The Mystery of the Helicopter Flying Around the Pentagon Before the Attack There on 9/11

A mysterious helicopter was seen flying near the Pentagon in the minutes before the attack there on September 11, 2001. Several witnesses have described seeing the helicopter, which circled the Pentagon and then apparently landed for a brief period on the helipad, near where the building was subsequently hit. It then flew off very shortly before the attack took place. And yet there has never been any public acknowledgement of this incident, or any official explanation of what the helicopter was doing at the Pentagon at that time.

While interviewing one of the witnesses to the incident, however, a Navy historian revealed that the helicopter belonged to the United States Park Police, and, the historian said, had been instructed to intercept the aircraft that was on a crash-course for the Pentagon.

Official accounts have claimed that Park Police helicopters only took to the air after the Pentagon was hit, to provide assistance in response to the attack. However, evidence casts doubt on this version of events. A woman who was dating one of the Park Police helicopter pilots has written an account of her experiences on September 11, which clearly supports the contention that the helicopters took off before the Pentagon attack occurred. And there are several contradictions between the various accounts describing the official narrative, indicating this narrative may, at least partly, have been fabricated. Furthermore, it appears there could have been a deliberate attempt to cover up the true details of what happened. The Navy historian in fact told the eyewitness he interviewed: "Don't tell anyone about that story. ... We don't want the press to get this."

WITNESSES SAW HELICOPTER BY THE PENTAGON
Several individuals have recalled seeing a helicopter flying near the Pentagon just before the attack there on September 11. Shortly after the attack occurred, a senior Air Force officer at the Pentagon told CNN's Chris Plante that he had seen "a helicopter circle the building," which had "disappeared behind the building where the helicopter landing zone is ... and he then saw [a] fireball go into the sky" when the Pentagon was hit. [1] Jennifer Reichert had been stuck in traffic on the road in front of the Pentagon. She described that "a helicopter [took] off from the heliport at the Pentagon." Then, "Minutes--maybe seconds--later," she heard the aircraft coming toward the Pentagon and then felt the explosion of the crash. [2]

Jeffrey Mark Parsons, an assistant chief patrol agent with the United States Border Patrol, saw the helicopter from a window on the 17th floor of his hotel, the Marriott Residence Inn in Arlington. Two or three minutes before the Pentagon was hit, Parsons recalled, he saw a blue and white helicopter flying in at "a weird angle" and circling "between the hotel and the Pentagon, going toward the landing pad [at the Pentagon] where that airliner ultimately hit." Parsons said he thought the helicopter "landed on the pad." He recognized the helicopter as a Huey from the noise it made, as he had flown Hueys and knew they made "a very distinct sound." [3]

HELICOPTER BELONGED TO THE PARK POLICE
The identity of this helicopter was revealed by John Darrell Sherwood, a Navy historian who interviewed Parsons about the incident. The helicopter's pilot had previously described what happened to a Marine Corps historian who was a colleague of Sherwood's. According to Sherwood, the helicopter was a Huey belonging to the Park Police that "had been directed to try to intercept that airline" that subsequently hit the Pentagon. The helicopter had been "in the area" of the Pentagon, when the pilot received a call telling him, "Try to intercept this plane, try to distract the plane, try to do something to, you know, prevent the plane from going into the Pentagon." The helicopter had then gone "to try to distract" the approaching aircraft. Although the helicopter had flown away from the Pentagon before the building was hit, its pilot "saw the plane go in, and then the next thing he started doing is medevacing people out of there," according to Sherwood. [4]

The Park Police Aviation Unit is located in Anacostia Park in southeast Washington, DC, across the Potomac River from the Pentagon. It has two Bell 412 helicopters, which are a modern version of the Huey. [5] These helicopters are colored blue and white, like the helicopter Parsons described. [6] The aviation unit's missions include the provision of aviation support for law enforcement, medical evacuation ("medevac"), search and rescue, and presidential and dignitary security. [7]

HELICOPTERS TOLD TO RESPOND TO PLANE HEADING FOR WASHINGTON
Sherwood's claim that at least one of the Park Police Aviation Unit's Hueys was launched prior to the attack on the Pentagon, and was instructed to intercept an approaching aircraft, has been supported by the account of Stephanie Hughes, a nurse at Johns Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore. At the time of the 9/11 attacks, Hughes was dating Sergeant Keith Bohn, one of the Park Police's helicopter pilots.

On her personal blog, Hughes has written that on the morning of September 11, she was driving to the aviation unit to meet Bohn for a late breakfast after he finished work, having just been on the night shift. On the way, she heard reports on the radio about the first plane crashing into the World Trade Center. When she arrived at the unit, she saw its two helicopters taking off, but assumed that Bohn, having completed his shift, was not flying in either of them.

But, Hughes recalled, "When I got inside the hangar, he was not there." The only person around was the aircraft maintenance technician, who told Hughes that the unit had "just got a call to respond to the White House, that a plane was headed to Washington, DC, and that they were to go airborne." Bohn had left Hughes "a quickly scribbled note" that said, "Got called into the air, there is another plane headed this way, go home and wait for me to call." This clearly appears to have been before the Pentagon was hit. At that time, Hughes recalled, "CNN was on the TV and it was showing video of the World Trade Center." As she headed home, Hughes called her mother and sister, "to tell them what was going on, in case I was the only non-police person who knew a plane was headed to Washington, DC." After she arrived home, Hughes was "glued to the TV, and it was then [that] the Pentagon was being identified as being hit." [8]

However, official accounts told a different story to this. They made no mention of Park Police helicopters taking off to intercept a plane heading toward Washington, or flying around the Pentagon before it was attacked. Instead, these accounts claimed that the aviation unit only launched its helicopters after the Pentagon was hit.

AVIATION UNIT RESPONDED TO THE PENTAGON ATTACK
The morning of September 11, the Park Police Aviation Unit was holding a large training event, in preparation for the upcoming meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in Washington. [9] Personnel there learned of the first attack in New York from television reports, but initially thought it was an accident. But when they saw the live coverage of the second plane hitting the WTC at 9:03 a.m., they realized it was a deliberate attack. [10]

Shortly after 9:37 a.m., when the Pentagon was hit, the aviation unit's "aircraft crash phone" started to ring. The crash phone is a direct communications line from the control tower at Washington's Reagan National Airport, which enables the aviation unit to respond quickly to incidents at the airport. Sergeant Ronald Galey, one of the unit's helicopter pilots, has said that he answered the call. The caller alerted the unit to the crash. [11]

According to official accounts, the Park Police Aviation Unit then became one of the first agencies to respond to the attack on the Pentagon. Its two Hueys were quickly prepared for takeoff, and then launched and arrived at the Pentagon within minutes. [12]

One of the helicopters, which has the call sign "Eagle I," was piloted by Galey. Also onboard were rescue technician Sergeant John Marsh and rescue team officer John Dillon. Flying in the other helicopter, "Eagle II," were Bohn and his copilot, Sergeant Kenneth Burchell, along with the aviation unit commander Lieutenant Philip Cholak and assistant commander Sergeant Bernard Stasulli, and two Defense Department medics who had been attending the training event: Keith Kettell and Jason Kepp. [13]

Eagle I reached the Pentagon within four minutes of the unit receiving the alert and Eagle II arrived two minutes later, according to Rotor & Wing magazine. [14] Upon arrival at the Pentagon, Eagle II landed to conduct medical evacuations while Eagle I circled overhead. [15]

That the Park Police helicopters were at the Pentagon after the attack there is beyond doubt. They were caught on film and witnessed by reporters. For example, at 9:48 a.m., CNN's Chris Plante reported from the Pentagon, "There is a Park Police helicopter overhead." [16] And at 10:11 a.m., Dave Statter of CBS affiliate Channel 9 reported that medics at the Pentagon were taking a man suffering burn injuries "to the U.S. Park Police Eagle helicopter. ... The Eagle helicopter from [the] Park Police is landing, taking this man to the hospital." [17] Accounts only conflict over whether at least one of these helicopters had also been flying near the Pentagon in the minutes before the attack.

A POSSIBLE COVER-UP
Although official accounts have made no mention of a Park Police helicopter flying near the Pentagon before it was attacked, or being instructed to intercept a hostile aircraft approaching Washington, it is possible that this is because attempts have been made to suppress this information.

Supporting this contention is the fact that after Jeffrey Mark Parsons recalled seeing the helicopter during his interview with John Darrell Sherwood, and after Sherwood then revealed that the helicopter belonged to the Park Police, Sherwood told Parsons to keep quiet about the incident. He said: "Don't tell anyone about that story because that's one of our, I think that's one of the best stories that's going to come out of this. We don't want the press to get this."

