Key Air Traffic Control Personnel Went 'Outside the Bonds of Protocol' as They Responded to the Crisis
Zalewski played the important role of being the air traffic controller handling Flight 11--the first of four commercial aircraft to apparently be hijacked on September 11--when it was apparently taken over by Arab terrorists and radio contact with its pilots was lost. Even after Flight 11 left his airspace, though, he remained a key player in the Boston Center's response to the crisis since he continued trying to deal with the flight as its pilots repeatedly failed to respond to radio communications, its transponder signal was lost, and threatening communications believed to have come from the plane were made.
Curiously, considering his significant involvement in the Boston Center's response to the hijacking, he wasn't originally scheduled to be on the shift he worked that day. "That was an interesting day for me because I wasn't supposed to actually be working that shift," he recalled. He had changed his schedule "because my sister wanted to go to a concert that night, so I worked the night shift the day before, came in, and worked the day shift," he explained. After finishing the night shift, he seems to have gone out for a short break, had breakfast, and then immediately started the day shift. [1]
A number of questions regarding his response to the apparent hijacking of Flight 11 need to be addressed. To begin with, why did he fail to inform a more senior member of staff when Flight 11's pilots repeatedly failed to respond to his radio communications?
CONTROLLER FAILED TO ALERT HIS SUPERVISOR TO THE LOSS OF RADIO CONTACT WITH FLIGHT 11
Zalewski had his last successful communication with Flight 11 when he instructed it to turn 20 degrees to the right at 8:13:29 a.m. The pilot had immediately acknowledged the instruction. However, he failed to respond when Zalewski then told him to climb to 35,000 feet. Zalewski made 12 more attempts to contact the flight between 8:13:57 a.m. and 8:20:08 a.m., all of which were unsuccessful. [2] And yet, in all that time, he made no attempt to alert his supervisor to the problem.
This was unusual, since an air traffic controller would normally notify their supervisor right away when radio contact with a plane was lost. "We always notify the supervisor immediately," Lino Martins, another controller at the Boston Center, explained. [3] "I think most controllers would notify [their supervisor] as soon as they realized they had a NORDO," Richard Beringer, an air traffic control specialist at the Boston Center, commented. ("NORDO" means there is no radio contact with a plane.) "Especially with an air carrier"--meaning a commercial aircraft, rather than a private aircraft--"you'd notify the supervisor right away," he added. [4]
Shirley Kula, an operations supervisor at the Boston Center, provided further details. "Whenever you have a NORDO aircraft, the first thing you do is you turn to the supervisor and say, 'I have a NORDO aircraft,' because then the supervisor can call ARINC and ARINC has another way of calling them in the cockpit," she explained. (ARINC is a company that airlines pay to transmit text messages to and from their planes.) She noted that alerting a supervisor when radio contact with a plane was lost was "inherent in the training" for air traffic controllers. She was emphatic about this. When it was put to her that every air traffic controller knew they should call a supervisor immediately when radio contact was lost, she replied, "Yes, absolutely, it's part of our training." [5]
And yet Zalewski made no attempt to notify Jon Schippani, his supervisor, when the pilots of Flight 11 repeatedly failed to answer his communications. He only alerted Schippani when Flight 11's transponder signal was lost, seven minutes after he lost radio contact with the plane. [6] However, even though he then told Schippani what the problems were, the response to the crisis continued to be inadequate.
CONTROLLER NEVER DECLARED THE SITUATION WITH FLIGHT 11 AN AIRCRAFT EMERGENCY
The unexpected loss of radar contact and radio communications with an aircraft constituted an aircraft emergency. The situation with Flight 11 should therefore have been treated as an aircraft emergency as soon as the plane's transponder signal was lost, at around 8:21 a.m. on September 11. If it had been, procedures that probably would have led to fighter jets being scrambled presumably would have been initiated at that time.
Zalewski did take some action after Flight 11's transponder signal was lost. He called Schippani over, reported that he thought Flight 11 had "some sort of serious problem," and explained what he had done to try and regain contact with the pilots. [7] He also said he thought the plane may have been having an electrical or mechanical problem. [8] However, it appears that he did not declare the situation an aircraft emergency.
It is unclear, though, who at the Boston Center was responsible for declaring an aircraft emergency. Was it the responsibility of an air traffic controller? If it was, Zalewski should have declared Flight 11 an aircraft emergency when he saw its transponder go off, let Schippani know his decision, and Schippani could then have put into action procedures for dealing with an aircraft emergency. Was it the responsibility of someone more senior than an air traffic controller? In that case, Schippani or perhaps someone in the Boston Center's traffic management unit should have declared Flight 11 an aircraft emergency after Zalewski alerted Schippani to the situation. Or did Zalewski, Schippani, and the traffic management unit personnel all have the authority to declare an aircraft emergency? If so, it appears that all of them failed to carry out their responsibility on this occasion.
CONTROLLER OVERREACTED WHEN HE HEARD THREATENING COMMUNICATIONS
Zalewski did at least respond promptly, alerting Schippani to what was happening, when, minutes after the plane's transponder signal was lost, he heard threatening communications that he thought came from Flight 11. However, the manner in which he did this was odd.
He actually appears to have become quite hysterical after he heard the second threatening communication, in which a Middle Eastern-sounding man said: "Nobody move. Everything will be okay. If you try to make any moves, you'll endanger yourself and the airplane. Just stay quiet." He "screamed" to Schippani to get the supervisor to come over. Then, referring to the man who made the threatening communications, he exclaimed: "What are they saying? What are they saying?"
His behavior was so dramatic that other controllers were unsettled. He recalled that they "looked at him as if he was crazy." They were "looking at me, like, 'What is wrong with you?'" he commented. [9]
And yet his reaction made no sense. He was an experienced air traffic controller, having worked as one for 19 years, and presumably had dealt with many anomalous incidents on previous occasions. He should therefore have had more than enough skill to handle the current crisis. Furthermore, the threatening communications indicated that the situation was just a typical hijacking. There were clear procedures for dealing with a typical hijacking and so he had no reason to panic. And yet he recalled that the second threatening communication "scared the hell out of me." "I just was terrified," he said. [10]
He also broadcast his radio frequency over a loudspeaker after he heard the second threatening communication. He said he did this "so that everyone else could experience what he was experiencing and to generate a sense of urgency, which he felt did not exist." But this response was unusual, too, since he surely should have been concerned that his action might impair the ability of other air traffic controllers to respond to the crisis, by unnerving them and distracting them from their work.
Schippani certainly thought that putting the radio frequency on the loudspeaker was a mistake and added to the stress experienced by other Boston Center controllers. "If they just had it on their headset, we'd just have to deal with those two people [presumably meaning Zalewski and one unnamed colleague] listening to this hijacker," he explained. However, he commented, after Zalewski's radio frequency was put on the speaker, "everybody in the room is now hearing it, so now I've got some other critical stress things that I've got to consider with these other people." [11]
The only useful consequence of the action was that Zalewski's colleagues presumably heard the third threatening communication apparently made by a hijacker on Flight 11, at 8:33:59 a.m., in which the Middle Eastern-sounding man said: "Nobody move please. We are going back to the airport. Don't try to make any stupid moves." [12] However, this small benefit only came after they spent around eight minutes unnecessarily listening to routine communications between Zalewski and the flights he was handling.
CONTROLLER WANTED THE RECORDING OF HIS RADIO COMMUNICATIONS TO BE LISTENED TO
After he heard the second threatening communication, Zalewski wanted someone to listen to the tape of his radio communications to determine what exactly the Middle Eastern-sounding man said. But this was also a strange response, since he should have realized that the task of getting someone to find and then listen to the tape would be time consuming. And because the crisis was clearly far from over, he should therefore have been concerned that having someone carry out the time-consuming task might have impeded the FAA's response to the unfolding emergency.
The task of obtaining and listening to the tape indeed appears to have slowed the FAA's response to the crisis, since it took quality assurance specialist Bob Jones until just before 9:03 a.m. to carry it out and then report his findings to Terry Biggio, the operations manager in charge at the Boston Center.
Incidentally, it is worth noting that Biggio, not Zalewski, instructed Jones to find and listen to the tape. However, evidence indicates that Zalewski prompted Biggio's course of action and thereby brought about the delay in the FAA's response to the hijacking.
Joseph Cooper and Daniel Bueno, who worked alongside Biggio in the Boston Center's traffic management unit, both stated that Biggio was the individual who asked Jones to go and listen to the tape. Cooper recalled that after Schippani "came up and told us he thinks it's a hijack," Biggio "asks for someone to pull the tapes so they can review the tapes and listen to the tapes." [13] And when Bueno was asked about who told Jones to pull the tapes during his interview with the 9/11 Commission in September 2003, he replied, "That must have been, maybe Terry." [14] Biggio himself corroborated Cooper's and Bueno's accounts. "I requested someone pull the tape," he recalled. Subsequently, he said, "Bob Jones came downstairs and I started to explain to him the scenario." [15]
Biggio appears to have taken this action, though, because Zalewski asked for someone to listen to the tape of his radio communications. Zalewski has claimed that he was unable to make out what was said in the first threatening communication apparently made by a hijacker. "I wasn't quite sure what it was because it was just a foreign voice," he recalled. He therefore told Schippani that he wanted someone to listen to the recording of his radio communications, according to a report by NBC based on interviews with air traffic controllers who dealt with the hijackings on September 11. "Zalewski, concerned he might be missing vital information, asks the supervisor to have someone pull the transmission tapes that are automatically recorded right away," the report stated. [16]
If this is what happened, Schippani presumably passed on Zalewski's request when he went to the traffic management unit and told personnel there about the possible hijacking and the threatening communications Zalewski heard. And Biggio presumably instructed Jones to find and listen to the tape in order to fulfil the request.
Although the NBC report is the only account that stated explicitly that Zalewski asked Schippani to have someone listen to the tape of his radio communications, it seems logical that the controller would have taken this action, since, other accounts reveal, he made clear at the time that he wanted someone to check the tape. He told the 9/11 Commission that because he "did not understand the first transmission," he said to Jones, "Someone has to pull these fucking tapes right now." [17] And Jones recalled him saying words to the effect of, "You've got to get a recording of what was said." [18]
CONTROLLER WAS UNCLEAR ABOUT WHAT WAS SAID IN THE FIRST THREATENING COMMUNICATION
Biggio may have wanted Jones to go and listen to the tape not just because Zalewski requested this, but also because Zalewski had claimed he was unable to understand what was said in the first threatening communication. Biggio could have felt it was important to ascertain what information the controller had missed. This was certainly what he indicated when he was interviewed by the 9/11 Commission in September 2003. "Before we notify everyone, 'We've got a hijack, we think we do, we're almost positive,' we wanted to nail down exactly what was said," he explained. [19]
Zalewski's claim of being unable to understand the first threatening communication was dubious, though, since evidence indicates that Zalewski should have had no trouble making out what was said. The recording of his radio communications around the time the threatening communications were made is available on the Internet, and it reveals that the first threatening communication was clear and easy to understand. [20] Indeed, this was what Jones found when he listened to the tape. "I heard an Arab voice talking and it was very clear to me," he recalled. "I was able to hear clearly what he said and obviously the first thing we heard was, 'We have some planes, just stay quiet and you'll be okay, we are returning to the airport,'" he added. Surely, then, Zalewski too should have understood what was said.
