The Many Failures and Unusual Actions of FAA Personnel After American Airlines Flight 11 Was Apparently Hijacked
"If the FAA had reacted faster" and NORAD's Northeast Air Defense Sector had reacted "as soon as [Flight 11] had headed south," the two F-15 fighter jets launched from Otis Air National Guard Base on Cape Cod, Massachusetts, in response to the hijacking "probably would have made the intercept" with the hijacked plane, Daniel Nash, the pilot of one of the F-15s, opined. [1] If Nash's evaluation was correct, it means the F-15s might have stopped Flight 11 from crashing into the World Trade Center if the FAA had responded more effectively.
We surely therefore need to carefully analyze the behavior of FAA personnel who were involved in the response to the apparent hijacking and try to determine what went wrong. Did some FAA employees simply make mistakes in an unusual and unprecedented situation or was something more sinister going on? Was an attempt perhaps made to disrupt normal procedures and thereby ensure that the 9/11 attacks succeeded?
CONTROLLER TOOK NO ACTION WHEN HIS COMMUNICATIONS WITH FLIGHT 11 WENT UNANSWERED
The FAA's response to the crisis on September 11 was problematic from the outset. Specifically, Pete Zalewski--the air traffic controller at the FAA's Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center who was handling Flight 11 when it was apparently hijacked--failed to raise the alarm when Flight 11's pilots repeatedly failed to answer his communications.
The last successful communication with Flight 11--the first of four commercial aircraft to apparently be hijacked by Arab terrorists that day--was at 8:13:29 a.m. At that time, Zalewski instructed the plane to turn 20 degrees right and the pilot acknowledged the instruction, saying, "Twenty right American 11." But when Zalewski instructed the plane to climb to 35,000 feet, 16 seconds later, he received no response. [2]
He recalled that he initially thought that "maybe the pilots weren't paying attention or there's something wrong with the frequency." [3] However, it became clear that this was not the case, since the repeated attempts of Boston Center air traffic controllers to contact the plane over the next 10 minutes were all unsuccessful. [4] Zalewski alone made 12 attempts to reach Flight 11 between 8:13:57 a.m. and 8:20:08 a.m., and all of them elicited no response. [5]
Journalist and author Mitchell Zuckoff described what happened. After Flight 11's pilots first failed to answer one of his communications, "Zalewski tried again," he wrote. When Zalewski again received no response, "he wondered if [the pilots] John Ogonowski and Tom McGuinness weren't paying attention or perhaps had a problem with the radio frequency." Next, he "checked his equipment, tried the radio frequency Flight 11 used when it first took off, then used an emergency frequency to hail the plane." But "still he heard nothing in response."
At 8:14:08 a.m., he tried to reach the pilots once more. "American 11, Boston," he said. Fifteen seconds later he repeated the message and 10 seconds after that he asked, "American one one ... how do you hear me?" "Four more tries in the next two minutes. Nothing," Zuckoff wrote. At 8:17:05 a.m., Zalewski tried again, saying, "American 11, American one one, Boston." He tried "again. And again. And again." But Flight 11 was "still NORDO," meaning there was no radio contact with the plane. [6]
Zalewski "noted that the situation was highly unusual," the 9/11 Commission stated, based on its interview with the controller in September 2003. [7] "I start to get concerned, obviously, as he's not answering me," Zalewski had said. [8] He became worried that, "at its current altitude and position, Flight 11 might be on a collision course with planes flying inbound toward Logan [International Airport in Boston]," Zuckoff wrote. [9]
SUPERVISOR WAS USUALLY ALERTED IMMEDIATELY WHEN RADIO CONTACT WAS LOST WITH A PLANE
Despite his concern, however, he failed to report the problem to a superior. This was odd since, when communication with a commercial aircraft was lost, the controller handling the flight would normally inform their supervisor.
Richard Beringer, an air traffic control specialist at the Boston Center, explained why it was important to do this. "Planes leave the frequency for whatever reason--they're not paying attention in the cockpit or hit a button or something--and when they get closer [and the pilots] realize they haven't been in contact with somebody for a while, they eventually call somebody and they find the frequency they're supposed to be on," he said.
But, he noted, "More than occasionally, if you had an air carrier like American [Airlines] and United [Airlines], you would notify your supervisor and they may or may not use ARINC." (ARINC is a company that airlines pay to transmit text messages to and from their planes.) ARINC had "another set of radios" and so if a supervisor contacted the company, "sometimes they can get ahold of an air carrier that's in the air and try to track them down that way," he explained.
Significantly, according to Beringer, "Most controllers would notify [a supervisor] as soon as they realized they had a NORDO." "Especially with an air carrier, you'd notify the supervisor right away, just because they do have that ability with ARINC to get ahold of them," he said. [10] And yet Zalewski made no attempt to alert his supervisor when the pilots of Flight 11 repeatedly failed to answer his communications. Their failure to respond "wasn't major, because these things happen," he commented.
He only took action seven minutes after the pilots first failed to respond to one of his communications, when Flight 11's transponder went off. (A transponder is a device that sends an aircraft's identifying information, speed, and altitude to the radar screens of air traffic controllers on the ground.) Only then did he conclude that something was seriously wrong. "Then it was a problem to me," he explained.
At that point, he finally alerted his supervisor, Jon Schippani, to what was happening. "I turn to the desk very quietly--and this is quite a distance from me--and I said, 'Jon, will you come over here please?'" he recalled. When Schippani came over, he told the supervisor, "I think this plane has some sort of serious problem" and explained what he had done to try and contact it. [11]
LOSS OF RADIO CONTACT AND TRANSPONDER SIGNAL COULD INDICATE 'A CATASTROPHIC SYSTEM FAILURE'
Even after Zalewski explained the situation to Schippani, though, Boston Center personnel took no significant action to resolve the crisis. This was an alarming failure, since the simultaneous loss of radio contact and transponder signal was a notable problem, regardless of whether or not the errant plane had been hijacked. When 9/11 Commission staffers visited the Boston Center in September 2003, they were told it was "highly unusual and many controllers had never experienced that combination." [12]
When Beringer was asked if the simultaneous loss of radio communications and transponder signal had "ever occurred on your watch," he replied: "No. Never seen it and never heard of anybody seeing it." [13] And when Zalewski was asked, "Had you ever encountered controlling an aircraft in your career at the FAA that had both lost radio communications and transponder?" he replied, "I believe not." [14]
The simultaneous loss of radio communications and transponder signal usually meant a plane had suffered a serious fault. It indicated "a catastrophic system failure," the 9/11 Commission Report stated. [15] It was a sign of "major mechanical malfunction," Terry Biggio, the operations manager in charge at the Boston Center, said. [16]
This was certainly what Zalewski and Lino Martins, another air traffic controller at the Boston Center, thought after Flight 11's transponder went off on September 11. When Zalewski alerted Schippani to the situation, he told the supervisor he thought Flight 11 had suffered a "serious problem" that was "either mechanical or electrical." [17] And Martins recalled, "At that time ... I thought it was an electrical problem, a mechanical problem of some kind in the airplane." [18] And yet no significant action was taken to deal with this "serious problem."
FIGHTER JETS WERE FREQUENTLY LAUNCHED IN RESPONSE TO AIRCRAFT EMERGENCIES
The FAA's air traffic control manual made clear the severity of the situation Boston Center personnel faced after Flight 11's transponder signal was lost. The "unexpected loss of radar contact and radio communications" with an aircraft constituted an "aircraft emergency," it explained. And if a controller was "in doubt that a situation constitutes an emergency or potential emergency," they should "handle it as though it were an emergency," the manual stated.
It is unclear if air traffic control personnel were required to follow a specific course of action if they lost both radio communications and transponder signal. The manual suggested that discretion should be used to determine what to do when there was an aircraft emergency. Controllers should "select and pursue a course of action which appears to be most appropriate under the circumstances," it stated. [19]
It would have made sense, though, for Boston Center personnel to have followed a course of action that would have resulted in the military being contacted and fighter jets being scrambled. The fighters could have been directed toward Flight 11 and, when they reached it, taken appropriate action to address the situation.
Fighters could carry out a number of actions to try and resolve an aircraft emergency. They could "intercept the aircraft, come up beside it, and divert it in the right direction toward an airfield or find out what the problems are in order to assist," Jeff Ford, the aviation and security coordinator for the NORAD and U.S. Northern Command Interagency Coordination Directorate, explained. [20] And Mike Snyder, a NORAD (North American Aerospace Defense Command) spokesman, noted that an aircraft emergency would typically be handled with a graduated response. "The approaching fighter may rock its wingtips to attract the pilot's attention or make a pass in front of the aircraft," he said. Eventually, the fighter could "fire tracer rounds in the airplane's path or, under certain circumstances, down it with a missile." [21]
It seems odd, then, that senior Boston Center personnel took no action that would have led to fighters being scrambled when Flight 11's transponder went off and the situation constituted an aircraft emergency. This was particularly the case since scrambling fighters in response to aircraft emergencies was a fairly routine occurrence. It was "not unusual, and certainly was a well-refined procedure," for NORAD fighters to intercept aircraft, Norton Schwartz, commander of the Alaskan NORAD Region on September 11, commented. [22] NORAD scrambled fighters for this purpose about once per day on average, according to a report published by the General Accounting Office in May 1994. The report stated that fighters had taken off to intercept aircraft 1,518 times during the previous four years. [23]
Martin Richard, a fighter pilot at Otis Air Base, noted that fighters would be scrambled in response to common and unremarkable problems. "We see many scrambles during the year and most all are just aircraft or vessels that can't be identified but are friendly," he remarked. [24] Information in the General Accounting Office report was consistent with his observation. While a small proportion of the 1,518 scrambles the report mentioned were in response to suspected drug-smuggling aircraft, the large majority of them--about 93 percent--involved "visually inspecting unidentified aircraft and assisting aircraft in distress." [25]
SUPERVISORS WERE NOTIFIED WHEN FLIGHT 11'S TRANSPONDER SIGNAL WAS LOST
Certainly, when Flight 11's transponder signal was lost, Lino Martins, whose airspace Flight 11 was in, and Pete Zalewski, who was still following the plane even though it had left his airspace, appear to have realized that action was necessary and responded appropriately. Air traffic controllers at the Boston Center "generally agreed that transponder loss would be reported to the supervisor," the 9/11 Commission found. [26] And, consistent with this view, Zalewski and Martins both immediately alerted their supervisors when Flight 11's transponder went off.