Sherwood also seemed uncomfortable about answering why the helicopter was flying near the Pentagon before the attack. After Sherwood explained that the helicopter's pilot had been instructed to try and intercept the aircraft that subsequently hit the Pentagon, Parsons asked him, "Then they knew it was headed toward the Pentagon before it actually hit the Pentagon, then?" Sherwood immediately changed the subject and talked about a fighter jet that had been flying in from North Carolina. Finally, he said, "So, I guess that helicopter swung around, but, by the time he got around the plane was already into the building." [18]

CONTRADICTIONS IN OFFICIAL ACCOUNTS
Casting doubt on the official narrative is the fact that there are a number of contradictions in the various accounts in which that narrative has been put forward. For example, as previously mentioned, Ronald Galey has claimed he was still on the ground at the aviation unit at the time the Pentagon was hit, and he was therefore able to answer the call on the aircraft crash phone in which the crash was reported. [19] However, Galey has given conflicting accounts about what the air traffic controller at Reagan Airport, David Walsh, supposedly told him in the call. [20]

In November 2001, Galey recalled Walsh saying, "We have a 757 down somewhere in the vicinity of the 14th Street Bridge," which goes over the Potomac River, near the Pentagon. [21] Later that month, Galey gave a slightly different account, recalling that Walsh said the control tower had "lost a 757 somewhere in the vicinity of the Pentagon." [22] But in January 2002, Galey said that Walsh specifically mentioned a plane hitting the Pentagon. Walsh supposedly said that "they had a 757 go into the Pentagon and they needed us to respond to the incident." [23]

And then, later that year, Galey gave a very different account. He recalled Walsh saying, "We have a 757 down on the north end of the airport," referring to Reagan Airport, which is about a mile away from the Pentagon. [24] Galey's fellow pilot, Keith Bohn, had earlier given a similar account. In November 2001, he said that in the initial phone call the aviation unit received about the attack, it was told there was "an aircraft down at the end of the runway at National Airport." [25]

A possible explanation for these conflicting accounts is that Galey had taken off before the Pentagon attack took place and therefore did not answer the call on the aircraft crash phone. Perhaps because he was ordered to keep quiet about his actual experiences from that time, Galey had been uncertain over what he should say instead, and so gave differing accounts when interviewed.

CONFLICTING DESCRIPTIONS OF TAKEOFFS
Also casting doubt on the accuracy of the official narrative is the fact that there have been conflicting accounts of which of the Park Police Aviation Unit's Hueys took off first, and how long it took for the two helicopters to launch after the unit was called about the crash.

According to most accounts, Eagle I was the first of the helicopters to take off. [26] Eagle II reportedly took longer to prepare for takeoff, as a few minutes were required to install a mass casualty kit, which would allow it to carry four patients instead of two, and so it took off after Eagle I. [27] However, a couple of months after 9/11, Galey said in an interview that Eagle II in fact took off first, while Eagle I, which he had been piloting, "launched right after." [28]

According to National Park Service reports, Eagle I took off less than two minutes after the aviation unit received the alert over the crash phone and Eagle II followed it about a minute later. [29] However, the Arlington County After-Action Report on the emergency response to the Pentagon attack stated that Eagle I took off at "approximately 9:43 a.m.," five or six minutes after the attack occurred, and "Eagle II launched eight minutes later at 9:51 a.m." [30]

A possible reason for these conflicting accounts is that the Park Police helicopters took off earlier than was being claimed, but the unit's personnel had been told to keep quiet about this. Those personnel may have been uncertain about what they should instead be saying publicly, and so their false accounts of the order of events sometimes contradicted each other.

AVIATION UNIT DECIDED TO 'GET READY' AFTER SECOND WTC ATTACK
There is an additional problem with the official narrative of the Park Police Aviation Unit's actions on September 11. As previously mentioned, when personnel at the unit saw the live television coverage of the second plane hitting the WTC, they immediately realized it was a deliberate attack. At that point, according to Galey, "We just started talking, 'Hey, we'd better get ready.'" Also, Galey has recalled, "we started some further discussion as to what other potential targets might be." [31]

Galey said that when the Pentagon was hit, at 9:37 a.m., he "heard a tremendous explosion" and then saw smoke rising from the vicinity of the Pentagon. [32] He claimed he did not realize the smoke was coming specifically from the Pentagon, only from "some military installation over there." All the same, Galey said, when aviation unit personnel heard the explosion, "We just knew what it was." He said, "I mean we've all been expecting something like this, for an attack of some sort." [33]

And yet, according to the official narrative, the Park Police's two Hueys did not take off to defend potential targets in Washington, or at least keep watch for any approaching hostile aircraft, in the 34 minutes between the second attack in New York and the attack on the Pentagon. This in spite of the fact that the unit's personnel had been "expecting something like" the Pentagon attack to happen, and had decided, "we'd better get ready," right after seeing the second WTC tower being hit on television.

WHY WAS A HELICOPTER FLYING NEAR THE PENTAGON?
As we can see, there is clear evidence that one of the Park Police's helicopters was flying close to the Pentagon, and possibly landing there briefly, very shortly before the attack there took place, and that attempts have been made to suppress this fact.

This leads to important questions that have so far been unaddressed. If, as John Darrell Sherwood and Stephanie Hughes indicated, one, or both, of the Park Police's helicopters were ordered to intercept the suspicious aircraft that was approaching Washington, who issued that order? And why did the helicopter fly away from the Pentagon before the attack there? Might there have been a different reason why the helicopter was flying near the Pentagon? If so, what was it?

Also, why has there been no official acknowledgement of the helicopter's presence near the Pentagon just before the attack there? No official explanation has been put forward as to what the helicopter was doing. And yet surely the authorities would have wanted to publicize what was apparently a courageous attempt at defending the Pentagon from the imminent attack? Why, then, does it appear that there has been a cover-up of this incident?

Clearly, this matter should be investigated further. To begin with, records pertaining to it need to be made public. These would include any unreleased transcripts and recordings of interviews with the relevant individuals, such as Park Police Aviation Unit personnel, the person who ordered the helicopter toward the Pentagon, and additional witnesses who saw the helicopter near the Pentagon. Pilots, crew members, and others connected with the aviation unit could also now be re-interviewed about their experiences on 9/11.

Logs and other records from the aviation unit might also clarify what happened. And the U.S. government reportedly has around 80 unreleased video tapes relating to the Pentagon attack. [34] If these were made public, perhaps one or more of them would show the helicopter and reveal exactly when it first arrived at the Pentagon.

As well as casting light on the mystery of the helicopter flying around the Pentagon, these records might reveal other important details relating to the Pentagon attack. Such information would surely take us closer to knowing the truth about 9/11.