Jones suggested otherwise. Air traffic controllers "are used to hearing standard ATC communications" and so "when something comes out non-standard," they "don't catch it the first second," he claimed. It "takes a while for your mind to kick back into that gear and assimilate that information," he explained.
He also noted that while the voice of the man who made the threatening communications "was very clear to me," unlike Zalewski, he "had the benefit of listening to it on a tape without the distractions of the control room." Additionally--again unlike Zalewski--he had known that he was "listening for something unusual" and this task "was my only role." [21]
All the same, Zalewski's claim of being unable to make out what was said in the first threatening communication was still suspect. To begin with, there appear to have been no particular "distractions of the control room" at the time that could have affected Zalewski's ability to understand radio communications. Certainly, Zalewski has never mentioned any in his recollections of that morning's events.
Zalewski should also have understood the first threatening communication because, having worked as an air traffic controller for 19 years, he would have had extensive experience of discerning what people said over radio. He was presumably very good at the task since, he told the 9/11 Commission, he "never had an operational error" in all his time as a controller. And, notably, he had experience of having to comprehend Middle Eastern-sounding voices from dealing with foreign aircraft. "I'm very used to working foreign carriers," he commented. These carriers included Egyptair and Saudi Arabian Airlines. An Arab voice was therefore nothing unusual to him. "I'm used to the dialect; I'm used to the voices; it's not something unusual to us," he noted.
The fact that the threatening communications he heard on September 11 were made by a Middle Eastern-sounding man should therefore have been unproblematic. And yet when he called Jon Schippani over after the first two threatening communications were made, he exclaimed: "What are they saying? What are they saying?" [22]
It turned out to be particularly unfortunate that Zalewski was supposedly unable to understand the first threatening communication because this meant a crucial piece of information was missed. Since the Middle Eastern-sounding man said, "We have some planes," he indicated that the hijacking of Flight 11 was part of a plan to simultaneously hijack several aircraft. The communication "included a seemingly unintentional warning about an unknown number of similar, related plots already in motion, but not yet activated," journalist and author Mitchell Zuckoff noted. Therefore, "At a time when every piece of information counted and every minute was crucial, the fact that Zalewski couldn't quite hear that chilling message marked a major misfortune," he commented. [23]
Zalewski's supposed failure to understand the message meant that until Jones listened to the tape of the controller's radio communications, Boston Center personnel were unaware that additional hijackings might be underway or were going to be attempted. Had they known this detail when they were first notified about the threatening communications, they may have responded to the crisis with greater urgency.
CONTROLLER WANTED HIS COMMUNICATIONS CHECKED EVEN THOUGH HE UNDERSTOOD THE SECOND THREATENING MESSAGE
It is also odd that Zalewski was intent on having someone listen to the tape of his radio communications since he understood what was said in the second threatening communication and was thereby able to determine that Flight 11 had been hijacked.
As previously noted, in the second threatening communication, which was made less than 20 seconds after the first one, the Middle Eastern-sounding man said: "Nobody move. Everything will be okay. If you try to make any moves, you'll endanger yourself and the airplane. Just stay quiet." Zalewski recalled that when he heard this, "I immediately knew something was very wrong and I knew it was a hijack." [24] Since he had established what had happened to Flight 11, then, why was he so keen for Jones to listen to the tape of his radio communications? What did he think Jones would achieve from listening to the tape?
He claimed that he "told Bob Jones that someone should be pulling the tapes" because "it was difficult comprehending the first transmission" and "I wanted to make sure I didn't miss anything." [25] But did he really think these concerns justified the delay to the Boston Center's response to the crisis that finding and listening to the tape might cause?
CONTROLLER DID NOT THINK THE CRASH AT THE WORLD TRADE CENTER WAS TERRORISM
A final aspect of Zalewski's response to the apparent hijacking of Flight 11 that was odd is that when Zalewski learned a plane had crashed into the World Trade Center, he didn't think the incident was a terrorist attack. He recalled that after his parents informed him of the crash when he phoned them during a break, he "immediately knew" Flight 11 hit the Trade Center, but "did not equate [the crash] to terrorism." [26]
This claim is baffling. He had determined that Flight 11 had been hijacked and been so concerned by the threatening communications apparently made by a hijacker that he broadcast his radio frequency over a loudspeaker so other air traffic controllers would hear what he was hearing. Surely, then, he would have concluded immediately that the crash was an attack by Middle Eastern terrorists who had hijacked Flight 11. Furthermore, if he didn't think the crash was a terrorist attack, why exactly did he think Flight 11 flew into the World Trade Center?
SUPERVISOR VIOLATED PROTOCOL AS HE RESPONDED TO THE HIJACKING
The conduct of Daniel Bueno, the supervisory traffic management coordinator at the Boston Center, also deserves close attention since, like Pete Zalewski, Bueno played a key role in the Boston Center's response to the apparent hijacking of Flight 11 and some of his actions on the morning of September 11 were unusual.
Bueno learned that Flight 11 appeared to have been hijacked when Jon Schippani came to the traffic management unit and passed on the information that Zalewski had just given him. Bueno recalled that, at "approximately 8:25 a.m.," Schippani explained that there was a possible hijacking in progress; the plane involved was American Airlines Flight 11, a Boston to Los Angeles flight; there was no radio contact with the pilots and "no altitude encoding" (presumably meaning there was no transponder signal); and the plane was visible as a primary target. (A primary target is what an air traffic controller sees if there is no transponder signal coming from a plane.) [27]
The way he responded after receiving this important information was certainly strange. But, alarmingly, some of his actions may have violated protocol. They may therefore have conflicted with the actions of FAA personnel who were following the correct procedure for dealing with a hijacking.
He appears to have violated protocol for the first time shortly after he learned there was a possible hijacking when, at 8:27:50 a.m., he called the FAA's Air Traffic Control System Command Center in Herndon, Virginia, to alert it to the situation. [28] This was unusual, since, after the traffic management unit and the operations manager in charge at an FAA en route center were alerted to a hijacking, the correct procedure was for the operations manager in charge to notify the appropriate FAA regional operations center (ROC) about the incident. [29]
Bueno therefore seems to have violated protocol in two ways when he called the Command Center. Firstly, because he was not the operations manager in charge at the Boston Center, it was not his job to notify other FAA facilities about the suspected hijacking of Flight 11. Secondly, since an en route center was expected to notify a ROC when a hijacking occurred, he was reporting the incident to the wrong facility when he contacted the Command Center.
SUPERVISOR WENT 'OUTSIDE THE BONDS OF PROTOCOL' BY TRYING TO CONTACT A MILITARY BASE
A few minutes after he called the Command Center, Bueno tried to contact the military directly to get fighters scrambled. At 8:34 a.m., in order to reach Otis Air National Guard Base on Cape Cod, Massachusetts, where two F-15 fighter jets were kept on alert, he called the Cape Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON), an air traffic control facility about 150 to 200 meters from the base. He reported the possible hijacking of Flight 11 and said, "I'd like to scramble some fighters to go tail him." [30]
However, this call appears to have been another breach of protocol. It was made "outside the bonds of protocol," Priscilla Jones of the Air Force History Office noted. [31] "Normally, the FAA receives the call from the military for a scramble, but this time it went the other way around," the 9/11 Commission explained. It was therefore "unusual for the [FAA en route] centers to contact [the] TRACON," the Commission noted. Indeed, Tim Spence, the operational supervisor who answered the call, said Bueno's action "was so different from anything I'd dealt with here before." [32]
Bueno himself seems to have realized he violated protocol by trying to contact Otis Air Base via the Cape TRACON. When he was asked during his interview with the 9/11 Commission, "Who were you supposed to call, military-wise?" he replied, "The Northeast Air Defense," meaning NORAD's Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS).
He claimed that he tried to reach Otis Air Base because it was "the closest and I know they have fighters there." "That was the quickest thing," he explained. He noted that his action was also influenced by past experience. "The reason I did that was ... early in my career we had aborted a hijack and I just recall them having fighters being tailed," he said. [33]
But surely these were poor reasons for a course of action that could have had detrimental consequences. Otis Air Base personnel might, for example, have wondered why protocol had been violated, could have been unsure how to respond to the violation, and, as a result, their response to the crisis may have been impaired.
Certainly, Daniel Nash, one of the fighter pilots at the base who later took off in response to the apparent hijacking of Flight 11, seems to have considered Bueno's action unhelpful. ''It sounds like the FAA didn't have their [act] together at all when they were calling the [Otis Air Base] tower," he told the Boston Globe. ''That has been explained away," he said. But, he commented, "To me, it sounded like there was someone who didn't know what they were doing." [34]
SUPERVISOR SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERED HIS ATTEMPT TO CONTACT THE MILITARY UNNECESSARY
Furthermore, it is odd that Bueno appears to have considered it necessary for him to take action to get fighter jets launched. This is because Terry Biggio had called the New England Regional Operations Center just a few minutes earlier and informed it of the possible hijacking of Flight 11. Had normal procedures subsequently been followed, that notification would have led to the military--specifically the National Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon--being contacted about the hijacking and asked to provide aircraft to escort Flight 11. [35] Bueno therefore had no reason to think he needed to do anything in order to get fighters in the air.
As it happened, while the ROC passed on the news of the hijacking to FAA headquarters, no one at FAA headquarters subsequently contacted the NMCC to report the hijacking and ask for military aircraft to be launched, as protocol required. [36] Bueno would surely have been unaware of this, though. He should therefore have assumed that the NMCC had been contacted and was arranging for fighters to be scrambled.