As previously mentioned, Zalewski reported what had happened to Jon Schippani. He told Schippani he thought the plane may have an electrical or mechanical problem. He also explained what he had done to try and regain contact with Flight 11. [27] Martins, meanwhile, reported what had happened to Pete Pasquale. "Hey, there's something wrong here, I've lost the transponder now," he told the supervisor.
Since the simultaneous loss of radio and transponder signal was "a rare and alarming occurrence," according to the 9/11 Commission Report, senior Boston Center personnel should presumably then have determined that they needed to take action that would lead to the military being contacted and fighter jets being scrambled. This was certainly what Martins believed. He told Pasquale, "Maybe they ought to scramble on this aircraft." [28]
And yet no one at the Boston Center contacted the military to ask for fighters to be scrambled or contacted another FAA facility--such as the New England Regional Operations Center (ROC) or FAA headquarters--so it could take action that would lead to fighters being scrambled.
SUPERVISOR'S ONLY RESPONSE WAS TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION WITH OTHER CONTROLLERS
Schippani didn't even notify his superiors at the Boston Center after he was alerted to the situation. He presumably should have gone straight to the traffic management unit (TMU) and reported what had happened to the senior personnel there, so they could take appropriate action. Instead, though, he went to another area where air traffic controllers were working and discussed the errant flight with some of the controllers there.
"I went over to Area B ... and asked if they had any contact [with Flight 11]," he recalled. "They didn't," he added. He told one of the controllers, Shirley Kula, "We don't know what his altitude is, so you need to check with all the facilities from the ground up." [29] And because Flight 11's altitude was unknown, he advised the controllers to move aircraft they were handling off their original courses, presumably because he was concerned that Flight 11 might collide with one of these aircraft. [30]
This appears to have been all he did. Certainly, Zalewski had no recollection of him doing anything else. "I don't know what he did," Zalewski commented. [31] Schippani himself recalled that after he spoke to Kula, "I went back to my area." [32]
MANAGERS MADE NO ATTEMPT TO REPORT THE EMERGENCY TO OUTSIDE FACILITIES
Lino Martins's supervisor, Pete Pasquale, however, did take appropriate action after Martins alerted him to the aircraft emergency. He immediately went to the TMU and told personnel there what the situation was.
Joseph Cooper, the traffic management unit coordinator, described what happened. "Pete Pasquale from Area B came up and he said, 'American 11 ... we lost communications and we lost the transponder,'" he recalled. Pasquale was clearly uneasy. "He said something like it didn't feel right or something like that ... and basically, what he was getting at was, to lose both the transponder and communications at the same time was kind of odd," Cooper added.
This happened at "about 8:20," according to Cooper. Since Flight 11's transponder went off at 8:20:48 a.m., Pasquale presumably therefore headed to the TMU immediately after Martins told him about the loss of transponder signal.
Pasquale's notification should surely have prompted action that would have led to fighter jets being scrambled. And yet no such action was taken. TMU personnel made no call to the New England Regional Operations Center, FAA headquarters, or any military facility to report the emergency. All that happened, according to Cooper, was that they "pulled up the call sign to monitor the flight" on a radar scope. [33]
At the very least, they should have immediately contacted Terry Biggio--the operations manager in charge--to alert him to the crisis. Biggio had been in the TMU and would have learned about the aircraft emergency when Pasquale reported it, but he had just left to go to the bathroom when Pasquale arrived. [34] And yet it appears that no attempt was made to contact him after Pasquale reported the emergency. Certainly, in their recollections of the events of September 11, neither Cooper, Daniel Bueno, the supervisory traffic management coordinator, who also worked in the TMU, nor Biggio himself mentioned anyone in the TMU doing this. [35]
The failure of Biggio's colleagues in the TMU to immediately contact Biggio is particularly puzzling considering that these men supposedly recognized right away the seriousness of the situation. "We were thinking something catastrophic," Bueno commented.
Their failure was also odd considering that Biggio was alerted immediately when Schippani came to the TMU minutes later and reported that there was a "hijack in progress." On that occasion, Bueno sent a pager message to Biggio and passed on the news to him and, as a result, Biggio was back in the TMU "by the time that I turned around," Bueno recalled. [36] If a report of a hijacking warranted contacting Biggio immediately, surely news of "something catastrophic" should have been treated with the same level of urgency.
Schippani and the TMU personnel's lack of response when Flight 11's transponder signal was lost was certainly unfortunate because if these men had taken appropriate action at that time, the military may have been alerted to the crisis significantly earlier than actually occurred. Since the transponder went off at 8:20:48 a.m., if someone in the TMU had passed on the news of the aircraft emergency up their chain of command immediately after Pasquale reported it to them, action that presumably would have led to fighter jets being scrambled would likely have been taken at around 8:23 a.m.
But because TMU personnel only took action after Schippani came and told them there was a hijacking, their chain of command was only alerted to the crisis seven minutes later when, at 8:30 a.m., Biggio called the New England Regional Operations Center and reported that "they may have a hijacking ongoing." [37]
Seven minutes is a long time in the middle of a major terrorist attack, when every minute is crucial. If TMU personnel had alerted their chain of command at 8:23 a.m., the extra minutes other facilities had to respond could have been invaluable and would surely have increased the likelihood that at least one of the planes that crashed into the World Trade Center would have been intercepted by fighter jets before it hit its target.
FIGHTER PILOTS RESPONDED WITH URGENCY TO AIRCRAFT EMERGENCIES
Furthermore, if Boston Center managers had followed the procedure for dealing with an aircraft emergency after Flight 11's transponder went off, the response to the crisis may have been more effective. This is because the procedure for dealing with an aircraft emergency was presumably fast, since it needed to resolve situations such as one in which a plane was out of control or one where a plane's pilots were unable to communicate with air traffic controllers. In situations like these, a prompt response is surely essential due to the possibility that the errant aircraft will crash into another plane or a populated area.
Supporting the contention that the procedure for dealing with an aircraft emergency was fast is the fact that fighter pilots responded with urgency to a typical scramble order. Specifically, they were expected to be in the air within five minutes of the scramble order. [38]
The procedure for responding to a hijacking, though, was likely slower, since it was based on the assumption that the original pilots were still flying the hijacked plane and the hijackers had no intention of using the plane as a weapon in a terrorist attack. "The paradigm assumed that negotiations between hijackers and law enforcement would take place, usually after a commandeered plane landed safely, and that passengers and crew would emerge unscathed," Priscilla Jones of the Air Force History Office explained. With a typical hijacking, then, it would have been unnecessary to get fighters in the air immediately. [39]
Flight 11's situation was in fact anomalous in that it involved an aircraft emergency and a suspected hijacking. All the same, even after Flight 11 was determined to have been hijacked, it would surely have made sense to follow the procedure for dealing with an aircraft emergency, since the danger posed by an aircraft that had lost communications and its transponder signal meant the fastest possible response was imperative.
PENTAGON COMMAND CENTER WAS THE 'FOCAL POINT' WHEN A HIJACKING OCCURRED
Pete Zalewski determined that Flight 11 had been hijacked at around 8:25 a.m., after he heard a threatening communication, apparently made by a hijacker, in which a man said: "Nobody move. Everything will be okay. If you try to make any moves, you'll endanger yourself and the airplane. Just stay quiet." [40]
Air traffic controllers were expected to follow specific procedures when a plane was thought to have been hijacked. The air traffic control manual stated that the controller handling the hijacked flight should "notify supervisory personnel of the situation." [41] After being alerted to the hijacking, the supervisor was expected to inform the traffic management unit and the operations manager in charge at their facility. The FAA en route center would then notify "the appropriate regional operations center, which in turn contacts FAA headquarters," the 9/11 Commission Report explained. [42]
At that point, a "hijack coordinator" at FAA headquarters would take charge of the situation. This person was responsible for contacting the military--specifically, the National Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon--and asking it to provide aircraft to escort the hijacked plane. Normally, NORAD aircraft would then be tasked with escorting the hijacked plane. [43] Subsequent to that, NORAD would "call the regional defense sector that is responsible for the area" in which the hijacked aircraft was flying, Colin Scoggins, a military operations specialist at the Boston Center, said. [44]
The kind of assistance military aircraft could provide was described in an FAA order published in November 1998. The aircraft could "assure positive flight following," "report unusual observances," and "aid search and rescue in the event of an emergency," the FAA order noted. The order also stated that the military aircraft launched in response to the hijacking were to be vectored to a position five miles directly behind the hijacked plane, where the people on the plane would be unable to see them. The military aircraft were then expected to fly at the same altitude, speed, and heading as the hijacked plane while they followed it. [45]
A military instruction published just over three months before 9/11 gave further details of the protocol for dealing with a hijacking. It pointed out that the NMCC was the "focal point" within the Department of Defense for providing assistance and was to be notified "by the most expeditious means by the FAA" when a hijacking occurred. Once it had been notified of the hijacking, the NMCC was required to forward requests for Department of Defense assistance to the secretary of defense for approval.
