Air Traffic Control Personnel May Have Thought Events Were Part of a Training Exercise
There were in fact many anomalous actions and other failures by air traffic control personnel on September 11 that could have caused delays. But while it could be claimed that these were due to incompetence or the result of having to improvise a response to a situation the FAA was unprepared for, this explanation would be misplaced.
To begin with, individuals who played key roles in the FAA's response to the hijacking of Flight 11, such as Pete Zalewski, Daniel Bueno, and Colin Scoggins at the FAA's Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center, had years of experience in air traffic control and should therefore have been able to deal with a crisis competently. The 9/11 Commission--the body created by Congress and the president in 2002 to investigate the 9/11 attacks--actually discovered that all of the Boston Center personnel who helped with the response to the hijackings on September 11 were highly experienced. "We found no young controllers involved on that day," it stated. [3] It was a "very, very experienced work force that we have here," Bueno commented. Most of the air traffic controllers at the Boston Center on September 11 had worked there since 1982, he noted. [4]
Furthermore, the problems air traffic control personnel faced after Flight 11 was apparently hijacked but before it crashed into the World Trade Center--such as losing radio contact with an aircraft and losing an aircraft's transponder signal--had all happened before. There were clear procedures to follow when these problems arose and so dealing with them should have been straightforward.
BOSTON CENTER PERSONNEL WERE TRAINED TO DEAL WITH A HIJACKING
It is worth noting that, although the hijacking of Flight 11 ended in the unprecedented event of an airliner being deliberately crashed into a building and causing mass casualties, it otherwise resembled a typical hijacking. The situation Boston Center air traffic controllers faced before Flight 11 hit the World Trade Center was therefore something they had trained for. They got "refreshed" on dealing with a hijacking in "training that we take every year on hijack procedures," Richard Beringer, an air traffic control specialist at the center, said. Responding to a hijacking was "part of our annual refresher training," Shirley Kula, an operations supervisor at the center, similarly pointed out.
The procedures for dealing with a hijacking were covered in computer-based training. The Boston Center had a CBI (computer-based instruction) lab and all of the controllers there had "a certain number of lessons they have to do every year" in it, Kula explained. The CBI training included a module "for hijack," she noted. This module would be "a refresher on what our protocols are and our procedures," Beringer said. [5]
Hijackings also featured in something called dynamic simulation (DYSIM) training. DYSIM training seems to have involved realistically creating the kinds of problematic situations air traffic controllers might encounter in their work so they would respond effectively if these situations ever arose. "We have our DYSIM problems every year and every year they'll throw in something crazy at us, out of the ordinary," Lino Martins, an air traffic controller at the Boston Center, explained. The "out of the ordinary" things included "hijacks," he pointed out. [6] Kula, meanwhile, mentioned that DYSIM training included a scenario in which "one of the aircraft gets hijacked, and so you have to go through and prove that you know what to do."
She described what might happen during a DYSIM training session that included a simulated hijacking. "You're talking to the airplanes just like you're talking to real airplanes down on the floor," she explained. "You have someone who's operating the computer, who's putting in all the instructions you give so the airplanes behave accordingly," she noted. Then, "All of a sudden, one of your airplanes starts squawking hijack," she said, meaning the plane's transponder emitted the code indicating that the plane had been hijacked. [7]
Notably, DYSIM training sessions that involved a simulated hijacking had included the same incidents indicating a hijacking as occurred after Flight 11 was apparently hijacked. "There have been times [in my DYSIM training] when the transponder goes off, the plane won't answer, and he makes a turn," Beringer recalled. [8] The DYSIM training Boston Center personnel received should therefore have been good preparation for what happened on September 11.
RESPONDING TO HIJACKINGS WAS LIKE DEALING WITH A 'SEVERE WEATHER EVENT'
Furthermore, while personnel at the Boston Center on September 11 may not previously have dealt with a real-world hijacking, they had experienced incidents that required a similar kind of response to what was needed when there was a hijacking. What happened on September 11 "was very similar to what we would call a 'severe weather event,'" Terry Biggio, the operations manager in charge at the center, commented. And, he explained, dealing with the crisis on September 11 was similar to dealing with a severe weather event in that, like responding to "thunderstorms" and "things of that nature," it involved "a lot of people talking [and] multi-tasking going on."
