in fact have been a participant in the exercise, playing the part of a potential terrorist.
<br><br><b>WHITE HOUSE RECEIVED A MESSAGE INDICATING THE PRESIDENT'S PLANE WOULD BE ATTACKED</b>
<br>Air Force One was again the focus of an apparent threat at around 10:30 a.m., when an anonymous phone call was received at the White House in which the caller said the president's plane would be the next target of the terrorist attacks. They referred to Air Force One by its Secret Service code name, "Angel," which, according to a senior White House official, suggested they had "knowledge of procedures that made the threat credible." [14]
<br><br>As many as three locations at the White House received the threatening message. It was received by the White House switchboard, according to some accounts. [15] A pager message sent at 10:32 a.m. that morning stated that it was received by the Secret Service Joint Operations Center at the White House. [16] And other accounts indicate it was received by the White House Situation Room. For example, Major Robert Darling of the White House Military Office has described answering a call from someone in the Situation Room, who told him the Situation Room had "a credible source in the Sarasota, Florida, area that claims Angel is the next target." [17]
<br><br>News of the threat was promptly relayed on the Pentagon's air threat conference call. [18] And a military officer passed on details of the threatening message to officials in the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC)--a bunker below the White House--including Vice President Dick Cheney and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice. [19] According to Robert Darling, who was in the PEOC at the time, "The talk among the principals in the room quickly determined that the use of a code word implied that the threat to Air Force One and the president could well be from someone with access to [the president's] inner circle--possibly someone who was near the president at that very moment." [20]
<br><br>Cheney quickly phoned Bush and told him about the threatening call. Bush passed on the news to his military aide, telling him, "A call came into the White House switchboard saying, 'Angel is next.'" [21] Mark Tillman was then told about the threat. Concerned about it, he asked for an armed guard at his cockpit door. Meanwhile, Secret Service agents double-checked the identities of everyone on Air Force One. [22]
<br><br><b>THREAT TO AIR FORCE ONE WAS LATER DISMISSED, BUT NEVER FULLY EXPLAINED</b>
<br>The threat was subsequently determined to be "almost surely bogus," according to <i>Newsweek</i>. [23] Toward the end of September 2001, unnamed government officials reportedly said that "they now doubt whether there was actually a call made threatening Air Force One," and claimed the mistaken report of the threat came about because "White House staffers apparently misunderstood comments made by their security detail." [24]
<br><br>The Secret Service's intelligence division said the mistaken report originated in a misunderstanding by a watch officer in the Situation Room. But Deborah Loewer, the director of the Situation Room on September 11, told the 9/11 Commission she disputed this claim. [25]
<br><br>White House spokesman Dan Bartlett said in 2004 that "there hadn't been any actual threat" against Air Force One, and the report of the threat was due to "confusion in the White House bunker, as multiple conversations went on simultaneously." Around the same time, two former Secret Service agents who had been on duty on September 11 said their agency played no role in receiving or passing on the alleged threatening message. [26] Their claim, however, was contradicted by the Secret Service pager message sent at 10:32 a.m. on September 11, which stated that the Secret Service Joint Operations Center received an "anonymous call" reporting that "Angel is [a] target." [27]
<br><br>Former Secret Service officials also said in 2004 that the code name for Air Force One--"Angel"--hadn't been an official secret, and was actually "a radio shorthand designation that had been made public well before 2001," according to the <i>Wall Street Journal</i>. [28] But Condoleezza Rice said the use of the code name in the threatening call was "why we still continue to suspect it wasn't a crank call." [29] And Mark Tillman said "Angel" was "a classified call sign of Air Force One." He added that on September 11, "the only people that knew that call sign was us, [the] Secret Service, and the staff," which was why he found the threat "incredible." [30]
<br><br>By the end of 2001, White House officials were still unsure where the threatening call had come from, according to <i>Newsweek</i>. [31] Details were still unclear by 2010. That year, Robert Darling wrote, "To this day, it has never been determined why either the 'credible source' or Situation Room personnel used that code word [i.e. 'Angel'] in their report to the PEOC." [32]
<br><br>A possibility that has never been suggested to explain this mysterious incident, however, is that the threatening phone call was in fact part of a training exercise intended to test the ability of the Secret Service, other government agencies, and the crew of Air Force One to respond to a threat against the president's plane. The fact that the Secret Service Joint Operations Center reportedly received the threatening call, and the threatening message included the Secret Service code name for Air Force One, suggests that the Secret Service would either have been running the exercise or have been a key participant in it.
<br><br>If the threatening call was indeed part of an exercise, this might help explain the contradictory accounts surrounding the incident, the denials that a threat was made, and the failure to identify the source of the call. The lack of clarity could have been the result of attempts to cover up the existence of the exercise and the fact that it was still taking place at around 10:30 a.m. on September 11, almost half an hour after the terrorist attacks that day ended.
<br><br><b>PILOT OF AIR FORCE ONE WAS ALERTED TO AN UNIDENTIFIED AIRCRAFT FLYING TOWARD HIS PLANE</b>
<br>Almost immediately after this threatening message was received, another apparent terrorist incident occurred in which Air Force One was the target. Just after he learned about the "Angel is next" message, Mark Tillman was informed that an unidentified aircraft that might be another hijacking was flying toward his plane and was only 10 miles away.
<br><br>Tillman has recalled that an air traffic controller at the FAA's Jacksonville Center told him that "there was an aircraft coming at us, descending ... and ... its transponder was not on, and they had no idea who it was. It could have been another hijacked airliner." The controller said the plane was "behind you 10 miles, descending at least, flight level 3-5-0, looks to be holding there." He added, "Apparently we've lost radio contact with them." [33] Tillman informed other individuals on Air Force One about the suspicious plane.
<br><br>In an interview, it was pointed out to Mark Rosenker, the director of the White House Military Office on September 11, who was on Air Force One with the president that day, that the unidentified aircraft had followed the modus operandi of the aircraft involved in the terrorist attacks, as it was out of radio contact with air traffic control and its transponder was off. (A transponder is a device that sends a plane's identifying information, speed, and altitude to controllers' radar screens.) Rosenker agreed that this fact had made people on Air Force One "a little nervous." [34]
<br><br>Air Force One changed course and headed out over the Gulf of Mexico in response to the report about the unidentified aircraft. "There's basically fighters all over the Gulf that have the capability to make sure that no one comes into the Gulf, penetrates the United States," Tillman has commented. "So I knew I'd be safe out into the Gulf of Mexico." [35]
<br><br>But the incident, like the previous apparent threats to Air Force One, was subsequently found to have been a false alarm. "In reality, just his transponder was off [and] he hadn't checked in with the controller right afterwards," Tillman said. [36] Again, though, it seems plausible that what happened was in fact a scenario in a training exercise taking place that morning, intended to test the response to a threat against the president's plane.
<br><br><b>OFFICIALS AT THE WHITE HOUSE WERE ALERTED TO SUSPICIOUS AIRCRAFT FLYING TOWARD WASHINGTON</b>
<br>The targets of other apparent terrorist incidents on September 11 were the places where President Bush lived: the White House in Washington, DC; Camp David in Maryland; and Bush's ranch in Crawford, Texas.
<br><br>In the first of these incidents, beginning at 10:02 a.m., the Secret Service Joint Operations Center gave reports to military officers in the PEOC, in which it passed on information it had received from the FAA about a fast-moving unidentified aircraft that was approaching Washington. A military aide then told Dick Cheney and others in the PEOC about the aircraft. At around 10:10 a.m. or shortly after, the aide reported that the plane was 80 miles away from Washington. A few minutes later, they reported that it was 60 miles away.
<br><br>Then, at around 10:30 a.m., those in the PEOC were told that another suspicious aircraft was flying toward Washington and was only five to 10 miles away from there. [37] They were alerted to this aircraft by the White House Situation Room, which was relaying a message from the Secret Service, according to Robert Darling. It was "a high-speed, low-level aircraft," Darling wrote, that was "coming down the Potomac in the direction of the White House." An FAA representative reported over the phone to those in the PEOC that the aircraft was too low for controllers to pick up on radar. [38]
<br><br>The reports of these two suspicious aircraft approaching Washington turned out to be false alarms. The <i>9/11 Commission Report</i> claimed the first aircraft was in fact United Airlines Flight 93, the fourth plane to be hijacked on September 11, even though this aircraft crashed in rural Pennsylvania at 10:03 a.m. The 9/11 Commission's explanation for the mistaken report was that the "FAA may have been tracking the progress of United 93 on a display that showed its projected path to Washington, not its actual radar return." Therefore, "the Secret Service was relying on projections and was not aware the plane was already down in Pennsylvania."
<br><br>The second aircraft was just a medevac helicopter, according to the <i>9/11 Commission Report</i>. [39] The helicopter was heading to the Pentagon, Robert Darling described, and "it seemed the hapless pilot had been on the wrong frequency and was apparently not communicating with the control tower at Reagan National Airport." [40] However, <i>Newsweek</i> claimed the aircraft was actually "a phantom of the fog of war" that in reality "never existed." [41]
<br><br>Alternatively, though, might the reports about the two suspicious aircraft have been simulated scenarios in a training exercise, intended to test the ability of government agencies to respond to an attempted terrorist attack on Washington or the White House?
<br><br>Since the Secret Service is responsible for protecting the White House and other buildings in Washington, if these reports were indeed part of an exercise, it seems quite likely that the Secret Service would either have been running that exercise or have been a key participant in it. Supporting this possibility is the fact that the Secret Service was the agency that alerted the White House to both of the suspicious aircraft, and so it played a central role in these incidents.
<br><br><b>SECRET SERVICE REPORTED THAT A PLANE HAD CRASHED AT CAMP DAVID</b>
<br>Immediately after these incorrect reports were received, another erroneous report went out, which suggested another of President Bush's homes had been the target of a terrorist attack. This time the location involved was Camp David, the presidential retreat in the Catoctin Mountains in Maryland, about 70 miles northwest of Washington.
<br><br>The incident was apparently first reported by the Secret Service, which stated that Flight 93 had crashed into Camp David. At 10:36 a.m., Doug Davis, a member of staff at FAA headquarters, was talking over the phone to John White, a manager at the FAA's Command Center, and said: "Secret Service is saying they believe United 93 hit Camp David. That is what Secret Service is reporting." [42] White later told the 9/11 Commission, "They [the Secret Service] confirmed that; I heard it; it was in my ear." [43]
<br><br>The erroneous report was apparently circulated widely within the Secret Service. Officials at the Director's Crisis Center at the agency's headquarters were told about the crash, apparently by the Secret Service's intelligence division. [44] Laura Bush, the wife of President Bush, heard about the crash while she was in an underground conference room at the Secret Service headquarters. [45] And Edward Marinzel, the head of the president's Secret Service detail, learned about it while flying away from Sarasota on Air Force One. [46] The crash was also reported on television, with CBS News mentioning it shortly after 11:00 a.m. [47]
<br><br>The Secret Service contacted officials at the Catoctin Mountain Park, where Camp David is located, and asked for the park to be closed and for an expanded security presence there. This was an unusual request. J. Mel Poole, the Catoctin Mountain Park superintendent, has commented, "It was only when we had an additional head of state beyond the president that we would do something like that." [48] The park was reportedly closed around midday, "as a precaution." [49] And fighter jets from Langley Air Force Base in Virginia arrived over the park at around 11:00 a.m., according to Poole. [50]
<br><br>The report that a plane had crashed at Camp David was soon found to have been incorrect. At 10:45 a.m., nine minutes after he passed on the Secret Service's claim that Flight 93 had hit Camp David, Doug Davis told John White that the Secret Service had retracted the claim. "They think the United did go in south of Johnstown and not at Camp David," he said. [51] The FAA called the military at some point for confirmation that a crash had occurred at Camp David and was assured that no such crash had taken place. [52] And after the Secret Service confirmed to him that it "had not heard of [any] plane crash" at Camp David, J. Mel Poole told reporters there had been "no crash at Camp David and no crash at Catoctin Mountain Park." [53]
<br><br>A possibility that needs to be investigated, though, is that this supposed plane crash was in fact a simulated scenario in a training exercise. Since Camp David is the president's country residence, the scenario could have been intended to test the response to an attempted terrorist attack on the president while he was staying there. The fact that the incorrect reports about the crash appear to have originated with the Secret Service suggests that if this incident was indeed part of an exercise, the Secret Service was either running the exercise or was a key participant in it.
<br><br><b>OTHER INCIDENTS NEAR CAMP DAVID MAY HAVE BEEN PART OF AN EXERCISE</b>
<br>If an exercise was taking place, there were other incidents that have been described, as well as the reports of the crash at Camp David, that may have been part of it. For example, around mid-morning on September 11, Theresa Hahn, the catering manager for a restaurant near the presidential retreat, told reporters that "lots of fire trucks were on the road and no one can get up there" to Camp David. While firefighters may simply have been responding to the incorrect reports of a plane crash, it is also possible they were practicing their response to a terrorist attack as part of an exercise. [54]
<br><br>Additionally, around the time the attacks on the World Trade Center took place, an Emergency Medical Services meeting was being held in the Catoctin Mountain Park, which, according to J. Mel Poole, "all the coordinators from all the parks in the region" were attending. [55] Could this meeting have been connected to an exercise taking place that morning and have perhaps been intended to discuss some of the issues addressed in the exercise, such as how to respond to a terrorist attack?
<br><br>Furthermore, communication systems went down in the Camp David area around the time the crash was being reported. Theresa Hahn has recalled that she was unable to get through on the phone to an aunt who lived on the other side of the Catoctin Mountain Park. [56] And J. Mel Poole said that when he tried making a call, "the entire trunk system for this area went down." There was "a message display on the phone that tells you the status of the phone," he said, and this showed that "it was not just that the line was busy, that there was too much traffic," but in fact that "the trunk went down, which is like the main line that all the other lines feed into." [57] No explanation has been given for this loss of communication. But might it have been caused deliberately as part of an exercise, and was it perhaps intended to test how emergency response agencies would cope if their usual lines of communication were unavailable during a crisis?
<br><br><b>AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS REPORTED A FAST-MOVING AIRCRAFT FLYING TOWARD THE PRESIDENT'S RANCH</b>
<br>The next incident in which one of President Bush's homes seemed to be the target of an attempted terrorist attack occurred early in the afternoon of September 11, when air traffic controllers at the FAA's Fort Worth Center reported that a suspicious aircraft was flying toward Bush's ranch in Crawford, Texas.