The instruction added that the NMCC, the deputy director for operations in the NMCC, and the FAA should "maintain coordination" during the hijacking situation. [46] The NMCC was meant to "keep the FAA hijack coordinator up to date and help the FAA centers coordinate directly with the military," the 9/11 Commission Report stated. [47]
CONTROLLER DIDN'T THINK HIS SUPERVISOR 'WAS TAKING THE SITUATION SERIOUSLY'
After Zalewski determined that Flight 11 had been hijacked, he followed protocol. He was required to "notify supervisory personnel of the situation" and this was what he did. He recalled that he "immediately yelled for the supervisor and let him know that I believed [Flight 11] was being hijacked." [48]
He was unhappy, though, with the way his supervisor, Jon Schippani, responded to the notification. He complained that Schippani "sauntered off" with "no sense of emergency." He said he had even "wanted to get another supervisor, since he did not think Schippani was taking the situation seriously." [49]
It would be appalling if Schippani responded to the news of the hijacking in the way Zalewski claimed. However, some evidence casts doubt on Zalewski's account and indicates that Schippani took the report of a hijacking seriously. To begin with, Schippani appears to have followed the protocol for responding to a hijacking after Zalewski reported the situation to him.
A supervisor was expected to notify the traffic management unit and the operations manager in charge at their facility if they were alerted to a hijacking, and Schippani said this was what he did. After he was informed of the situation with Flight 11, he went to the TMU and told personnel there what was happening. "We think it's a hijack and he's going to an airport," he explained to them. [50]
Joseph Cooper confirmed Schippani's account. He said that after Pete Pasquale left the TMU, having reported the loss of communication with Flight 11 and the loss of the plane's transponder signal, "Another supervisor came up--this is the one from Area C--and he said he thinks American [11] is being hijacked." He recalled that Schippani also said that "they were listening to a conversation in the cockpit and it sounded like someone was making threats." [51]
Daniel Bueno, too, corroborated Schippani's account. "My first inkling of something strange was Jon Schippani, a supervisor in Area C, came down to me," he explained. He recalled Schippani telling him something like "There's a hijack," "American 11 is a hijack," or "There's a hijack in progress." [52]
He also indicated that Schippani passed on the details of the suspected hijacking to TMU personnel promptly, thereby casting doubt on Zalewski's claim that the supervisor responded with "no sense of emergency." Schippani "advised of a possible hijack in progress" at "approximately 8:25," he stated. [53] Since Zalewski reportedly determined that Flight 11 had been hijacked at around 8:25 a.m. and let Schippani know right away after he came to this conclusion, Bueno implied that Schippani headed to the TMU immediately after being told there was a possible hijacking.
Another detail that casts doubt on Zalewski's claim that Schippani failed to take the notification of the hijacking seriously is that Schippani reportedly made the effort to assign an air traffic controller to help Zalewski deal with the crisis before he headed to the TMU. Schippani said that after Zalewski informed him of the threatening communications believed to have come from Flight 11, "I assigned somebody else to sit next to Pete so we could get two people listening if anything needed to happen." He assigned a controller called Alan Miller to help Zalewski and told the two men to "keep an ear open [and] let me know what's going on." [54]
Miller more or less corroborated Schippani's account. He recalled that when he came into the air traffic control room after a break, someone told him that "Pete needed help because there's something going on and they weren't quite sure exactly what it was." "Hijack was mentioned at the time," he noted. Subsequently, he explained, "I sat in the position with Pete, just to be another set of eyes, another set of ears."
However, he said that Schippani had already gone to the TMU when he returned from his break, thereby implying that someone other than Schippani told him to help Zalewski. "I believe [Schippani] was doing his briefing up at the watch area," he recalled. [55] Even if this is correct, though, Schippani could still have been responsible for assigning Miller to assist Zalewski, since he could have asked a colleague to arrange this before he headed to the TMU.
If Schippani arranged to have someone assist Zalewski and also reported the suspected hijacking to personnel in the TMU promptly, he would have been responding appropriately and in line with protocol. It would therefore be odd that Zalewski claimed the supervisor responded to his report of a possible hijacking with a lack of urgency.
REGIONAL OPERATIONS CENTER WAS INFORMED OF THE SUSPECTED HIJACKING
Terry Biggio, like Zalewski and Schippani, followed the protocol for responding to a hijacking. The operations manager in charge at an FAA en route center was supposed to notify the appropriate regional operations center of the hijacking and this was what he did. [56]
At 8:30 a.m., after he learned that Flight 11 appeared to have been hijacked, he called the FAA's New England Regional Operations Center and told Barry O'Connor, an operations officer, what was happening. He said words to the effect of "It looks like we may have a hijacking going on at this time." He also explained that the suspect plane had stopped responding to radio communications and controllers had overheard threats from its cockpit. [57]
O'Connor subsequently followed protocol, too. The ROC was required to notify FAA headquarters of the hijacking and this was what he did. He promptly contacted the operations center at FAA headquarters and passed on the details of what was happening to Jesse McKie, a member of staff there. [58]
FAA HEADQUARTERS FAILED TO CONTACT THE MILITARY
At this point, though, things went wrong. After FAA headquarters was notified of a hijacking, the hijack coordinator there was meant to contact the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon and request escort aircraft for the hijacked flight. [59] However, Lee Longmire--the hijack coordinator on September 11--appears to have made no effort to contact the NMCC.
Because neither he nor anyone else at FAA headquarters contacted the NMCC about the suspected hijacking, NMCC personnel only learned what had happened around half an hour after FAA headquarters was informed of it. Furthermore, they only learned about the suspected hijacking inadvertently and as a result of an initiative by an officer in the NMCC, rather than due to any effort by FAA headquarters personnel.
Specifically, at 9:00 a.m., Ryan Gonsalves, the senior operations officer, called FAA headquarters as he sought more information about the recent plane crash at the World Trade Center, which NMCC personnel had seen coverage of on television. [60] The FAA headquarters employee who answered the call briefed him on the "explosion" at the Trade Center, which they said was "possibly" caused by an aircraft crash. They also mentioned the hijacking of Flight 11, which they said was a flight from Boston to Los Angeles. However, they made no request for the military to provide aircraft to escort the hijacked plane.
Furthermore, they inexplicably gave Gonsalves some inaccurate information about the hijacked plane. They never suggested that Flight 11 might have been the plane that crashed and instead said it was still airborne, the original pilot was still in control, and it was heading to JFK International Airport in New York. [61]
SUPERVISOR VIOLATED PROTOCOL BY REPORTING THE HIJACKING TO THE FAA COMMAND CENTER
Longmire's failure to contact the NMCC wasn't the first violation of protocol by an FAA employee after Flight 11 was determined to have been hijacked, though. That had been when Daniel Bueno called the FAA's Air Traffic Control System Command Center in Herndon, Virginia, and alerted it to the suspected hijacking.
Bueno called the Command Center at 8:27:50 a.m. He explained to Anthony Smith, the Command Center employee who answered the call: "I got a situation here with American one one, American 11, Boston departure to LAX. We believe it's a possible hijack situation." He then described what had happened. "We lost radio communications with him, then we lost his transponder, and they believe that they heard in the background something, a threat," he said. Flight 11 was "just west of Albany" and "going southbound," he added.
Strangely, when Smith asked if he could do anything to help, Bueno replied, "Nope." "We have no idea where this aircraft is going," he explained. However, he then suggested that Smith could perhaps give the FAA's New York Center a "head-up" on the situation. [62]
Since the Boston Center was meant to inform the New England Regional Operations Center, not the Command Center, when a hijacking occurred, calling the Command Center was presumably a violation of protocol.
It was also odd that Bueno's priority after he was notified of the suspected hijacking was to report the incident to the Command Center, since the facility played a much smaller role than the FAA's en route centers, regional operations centers, and headquarters when a hijacking occurred. "The Command Center, besides probably needing to be aware of how the situation would affect the rest of the air traffic control system, really didn't have a large role in hijacked aircraft," John White, manager of system efficiency at the Command Center on September 11, commented. [63]
Linda Schuessler, manager for tactical operations at the Command Center that day, noted that if there was a hijacking, "from a tactical perspective" the FAA field facilities rather than the Command Center would be "talking to the pilots and moving the aircraft." She also said she was unaware of any documents that listed tasks the Command Center was meant to carry out when there was a hijacking. When she was asked during her interview with the 9/11 Commission in April 2004 what role the Command Center played when there was a hijacking and whether this role was codified anywhere, she replied, "To my knowledge, there was not any documentation that said, 'In a hijack situation, the Command Center shall do bump, bump, bump, bump.'" [64]
SUPERVISOR VIOLATED PROTOCOL BY TRYING TO CONTACT AN AIR BASE DIRECTLY
The call to the Command Center was in fact the first of several anomalous actions taken by Bueno that day. The next one occurred just four minutes after the call ended when, at 8:34 a.m., Bueno tried to contact Otis Air National Guard Base directly--bypassing the normal line of notification--to get fighter jets scrambled from there.
In order to reach Otis Air Base, he called the Cape Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON), an air traffic control facility near the base. "I went on the line to Cape TRACON to see if I could scramble fighters out of Otis," he explained. [65] He told Tim Spence, the operational supervisor, that there was a "possible hijack" and said he would "like to scramble some fighters to go tail him." [66]
Since an FAA en route center, like the Boston Center, was meant to notify the appropriate regional operations center--not a military base--when a hijacking occurred, the call was presumably a breach of protocol. Certainly, Spence implied that it was. After recalling that Bueno called him and "asked me if we could scramble the fighters," he commented, "Typically that's not a function of an ops supervisor." "We don't make that call," he added. [67]
Bueno himself in fact appears to have believed it was a violation of protocol for an en route center to try to contact an air base directly to get fighters scrambled. When he was asked by a 9/11 Commission staffer, "Who were you supposed to call, military wise?" he replied, "The Northeast Air Defense," meaning NORAD's Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS).