Bueno's action was also problematic in that, during the call to the Cape TRACON, Bueno implied that the F-15s on alert at Otis Air Base could be launched without authorization from senior military personnel. After asking for some fighter jets to "go tail" Flight 11, he told Spence, "If you want, just depart and we'll put a flight plan in for [the fighters], and we'll aim him towards Hampton direct." [37]
He should never have made this suggestion, though, since Otis Air Base needed authorization from NEADS before it scrambled the fighters. Spence found this out as he tried to fulfil Bueno's request. Consequently, when he called Bueno back at 8:43:07 a.m., he explained to the supervisory traffic management coordinator, "I just talked to Otis here and they said they needed NEADS authorization." [38]
INCIDENT APPEARED TO BE A TYPICAL HIJACKING
The 9/11 Commission suggested that even though the attempt to contact Otis Air Base directly went against protocol, Bueno made it "due to the urgency of the circumstance." Its explanation was misplaced, though, since Bueno had no reason to think the situation was particularly urgent.
This is because, on previous occasions, a hijacking generally involved the hijacked flight proceeding to an airport and landing there or included a ransom demand, and was therefore a manageable incident. "A hijack to us, prior to 9/11, was an aircraft going to land at Kennedy [Airport], look for money, or go to Cuba," Bueno explained. "That was our box of hijack; that's where it fit," he said. [39] And at the time he called the Cape TRACON, there had been nothing to indicate that the hijacking was anything other than a typical one. Indeed, in the first threatening communication apparently made by a hijacker, the speaker said, "We are returning to the airport." And in the third threatening communication, they said, "We are going back to the airport." [40]
Certainly, Pete Zalewski and Jon Schippani believed they were dealing with just a typical hijacking. Zalewski recalled that he thought Flight 11 "was headed back to Logan Airport" in Boston after he heard the second threatening communication apparently made by a hijacker. Then, he said, when the plane "continued on a southbound heading," he decided it was instead going to JFK International Airport in New York. [41] Schippani, meanwhile, recalled that he "assumed and probably told them [at the Boston Center watch desk] of that assumption, that he was going to Kennedy [Airport]." [42]
Other Boston Center personnel, too, saw nothing unusual about the hijacking. James Ekins recalled that as he and other air traffic controllers followed Flight 11 down the Hudson River, they assumed the plane was "bound for JFK Airport, where the hijackers could get a lot of media attention for whatever demands usually accompany this kind of situation." [43] "No one seriously considered any outcome other than an airplane proceeding to an airport somewhere and landing," the 9/11 Commission stated, based on its interviews with Boston Center personnel. [44]
Since the hijacking appeared to be a typical, traditional one, then, Bueno had no reason to take any exceptional measures--like trying to contact an air base directly to get fighters scrambled--in response to it. Indeed, Colin Scoggins explained that before 9/11, when a hijacking occurred, air traffic control personnel would usually just "sit back and you watch and follow them." A hijacking would be "a pretty boring event," he noted. [45]
SUPERVISOR INSTRUCTED A COLLEAGUE TO GO AGAINST PROTOCOL AND CALL THE MILITARY
Bueno was involved in another likely violation of protocol just after he called the Cape TRACON. The likely violation of protocol occurred at 8:37 a.m., when Joseph Cooper at the Boston Center called NEADS and said, "We have a hijacked aircraft headed towards New York and we need you guys to, we need someone to scramble some F-16s or something up there." This call was presumably a breach of protocol, since the correct procedure for dealing with a hijacking was for the operations manager in charge at an FAA en route center to notify the appropriate regional operations center of the incident. The en route center was apparently not expected to report the hijacking to any other facilities instead of, or as well as, the ROC. [46]
Although the call to NEADS was made by Cooper, Bueno instructed Cooper to make it. "Danny told me to call the military," Cooper explained. [47] If it was a violation of protocol, then, responsibility for the violation surely lay with Bueno.
As it happened, because FAA headquarters inexplicably failed to contact the National Military Command Center about the hijacking after the ROC informed it of the incident, it was fortunate that Cooper went against protocol and called NEADS, since fighter jets were only scrambled as a result of him making the call. (F-15s were scrambled from Otis Air Base at 8:46 a.m.) [48] However, since Bueno was presumably unaware that FAA headquarters personnel failed to follow protocol and contact the NMCC, he had no reason to tell Cooper to call the military.
It was therefore odd that Bueno had Cooper call NEADS for the same reason it was odd that Bueno tried to reach Otis Air Base via the Cape TRACON. Specifically, the supervisory traffic management coordinator should have considered the action unnecessary to get fighter jets scrambled. Since Terry Biggio had called the New England Regional Operations Center several minutes earlier and informed it of the hijacking, Bueno ought to have assumed that, in line with protocol, the ROC had reported the hijacking to FAA headquarters and FAA headquarters had then called the NMCC to ask it to provide aircraft to escort the hijacked plane. [49]
Additionally, he should have thought a call to NEADS was unnecessary because Tim Spence at the Cape TRACON had indicated that he was going to arrange for fighters to be scrambled from Otis Air Base. When Bueno called the Cape TRACON at 8:34 a.m. and asked for "some fighters to go tail [Flight 11]," Spence said he would "talk to Otis here" and "see what we can do." [50] This again meant Bueno needed to do nothing to get fighters launched.
It is also curious that Bueno appears to have determined that Cooper should specifically call NEADS to get fighter jets launched, since, at the time he told Cooper to make the call, he had not yet been informed that authorization from NEADS was needed in order to scramble the fighters at Otis Air Base. Although Spence called him and reported, "I just talked to Otis here and they said they needed NEADS authorization," Spence only did this at 8:43:07 a.m., several minutes after Cooper called NEADS. [51]
Why then did Bueno have Cooper call NEADS? Perhaps he knew authorization from NEADS was needed to launch the fighters before Spence explained this to him. But if this was the case, it makes no sense that he tried to get fighters scrambled from Otis Air Base at 8:34 a.m. without authorization from NEADS, since he would have known that personnel at the base would be unable to fulfil his request.
SUPERVISOR POSSIBLY ADVISED A COLLEAGUE TO CONTACT A FIGHTER UNIT IN NEW JERSEY
Bueno may have been involved in yet another breach of protocol around the time he instructed Cooper to call NEADS. He appears to have told Colin Scoggins to contact the 177th Fighter Wing of the New Jersey Air National Guard at Atlantic City International Airport and ask it to launch fighter jets. But, like his attempt to get fighters launched by contacting Otis Air Base directly, an attempt to contact the 177th Fighter Wing directly to request fighters would presumably have been a violation of protocol.
After Scoggins arrived in the air traffic control room on the morning of September 11, Bueno told him that if fighter jets were "not coming out of Otis, I want you to scramble something like Atlantic City because I'm figuring from the south now to come up." [52] It is unclear, however, if Scoggins subsequently called the 177th Fighter Wing.
The 9/11 Commission Report indicated that he did. It stated that someone at the Boston Center "tried to contact a former alert site in Atlantic City." [53] Scoggins, though, said he spoke to NEADS--not the "former alert site in Atlantic City"--about getting fighters from the 177th Fighter Wing launched. He told the 9/11 Commission that, shortly before 8:46 a.m., when Flight 11 crashed into the World Trade Center, because the fighters at Otis Air Base "had not got off yet," he called NEADS and said, "Maybe you wanna activate the guys off Atlantic City because they also do this." [54] And in an interview with a website called 9/11 Guide, he recalled that he "personally prodded NEADS to launch from Atlantic City." [55]
Exactly what Bueno told Scoggins to do is therefore unclear. Bueno may have instructed Scoggins to call the Atlantic City unit directly and ask it to launch fighters, but Scoggins disregarded the instruction and instead called NEADS and advised it to call the unit; he may have instructed Scoggins to ask NEADS to contact the Atlantic City unit and Scoggins then followed the instruction; or he may have been unspecific about how Scoggins should go about getting 177th Fighter Wing aircraft scrambled and Scoggins then determined that the best course of action was to call NEADS.
Regardless of what exactly Bueno said to Scoggins, it seems likely that the action he suggested would have been a violation of protocol, since, because FAA en route centers were only required to call the appropriate regional operations center when there was a hijacking, Scoggins presumably should not have called NEADS or the 177th Fighter Wing.
We can see, then, that Bueno was likely involved in several violations of protocol in the space of around 10 to 15 minutes on the morning of September 11. This is extraordinary. We surely need to know why he responded to the apparent hijacking in the way he did. It would be difficult to contend that his actions were due to incompetence, though. After all, he had worked in air traffic control for 19 years. He had worked as a controller, a supervisor, and a traffic management specialist. [56] He should therefore have had a good understanding of what air traffic control personnel were meant to do when there was a hijacking and the importance of following protocol.
MILITARY SPECIALIST TALKED TO NEADS ON A DAILY BASIS
Colin Scoggins was another member of staff at the Boston Center whose actions on September 11 deserve close attention since, like Pete Zalewski and Daniel Bueno, he had a lot of influence over the response to the hijacking of Flight 11 and, like Bueno, he seems to have violated protocol numerous times that day.
Scoggins had years of experience, which should have helped him respond effectively to the crisis on September 11. He was an F-4 fighter jet crew chief in the U.S. military between 1976 and 1980. He started working for the FAA as an air traffic controller at the Boston Center in 1982. He subsequently worked as an airspace and procedures specialist, an air traffic control specialist, and, since 1995, a military operations specialist. [57]
As a military operations specialist, he dealt with airspace, procedures, and military operations. [58] He managed "operating agreements between Boston Center and other air traffic control facilities, and also the military," and was responsible for "generating the military schedules that keep the FAA facilities in sync with military airspace requirements," author Lynn Spencer wrote. [59] He explained that he was "responsible for all military procedures between Boston Center and the military units in my airspace." [60]
Furthermore, he noted, he "probably dealt with [NEADS] more than other [FAA] facilities did." This meant he had close relationships with some NEADS employees. [61] Even before 9/11, he talked to them on a daily basis. [62]
On September 11, though, he was in a different position to his usual one. Due to the extraordinary events, he worked at the military desk at the Boston Center, where he helped respond to the hijackings. This should have been little problem, though, since, although he did not usually sit at the military desk, he noted, "I write all the procedures for it, so I understand the position probably better than anybody else who works the position." [63]
MILITARY SPECIALIST CAME TO WORK AN HOUR LATE ON SEPTEMBER 11
From the outset, Scoggins's actions on September 11 were out of the ordinary. Unusually, Scoggins went into work an hour late that day. "Normally I come into work about 7:30," he explained. But, since it was "a gorgeous day up in New England," he "ended up taking an hour off the front." "To date, I still can't remember what I did with that hour," he commented at a public event in 2010. [64]
Having taken "an hour off the front," he arrived at the Boston Center at around 8:25 a.m. to 8:30 a.m. and was informed of the hijacking of Flight 11 right away. [65] "As soon as I walked in the front door, there was somebody going out the door and they said, 'Hey, you might want to get on the floor; there's a hijack going on,'" he recalled. [66]
He usually worked upstairs in the administrative wing of the Boston Center. [67] But when he reached his office, a colleague told him that Bueno had just called and asked for him to go to the traffic management unit and see if he could help there. He therefore went down to the operational floor, arriving there at about 8:35 a.m. [68]
He was then briefed by Bueno on the details of the hijacking. Bueno emphasized to him that the hijacking was not a normal one and explained that the hijackers had turned off the transponder on Flight 11. He reported that a Middle Eastern or Arab voice may have been heard from the hijacked plane. He also said he had contacted the Cape TRACON and got Joseph Cooper to call NEADS.