NOTES
[1] "Terrorism Strikes in the United States in a Massive Attack." Breaking News, CNN, September 11, 2001.
[2] "'A Constant Reminder.'" Washington Post, September 5, 2002.
[3] Jeffrey Mark Parsons, interview by John Darrell Sherwood. U.S. Naval Historical Center, December 13, 2001.
[4] Ibid. Although there is no mention of the name of the historian who interviewed Parsons in the transcript of the interview, the fact that Sherwood was the interviewer was revealed in Alfred Goldberg et al., Pentagon 9/11. Washington, DC: Defense Department, Office of the Secretary, Historical Office, 2007, p. 258.
[5] Bill Wagstaff, "Aeromed Helos Find Little to do but Grieve." Aviation International News, October 1, 2001; Mark Forror, "Compassion Under Fire." Rotor & Wing, November 2001; "Aviation Unit." United States Park Police, n.d.
[6] Janet A. McDonnell, National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks. Washington, DC: National Park Service, 2004, p. 24.
[7] "Aviation Unit."
[8] Stephanie Hughes, "Where Were You on 9/11?" A Ditchin' Time Quilts, September 11, 2010.
[9] Keith Bohn, interview by Gary Solis. U.S. Naval Historical Center, November 19, 2001; Janet A. McDonnell, National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks, pp. 18-20.
[10] Ronald Alan Galey, interview by Gary Hall et al. U.S. Naval Historical Center, November 20, 2001; Ron Galey, interview by Mark Schoepfle. National Park Service, January 17, 2002.
[11] Ron Galey, interview by Mark Schoepfle; Janet A. McDonnell, National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks, p. 20.
[12] Ron Galey, interview by Mark Schoepfle; Alfred Goldberg et al., Pentagon 9/11, pp. 161-162.
[13] U.S. Congress. House. Commemorative Joint Meeting of the Congress of the United States in Remembrance of the Victims and Heroes of September 11, 2001. 107th Cong., 2nd sess., September 11, 2002; Bill Line, "National Capital Region Contributes to September 11th Help Efforts." National Park Service, September 21, 2002; Janet A. McDonnell, National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks, p. 20.
[14] Mark Forror, "Compassion Under Fire."
[15] Janet A. McDonnell, National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks, pp. 20-21.
[16] CNN, September 11, 2001.
[17] CBS 9, September 11, 2001.
[18] Jeffrey Mark Parsons, interview by John Darrell Sherwood.
[19] Ron Galey, interview by Mark Schoepfle.
[20] Air Traffic Division Event Summary. Federal Aviation Administration, September 18, 2001.
[21] Mark Forror, "Compassion Under Fire."
[22] Ronald Alan Galey, interview by Gary Hall et al.
[23] Ron Galey, interview by Mark Schoepfle.
[24] Bill Line, "National Capital Region Contributes to September 11th Help Efforts."
[25] Keith Bohn, interview by Gary Solis.
[26] Ibid.; U.S. Congress. House. Commemorative Joint Meeting of the Congress of the United States in Remembrance of the Victims and Heroes of September 11, 2001; "Helicopter Crews Were First on Scene Sept. 11." NBC 4, September 11, 2003.
[27] Janet A. McDonnell, National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks, p. 20.
[28] Ronald Alan Galey, interview by Gary Hall et al.
[29] Bill Line, "National Capital Region Contributes to September 11th Help Efforts"; "9.11.01 Remembrance: Washington DC Area." National Park Service, October 22, 2002.
[30] Arlington County, Virginia, report, Titan Systems Corp., Arlington County: After-Action Report on the Response to the September 11 Terrorist Attack on the Pentagon. 2002, p. A-45.
[31] Ronald Alan Galey, interview by Gary Hall et al.; Ron Galey, interview by Mark Schoepfle.
[32] Ron Galey, interview by Mark Schoepfle; Janet A. McDonnell, National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks, p. 20.
[33] Ronald Alan Galey, interview by Gary Hall et al.; "Helicopter Crews Were First on Scene Sept. 11."
[34] "The Stories Behind the Stories." On the Story, CNN, May 20, 2006.

The Many False Hijackings of 9/11

"There were a number of false reports out there. What
was valid? What was a guess? We just didn't know."

- Colonel Robert Marr, battle commander at
NORAD's Northeast Air Defense Sector on 9/11

Although it has been widely reported that four commercial aircraft were hijacked over the United States on September 11, 2001, what is less well known is that while the terrorist attacks were taking place and for many hours after, numerous additional aircraft gave indications that they had been hijacked or, for other reasons, were singled out as potential emergencies. More than 20 aircraft were identified as possible hijackings, according to some accounts, and other aircraft displayed signs of emergencies, such as losing radio communication with air traffic controllers or transmitting a distress signal.

Reports about these false alarms have revealed extraordinary circumstances around some of the incidents and bizarre explanations for how they arose. For example, it has been claimed that the pilots of one foreign aircraft approaching the U.S. set their plane's transponder to transmit a code signaling they had been hijacked simply to show authorities that they were aware of what had been taking place in America that morning. [1] Another aircraft reported as transmitting a distress signal while approaching the U.S. was subsequently found to have been canceled, and still at the airport. [2]

There may be innocent explanations for some of the less serious false alarms, such as those simply involving the temporary loss of radio communication with the plane, which is a common occurrence and happens on a daily basis. [3] But, viewed in its entirety, the evidence appears highly suspicious and raises serious questions. Why, for example, were there so many false alarms on September 11? Why did so many of them involve false reports of hijackings or aircraft falsely signaling that they had been hijacked? The details of specific incidents that have been reported, which I describe below, show that these false alarms must have been something more than just the results of confusion caused by the terrorist attacks.

MILITARY EXERCISES INCLUDED SIMULATED HIJACKINGS
One possibility to consider is that some of the false alarms related to training exercises taking place on September 11. There is evidence supporting this contention. For example, shortly after 9/11, the New Yorker reported, "During the last several years, the government regularly planned for and simulated terrorist attacks, including scenarios that involved multiple plane hijackings." [4] And we know that the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), the military organization responsible for defending U.S. airspace, was in the middle of a major exercise called Vigilant Guardian on September 11. [5] This exercise is known to have been scheduled to include at least one simulated plane hijacking on the morning of 9/11. [6] And in the week before 9/11, it included at least four simulated plane hijackings. [7]

The possibility that these false alarms were deliberate and intended to fulfill a sinister purpose needs to be seriously examined. Were they coordinated and pre-planned by rogue insiders working in the military and other U.S. government agencies, so as to ensure the attacks succeeded?

Were the false alarms that occurred at the same time as the attacks intended to cause confusion, and divert personnel and resources, thereby impairing the emergency response to the attacks? Colonel Robert Marr, the battle commander at NORAD's Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) on 9/11, has indicated that this is what they achieved. He recalled: "There were a number of false reports out there. What was valid? What was a guess? We just didn't know." Major General Larry Arnold, the commander of the Continental United States NORAD Region (CONR) on 9/11, similarly recalled, "A number of aircraft [were] being called possibly hijacked ... there was a lot of confusion, as you can imagine." [8]

And were the false alarms that occurred after the attacks ended intended to prevent principled and honest military or government employees from promptly assessing what had happened, and determining how, against the odds, the attacks had succeeded? As Vanity Fair reported, tape recordings of the operations floor at NEADS reveal that "there was no sense that the attack was over with the crash of United 93," the last of the four hijacked aircraft. Instead, "the alarms go on and on. False reports of hijackings, and real responses, continue well into the afternoon. ... The fighter pilots over New York and DC (and later Boston and Chicago) would spend hours darting around their respective skylines intercepting hundreds of aircraft they deemed suspicious. ... No one at NEADS would go home until late on the night of the 11th." [9]

By tying up personnel, the false alarms could also have prevented anyone from making public information that contradicted the official 9/11 story that was being put out, and that would raise questions about who was actually responsible for the attacks. By the time a person with such information was free to reveal it, after the crisis calmed down, the official story would already have been extensively promoted to the public and generally accepted as true, and so it would be too late to effectively disclose information that would cast serious doubt on that account.

UP TO 29 PLANES REPORTED AS HIJACKED
Several accounts have indicated the large number of false alarms that occurred on September 11. For example, sometime between the attack on the Pentagon and the crash of Flight 93 in rural Pennsylvania, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) administrator, Jane Garvey, received a call from Leo Mullin, the CEO of Delta Air Lines. Mullin complained: "We can't find four of our planes. Four of our transponders are off." [10] (A transponder is a device that sends an aircraft's identifying information, speed, and altitude to air traffic controllers' radar screens.)

After the World Trade Center was hit the second time at 9:03 a.m., the FAA told all air traffic control facilities around the U.S. to notify it of anything unusual that occurred. In response, facilities reported numerous incidents. [11] According to author Pamela Freni, "Upward to two-dozen [aircraft] were listed at one time, but ultimately the number was whittled to 11 highly suspicious cases." The list included the third and fourth aircraft targeted in the attacks--American Airlines Flight 77 and United Airlines Flight 93--and nine false alarms. [12]

Regarding, specifically, incorrect reports of planes being hijacked, the 9/11 Commission Report stated, "During the course of the morning, there were multiple erroneous reports of hijacked aircraft." [13] Defense Department spokeswoman Victoria Clarke, who was in the Pentagon during the attacks and for most of the rest of September 11, has recalled: "There were lots of false signals out there. There were false hijack squawks, and a great part of the challenge was sorting through what was a legitimate threat and what wasn't." [14] Larry Arnold has said, "By the end of the day, we had 21 aircraft identified as possible hijackings." [15] Robert Marr recalled, "At one time I was told that across the nation there were some 29 different reports of hijackings." [16]

I describe below details of some of the flights that were among the false alarms on September 11. Firstly, I examine nine flights that were mistakenly considered to have been hijacked. I then examine flights for which we either do not know the nature of the false alarm, due to the lack of available information (so the aircraft may have been a suspected hijacking, but this fact has not been reported), or the emergency is known to have been something other than a suspected hijacking, such as a loss of radio contact with the aircraft.