Why then did he call the Cape TRACON? He told the 9/11 Commission he contacted the facility because "that was the most direct, quickest, most expeditious way to get [fighter jets] out and running." Otis was "the closest [air base] and I know they have fighters there," he noted. He also claimed his course of action was influenced by his memory of a previous hijacking. "The reason I did that was ... early in my career we had aborted a hijack and I just recall them having fighters being tailed," he said. [68]
But he surely ought to have been concerned that his action might cause confusion and impair the response to the hijacking. After all, personnel who subsequently became involved in responding to the hijacking might have wondered why he had violated protocol and may consequently have been uncertain about what to do.
SUPERVISOR WRONGLY IMPLIED THAT FIGHTERS COULD BE LAUNCHED WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM NEADS
It is also odd that, during his call to the Cape TRACON, Bueno implied that personnel at Otis Air Base could launch fighter jets based solely on his request for them to do this. After asking for some fighters to "go tail" Flight 11, he told Spence, "If you want, just depart and we'll put a flight plan in for [the fighters], and we'll aim him towards Hampton direct." [69]
And yet it was likely prohibited for fighters at Otis Air Base to "just depart." The two F-15s on alert at the base were NORAD assets and so authorization from NEADS was presumably necessary to get them launched.
This certainly seems to have been what Spence was told in the calls he made as he tried to get fighters in the air. He recalled that "every time I asked, 'Who do I call next to get this going?'" he was told, "The people that they respond to was NEADS."
As a result of receiving this information, when he called the operations desk at Otis Air Base, he explained that he lacked the authority to authorize a fighter scramble. "I made a point of telling them that I don't have the authority to scramble these guys, to get them going," he recalled. [70] And when he called Bueno back at 8:43:07 a.m., he told the supervisor, "I just talked to Otis here and they said they needed NEADS authorization." [71]
SUPERVISOR SHOULD HAVE ASSUMED THAT THE SCRAMBLING OF FIGHTERS WAS ALREADY BEING ARRANGED
Besides the fact that calling the Cape TRACON to try and get fighter jets scrambled likely violated protocol, it is puzzling that Bueno contacted the TRACON because at the time he called the facility, he should have considered it unnecessary for him to do anything to get fighters launched.
This is because he presumably knew that Terry Biggio, who was working alongside him in the traffic management unit, had contacted the New England Regional Operations Center and informed it of the possible hijacking of Flight 11. He should therefore have assumed that, following Biggio's call, the process of notification had led to the National Military Command Center being contacted and asked to provide aircraft to escort the hijacked plane. [72]
He was surely unaware that FAA headquarters failed to contact the NMCC to request military assistance after the ROC informed it of the hijacking, as protocol required. He should therefore have assumed that the NMCC knew about the hijacking and was arranging for military aircraft to be launched in response to it, and so no further action was necessary in order to get fighters scrambled.
BOSTON CENTER WENT 'OUTSIDE OF NORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURES' BY CALLING NEADS
After he contacted the Cape TRACON, Bueno was involved in another violation of protocol. This was when Joseph Cooper called NEADS, at 8:37 a.m., reported that there was "a hijacked aircraft headed towards New York," and said the Boston Center wanted NEADS "to scramble some F-16s or something up there." [73] While the call was beneficial in that it was "the first notification received by the military--at any level--that American 11 had been hijacked," according to the 9/11 Commission Report, it was still made "outside of normal operating procedures," Mitchell Zuckoff noted. [74]
The call went against protocol in two ways. Firstly, when an FAA en route center reported a hijacking to an outside facility, it was meant to call an FAA regional operations center rather than a military facility. And, secondly, when an FAA facility--specifically FAA headquarters--called the military to report a hijacking, it was meant to call the NMCC, not a NORAD air defense sector. "Normally, the FAA would have contacted officials at the Pentagon's National Military Command Center who would have contacted the North American Aerospace Defense Command," journalist and author Leslie Filson explained. [75]
When Cooper called NEADS, therefore, military and FAA instructions for responding to a hijacking were "bypassed in the emergency air defense response to the attacks of September 11, 2001," Priscilla Jones pointed out. "Apropos or not, the protocol was by and large not used," she commented. [76] It is important to note, however, that although Cooper made the call to NEADS, Bueno was surely responsible for the violation of protocol, since Cooper acted under his direction. "Danny told me to call the military," Cooper explained. [77]
As it happened, because Cooper went "outside of normal operating procedures" and called NEADS, key military personnel learned of the hijacking of Flight 11 over 20 minutes earlier than would otherwise have been the case. However, this was only because FAA headquarters failed to follow protocol and contact the NMCC after it was notified of the hijacking. Without Cooper's call, then, military personnel in a position to organize a response to the hijacking would only have learned what was going on at around 9:00 a.m. That was when Ryan Gonsalves in the NMCC called FAA headquarters as he sought more information about the crash at the World Trade Center and, during the call, was told that Flight 11 had been hijacked. [78]
It was therefore fortunate that Cooper called NEADS, since his action led to fighter jets being ordered to take off at 8:46 a.m. [79] Without his call, fighters would presumably only have been scrambled sometime after 9:00 a.m., when Gonsalves was informed of the hijacking. "They were lucky we circumvented the protocol or the military would have never known anything was going on," Colin Scoggins commented. [80]
Despite this fortuitous outcome, it is still inexplicable that Bueno instructed Cooper to call NEADS. Since Bueno was presumably unaware that FAA headquarters had failed to contact the NMCC about the hijacking, he should have believed that, in line with protocol, the NMCC had been notified and was arranging for fighters to be scrambled. He should consequently have considered it unnecessary and potentially counterproductive for the Boston Center to contact NEADS about the hijacking. After all, if the NMCC was in the process of arranging for fighters to be launched, Cooper's call to NEADS may have interfered with its efforts.
PROCEDURE FOLLOWED ON SEPTEMBER 11 WAS THE OPPOSITE OF WHAT WAS LAID OUT IN A 'LETTER OF AGREEMENT'
Furthermore, even though Cooper's call to NEADS led to fighters being scrambled, the call may have had some unhelpful consequences. For example, military personnel may have been confused because they realized protocol had been violated and their response to the crisis may have been impaired as a result. Indeed, the 9/11 Commission determined that this could have been the case. "The reverse order of the set procedure might have caused some confusion," it stated.
It came to this conclusion based on information provided by Scoggins who, as a military operations specialist, presumably had a good understanding of the correct procedure for scrambling fighters. Scoggins explained during his interview with the 9/11 Commission in September 2003 that the procedure for getting fighters from Otis Air Base launched was laid out in a "letter of agreement" between the Boston Center, NEADS, Otis Air Base, and the 102nd Fighter Wing--the unit at Otis Air Base that kept two F-15s on alert--written in around 1990 or 1991.
According to the agreement, the military would call the Boston Center and inform personnel there when fighters were going to be scrambled. "It has always been military calling us saying they're doing the scramble, never us ever calling them and asking them to do a scramble," Scoggins noted. He explained that the air traffic control tower at Otis Air Base would normally call the Boston Center to let personnel there know that there was "an active scramble" and tell them "to be ready." Subsequently, NEADS would call the Boston Center and say it was doing an active scramble.
What happened on September 11, when Cooper called NEADS and asked for fighters to be scrambled, was therefore almost the opposite of what typically occurred. This course of action was, in fact, highly unusual. It was "the first time we've ever had to do anything like that," Scoggins noted. [81]
FIGHTERS WERE PUT ON 'BATTLE STATIONS' INSTEAD OF BEING LAUNCHED IMMEDIATELY
It is possible that confusion resulting from the unconventional way in which NEADS was alerted to the hijacking of Flight 11 caused NEADS personnel to take longer than normal to scramble fighter jets. After Cooper called about the hijacking, instead of issuing a scramble order right away, they initially put the two F-15s on alert at Otis Air Base on "battle stations." When fighters are on battle stations, the pilots get into the aircraft and get strapped in, but don't start the engines. [82]
Larry Arnold--the commander of the Continental United States NORAD Region at the time of the 9/11 attacks--gave the impression that NEADS personnel took this action as a result of uncertainty caused by the way in which they were notified of the hijacking. He told Code One magazine: "You might ask why the aircraft weren't scrambled immediately. The procedure is that the FAA contacts the National Military Command Center whenever there is a problem. They, in turn, go to NORAD to see if assets are available. Then the secretary of defense grants approval to intercept a hijacked airplane." [83] He seemed to be implying a connection between NEADS's decision to put the fighters on battle stations rather than launching them immediately and the protocol for dealing with a hijacking, which Cooper violated by calling NEADS to report what was happening and request military assistance. If this was what he was suggesting, he must have felt that NEADS personnel failed to scramble fighters as soon as they learned of the hijacking because they realized protocol had been violated.
The consequences of the violation of protocol may therefore have been significant. The fighters at Otis Air Base were placed on battle stations at 8:41 a.m. and only given a scramble order at 8:46 a.m. [84] This means the decision to put them on battle stations may have meant NEADS took five minutes more than necessary to get them in the air. And in a situation where every minute was crucial, a delay of five minutes could have made a big difference to the outcome of the crisis.
BATTLE COMMANDER SOUGHT PERMISSION THAT WAS USUALLY UNNECESSARY BEFORE SCRAMBLING FIGHTERS
It is worth noting that Robert Marr, the battle commander at NEADS on September 11, sought permission from a more senior officer--Larry Arnold--before he had the fighter jets scrambled, even though permission from a superior should have been unnecessary. It is possible, therefore, that the fighters were put on battle stations as an interim measure, until he received the permission he sought.