Notably, Boston Center personnel dealt with severe weather events frequently. These events were "a nightly occurrence probably just about every day of the summertime for us," Biggio pointed out. They would therefore have had a lot of practice putting together a response similar to what was required when problems arose on September 11. [9]
Considering their training and previous experience, then, it is puzzling that the way Boston Center personnel responded to the apparent hijacking of Flight 11 was so poor. Among other things, their responses were sometimes slow or inappropriate, protocol was sometimes violated, and procedures for dealing with an aircraft emergency were never initiated.
It is surely therefore possible that some of the failures of Boston Center personnel and other FAA employees on September 11 were intentional. These failures could have been planned beforehand with the aim of hindering the response to the hijackings and increasing the likelihood that the attacks on the World Trade Center would succeed. If this was found to be the case, though, it would radically change our understanding of 9/11. It would mean corrupt U.S. officials helped plan and perpetrate the terrorist attacks, and it would mean some FAA employees were involved.
MILITARY EXERCISE ON SEPTEMBER 11 FEATURED A SIMULATED HIJACKING
When we try to determine how corrupt U.S. officials might have disrupted normal FAA procedures on September 11, it is worth noting that the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)--the military organization responsible for monitoring and defending the airspace over North America--was running a major training exercise that day. [10] It is surely possible that the exercise--an annual event called Vigilant Guardian--was used to impair how people responded to real-world events. It may, for example, have been designed to confuse personnel dealing with the hijackings by making them uncertain about whether the crisis was real or simulated as part of the exercise.
We therefore need to find out if any FAA personnel--especially those at the Boston Center--were involved in Vigilant Guardian or any other military exercises on September 11. Alternatively, they may have been participating in an exercise run by the FAA that was designed to confuse personnel dealing with the real-world crisis.
In light of these possibilities, it is worth noting that Vigilant Guardian had similarities to the real-world events taking place on September 11. It was reportedly "an air defense exercise simulating an attack on the United States" and was scheduled to include a simulated hijacking. It was "designed to run a range of scenarios, including a 'traditional' simulated hijack in which politically motivated perpetrators commandeer an aircraft, land on a Cuba-like island, and seek asylum," Vanity Fair reported. [11] Any FAA personnel who were participating in it or were simply aware that it was taking place could surely therefore have assumed the hijackings they were responding to were simulated as part of the exercise.
NEADS PERSONNEL THOUGHT THE HIJACKING OF FLIGHT 11 WAS PART OF AN EXERCISE
Certainly, some NEADS personnel are known to have been confused as a result of Vigilant Guardian taking place when the terrorist attacks began on September 11. They actually believed that when Joseph Cooper, a member of staff at the Boston Center, called at 8:37 a.m. and reported the hijacking of Flight 11, this was part of the exercise. For example, when Kevin Nasypany, the mission crew commander, was told there had been a hijacking, his first thought was, "Somebody started the exercise early" and he said out loud, "The hijack's not supposed to be for another hour." [12]
Robert Marr, the battle commander, was similarly confused. After Cooper told Dawne Deskins, the aircraft control and warning officer, about the hijacking of Flight 11, Deskins went to Marr and said, "It's a hijacking and ... it appears that the plane is heading toward New York City." Even though she pointed out, "This is real life, not part of the exercise," according to a book about the FAA and military response to the 9/11 attacks by author Lynn Spencer, Marr's initial thought upon hearing the news was: "This is an interesting start to the exercise. This 'real-world' mixed in with today's [simulated exercise] will keep them on their toes." [13]
James Fox, another senior member of staff at NEADS, also seems to have thought the report of a hijacking was part of the exercise. Several minutes after NEADS was informed of the hijacking, he was recorded saying, "I've never seen so much real-world stuff happen during an exercise."
At least one person still thought actual events were part of the exercise more than 25 minutes after Cooper called NEADS. At around 9:05 a.m., after NEADS personnel saw the second crash at the World Trade Center on television and were informed that a second plane had been hijacked, one of them said, "I think this is a damn input, to be honest." The word "input" was "a reference to the exercise, meaning a simulations input," Vanity Fair explained. [14]
NEADS personnel may have mistakenly thought real-world events on September 11 were part of an exercise not only because Vigilant Guardian was set to include a simulated hijacking that day but also because they had faced scenarios resembling what happened on previous occasions during exercises.