AIRCRAFT FALSELY REPORTED AS HIJACKED ON 9/11

• Flight 11 Reported as Still Airborne After Hitting WTC
The first of the "multiple erroneous reports of hijacked aircraft," according to the 9/11 Commission, was a report that American Airlines Flight 11 was still airborne and heading toward Washington, DC, more than half an hour after this plane crashed into the World Trade Center. [17]

Colin Scoggins, the military liaison at the FAA's Boston Center, called NEADS at 9:21 a.m. and said: "I just had a report that American 11 is still in the air, and it's on its way towards--heading towards Washington. ... It was evidently another aircraft that hit the tower." However, Boston Center controllers were not tracking this alleged flight, heading toward Washington, on radar. Instead, according to Vanity Fair, "The plane's course, had it continued south past New York in the direction it was flying before it dipped below radar coverage, would have had it headed on a straight course toward DC." Scoggins has claimed he got the erroneous information about the flight from an FAA teleconference he was monitoring. He said he thought someone was overheard "trying to confirm from American [Airlines] whether American 11 was down," and that "somewhere in the flurry of information zipping back and forth during the conference call this transmogrified into the idea that a different plane had hit the tower, and that American 11 was still hijacked and still in the air." [18]

• United Airlines Plane Reported as Hijacked, but Still at Airport
Another early false report of a hijacking occurred at 9:25 a.m., when Marcus Arroyo, the security division manager for the FAA's eastern region, called Mark Randol, the manager of the FAA's Washington, DC, Civil Aviation Security Field Office, and alerted him to several hijackings. Arroyo mentioned Flight 175 and Flight 77 (the second and third aircraft actually targeted that morning), but also said, incorrectly, that another aircraft, United Airlines Flight 177, had been hijacked. Randol's staff soon discovered that Flight 177 was still on the ground at Logan International Airport in Boston, being held at the gate there. [19] No explanation has been given for why Flight 177 was falsely reported as a hijacking.

• Delta 1989 Gave Numerous Indications of Being Hijacked
Delta Air Lines Flight 1989 was a Boeing 767 bound from Boston to Los Angeles, which repeatedly acted suspiciously and was repeatedly suspected of being hijacked. The aircraft was first suspected of being hijacked at around 9:30 a.m. when controllers at the FAA's Cleveland Center who were monitoring it mistakenly thought the sounds of Flight 93 being hijacked, heard over radio, had come from Delta 1989. But they soon decided that Flight 93 was the source of the communications and that Delta 1989 was not hijacked. [20]

However, at around 9:40 a.m., Colin Scoggins at the FAA's Boston Center called NEADS and said the Boston Center believed Delta 1989 was a hijacked aircraft. [21] It is unclear why Scoggins made this claim, and also why he considered it his responsibility to call NEADS about Delta 1989, since the flight was at that time being tracked by the Cleveland Center, not the Boston Center. [22] The 9/11 Commission Report suggested that Boston Center managers had noted the similarities between Delta 1989 and the two aircraft that had hit the WTC: all were 767s flying from Boston to Los Angeles, which had taken off around the same time. The managers also remembered a radio transmission the center heard, apparently made by a hijacker on Flight 11, saying, "We have some planes," and consequently "guessed that Delta 1989 might also be hijacked." [23]

Over the next 30 to 35 minutes, Delta 1989 repeatedly behaved strangely, creating further suspicion that it might have been hijacked. Delta Air Lines instructed the flight to land in Cleveland, but did not inform air traffic control of this. Consequently, Cleveland Center controllers became suspicious when the plane's pilot contacted them, requesting an immediate change of course. Their level of concern increased when he failed to respond to a message as his plane descended toward Cleveland. [24] Then controllers at another facility had their suspicions of the flight increased when the pilot failed to use standard, and highly important, terminology in his radio communications with them. [25]

Delta 1989 landed at Cleveland Hopkins Airport at around 10:18 a.m. and was directed to a remote area. [26] FBI agents and a police SWAT team approached it, in case any problems arose. [27] It was about two hours after the plane landed that the passengers were allowed off, and it was around mid-afternoon before it was finally confirmed that the flight had never been hijacked. [28]

• Continental Airlines Plane Transmitted Hijack Signal Three Times
Another incident appears to have occurred at around 9:35 a.m., as it was reported at 9:36 a.m., in a phone call between John White, a manager at the FAA's Command Center in Herndon, Virginia, and Doug Davis, the special assistant for technical operations in air traffic services at FAA headquarters. White told Davis that Continental Airlines Flight 321, which was "en route from Cleveland to Denver," had "squawked hijack three times." In other words, the pilot had set the plane's transponder to transmit the code of "7500," which signals that the flight has been hijacked. But, White added, "we have made contact with the pilot and the pilot has told us everything is okay." Just over an hour later, White informed Davis that Flight 321 was "on the ground at Peoria," Illinois, and the FBI was "approaching the aircraft at this time." Although White told Davis, "We are trying to determine why he squawked hijack," further details of this false alarm are unreported. [29]

• American Airlines 189 Sent Text Message Signaling a Hijacking
Employees at the American Airlines System Operations Control (SOC) center in Fort Worth, Texas, became concerned when they temporarily lost communication with one of their planes, and the center also received a message from that plane incorrectly signaling it had been hijacked. Radio contact was lost with the Boston-to-Seattle flight at 9:45 a.m. According to the Wall Street Journal, "Everyone in the room [at the SOC] was convinced it was a ... hijacking." [30]

Evidence indicates this aircraft was American Airlines Flight 189. [31] Donald Robinson, a dispatcher at the SOC, received what he has called a "hijack message" from Flight 189, via the ACARS text messaging system. Robinson then sent a text message back to the plane's pilots, asking them if they were "squawking" the universal code for a hijacking. Ten minutes after communication with Flight 189 was lost, contact was restored. The problem, according to the Wall Street Journal, was due to a "radio glitch." Though Robinson suggested that the pilots may have sent the "hijack message" accidentally, he admitted that it was "unknown why the cockpit sent this message." [32]

• Possible Hijacked Aircraft Heading to U.S. from Canada
Around 10:00 a.m., a Canadian NORAD unit called NEADS and told it that a suspected hijacked aircraft was heading south from Canada, toward Washington, DC. [33] Few details were revealed about this plane. A member of staff at NEADS informed their colleagues that it was from an "unknown departure airport," and they did not "know any codes or anything" else about it. [34] When someone at NEADS then called the Canadian unit for more information, the person who answered the call only said they had seen "something on the chat"--meaning NORAD's computer chat system--about a "possible" aircraft. A few minutes later, the Canadian unit called NEADS again and said the suspected hijacking was a false alarm. The caller said the unit's intelligence team was "not assessing that there's an actual aircraft problem. It's just that there could be problems from our area." He added, "There's no actual aircraft that we suspect as being a danger." [35]

• Korean Airlines 85 Repeatedly Indicated it was Hijacked
One of the aircraft mistakenly suspected of being hijacked on September 11 about which most has been reported is Korean Airlines Flight 85. This plane gave several indications that it had been hijacked, was tailed by fighter jets, and was even threatened with being shot down by the military.

KAL 85 was a Boeing 747 with 215 people on board, flying from Seoul, South Korea, to New York. It had been due to land in Anchorage, Alaska, for a refueling stop when problems began. Shortly before midday, it was discovered that the plane's pilots had sent a text message that included the letters "HJK," the code for a hijacking. [36] Then, after KAL 85 entered their airspace at around 1:00 p.m., Anchorage air traffic controllers asked the pilots coded questions over radio to see if the plane had indeed been hijacked. But instead of giving reassurance that the plane was safe, the pilots switched their transponder to "7500," the code signaling a hijacking. KAL 85 continued transmitting this code for the next 90 minutes, until it landed. [37] In fact, according to an official report, "There were five separate and ongoing indicators of a hijacking situation" on KAL 85, although the report did not specify what those indicators were. [38]

NORAD launched fighter jets to follow KAL 85, ordered that the plane be directed away from Anchorage, and threatened to have it shot down if it refused to change course. [39] KAL 85 was redirected to Whitehorse Airport in Canada. It was escorted there by fighters and landed without incident at 2:54 p.m. [40] Only on the following morning, after a bomb-sniffing dog searched the plane and its cargo was checked, did the Royal Canadian Mounted Police finally confirm that KAL 85 was never hijacked. [41]

KAL 85 has subsequently been treated with much secrecy. The FAA, NORAD, and Transport Canada have declined to answer questions about it. [42] Korean Airlines refused to make available a tape recording of conversations between the pilot and airline officials in Anchorage, and has not even revealed the names of the members of the plane's flight crew on September 11. [43]