Marr learned there was "a possible ongoing hijack" from Dawne Deskins, the aircraft control and warning officer at NEADS, when she reported back to him after speaking on the phone with Cooper and being told what was happening. He subsequently called Arnold at Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida and told him about the suspected hijacking. He also told Arnold that he had put the fighters at Otis Air Base on battle stations and wanted permission to scramble them. [85]
And yet he should have been able to get fighters scrambled without authorization from a more senior officer. In fact, even the mission crew commander (MCC) at NEADS--who was below Marr in the chain of command--usually had the authority to issue a scramble order. However, because Marr was in the NEADS battle cab on September 11, it was his role to give the order that day.
"Because Colonel Marr was in the battle cab, the MCC would have made sure that Colonel Marr wanted to scramble that aircraft," Deskins explained. The MCC--Kevin Nasypany--would also have made sure that Marr wanted fighters scrambled before action was taken "because it was a hijacked aircraft" they were dealing with, she noted. [86]
Other knowledgeable individuals in addition to Deskins confirmed that it would normally have been unnecessary for Marr to get authorization from a more senior officer before having fighter jets scrambled. Arnold himself said NEADS and the two other regional air defense sectors in the continental United States had "scramble authority over aircraft assigned to their sector area." [87]
And Colin Scoggins explained that the regional air defense sectors "didn't necessarily have to wait for a clearance from NORAD" before launching fighters. Instead, they could scramble the fighters and then afterward tell NORAD, "Hey, we are launching fighters for an escort mission of a hijacked aircraft." He was in fact confused as to why Marr sought permission from Arnold before the scramble order was issued on September 11. "Why they waited for the okay from NORAD I don't know," he commented. [88]
Was it because Marr was unsure what to do since he recognized that protocol had been violated when the Boston Center called NEADS and reported the hijacking? Did he perhaps want to consult a more senior officer to ensure he did the right thing and avoid getting into trouble?
NEADS MAY HAVE BEEN GIVEN INCORRECT INFORMATION ABOUT FLIGHT 11'S LOCATION
The call in which NEADS was notified of the hijacking of Flight 11 was problematic not just because it went against protocol, but also because Joseph Cooper appears to have provided an inaccurate location for the hijacked aircraft during it.
"To successfully find any airplane in the sky, the Northeast Air Defense Sector needed to know either the plane's transponder code ... or the plane's latitude and longitude coordinates," Priscilla Jones noted. [89] Therefore, since Flight 11's transponder went off long before Cooper called NEADS, NEADS personnel needed latitude and longitude coordinates to locate the plane.
Presumably for this reason, after Cooper told her there was a hijacked aircraft, Deskins asked, "Can you give me a lat/long where you think he is?" In reply, Cooper said that Flight 11's "current coordinates" were "4115 north" and "07346 west." He also said the plane's "approximate heading" was 190, and provided the speed and last known altitude of Flight 11. [90]
With this information, NEADS personnel should have been able to locate the aircraft. Marr explained that if a plane had its transponder off, NEADS personnel could still see it on their scopes. They simply saw "a much more faint symbol" than they would have if the transponder was on. [91] One of the NEADS ID technicians in fact commented that "to pick up a primary target is relatively simple over land." [92] (A primary target is what a controller sees if there is no transponder signal coming from a plane.)
After being given latitude and longitude coordinates for Flight 11, NEADS personnel put in a lot of effort to locate the plane. "We had people on the ops floor that were frantically looking at the scopes as well as in the battle cab, looking for this on the scope to see if they could find anything at all," Marr recalled. [93] And yet they were unable to find Flight 11.
Jeffrey Richmond, the most senior person in air surveillance at NEADS that day, explained that the ID technicians--Maureen Dooley, Stacia Rountree, and Shelley Watson--"began tracking for the aircraft." However, he said that he did "not recall a track that was for sure [Flight 11]." [94] Deskins, too, tried to spot the aircraft and her efforts were also unsuccessful. "I looked where [Cooper] told me to look and I didn't see anything there," she recalled. [95]
It is surely possible that NEADS personnel were unable to locate Flight 11 because Cooper provided incorrect latitude and longitude coordinates for the plane. Deskins tentatively suggested another reason why NEADS personnel may have been unable to find the plane on their scopes. "Our system tied into the [Joint Surveillance System] sites, which are more of a long-range [system], and on that day, there wasn't a JSS site that was picking up the aircraft," she told the 9/11 Commission. However, she also acknowledged that Cooper may have given her incorrect latitude and longitude coordinates. Her explanation only applied "if the location he gave me was correct," she noted. [96]
CHECKING THE RECORDING OF RADIO COMMUNICATIONS MAY HAVE SLOWED THE RESPONSE TO THE HIJACKING
Another aspect of the actions of Boston Center personnel on the morning of September 11 that deserves close examination is the decision to have the tape of Pete Zalewski's radio communications listened to, since the task of finding and then checking the tape may have significantly slowed the FAA's response to the apparent hijacking of Flight 11.
Boston Center personnel had the capability to promptly obtain and listen to their facility's recordings of pilot-controller communications. "I think it's within minutes they can get it," New York Center air traffic controller David Bottiglia commented. [97] And since Zalewski supposedly didn't understand the first threatening communication he believed came from Flight 11, he wanted someone to listen to the tape of his radio communications to find out what was said. [98]
The task of obtaining and listening to the tape was assigned to quality assurance specialist Bob Jones. At some time between around 8:25 a.m. and 8:27 a.m. on September 11, Jones received a call in which he was informed of a possible hijacking and told that the "controller in Area C had heard suspicious conversations going on, but wasn't sure what he had heard."
He headed to the air traffic control room to find out when Zalewski heard the "suspicious conversations," so he would be able to quickly find them in the recording of Zalewski's radio communications. "I went down there because I needed to know exactly what position this and that was occurring at, and give me a better time of when this was occurring, so that I can isolate my search and get the search time down," he explained.
Zalewski told him there was a hijack in progress and said words to the effect of, "You've got to get a recording of what was said." [99] "Someone has to pull these fucking tapes right now," Zalewski recalled saying. [100] The controller was "quite concerned over what was going on," Jones noted. [101]
Jones then hurried down to the basement to find the tape of Zalewski's radio communications on the reel-to-reel machines there. [102] Once he had it, he went to the playback room, located the approximate position in the recording where the communications he sought were, and listened to the tape. [103]
QUALITY ASSURANCE SPECIALIST HEARD A HIJACKER SAY, 'WE HAVE SOME PLANES'
Jones considered it his purpose at the time to relay what he heard on the tape up to the watch desk. This was because the watch desk was the part of the Boston Center where the information he provided would affect command and control decisions. He was therefore on the phone with Terry Biggio while he listened to the tape. "I'm relaying all this information to Terry and I know he's calling authorities above him," he recalled.
He was able to locate the first of the three threatening communications that Zalewski heard. And whereas Zalewski supposedly failed to make out what was said, he understood right away. "The first thing we heard was, 'We have some planes, just stay quiet and you'll be okay, we are returning to the airport,'" he recalled. "I was able to hear that quite clearly," he noted. He let Biggio know what he had found. "Yeah, we do have a hijack; it appears to be a Middle Eastern male," he reported. [104]
He also noticed that the speaker appeared to have been referring to several planes--rather than just one--being hijacked. He recalled that he "could hear the hijacker reference 'planes,' meaning multiple planes." [105] He reported this to Biggio. "I don't know exactly what that means, but we may have more than one plane involved," he said.
He subsequently found the second threatening communication, which had been made seconds after the first one, on the tape. In this communication, the man who spoke in the first communication said: "Nobody move. Everything will be okay. If you try to make any moves, you'll endanger yourself and the airplane. Just stay quiet." When he heard it, he thought "how chilling" and "how ominous" the communication was. He also found the third threatening communication, which had been made nine minutes after the second one, in which the man said: "Nobody move please. We are going back to the airport. Don't try to make any stupid moves." [106]
CHECKING THE RECORDING OF RADIO COMMUNICATIONS WAS TIME-CONSUMING
One detail suggests that the effort to have someone find and then listen to the tape of Zalewski's radio communications had only minor consequences. Specifically, even though Zalewski was uncertain about what was said in the first threatening communication, the Boston Center still alerted the New England Regional Operations Center to the suspected hijacking quite promptly.
Time-stamped phone records show that Biggio called the ROC and reported that there was a possible hijacking at 8:30:13 a.m., about five minutes after Zalewski determined that Flight 11 had been hijacked and notified his supervisor. [107] This means that if Zalewski's uncertainty led to a delay in when the ROC was informed of what was happening, the delay was of just a few minutes.
However, Zalewski's uncertainty did affect what Biggio said when he phoned the ROC in that Biggio told Barry O'Connor, who answered the call, that there was a possible hijacking rather than a definite one. He said words to the effect of, "It looks like we may have a hijacking going on at this time," O'Connor recalled (italics mine). [108] This and other details indicate that the decision to have the tape of Zalewski's radio communications listened to did, in fact, impair the FAA's response to the hijacking.
Notably, it appears that Jones only notified Biggio of what he'd learned from listening to the tape just before 9:03 a.m. We can deduce this because Biggio relayed Jones's findings over an FAA teleconference at around 9:03 a.m. He spoke to someone who he referred to as "Tommy"--presumably Tom Benson, the man who ran the ROC--and told them: "Bobby [i.e., Bob Jones] seemed to think the guy said that 'we have planes.' Now, I don't know if it was because it was the accent or if there's more than one, but I'm gonna reconfirm that for you." After someone else on the teleconference asked, "They have what?" Biggio clarified, "Planes, as in plural."
Biggio must have said these things at around 9:03 a.m. because a short time later, he told the other participants on the teleconference, "A second one just hit the Trade Center" and the second hijacked plane crashed into the World Trade Center at 9:03 a.m. [109]
If Biggio relayed what the recording revealed immediately after Jones reported it to him, as he claimed, Jones must have given him the information just before 9:03 a.m. This means that after Jones was alerted to the "suspicious conversations" that Zalewski heard, sometime between 8:25 a.m. and 8:27 a.m., it took him about 35 minutes to discuss the situation with Zalewski, go to the basement, get the tape of Zalewski's radio communications, locate and listen to the threatening communications, and report his findings to Biggio.