They had, for example, previously encountered simulated hijackings. In command post exercises, "we'll do Special 15s, which are a hijack," one of the NEADS ID technicians told the 9/11 Commission. And during exercises, the ID technicians had been required to find an aircraft that like Flight 11 was a primary target only, meaning it was not emitting a transponder signal. So, when a 9/11 Commission staffer asked the ID technicians: "Did you ever have an exercise where you actually had to find the plane? In other words, it's not transponding," one of them replied, "Yeah." [15]
FAA PERSONNEL WERE SOMETIMES INVOLVED IN MILITARY EXERCISES
However, while there is evidence that the way NEADS personnel responded to the apparent hijacking of Flight 11 was affected by their participation in Vigilant Guardian, it is unclear whether the NORAD exercise also had an effect on the actions of FAA personnel.
Colin Scoggins, a military operations specialist at the FAA's Boston Center, indicated that the actions of Boston Center personnel were unaffected by Vigilant Guardian. It was "an exercise that we don't participate [in] at Boston Center," he asserted. He also claimed he was unaware of any military exercises taking place on September 11. When he was asked, "What can you tell about the military exercises of that day and if they had any effect whatsoever on the response?" he answered, "I never knew anything about them." [16] Joseph Cooper, the traffic management unit coordinator at the Boston Center, said the same thing. When he was asked, "Were you aware that there was an exercise going on that day?" he replied, "No." [17]
Despite what Scoggins and Cooper stated, though, some evidence indicates that FAA personnel may indeed have been involved in Vigilant Guardian or another military exercise when the 9/11 attacks occurred. Notably, FAA personnel had taken part in military exercises on previous occasions and so it is surely possible that they were again participating in a military exercise on September 11.
The NEADS ID technicians confirmed that FAA personnel sometimes participated in military exercises when they were interviewed by the 9/11 Commission in October 2003. When they were asked, "Do you work with FAA in identifying tracks of interest during exercises?" one of them replied, "Yeah, sometimes they are involved." And when they were then asked, "Is that usually the FAA people involved or somebody simulating the FAA?" one of them replied, "Depending on what type of exercise we're running is who is gonna be involved in that exercise and there's a few that we involve FAA." [18]
EXERCISE INVOLVED A REAL AMERICAN AIRLINES PLANE PRETENDING TO BE HIJACKED
Among the exercises FAA personnel participated in was one held in 1995 called Twin Star, which included a simulated hijacking. This exercise dealt with the procedures by which the FAA would request help from the military when a hijacking occurred.
Twin Star was a comprehensive exercise. "What they did was ran a full hijack scenario from start to finish," Paul Goddard, chief of live exercises for NORAD on September 11, explained. "When you're talking about hijacks, that was the cradle-to-grave exercise," he commented.
Goddard and Scoggins, too, revealed that FAA personnel, as well as military personnel, participated in Twin Star. The exercise "involved the entire FAA system plus [the] National Military Command Center," Goddard explained. [19] While the aim had been "to test the military system," the FAA was an "active participant" too, Scoggins noted.
Furthermore, Twin Star had some intriguing similarities to what happened on September 11. To begin with, American Airlines--the airline that Flight 11 belonged to--was involved. "It was American Airlines that participated in it," Scoggins recalled. (He presumably meant an American Airlines airliner was used to act as the hijacked plane.) The aircraft pretending to be hijacked even had passengers on it. "They actually had passengers on board that were gonna be hijacked," Scoggins mentioned.
Additionally, fighter jets were scrambled to escort the hijacked plane but were unable to reach it. In the exercise, this was because they were sent in the wrong direction when they took off. "They got a bad heading, initial heading," Scoggins explained. On September 11, meanwhile, fighters scrambled from Otis Air National Guard Base on Cape Cod, Massachusetts, were unable to reach Flight 11 because the plane had already crashed into the World Trade Center by the time they took off. [20]
FAA ASSISTED REGIONAL AIR DEFENSE SECTORS DURING EXERCISES
Twin Star was the only joint FAA/military exercise before 9/11 that involved a simulated hijacking, according to Scoggins. "That's the only exercise we've ever had like that," he claimed. [21] However, some NEADS and NORAD personnel indicated otherwise.