In light of the possibility that some of the false alarms on September 11 related to training exercises taking place that day, it is notable that, a few days earlier, one of those exercises included a scenario where an aircraft remarkably similar to KAL 85 was hijacked. On September 6, NORAD's exercise Vigilant Guardian included a simulated scenario in which a plane, Korean Airlines Flight 357, was taken over by terrorists. KAL 357, like KAL 85, was a Boeing 747 flying from Seoul to Anchorage. And on September 6, similar to what it did in response to KAL 85 five days later, NORAD ordered its Alaskan region to intercept and shadow the hijacked plane, and directed fighter jets to get in a position to shoot the plane down if necessary. [44]

• San Diego to Denver Flight Suspected as Hijacked
At some unspecified time, apparently early in the afternoon, it has been reported that NORAD's operations center in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado, was receiving "reports of a hijacking out of San Diego, California," that was "headed to Denver." Eventually, the aircraft identified itself and landed uneventfully. Further details of this flight are unknown. [45]

• Possibly Hijacked U.S. Airways Flight Approaching From Spain
The last aircraft incorrectly suspected of being hijacked on September 11, according to CONR's Larry Arnold, was a U.S. Airways flight approaching the United States from Madrid, Spain. [46] At 3:20 p.m., it was reported over an FAA teleconference that the White House was saying this flight was heading to Philadelphia International Airport, and the military was scrambling fighter jets in response to it. Accounts conflict over whether the U.S. Airways plane was Flight 930 or Flight 937. [47] Lewis Libby, Vice President Dick Cheney's chief of staff, who was in the Presidential Emergency Operations Center below the White House, has recalled, "When we first got word [of the flight], we got word that it was only 30 minutes or so outside of U.S. airspace." Libby indicated that the plane's transponder had been transmitting the code for a hijacking, saying, "I think it was one of those ones where there was an actual report that it was showing hijacking through some electronic signal." [48]

After a short time, the flight was found to be secure. Arnold has recalled that Robert Marr called him from NEADS and said, "We just talked to the airline, and that aircraft is back on the ground in Madrid." [49] According to Libby, "It turned out that, I think, it was only 35 minutes out of Spanish airspace, not out of our airspace." [50]

OTHER AIRCRAFT EMERGENCIES, AND UNSPECIFIED AIRCRAFT EMERGENCIES, ON 9/11

• Coast Guard Reported Three Suspicious Aircraft, but One Flight 'Never Existed'
As previously mentioned, there were some false alarms on September 11 for which the specific nature of the emergency is unstated. These may have been suspected hijackings or they may have been something else, like the loss of radio contact or the loss of a transponder signal. An example of this is an incident that occurred shortly after 11:00 a.m., when three suspicious flights were reported as approaching the U.S.

At 11:18 a.m., it was reported on an FAA teleconference that the Coast Guard in Norfolk, Virginia, had received distress signals from Air Canada Flight 65, Continental Airlines Flight 57, and United Airlines Flight 947. Whether these distress signals were the "7500" transponder code signaling a hijacking, or something else, is unreported. The three aircraft were reported as being over the Atlantic Ocean. Jeff Griffith, the deputy director of air traffic at FAA headquarters, subsequently instructed John White at the FAA's Command Center to alert NORAD to the aircraft, and to also notify the Air Traffic Services Cell (ATSC), an office at the Command Center manned by military reservists.

By 11:46 a.m., it was determined that the distress signals were false alarms. It was reported on the FAA teleconference that "all three aircraft ... are accounted for" and "all are OK." The United Airlines plane returned to Europe and the Continental Airlines flight landed in Gander, Canada. Remarkably, it was discovered that Air Canada 65 hadn't even been airborne. White reported that it "landed last night and was scheduled to depart today, but the flight's canceled." [51] According to an ATSC chronology of the events of 9/11, this flight "never existed." [52]

• FAA Command Center Compiled List of 11 Suspicious Aircraft
As mentioned earlier, following the second attack in New York, the FAA's Command Center instructed air traffic control facilities to notify it of anything unusual. In response, according to Linda Schuessler, the deputy director of system operations at the Command Center, "we started getting more and more calls about bomb threats, about aircraft that we had lost communication or radar identification with." This led to the center compiling a list of 11 aircraft "that we had gotten unusual information on, that we thought seemed worthy of keeping a closer eye on." The list included two of the planes targeted in the terrorist attacks, Flight 77 and Flight 93. [53]

Various accounts have indicated details of the other flights singled out by the Command Center. A 9:10 a.m. entry in a chronology of events at the Command Center on September 11 mentioned seven aircraft for which the center was providing "coordination to assist in finding," although evidence indicates that at least some of these aircraft only aroused suspicion later on than 9:10 a.m. One of the aircraft was Delta Air Lines Flight 1989 (see above). The other six, and the few details we know about them, are as follows:

- American Airlines Flight 2247: At 10:04 a.m., the FAA's Fort Worth Center reported this flight to the Command Center. The aircraft, going from Orlando, Florida, to Shreveport, Louisiana, was "NORDO," meaning radio contact with it had been lost. Communication was restored by 10:17 a.m.

- U.S. Airways Flight 41: The FAA's Memphis Center reported this plane, going from Charlotte, North Carolina, to Los Angeles, to the Command Center. The reason for the report is unknown.

- Northwest Airlines Flight 197: The Command Center appears to have been alerted to this plane, en route from Lansing, Michigan, to Minneapolis, Minnesota, at 10:03 a.m. The reason for the report is unknown. Flight 197 subsequently landed in Marquette, Michigan.

- United Airlines Flight 641: United Airlines lost contact with this plane at around 10:00 a.m., but persistent attempts to communicate with it were eventually successful. The flight subsequently landed in Detroit, Michigan.

- United Airlines Flight 57: This aircraft was reported as missing sometime between 10:55 a.m. and 11:15 a.m. It appears to have been reported to the Command Center by controllers at Denver International Airport, for reasons that are unknown. It subsequently landed in Garden City, Kansas.

- U.S. Airways Flight 633: At 10:55 a.m., controllers at Philadelphia International Airport reported that they had "lost" this flight, which was heading to Las Vegas. The Command Center chronology indicated that the plane subsequently landed at the Philadelphia airport, at 11:14 a.m. [54]

Other accounts have mentioned three additional suspicious aircraft that were on the Command Center's list. (However, if these accounts are correct, it would indicate that the list included 12 aircraft, not 11.) One of the aircraft was a U.S. Airways flight heading to Chicago that was not communicating with air traffic controllers. [55] Another was a TWA flight that was refusing to land in Pittsburgh, and instead wanted to fly on to Washington. The third was a Midwest Express flight that disappeared from radar over West Virginia. [56]

Schuessler has recalled that Command Center personnel later "continued to say [they had] a little discomfort about the information [they] received" about these suspicious flights. But, she said, "We followed up with the security people and got enough information that the specialists here felt very comfortable that they understood the situation." [57]

• United Airlines Worker in England Received Suspicious Call from Pilot
At around 11:16 a.m. (U.S. Eastern time), a United Airlines aircraft maintenance officer at a facility in London, England, received a brief but suspicious phone call from an unidentified aircraft, in which the caller--apparently the plane's pilot--sounded distraught, possibly as if he was being choked. The maintenance officer recognized the call as coming from a particular type of satellite phone that is available on Boeing 767s and 777s, although he believed it was most likely from a 777. He told the 9/11 Commission that the caller sounded strange, and that this was the "only phone call that he'd ever received of that nature in the 10 years he's been on the job for United."

The maintenance officer contacted a United Airlines maintenance facility at San Francisco International Airport to report the suspicious call, and it in turned notified the FBI. The FBI was told that the maintenance officer had said the caller from the plane "sounded as if they were being choked," although the maintenance officer later claimed he was unsure whether this had been the case. [58]

• Other Suspicious Flights
We know of numerous other flights on September 11 that raised concern, although the reported details of these are scant. Andrew Studdert, United Airlines' chief operating officer at the time of the attacks, told the 9/11 Commission that at around 10:00 a.m., as well as losing contact with Flight 641 (see above), United lost contact with two more of its planes, Flights 399 and 415. Studdert also said that between 10:55 a.m. and 11:15 a.m., as well as Flight 57 (see above), eight other United planes were reported as missing. These were Flights 103, 634, 1211, 1695, 2101, 2102, 2256, and 2725. All of them were eventually located at various airports. [59] Furthermore, a Secret Service timeline stated that at 10:55 a.m., United Airlines Flight 182, from Boston to Seattle, was "unaccounted for." [60]

As previously mentioned, the temporary loss of radio contact with aircraft is a common occurrence. [61] And an order issued by the FAA at 9:45 a.m., for all aircraft over the U.S. to land at the nearest airport, presumably complicated interactions between pilots and air traffic controllers. [62] But can these factors account for a single airline losing communication with so many of its planes, all on the same day, and all within such short spaces of time? And on September 11, 2001, of all days, when two of the aircraft targeted in the terrorist attacks belonged to that particular airline?