The fact that Zalewski was uncertain about what was said in the first threatening communication and wanted someone to listen to the recording of his radio communications therefore seems to have caused a significant delay. After all, it was only after Jones listened to the tape and passed on his findings that Biggio was sure that Flight 11 had been hijacked. The operations manager in charge recalled that he wanted Jones to listen to the tape of Zalewski's radio communications "to see if there was any information on the tape which would help us determine whether we had a real hijacking" and added, "The recording confirmed we had a hijacking." [110]
The wait while Jones went and listened to the tape surely impaired the FAA's response to the crisis. Certainly, in the middle of a major terrorist attack, when events were moving fast and prompt action was essential, a 35-minute delay must have been a serious impediment.
CONTROLLER DIDN'T INITIALLY BELIEVE FLIGHT 11 WAS HIJACKED
Another aspect of the Boston Center's response to the crisis that deserves scrutiny is that John Hartling--the air traffic controller responsible for Flight 11 after it left Lino Martins's airspace--was unaware that Flight 11 was a suspected hijacking when it came onto his radar screen and was incredulous when another controller told him this was the case.
Hartling, who was at the Kingston Sector Radar position, noticed Flight 11 when Martins forced it onto his radar screen at around 8:28 a.m. [111] Apparently just a short time later, another controller, Tom Roberts, came over and told him the plane was thought to have been hijacked. "One of the controllers come over and said that they heard threatening conversation coming out of that aircraft and they think it's hijacked," he recalled. [112]
Even though several minutes had passed since Zalewski determined that Flight 11 had been hijacked, it appears that no one had told Hartling there was a suspected hijacking, since Hartling recalled that he initially "didn't believe" Roberts. [113] And alarmingly, even though a hijacking was highly unusual and therefore deserved particular attention, his initial response to Roberts's information was apathy. "I didn't take it serious ... because you just didn't think something like that [i.e., a hijacking] would happen," he explained. (The last hijacking involving coordination between FAA personnel and the U.S. military had in fact occurred over eight years earlier, in February 1993.) His only concern was to "make sure you keep [other aircraft] away from him, American 11," he said.
Despite noticing that the plane was flying much faster than it was supposed to and its transponder was off, he only came to accept that there was a serious problem as time passed. "The further on it went--and when I'm looking at the speed and there's no data block and there's no transmission and the guy was way off course--[I realized that] there's something wrong with this airplane," he recalled. [114]
RADAR ASSOCIATE CONTROLLER 'DIDN'T REALLY HAVE TIME TO BRIEF' HIS COLLEAGUE
Hartling's lack of awareness of the hijacking and failure to take the hijacking seriously after being alerted to it are notable for several reasons. To begin with, an air traffic controller who was assisting Hartling was, unlike his colleague, promptly given information that indicated Flight 11 had been hijacked.
William Dean was Hartling's "radar associate controller"--an air traffic controller who works with a radar controller to plan the separation of aircraft, and coordinate with other sectors and facilities. Dean learned of the problems with Flight 11 from Shirley Kula at the Athens Sector Radar Associate position. [115] At 8:28:06 a.m., after she noticed that Flight 11 appeared to be heading into Hartling's airspace, Kula spoke to Dean over radio. "I need you to look west of Albany. American 11, I put him on your scope. He is NORDO, has been since he talked to Boston High. We assume he's at flight level 290," she said.
Strangely, she did not explicitly state that the plane was believed to have been hijacked. However, she indicated that this was the case. "We're not sure, we think there's someone in the cockpit with him," she said. She ended by telling Dean, "Nobody is talking to him; we don't know where he's going; we don't know what altitude he's at." [116]
Dean presumably ought to have passed on the information Kula gave him to Hartling immediately. And yet it seems that he failed to do this, since if Hartling had been given the information, he would surely have believed it when Roberts told him Flight 11 was thought to have been hijacked.
Indeed, Dean admitted that he failed to pass on Kula's information to Hartling right away when he was interviewed by the 9/11 Commission in September 2003. "John [Hartling] was busy with other stuff at the time so I didn't really have time to brief him initially on what was going on with this," he explained. It was only "later on that I got a chance to tell him what she had told me," he added. [117]
CONTROLLER WASN'T TOLD ABOUT THE SUSPECTED HIJACKING BY A SUPERVISOR BEFORE FLIGHT 11 ENTERED HIS AIRSPACE
It is also odd that Jon Schippani failed to tell Hartling that Flight 11 was thought to have been hijacked after Zalewski alerted him to the situation, in light of the possibility that Flight 11 would enter Hartling's airspace.
Schippani learned that there was a possible hijacking after Zalewski heard the second threatening communications apparently made by a hijacker and told him about it. "This is when we thought it was a hijacking," Schippani recalled. [118] He then notified Terry Biggio, the operations manager in charge at the Boston Center, in line with what FAA protocol required in the event of a hijacking. [119] However, he seems to have made no attempt to also let Hartling know what was happening.
It might be argued that this was because protocol did not require a supervisor to alert other air traffic controllers to a hijacking and also because Schippani was responsible for a different section of the control room to the one in which Hartling worked. He was the supervisor for Area C while Hartling worked in Area E. (The supervisor for Area E was a man called Ron McEwan.) [120]
The problem with these contentions is that Schippani did go and tell Shirley Kula about the situation with Flight 11, even though protocol did not require him to do this and even though she, like Hartling, worked in a different section of the control room to the one he was supervisor for. (She was working in Area B that morning.) "He came and he stood behind us and he said, 'We have reason to believe there's somebody in the cockpit and that he's been hijacked,'" Kula recalled.
Schippani apparently notified Kula of the suspected hijacking soon after Zalewski alerted him to the situation, since this was the first notification she received about what was happening. "The first time that we believed that it was a hijack was whatever time Jon Schippani walked over and stood behind us and told us," she explained. [121]
Schippani may have also alerted Tom Roberts to the suspected hijacking, even though Roberts, like Kula, worked in a different section of the control room to the one he supervised. Roberts recalled that a supervisor came up behind him and said, "We believe American 11 has been hijacked." [122] Like what Kula described, this appears to have happened shortly after Zalewski determined that Flight 11 had been hijacked, since Roberts stated that he "became aware that [Flight 11] may be subject to a possible hijack attempt" before 8:28 a.m. [123]
However, Roberts didn't name the person who told him about the suspected hijacking. It is therefore possible that the supervisor he referred to was Pete Pasquale, the supervisor for Area B. Unfortunately, details of what Pasquale knew about what was happening and his actions around the time Roberts was notified about the hijacking of Flight 11 are unknown. However, since Roberts worked in Area B--the same section of the control room as Kula was working in that morning--it seems quite likely that he learned of the problems with Flight 11 from Schippani, around the time Schippani told Kula about them.
Since Dean, Kula, and Roberts were told what was happening shortly after Flight 11 was determined to have been hijacked, then, it is strange that Hartling wasn't told, too. Author Lynn Spencer suggested the reason Hartling wasn't told about the hijacking was that "the concentration required for the job is so intense that controllers operate on a need-to-know basis." Because they "don't need to know what's happening in other controllers' sectors unless it might affect their own airspace," distractions are "rigorously kept to a minimum," she wrote. [124] In other words, Hartling wasn't notified because his colleagues thought the problems with Flight 11 wouldn't affect him and so they wanted to avoid distracting him unnecessarily. However, this explanation is misplaced, since, after it turned south at 8:26 a.m., Flight 11 was heading into his airspace and so the suspected hijacking clearly was going to affect him.
CONTROLLER DIDN'T NOTICE HIS COLLEAGUE'S ATTEMPTS TO DRAW ATTENTION TO THE HIJACKING
It is also odd that Hartling was apparently unaware that Flight 11 was a suspected hijacking when Roberts told him this was the case because Zalewski made conspicuous attempts to draw his colleagues' attention to what was happening. For example, he had his radio frequency broadcast on a speaker after he heard the second threatening communication that seemed to have been made by a hijacker. [125] He explained that he'd "wanted the speaker on 'loud' so that everyone could hear what he was experiencing." [126]
Hartling should presumably have heard the radio frequency, wondered what was going on, and consequently found out the details suggesting that Flight 11 had been hijacked. However, Zalewski indicated this may not have happened. He specified that his radio frequency was broadcast over "the loudspeaker for the section" he was working in. [127] Although Hartling worked in a section of the control room adjacent to the one in which Zalewski worked--he was in Area E and Zalewski was in Area C--it is possible that he was too far away from the speaker to hear Zalewski's radio frequency. [128]
Even if he was unable to hear it, however, he presumably should have noticed the dramatic way Zalewski acted after hearing the first two threatening communications. Zalewski recalled that he "immediately stood up and yelled at the supervisor, 'Jon, get over here immediately, right now.'" Referring to the communications apparently made by a hijacker, he exclaimed: "What are they saying? What are they saying?"
His actions must have stood out because other controllers noticed them and were unsettled. "Everybody in that building" was "looking at me, like, 'What is wrong with you?'" he commented. He recalled that they "looked at him as if he was crazy." [129]
Hartling should presumably therefore have noticed Zalewski's dramatic behavior and ought to have tried to find out the reason for his colleague's distress. Had he done so, he surely would have been told about the suspected hijacking. It is puzzling, therefore, that he was apparently unaware that Flight 11 was a possible hijacking when the plane subsequently came onto his radar screen.