One of the NEADS ID technicians told the 9/11 Commission that there had been a few NEADS exercises--rather than just one--in which FAA personnel participated. "There's a few that we involve FAA ... in order for them to get as much practice as us," she said. [22]
Ken Merchant, the joint exercise design manager for NORAD on September 11, provided further details. He explained that while FAA personnel only occasionally participated in exercises in which all of NORAD was involved, they often participated in exercises involving one of NORAD's regional air defense sectors in the United States: NEADS, the Southeast Air Defense Sector (SEADS), or the Western Air Defense Sector (WADS).
"At the national level, only a few times I can recall that we had national play from FAA," he told the 9/11 Commission. This was because NORAD "at the national level" would not usually be involved in the response to a hijacking. "We didn't get national play in just something that mundane," he noted. But, he said, "We always had it at the sector level." "At that level, there was a good relationship and [the FAA] would support us in exercises," he added. [23]
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS PARTICIPATED IN 'DO NOT PASS TO AIR DEFENSE RADAR' EXERCISES
It is worth noting that air traffic control personnel were often involved in a particular kind of military exercise called a NOPAR--meaning "do not pass to air defense radar"--exercise and the way they responded to the hijackings on September 11 could have been affected if one of these exercises was taking place that day. Several FAA employees provided details of NOPAR exercises when they spoke to the 9/11 Commission in late 2003.
Phil Swinney, a military operations specialist at the FAA's Washington Center, and Bob Felser, a military operations specialist at the FAA's New York Center, described scenarios that had been included in NOPAR exercises before 9/11. Swinney said Washington Center personnel had been involved in NOPAR exercises in which communication was lost with an aircraft. "Sometimes they would, on the mission that they would give us, they would say it was an aircraft with no radios," he recalled. [24]
Felser, meanwhile, mentioned a number of scenarios that had been included in NOPAR exercises that New York Center personnel had been involved with. The scenario in a NOPAR exercise "could be drugs; it could be a hijacked airplane; it could be an airplane with smoke in the cockpit [i.e., a plane that had suffered a mechanical fault]," he said. [25] The situation air traffic control personnel faced on September 11 therefore resembled some NOPAR exercises, since it involved hijackings and the loss of radio contact with aircraft.
NOPAR exercises could also involve scrambling fighter jets. A man who was employed at the FAA's Boston Center at the time of the 9/11 attacks but whose name has not been made public recalled that there had been "periodic NOPAR missions that involved active air scrambles." [26] NOPAR exercises were "where they practice the response of the military scramblers," Swinney mentioned. Felser confirmed that the aim was "to test [the military's] reaction time." If, for example, a NOPAR exercise was based around a simulated hijacking, participants would be evaluated on "how soon do the fighters get to the [hijacked] plane," he said. [27] This was therefore another similarity between what happened in NOPAR exercises and what happened on September 11, since fighters were scrambled in response to the real-world crisis that day.