<br><br>The report appears to have circulated widely among government agencies. The aircraft was discussed on the Pentagon's air threat conference call. [58] Just before 1:00 p.m., Dick Cheney and others in the PEOC were told about "a low-flying, high-speed aircraft headed for the president's ranch." [59] The president and his entourage learned about it just after 1:00 p.m. and, in response, Bush instructed an underling to alert everyone at the ranch. [60] And Laura Bush has recalled hearing that a plane had crashed into the ranch while she was at Secret Service headquarters. [61]
<br><br>Officials in the White House Situation Room were also alerted to the aircraft and, in response, Bush's personal aide, Logan Walters, contacted the ranch's caretaker and told him to get away from the ranch right away. Franklin Miller, a senior national security official who was in the Situation Room that day, was told that a combat air patrol--an aircraft patrol set up for the purpose of intercepting and destroying hostile aircraft before they reach their targets--had been established over the ranch in response to the threat. However, when Miller then tried to call off the combat air patrol, he was told it had not been established to begin with. [62]
<br><br>Meanwhile, on the air threat conference call, the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) representative told the deputy director for operations in the Pentagon's National Military Command Center that NORAD had two fighter jets on the ground and two en route from Ellington Field, Texas, to respond to the suspicious aircraft. But after the aircraft was reportedly found, the NORAD representative said: "We don't have confirmation of an actual scramble [of the fighter jets]. The only word we got was they were working on tactical action." [63]
<br><br><b>SUSPICIOUS AIRCRAFT WAS A CROP DUSTER</b>
<br>Like the previous incidents in which it appeared that terrorists might be trying to attack one of the president's homes, this incident turned out to be a false alarm. Franklin Miller was told that "no rogue aircraft" had been heading toward Bush's ranch. [64] White House press secretary Ari Fleischer, who was traveling with the president that day, has recalled that the unidentified aircraft "turned out to be a private plane of no consequence that should have been grounded, but wasn't grounded." [65] According to Dick Cheney, it "turned out to be a wayward crop duster, or something." [66]
<br><br>Again, we need to consider whether this incident was a scenario in a training exercise. It could have been intended to test how various agencies would respond to an attempted attack on the president while he was staying at his ranch in Crawford.
<br><br>A notable piece of evidence supports this possibility. A NORAD exercise called Amalgam Virgo 02 included a scenario much like this incident. The exercise, according to an official information sheet, included the simulation of a crop duster plane stolen in Mexico being "en route to the simulated ranch" in Turnersville, Texas, which is just a few miles from Crawford, "with the intent of spraying anthrax" there.
<br><br>This simulation of a terrorist attack was scheduled to be conducted on November 8, 2001. [67] Presumably it would have required a considerable amount of time to plan and would therefore have been in preparation before September 11. If this was the case, it would mean that, even before 9/11, an incident resembling that which took place over Crawford on September 11 was considered as a possible scenario to be used in training exercises. Might that therefore have been the case for an exercise taking place on the day of 9/11?
<br><br>It is notable that around the time the U.S. came under attack on September 11, all these incidents occurred in which the president or a location associated with the president seemed to be the target of terrorists, and that every one of them turned out to be a false alarm. All of the incidents were also subsequently treated as if they were insignificant and had an innocent explanation, such as being the result of a misunderstanding, and as if they had no connection to the terrorist attacks they had coincided with.
<br><br>It would be a remarkable coincidence if so many incidents that had the same theme--the president or a location associated with him being the apparent target of a terrorist attack--and that took place around the same time were unrelated. The timing and similarity of the incidents would make sense, however, if they were all scenarios in training exercises scheduled for September 11, which had been intended to test the ability of government agencies to protect the president from terrorists.
<br><br><b>SECRET SERVICE WAS LIKELY PARTICIPATING IN ANY TRAINING EXERCISES</b>
<br>There is a significant amount of evidence suggesting that if these apparent terrorist incidents were indeed scenarios in training exercises, the exercises were either run by the Secret Service or were interagency exercises in which the Secret Service was a key participant.
<br><br>To begin with, as its mission statement noted, the Secret Service was "responsible for the protection of the president." [68] And as the descriptions above make clear, President Bush appeared to be the focus of these incidents. Indeed, I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, Dick Cheney's chief of staff, commented that the nature of the events of September 11 suggested "a pretty widespread effort at decapitation" of the government, and added that this was "a pattern that you couldn't ignore." [69]
<br><br>Since the Secret Service was the agency responsible for protecting the president, it seems logical that it would have held training exercises based on the scenario of the president being targeted by terrorists. The apparent terrorist incidents on September 11 that seemed to be targeting Bush could presumably, therefore, have been instances of these exercises.
<br><br>And since the Secret Service was also responsible for protecting the White House, if the reports about the two suspicious aircraft heading toward the White House between around 10:00 a.m. and 10:30 a.m. on September 11 were part of an exercise, it seems quite likely that the Secret Service would have been running or participating in that exercise.
<br><br><b>INCIDENTS ON SEPTEMBER 11 RESEMBLED EXERCISES HELD BEFORE THEN</b>
<br>Furthermore, it has been reported that the Secret Service participated in exercises in the years before 9/11 based on scenarios resembling some of the apparent terrorist incidents on September 11.
<br><br>Specifically, in May 2001, Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill stated that the Secret Service "holds interagency tabletop exercises in preparation for terrorist attacks on the White House." [70] And since 1998, according to former Secret Service agent Paul Nenninger, the Secret Service's James J. Rowley Training Center in Beltsville, Maryland, had been running computer simulations of planes crashing into the White House, in order to test security there. [71]
<br><br>So if the Secret Service was participating in training exercises on September 11, some of those exercises, similar to the agency's previous exercises, could presumably have involved the scenario of terrorists attempting to crash planes into the White House. The reports of two unidentified aircraft approaching the White House between 10:00 a.m. and 10:30 a.m. on September 11 could plausibly have been part of such an exercise.
<br><br><b>SECRET SERVICE WAS PREPARING FOR 'SPECIAL SECURITY EVENTS' ON SEPTEMBER 11</b>
<br>Evidence also suggests the Secret Service could have been conducting training exercises on September 11 as part of its preparations for two forthcoming events that had been designated "National Special Security Events." These were a UN event in New York, presumably the General Assembly's annual gathering of world leaders on September 24 to October 5, which President Bush was due to address on September 24, and the annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, which were scheduled to take place in Washington, just a few blocks from the White House, on September 29-30. [72]
<br><br>Since the late 1990s, if an important upcoming public event was designated a National Special Security Event (NSSE), the Secret Service became the lead agency for designing and implementing security operations for it. The agency, according to its website, would then conduct a "tremendous amount of advance planning" for the NSSE. This would involve a "variety of training initiatives," which included "simulated attacks and medical emergencies, interagency tabletop exercises, and field exercises." [73]
<br><br>On September 11, it has been reported, government agencies were already busy with their preparations for the forthcoming UN event and International Monetary Fund /World Bank meetings. [74] Might the Secret Service, therefore, have been conducting "tabletop exercises," "field exercises," or "simulated attacks" that day, in preparation for the NSSEs in New York and Washington at the end of the month?
<br><br>Furthermore, the Secret Service would be involved in providing air defense for NSSEs. This would include using "air interdiction teams to detect, identify, and assess any aircraft that violates, or attempts to violate, an established temporary flight restricted area ... above an NSSE," according to Brian Stafford, the director of the Secret Service at the time of the 9/11 attacks. [75]
<br><br>Perhaps for this reason, the possibility that suicide pilots would commit terrorist attacks using planes as weapons was considered during the preparations for an NSSE. Louis Freeh, the director of the FBI from 1993 to June 2001, told the 9/11 Commission that in 2000 and 2001, the subject of "planes as weapons" was "always one of the considerations" in the planning of security for NSSEs. He said preparing for "the use of airplanes" by terrorists "in suicide missions" was "part of the planning" for an NSSE. [76]
<br><br>Since several of the apparent terrorist incidents described above--such as the supposed plane crash at Camp David and the report of an unidentified aircraft flying toward Air Force One--seemed to involve terrorists attempting to use planes as weapons, might these incidents have been scenarios in exercises, as "part of the planning" for the two forthcoming NSSEs?
<br><br><b>OTHER AGENCIES WERE RUNNING EXERCISES ON SEPTEMBER 11</b>
<br>Further supporting the possibility that the Secret Service was participating in training exercises on September 11 is the fact that other government and military agencies are known to have been conducting exercises that day. [77] For example, NORAD was holding its annual exercise, Vigilant Guardian, which has been described as "an air defense exercise simulating an attack on the United States." [78] And the U.S. Strategic Command (Stratcom) was holding its annual exercise, Global Guardian, which tested nuclear command and control and execution procedures, and was based around a fictitious scenario that would exercise the ability of Stratcom to deter a military attack against the United States. [79]
<br><br>The Secret Service could have been participating in some of the exercises run by other agencies or could have scheduled its own exercises so they were concurrent with them. Don Arias, the director of public affairs for the 1st Air Force and the Continental United States NORAD Region at the time of the 9/11 attacks, has confirmed the collaboration that takes place between different agencies for training exercises. "It's common practice, when we have exercises, to get as much bang for the buck as we can," he said. "So sometimes we'll have different organizations participating in the same exercise for different reasons." [80] A NORAD exercise held in June 2002, for example, included participants from agencies such as the FAA, the FBI, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the Transportation Security Administration. [81]
<br><br><b>POSSIBILITY OF TRAINING EXERCISES ON SEPTEMBER 11 AND THEIR EFFECTS REQUIRE INVESTIGATION</b>
<br>The numerous apparent terrorist incidents on September 11 in which President Bush or locations associated with him seemed to be the target require further investigation. If it turns out that any or all of these incidents were scenarios in training exercises, this will raise serious questions.
<br><br>For example, when were the exercises terminated? Many of the incidents that could have been exercise scenarios occurred after the actual attacks ended. (Flight 93, the last plane to be hijacked on September 11, reportedly crashed at 10:03 a.m.) One incident--the suspicious aircraft flying toward the president's ranch--took place around three hours after the attacks ended.
<br><br>Evidence therefore indicates that exercises were allowed to continue even after it became obvious the U.S. was in the middle of a serious terrorist attack. At that time, agencies such as the Secret Service should surely have been devoting all their available resources to dealing with the real-world crisis. But if instead the exercises were allowed to carry on, why was this?
<br><br>And if the Secret Service was participating in exercises on the morning of September 11, did this activity contribute in any way to its alarmingly slow response to the terrorist attacks? For example, various accounts have described how slow the Secret Service was to evacuate its protectees, such as President Bush, Laura Bush, Dick Cheney, and Lynne Cheney, and take them to secure locations. [82]
<br><br>The Secret Service only implemented the standard "emergency call-up" of all its personnel after 9:37 a.m., when the Pentagon was hit. [83] And it only ordered that the White House be evacuated at 9:45 a.m., almost an hour after the first plane crashed into the World Trade Center. [84] In a book about the Secret Service, author Philip Melanson summarized what happened, referring to the Secret Service's "slow start to 9/11 protection," and noted that "the president's detail seemed late in responding to the news of the aerial terrorist assault, whose scope, targets, and nature had yet to be determined." [85]
<br><br>Investigators would need to examine if Secret Service personnel mistook real-world events for exercise scenarios. And did the exercises cause any additional confusion, or otherwise impair the ability of Secret Service agents to respond to the real-world crisis?
<br><br>Importantly, who was responsible for planning the exercises? Who decided what scenarios they would include? And who decided they would take place on the morning of September 11?
<br><br>Furthermore, since any exercise scenarios based on attempted terrorist attacks could have been confused with the real-world events they coincided with, investigators should surely examine whether the exercises were part of a deliberate attempt to sabotage the responses of the Secret Service and other government agencies, so as to ensure the 9/11 attacks were successful. If this was the case, it would suggest that at least some of the people who planned the exercises were part of the group that planned and perpetrated the 9/11 attacks.
<br><br>As previously stated, evidence suggests that if the apparent terrorist incidents described above were indeed parts of training exercises, the Secret Service was either running the exercises or was a key participant in them. And yet little has been revealed about the actions of the Secret Service on September 11. Many more documents relating to this subject should therefore be made public. And the actions of the Secret Service, and the possibility of its involvement in training exercises, would need to be important areas of inquiry in any new investigation of 9/11.
<br><br><b>NOTES</b>
<br>[1] <a href="http://www.madcowprod.com/policea.htm" target="_blank">Sarasota Police Department Incident Report #01-049053, Part 1. Sarasota Police Department, September 11, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.madcowprod.com/policeb.htm" target="_blank">Sarasota Police Department Incident Report #01-049053, Part 2. Sarasota Police Department, September 11, 2001</a>; Anthony Summers and Robbyn Swan, <i>The Eleventh Day: The Full Story of 9/11 and Osama bin Laden</i>. New York: Ballantine Books, 2011, p. 457.
<br>[2] <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20030220064542/http:/www.longboatobserver.com/showarticle.asp?ai=1874" target="_blank">Shay Sullivan, "Possible Longboat Terrorist Incident." <i>Longboat Observer</i>, September 26, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.yourobserver.com/news/longboat-key/Front-Page/0907201113869/911-Timeline" target="_blank">"9/11: Timeline." <i>Longboat Observer</i>, September 7, 2011</a>.
<br>[3] <a href="http://www.sptimes.com/2004/07/04/Worldandnation/Of_fact__fiction__Bus.shtml" target="_blank">Susan Taylor Martin, "Of Fact, Fiction: Bush on 9/11." <i>St. Petersburg Times</i>, July 4, 2004</a>.
<br>[4] <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/08/05/time.history/" target="_blank">Michael Elliott, "They Had a Plan." <i>Time</i>, August 12, 2002</a>; <a href="http://www.sptimes.com/2002/09/09/911/The_man_who_would_hav.shtml" target="_blank">Susan Taylor Martin, "The Man Who Would Have Led Afghanistan." <i>St. Petersburg Times</i>, September 9, 2002</a>.
<br>[5] <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20030220064542/http:/www.longboatobserver.com/showarticle.asp?ai=1874" target="_blank">Shay Sullivan, "Possible Longboat Terrorist Incident"</a>; <a href="http://www.yourobserver.com/news/longboat-key/Front-Page/0907201113880/911-Looking-Back-QA-with-former-City-Editor-Shay-S" target="_blank">Robin Hartill, "9/11 Looking Back: Q&A With Former City Editor Shay Sullivan." <i>Longboat Observer</i>, September 7, 2011</a>.
<br>[6] <a href="http://www.yourobserver.com/news/longboat-key/Front-Page/0907201113873/911-Looking-Back-John-Kintz" target="_blank">Robin Hartill, "9/11 Looking Back: John Kintz." <i>Longboat Observer</i>, September 7, 2011</a>.
<br>[7] <a href="http://www.yourobserver.com/news/longboat-key/Front-Page/0907201113880/911-Looking-Back-QA-with-former-City-Editor-Shay-S" target="_blank">Robin Hartill, "9/11 Looking Back: Q&A With Former City Editor Shay Sullivan."</a>
<br>[8] <a href="http://www.sptimes.com/2004/07/04/Worldandnation/Of_fact__fiction__Bus.shtml" target="_blank">Susan Taylor Martin, "Of Fact, Fiction."</a>
<br>[9] <a href="http://www.yourobserver.com/news/longboat-key/Front-Page/0907201113880/911-Looking-Back-QA-with-former-City-Editor-Shay-S" target="_blank">Robin Hartill, "9/11 Looking Back: Q&A With Former City Editor Shay Sullivan."</a>
<br>[10] <a href="http://www.foxnews.com/us/2011/09/06/command-control-presidential-pilots-journey-on-september-11-2001/" target="_blank">Eric Shawn, "Command & Control: The Careful Job of Piloting the President on Sept. 11, 2001." Fox News, September 6, 2011</a>; <a href="http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-120723-046.pdf" target="_blank">Mark W. Tillman, "Air Force One: Zero Failure." Speech presented at the National Museum of the U.S. Air Force, Dayton, Ohio, February 29, 2012</a>.
<br>[11] <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LdqIvFOKyGY" target="_blank"><i>On Board Air Force One</i>. National Geographic Channel, January 25, 2009</a>.