MILITARY SPECIALIST CALLED NEADS DOZENS OF TIMES
Scoggins offered to help out and man the "mission coordinator position." He also asked Cooper if he had passed on all the relevant details about Flight 11 to NEADS, such as the plane's location and heading. Cooper said he had not.
Scoggins therefore called NEADS. He did this partly because he wanted fighter jets to be launched as soon as possible. "I was concerned we were trying to get the fighters off and they hadn't gotten off yet," he explained. He also wanted to get Flight 11 "identified"--apparently meaning located on NEADS's radar screens--so NEADS could provide the Boston Center with an altitude for it. [69]
He ended up making around 30 to 40 calls to NEADS that day. [70] He in fact spent "the majority of his time" while he was on the operational floor "in intermittent direct phone contact with NEADS," the 9/11 Commission noted. He had numerous discussions with a female officer who he believed was Dawne Deskins, the aircraft control and warning officer, and tried to help NEADS personnel gain "scope contact" with Flight 11--presumably meaning finding the plane on their radar screens--according to the Commission. [71]
Throughout the day, he regularly provided NEADS with information about the situation in the air. He recalled that he "had a lot of information coming in" from a "security telcon that I was listening in [on] with one ear" and so, "whenever anything passed over that, I would immediately call them." [72]
MILITARY SPECIALIST WENT 'OUTSIDE OF THE PROTOCOL'
However, he was presumably breaking protocol when he called NEADS, since an FAA en route center dealing with a hijacked plane was meant to contact an FAA regional operations center, and not NEADS, about the hijacking. [73]
Terry Biggio explained the correct procedure. He noted that in pre-9/11 training exercises in which the protocol for dealing with a hijacking was practiced, all communication was handled through the New England Regional Operations Center. "Training-wise or as far as the role play, we know that it's got to go to the ROC and it usually stops there," he said. [74] Scoggins was clearly aware of the protocol, since he mentioned it when he was interviewed by the 9/11 Commission in September 2003. "In a hijack, they're supposed to be notified, I think it's called the ROC," he said. [75]
Official investigators certainly seem to have thought he violated protocol by calling NEADS on September 11. He recalled that they asked him "where I got the authority to go directly to NEADS and how come I didn't follow the protocol." [76] He even admitted at a public event that with "a lot of the things [on September 11], I did go outside of the protocol." His "steps" for reaching the military "were more direct," he noted. The reason he gave for going against protocol was that he'd had "a telephone number right here to NEADS" and so he'd thought, "Why do I want to have all this happen when I can pick up a phone and call them myself?" [77]
Based on its interview with him, the 9/11 Commission suggested a different reason for his actions. It stated that while he knew that "in the case of a hijack, the [Boston] Center is supposed to notify the ROC," he was "not confident in the ROC's ability to facilitate military cooperation." "I'm not even sure what the [ROC's] role was in it at that time," he said during the interview. "I know they wanted to be notified a little early, but I'm not sure what the purpose would be, other than to get mobilized and start getting things working," he commented. [78]
However, when we try to understand why Scoggins repeatedly violated protocol that day, it is worth considering another factor: By making so many calls to NEADS, the military operations specialist put himself in the privileged position of being the main person in the FAA providing information to NEADS about the situation in the sky. He was the person at the Boston Center "most often in contact with NEADS," the 9/11 Commission noted. [79] He was in fact "the only one [in the FAA] giving them information about the flights [that] morning, other than the coverage on CNN," Lynn Spencer wrote. [80] Robert Marr--the battle commander at NEADS that day--confirmed that Scoggins "was about the only one that was feeding us information." [81]
MILITARY SPECIALIST MAY HAVE PROVIDED INCORRECT INFORMATION ABOUT FLIGHT 11'S LOCATION
Another notable aspect of Scoggins's behavior on September 11, in addition to the repeated violations of protocol, is that Scoggins appears to have given NEADS inaccurate information about the location of Flight 11. He initially gave it a fix/radial/distance (F/R/D), which is a distance and direction from a known geographical position. [82] After telling a NEADS technician that Flight 11 "was primary only, no transponder," he described where the plane was in relation to Albany International Airport. [83] "I have a target two zero miles south of Albany, heading one eight zero," he said. However, the technician saw no aircraft at this location. When Scoggins asked them, "Do you see the target?" they replied, "No, we don't."
The technician then asked Scoggins if he could provide a latitude and longitude for the aircraft. [84] Scoggins therefore tried to get latitude and longitude coordinates for them. "I had Joe Cooper sit directly at the radar and slew over [Flight 11] exactly when I asked for it, to give them an exact lat/long," he recalled. Subsequently, he stated, "Joe gave me the lat/longs and I read them directly to NEADS." NEADS personnel, though, were unable to find Flight 11 on their scopes at the location he described. It was "to no avail" and they "couldn't pick up the primary target," he noted.
The reason why NEADS personnel were unable to find Flight 11 at the location Scoggins described is unclear. Scoggins indicated that the blame lay with NEADS. Its personnel were unable to find the plane when he provided an F/R/D because they were "not using common reference points any longer," he stated. However, "We didn't know this on 9/11," he added.
He also implied that NEADS personnel were unable to find Flight 11's blip on their scopes because the plane was over land, rather than over water, which meant they had to locate it among a lot of what he called "ground clutter." "There isn't much ground clutter over water" and so NEADS personnel "have a high chance of success on picking up a threat" that is over water, he explained. NEADS personnel "normally wouldn't have much difficulty in finding targets because the perceived threat on 9/11 was from over water," he noted. [85] However, a NEADS ID technician contradicted his assertion. "To pick up a primary target is relatively simple over land," they told the 9/11 Commission. [86]
Furthermore, there is evidence indicating that blame for the inability of NEADS personnel to find Flight 11 on their scopes in fact lay with Scoggins. Specifically, the military operations specialist was recorded providing information about the plane's location that was demonstrably incorrect.
MILITARY SPECIALIST PROVIDED INFORMATION THAT WAS DEMONSTRABLY FALSE
A recording of communications at the Boston Center reveals that, at 8:52:41 a.m. on September 11, Scoggins told Jeremy Powell, a senior director (weapons) technician at NEADS, that when Flight 11 disappeared from Boston Center radar screens, it was "eight miles east" of JFK International Airport. [87] He subsequently provided the same information to a couple of the NEADS ID technicians. A minute or so after he gave Powell the plane's last known location, he told Stacia Rountree that "the last hit we had" showed Flight 11 about eight miles east of JFK Airport. He then said to Maureen Dooley, "Eight miles east of JFK was our last primary hit." [88]
Since JFK Airport is 12 miles southeast of Lower Manhattan, where the World Trade Center was situated, the location where he said Flight 11 disappeared from radar was presumably around 15 miles east and several miles south of the Trade Center. However, radar data show that Flight 11 approached the World Trade Center from the north-northeast, flying in a south-southwesterly direction, and so it was never eight miles east of JFK Airport. [89] This means Scoggins was recorded giving NEADS personnel incorrect information about the location of Flight 11 three times.
If he provided incorrect information on these three occasions, then, it is surely possible that he also provided incorrect information earlier on, when he described Flight 11's location in relation to Albany International Airport and gave latitude and longitude coordinates. Why he would provide inaccurate information about the location of Flight 11, however, is unknown.
MILITARY SPECIALIST TALKED AS IF FLIGHT 11 WAS STILL AIRBORNE AFTER IT CRASHED
In addition to giving inaccurate details about the plane's location, Scoggins provided NEADS with other misleading information about Flight 11. Specifically, he implied that it was still airborne after it crashed.
He did this during a call with Powell. The two men had been talking about the fighter jets scrambled from Otis Air Base when, at 8:52:32 a.m., Powell mentioned that NEADS personnel had been unable to locate Flight 11 on their scopes. Strangely, Scoggins subsequently talked about the plane as if it was still in the air, even though it had flown into the World Trade Center six minutes earlier. "I assume he's probably about 20 miles southeast of JFK [International Airport] now or south, almost due south," he said. Seconds later, at the end of the call, he again talked about the plane as if it was still airborne. "If you do get a hit on him or you track him up, please let us know," he said. [90]
He made no mention during the call of the crash in New York and the possibility that Flight 11 was involved. His failure to do so is certainly puzzling. Could he really have been unaware that a plane had flown into the World Trade Center? Or did he know about the crash but think it was unnecessary to discuss the extraordinary incident with Powell?
It would have been odd if Scoggins was unaware of the crash, since the incident was first reported on television three minutes before he talked about Flight 11 with Powell. At 8:49 a.m., a CNN news anchor stated that there were "unconfirmed reports this morning that a plane has crashed into one of the towers of the World Trade Center." [91]
At least some Boston Center employees should have seen the first television reports of the crash, since CNN was always on in the cafeteria air traffic controllers went to during their breaks and also in an office next to the traffic management unit (TMU) watch desk. [92] Any employees who saw the reports would surely have informed their colleagues about what had happened right away due to the seriousness of the event and because the event involved an aircraft. Scoggins therefore ought to have known that a plane hit the World Trade Center when he spoke to Powell.
Certainly, Joseph Cooper implied that Scoggins was promptly informed of the crash. He indicated that personnel in the TMU--where Scoggins was working that morning--learned of the crash just after it was first reported on television. They were alerted to it by a member of staff he referred to as the "SE"--presumably short for "systems engineer"--who worked in a room next to the TMU. He recalled that this man, who had CNN on in his room, "came over to the TMU, into the doorway," and shouted out, "A plane just hit the World Trade Center." [93] According Cooper, then, Scoggins likely learned that a plane had crashed into the World Trade Center at about 8:50 a.m.
Scoggins in fact suggested as much in his own recollections of the morning's events. "We didn't get notified for about three or four minutes after it actually hit, at our facility, that the tower was hit," he said when he was interviewed by the 9/11 Commission. [94] "We got a report about two minutes [after the crash] that a small aircraft had hit the tower," he said on another occasion. [95] And another time, he recalled that "about four minutes" after Flight 11 disappeared from radar, he and his colleagues "heard a call that a small business-type jet had hit the World Trade Center." [96]
Since Flight 11 hit the World Trade Center at 8:46 a.m., he implied that he learned of the crash sometime between 8:48 a.m. and 8:50 a.m. But if he knew about the crash by 8:50 a.m., why did he talk about Flight 11 as if it was still airborne a couple of minutes later, when he was on the phone with Powell?