An additional, although perhaps less significant, feature of NOPAR exercises was that exercise scenarios could involve an unidentified aircraft emerging just outside an area of special use airspace off the coast of the United States called a "warning area." This aircraft might be a Lear jet simulating a Russian Bear bomber aircraft, the unnamed Boston Center employee mentioned. [28] It would appear "maybe two or three miles from the warning area," Felser noted. [29] NEADS would then "determine if they need to get up there and see who this guy is," Swinney said. [30]
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS WITHHELD INFORMATION ABOUT AIRCRAFT DURING NOPAR EXERCISES
Although NOPAR exercises were run by the military and intended to test military personnel, air traffic control personnel played a crucial role in that they were expected to withhold information about the aircraft involved in the exercise scenario from the military. "You're not supposed to pass to the Northeast Air Defense," Daniel Bueno explained. [31] "FAA controllers would be aware of the aircraft but could only respond to Otis [Air Base] if Otis initiated the call," the unnamed Boston Center employee noted. [32]
Mark DePalma, the union representative at the New York Center, explained that if the military called the New York Center about an aircraft that was playing a part in a NOPAR exercise, the employee who answered the call was supposed to make the caller believe, "No, I have no idea what you're talking about." [33]
Personnel at the Washington Center responded in a similar way if they received a call from NEADS about an unknown aircraft that was involved in a NOPAR exercise. Swinney explained that because those running the exercise didn't want NEADS personnel or fighter pilots to know that the aircraft was a "fake target," the employee who took the call would say it was just an innocent aircraft. They would tell NEADS, "That's Lear [jet] so and so" and NEADS would therefore think, "He's not a threat." Alternatively, they might say, "No, we don't know who that is." [34]
NOPAR EXERCISES INVOLVED REAL AIRCRAFT PRETENDING TO BE HIJACKED
Notably, a real aircraft would often play the part of a hijacked plane in a NOPAR exercise. "The majority of the time we had a military aircraft, real-world, out there flying over land, coming into our area where we were gonna hold the exercise," one of the NEADS ID technicians mentioned. NEADS personnel would then be told, "This guy's hijacked."
Air traffic control personnel would know the supposedly hijacked aircraft was involved in the exercise and were told to provide no information if someone at NEADS called about it. The ID technician said that if someone at NEADS called an air traffic control facility about the aircraft, personnel at the facility "knew that that was just a military aircraft, wasn't really a hijack, so they weren't really concerned."
She gave an example of what might happen, telling the 9/11 Commission: "We call them, real-world, and say: 'Hey, Cleveland Center, do you know who this guy is? He's on a one-two-three-four code, north of wherever.' And they'd say, 'Yeah, no, well he's a C-130.'" (A C-130 is a military cargo plane.) Air traffic control personnel would know they had to withhold information about the plane from NEADS, she explained, because they had been told beforehand, "This guy's a C-130; he's gonna fake these guys out; he's gonna pretend he's hijacked; don't tell them who it is.'" [35]
MILITARY INFORMED AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL CENTERS ABOUT FORTHCOMING NOPAR EXERCISES
When the military was going to require assistance from an air traffic control facility during a NOPAR exercise, it would contact the facility and provide details of the forthcoming exercise so personnel there could prepare. Felser said that if NEADS needed assistance from the New York Center, it would "make requests" to the center "so we can advance for a NOPAR." "They tell us who [the aircraft that will be involved in the exercise] is for air traffic control purposes," DePalma mentioned. If the exercise was going to include a simulated hijacking, NEADS would "list the scenario, saying, 'November seven seven delta, hijacked, he'll be on this code,'" Felser explained.
Details of the exercise would then be passed on to at least some of the controllers at the New York Center. They might be told "that it's a NOPAR [and] that the aircraft will be, let's say, at 31,000 feet for 20 miles," Felser said. They might also be told that "in that 20 miles," the aircraft involved in the exercise would be "in the warning areas." And while the aircraft was in the warning area, NEADS "or whatever controlling agency made the request for the exercise" could "do whatever they want." [36]
Swinney described what happened when NEADS required assistance from the Washington Center with a NOPAR exercise. Whoever designed the exercise would brief the center and say that "on this day, at this time, there's gonna be an airplane coming in," he explained. They would also "fax us a mission scenario, and then they would call us and ask us if we got it and if we had any questions," he added.
After he was briefed about a NOPAR exercise, Swinney would let controllers at the Washington Center know what to do if NEADS called about the aircraft involved in the exercise scenario. He would tell them, "When you see this code, if Northeast [Air Defense Sector] calls you, say you don't know who it is." [37]
The amount of information an employee at an air traffic control facility was given about a NOPAR exercise varied depending on their role in the exercise. Bueno said the only controllers at the Boston Center who would be briefed on a forthcoming NOPAR exercise were the ones who handled the airspace that was going to be affected when the exercise took place. "If Area A, which is up in northern New York, if they're not affected and it's only the Area C and Area D that's out towards the ocean, if the exercise is happening there, that's the people that are gonna be briefed," he explained. [38] Controllers who handled airspace that would be unaffected by the NOPAR exercise were presumably given no information. They may even have been unaware that the exercise was taking place.