<br>[12] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16063507/T3-B1-EOP-Press-Interviews-of-Staff-Fdr-Internal-Transcript-81202-Pelley-Interview-of-Bartlett-952" target="_blank">White House transcript, interview of White House communications director Dan Bartlett by Scott Pelley, CBS. White House, August 12, 2002</a>.
<br>[13] <a href="http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-120723-046.pdf" target="_blank">Mark W. Tillman, "Air Force One: Zero Failure"</a>; <a href="http://www.kansas.com/2012/11/13/2566642/air-force-one-pilot-recalls-911.html" target="_blank">Molly McMillin, "Air Force One Pilot Recalls 9/11 Attacks." <i>Wichita Eagle</i>, November 13, 2012</a>.
<br>[14] <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/13/opinion/13SAFI.html" target="_blank">William Safire, "Inside the Bunker." <i>New York Times</i>, September 13, 2001</a>; Bob Woodward, <i>Bush at War</i>. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002, p. 18.
<br>[15] Bill Sammon, <i>Fighting Back: The War on Terrorism--From Inside the Bush White House</i>. Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2002, p. 106; Ari Fleischer, <i>Taking Heat: The President, the Press, and My Years in the White House</i>. New York: HarperCollins, 2005, pp. 141-142.
<br>[16] <a href="http://www.cbsnews.com/news/egads-confidential-9-11-pager-messages-disclosed/" target="_blank">Declan McCullagh, "Egads! Confidential 9/11 Pager Messages Disclosed." CBS News, November 25, 2009</a>.
<br>[17] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States</i>. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004, p. 554; Robert J. Darling, <i>24 Hours Inside the President's Bunker: 9/11/01 The White House</i>. Bloomington, IN: iUniverse, 2010, pp. 60-61.
<br>[18] <a href="http://www.oredigger61.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Air-Threat-Conference-Call-Hyde.pdf" target="_blank">Air Threat Conference Call, Transcript. U.S. Department of Defense, September 11, 2001</a>; 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 554.
<br>[19] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16571587/T3-B11-EOP-Produced-Documents-Vol-III-Fdr-11101-Evan-ThomasNewsweek-Interview-of-Rice-001" target="_blank">White House transcript, interview of National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice by Evan Thomas of <i>Newsweek</i> magazine. White House, November 1, 2001</a>.
<br>[20] Robert J. Darling, <i>24 Hours Inside the President's Bunker</i>, p. 61.
<br>[21] Bill Sammon, <i>Fighting Back</i>, pp. 106-107; Ari Fleischer, <i>Taking Heat</i>, pp. 141-142.
<br>[22] <a href="http://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-presidents-story-11-09-2002/" target="_blank">David Kohn, "The President's Story." CBS News, September 11, 2002</a>.
<br>[23] <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/day-changed-america-148319" target="_blank">Evan Thomas, "The Day That Changed America." <i>Newsweek</i>, December 30, 2001</a>.
<br>[24] <a href="http://cjonline.com/stories/092601/ter_ussupport.shtml" target="_blank">Ron Fournier, "Support Builds for Coalition." Associated Press, September 26, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/chatterbox/2001/09/whopper_of_the_week_karl_rove_ari_fleischer_and_dick_cheney.html" target="_blank">"Whopper of the Week: Karl Rove, Ari Fleischer, and Dick Cheney." Slate, September 28, 2001</a>.
<br>[25] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 554.
<br>[26] <a href="http://www.cwalocal4250.org/news/binarydata/9-11%20Government%20Inconsitencies.pdf" target="_blank">Scot J. Paltrow, "Government Accounts of 9/11 Reveal Gaps, Inconsistencies." <i>Wall Street Journal</i>, March 22, 2004</a>.
<br>[27] <a href="http://www.cbsnews.com/news/egads-confidential-9-11-pager-messages-disclosed/" target="_blank">Declan McCullagh, "Egads! Confidential 9/11 Pager Messages Disclosed."</a>
<br>[28] <a href="http://www.cwalocal4250.org/news/binarydata/9-11%20Government%20Inconsitencies.pdf" target="_blank">Scot J. Paltrow, "Government Accounts of 9/11 Reveal Gaps, Inconsistencies."</a>
<br>[29] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16571587/T3-B11-EOP-Produced-Documents-Vol-III-Fdr-11101-Evan-ThomasNewsweek-Interview-of-Rice-001" target="_blank">White House transcript, interview of National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice by Evan Thomas of <i>Newsweek</i> magazine</a>.
<br>[30] <a href="http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-120723-046.pdf" target="_blank">Mark W. Tillman, "Air Force One: Zero Failure."</a>
<br>[31] <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/day-changed-america-148319" target="_blank">Evan Thomas, "The Day That Changed America."</a>
<br>[32] Robert J. Darling, <i>24 Hours Inside the President's Bunker</i>, p. 62.
<br>[33] <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LdqIvFOKyGY" target="_blank"><i>On Board Air Force One</i></a>.
<br>[34] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16063471/T3-B1-EOP-Press-Interviews-of-Staff-Fdr-Internal-Transcript-22902-CBS-Interview-of-Gen-Mark-v-Rosenker-White-House-Military-Office-Director-Ang" target="_blank">White House transcript, interview of General Mark V. Rosenker, director of the White House Military Office by CBS. White House, August 29, 2002</a>.
<br>[35] <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LdqIvFOKyGY" target="_blank"><i>On Board Air Force One</i></a>.
<br>[36] <a href="http://www.cbsnews.com/news/air-force-one-pilot-calls-it-quits/" target="_blank">Mark Knoller, "Air Force One Pilot Calls it Quits." CBS News, January 17, 2009</a>.
<br>[37] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16869893/NY-B10-Farmer-Misc-WH-3-of-3-Fdr-111601-Newsweek-Interview-of-Scooter-Libby-476" target="_blank">White House transcript, interview of Scooter Libby by <i>Newsweek</i> magazine. White House, November 14, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/day-changed-america-148319" target="_blank">Evan Thomas, "The Day That Changed America"</a>; 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 41.
<br>[38] Robert J. Darling, <i>24 Hours Inside the President's Bunker</i>, pp. 57-58.
<br>[39] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, pp. 41-42.
<br>[40] Robert J. Darling, <i>24 Hours Inside the President's Bunker</i>, p. 59.
<br>[41] <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/day-changed-america-148319" target="_blank">Evan Thomas, "The Day That Changed America."</a>
<br>[42] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/13883514/Transcript-of-FAA-Open-Line-on-911" target="_blank">Miles Kara, "Transcript of East NTMO, Line 4530, Admin Line." 9/11 Commission, November 4, 2003</a>.
<br>[43] "<a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/15877922/FO-B6-Public-Hearing-61704-2-of-2-Fdr-Tab-619-John-S-White-Bio-MFR-Written-Statement-Testimony-Request-710" target="_blank">Memorandum for the Record: Interview With John White, Former Assistant. Program Manager for Administration at the ATCSCC, 'Command Center,' Herndon, VA." 9/11 Commission, May 7, 2004</a>.
<br>[44] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/14353654/DH-B5-Secret-Service-Requests-Fdr-Entire-Contents-5-Withdrawal-Notice-Doc-Req-Notes-Garabito-Shortly-After-9am-FAA-Van-Steenbergen-Said-4-Planes" target="_blank">"USSS Statements and Interview Reports." 9/11 Commission, July 28, 2003</a>.
<br>[45] <a href="http://www.today.com/id/36943246/ns/today-today_books/page/0/" target="_blank">Laura Bush, <i>Spoken From the Heart</i>. New York: Scribner, 2010, pp. 201-202</a>.
<br>[46] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/30764772/Monaghan-FOIA-USSS-Memos-and-Timelines" target="_blank">USSS memo, interview of Edward Marinzel. United States Secret Service, October 3, 2001</a>.
<br>[47] <a href="http://www.broadcastingcable.com/news/news-articles/three-hours-shook-america-chronology-chaos/93600" target="_blank">Mark K. Miller, "Three Hours That Shook America: A Chronology of Chaos." <i>Broadcasting & Cable</i>, August 25, 2002</a>.
<br>[48] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20030303163931/http:/www.nps.gov/remembrance/dcarea/dc_int_1.html" target="_blank">J. Mel Poole, interview by Mark Schoepfle. National Park Service, December 17, 2001</a>.
<br>[49] Peter Geier, "Camp David Crash Rumor Proves False." <i>Maryland Daily Record</i>, September 12, 2001.
<br>[50] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20030303163931/http:/www.nps.gov/remembrance/dcarea/dc_int_1.html" target="_blank">J. Mel Poole, interview by Mark Schoepfle</a>.
<br>[51] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/13883514/Transcript-of-FAA-Open-Line-on-911" target="_blank">Miles Kara, "Transcript of East NTMO, Line 4530, Admin Line."</a>
<br>[52] Pamela Freni, <i>Ground Stop: An Inside Look at the Federal Aviation Administration on September 11, 2001</i>. Lincoln, NE: iUniverse, Inc., 2003, p. 42.
<br>[53] Peter Geier, "Camp David Crash Rumor Proves False"; <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20030303163931/http:/www.nps.gov/remembrance/dcarea/dc_int_1.html" target="_blank">J. Mel Poole, interview by Mark Schoepfle</a>.
<br>[54] Peter Geier, "Camp David Crash Rumor Proves False."
<br>[55] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20030303163931/http:/www.nps.gov/remembrance/dcarea/dc_int_1.html" target="_blank">J. Mel Poole, interview by Mark Schoepfle</a>.
<br>[56] Peter Geier, "Camp David Crash Rumor Proves False."
<br>[57] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20030303163931/http:/www.nps.gov/remembrance/dcarea/dc_int_1.html" target="_blank">J. Mel Poole, interview by Mark Schoepfle</a>.
<br>[58] <a href="http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/homeland_defense/september11/Transcript.pdf" target="_blank">Air Threat Conference and DDO Conference, Transcript. U.S. Department of Defense, September 11, 2001</a>.
<br>[59] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/12992809/Lynne-Cheneys-911-Notes-from-the-White-House-Bunker" target="_blank">White House notes: Lynne Cheney notes, September 11, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16942240/NY-B10-Farmer-Misc-WH-3-of-3-Fdr-11901-Newsweek-Interview-of-Mrs-Cheney-482" target="_blank">White House transcript, telephone interview of Mrs. Cheney by <i>Newsweek</i> magazine. White House, November 9, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16869695/NY-B9-Farmer-Misc-WH-1-of-3-Fdr-111901-Newsweek-Interview-of-Cheney-450" target="_blank">White House transcript, telephone interview of the vice president by <i>Newsweek</i>. White House, November 19, 2001</a>.
<br>[60] <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20020812053157/http:/www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?011001fa_FACT1" target="_blank">Nicholas Lemann, "The Options." <i>New Yorker</i>, October 1, 2001</a>; Bill Sammon, <i>Fighting Back</i>, p. 117.
<br>[61] <a href="http://www.today.com/id/36943246/ns/today-today_books/page/0/" target="_blank">Laura Bush, <i>Spoken From the Heart</i>, p. 202</a>.
<br>[62] Robert Draper, <i>Dead Certain: The Presidency of George W. Bush</i>. New York: Free Press, 2007, pp. 142-143.
<br>[63] <a href="http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/homeland_defense/september11/Transcript.pdf" target="_blank">Air Threat Conference and DDO Conference, Transcript</a>.
<br>[64] Robert Draper, <i>Dead Certain</i>, p. 143.
<br>[65] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16063500/T3-B1-EOP-Press-Interviews-of-Staff-Fdr-Internal-Transcript-8802-Moran-Interview-of-Ari-Fleischer-950" target="_blank">White House transcript, interview of press secretary Ari Fleischer by Terry Moran of ABC. White House, August 8, 2002</a>.
<br>[66] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16869695/NY-B9-Farmer-Misc-WH-1-of-3-Fdr-111901-Newsweek-Interview-of-Cheney-450" target="_blank">White House transcript, telephone interview of the vice president by <i>Newsweek</i></a>.
<br>[67] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/50996550/GSA-B32-RDOD03005034-1of3-Fdr-Amalgam-Virgo-02-6" target="_blank">"Unclassified Change 1: Exercise Amalgam Virgo 02-6 Exord/Red Spins." North American Aerospace Defense Command, July 31, 2003</a>.
<br>[68] <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20020607064100/http:/www.secretservice.gov/mission.shtml" target="_blank">"Mission Statement." United States Secret Service, 2002</a>.
<br>[69] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16869893/NY-B10-Farmer-Misc-WH-3-of-3-Fdr-111601-Newsweek-Interview-of-Scooter-Libby-476" target="_blank">White House transcript, interview of Scooter Libby by <i>Newsweek</i> magazine</a>.
<br>[70] <a href="http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/po361.aspx" target="_blank">"Testimony of Paul H. O'Neill, Secretary of the Treasury, Before the Senate Committee on Appropriations." U.S. Department of the Treasury, May 8, 2001</a>.
<br>[71] Paul L. Nenninger, "Simulation at the Secret Service: As Real as it Gets." In <i>Learning Rants, Raves, and Reflections: A Collection of Passionate and Professional Perspectives</i>, edited by Elliott Masie, pp. 175-187. San Francisco: Pfeiffer, 2005, p. 175; <a href="http://www.semissourian.com/story/1757355.html" target="_blank">Paul L. Nenninger, "One Secret Service Agent's Experience." <i>Southeast Missourian</i>, August 29, 2011</a>.
<br>[72] <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/18/us/washington-is-seeking-support-to-handle-protests-at-2-meetings.html" target="_blank">"Washington is Seeking Support to Handle Protests at 2 Meetings." <i>New York Times</i>, August 18, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/12/international/12UN-WIRE.html" target="_blank">"UN General Security Council Condemns Attacks." <i>New York Times</i>, September 12, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/14/september11.usa24" target="_blank">Mark Tran, "IMF and World Bank Meetings in Jeopardy." <i>The Guardian</i>, September 14, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/aponline/20011029/aponline134749_000.htm" target="_blank">"Bush to Attend UN General Assembly." Associated Press, October 29, 2001</a>; <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20120117060717/http:/www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0207.shtm" target="_blank">"National Special Security Events Fact Sheet." U.S. Department of Homeland Security, July 9, 2003</a>.
<br>[73] <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20020607063432/http:/www.secretservice.gov/nsse.shtml" target="_blank">"National Special Security Events." United States Secret Service, 2002</a>; <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20110604024914/http://judiciary.house.gov/legacy/stafford070902.htm" target="_blank">"Statement of Brian L. Stafford, Director, United States Secret Service, Before the Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security." U.S. House of Representatives, July 9, 2002</a>.
<br>[74] <a href="http://www.secretservice.gov/press/pub1202.pdf" target="_blank">"Members of Congress to Present Commendation to New York Field Office for Actions on September 11th." United States Secret Service news release, April 29, 2002</a>; 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 314; <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20080506001246/http:/pccw.alumni.cornell.edu/news/newsletters/spring06/riggs.html" target="_blank">"Spotlight on: Barbara Riggs." <i>PCCW Newsletter</i>, Spring 2006</a>.
<br>[75] <a href="http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-106shrg62810/pdf/CHRG-106shrg62810.pdf" target="_blank">"Statement of Brian L. Stafford, Director, United States Secret Service, Before the Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Treasury and General Government." United States Senate, March 30, 2000</a>.
<br>[76] <a href="http://www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing10/9-11Commission_Hearing_2004-04-13.htm" target="_blank">National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: Tenth Public Hearing. 9/11 Commission, April 13, 2004</a>.