MILITARY SPECIALIST 'DIDN'T EVEN ASSOCIATE IT WITH AMERICAN 11' WHEN HE HEARD ABOUT THE CRASH
He indicated that, if he was indeed aware of the crash when he spoke to Powell, it was because he didn't initially think Flight 11 was involved when he heard what happened in New York. "First time we were told an airplane impacted the tower, me and Dan Bueno didn't even associate it with American 11," he told the 9/11 Commission. "I just didn't have the feeling that that was him," he explained. He made the same assertion at a public event in 2010. "Our first response where we were at was that it couldn't have been American 11; he wouldn't have done that," he said on that occasion.
He claimed that he dismissed the possibility that Flight 11 was involved in the crash because "the initial call we got [was that it] was a small aircraft." "We heard it was a small aircraft or a business jet or something that had hit the tower ... so our assumption was it was just some other aircraft," he recalled. [97]
Scoggins's assertion that he didn't initially think Flight 11 was the plane that hit the World Trade Center was dubious, though, for several reasons. To begin with, Scoggins knew Flight 11 was in the New York area when the crash occurred. Indeed, at 8:40:25 a.m., he told one of the NEADS ID technicians it was "heading towards Kennedy"--meaning JFK International Airport. It was "35 miles north of Kennedy now, at 367 knots," he mentioned. [98] This meant it would be "over New York in less than five minutes," Lynn Spencer noted. [99]
He also knew Flight 11 had disappeared from radar--a detail consistent with the plane having crashed. "We lost radar on him about eight [miles] north of JFK [International Airport]," he recalled. [100] He even mentioned this during his call with Powell. "We lost radar on [Flight 11] ... about five minutes ago," he said. [101]
Additionally, he knew Flight 11 had been under the control of hijackers and therefore that events involving the aircraft were already unusual. He should surely have determined right away, then, that Flight 11 was likely the plane that hit the World Trade Center.
OTHER BOSTON CENTER PERSONNEL IMMEDIATELY CONCLUDED THAT FLIGHT 11 HIT THE WORLD TRADE CENTER
Casting further doubt on his claim that he didn't initially think Flight 11 was the plane that crashed is the fact that others at the Boston Center determined right away that Flight 11 hit the Trade Center and it is hard to believe that he would have thought differently to them. "Intuitively and instinctively, [Boston] Center personnel who were aware of and followed [Flight 11] on its flight south knew that it was [Flight 11] that impacted the North Tower, irrespectively of differing information available from CNN," the 9/11 Commission stated, based on the interviews it conducted at the Boston Center. [102]
Alan Miller, for example, said he had "no other reason to think it was something other than [Flight 11]" when Jon Schippani told him, "A plane crashed into the World Trade Center." "I think that's what [Schippani's] meaning was, that the plane that we were tracking, American 11, was the one [that hit the Trade Center]," he commented. [103] Lino Martins, meanwhile, recalled that he thought Flight 11 hit the World Trade Center immediately when he saw the crash being reported on the television in the cafeteria. He said he thought this because Flight 11 "was southbound" and because of "the turn," presumably meaning the plane's sharp turn to the south at 8:26 a.m. [104]
Tom Roberts, too, thought Flight 11 was the plane that crashed right away when he saw the coverage of what had happened in New York on television. Shirley Kula explained that Roberts had been "in the cafeteria" during his break "and saw it on TV." She recalled that when he returned to the control room, he told her, "Hey Shirley, I found your hijack." She had asked him, "Where?" and he'd replied, "He hit the World Trade Center."
Furthermore, Scoggins's claim that he dismissed the possibility that Flight 11 was involved in the crash because he heard the incident involved a small plane is hard to believe since Kula was unswayed by the misinformation. She recalled that after Roberts told her what had happened at the World Trade Center, she went to the cafeteria and saw it being reported on television that a "small aircraft" hit the North Tower. However, she said, she immediately rejected the information. "I figured it was a 757 and that whoever had witnessed it was mistaken," she explained. She said she immediately thought that "it was American 11 [that hit the North Tower] because they disappeared off the radar screen." [105] If Kula was able to quickly determine that any witnesses who said a small plane hit the World Trade Center were wrong, then, Scoggins should have been able to as well.
MILITARY SPECIALIST MAY IN FACT HAVE THOUGHT RIGHT AWAY THAT FLIGHT 11 CRASHED INTO THE WORLD TRADE CENTER
Some evidence indicates that this was in fact the case. To begin with, in the first account he gave of his experiences on September 11--a statement he wrote nine days later--Scoggins mentioned that after those in the traffic management unit learned of the crash at the World Trade Center, there were "discussions" among them "on what aircraft hit the WTC" and "it was apparent it was AAL 11." [106] And additionally, Joseph Cooper, who was with Scoggins in the TMU, recalled that after a member of staff came and told everyone in the TMU that a plane had just hit the World Trade Center, "Right away we knew it was American 11." [107] These two accounts therefore suggested that Scoggins's claim that he initially didn't think Flight 11 was involved in the crash was untrue.
Furthermore, it seems unlikely that Scoggins would have dismissed the possibility that Flight 11 hit the World Trade Center since, if he had done so, it would mean he disregarded the opinion of Terry Biggio, who, as operations manager in charge at the Boston Center, was presumably his boss that day. Biggio was convinced as soon as he learned of the crash that Flight 11 was the plane involved and let his colleagues know this. He recalled that after "someone from [airways facilities] came over and said, 'An airplane just hit the Trade Center,"' he "knew that it was American 11." He therefore turned to the other people in the TMU and "told them that American 11 just hit the World Trade Center." [108]
We can see, then, that there are two possible explanations for why Scoggins talked as if Flight 11 was still airborne during his call with Jeremy Powell and both are problematic. The first is that Scoggins had not yet been informed that a plane had hit the World Trade Center when Powell contacted him at 8:52 a.m. But if this was the case, it would mean no one told him about the crash in the three minutes after it was first mentioned on television, even though this was critical information that he needed to be notified of.
The second is that he was informed of the crash but nevertheless made no mention of it and the possibility that Flight 11 was involved when he spoke with Powell. But if this is what happened, it would mean he inexplicably failed to mention to Powell a crucial detail--that a plane had just crashed--which may have been connected to the crisis they were trying to deal with. It would also mean he talked about Flight 11 as if it was still airborne, even though he surely should have determined that it had just flown into the Trade Center.
Scoggins's call with Powell was certainly puzzling. But the military operations specialist's subsequent conversations with other NEADS personnel were odd, too. At 8:55 a.m., Scoggins seems to have told one of the ID technicians unequivocally that Flight 11 hit the World Trade Center. After discussing the plane with Stacia Rountree, he said, "He crashed into the World Trade Center." When Rountree asked, "That is the aircraft that crashed into the World Trade Center?" he replied: "Yup. Disregard the tail number [given earlier for Flight 11]." And when Rountree asked, "He did crash into the World Trade Center?" he answered, "That's what we believe, yes."
However, when another ID technician, Maureen Dooley, then came on the line, he contradicted what he had just told Rountree. After Dooley asked, "Are you giving confirmation that American 11 was the one [that hit the World Trade Center]?" he replied: "No, we're not gonna confirm that at this time. We just know an aircraft crashed in." [109]
MILITARY SPECIALIST SUGGESTEDED FIGHTER UNITS THAT NEADS COULD CONTACT
Another curious aspect of Scoggins's behavior on September 11 is that Scoggins advised NEADS of a number of fighter units to call for assistance, even though it presumably was not his job to do this. He mentioned at least six units that NEADS could contact.
He told it to try and get fighters from the 177th Fighter Wing of the New Jersey Air National Guard, based at Atlantic City International Airport, to go after Flight 11. "I requested that we take from Atlantic City very early in the [morning]," he recalled. He suggested making use of the unit's fighters that were already airborne in Warning Area 107, a military training area off the New Jersey coast. Although the unit no longer had an "intercept mission," he believed that "NEADS could have called them and asked them to cancel their [training] mission and divert." [110]
He similarly advised NEADS to call Andrews Air Force Base, a facility about 10 miles from Washington, DC, to get some of its fighters that were already airborne sent after Flight 11. "I called NEADS to call the DC [Air National] Guard as well, out of Andrews Air Force Base, to get them up," he stated. Although the DC Air National Guard, like the 177th Fighter Wing, was not involved in NORAD's air defense mission, he knew that some of its fighters flew every morning and "could have diverted over."
He also suggested launching fighters from units in Toledo, Ohio, and Selfridge, Michigan. While neither of these units was involved in NORAD's air defense mission, he again believed that "under the circumstances, [NEADS] could have grabbed all those aircraft." And he "prodded" NEADS to launch fighters from units in Burlington, Vermont; Syracuse, New York; and "maybe one more" location. [111]
A MILITARY OFFICIAL WAS LIKELY RESPONSIBLE FOR DECIDING WHICH FIGHTER UNITS TO CALL FOR ASSISTANCE
While these initiatives might appear to have been well intentioned, Scoggins could have been violating protocol by taking them, since it was presumably not his job to say which units NEADS should call to request fighters. It seems more likely that a senior military official would have been responsible for the task.
This official may have been someone in the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon, since the NMCC was "the focal point within [the] Department of Defense for providing assistance" in response to hijackings. Certainly, a military instruction issued three months before 9/11 gave the impression that someone at the NMCC might normally decide which fighter units to call on for assistance when there was a hijacking. It explained that when the military was going to provide aircraft to escort a hijacked plane, "the NMCC will advise the FAA hijack coordinator of the identification and location of the squadron tasked to provide escort aircraft." [112]
Alternatively, an officer at NEADS may have been responsible for the decision. Certainly Kevin Nasypany, the mission crew commander (MCC), and Robert Marr, the battle commander, usually had the authority to issue a scramble order and so it would be logical if these two men also had the authority to decide which fighter units to call on for assistance. However, due to the unique circumstances, it seems that Marr alone had the authority to make the decision on September 11.
Dawne Deskins explained that even though the MCC typically had "authority to have issued the scramble order," because Marr was in the NEADS battle cab on September 11, "the MCC would have made sure that Colonel Marr wanted to scramble that aircraft." The MCC would also have done this "because it was a hijacked aircraft" they were dealing with, she added. An additional reason why Marr would have been responsible for issuing the scramble order was that "this was a request for assistance, basically, to civilian authorities," she said. "In the decision process, it makes it different in that Colonel Marr would have to say, 'Yes, go ahead and do it,'" she noted. [113] If Marr was responsible for issuing the scramble order on September 11, then, it was presumably also his job to decide which fighter units to call for assistance that day.