Additionally, Studdert told the 9/11 Commission that throughout the morning of September 11, United Airlines received "a torrent of reported bomb threats; explosions are reported at two airports, and there are reports of other threats and other hijackings." These turned out to be "misunderstandings or hoaxes," but, Studdert commented, "the presumed threats cannot be dismissed in the high uncertainty of the moment." [63]

It seems reasonable to assume there were other false alarms that have not yet come to light. If Larry Arnold's claim of "21 aircraft identified as possible hijackings" or Robert Marr's claim of "29 different reports of hijackings" are anywhere near accurate, then there must have been additional false reports of hijackings beyond what I have described.

Who or what caused these false alarms? What effect did they have on the ability of the military and other U.S. government agencies to respond to the actual attacks, and to then assess how those attacks had been able to succeed? These questions have not yet been adequately addressed, and need to be investigated thoroughly.

NOTES
[1] Lynn Spencer, Touching History: The Untold Story of the Drama That Unfolded in the Skies Over America on 9/11. New York: Free Press, 2008, p. 196.
[2] Draft: The Air Traffic Organization's Response to the September 11th Terrorist Attack: ATC System Assessment, Shutdown, and Restoration. Federal Aviation Administration, March 21, 2002, p. S-26; "Full Transcription; Air Traffic Control System Command Center, National Traffic Management Officer, East Position; September 11, 2001." Federal Aviation Administration, October 21, 2003.
[3] See Donald A. Robinson Jr., interview by the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation, September 11, 2001; "Memorandum for the Record: Staff Visit to the Boston Center, New England Region, FAA." 9/11 Commission, September 22-24, 2003.
[4] "September 11, 2001." New Yorker, September 24, 2001.
[5] William M. Arkin, Code Names: Deciphering U.S. Military Plans, Programs, and Operations in the 9/11 World. Hanover, NH: Steerforth Press, 2005, p. 545.
[6] Michael Bronner, "9/11 Live: The NORAD Tapes." Vanity Fair, August 2006.
[7] "NORAD Exercises: Hijack Summary." 9/11 Commission, n.d.
[8] Leslie Filson, Air War Over America: Sept. 11 Alters Face of Air Defense Mission. Tyndall Air Force Base, FL: 1st Air Force, 2003, p. 73.
[9] Michael Bronner, "9/11 Live."
[10] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Jane Garvey." 9/11 Commission, October 21, 2003; Lynn Spencer, Touching History, p. 186.
[11] Lynn Spencer, Touching History, pp. 125-126.
[12] Pamela Freni, Ground Stop: An Inside Look at the Federal Aviation Administration on September 11, 2001. Lincoln, NE: iUniverse, Inc., 2003, p. 65.
[13] 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004, p. 28.
[14] "Chilling Audio From 9/11 Hijack Played at Hearing." Paula Zahn Now, CNN, June 17, 2004.
[15] "Conversation With Major General Larry Arnold, Commander, 1st Air Force, Tyndall AFB, Florida." Code One, January 2002.
[16] Robert A. Baker, "Commander of 9/11 Air Defenses Retires." Newhouse News Service, March 31, 2005.
[17] 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 26, 28.
[18] Ibid. p. 26; Michael Bronner, "9/11 Live."
[19] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Mark Randol, Former Manager of the Civil Aviation Security Field Office in Washington, DC." 9/11 Commission, October 8, 2003.
[20] Marilyn Adams, Alan Levin, and Blake Morrison, "Part II: No One Was Sure if Hijackers Were on Board." USA Today, August 12, 2002; "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With John Werth, Air Traffic Controller, Area 4, Lorain Sector." 9/11 Commission, October 1, 2003; "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Kim Wernica, Operations Manager at Cleveland ARTCC on 9/11." 9/11 Commission, October 2, 2003.
[21] Michael Bronner, "9/11 Live"; Untitled Chronology of FAA and NEADS Communications on September 11, 2001. 9/11 Commission, n.d.
[22] Marilyn Adams, Alan Levin, and Blake Morrison, "Part II: No One Was Sure if Hijackers Were on Board"; Alan Levin, "For Air Controller, Terror Still Vivid 7 Years Later." USA Today, September 11, 2008.
[23] Marilyn Adams, Alan Levin, and Blake Morrison, "Part II: No One Was Sure if Hijackers Were on Board"; 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 27-28.
[24] Marilyn Adams, Alan Levin, and Blake Morrison, "Part II: No One Was Sure if Hijackers Were on Board"; Lynn Spencer, Touching History, pp. 167-168.
[25] "DAL 1989 Order of Events." Federal Aviation Administration, September 16, 2001.
[26] Ibid.; Marilyn Adams, Alan Levin, and Blake Morrison, "Part II: No One Was Sure if Hijackers Were on Board."
[27] Michael O'Mara, "9/11: 'Fifth Plane' Terror Alert at Cleveland Hopkins Airport." WKYC, September 11, 2006; Lynn Spencer, Touching History, p. 270.
[28] Marilyn Adams, Alan Levin, and Blake Morrison, "Part II: No One Was Sure if Hijackers Were on Board." For more information about Delta Airlines Flight 1989, see "Was Delta 1989 Part of a Live-Fly Hijacking Exercise on 9/11?" Shoestring 9/11, July 22, 2009.
[29] "Full Transcription; Air Traffic Control System Command Center, National Traffic Management Officer, East Position; September 11, 2001"; Miles Kara, "Transcript of East NTMO, Line 4530, Admin Line." 9/11 Commission, November 4, 2003.
[30] Donald A. Robinson Jr. interview by the FBI; Scott McCartney and Susan Carey, "American, United Watched and Worked in Horror as Sept. 11 Hijackings Unfolded." Wall Street Journal, October 15, 2001.
[31] For example, the Bureau of Transportation Statistics database of "Airline On-Time Data" reveals that Flight 189 was the only American Airlines plane going from Boston to Seattle that day.
[32] Donald A. Robinson Jr. interview by the FBI; Scott McCartney and Susan Carey, "American, United Watched and Worked in Horror as Sept. 11 Hijackings Unfolded."
[33] Michael Bronner, "9/11 Live."
[34] NEADS Audio File, Mission Crew Commander Position, Channel 2. North American Aerospace Defense Command, September 11, 2001.
[35] NEADS Audio File, Identification Technician Position, Channel 4. North American Aerospace Defense Command, September 11, 2001; "NEADS CDs." 9/11 Commission, n.d.
[36] Alan Levin, "Korean Air Jet May Have Narrowly Missed Disaster." USA Today, August 12, 2002; Zaz Hollander, "High Alert." Anchorage Daily News, September 8, 2002.
[37] Alan Levin, "Korean Air Jet May Have Narrowly Missed Disaster"; Lynn Spencer, Touching History, pp. 277-278.
[38] September 11, 2001, Whitehorse International Airport Emergency: Public Findings Report. Whitehorse, Yukon: Yukon Government, November 13, 2001, p. 17.
[39] Alan Levin, "Korean Air Jet May Have Narrowly Missed Disaster"; Lynn Spencer, Touching History, p. 278.
[40] Alan Levin, "Korean Air Jet May Have Narrowly Missed Disaster"; Zaz Hollander, "High Alert."
[41] September 11, 2001, Whitehorse International Airport Emergency, p. 18.
[42] Zaz Hollander, "False Sept. 11 Hijack Signal Put Air Force on Alert." Anchorage Daily News, September 29, 2001; September 11, 2001, Whitehorse International Airport Emergency, p. 27; Alan Levin, "Korean Air Jet May Have Narrowly Missed Disaster."
[43] Zaz Hollander, "False Sept. 11 Hijack Signal Put Air Force on Alert"; Stephanie Waddell, "9/11 Documentary to be Released Next Year." Whitehorse Daily Star, December 31, 2010.
[44] "NORAD Exercises: Hijack Summary." For more details about Korean Airlines Flight 85, see "Was Korean Airlines Flight 85 a Simulated Hijack in a 9/11 Training Exercise?" Shoestring 9/11, April 18, 2010.
[45] Rebecca Grant, The First 600 Days of Combat. Washington, DC: IRIS Press, 2004, p. 26.
[46] "Chronology of Events (All Times are Local Eastern Daylight Time)." Federal Aviation Administration, September 11, 2001; "Conversation With Major General Larry Arnold."
[47] "ADA-30 Operations Center Activity Report, September 11-14, 2001." Federal Aviation Administration, September 2001; "Chronology of Events (All Times are Local Eastern Daylight Time)"; "Eastern Region Operations Center Log: Chronological Events of Hijacking Crisis." Federal Aviation Administration, January 2, 2002.
[48] Lewis Libby, interview by Newsweek magazine. White House, November 16, 2001.
[49] "Eastern Region Operations Center Log"; Leslie Filson, Air War Over America, p. 88.
[50] Lewis Libby, interview by Newsweek magazine.
[51] Draft: The Air Traffic Organization's Response to the September 11th Terrorist Attack, pp. S-26, S-29, S-33; "Full Transcription; Air Traffic Control System Command Center, National Traffic Management Officer, East Position; September 11, 2001."
[52] Untitled Air Traffic Services Cell Chronology of Events. U.S. Air Force, September 11, 2001.
[53] David Bond, "Crisis at Herndon: 11 Airplanes Astray." Aviation Week & Space Technology, December 17, 2001.
[54] Untitled FAA Command Center Chronology of the Events of September 11, 2001. Federal Aviation Administration, September 11, 2001; "Statement of Andrew P. Studdert to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States." 9/11 Commission, January 27, 2004; "Suspect Aircraft of September 11, 2001." 9/11 Commission, n.d.
[55] Lynn Spencer, Touching History, p. 126.
[56] Marilyn Adams, Alan Levin, and Blake Morrison, "Part II: No One Was Sure if Hijackers Were on Board."
[57] David Bond, "Crisis at Herndon."
[58] Ray Kime, interview by the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation, September 11, 2001; "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Rich Belme, Manager of United Airlines SAMC in San Francisco, CA." 9/11 Commission, November 21, 2003; "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With [Name Redacted], United Airlines." 9/11 Commission, November 21, 2003.
[59] "Statement of Andrew P. Studdert to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States."
[60] "Secret Service Timeline, Unclassified Extract." United States Secret Service, September 11, 2001.
[61] See Donald A. Robinson Jr., interview by the FBI; "Memorandum for the Record: Staff Visit to the Boston Center, New England Region, FAA."
[62] U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Statement of Jane F. Garvey, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration, Before the House Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. 107th Cong., 1st sess., September 21, 2001; 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 29.
[63] "Statement of Andrew P. Studdert to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States."