CONTROLLER WAS ADVISED TO SEND THE FIGHTER JETS BACK TO THEIR BASE
One more notable incident regarding the response of Boston Center personnel to the crisis on September 11 was revealed by a Boston Center employee who was off work that day. The employee, whose name has not been made public, learned about the incident at a "post-9/11 session" where the first two hijackings on September 11 were discussed. During the session, the air traffic controller who had communicated with the pilots of the fighter jets scrambled in response to the hijacking of Flight 11 explained that after the first crash at the World Trade Center but before the second, a colleague came over and suggested to him that the pilots be told "that the fighters might want to go home." [130] (The name of the controller and their colleague have not been made public.)
The controller must have ignored the suggestion, since the fighter pilots received no instruction to return to Otis Air Base. Instead, when the controller spoke to one of them nine minutes after Flight 11 hit the North Tower, they informed him of the crash and then said, "So I'm not quite sure what your intentions are, if you're still going to head that way"--presumably meaning toward New York. "You may want to talk to your operations," they suggested. (By "your operations," they presumably meant NEADS.) [131]
All the same, this incident is still worth noting, since it would have been illogical to send the fighters back to Otis Air Base after the first crash at the World Trade Center. Although the cause of the crash was initially unclear, Boston Center personnel believed Flight 11 had been under the control of hijackers and therefore had good reason to suspect that the crash was a terrorist attack involving the hijacked plane. And if they thought one terrorist attack had occurred, it would have been reasonable for them to fear that more would follow.
It was therefore a time for caution. But if the fighters went back to Otis Air Base, this would have ensured that the airspace around New York was unprotected against further attacks.
NOTES
[1] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With F-15 Fighter Pilot Major Daniel S. Nash." 9/11 Commission, October 14, 2003.
[2] Full transcript: Boston ARTCC Boston Sector, Sector 46, Radar position, September 11, 2001, 1204 UTC to September 11, 2001, 1240 UTC. Federal Aviation Administration, February 15, 2002; Priscilla D. Jones, The First 109 Minutes: 9/11 and the U.S. Air Force. Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 2011, p. 18.
[3] "The Skies Over America: The Air Traffic Controllers in Charge of the Skies Over America on 9/11 Saw the Nightmare Coming." Dateline, NBC, September 10, 2006.
[4] Staff Report: The Four Flights. 9/11 Commission, August 26, 2004, p. 7.
[5] Full transcript: Boston ARTCC Boston Sector, Sector 46, Radar position, September 11, 2001, 1204 UTC to September 11, 2001, 1240 UTC.
[6] Mitchell Zuckoff, Fall and Rise: The Story of 9/11. New York: HarperCollins, 2019, pp. 45-47.
[7] "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview With Peter Zalewski, Air Traffic Control Specialist Area C." 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003.
[8] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Peter Zalewski. 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003.
[9] Mitchell Zuckoff, Fall and Rise, p. 46.
[10] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Richard Beringer. 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003.
[11] "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview With Peter Zalewski, Air Traffic Control Specialist Area C"; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Peter Zalewski.
[12] "Memorandum for the Record: Staff Visit to the Boston Center, New England Region, FAA." 9/11 Commission, September 22-24, 2003.
[13] Richard Beringer, 9/11 Commission interview, handwritten notes. 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Richard Beringer.
[14] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Peter Zalewski.
[15] 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004, p. 16.
[16] "Memorandum for the Record: Staff Visit to the Boston Center, New England Region, FAA"; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Terry Biggio. 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003.
[17] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Peter Zalewski.
[18] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Brazalino Martins. 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003.
[19] FAA Order 7110.65M: Air Traffic Control. Federal Aviation Administration, February 24, 2000, pp. 10-1-1, 10-2-1 - 10-2-2.
[20] Thomas Doscher, "In Their Own Words--NORAD Members Recall September 11: Jeff Ford." Defense Visual Information Distribution Service, September 8, 2011.
[21] Glen Johnson, "Facing Terror Attack's Aftermath: Otis Fighter Jets Scrambled Too Late to Halt the Attacks." Boston Globe, September 15, 2001.
[22] Adam J. Hebert, "Airmen on 9/11: Lt. Gen. Norton Schwartz." Air Force Magazine, September 2011.
[23] Jerry Herley et al., Continental Air Defense: A Dedicated Force is no Longer Needed. Washington, DC: United States General Accounting Office, May 3, 1994, p. 4.
[24] Bruce Vittner, "Historian's Report for Sept. 11, 2001." 102nd Fighter Wing, n.d.
[25] Jerry Herley et al., Continental Air Defense, p. 4.
[26] "Memorandum for the Record: Staff Visit to the Boston Center, New England Region, FAA."
[27] Personnel statement of Peter A. Zalewski. Federal Aviation Administration, November 2, 2001; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Peter Zalewski.
[28] Personnel statement of Brazalino Martins. Federal Aviation Administration, November 5, 2001; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Brazalino Martins.
[29] "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Interview With Jon Schippani, Operational Supervisor in Charge, Boston Center." 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Jon Schippani. 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003.
[30] Personnel statement of Jon Schippani. Federal Aviation Administration, September 18, 2001.
[31] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Peter Zalewski.
[32] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Jon Schippani.
[33] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Joseph Cooper, part 1. 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Joseph Cooper, part 2. 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003.
[34] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Terry Biggio; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Dan Bueno, part 1. 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003.
[35] Personnel statement of Daniel D. Bueno. Federal Aviation Administration, September 11, 2001; Personnel statement of Terry Biggio. Federal Aviation Administration, September 15, 2001; "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview With Joseph Cooper, Traffic Management Unit Coordinator." 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003; "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview 1 With Daniel D. Bueno, Traffic Management Supervisor, Boston Center." 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003; "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Interview With Terry Biggio, Deputy of Facility, Boston Center." 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003.
[36] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Dan Bueno, part 1.
[37] "Quality Assurance Bulletin: Boston Center Bulletin." Federal Aviation Administration, September 20, 2001; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Barry O'Connor. 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003.
[38] Pat McKenna, "The Border Guards." Airman, January 1996; Kevin Dennehy, "Local Reservists Await the Call." Cape Cod Times, September 15, 2001; Kevin Dennehy, "Otis Force Activated; Home Duty Seen Likely." Cape Cod Times, September 21, 2001.
[39] Priscilla D. Jones, The First 109 Minutes, p. 10.
[40] 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 19; Staff Report: The Four Flights, p. 10; Priscilla D. Jones, The First 109 Minutes, p. 20.
[41] FAA Order 7110.65M, p. 10-2-2.
[42] 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 458.
[43] FAA Order 7610.4J: Special Military Operations. Federal Aviation Administration, November 3, 1998, p. 7-1-1.
[44] Emma Helfrich, "Air Traffic Controller Details Sea of Red Tape That Mired 9/11 Response." The War Zone, September 11, 2022.
[45] FAA Order 7610.4J, pp. 7-1-1, 7-2-1.
[46] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCSI 3610.01A: Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking) and Destruction of Derelict Airborne Objects. Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 1, 2001.
[47] 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 18.
[48] Personnel statement of Peter A. Zalewski.
[49] "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview With Peter Zalewski, Air Traffic Control Specialist Area C" (draft version). 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003; Peter Zalewski, 9/11 Commission interview, handwritten notes. 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003.
[50] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Jon Schippani.
[51] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Joseph Cooper, part 2.
[52] "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview 1 With Daniel D. Bueno, Traffic Management Supervisor, Boston Center"; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Dan Bueno, part 1.
[53] Personnel statement of Daniel D. Bueno.
[54] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Jon Schippani.
[55] "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview With Alan Miller." 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Alan Miller, part 1. 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003.
[56] 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 458; "Q&A With 9/11 Boston Center Air Traffic Controller." 9/11 Guide, October 28, 2007.
[57] "Quality Assurance Bulletin: Boston Center Bulletin"; "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Interview of Jennifer Donahue, Regional Executive Manager (REM) for Communications Information Security (COMSAT), FAA Regional Operations Center (ROC)." 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003; "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Interview With Terry Biggio, Deputy of Facility, Boston Center"; Barry O'Connor, 9/11 Commission interview, handwritten notes. 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Barry O'Connor.
[58] New England Region daily log. Federal Aviation Administration, September 11, 2001; "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events: September 11, 2001." Federal Aviation Administration, September 17, 2001; "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Interview of Jennifer Donahue, Regional Executive Manager (REM) for Communications Information Security (COMSAT), FAA Regional Operations Center (ROC)"; Jesse McKie, 9/11 Commission interview, handwritten notes. 9/11 Commission, March 25, 2004.
[59] FAA Order 7610.4J, p. 7-1-1.
[60] 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 35; "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Captain Charles Joseph Leidig, USN, Commandant of Midshipmen, U.S. Naval Academy." 9/11 Commission, April 29, 2004; Patrick Gardner, 9/11 Commission interview part 1, handwritten notes. 9/11 Commission, May 5, 2004.
[61] 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 35, 462; Admiral Charles Joseph Leidig, 9/11 Commission interview, handwritten notes. 9/11 Commission, April 29, 2004; "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Lt. Col. Ryan Gonsalves." 9/11 Commission, May 14, 2004; Senior operations officer log, September 11, 2001, to September 16, 2001. U.S. Department of Defense, n.d.
[62] Transcript: Air Traffic Control System Command Center position 15, line 5115, parts 2 and 3. Federal Aviation Administration, September 11, 2001; Full transcript: Boston ARTCC Boston TMU Severe Weather position, September 11, 2001, 1222 UTC to September 11, 2001, 1250 UTC. Federal Aviation Administration, April 19, 2002; "Memorandum for the Record: Follow Up Visit to FAA." 9/11 Commission, June 12, 2003; Timeline of the events of the day of 9/11 drafted by the 9/11 Commission. 9/11 Commission, n.d.
[63] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With John White, Former Assistant Program Manager for Administration at the ATCSCC, 'Command Center,' Herndon VA." 9/11 Commission, May 7, 2004; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with John White, part 1. 9/11 Commission, May 7, 2004.