However, while there is evidence indicating that officials at the NMCC and NEADS had the authority to decide which units should be called to request fighters, there is no evidence that Scoggins had any authority. It is therefore puzzling that he suggested to NEADS fighter units to call for assistance. Furthermore, he should have been well aware that it was not his role to do this, since he specialized in procedures and military operations, and was responsible for all military procedures between the Boston Center and the military units that used its airspace.
FIGHTERS WERE PROVIDED FOR REASONS UNRELATED TO THE MILITARY SPECIALIST'S ADVICE
As it happened, all of the units that Scoggins advised NEADS to contact subsequently provided fighter jets to assist the military response to the crisis. However, they appear to have done so for reasons unrelated to Scoggins's efforts.
For example, two F-16s from the 180th Fighter Wing of the Ohio Air National Guard in Toledo took off at 10:17 a.m. They did so, though, because NEADS was concerned that another commercial aircraft, Delta Air Lines Flight 1989, had been hijacked. We know this because at 9:49:29 a.m., someone at NEADS was recorded saying, "We're trying to get Toledo up after that Delta flight." [114]
The 127th Wing, a unit of the Michigan Air National Guard at Selfridge Air National Guard Base, also provided a couple of fighters, but this again was in response to NEADS's concerns about the possible hijacking of Flight 1989. We know this because at 9:57:35 a.m., a NEADS employee was recorded saying, "As far as that Delta 1989, we scrambled Selfridge and Toledo." [115]
Fighter jets from the 177th Fighter Wing in Atlantic City took off at 10:30 a.m. Although the reason for the scramble is unclear, there is no evidence that it had anything to do with Scoggins's actions. [116] Indeed, when a technician at NEADS tried to contact the 177th Fighter Wing earlier that morning in response to Scoggins's suggestion, the call went unanswered and so nothing came of the effort. [117]
Then, at around 10:38 a.m., an F-16 from the DC Air National Guard took off from Andrews Air Force Base. However, the scramble was in response to concerns about a suspicious aircraft that was approaching Washington and had nothing to do with Scoggins's advice to NEADS. [118]
F-16s from the 174th Fighter Wing at Hancock Field Air National Guard Base near Syracuse took off minutes later. But they did so because NEADS called on the unit for assistance due to its concerns about Delta Air Lines Flight 1989 and United Airlines Flight 93--the fourth plane to apparently be hijacked that day. [119]
And F-16s from the 158th Fighter Wing, located at Burlington Air National Guard Base, were reportedly patrolling the sky over New York "within hours" of the terrorist attacks. But while the reason they were launched is unspecified, there is no evidence that the scramble had anything to do with Scoggins's efforts. [120] It seems, then, that as well as presumably being made in violation of protocol, Scoggins's suggestions to NEADS about which fighter units to call for assistance achieved nothing.
MILITARY SPECIALIST CALLED NEADS ON AN UNRECORDED LINE
A final aspect of Scoggins's conduct on September 11 that is unusual and worth noting is that Scoggins often called NEADS on a different line to the one his colleagues at the Boston Center used when they contacted NEADS. As a result, many of his calls that day were not taped, either at the Boston Center or at NEADS, and so recordings of them were subsequently unavailable for investigators to listen to.
He made calls over something called the Defense Switched Network (DSN), a global phone service used by the U.S. government that is capable of both secure and non-secure communications. Most of his calls to NEADS were made using the DSN line at the mission coordinator position. This line was not recorded at the Boston Center. It was meant to have been recorded at NEADS, but "only if that line is used as a classified phone as well," he explained.
Everyone else on the Boston Center's operational floor used what Scoggins called the "hotline to NEADS" if they wanted to contact the Northeast Air Defense Sector. Unlike the DSN line, this line was recorded. Scoggins claimed that he used the DSN line instead of the hotline because he "knew all of the DSN numbers." [121] "I had their numbers memorized, the people that I knew I needed to talk to. I had the number for the battle cab; I had the number for their airspace manager; I had the number in my mind for the ID section," he explained. [122]
He recognized, however, that his use of the DSN line appeared suspicious. It "created a lot of [conspiracy theory] issues later," he noted. [123] Indeed, authorities were curious about his calls to NEADS and questioned him about them a few days after 9/11. The people who interviewed him said, "We only have one call from you on the hotline." He told them he made "40 phone calls" on September 11. When they then asked him where the recordings of the calls were, he said he had used the DSN line, which was not recorded by the Boston Center. He explained that NEADS did record the DSN line and mentioned that someone should request the tapes from NEADS. But "no one ever did," he recalled. [124]
FAA HEADQUARTERS EMPLOYEE WOULD BE THE HIJACK COORDINATOR WHEN A HIJACKING OCCURRED
Another FAA employee whose actions deserve scrutiny is the hijack coordinator on duty at FAA headquarters, since the person in this position had crucial responsibilities when a hijacking occurred.
Lee Longmire, the director of civil aviation security operations, appears to have been the hijack coordinator on September 11. Three senior FAA officials, including Longmire himself, indicated that he was in the position when they were interviewed by the 9/11 Commission.
When Lynne Osmus, the FAA's deputy associate administrator for civil aviation security on September 11, was asked who the hijack coordinator was, she replied, "On that day it was Lee Longmire." However, she noted that Longmire "could delegate that to someone if he so chose." [125] Monte Belger, the acting FAA deputy administrator on September 11, said the hijack coordinator "would have been the senior security person--Lee, if he was the one." [126]
Longmire, meanwhile, agreed when it was put to him, "We believe that your position that day was the hijack coordinator" and he was then asked, "Were you aware of that?" "Right," he replied. However, he sounded strangely tentative. [127] "It is not explicit in Longmire's recall that he was aware he was the hijack coordinator," Miles Kara, one of the 9/11 Commission staff members who interviewed him, commented. [128]
HIJACK COORDINATOR FAILED TO CONTACT THE PENTAGON
The hijack coordinator was the FAA employee whose job it was to contact the NMCC at the Pentagon when a hijacking occurred. It was their responsibility to "request the military to provide an escort aircraft for a confirmed hijacked aircraft" and they were meant to carry out this task "by direct contact with the National Military Command Center," an FAA order published in November 1998 stated. [129]
Longmire, though, made no call to the NMCC after FAA headquarters was alerted to the hijacking of Flight 11. After the New England Regional Operations Center notified it of the hijacking, "FAA headquarters began to follow the hijack protocol, but did not contact the NMCC to request a fighter escort," the 9/11 Commission Report noted. [130]
By 9:00 a.m., about 29 minutes after FAA headquarters was informed of the hijacking, Longmire had still made no call to the NMCC. The NMCC was finally notified that a plane had been hijacked at that time. However, the notification came about inadvertently and through no effort by Longmire or anyone else at FAA headquarters.
Specifically, Ryan Gonsalves, the senior operations officer in the NMCC, called FAA headquarters as he sought more information about the crash at the World Trade Center, which NMCC personnel had seen coverage of on television. [131] The FAA headquarters employee who took the call briefed Gonsalves on the "explosion" at the World Trade Center, which they said was "possibly" caused by an aircraft crash, and also mentioned the hijacking of Flight 11, which they said was a flight from Boston to Los Angeles. [132]
Longmire's failure to call the NMCC about the hijacking was serious. "That is where the breakdown occurred," Colin Scoggins commented. Indeed, because Longmire didn't contact the NMCC, it was "lucky" that Boston Center personnel "circumvented the protocol" and called NEADS. Had they not done so, "the military would have never known anything was going on," Scoggins noted. [133]
Ben Sliney, the national operations manager at the FAA's Command Center on September 11, pointed out the significance of Longmire's inaction in light of the failure of fighter jets to intercept the planes that crashed into the World Trade Center. "There is only one person in Washington who has the ability on the FAA's side to request that the military scramble jets and that's the hijack coordinator," he explained at a public event in 2010. "They are still looking for him," he added sarcastically. [134]
HIJACK COORDINATOR MAY NOT HAVE BEEN TOLD THERE WAS A HIJACKING
Although it was the job of the hijack coordinator to contact the NMCC when there was a hijacking, someone other than Longmire may actually have been to blame for the FAA's failure to call the NMCC about the hijacking of Flight 11. This is because, incredibly, it appears that Longmire was never told about the hijacking of Flight 11 in the half-hour or so after FAA headquarters was informed of it. [135]
Longmire indicated as much when he described his experiences on September 11 to the 9/11 Commission in April 2004. He recalled that he had been in his office on the third floor of the FAA headquarters building when Kay Payne, chief of staff for the FAA's associate administrator for civil aviation security, came and told him that "she'd been notified that air traffic had lost track of an aircraft." There was "no transponder, no communications," she explained.
He then headed to the aviation command center (ACC) on the 10th floor of the headquarters building to respond to the incident. He must have reached it sometime before 8:49 a.m., since the first crash at the World Trade Center had not yet been reported on television when he got there. He found that other personnel had reached the ACC before him. "When I arrived, people from my staff [were] already there, setting up the command center," he recalled.
At that time, his understanding of the situation was limited. Although he knew air traffic controllers had lost communication with an aircraft and lost the plane's transponder signal, he was unaware that a plane had been hijacked. He had not heard any mention of a hijacking when he headed up to the 10th floor and, when he arrived in the ACC and "asked my folks what we had," no one in the ACC said there had been a hijacking.
Even by the time Longmire and his colleagues in the ACC learned of the first crash in New York from the television coverage of the incident, no one had told them there had been a hijacking. "At that point, all we were hearing is still [that air traffic controllers were] attempting to communicate with [Flight 11] and not able to do so," Longmire recalled.
And when a second aircraft--United Airlines Flight 175--crashed into the World Trade Center, at 9:03 a.m., they were still unaware that planes had been hijacked. When Longmire was asked by a 9/11 Commission staffer, "Had you heard [the word] 'hijack' yet, at the point you see the second crash?" he replied, "I don't think so." He explained that, at the time, all he and his colleagues knew was that "we had multiple aircraft that we couldn't communicate with," since this was what air traffic controllers had reported. [136]
THERE WAS 'A PROBLEM WITH THE FLOW OF INFORMATION' AT FAA HEADQUARTERS
It appears, then, that no one at FAA headquarters informed the hijack coordinator that there was a possible hijacking after the New England Regional Operations Center called FAA headquarters, sometime between 8:30 a.m. and 8:32 a.m., and reported the situation with Flight 11.