Army Command Center at the Pentagon Planned to Hold Exercise in Week After 9/11 Based on a Plane Hitting the WTC

Army officers at the Pentagon were planning a training exercise that would take place less than a week after 9/11 and that would, extraordinarily, be based around the scenario of a plane crashing into the World Trade Center. Preparations for the exercise were being made about a week before September 11.

The existence of the planned exercise was revealed by Major General Peter Chiarelli, who on September 11, 2001, was the Army's director of operations, readiness, and mobilization. In that position, which he had moved into about a month before 9/11, Chiarelli was in charge of current operations in the Army Operations Center (AOC) at the Pentagon.

Chiarelli recalled in a February 2002 interview that, after beginning his new position, he had "planned to do an exercise for the Crisis Action Team, the CAT." He said, "In some of my pre-briefings, in learning about the job, it was briefed to me that the Crisis Action Team had not stood up, except for an exercise, in about 10 years in any great role." He therefore had members of his staff design a CAT exercise that, he said, he planned to run on September 17. [1]

SCENARIO FOR MASS CASUALTY PROCEDURE WAS OF A PLANE HITTING THE WTC
Chiarelli also recalled in the interview that the Personnel Contingency Cell in the AOC had been tasked with putting together a new mass casualty standard operating procedure (SOP) for the Army. About a week before 9/11, Chiarelli said, a colleague of his--"Robby Robinson"--and two other officers "came in to brief me on their new SOP for mass casualty."

During the meeting, it was decided that in the CAT exercise Chiarelli was going to run, "we would go ahead and use this SOP as a kind of exercise driver." Chiarelli recalled, "The real amazing thing of that SOP is that the scenario was an aircraft crashing into the World Trade Center." Chiarelli told the others in the meeting, "Hey, not only is this a good SOP and a good plan, but at the same time, to really make this good, what we need to do is exercise it." According to Chiarelli, "We decided that we would use a scenario similar to that to drive this exercise" that he was planning. [2]

Chiarelli did not specify in his February 2002 interview what type of aircraft was envisaged hitting the WTC in the scenario. Nor did he say whether it would have been a hijacked plane or one that crashed into the WTC accidentally. But what his account means is that, in the days before the terrorist attacks in New York and at the Pentagon occurred, a military exercise was being planned that was scheduled to take place less than a week after September 11, with a scenario that was identical--or at least extremely similar--to what happened in New York on 9/11.

The possible significance of Chiarelli's training exercise being based around a plane crashing into the World Trade Center will need to be determined by a new and unrestrained investigation of the 9/11 attacks. However, the odds of this being due to chance, and unrelated to what happened on September 11, must be minute.

ARMY OPERATIONS CENTER AND CRISIS TEAM PLAYED IMPORTANT ROLES ON SEPTEMBER 11
The AOC that Chiarelli was in charge of is located in the basement of the Pentagon, two levels beneath a parking lot. It plays an important role within the Army. Reportedly, "Critical information flows through the high-security worksite, with AOC personnel--almost all in uniform--working day and night to keep senior Army leaders aware of issues and events around the world, helping them make timely, critical decisions." Chiarelli described the AOC as "the Army's command and control center." [3] On September 11, senior Army leaders assembled there in response to the terrorist attacks.

The Crisis Action Team, whose members were going to participate in Chiarelli's training exercise, was activated in response to the attacks on the WTC. Chiarelli said at the time that he had activated it "to respond to the contingency in New York if requested by state and local officials." He said he "anticipated that the World Trade Center disaster would require enormous rescue, firefighting, and recovery efforts." [4]

NOTES
[1] Pete Chiarelli, interview by Frank Shirer. U.S. Army Center of Military History, February 5, 2002. However, in an interview with Chiarelli's deputy, Brigadier General Clyde Vaughn, Army Center of Military History historian Stephen Lofgren mentioned that the exercise was scheduled for "a couple of days" after September 11, meaning September 13. See Clyde Vaughn, interview by Stephen Lofgren, U.S. Army Center of Military History, February 12, 2002. It is unclear which date for the exercise is correct.
[2] Pete Chiarelli, interview by Frank Shirer.
[3] William Schwab and Lorie Jewell, "The Army's Nerve Center." Soldiers, September 2004.
[4] Alfred Goldberg et al., Pentagon 9/11. Washington, DC: Defense Department, Office of the Secretary, Historical Office, 2007, pp. 134-135.

Backup Communications System Was 'Miraculously' Switched on for 'Exercise Mode' and Ready for Use on 9/11

A special backup network that allows communications between government and military agencies to continue during emergencies was "miraculously" switched on the day before 9/11, and so was already operational when the terrorist attacks in New York and at the Pentagon took place. The Special Routing Arrangement Service (SRAS) was, for reasons unknown, turned on for "exercise mode" on September 10, 2001, and was therefore ready to be utilized the following day, when there was a national emergency like that for which it was intended.

The SRAS is the responsibility of a little-known government agency called the National Communications System (NCS), which works to keep critical telecommunications functioning during emergencies and played a crucial role in the government's response to the 9/11 attacks, helping to maintain and restore communications networks. Furthermore, the SRAS is related to "Continuity of Government"--a plan that was activated for the first time during the attacks.

SRAS TURNED ON FOR 'EXERCISE MODE' ON SEPTEMBER 10
Brenton Greene, the director of the NCS on September 11, told the 9/11 Commission that on September 10, 2001, "miraculously, the SRAS system was turned on for exercise mode and thus it was ready to function on September 11." Therefore, when the NCS was required to assist the government's response to the terrorist attacks, the "SRAS was already in exercise mode and operational." [1]

The SRAS supports the highly secret Continuity of Government (COG) plan, which is intended to keep the government functioning in the event of an attack on the U.S. [2] The NCS's involvement in COG was one of the agency's three main programs. As Greene told the 9/11 Commission, "The main communications system of the country must be kept going or no one can communicate." [3] The SRAS provides "a vehicle for continuity of operations by providing survivable communications linkages to federal and defense end users over the public network," according to a Department of Homeland Security publication. [4]

Apparently describing the SRAS, Greene told the 9/11 Commission, "There is a separate network linking the National Coordinating Center and the major carriers and networks as a backup." (The National Coordinating Center, in Arlington, Virginia, is the "operational arm" of the NCS.) This network "proved its value as a separate link on 9/11 because it coordinated network use between Network Operations Centers while the [telecommunications] network was saturated." Furthermore, again apparently describing the SRAS, Greene said, "In the situation where Continuity of Government is put into play"--as was the case on September 11--"there is a communications system where no one can trace the site of the call on either end." [5]

WAS THE NCS INVOLVED IN A TRAINING EXERCISE ON SEPTEMBER 11?
Greene apparently did not tell the 9/11 Commission why the SRAS was turned on for "exercise mode" on September 10. But a possible explanation that needs to be investigated is that the NCS was scheduled to participate in a training exercise on September 11. We know that the NCS was, in 2001, part of the Department of Defense. [6] And several U.S. military agencies are known to have been conducting exercises on the morning of September 11. For example, the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) was running its annual exercise, "Vigilant Guardian," [7] and the United States Strategic Command (Stratcom) was holding its annual exercise, "Global Guardian." [8] Might the NCS have been participating in one of these, or another exercise?