<br>[77] <a href="http://www.historycommons.org/timeline.jsp?timeline=complete_911_timeline&day_of_9/11=complete_911_timeline_training_exercises" target="_blank">See "Training Exercises on 9/11." Complete 9/11 Timeline, n.d.</a>
<br>[78] Leslie Filson, <i>Air War Over America: Sept. 11 Alters Face of Air Defense Mission</i>. Tyndall Air Force Base, FL: 1st Air Force, 2003, p. 122; William M. Arkin, <i>Code Names: Deciphering U.S. Military Plans, Programs, and Operations in the 9/11 World</i>. Hanover, NH: Steerforth Press, 2005, p. 545.
<br>[79] <a href="http://www.dod.gov/pubs/dswa/document.html" target="_blank"><i>Nuclear Weapon Systems Sustainment Programs</i>. Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 1997</a>; <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20040131111117/http:/www.carlisle.army.mil/usacsl/Publications/vol1iss3.pdf" target="_blank">Joe Wasiak, "Global Guardian '99." <i>Collins Center Update</i>, December 1999</a>; <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/54399941/FOIA-11-023-Response-Pgs-1-30" target="_blank"><i>Exercise Global Guardian 2001-2 Joint After-Action Report</i>. United States Strategic Command, December 4, 2001, p. A2</a>.
<br>[80] Michael C. Ruppert, <i>Crossing the Rubicon: The Decline of the American Empire at the End of the Age of Oil</i>. Gabriola Island, BC: New Society Publishers, 2004, p. 367.
<br>[81] <a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=43789" target="_blank">Gerry J. Gilmore, "NORAD-Sponsored Exercise Prepares for Worst-Case Scenarios." American Forces Press Service, June 4, 2002</a>.
<br>[82] See, for example, <a href="http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2012/03/secret-service-failures-on-911-a-call-for-transparency.html" target="_blank">Kevin Ryan, "Secret Service Failures on 9/11: A Call for Transparency." Washington's Blog, March 25, 2012</a>; <a href="http://shoestring911.blogspot.co.uk/2012/06/laura-bush-on-911-why-was-presidents.html" target="_blank">"Laura Bush on 9/11: Why Was the President's Wife Left Vulnerable and Unprotected?" Shoestring 9/11, June 18, 2012</a>; <a href="http://shoestring911.blogspot.co.uk/2013/10/the-dangerously-delayed-reactions-of.html" target="_blank">"The Dangerously Delayed Reactions of the Secret Service on 9/11." Shoestring 9/11, October 2, 2013</a>.
<br>[83] <a href="http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/021209/archive_038371_print.htm" target="_blank">Chitra Ragavan, "Under Cloudy Skies." <i>U.S. News & World Report</i>, December 1, 2002</a>; Philip H. Melanson, <i>The Secret Service: The Hidden History of an Enigmatic Agency</i>. 2nd ed. New York: Carroll & Graf, 2005, p. 331.
<br>[84] <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/11/chronology.attack/" target="_blank">"September 11: Chronology of Terror." CNN, September 12, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/18/AR2006071801175_pf.html" target="_blank">Dan Balz and Bob Woodward, "America's Chaotic Road to War." <i>Washington Post</i>, January 27, 2002</a>.
<br>[85] Philip H. Melanson, <i>The Secret Service</i>, pp. 330-331.Shoestringhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01534319150672667644noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2990970741097819876.post-24919616671551012832013-10-02T01:55:00.000-07:002013-10-02T02:25:13.045-07:00The Dangerously Delayed Reactions of the Secret Service on 9/11<br><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi1ChiNqrEoNHmWIO1TuXwtp8gzE9YmK84vOTKcfCKTkGOiInTBCgJ4u8E2BqGbyr8vRkIRMYtbvTuFuPFob70XQp3WdOMOXS-pe_sRhMuRdiEi2nXFi8VVzzrn5M9Gf7DZ-WvJwq3suzP8/s1600/CheneyToPEOC.jpg" target="_blank" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi1ChiNqrEoNHmWIO1TuXwtp8gzE9YmK84vOTKcfCKTkGOiInTBCgJ4u8E2BqGbyr8vRkIRMYtbvTuFuPFob70XQp3WdOMOXS-pe_sRhMuRdiEi2nXFi8VVzzrn5M9Gf7DZ-WvJwq3suzP8/s1600/CheneyToPEOC.jpg" alt="Dick Cheney being evacuated to the PEOC on 9/11"/></a></div>
<br>The United States Secret Service--the law enforcement agency responsible for protecting the president and the White House--had a critical role to play in response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Various accounts, however, reveal that it was inexplicably slow to react to the crisis that day. Secret Service agents only appear to have acted with the kind of urgency we might reasonably expect more than 45 minutes after the first plane crashed into the World Trade Center and more than 30 minutes after the second plane crashed.
<br><br>The Secret Service's slow response meant some high-level individuals the agency was responsible for protecting were allowed to remain at unsafe locations throughout much of the duration of the attacks, and so could have been killed or seriously injured if their locations had been targeted.
<br><br>The Secret Service was also alarmingly slow to protect the White House--a building considered a likely target for terrorists--which meant the people there, including some key government officials, were left in danger throughout the attacks. It only ordered the evacuation of the White House about an hour after the attacks began.
<br><br>In this article, as well as examining the Secret Service's apparent failure to adequately protect the White House on September 11, we will look at the experiences of three individuals--Vice President Dick Cheney, his wife, Lynne Cheney, and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice--and consider how the Secret Service appears to have failed to sufficiently protect them.
<br><br><b>SECRET SERVICE COULD DETECT AND RESPOND TO TERRORIST ATTACKS</b>
<br>The Secret Service protects America's "most visible targets," which include the president, the vice president, and their families; the White House complex; the vice president's residence; and other buildings in Washington, DC. [1] It had an important role in responding to terrorism and was prepared to deal with terrorist attacks. A report by the Office of Management and Budget published in July 2001 noted that it was "responsible for protection of high visibility officials and facilities that terrorists might target." [2]
<br><br>Paul O'Neill, the Treasury secretary in 2001, said four months before 9/11 that in response to heightened concerns about terrorism, the Secret Service was carrying out "security operations that deter, minimize, and respond to these threats." He added that it had counter-assault teams, a counter-surveillance unit, and counter-sniper assets that could "detect and prevent, and if necessary respond to, any and all terrorist attacks on the president or vice president." [3]
<br><br>Furthermore, the Secret Service was uniquely able to defend the White House and the Eisenhower Executive Office Building (the building next to the White House where most of the president's staff works)--two buildings that should have been considered potential targets in the 9/11 attacks--since both buildings were protected by its uniformed division. [4] Additionally, the Secret Service's emergency response team--a specialized unit within the uniformed division--comprised the "sharpshooters assigned to respond to any terrorist strike," according to <i>U.S. News & World Report</i>. [5]
<br><br>In light of the agency's specific responsibilities, particularly those relating to dealing with terrorism, the Secret Service's performance on September 11 appears to have been particularly poor.
<br><br><b>THE SECRET SERVICE ONLY RESPONDED TO THE ATTACKS AFTER THE SECOND CRASH</b>
<br>Despite the heightened concern about terrorism around that time, Secret Service agents have indicated that they thought the first plane crash at the WTC was an accident, and they only realized a terrorist attack was underway and started taking action when they learned of the second crash.
<br><br>Paul Nenninger, a special agent, was at Secret Service headquarters in Washington on the morning of September 11 for a meeting. He recalled that one of the last people to arrive for the meeting "announced that a plane had just crashed into the World Trade Center." But, according to Nenninger, it was only after they learned that another plane had hit the WTC that the agents there for the meeting realized that "one plane could be an accident, [but] two was an attack." The agents then "disbanded and went to various support roles defined by the day's events." [6]
<br><br>Brian Stafford, the director of the Secret Service in 2001, was also at the Secret Service headquarters when the attacks began. He recalled that after he learned about the first crash, he "thought and hoped that it was an accident." But, he said, "When the second one hit, we knew that it wasn't." [7]
<br><br>After the second crash, according to Assistant Director Danny Spriggs, Stafford activated the Director's Crisis Center. [8] The Director's Crisis Center, located on the ninth floor of the headquarters building, was used to direct operations in emergencies. [9] Little has been revealed about what was done there to respond to the 9/11 attacks, however. Spriggs, who arrived at the Director's Crisis Center at around 9:35 a.m., recalled that his "area of concern" while he was there was "the location of our protective details and the safety of our protectees." [10]
<br><br><b>SENIOR AGENTS MET TO DISCUSS 'SECURITY ENHANCEMENTS AT THE WHITE HOUSE'</b>
<br>A Secret Service official whose response to the 9/11 attacks deserves particular attention is Carl Truscott. As the special agent in charge of the presidential protective division, Truscott was responsible for the overall security of the president, the president's family, and the White House. [11] He was in his office at the Eisenhower Executive Office Building when the attacks began.
<br><br>Truscott has recalled that he started taking action after he "observed the CNN broadcast of the aircraft crashing into the World Trade Center." (It is unclear if he was referring to the first crash, which occurred at 8:46 a.m. but was first reported on CNN at 8:48 a.m., or the second crash, which was broadcast live at 9:03 a.m.) Truscott's first response appears to have been to contact three other senior Secret Service agents--two of them with the presidential protective division and one with the technical security division--and ask them to come to his office for a meeting.
<br><br>The meeting was intended to discuss the critical subject of "security enhancements at the White House," according to Truscott. After it commenced, Truscott and the three other agents addressed a number of issues, including placing counter-sniper support on the White House, placing counter-surveillance units near the White House, increasing the number of emergency response teams, and opening the Emergency Operations Center. The meeting, however, began at "approximately 9:18 a.m.," according to Truscott--more than 30 minutes after the first attack on the WTC and 15 minutes after the second. [12]
<br><br><b>SECURITY ENHANCEMENTS AT THE WHITE HOUSE WERE ONLY 'PRECAUTIONARY STEPS'</b>
<br>Although the Secret Service was responsible for protecting the White House, it appears to have done little to defend the place for a significant time after the attacks began. Certainly, its initial actions seem much less than what we might reasonably expect, considering the unprecedented emergency that was taking place.
<br><br>Although the Secret Service implemented "security enhancements" around the White House complex, since Carl Truscott's meeting to discuss these measures began at around 9:18 a.m., the security enhancements would presumably have only been initiated some time after 9:18 a.m., well after the attacks began. [13]
<br><br>As the nation's capital, Washington should have been considered a likely target for any subsequent attacks after the WTC towers had been hit. An FBI spokesman in fact said, in 1999, that Washington was a "target-rich environment" for terrorists, because of all the embassies, monuments, and federal agencies there. [14] And yet the security enhancements around the White House were only "precautionary steps taken because of the strikes in New York," and not due to concerns about a possible attack in Washington, according to the <i>9/11 Commission Report</i>. [15]
<br><br>Additionally, some of the security enhancements appear to have been implemented half-heartedly, as if those who ordered them were unaware of the seriousness of the situation. Uniformed division officers who established a perimeter around the White House complex were ordered to keep their submachine guns out of sight, so they would not look too "militaristic." The officers were furious about this. One of them complained, "All we were left with were our pistols." And Secret Service executives only implemented the standard "emergency call-up" that would put all personnel on active duty after 9:37 a.m., when the Pentagon was hit. [16]
<br><br><b>THE SECRET SERVICE ONLY EVACUATED THE WHITE HOUSE AFTER THE PENTAGON ATTACK</b>
<br>Significantly, the Secret Service only ordered the evacuations of the White House and the adjacent Eisenhower Executive Office Building at around 9:45 a.m., seven or eight minutes after the Pentagon--which is only a couple of miles away from them--was attacked. [17]
<br><br>The evacuations were ordered after Carl Truscott received a call from Danny Spriggs, who was at the Director's Crisis Center, in which Spriggs said that "the intelligence division duty desk was reporting Federal Aviation Administration information that a suspicious aircraft was coming toward Washington." [18] (Federal Aviation Administration air traffic controllers informed the Secret Service that an unidentified aircraft was heading toward the White House at around 9:33 a.m. [19]) Then, while he was still on the phone with Spriggs, Truscott received a call from a "White House security representative" and, based on what Spriggs had said to him, he told the security representative to evacuate the White House. [20]
<br><br>What is worth noting, as CNN White House correspondent John King observed at the time, is that people started evacuating the White House in a slow, orderly fashion--and presumably of their own accord--about 25 minutes before the Secret Service ordered people to leave there. [21] So while some staffers apparently realized they would be better off away from the White House by around 9:20 a.m., it took the agency responsible for protecting the White House another 25 minutes before it came to the same conclusion and ordered an evacuation.
<br><br>Consequently, by the time agents started telling people to get away from the White House, 12 minutes had passed since the Secret Service was alerted to the suspicious aircraft flying toward the presidential mansion. Had that aircraft crashed into the White House, the Secret Service's evacuation order would have come many minutes too late to have helped save the lives of people there.
<br><br><b>VICE PRESIDENT'S WIFE STAYED AT A HAIR SALON DURING THE ATTACKS</b>
<br>The slowness of the Secret Service's response to the 9/11 attacks was evident in the way agents performed in moving people they were meant to protect to safe locations, where those people were less likely to be victims of any additional attacks. The experiences of Dick Cheney, Lynne Cheney, and Condoleezza Rice illustrate this. All three individuals were at or near the White House when the attacks began.
<br><br>Lynne Cheney, as the wife of the vice president, was protected by the Secret Service. [22] She was at the Nantucket Hair Salon in Washington, just a block away from the White House, at the time the planes crashed into the WTC. [23] Special Agent Michael Seremetis, who was with her, has recalled that a television was on in the hair salon, showing coverage of the attacks in New York. Seremetis, or possibly another Secret Service agent with him, went and told Cheney about the crashes as they were being reported on TV. [24]
<br><br>Cheney has claimed that, when she was told of them, she did not initially realize the crashes were terrorist attacks. "I was so naive," she recalled. "At the first one I thought, 'Gee, that's odd.' And then the second one--now this is really naive--I thought, 'That's really odd.'" She said it was only after "a few minutes" that "it just set in that this can't happen." [25] Even if this is true, however, Cheney's Secret Service agents should surely have realized a terrorist attack was underway when the second plane hit the WTC, if not before then.
<br><br>In a "state of emergency"--like the situation on September 11--"the Secret Service's plan is to get every protectee to a secure site," according to a National Geographic Channel documentary about the Secret Service. [26] And yet the agents did not evacuate Cheney from the hair salon and head toward a secure location until at least 30 minutes after the second attack. [27]
<br><br><b>LYNNE CHENEY WAS EVACUATED AFTER AGENTS LEARNED OF AN AIRCRAFT FLYING TOWARD THE WHITE HOUSE</b>
<br>Lynne Cheney's Secret Service agents only took action after they heard from the Joint Operations Center that an aircraft was flying toward the White House. This would presumably have been shortly after 9:33 a.m., when the Secret Service was alerted to this suspicious aircraft. [28]
<br><br>Cheney's explanation for her agents' slow response to the attacks was that the crisis was not initially "a Washington event." [29] But while the first attacks took place in New York, Cheney's agents should surely have considered the possibility of further attacks, and that these might have occurred in Washington. Casey McGee, a Secret Service special agent, specifically stated, "Part of our training [in the Secret Service] was to expect a diversion, expect multiple attacks." [30]
<br><br>Cheney also explained the initial inaction of her agents by saying they "had no knowledge of a plane headed toward Washington." [31] But what if a plane had been heading toward Washington without their knowledge? Or what if terrorists attacked the capital from the ground, perhaps by setting off a bomb? Cheney's agents should surely have contemplated possibilities such as these and acted accordingly.