A 9/11 Commission staffer noted that this was a serious failure. "It would seem to me that [the report of a possible hijacking] should have flowed up to your position," he said to Longmire. "If you're standing there looking at the second crash on TV and if you've yet to hear the word 'hijack,' to put it bluntly, then there's a problem with the flow of information," he stated. Longmire concurred. "I agree," he replied.
Furthermore, in addition to failing to mention that the situation they were dealing with involved a hijacking, no one in the ACC raised the issue of contacting the military with the hijack coordinator. When a 9/11 Commission staffer asked Longmire whether, after those in the ACC saw the second crash on television, there were "any discussions up in that room, then, about 'Where is the military? ... Have we got to get them involved?'" he answered, "I don't recall any." [137]
If Longmire's account is correct, then, blame for the FAA's failure to contact the NMCC to report the hijacking of Flight 11 and request military escort aircraft must lie with someone other than Longmire. After all, the hijack coordinator would not have reported a hijacking to the military if he was unaware that any planes had been hijacked.
It is unclear, though, who was to blame for Longmire's lack of awareness. A report written by several former 9/11 Commission staffers noted that after a regional operations center informed FAA headquarters of a hijacking, "duty officers" in the operations center at FAA headquarters were "required to notify the FAA's senior leadership, specifically the FAA 'hijack coordinator.'" [138] Unfortunately, the identities of the duty officers who should have informed Longmire of the suspected hijacking of Flight 11 and the reason they failed to pass on the important information to him have apparently not been determined.
NOTES
[1] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Peter Zalewski. 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003.
[2] Full transcript: Boston ARTCC Boston Sector, Sector 46, Radar position, September 11, 2001, 1204 UTC to September 11, 2001, 1240 UTC. Federal Aviation Administration, February 15, 2002.
[3] Brazalino Martins, 9/11 Commission interview, handwritten notes. 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Brazalino Martins. 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003.
[4] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Richard Beringer. 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003.
[5] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Shirley Kula. 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003.
[6] "Report of Aircraft Accident: Boeing 767-200, (B762), AAL11." Federal Aviation Administration, November 13, 2001; "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview With Peter Zalewski, Air Traffic Control Specialist Area C." 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003.
[7] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Peter Zalewski.
[8] Personnel statement of Peter A. Zalewski. Federal Aviation Administration, November 2, 2001.
[9] "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview With Peter Zalewski, Air Traffic Control Specialist Area C"; "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview With Peter Zalewski, Air Traffic Control Specialist Area C" (draft version). 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003; "The Skies Over America: The Air Traffic Controllers in Charge of the Skies Over America on 9/11 Saw the Nightmare Coming." Dateline, NBC, September 10, 2006.
[10] "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview With Peter Zalewski, Air Traffic Control Specialist Area C" (draft version); 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Peter Zalewski.
[11] "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Interview With Jon Schippani, Operational Supervisor in Charge, Boston Center." 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Jon Schippani. 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003.
[12] Full transcript: Boston ARTCC Boston Sector, Sector 46, Radar position, September 11, 2001, 1204 UTC to September 11, 2001, 1240 UTC; 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004, p. 19; Staff Report: The Four Flights. 9/11 Commission, August 26, 2004, p. 12; Priscilla D. Jones, The First 109 Minutes: 9/11 and the U.S. Air Force. Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 2011, p. 20.
[13] "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview With Joseph Cooper, Traffic Management Unit Coordinator." 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Joseph Cooper, part 1. 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003.
[14] "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview 1 With Daniel D. Bueno, Traffic Management Supervisor, Boston Center." 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Dan Bueno, part 1. 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003.
[15] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Terry Biggio. 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003.
[16] "The Skies Over America."
[17] "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview With Peter Zalewski, Air Traffic Control Specialist Area C" (draft version); Peter Zalewski, 9/11 Commission interview, handwritten notes. 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003.
[18] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Robert Jones. 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003.
[19] Terry Biggio, 9/11 Commission interview, handwritten notes. 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Terry Biggio.
[20] FAA audio file, Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center position 46R, 1204-1240 UTC. Federal Aviation Administration, September 11, 2001.
[21] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Robert Jones.
[22] "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview With Peter Zalewski, Air Traffic Control Specialist Area C"; "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview With Peter Zalewski, Air Traffic Control Specialist Area C" (draft version) ; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Peter Zalewski.
[23] Mitchell Zuckoff, Fall and Rise: The Story of 9/11. New York: HarperCollins, 2019, p. 64.
[24] "The Skies Over America."
[25] Personnel statement of Peter A. Zalewski.
[26] "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview With Peter Zalewski, Air Traffic Control Specialist Area C"; "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview With Peter Zalewski, Air Traffic Control Specialist Area C" (draft version); Peter Zalewski, 9/11 Commission interview, handwritten notes.
[27] Personnel statement of Daniel D. Bueno. Federal Aviation Administration, September 11, 2001; "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview 1 With Daniel D. Bueno, Traffic Management Supervisor, Boston Center"; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Dan Bueno, part 1.
[28] Full transcript: Boston ARTCC Boston TMU Severe Weather position, September 11, 2001, 1222 UTC to September 11, 2001, 1250 UTC. Federal Aviation Administration, April 19, 2002; "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview 1 With Daniel D. Bueno, Traffic Management Supervisor, Boston Center"; Staff Report: The Four Flights, p. 11.
[29] 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 458; "Q&A With 9/11 Boston Center Air Traffic Controller." 9/11 Guide, October 28, 2007; Emma Helfrich, "Air Traffic Controller Details Sea of Red Tape That Mired 9/11 Response." The War Zone, September 11, 2022.
[30] Full transcript: Boston ARTCC Boston TMU Severe Weather position, September 11, 2001, 1222 UTC to September 11, 2001, 1250 UTC; Partial transcript: Cape TRACON Flight Data position, September 11, 2001, 1229 UTC to September 11, 2001, 1253 UTC. Federal Aviation Administration, October 10, 2003.
[31] Priscilla D. Jones, The First 109 Minutes, p. 23.
[32] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Tim Spence, Cape TRACON Operational Supervisor." 9/11 Commission, September 30, 2003; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Tim Spence. 9/11 Commission, September 30, 2003.
[33] "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview 1 With Daniel D. Bueno, Traffic Management Supervisor, Boston Center"; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Dan Bueno, part 1.
[34] Matt Viser, "Two Pilots Revisit Their 9/11." Boston Globe, September 11, 2005.
[35] "Quality Assurance Bulletin: Boston Center Bulletin." Federal Aviation Administration, September 20, 2001; "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview 1 With Barry O'Connor, Regional Operations Officer for Communications Information Security (COMSAT), FAA Regional Operations Center (ROC)." 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003; Priscilla D. Jones, The First 109 Minutes, p. 16.
[36] New England Region daily log. Federal Aviation Administration, September 11, 2001; "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events: September 11, 2001." Federal Aviation Administration, September 17, 2001; 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 19.
[37] Full transcript: Boston ARTCC Boston TMU Severe Weather position, September 11, 2001, 1222 UTC to September 11, 2001, 1250 UTC; Partial transcript: Cape TRACON Flight Data position, September 11, 2001, 1229 UTC to September 11, 2001, 1253 UTC.
[38] Partial transcript: Cape TRACON Supervisor position, September 11, 2001, 1229 UTC to September 11, 2001, 1253 UTC. Federal Aviation Administration, October 10, 2003; Priscilla D. Jones, The First 109 Minutes, pp. 25-30.
[39] "Memorandum for the Record: Staff Visit to the Boston Center, New England Region, FAA." 9/11 Commission, September 22-24, 2003; "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview 1 With Daniel D. Bueno, Traffic Management Supervisor, Boston Center"; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Dan Bueno, part 1.
[40] "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events: September 11, 2001"; 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 19; Staff Report: The Four Flights, pp. 10, 12.
[41] "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview With Peter Zalewski, Air Traffic Control Specialist Area C."
[42] "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Interview With Jon Schippani, Operational Supervisor in Charge, Boston Center"; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Jon Schippani.
[43] "ATC on 9/11: 'The Single Greatest Feat in All of ATC History.'" National Air Traffic Controllers Association, September 11, 2021.
[44] "Memorandum for the Record: Staff Visit to the Boston Center, New England Region, FAA."
[45] Aviation Officials Remember September 11, 2001. C-SPAN, September 11, 2010.
[46] 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 20, 458; Emma Helfrich, "Air Traffic Controller Details Sea of Red Tape That Mired 9/11 Response."
[47] "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview With Joseph Cooper, Traffic Management Unit Coordinator"; Joseph Cooper, 9/11 Commission interview, handwritten notes. 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Joseph Cooper, part 2. 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003.
[48] 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 19-20.
[49] "Quality Assurance Bulletin: Boston Center Bulletin"; "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview 1 With Barry O'Connor, Regional Operations Officer for Communications Information Security (COMSAT), FAA Regional Operations Center (ROC)"; Priscilla D. Jones, The First 109 Minutes, p. 16.
[50] Full transcript: Boston ARTCC Boston TMU Severe Weather position, September 11, 2001, 1222 UTC to September 11, 2001, 1250 UTC; Partial transcript: Cape TRACON Flight Data position, September 11, 2001, 1229 UTC to September 11, 2001, 1253 UTC; Partial transcript: Cape TRACON Supervisor position, September 11, 2001, 1229 UTC to September 11, 2001, 1253 UTC.
[51] Partial transcript: Cape TRACON Supervisor position, September 11, 2001, 1229 UTC to September 11, 2001, 1253 UTC.
[52] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Dan Bueno, part 1.
[53] 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 20.
[54] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Colin Scoggins, part 1. 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003.
[55] "Q&A With 9/11 Boston Center Air Traffic Controller."
[56] "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview 1 With Daniel D. Bueno, Traffic Management Supervisor, Boston Center."
[57] "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview With Colin Scoggins, Military Operations Specialist." 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003; "Q&A With 9/11 Boston Center Air Traffic Controller"; Emma Helfrich, "Air Traffic Controller Details Sea of Red Tape That Mired 9/11 Response."
[58] Personnel statement of Colin Scoggins. Federal Aviation Administration, September 20, 2001.
[59] Lynn Spencer, Touching History: The Untold Story of the Drama That Unfolded in the Skies Over America on 9/11. New York: Free Press, 2008, pp. 32-33.
[60] "Q&A With 9/11 Boston Center Air Traffic Controller."
[61] Aviation Officials Remember September 11, 2001.
[62] Colin Scoggins, 9/11 Commission interview, handwritten notes 1. 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Colin Scoggins, part 1.
[63] Aviation Officials Remember September 11, 2001.
[64] Ibid.