Furthermore, it is worth noting that beginning at 8:00 a.m. on September 11, representatives from the CIA gave a briefing to the NCS at "a secure facility outside of Washington, DC," where they discussed the threat that international terrorists posed to America's telecommunications infrastructure. Along with Brenton Greene, the briefing was attended by representatives from seven other federal agencies and more than 40 technology and communications companies. The private sector representatives were all "senior executives from their respective companies, and all had government security clearances that granted them access to the most sensitive intelligence data" relating to threats to the nation's telecommunications infrastructure, according to journalist and author Dan Verton. Topics discussed during the briefing included the growing terrorist threat to the telecommunications infrastructure, the information warfare capabilities of foreign nations, and the possibility of a strategic cyber-attack on critical U.S. infrastructures, committed by a foreign nation or a terrorist group. [9]

Considering that the NCS's Special Routing Arrangement Service had been switched on for "exercise mode" the previous day, and considering the topics that were discussed, might this briefing have been an introduction for a training exercise, perhaps preparing participants for a scenario based around a simulated attack against the telecommunications network?

CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT WAS ACTIVATED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON SEPTEMBER 11
Continuity of Government is a program dating back to the cold war, which aims to ensure that the government will continue to function in the event of an attack on the United States. During the 1980s it prepared for a possible nuclear attack by the Soviet Union, but during the 1990s it focused instead on the possibility of a terrorist attack in the U.S.

Considering that the SRAS supports COG by "providing survivable communications linkages to federal and defense end users," it is worth noting that sophisticated communications methods have played an important role in the COG program. In the 1980s, for example, much of its budget of hundreds of millions of dollars "was spent on advanced communications equipment that would enable the teams [involved in COG] to have secure conversations with U.S. military commanders," according to journalist and author James Mann.

Furthermore, three of the program's key players during the 1980s and 1990s held critical positions in the U.S. government on September 11. Those individuals--Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and Richard Clarke--were the vice president, secretary of defense, and White House counterterrorism adviser, respectively, when the attacks occurred. [10] David Addington, Cheney's legal counsel in 2001, was also involved in the COG program. [11]

It is also notable that the COG plan was activated, apparently for the first time, during the 9/11 attacks. Richard Clarke has said that he gave the order to activate it, apparently at around 9:45 a.m. on September 11, or shortly after. [12] He told ABC News: "On the morning of 9/11, the entire Continuity of Government program was activated. Every federal agency was ordered ... to activate an alternative command post, an alternative headquarters outside of Washington, DC, and to staff it as soon as possible." [13]

Considering that the SRAS is intended to support the COG program, it was convenient, to say the least, that it was already operational on September 11 and therefore immediately ready to be utilized by those involved with COG when the plan was activated.

NCS'S CRITICAL RESPONSE TO THE 9/11 ATTACKS
The National Communications System, which is responsible for the Special Routing Arrangement Service, is a relatively small agency that was established in 1963, in order to provide better communications support to critical government functions during emergencies. [14] Around the time of the 9/11 attacks, it consisted of 22 federal agencies, 100 full-time civilian employees, and 10 military employees. [15]

The NCS played a critical role following the 9/11 attacks, when the destruction caused by those attacks became what Brenton Greene called "the most significant challenge that the National Communications System had ever seen." [16] In partnership with private companies, it "quickly assembled an unprecedented level of resources at the national, state, and local levels to support the response and recovery efforts."

Presumably, the NCS's emergency efforts benefited from having the SRAS already operational when the attacks took place. As previously mentioned, the SRAS is related to the Continuity of Government plan. Notably, in response to the attacks, the NCS's National Coordinating Center operated at four sites, which included a "remote continuity of operations location." [17] And Greene has said he went to his "Continuity of Government site," where personnel operated around the clock to monitor the status of the telecommunications network, and coordinate priorities and repairs. [18]

GOVERNMENT AGENCIES EXPERIENCED COMMUNICATIONS PROBLEMS ON SEPTEMBER 11
So little has been reported about the National Communications System and the Special Routing Arrangement Service, and the role played by each on September 11, that many crucial questions remain unanswered. For example, what capabilities did the SRAS enable? And what use was made of them on September 11, before, during, and after the attacks took place? Why was the SRAS turned on for exercise mode the day before 9/11?

The need for investigation of the roles of the NCS and the SRAS appears increasingly urgent in light of the fact that communication difficulties were a significant problem for government agencies responding to the 9/11 attacks. Indeed, one classified after-action report "does not paint a favorable picture of the government's overall crisis management capabilities," according to Dan Verton. One government official said "the nation was 'deaf, dumb, and blind' for much of that horrible day in September." [19]

NOTES
[1] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview of Brenton C. Greene." 9/11 Commission, March 16, 2004.
[2] House Select Committee on Homeland Security, The Department of Homeland Security's Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Budget Proposal for Fiscal Year 2005: Prepared Opening Statement of General Frank Libutti, Under Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, Department of Homeland Security. 108th Cong., 2nd sess., March 4, 2004.
[3] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview of Brenton C. Greene."
[4] David M. Barron, J. M. Hickey, and Dan Bart, Communications: Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Sector-Specific Plan as Input to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan. Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, May 2007, p. 106.
[5] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview of Brenton C. Greene."
[6] Ibid.
[7] "Conversation With Major General Larry Arnold, Commander, 1st Air Force, Tyndall AFB, Florida." Code One, January 2002; 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004, p. 458; William M. Arkin, Code Names: Deciphering U.S. Military Plans, Programs, and Operations in the 9/11 World. Hanover, NH: Steerforth Press, 2005, p. 545.
[8] Joe Dejka, "Inside Stratcom on Sept. 11 Offutt Exercise Took Real-Life Twist." Omaha World-Herald, February 27, 2002; Joe Dejka, "When Bush Arrived, Offutt Sensed History in the Making." Omaha World-Herald, September 8, 2002.
[9] Dan Verton, Black Ice: The Invisible Threat of Cyber-Terrorism. Emeryville, CA: McGraw-Hill/Osborne, 2003, pp. 135-139.
[10] CBS News, September 11, 2001; James Mann, "The Armageddon Plan." The Atlantic, March 2004; Howard Kurtz, "'Armageddon' Plan Was Put Into Action on 9/11, Clarke Says." Washington Post, April 7, 2004; "Worst Case Scenario: Secret Plan to Control U.S. Government After an Attack Went Into Motion on 9/11." ABC News, April 25, 2004; Andrew Cockburn, Rumsfeld: His Rise, Fall, and Catastrophic Legacy. New York: Scribner, 2007, pp. 84-88.
[11] Jane Mayer, "The Hidden Power." New Yorker, July 3, 2006; Jane Mayer, The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the War on Terror Turned Into a War on American Ideals. New York: Doubleday, 2008, p. 49.
[12] Richard Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror. New York: Free Press, 2004, p. 8; 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 38.
[13] "Worst Case Scenario: Secret Plan to Control U.S. Government After an Attack Went Into Motion on 9/11."
[14] Dan Verton, Black Ice, p. 136; "Background and History of the NCS." National Communications System, n.d.
[15] Dan Verton, "At NCS, the Focus is on Telecom Preparedness." Computerworld, November 7, 2002.
[16] Dan Verton, Black Ice, p. 151.
[17] 40th Anniversary: Forty Years of Service to the Nation: 1963-2003. National Communications System, 2004, p. 56.
[18] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview of Brenton C. Greene."
[19] Dan Verton, Black Ice, pp. 150-151; see also "'Deaf, Dumb, and Blind': Were Communications Sabotaged on 9/11?" Shoestring 9/11, October 19, 2007.