[64] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Linda Schuessler." 9/11 Commission, April 6, 2004; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Linda Schuessler. 9/11 Commission, April 6, 2004.
[65] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Dan Bueno, part 1.
[66] Personnel statement of Daniel D. Bueno; Full transcript: Boston ARTCC Boston TMU Severe Weather position, September 11, 2001, 1222 UTC to September 11, 2001, 1250 UTC; Partial transcript: Cape TRACON Flight Data position, September 11, 2001, 1229 UTC to September 11, 2001, 1253 UTC. Federal Aviation Administration, October 10, 2003; Priscilla D. Jones, The First 109 Minutes, p. 23.
[67] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Tim Spence, Cape TRACON Operational Supervisor." 9/11 Commission, September 30, 2003; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Tim Spence. 9/11 Commission, September 30, 2003.
[68] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Dan Bueno, part 1.
[69] Full transcript: Boston ARTCC Boston TMU Severe Weather position, September 11, 2001, 1222 UTC to September 11, 2001, 1250 UTC; Partial transcript: Cape TRACON Flight Data position, September 11, 2001, 1229 UTC to September 11, 2001, 1253 UTC.
[70] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Tim Spence, Cape TRACON Operational Supervisor"; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Tim Spence.
[71] Partial transcript: Cape TRACON Supervisor position, September 11, 2001, 1229 UTC to September 11, 2001, 1253 UTC. Federal Aviation Administration, October 10, 2003.
[72] "Quality Assurance Bulletin: Boston Center Bulletin"; "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview 1 With Barry O'Connor, Regional Operations Officer for Communications Information Security (COMSAT), FAA Regional Operations Center (ROC)." 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003; Priscilla D. Jones, The First 109 Minutes, pp. 22-23.
[73] 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 20; Priscilla D. Jones, The First 109 Minutes, p. 24.
[74] Mitchell Zuckoff, Fall and Rise, p. 69.
[75] Leslie Filson, Air War Over America: Sept. 11 Alters Face of Air Defense Mission. Tyndall Air Force Base, FL: Headquarters 1st Air Force, Public Affairs Office, 2003, p. 51.
[76] Priscilla D. Jones, The First 109 Minutes, p. 16.
[77] "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview With Joseph Cooper, Traffic Management Unit Coordinator"; Joseph Cooper, 9/11 Commission interview, handwritten notes. 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Joseph Cooper, part 2.
[78] 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 462; "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Captain Charles Joseph Leidig, USN, Commandant of Midshipmen, U.S. Naval Academy"; "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Lt. Col. Ryan Gonsalves"; Senior operations officer log, September 11, 2001, to September 16, 2001.
[79] Partial transcript: Cape TRACON Supervisor position, September 11, 2001, 1229 UTC to September 11, 2001, 1253 UTC; 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 20; "Otis Story Board." 9/11 Commission, n.d.
[80] "Q&A With 9/11 Boston Center Air Traffic Controller."
[81] "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview With Colin Scoggins, Military Operations Specialist." 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Colin Scoggins, part 1. 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003.
[82] Transcript, interview of Larry Arnold by Leslie Filson, 2002; Transcript, interview of Lt. Col. Tim Duffy by Leslie Filson, October 22, 2002; Michael Bronner, "9/11 Live: The NORAD Tapes." Vanity Fair, September 2006; Lynn Spencer, Touching History: The Untold Story of the Drama That Unfolded in the Skies Over America on 9/11. New York: Free Press, 2008, p. 27.
[83] "Conversation With Major General Larry Arnold, Commander, 1st Air Force, Tyndall AFB, Florida." Code One, January 2002.
[84] Partial transcript: Cape TRACON Supervisor position, September 11, 2001, 1229 UTC to September 11, 2001, 1253 UTC; Priscilla D. Jones, The First 109 Minutes, p. 30; "Otis Story Board."
[85] William B. Scott, "Exercise Jump-Starts Response to Attacks." Aviation Week & Space Technology, June 3, 2002; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: Public hearing. 9/11 Commission, May 23, 2003; "Memorandum for the Record: Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) Field Site Visit." 9/11 Commission, October 27, 2003; "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Lt. Col. Dawne Deskins." 9/11 Commission, October 30, 2003; Lynn Spencer, Touching History, pp. 26, 38.
[86] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Lt. Col. Dawne Deskins"; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Dawne Deskins, part 1. 9/11 Commission, October 30, 2003.
[87] Transcript, interview of Larry K. Arnold by Dr. Charles J. Gross. National Guard Bureau, November 19, 2001.
[88] "Q&A With 9/11 Boston Center Air Traffic Controller."
[89] Priscilla D. Jones, The First 109 Minutes, pp. 19-20.
[90] Full transcript: Boston ARTCC Military Operations Specialist position, September 11, 2001, 1232 UTC to September 11, 2001, 1259 UTC. Federal Aviation Administration, April 12, 2002.
[91] Transcript, interview of Col. Marr, NEADS Commander by Leslie Filson, June 25, 2002.
[92] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Maureen Dooley, Shelley Watson, and Stacia Rountree, part 1. 9/11 Commission, October 27, 2003.
[93] Chasing Planes: Witnesses to 9/11. Directed by Michael Bronner. London: Working Title Films, 2006.
[94] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With TSgt. Jeffrey LaMarche and TSgt. Jeffrey Richmond." 9/11 Commission, October 27, 2003.
[95] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Lt. Col. Dawne Deskins"; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Dawne Deskins, part 1.
[96] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Dawne Deskins, part 1.
[97] "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) New York Air Route Center Interview With David Bottiglia." 9/11 Commission, October 1, 2003; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with David Bottiglia, part 2. 9/11 Commission, October 1, 2003.
[98] Robert Jones, 9/11 Commission interview, handwritten notes. 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003; "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview With Peter Zalewski, Air Traffic Control Specialist Area C" (draft version).
[99] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Robert Jones. 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003.
[100] "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview With Peter Zalewski, Air Traffic Control Specialist Area C" (draft version); Peter Zalewski, 9/11 Commission interview, handwritten notes.
[101] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Robert Jones.
[102] "Memorandum for the Record: Staff Visit to the Boston Center, New England Region, FAA"; Mitchell Zuckoff, Fall and Rise, p. 65.
[103] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Robert Jones.
[104] Robert Jones, 9/11 Commission interview, handwritten notes; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Robert Jones.
[105] "The Footnotes of 9/11." CNN Presents, CNN, September 11, 2011.
[106] Robert Jones, 9/11 Commission interview, handwritten notes; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Robert Jones; 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 19.
[107] "Quality Assurance Bulletin: Boston Center Bulletin."
[108] "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview 1 With Barry O'Connor, Regional Operations Officer for Communications Information Security (COMSAT), FAA Regional Operations Center (ROC)"; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Barry O'Connor.
[109] Transcript: Air Traffic Control System Command Center position 14, parts 1 through 4. Federal Aviation Administration, September 11, 2001; 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 23; Priscilla D. Jones, The First 109 Minutes, p. 21.
[110] Personnel statement of Terry Biggio.
[111] Full transcript: Boston ARTCC Athens Sector, Sector 38, Radar Associate position, September 11, 2001, 1213 UTC to September 11, 2001, 1240 UTC. Federal Aviation Administration, April 24, 2002; "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview With John Hartling." 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003.
[112] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with John Hartling. 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003.
[113] "The Skies Over America."
[114] "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview With John Hartling"; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with John Hartling.
[115] "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview With William Dean, Traffic Management Unit Specialist." 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003.
[116] Personnel statement of Shirley Kula. Federal Aviation Administration, October 16, 2001; Full transcript: Boston ARTCC Athens Sector, Sector 38, Radar Associate position, September 11, 2001, 1213 UTC to September 11, 2001, 1240 UTC; "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview With William Dean, Traffic Management Unit Specialist."
[117] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with William Dean. 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003.
[118] Jon Schippani, 9/11 Commission interview, handwritten notes 1. 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Jon Schippani; "The Skies Over America."
[119] Personnel statement of Jon Schippani.
[120] "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview With William Dean, Traffic Management Unit Specialist"; Jon Schippani, 9/11 Commission interview, handwritten notes 1; Jon Schippani, 9/11 Commission interview, handwritten notes 2. 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003.
[121] Personnel statement of Shirley Kula; "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview 1 With Shirley Kula, Operations Supervisor, Boston Center." 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003; Shirley Kula, 9/11 Commission interview, handwritten notes. 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Shirley Kula. 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003; "Boston ARTCC: Rough Sketch." 9/11 Commission, n.d.
[122] Chasing Planes: Witnesses to 9/11.
[123] Personnel statement of Thomas L. Roberts. Federal Aviation Administration, October 31, 2001.
[124] Lynn Spencer, Touching History, pp. 22-23.
[125] Pamela S. Freni, Ground Stop: An Inside Look at the Federal Aviation Administration on September 11, 2001. Lincoln, NE: iUniverse, Inc., 2003, pp. 14-15; "The Skies Over America."
[126] "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview With Peter Zalewski, Air Traffic Control Specialist Area C" (draft version).
[127] "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview With Peter Zalewski, Air Traffic Control Specialist Area C."
[128] Diagrams of the air traffic control room that show where Hartling and Zalewski were seated can be viewed online. See Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center facility layout chart. Federal Aviation Administration, August 17, 2000; "Boston ARTCC: Rough Sketch."
[129] "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview With Peter Zalewski, Air Traffic Control Specialist Area C" (draft version); "The Skies Over America."
[130] "Memorandum for the Record: Unsolicited Phone Call From
[Name Redacted] Former Controller Boston Center." 9/11 Commission, October 22, 2003.
[131] Full transcript: Boston ARTCC Cape Sector, Sector 18, Radar position, September 11, 2001, 1254 UTC to September 11, 2001, 1330 UTC. Federal Aviation Administration, October 7, 2003.
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