<br><br>After evacuating her from the hair salon, the Secret Service agents initially drove Cheney toward the vice president's residence in northwest Washington. But in a phone call with a colleague, they learned that a plane had hit the Pentagon and were instructed, therefore, to take her to the White House, where she could join her husband. [32]
<br><br>Cheney has recalled that the Secret Service "decided that maybe it would be safer for me to be underneath the White House. The immediate threat was gone, so they took me there." [33] The Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC), where the agents were taking her, was certainly safer than the Nantucket Hair Salon: the bunker below the White House was designed to withstand a nuclear attack. [34]
<br><br>Lynne Cheney arrived at the White House at 9:52 a.m., according to a Secret Service timeline, and the <i>9/11 Commission Report</i> stated that she finally entered the safety of the PEOC at around 9:58 a.m.--more than 1 hour and 10 minutes after the first plane hit the WTC. [35]
<br><br><b>THE EVACUATION OF VICE PRESIDENT DICK CHENEY</b>
<br>Dick Cheney, as the vice president on September 11, was one of America's "most visible targets" and was guarded by his own detail of Secret Service agents. The actions of those agents were crucial and so an analysis of what they did is important. This analysis, however, is complicated by conflicting evidence about when they evacuated Cheney from his office in the West Wing of the White House and took him to the PEOC.
<br><br>Norman Mineta, the secretary of transportation in September 2001, has indicated that Cheney may have been evacuated some time before around 9:20 a.m. Mineta said that when he arrived at the PEOC on September 11, Cheney was already there. [36] Mineta said, on one occasion, that he arrived at the PEOC at 9:20 a.m.; on another occasion, he said he arrived there at 9:27 a.m. [37] But other accounts, including the <i>9/11 Commission Report</i>, have stated that Secret Service agents only evacuated Cheney from his office and headed toward the PEOC at around 9:35 a.m., after they were alerted to the suspicious plane flying toward the White House. [38]
<br><br>While further investigation is necessary to determine if Cheney was evacuated at the earlier time implied by Mineta or the later time stated in other accounts, we should certainly examine the accounts that describe Cheney being evacuated at around 9:35 a.m., because if they are correct it would mean the Secret Service failed to take action to protect the vice president for more than 30 minutes after the second plane hit the WTC and it became clear the U.S. was under attack.
<br><br><b>LEAD AGENT LEARNED OF ATTACKS FROM TELEVISION</b>
<br>Dick Cheney's Secret Service agents reportedly learned of the crisis on September 11 when Special Agent James Scott, the shift leader, saw the coverage of the first crash at the WTC on television and then alerted the "working shift"--the "body men" who remain in close proximity to a protectee--to what had happened, presumably in a phone call or over his radio. [39] Although Scott has not stated his location at that time, he was presumably at the Joint Operations Center at the White House, where the White House complex is monitored and the location of every "protected person," including the vice president, is constantly tracked. [40] Scott, however, did not instruct his colleagues to evacuate Cheney from his office.
<br><br>Around the same time, John McConnell, Cheney's chief speechwriter, was waiting outside the vice president's office and chatting with the Secret Service agent posted there. After the two men learned of the first crash at the WTC, but before the second crash occurred, the agent was called by the Secret Service's intelligence division. He was told that the WTC had been hit, specifically, by a "passenger jet," according to McConnell. After the agent passed on this detail to him, McConnell experienced a "sick feeling," because, he commented, "a passenger aircraft is <i>not</i> going to crash into the World Trade Center." [41] If McConnell's account is correct, the Secret Service agent outside Cheney's office should have been similarly concerned about what had caused the plane to crash. But still no attempt was made to evacuate the vice president.
<br><br><b>LEAD AGENT BECAME CERTAIN THAT CRASHES WERE TERRORIST ATTACKS</b>
<br>After Scott learned of the second crash at the WTC, presumably seeing it live on television, he was "certain that the airplane crashes were terrorist activities," he has recalled. But he still did not order that Cheney be taken to a secure location. Instead, he conferred with the supervisor who was with him, and the two men discussed "emergency contingency plans and a heightened security alert."
<br><br>Then at "approximately 9:30 a.m."--more than 25 minutes after the second attack--Scott went to the West Wing to meet with Cheney's shift agents who were posted there. But he did not instruct them to evacuate the vice president. Instead, he recalled, he "discussed the heightened alert and reviewed the contingency plan" with them. He then remained near Cheney's office door.
<br><br>Scott has said he only took action to get Cheney to a safe location when he learned a suspicious aircraft was flying toward Washington. [42] This was presumably shortly after 9:33 a.m., when the Secret Service was first informed about the aircraft.
<br><br>Even after it was alerted to the aircraft, there was a delay before the Secret Service took action. At 9:33 a.m., according to the <i>9/11 Commission Report</i>, a supervisor at Reagan National Airport in Washington called the Joint Operations Center at the White House and said, "An aircraft [is] coming at you and not talking with us." The Secret Service officer who answered the call--apparently Gregory LaDow--recalled that, after he was told about the aircraft, he was "about to push the alert button." However, he said, the supervisor then told him "that the aircraft was turning south and approaching Reagan National Airport," instead of continuing toward the White House. Therefore, according to the <i>9/11 Commission Report</i>, "No move was made to evacuate the vice president at this time."
<br><br>Action was finally taken after the Secret Service learned the plane was beginning to circle back. [43] Scott heard the "broadcast alert" from the Joint Operations Center over his radio, stating, "Unidentified aircraft coming toward the White House." [44] Some or perhaps all of Cheney's agents then went into the vice president's office, to move Cheney to the PEOC. The Secret Service ordered the evacuation of Cheney "just before 9:36," according to the <i>9/11 Commission Report</i>. [45] The agents hurried Cheney down the hallway, past the Oval Office, and down to the basement of the White House. [46]
<br><br>If this account, according to which the Secret Service moved Cheney from his office to take him to a secure location at around 9:35 a.m., is correct, the implications are serious. It would mean Cheney's agents did nothing to protect the vice president--the man who would have been running the country if the president was killed or incapacitated--for over 45 minutes after the first attack and over 30 minutes after the second. <i>Washington Post</i> reporter Barton Gellman commented on their slow response, writing that after they left the vice president's office, Cheney and his agents "were racing a jet aircraft on foot." Therefore, Gellman noted, "If the White House had been the target, Cheney would have lost the race." [47]
<br><br>Cheney and his agents reached the safety of the underground tunnel leading to the PEOC about a minute after they left Cheney's office. Cheney then used a phone in the tunnel to talk with President Bush, who was by then on Air Force One, ready to fly out of Sarasota, Florida. Cheney finally entered the PEOC at around 9:58 a.m., according to the <i>9/11 Commission Report</i>. [48]
<br><br><b>NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER WAS ONLY TAKEN TO A SECURE LOCATION AFTER THE PENTAGON ATTACK</b>
<br>Another key government official whose experiences on September 11 highlight the slow responses of the Secret Service was Condoleezza Rice, the national security adviser. Rice was in the White House at the time of the attacks on the U.S. [49]
<br><br>Although she was not one of the Secret Service's designated protectees at that time, immediately after the attacks on the WTC, the Secret Service apparently considered itself responsible for her safety: At the 9:18 a.m. meeting during which Carl Truscott and three other senior Secret Service agents discussed security at the White House, one item covered, according to Truscott, was "providing protection for National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice." However, as was the case for Lynne Cheney and also, according to some accounts, Dick Cheney, the Secret Service only moved Rice to a secure location after it learned about the unidentified aircraft flying toward the White House.
<br><br>Rice was escorted from the White House Situation Room to the PEOC by Truscott. Truscott learned about the suspicious aircraft heading toward the White House during his 9:18 a.m. meeting, when, as previously mentioned, Danny Spriggs phoned him and alerted him to it. He subsequently left his office in the Eisenhower Executive Office Building and headed toward the PEOC.
<br><br>On the way there, Truscott stopped off at the Situation Room. [50] There, he told Rice she had to go to the PEOC. This appears to have been at around 9:45 a.m., as Rice has recalled that at the time, she had just been watching the first coverage of the Pentagon attack on TV. [51] (The Pentagon attack was first reported on CNN at 9:42 a.m. [52]) Rice called President Bush and spoke with him before Truscott escorted her out of the Situation Room. [53] Rice and Truscott then joined Dick and Lynne Cheney in the underground tunnel leading to the PEOC, and Rice entered the PEOC shortly before 10:00 a.m. [54]
<br><br>But if the Secret Service considered itself responsible for protecting Rice that morning, the question arises as to why it waited so long before it moved her to a secure location. Surely, for her safety, Rice should have been taken to the PEOC immediately after the second plane hit the WTC, if not before then. Agents should have known, once they realized the U.S. was under attack, that Rice could have been killed or seriously injured if the White House was targeted. And yet the national security adviser only reached the safety of the PEOC about 55 minutes after the second attack took place.
<br><br><b>ARMED AGENTS ORDERED PEOPLE TO RUN AWAY FROM THE WHITE HOUSE</b>
<br>The oddness of the Secret Service's sluggish initial response to the 9/11 attacks becomes more apparent when we compare it with the urgency and professionalism agents suddenly exhibited after around 9:35 a.m. or 9:45 a.m. on September 11. After that time, they reacted in a manner we might reasonably expect them to in such a crisis.
<br><br>The new level of urgency was evident when Secret Service agents ordered people to evacuate the White House, at around 9:45 a.m. CNN's John King reported that, after that time, the people he saw leaving the White House grounds "were told and ordered by the Secret Service to run." [55] Major Robert Darling of the White House Military Office, who was also at the scene, described seeing the White House in "full evacuation mode." "I was struck by the number of uniformed and plainclothes Secret Service agents with automatic weapons drawn," he commented, "yelling over megaphones, 'Ladies, take off your heels and run for the exits; there's another plane inbound.'" Darling also noticed "grim-faced Secret Service agents" who were "taking up positions in and around the White House." [56]
<br><br>Secret Service agents acted with the same urgency as they ordered people to leave the Eisenhower Executive Office Building, next door to the White House, at that time. Ron Christie, the deputy assistant to the vice president for domestic policy, described the scene on the second floor of the building, writing: "The offices containing the vice president's Secret Service detail were flung open. Men and women I'd never seen before ran out with automatic weapons. They began to shout: 'Everybody evacuate the building. Get out <i>now!</i>'" [57] The <i>New York Times</i> described bomb squads "racing through the upper floors of the Old Executive Office Building, screaming, 'Get out, get out, this is real!'" [58]
<br><br>The increased concern of the Secret Service meant people were refused entry to the White House grounds. After he was evacuated from the Eisenhower Executive Office Building, David Addington, Dick Cheney's general counsel and legal adviser, tried to re-enter the White House complex but was denied access. A Secret Service agent told him no one was being allowed in. Addington then "tried several other entrances," but "without success," according to journalist and author Stephen Hayes. [59]
<br><br>Lynne Cheney and her Secret Service agents experienced a similar response when they arrived at the White House as it was being evacuated. A guard refused to let their car into the White House grounds. [60] The guard "didn't know who I was," Cheney wrote. [61] "The security people at the White House were stunned that somebody would want to come in," she recalled, "and so made quite an effort to keep us out." Cheney's driver took the car over the curb and onto the sidewalk, to try and get into the grounds, but a fire engine was driven in front of the car to block its way. Eventually, though, Cheney and her agents were admitted in. [62]
<br><br><b>AGENTS SHOWED INCREASED CONCERN FOR THE SAFETY OF THEIR PROTECTEES</b>
<br>The sudden change in the attitude of the Secret Service was reflected in the way agents treated the people they were protecting.
<br><br>If the accounts stating that Dick Cheney was evacuated from his office at around 9:35 a.m. are correct, then there was a dramatic contrast between the vice president's Secret Service agents' lack of response to the two crashes at the WTC, and their rapid and determined actions after they learned an unidentified plane was flying toward the White House.
<br><br>Even after the second plane crashed, Cheney was allowed to stay in his office and meet with several other government officials. He then spent "several minutes watching developments on the television," he has recalled, and was starting "to get organized to figure out what to do." [63] But at around 9:35 a.m., according to Barton Gellman, "Four or five Secret Service agents arrived, submachine guns in hand." One of them, James Scott, pushed through the group of officials around Cheney and told the vice president, "Sir, we need to move you--now." Cheney nodded, indicating he would respond in a moment. But Scott "brought down the flat of his hand--loud--on Cheney's desk," according to Gellman, and commanded, "<i>Now!</i>" [64] Cheney recalled that Scott then "grabbed [me], put a hand on my belt, another hand on my shoulder, and propelled me out the door of my office." [65]
<br><br>A similar change was evident in the behavior of Lynne Cheney's Secret Service agents after they were alerted to the aircraft flying toward the White House. Whereas they previously allowed the vice president's wife to continue with her appointment at the hair salon, Lynne Cheney has recalled that the agents now moved her "rather briskly into a car," drove her "at rather high speed toward the vice president's house," and then "made a rather dramatic U-turn in the middle of the street and headed toward the White House." [66]
<br><br>And while she had been allowed to stay in a non-secure location after the planes hit the WTC, Condoleezza Rice was treated with a new level of urgency at around 9:45 a.m., when Carl Truscott took her to the PEOC. Rice has recalled that when she phoned the president before going to the PEOC, the call had to be "brief" because she was "being pushed to get off the phone and get out of the West Wing." [67] Truscott, she said, was "pulling at my arm, saying, 'You have to go to the bunker.'" [68] Then, as she headed to the PEOC, she was "pushed along" the corridors by Truscott. [69]
<br><br>In all three accounts--of Dick and Lynne Cheney, and Condoleezza Rice--we see that Secret Service agents did eventually respond to the 9/11 attacks in a way we might reasonably expect from such highly skilled professionals in an emergency. But why did they fail to respond that way after the second plane hit the WTC at 9:03 a.m., when, according to the <i>9/11 Commission Report</i>, "nearly everyone in the White House ... immediately knew it was not an accident?" [70]
<br><br><b>THE SECRET SERVICE WAS PREPARED FOR GROUND ATTACKS</b>
<br>Although the call it received at 9:33 a.m. about a suspicious aircraft flying toward the White House was "the first specific report to the Secret Service of a direct threat to the White House," according to the <i>9/11 Commission Report</i>, how could the Secret Service have known, when it first became aware of the attacks in New York, that Washington or the White House would not also be attacked? A hijacked aircraft could have been flying toward Washington without its knowledge. Or terrorists could have attacked from the ground: A group brandishing firearms could have gone on a rampage in the capital, or a bomb, chemical weapon, or biological weapon could have been set off. The Secret Service should surely have anticipated these possibilities as soon as it realized or suspected the U.S. was under attack.