[65] "Chronology of Events at Mission Coordinator Position." Federal Aviation Administration, September 20, 2001; "Memorandum for the Record: Staff Visit to the Boston Center, New England Region, FAA"; "NORAD Tapes." Diane Rehm Show, WAMU, August 3, 2006; "Q&A With 9/11 Boston Center Air Traffic Controller."
[66] Chasing Planes: Witnesses to 9/11. Directed by Michael Bronner. London: Working Title Films, 2006.
[67] Colin Scoggins, 9/11 Commission interview, handwritten notes 1; "NORAD Tapes."
[68] David Ray Griffin, Debunking 9/11 Debunking: An Answer to Popular Mechanics and Other Defenders of the Official Conspiracy Theory. Northampton, MA: Olive Branch Press, 2007, p. 335; "Q&A With 9/11 Boston Center Air Traffic Controller."
[69] "Chronology of Events at Mission Coordinator Position"; Chasing Planes: Witnesses to 9/11; "Q&A With 9/11 Boston Center Air Traffic Controller."
[70] "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview With Colin Scoggins, Military Operations Specialist"; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Colin Scoggins, part 1; "Q&A With 9/11 Boston Center Air Traffic Controller."
[71] Personnel statement of Colin Scoggins; "Memorandum for the Record: Staff Visit to the Boston Center, New England Region, FAA"; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Colin Scoggins, part 1.
[72] Aviation Officials Remember September 11, 2001.
[73] 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 458; Emma Helfrich, "Air Traffic Controller Details Sea of Red Tape That Mired 9/11 Response."
[74] "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Interview With Terry Biggio, Deputy of Facility, Boston Center." 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Terry Biggio.
[75] "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview With Colin Scoggins, Military Operations Specialist"; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Colin Scoggins, part 1.
[76] David Ray Griffin, Debunking 9/11 Debunking, p. 44.
[77] Aviation Officials Remember September 11, 2001.
[78] "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview With Colin Scoggins, Military Operations Specialist"; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Colin Scoggins, part 1.
[79] "Memorandum for the Record: Staff Visit to the Boston Center, New England Region, FAA."
[80] Lynn Spencer, Touching History, p. 82.
[81] Chasing Planes: Witnesses to 9/11.
[82] David Ray Griffin, Debunking 9/11 Debunking, p. 47.
[83] "Q&A With 9/11 Boston Center Air Traffic Controller."
[84] Chasing Planes: Witnesses to 9/11; David Ray Griffin, Debunking 9/11 Debunking, p. 47.
[85] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Colin Scoggins, part 1; "Q&A With 9/11 Boston Center Air Traffic Controller."
[86] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Maureen Dooley, Shelley Watson, and Stacia Rountree, part 1. 9/11 Commission, October 27, 2003.
[87] FAA audio file, Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center Military Operations Specialist position, 1200-1330 UTC. Federal Aviation Administration, September 11, 2001; Full transcript: Boston ARTCC Military Operations Specialist position, September 11, 2001, 1232 UTC to September 11, 2001, 1259 UTC. Federal Aviation Administration, April 12, 2002.
[88] Transcript: NEADS audio file, Identification Technician position, channel 7. North American Aerospace Defense Command, September 11, 2001; NEADS audio file, Identification Technician position, channel 7. North American Aerospace Defense Command, September 11, 2001; Michael Bronner, "9/11 Live: The NORAD Tapes." Vanity Fair, September 2006.
[89] "Flight Path Study: American Airlines Flight 11." National Transportation Safety Board, February 19, 2002.
[90] Full transcript: Boston ARTCC Military Operations Specialist position, September 11, 2001, 1232 UTC to September 11, 2001, 1259 UTC.
[91] "CNN Sept. 11, 2001, 8:48 a.m.-9:29 a.m." CNN, September 11, 2001; "Terrorist Attack on United States." Breaking News, CNN, September 11, 2001.
[92] "Memorandum for the Record: Staff Visit to the Boston Center, New England Region, FAA."
[93] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Joseph Cooper, part 2.
[94] "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview With Colin Scoggins, Military Operations Specialist"; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Colin Scoggins, part 1.
[95] Emma Helfrich, "Air Traffic Controller Details Sea of Red Tape That Mired 9/11 Response."
[96] "Q&A With 9/11 Boston Center Air Traffic Controller."
[97] "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview With Colin Scoggins, Military Operations Specialist"; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Colin Scoggins, part 1; Aviation Officials Remember September 11, 2001.
[98] "Transcripts From Voice Recorder, 11 September 2001 1227Z-1417Z, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Rome, NY." North American Aerospace Defense Command, September 11, 2001; Transcript: NEADS audio file, Identification Technician position, channel 4. North American Aerospace Defense Command, September 11, 2001.
[99] Lynn Spencer, Touching History, p. 34.
[100] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Colin Scoggins, part 1.
[101] Full transcript: Boston ARTCC Military Operations Specialist position, September 11, 2001, 1232 UTC to September 11, 2001, 1259 UTC.
[102] "Memorandum for the Record: Staff Visit to the Boston Center, New England Region, FAA."
[103] "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview With Alan Miller." 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003; Alan Miller, 9/11 Commission interview, handwritten notes. 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Alan Miller, part 1. 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003.
[104] "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview With Brazalino Martins, Certified Professional Controller." 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003; Brazalino Martins, 9/11 Commission interview, handwritten notes. 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Brazilino Martins. 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003.
[105] Shirley Kula, 9/11 Commission interview, handwritten notes. 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Shirley Kula.
[106] Personnel statement of Colin Scoggins.
[107] "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview With Joseph Cooper, Traffic Management Unit Coordinator"; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Joseph Cooper, part 2.
[108] "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Interview With Terry Biggio, Deputy of Facility, Boston Center"; "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Interview With Terry Biggio, Facility Deputy Manager, Boston Center" (draft version). 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003; Terry Biggio, 9/11 Commission interview, handwritten notes; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Terry Biggio.
[109] Transcript: NEADS audio file, Identification Technician position, channel 7; Michael Bronner, "9/11 Live: The NORAD Tapes."
[110] David Ray Griffin, Debunking 9/11 Debunking, p. 62; Lynn Spencer, Touching History, pp. 33-34.
[111] David Ray Griffin, Debunking 9/11 Debunking, p. 62; "Q&A With 9/11 Boston Center Air Traffic Controller."
[112] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCSI 3610.01A: Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking) and Destruction of Derelict Airborne Objects. Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 1, 2001.
[113] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Lt. Col. Dawne Deskins." 9/11 Commission, October 30, 2003; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Dawne Deskins, part 1. 9/11 Commission, October 30, 2003.
[114] "Transcripts From Voice Recorder, 11 September 2001 1227Z-1417Z, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Rome, NY"; Leslie Filson, Air War Over America: Sept. 11 Alters Face of Air Defense Mission. Tyndall Air Force Base, FL: Headquarters 1st Air Force, Public Affairs Office, 2003, pp. 71, 75; 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 28; Lynn Spencer, Touching History, pp. 178-179; Priscilla D. Jones, The First 109 Minutes, p. 43.
[115] Transcript: NEADS audio file, Identification Technician position, channel 7; NEADS audio file, Identification Technician position, channel 7; Leslie Filson, Air War Over America, pp. 68-70; Michael Bronner, "9/11 Live: The NORAD Tapes"; Priscilla D. Jones, The First 109 Minutes, pp. 43-44.
[116] Transcript: NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander position, channel 2. North American Aerospace Defense Command, September 11, 2001; Leslie Filson, Air War Over America, p. 75.
[117] Lynn Spencer, Touching History, pp. 33-34.
[118] Steve Vogel, "Flights of Vigilance Over the Capital." Washington Post, April 8, 2002; William B. Scott, "F-16 Pilots Considered Ramming Flight 93." Aviation Week & Space Technology, September 9, 2002; Leslie Filson, Air War Over America, pp. 79-82; 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 44; Miles Kara, "Relevant Andrews Transmissions." 9/11 Commission, February 17-18, 2004.
[119] Walt Wasilewski, "Fighter Wing's Aircraft Diverted." Syracuse Post-Standard, September 12, 2001; Leslie Filson, Air War Over America, p. 71; Priscilla D. Jones, The First 109 Minutes, pp. 43, 45.
[120] Susan Rosenfeld and Charles J. Gross, Air National Guard at 60: A History. Arlington, VA: Air National Guard, 2007, p. 36; "Vermont Guard Shines Brightest During Disaster Response." Pomerleau Real Estate, June 26, 2018; "History of the 158th Fighter Wing." AirForces Monthly, December 2020; Brian Colleran, "Vermont Pilots Recall Patrolling Sky Above Manhattan After 9/11 Attacks." NBC5 News, September 10, 2021.
[121] Personnel statement of Colin Scoggins; David Ray Griffin, Debunking 9/11 Debunking, p. 54; "Q&A With 9/11 Boston Center Air Traffic Controller."
[122] Aviation Officials Remember September 11, 2001.
[123] "Q&A With 9/11 Boston Center Air Traffic Controller."
[124] Aviation Officials Remember September 11, 2001.
[125] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Lynne Osmus." 9/11 Commission, October 3, 2003; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Lynne Osmus. 9/11 Commission, October 3, 2003.
[126] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Monte Belger, Former Deputy Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration." 9/11 Commission, November 24, 2003; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Monte Belger, part 1. 9/11 Commission, November 24, 2003.
[127] Lee Longmire, 9/11 Commission interview, typed notes. 9/11 Commission, April 30, 2004; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Lee Longmire, part 2. 9/11 Commission, April 30, 2004.
[128] Miles Kara, "Correspondent's Corner." 9/11 Revisited, June 21, 2012.
[129] FAA Order 7610.4J: Special Military Operations. Federal Aviation Administration, November 3, 1998, pp. 7-1-1.
[130] 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 19.
[131] Ibid., p. 35; "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Captain Charles Joseph Leidig, USN, Commandant of Midshipmen, U.S. Naval Academy." 9/11 Commission, April 29, 2004; Patrick Gardner, 9/11 Commission interview part 1, handwritten notes. 9/11 Commission, May 5, 2004.
[132] 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 462; Senior operations officer log, September 11, 2001, to September 16, 2001. U.S. Department of Defense, n.d.
[133] "Q&A With 9/11 Boston Center Air Traffic Controller."
[134] Aviation Officials Remember September 11, 2001.
[135] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Lee Longmire." 9/11 Commission, October 28, 2003; Lee Longmire, 9/11 Commission interview, typed notes.
[136] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Lee Longmire, part 1. 9/11 Commission, April 30, 2004.
[137] Ibid.
[138] John J. Farmer Jr. et al., "A New Type of War: The Story of the FAA and NORAD Response to the September 11, 2001 Attacks." Rutgers Law Review, September 8, 2011.