<br><br>Secret Service agents apparently would have been prepared for these kinds of attacks: The <i>Washington Post</i> reported, "Of the more than 201 federal planning exercises conducted in the late 1990s, two-thirds were aimed at defending the public against biological and chemical attacks." [71]
<br><br>Dick Cheney's Secret Service agents indeed seemed to recognize the possibility of a ground attack on the White House when they moved the vice president down toward the PEOC. Cheney recalled that they "positioned themselves at the top, middle, and bottom of the staircase, creating layers of defense in case the White House itself should be invaded." James Scott gave Cheney's other agents extra firearms and gas masks, presumably in case there was a chemical or biological attack on the White House. [72] But why did these agents wait so long before reacting with this high level of urgency and professionalism?
<br><br><b>THE WHITE HOUSE WAS CONSIDERED A POSSIBLE TERRORIST TARGET</b>
<br>The slowness of the Secret Service in protecting the White House on September 11 seems particularly odd in light of the fact that the agency considered the place a possible target for terrorists and had been concerned that it might be attacked from the air.
<br><br>Paul O'Neill revealed in May 2001 that the Secret Service held "interagency tabletop exercises in preparation for terrorist attacks on the White House." [73] And after the 1996 Atlanta Olympics, when there were concerns about the games being attacked using an aircraft, the Secret Service "continued to work on the problem of airborne threats to the Washington region," according to the <i>9/11 Commission Report</i>. [74] Additionally, Marlin Fitzwater, the press secretary to Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush, said in 1994 that "aerial attacks" were "the ultimate fear for security people." [75]
<br><br>The Secret Service's concerns would surely have been heightened because of an incident in 1994--actually on the night of September 11 that year--when a man stole a small propeller plane from an airport in Maryland and then crashed it into the wall of the White House. <i>Time</i> magazine commented, "The unlikely incident confirmed all too publicly what security officials have long feared in private: the White House is vulnerable to sneak attack from the air." [76]
<br><br>Between 1998 and 2001, the Secret Service even held training exercises to test security at the White House, which involved computer simulations of planes crashing into the building. [77]
<br><br><b>THE SECRET SERVICE HAD COMMUNICATION PROBLEMS ON SEPTEMBER 11</b>
<br>While a proper investigation is required to determine why the Secret Service performed so poorly in protecting the White House and some of the people it was responsible for on September 11, we can at least speculate as to some factors that may have been involved.
<br><br>There is already some evidence suggesting the Secret Service's lines of communication were sabotaged on September 11, thereby hindering the agency's ability to respond to the terrorist attacks. The sabotage may have involved phones being jammed, or rogue employees deliberately failing to pass on information or failing to pass on information quickly enough.
<br><br>For example, Nelson Garabito, a senior Secret Service agent who was responsible for coordinating the president's movements, phoned his counterpart at the Federal Aviation Administration promptly after the second attack on the WTC, and was told there were two planes that were unaccounted for and possibly hijacked in addition to the two that had hit the WTC. Garabito instructed someone with him to go upstairs and pass this information on to other Secret Service agents. But, for unknown reasons, the information was not passed on, or was passed on but not disseminated. It "failed to reach agents assigned to the vice president, and the vice president was not evacuated at that time," the <i>9/11 Commission Report</i> stated. [78]
<br><br>And Danny Spriggs said that when he arrived at the Director's Crisis Center at Secret Service headquarters at around 9:35 a.m., "many of the telephones" in the center were "not operational." However, it is unclear if he meant the phones were not working or were simply not yet being used. [79]
<br><br><b>AGENTS WERE HINDERED BY 'CONFLICTING' AND 'UNCONFIRMED' INFORMATION</b>
<br>Further evidence that the Secret Service was affected by communication problems on September 11 was its lack of awareness of what was going on that day.
<br><br>Laura Bush, the wife of President Bush, spent much of September 11 at Secret Service headquarters and has described the lack of information available to people there. "All of us in that basement conference room [at Secret Service headquarters] and many more in the Secret Service building were relying on rumors and on whatever news came from the announcers on television," she wrote. [80]
<br><br>Danny Spriggs also described the lack of awareness of what was happening among those at Secret Service headquarters. He said the amount of information that came into the Director's Crisis Center throughout the day was "enormous." However, agents in the center were receiving "conflicting" information from the Secret Service's intelligence division, "unconfirmed data," and "raw information," which hindered their ability to make proper decisions. Spriggs recalled that one of his colleagues was making decisions based on "inaccurate data that could have been quickly verified." [81]
<br><br>Confusion within the Secret Service was also indicated by the behavior of a senior agent who met Lynne Cheney when she arrived at the White House and escorted her through the building. Inside the White House, Cheney and the agent ran into I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, the vice president's chief of staff, who was making his way to the PEOC.
<br><br>Libby has recalled that the Secret Service agent appeared to be "a little confused" about where he should take Cheney. The agent, according to Libby, "had the impression that she was supposed to be in the mess area"--the cafeteria on the ground floor of the West Wing, which was much less secure than the underground PEOC.
<br><br>Libby told the Secret Service agent, "I think we're--Mrs. Cheney and I--are supposed to be in the PEOC." But the agent, who was wearing an earpiece that Libby thought "he was getting some instructions off," believed they were "supposed to be somewhere else." Eventually, after "probably a minute or so," according to Libby, the agent received "the proper instruction" over his earpiece. Cheney, the agent, and Libby then headed toward the PEOC. [82]
<br><br><b>WAS THE SECRET SERVICE HOLDING A TRAINING EXERCISE ON SEPTEMBER 11?</b>
<br>Another possible reason for the Secret Service's poor response to the terrorist attacks is that the agency was running a training exercise, maybe based around a scenario resembling the actual attacks that day. As previously mentioned, around that time, the Secret Service had been conducting "interagency tabletop exercises in preparation for terrorist attacks on the White House." [83] One of these exercises could have been scheduled for the morning of September 11, and could have been used to deceive and confuse agents. Some agents may have been unclear as to what was real and what was simulated, and could have mistaken actual events for part of the exercise.
<br><br>While we can currently speculate, the actual reasons for the Secret Service's initial lack of response to the 9/11 attacks are still unknown. The amount of evidence publicly available about the Secret Service's actions on September 11 is, unfortunately, very small. A lot more relevant information therefore needs to come to light. And the actions of the Secret Service need to be a key area of consideration in any new investigations of the 9/11 attacks.
<br><br><b>NOTES</b>
<br>[1] <a href="http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/po361.aspx" target="_blank">"Testimony of Paul H. O'Neill, Secretary of the Treasury, Before the Senate Committee on Appropriations." U.S. Department of the Treasury, May 8, 2001</a>; <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20020607064100/http:/www.secretservice.gov/mission.shtml" target="_blank">"Mission Statement." United States Secret Service, 2002</a>.
<br>[2] <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/legislative/nsd_annual_report2001.pdf" target="_blank">Office of Management and Budget, <i>Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism</i>. Washington, DC: Office of Management and Budget, July 2001, p. 81</a>.
<br>[3] <a href="http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/po361.aspx" target="_blank">"Testimony of Paul H. O'Neill, Secretary of the Treasury, Before the Senate Committee on Appropriations."</a>
<br>[4] Philip H. Melanson with Peter F. Stevens, <i>The Secret Service: The Hidden History of an Enigmatic Agency</i>. New York: Carroll & Graf, 2002, p. 169; <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20020806203428/http:/www.secretservice.gov/ud.shtml" target="_blank">"Protection: Uniformed Division." United States Secret Service, 2002</a>.
<br>[5] <a href="http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/021209/archive_038371_print.htm" target="_blank">Chitra Ragavan, "Under Cloudy Skies." <i>U.S. News & World Report</i>, December 1, 2002</a>.
<br>[6] <a href="http://www.semissourian.com/story/1757355.html" target="_blank">Paul L. Nenninger, "One Secret Service Agent's Experience." <i>Southeast Missourian</i>, August 29, 2011</a>.
<br>[7] <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k4zfz-1IYy4" target="_blank"><i>Inside the U.S. Secret Service</i>. National Geographic Channel, October 24, 2004</a>.
<br>[8] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/30764772/Monaghan-FOIA-USSS-Memos-and-Timelines" target="_blank">USSS memo, interview with AD C. Danny Spriggs, OPO. United States Secret Service, October 1, 2001</a>.
<br>[9] Ronald Kessler, <i>In the President's Secret Service: Behind the Scenes With Agents in the Line of Fire and the Presidents They Protect</i>. New York: Crown, 2009, pp. 23-24.
<br>[10] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/30764772/Monaghan-FOIA-USSS-Memos-and-Timelines" target="_blank">USSS memo, interview with AD C. Danny Spriggs, OPO</a>.
<br>[11] <a href="http://www.secretservice.gov/press/pub0704.pdf" target="_blank">"Assistant Director Carl J. Truscott Announces Plans to Retire From the U.S. Secret Service." United States Secret Service news release, April 1, 2004</a>.
<br>[12] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/30764772/Monaghan-FOIA-USSS-Memos-and-Timelines" target="_blank">USSS memo, interview with SAIC Carl Truscott. United States Secret Service, October 1, 2001</a>.
<br>[13] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States</i>. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004, pp. 35-36.
<br>[14] <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/1999/11/15/us/washington-moves-to-deter-millennial-terrorist-attacks.html" target="_blank">"Washington Moves to Deter Millennial Terrorist Attacks." <i>New York Times</i>, November 15, 1999</a>.
<br>[15] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 36.
<br>[16] <a href="http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/021209/archive_038371_print.htm" target="_blank">Chitra Ragavan, "Under Cloudy Skies"</a>; Philip H. Melanson, <i>The Secret Service: The Hidden History of an Enigmatic Agency</i>. 2nd ed. New York: Carroll & Graf, 2005, p. 331.
<br>[17] <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20080306021320/http:/associatedpress.com/log/APNewsAlertsandFlashes.pdf" target="_blank">"A Stunning 48 Hours of News." Associated Press, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/18/AR2006071801175_pf.html" target="_blank">Dan Balz and Bob Woodward, "America's Chaotic Road to War." <i>Washington Post</i>, January 27, 2002</a>.
<br>[18] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/30764772/Monaghan-FOIA-USSS-Memos-and-Timelines" target="_blank">USSS memo, interview with SAIC Carl Truscott</a>.
<br>[19] <a href="http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB165/faa7.pdf" target="_blank">"Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events: September 11, 2001." Federal Aviation Administration, September 17, 2001</a>; 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 39.
<br>[20] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/30764772/Monaghan-FOIA-USSS-Memos-and-Timelines" target="_blank">USSS memo, interview with SAIC Carl Truscott</a>.
<br>[21] <a href="http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0109/11/bn.06.html" target="_blank">"The White House Has Been Evacuated." <i>Breaking News</i>, CNN, September 11, 2001</a>.
<br>[22] <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20020806201356/http:/www.secretservice.gov/protection.shtml" target="_blank">"Protection: Protective Mission." United States Secret Service, 2002</a>.
<br>[23] <a href="http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB358a/doc22.pdf" target="_blank">"9/11/01 Timeline." United States Secret Service, November 17, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/30764772/Monaghan-FOIA-USSS-Memos-and-Timelines" target="_blank">USSS memo, interview with SA Michael Seremetis. United States Secret Service, October 1, 2001</a>.
<br>[24] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/30764772/Monaghan-FOIA-USSS-Memos-and-Timelines" target="_blank">USSS memo, interview with SA Michael Seremetis</a>; <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16942240/NY-B10-Farmer-Misc-WH-3-of-3-Fdr-11901-Newsweek-Interview-of-Mrs-Cheney-482" target="_blank">White House transcript, telephone interview of Mrs. Cheney by <i>Newsweek</i> magazine. White House, November 9, 2001</a>.
<br>[25] "Lynne Cheney--Excerpts." Associated Press, November 30, 2001.
<br>[26] <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k4zfz-1IYy4" target="_blank"><i>Inside the U.S. Secret Service</i></a>.
<br>[27] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/30764772/Monaghan-FOIA-USSS-Memos-and-Timelines" target="_blank">USSS memo, interview with SA Michael Seremetis</a>.
<br>[28] Ibid.
<br>[29] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16942240/NY-B10-Farmer-Misc-WH-3-of-3-Fdr-11901-Newsweek-Interview-of-Mrs-Cheney-482" target="_blank">White House transcript, telephone interview of Mrs. Cheney by <i>Newsweek</i> magazine</a>.
<br>[30] <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k4zfz-1IYy4" target="_blank"><i>Inside the U.S. Secret Service</i></a>.
<br>[31] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16942240/NY-B10-Farmer-Misc-WH-3-of-3-Fdr-11901-Newsweek-Interview-of-Mrs-Cheney-482" target="_blank">White House transcript, telephone interview of Mrs. Cheney by <i>Newsweek</i> magazine</a>.
<br>[32] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/30764772/Monaghan-FOIA-USSS-Memos-and-Timelines" target="_blank">USSS memo, interview with SA Michael Seremetis</a>.
<br>[33] <a href="http://www.npr.org/programs/npc/2002/020702.lcheney.html" target="_blank">"Lynne Cheney's July 2002 Talk at the National Press Club." NPR, July 2, 2002</a>.
<br>[34] <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/16/us/after-attacks-events-four-days-national-crisis-changes-bush-s-presidency.html" target="_blank">David E. Sanger and Don Van Natta Jr., "In Four Days, a National Crisis Changes Bush's Presidency." <i>New York Times</i>, September 16, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/18/AR2006071801175_pf.html" target="_blank">Dan Balz and Bob Woodward, "America's Chaotic Road to War."</a>
<br>[35] <a href="http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB358a/doc22.pdf" target="_blank">"9/11/01 Timeline"</a>; 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 40.
<br>[36] <a href="http://www.achievement.org/autodoc/printmember/min0int-1" target="_blank">Norman Mineta, interview by the Academy of Achievement. Los Angeles, CA, June 3, 2006</a>.
<br>[37] <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20070808204935/http:/www.msnbc.com/modules/91102/interviews/mineta.asp?cp1=1" target="_blank">Norman Mineta, interview by Robert Hager. NBC News, September 11, 2002</a>; <a href="http://www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing2/9-11Commission_Hearing_2003-05-23.htm" target="_blank">National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: Public Hearing. 9/11 Commission, May 23, 2003</a>.
<br>[38] <a href="http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB358a/doc22.pdf" target="_blank">"9/11/01 Timeline"</a>; 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, pp. 39-40.
<br>[39] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/30764772/Monaghan-FOIA-USSS-Memos-and-Timelines" target="_blank">USSS memo, interview with ATSAIC Scott Johnson and SA James Scott. United States Secret Service, October 1, 2001</a>.
<br>[40] <a href="http://www.nydailynews.com/archives/entertainment/joan-lunden-night-guns-n-gams-article-1.783455" target="_blank">Scott Williams, "Joan Lunden's Night of Guns 'N' Gams." <i>New York Daily News</i>, December 22, 1997</a>; <a href="http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/national-geographic-channel-steps-into-the-line-of-fire-alongside-special-agents-of-the-us-secret-service-73931542.html" target="_blank">"National Geographic Channel Steps Into the Line of Fire Alongside Special Agents of the U.S. Secret Service." National Geographic Channel news release, September 27, 2004</a>.
<br>[41] Stephen F. Hayes, <i>Cheney: The Untold Story of America's Most Powerful and Controversial Vice President</i>. New York: HarperCollins, 2007, pp. 329-330.
<br>[42] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/30764772/Monaghan-FOIA-USSS-Memos-and-Timelines" target="_blank">USSS memo, interview with ATSAIC Scott Johnson and SA James Scott</a>.
<br>[43] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, pp. 39, 464.
<br>[44] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/30764772/Monaghan-FOIA-USSS-Memos-and-Timelines" target="_blank">USSS memo, interview with ATSAIC Scott Johnson and SA James Scott</a>.
<br>[45] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, pp. 39-40.
<br>[46] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16869695/NY-B9-Farmer-Misc-WH-1-of-3-Fdr-111901-Newsweek-Interview-of-Cheney-450" target="_blank">White House transcript, telephone interview of the vice president by <i>Newsweek</i>. White House, November 19, 2001</a>.
<br>[47] Barton Gellman, <i>Angler: The Cheney Vice Presidency</i>. New York: Penguin, 2008, p. 115.
<br>[48] <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20020812053157/http:/www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?011001fa_FACT1" target="_blank">Nicholas Lemann, "The Options." <i>New Yorker</i>, October 1, 2001</a>; 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 40.
<br>[49] <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/11/us/where-they-were-frozen-memory-first-moments-transformed-world-condoleezza-rice.html" target="_blank">David E. Sanger, "Frozen in Memory, the First Moments of a Transformed World--Condoleezza Rice; National Security Adviser." <i>New York Times</i>, September 11, 2002</a>.
<br>[50] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/30764772/Monaghan-FOIA-USSS-Memos-and-Timelines" target="_blank">USSS memo, interview with SAIC Carl Truscott</a>.
<br>[51] <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/11/us/where-they-were-frozen-memory-first-moments-transformed-world-condoleezza-rice.html" target="_blank">David E. Sanger, "Frozen in Memory, the First Moments of a Transformed World--Condoleezza Rice; National Security Adviser."</a>
<br>[52] <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0109/11/bn.03.html" target="_blank">"Terrorism Strikes in the United States in a Massive Attack." <i>Breaking News</i>, CNN, September 11, 2001</a>.
<br>[53] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16571537/T3-B11-EOP-Produced-Documents-Vol-III-Fdr-8602-Terry-MoranABC-Interview-of-Rice-003" target="_blank">White House transcript, interview of National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice by Terry Moran of ABC. White House, August 6, 2002</a>; <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/11/us/where-they-were-frozen-memory-first-moments-transformed-world-condoleezza-rice.html" target="_blank">David E. Sanger, "Frozen in Memory, the First Moments of a Transformed World--Condoleezza Rice; National Security Adviser."</a>
<br>[54] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/30764772/Monaghan-FOIA-USSS-Memos-and-Timelines" target="_blank">USSS memo, interview with SAIC Carl Truscott</a>; Elisabeth Bumiller, <i>Condoleezza Rice: An American Life: A Biography</i>. New York: Random House, 2007, p. xiii.
<br>[55] <a href="http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0109/11/bn.06.html" target="_blank">"The White House Has Been Evacuated."</a>
<br>[56] Robert J. Darling, <i>24 Hours Inside the President's Bunker: 9/11/01 The White House</i>. Bloomington, IN: iUniverse, 2010, p. 47.
<br>[57] Ron Christie, <i>Black in the White House: Life Inside George W. Bush's West Wing</i>. Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson, 2006, p. 129.
<br>[58] <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/16/us/after-attacks-events-four-days-national-crisis-changes-bush-s-presidency.html" target="_blank">David E. Sanger and Don Van Natta Jr., "In Four Days, a National Crisis Changes Bush's Presidency."</a>
<br>[59] Stephen F. Hayes, <i>Cheney</i>, p. 334.
<br>[60] Ibid. p. 334.
<br>[61] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/12992809/Lynne-Cheneys-911-Notes-from-the-White-House-Bunker" target="_blank">White House notes: Lynne Cheney notes, September 11, 2001</a>.
<br>[62] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16942240/NY-B10-Farmer-Misc-WH-3-of-3-Fdr-11901-Newsweek-Interview-of-Mrs-Cheney-482" target="_blank">White House transcript, telephone interview of Mrs. Cheney by <i>Newsweek</i> magazine</a>; Katherine M. Skiba, "Lynne Cheney Stresses Importance of History; Discusses Sept. 11." <i>Milwaukee Journal Sentinel</i>, July 2, 2002; Stephen F. Hayes, <i>Cheney</i>, p. 334.
<br>[63] <a href="http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp20010916.html" target="_blank"><i>Meet the Press</i>. NBC, September 16, 2001</a>; Stephen F. Hayes, <i>Cheney</i>, pp. 331-332.
<br>[64] Barton Gellman, <i>Angler</i>, pp. 114-115.
<br>[65] <a href="http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/09/10/60ii/main521483.shtml" target="_blank">David Kohn, "The President's Story." CBS News, September 10, 2002</a>.
<br>[66] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16942240/NY-B10-Farmer-Misc-WH-3-of-3-Fdr-11901-Newsweek-Interview-of-Mrs-Cheney-482" target="_blank">White House transcript, telephone interview of Mrs. Cheney by <i>Newsweek</i> magazine</a>.
<br>[67] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16571528/T3-B11-EOP-Produced-Documents-Vol-III-Fdr-8202-Scott-PelleyCBS-Interview-of-Rice-002" target="_blank">White House transcript, interview of National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice by Scott Pelley, CBS. White House, August 2, 2002</a>.
<br>[68] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16571587/T3-B11-EOP-Produced-Documents-Vol-III-Fdr-11101-Evan-ThomasNewsweek-Interview-of-Rice-001" target="_blank">White House transcript, interview of National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice by Evan Thomas of <i>Newsweek</i> magazine. White House, November 11, 2001</a>.
<br>[69] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16571528/T3-B11-EOP-Produced-Documents-Vol-III-Fdr-8202-Scott-PelleyCBS-Interview-of-Rice-002" target="_blank">White House transcript, interview of National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice by Scott Pelley, CBS</a>.
<br>[70] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 35.
<br>[71] <a href="http://old.911digitalarchive.org/crr/documents/985.pdf" target="_blank">Joby Warrick and Joe Stephens, "Before Attack, U.S. Expected Different Hit." <i>Washington Post</i>, October 2, 2001</a>.
<br>[72] <a href="http://www.nbcnews.com/id/44318966/ns/today-today_books/t/dick-cheney-reflects-difficult-decisions/" target="_blank">Dick Cheney with Liz Cheney, <i>In My Time: A Personal and Political Memoir</i>. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011, p. 1</a>.
<br>[73] <a href="http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/po361.aspx" target="_blank">"Testimony of Paul H. O'Neill, Secretary of the Treasury, Before the Senate Committee on Appropriations."</a>
<br>[74] 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 345.
<br>[75] <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/1994/09/13/us/crash-white-house-defenses-pilot-s-exploit-rattles-white-house-officials.html" target="_blank">Stephen Labaton, "Pilot's Exploit Rattles White House Officials." <i>New York Times</i>, September 13, 1994</a>.
<br>[76] <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/1994/09/13/us/crash-white-house-overview-unimpeded-intruder-crashes-plane-into-white-house.html" target="_blank">Maureen Dowd, "Unimpeded, Intruder Crashes Plane Into White House." <i>New York Times</i>, September 13, 1994</a>; <a href="http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,165128,00.html" target="_blank">Michael Duffy, "Flight of the Intruder." <i>Time</i>, September 26, 1994</a>.
<br>[77] <a href="http://www.semissourian.com/story/1757355.html" target="_blank">Paul L. Nenninger, "One Secret Service Agent's Experience."</a>
<br>[78] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/14353654/DH-B5-Secret-Service-Requests-Fdr-Entire-Contents-5-Withdrawal-Notice-Doc-Req-Notes-Garabito-Shortly-After-9am-FAA-Van-Steenbergen-Said-4-Planes" target="_blank">"USSS Statements and Interview Reports." 9/11 Commission, July 28, 2003</a>; 9/11 Commission, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>, p. 464.
<br>[79] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/30764772/Monaghan-FOIA-USSS-Memos-and-Timelines" target="_blank">USSS memo, interview with AD C. Danny Spriggs, OPO</a>.
<br>[80] <a href="http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/36943246/ns/today-books/t/laura-bush-recalls-panic/" target="_blank">Laura Bush, <i>Spoken From the Heart</i>. New York: Scribner, 2010, p. 202</a>.
<br>[81] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/14353654/DH-B5-Secret-Service-Requests-Fdr-Entire-Contents-5-Withdrawal-Notice-Doc-Req-Notes-Garabito-Shortly-After-9am-FAA-Van-Steenbergen-Said-4-Planes" target="_blank">"USSS Statements and Interview Reports."</a>
<br>[82] <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/16869893/NY-B10-Farmer-Misc-WH-3-of-3-Fdr-111601-Newsweek-Interview-of-Scooter-Libby-476" target="_blank">White House transcript, interview of Scooter Libby by <i>Newsweek</i> magazine. White House, November 16, 2001</a>.
<br>[83] <a href="http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/po361.aspx" target="_blank">"Testimony of Paul H. O'Neill, Secretary of the Treasury, Before the Senate Committee on Appropriations."</a>Shoestringhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01534319150672667644noreply@blogger.com5tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2990970741097819876.post-69032110122212118522013-06-19T01:48:00.001-07:002013-06-19T01:48:38.210-07:00The CBS Drama Series That--With CIA Help--Predicted 9/11 and the Anthrax Attacks<br><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiB6p_BXArFS9gLbGE3rYIaBiLau-bm4WAp3pEvKcj4rxmZq7kxOYZDqhCTKUsKBEaGZfU8zT5vyKS9EpfToZsDTHBl2mBsNPQDAwZEmWPeBdY3Kjt7yNGwmtwaxsYhYFwU-5kFD9VdZEch/s1600/CIA_seal.jpg" target="_blank" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiB6p_BXArFS9gLbGE3rYIaBiLau-bm4WAp3pEvKcj4rxmZq7kxOYZDqhCTKUsKBEaGZfU8zT5vyKS9EpfToZsDTHBl2mBsNPQDAwZEmWPeBdY3Kjt7yNGwmtwaxsYhYFwU-5kFD9VdZEch/s1600/CIA_seal.jpg" alt="The CIA seal"/></a></div>
<br><i>The Agency</i>, a major CBS drama series about the CIA that began being broadcast in late September 2001, featured storylines with remarkable similarities to the 9/11 attacks and the anthrax attacks that occurred in the U.S. shortly after them. One of the show's executive producers said the parallels were so apparent that "people are asking me, 'Are we showing the bad guys our script?'" because "it seems like they're kind of following, in some ways, things that we're doing." [1] Significantly, these storylines were written before September 11, and the show was made with extensive assistance from the CIA. Some of the show's storylines, including those resembling 9/11 and the anthrax attacks, were actually suggested to one of the writers by the CIA. [2]
<br><br>News reports around the time <i>The Agency</i> was broadcast noted the similarity between the show's storylines and the horrifying events that had taken place in the U.S. No one suggested, however, that this similarity might have been the result of people having foreknowledge of the terrorist attacks that hit America in late 2001. But surely we need to look closer and consider whether some individuals, perhaps employees of the CIA, did indeed know about these attacks in advance and, for as yet unknown reasons, wanted episodes of <i>The Agency</i> to depict events similar to what was going to happen.
<br><br><b>SERIES WAS MADE WITH EXTENSIVE CIA ASSISTANCE</b>
<br><i>The Agency</i> was a prime-time TV series that told stories of life inside the CIA and showed agents tackling problems of national security. [3] The villains they faced included Arab terrorists, Colombian drug dealers, and Iraqis.
<br><br>The show featured well-known actors such as Gil Bellows, Will Patton, Ronny Cox, and Gloria Reuben. [4] Its principal executive producer was Wolfgang Petersen, who directed blockbuster movies including <i>Air Force One</i> and <i>In the Line of Fire</i>. [5]
<br><br>The CIA provided substantial support for <i>The Agency</i>. It vetted scripts and allowed its employees to be used as extras. <i>The Agency</i> was also the first television program permitted to film inside CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia. [6] There was even going to be a "big red carpet premiere" of the show's pilot episode at CIA headquarters the week before it aired on TV, on September 18, but the event was canceled because the CIA was busy responding to the 9/11 attacks. [7]
<br><br><b>UNUSED SCRIPT FEATURED PLANE HIJACKINGS</b>
<br>Three storylines written for <i>The Agency</i> are particularly notable. Two of these were made into episodes but one was never used.
<br><br>The storyline that was not used bore a striking resemblance to the events of September 11, when, according to the official story, Osama bin Laden had four U.S. aircraft hijacked. Michael Frost Beckner, the creator of <i>The Agency</i>, revealed to <i>Variety</i> magazine that four months before 9/11, he wrote an episode "in which bin Laden had three U.S. planes hijacked." The script, though, "was never completed." [8] An episode of <i>The Agency</i> based on this plot could plausibly have been produced between May 2001, when the script was written, and September 11, when it would have become unusable. But Beckner has not said why such an episode was never made.
<br><br>Beckner has revealed, however, that some storylines for <i>The Agency</i> were suggested to him by Chase Brandon, the CIA's entertainment liaison officer (who happens to be a cousin of Oscar-winning actor Tommy Lee Jones). [9] But Beckner has not said whether Brandon suggested to him the storyline about bin Laden having three American aircraft hijacked.
<br><br><b>PILOT EPISODE FEATURED A '9/11-TYPE EVENT' IN ENGLAND</b>
<br>The pilot episode of <i>The Agency</i> also had similarities to what happened on September 11. David Clennon, one of the show's stars, commented that the episode was "spooky" in that it anticipated "a 9/11-type event, only taking place in London." [10] The storyline, according to Beckner, who wrote the episode, "was based on the premise that bin Laden attacks the West and a war on terrorism invigorates the CIA." [11] Osama bin Laden's name is mentioned twice in the episode. [12] Author Tricia Jenkins commented that the timing of the pilot episode was also "eerie," as the episode was originally scheduled to air "just two weeks after 9/11," on September 27, 2001. [13]
<br><br>In the episode, it is revealed that the CIA has identified al-Qaeda as a threat, and has discovered that the terrorist group is planning to carry out a major attack in Europe. A CIA officer who infiltrated the group is able to provide the agency with the date of the planned attack, but this is only three days away. Agents then learn that the terrorists intend to bomb the Harrods department store in London, England--a target that one character describes as "an international symbol of consumerism." The CIA shares what it has learned with British intelligence officers and helps to avert the attack at the last minute. [14]
<br><br>As well as noting "the eerie coincidence of an attack on a 'symbol of capitalism,'" <i>Newsday</i> pointed out that the episode "inadvertently anticipated debates in the aftermath of the [9/11] attacks about how harsh and indiscriminate our response to the terrorists should be, and what more, if anything, our intelligence operatives should be empowered to do in the way of preventive defense. It also anticipated, at least allusively, the response of CIA champions ... who've said that our spies failed to detect the [9/11] attacks because their hands have been tied by civil libertarians who care more about being 'good guys' than winning." [15]
<br><br>The broadcast of the pilot episode on September 27 was canceled in response to the 9/11 attacks, with another episode of <i>The Agency</i> replacing it. [16] Gail Katz, one of the show's executive producers, commented around that time: "Our show seems to be too close to what's in the headlines. Too close, in fact, that ... it's not appropriate for viewing." The pilot episode finally went out on November 1, with all references to Osama bin Laden removed. [17]
<br><br><b>STORYLINE OF PILOT EPISODE CAME FROM THE CIA</b>
<br>Regarding the similarity between storylines of <i>The Agency</i> and real-world events, Bill Harlow, the CIA's chief spokesman, said there was "no magic" involved in the show's apparent ability "to predict the headlines." He claimed that "<i>The Agency</i> simply got lucky that the headlines intersected with its storylines so neatly." However, Beckner revealed that the plot of the pilot episode was one of several storylines suggested to him by Chase Brandon, the CIA's entertainment liaison officer. What this means, Tricia Jenkins has noted, is that it "originated from the CIA." [18]
<br><br>Beckner said he wrote the episode "over a year before 9/11," presumably meaning around summer 2000. [19] He worked with Brandon to develop the script, and sent early drafts to Brandon. [20] "I made some comments and he made some changes," Brandon has said. [21]
<br><br>Beckner also said the similarity between the storyline of the pilot episode of <i>The Agency</i> and what happened on September 11 was because, during his career as a writer, he had done "a lot of back and forth with the CIA," and, he said, "The CIA would let in anyone, including a little writer like me, to hear that al-Qaeda and bin Laden are going to attack us." [22]
<br><br><b>CBS 'HAD NO IDEA' ABOUT BIN LADEN BEFORE 9/11</b>
<br>When we consider the two storylines for <i>The Agency</i> described above--that of the pilot episode and the unused plot about three American aircraft being hijacked--it is worth noting that, before September 11, Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda were unusual choices as villains for a major television series, since they only became well known among the public after 9/11.
<br><br>Beckner in fact recalled that when he first presented his script for the pilot episode to CBS, the network "had no idea about bin Laden or al-Qaeda." On another occasion before September 11, CBS told Beckner: "This al-Qaeda thing, you've got to get off that. No one is interested. Trust us." [23] In light of the general lack of awareness of al-Qaeda at the time, therefore, it would be surprising if it was simply a coincidence that, before 9/11, Beckner was already writing storylines about attacks committed by bin Laden and his terrorist group.
<br><br><b>EPISODE FEATURED PLANNED ANTHRAX ATTACK IN THE U.S.</b>
<br>While two of <i>The Agency</i>'s storylines had similarities to what happened on September 11, another storyline is notable because it involved a planned terrorist attack in the U.S. using anthrax, and because, at the time the episode with this storyline was originally going to be broadcast, the U.S. was actually in the middle of a series of anthrax attacks.
<br><br>The episode, titled "A Slight Case of Anthrax," featured a German terrorist who had obtained the type of anthrax that the U.S. developed and sold to Iraq when it was an ally. The terrorist has already committed an attack in Belgium using the anthrax. The CIA discovers his identity and finds that he intends to carry out his next attack in Washington, DC, using a crop duster plane to spray the deadly disease. CIA agents then hurry to stop the man in his tracks. [24]
<br><br>Originally, al-Qaeda was going to be behind the fictitious anthrax attacks. But after CBS objected, the storyline was changed so that it involved "Iraqis making an anthrax attack through German terrorist proxies." [25]
<br><br>The episode, filmed in August 2001, was set to be broadcast on October 11, 2001, but had to be rescheduled because President Bush decided to hold a news conference that evening. It was then set to air on October 18, but was canceled because it was deemed inappropriate in light of the real-world anthrax attacks talking place. At that time, anthrax had been discovered in three states and the District of Columbia; at least 13 people either had the disease or had been exposed to its spores, and one person had died. [26] The episode finally aired on November 8. [27]
<br><br>Significantly, Michael Frost Beckner, who wrote "A Slight Case of Anthrax," revealed that the episode's storyline was another one of the plots suggested to him by Chase Brandon. This means that the storyline originated with the CIA. [28]
<br><br>Considering that storylines written for <i>The Agency</i> appear to have predicted terrorist attacks that took place in the U.S., it is worth noting that the CIA's cooperation with the show included reviewing scripts. The CIA would presumably therefore have seen the scripts for "A Slight Case of Anthrax" and the pilot episode before the episodes were filmed. It would certainly be worth discovering how the agency responded to these scripts. Whether the CIA also saw the script about Osama bin Laden having three American aircraft hijacked, and, if so, how it responded, is unknown.
<br><br><b>SERIES WAS 'TIMELY' BECAUSE THE PUBLIC NEEDED 'A SENSE OF REASSURANCE'</b>
<br>The fact that a major TV series with storylines about terrorists and the CIA's efforts to tackle them was ready to air within weeks of 9/11, when terrorism suddenly became a major concern, seems a remarkable coincidence.
<br><br>When members of the press were shown the pilot episode of <i>The Agency</i> before September 11, their "big question," according to Michael Frost Beckner, was, "Who would want to make a television series about the CIA?" [29] At that time, according to Tricia Jenkins, "the CIA was suffering from attrition, Congressional attacks, and a lack of strong public support." But, as Jenkins noted, <i>The Agency</i> subsequently turned out to be particularly "timely ... both in terms of the show's ripped-from-the-headlines plotlines and the CIA's need to deflect the sharp criticisms aimed at the organization in the immediate aftermath of 9/11." [30]
<br><br>Shortly after September 11, Chase Brandon similarly commented that "a show like <i>The Agency</i> couldn't be more timely." This, he said, was because, "Right now, the American public needs a sense of reassurance." [31] Indeed, CBS ran promos for the show in which the voiceover stated, "Now, more than ever, America needs the unsung heroes of <i>The Agency</i>." [32] Brandon added that as a result of the 9/11 attacks, "Our whole national consciousness is going to change, and I think a responsible film or TV episode about the agency, even one that weaves elements of terrorism into the storyline, can show the magnitude of what's at stake." [33]
<br><br>A question to consider is whether it was just a coincidence that <i>The Agency</i> was ready to be broadcast just after September 11, when the American public needed to learn "the magnitude of what's at stake" and get "a sense of reassurance." Or could the show's timing have come about because some people in positions that enabled them to influence what programs a TV network produced had foreknowledge of 9/11 and the "war on terror" it would initiate? They therefore wanted programs made that would immediately be ready to fit in with the new reality that would emerge after September 11.
<br><br><b>STORYLINES INDICATE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF TERRORIST ATTACKS</b>
<br>Likewise, could the resemblance of some of <i>The Agency</i>'s storylines to 9/11 and the anthrax attacks in the U.S. have been the result of people having foreknowledge of these events?
<br><br>CNN suggested that the similarity was because the producers and writers of <i>The Agency</i> "read intelligence manuals, pull from actual CIA cases, and confer at length with the show's consultant, retired [CIA] operative Bazzel Baz." [34] However, Michael Frost Beckner revealed that these storylines were suggested to him by the CIA, via its entertainment liaison officer. This surely indicates that some people at the CIA had foreknowledge of 9/11 and the anthrax attacks.
<br><br>This issue should clearly be examined as part of a new investigation of 9/11. That investigation would need to find out what was known, and who knew it.
<br><br><b>NOTES</b>
<br>[1] <a href="http://www.cnn.com/CNN/Programs/showbiz.today/featured.story/0110/31.html" target="_blank">Lauren Hunter, "'The Agency' Finds Art a Little Too Close to Reality." CNN, October 31, 2001</a>.
<br>[2] Tricia Jenkins, <i>The CIA in Hollywood: How the Agency Shapes Film and Television</i>. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2012, pp. 55, 65-66.
<br>[3] <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/06/us/cameras-are-being-turned-on-a-once-shy-spy-agency.html" target="_blank">Elaine Sciolino, "Cameras Are Being Turned on a Once-Shy Spy Agency." <i>New York Times</i>, May 6, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/film/2001/oct/05/artsfeatures" target="_blank">John Patterson, "The Caring, Sharing CIA." <i>The Guardian</i>, October 5, 2001</a>.
<br>[4] <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/sep/06/media.filmnews" target="_blank">Duncan Campbell, "Hollywood Helps CIA Come in From the Cold." <i>The Guardian</i>, September 6, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/29/arts/critic-s-notebook-two-new-spy-series-at-unexpected-risk.html" target="_blank">Julie Salamon, "Two New Spy Series at Unexpected Risk." <i>New York Times</i>, September 29, 2001</a>.
<br>[5] <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20011005123425/http:/www.dallasnews.com/entertainment/columnists/edbark/480674_agency_27liv.A.html" target="_blank">Ed Bark, "CBS' 'The Agency' Skips Terror-Themed Episode." <i>Dallas Morning News</i>, September 27, 2001</a>.
<br>[6] <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/26/opinion/editorial-observer-making-over-the-central-intelligence-agency.html" target="_blank">Philip Taubman, "Making Over the Central Intelligence Agency." <i>New York Times</i>, August 26, 2001</a>; Tricia Jenkins, <i>The CIA in Hollywood</i>, p. 56.
<br>[7] <a href="http://www.angelfire.com/celeb/dcassidyfan/sep2001brief.html" target="_blank">Brooks Boliek, "CIA Calls off 'Agency' Plan." <i>Hollywood Reporter</i>, September 17, 2001</a>; <a href="http://library.constantcontact.com/download/get/file/1103935397483-725/vol+20+no+5.pdf" target="_blank">Ed Rampell, "Hollywood's Year of Living Clandestinely." <i>CounterPunch</i>, May 2013</a>.
<br>[8] <a href="http://variety.com/2001/film/news/art-imitates-life-sort-of-1117856120/" target="_blank">Army Archerd, "Art Imitates Life, Sort Of." <i>Variety</i>, November 20, 2001</a>.
<br>[9] Tricia Jenkins, <i>The CIA in Hollywood</i>, pp. 65-66.
<br>[10] <a href="http://library.constantcontact.com/download/get/file/1103935397483-725/vol+20+no+5.pdf" target="_blank">Ed Rampell, "Hollywood's Year of Living Clandestinely."</a>
<br>[11] Tricia Jenkins, <i>The CIA in Hollywood</i>, p. 66.
<br>[12] <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20011005123425/http:/www.dallasnews.com/entertainment/columnists/edbark/480674_agency_27liv.A.html" target="_blank">Ed Bark, "CBS' 'The Agency' Skips Terror-Themed Episode."</a>
<br>[13] Tricia Jenkins, <i>The CIA in Hollywood</i>, p. 63.
<br>[14] <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/29/arts/critic-s-notebook-two-new-spy-series-at-unexpected-risk.html" target="_blank">Julie Salamon, "Two New Spy Series at Unexpected Risk"</a>; Tricia Jenkins, <i>The CIA in Hollywood</i>, pp. 62-63; <a href="http://library.constantcontact.com/download/get/file/1103935397483-725/vol+20+no+5.pdf" target="_blank">Ed Rampell, "Hollywood's Year of Living Clandestinely."</a>
<br>[15] <a href="http://www.newsday.com/entertainment/fanfare/television-bad-timing-three-new-spy-themed-series-also-may-end-up-victims-of-the-terrorist-attacks-on-the-world-trade-center-and-pentagon-1.788538" target="_blank">Noel Holston, "Three New Spy-Themed Series Also May End up Victims of the Terrorist Attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon." <i>Newsday</i>, September 22, 2001</a>.
<br>[16] <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/29/arts/critic-s-notebook-two-new-spy-series-at-unexpected-risk.html" target="_blank">Julie Salamon, "Two New Spy Series at Unexpected Risk."</a>
<br>[17] <a href="http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2001-10-25/lifestyle/0110240308_1_pilot-cable-air" target="_blank">"Reworked Agency Pilot to Air Nov. 1 on CBS." <i>South Florida Sun Sentinel</i>, October 25, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.cnn.com/CNN/Programs/showbiz.today/featured.story/0110/31.html" target="_blank">Lauren Hunter, "'The Agency' Finds Art a Little Too Close to Reality."</a>
<br>[18] Tricia Jenkins, <i>The CIA in Hollywood</i>, pp. 66-67.
<br>[19] <a href="http://hollywoodhealthandsociety.org/sites/default/files/panel-discussions/Bio-Terrorism.pdf" target="_blank">"Critical Issues in Writing About Bioterrorism." Hollywood, Health & Society, April 2, 2002</a>.
<br>[20] Tricia Jenkins, <i>The CIA in Hollywood</i>, p. 56.
<br>[21] <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/sep/06/media.filmnews" target="_blank">Duncan Campbell, "Hollywood Helps CIA Come in From the Cold."</a>
<br>[22] <a href="http://hollywoodhealthandsociety.org/sites/default/files/panel-discussions/Bio-Terrorism.pdf" target="_blank">"Critical Issues in Writing About Bioterrorism."</a>
<br>[23] Ibid.
<br>[24] <a href="http://www.sptimes.com/News/102901/Floridian/Leave_attacks__afterm.shtml" target="_blank">Eric Deggans, "Leave Attacks' Aftermath to Real Life." <i>St. Petersburg Times</i>, October 29, 2001</a>; <a href="http://uk.eonline.com/news/42409/anthrax-shows-up-for-sweeps" target="_blank">Bridget Byrne, "'Anthrax' Shows up for Sweeps." E! Online, November 2, 2001</a>; <a href="http://www.people.com/people/article/0,,622900,00.html" target="_blank">Stephen M. Silverman, "Fictional Anthrax Hits 'The Agency.'" <i>People</i>, November 6, 2001</a>; Tricia Jenkins, <i>The CIA in Hollywood</i>, p. 68.
<br>[25] <a href="http://hollywoodhealthandsociety.org/sites/default/files/panel-discussions/Bio-Terrorism.pdf" target="_blank">"Critical Issues in Writing About Bioterrorism."</a>
<br>[26] <a href="http://www2.ljworld.com/news/2001/oct/17/cbs_pulls_anthrax/" target="_blank">"CBS Pulls Anthrax Episode of CIA Drama 'The Agency.'" Associated Press, October 17, 2001</a>; <a href="http://uk.eonline.com/news/42409/anthrax-shows-up-for-sweeps" target="_blank">Bridget Byrne, "'Anthrax' Shows up for Sweeps."</a>
<br>[27] <a href="http://www.people.com/people/article/0,,622900,00.html" target="_blank">Stephen M. Silverman, "Fictional Anthrax Hits 'The Agency.'"</a>
<br>[28] Tricia Jenkins, <i>The CIA in Hollywood</i>, p. 66.
<br>[29] <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/10/movies/the-moods-they-are-a-changing-in-films-terrorism-is-making-government-look-good.html" target="_blank">Bernard Weinraub, "The Moods They Are a'Changing in Films; Terrorism is Making Government Look Good." <i>New York Times</i>, October 10, 2001</a>.
<br>[30] Tricia Jenkins, <i>The CIA in Hollywood</i>, pp. 55, 61.
<br>[31] <a href="http://articles.latimes.com/2001/sep/29/entertainment/ca-51174" target="_blank">Patrick Goldstein, "The CIA Spins Itself." <i>Los Angeles Times</i>, September 29, 2001</a>.
<br>[32] <a href="http://articles.latimes.com/2001/oct/02/entertainment/ca-52219" target="_blank">Brian Lowry, "TV Viewers Flock to What is Familiar." <i>Los Angeles Times</i>, October 2, 2001</a>.
<br>[33] <a href="http://articles.latimes.com/2001/sep/29/entertainment/ca-51174" target="_blank">Patrick Goldstein, "The CIA Spins Itself."</a>
<br>[34] <a href="http://www.cnn.com/CNN/Programs/showbiz.today/featured.story/0110/31.html" target="_blank">Lauren Hunter, "'The Agency' Finds Art a Little Too Close to Reality."</a>Shoestringhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01534319150672667644noreply@blogger.com0