The employees given the most information about NOPAR exercises were the military operations specialists at the facility, who had something called "trusted agent" status. Felser noted that the "three of us" in the "military office" at the New York Center were trusted agents and consequently knew more than their colleagues did about NOPAR exercises, and had the combination to the safe that held documents relating to air defense missions. "We have a little bit more knowledge; we have the combination to the safe," he said. [39]
Colin Scoggins, as Felser's counterpart at the Boston Center, was presumably a trusted agent too and had "a little bit more knowledge" than his colleagues had about NOPAR exercises. While this has not been stated explicitly, he is at least known to have had unique responsibilities when the military was going to hold an exercise. Bueno explained that it was the role of the military operations specialist at the Boston Center--i.e., Scoggins--to "do the coordination" and "talk to the areas" about NORAD exercises. "They give briefings, say 'This is what's gonna happen [and] this is what we're expecting to do,'" he said. [40]
Some air traffic control centers seem to have assisted with NOPAR exercises more often than others. For example, it appears that the Washington Center was only occasionally involved. NEADS would involve it in a NOPAR exercise "maybe once or twice a year," Swinney said. [41] The New York Center was apparently involved more frequently. Felser recalled that NEADS would call his office "once a month, maybe," about a forthcoming NOPAR exercise. Despite its regular involvement, though, the New York Center only played a minor role when the exercises took place. The military was "testing their own systems" and so New York Center personnel were "just here to block airspace for them," Felser explained. "Usually it doesn't impact our area too much," he commented. [42]
How often the Boston Center assisted with NOPAR exercises is unknown. When Bueno--a senior member of staff at the facility--was asked how frequently NOPAR exercises occurred before 9/11, he replied, "I couldn't tell you how frequently." [43]
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL PERSONNEL MAY HAVE THOUGHT THE HIJACKING OF FLIGHT 11 WAS PART OF AN EXERCISE
Since FAA personnel had been involved in military exercises before September 11, then, it is surely possible that at least some individuals at the Boston Center were involved in a military exercise on September 11. If this was the case, it could help explain the conduct of some Boston Center personnel when the apparent hijackings occurred.
It might, for example, help explain some of Pete Zalewski's failures and anomalous actions, such as the controller's failure to notify his supervisor after radio contact with Flight 11 was lost; his failure to declare the situation an aircraft emergency after Flight 11's transponder signal was lost; and his demand that someone find and listen to the tape of his radio communications, even though doing so would risk slowing the FAA's response to the apparent hijacking of Flight 11.
Zalewski could surely have responded to the crisis in the unusual way he did because he thought he was responding to simulated events that were part of a training exercise rather than real events. Supporting this contention is the fact that NOPAR exercises sometimes included simulations of what he encountered that day. As Swinney and Felser noted, they sometimes included "an aircraft with no radios" or "a hijacked airplane." [44] Zalewski may therefore have thought, when he lost radio contact with Flight 11 and when he subsequently heard threatening communications indicating a plane had been hijacked, that these incidents were part of an exercise.
He might have thought this because a NOPAR exercise was taking place that day and he was participating in it or was at least aware that it was being held. Alternatively, he might have thought this simply because he noticed that the incidents occurring that day resembled simulated events that had been included in NOPAR exercises on previous occasions.
Participation in an exercise could also help explain some of Daniel Bueno's unusual responses to the apparent hijacking of Flight 11, such as going against protocol and contacting the FAA's Command Center to report the possible hijacking; trying to reach Otis Air Base directly via the Cape Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) to get fighter jets scrambled, again in breach of protocol; and instructing Joseph Cooper to call the military about the possible hijacking, even though the Boston Center was only meant to contact the FAA's New England Regional Operations Center when a hijacking occurred.
Bueno may have taken these unorthodox actions because he thought the hijacking was simulated as part of an exercise. Perhaps he had been required to respond inappropriately to simulated hijackings on previous occasions as part of his role in training exercises and was therefore simply doing what he thought was expected of him on September 11.
Furthermore, it is surely possible that his actions on September 11 that violated protocol were permissible when they were carried out as part of an exercise. If this was the case, he may have believed he was doing nothing wrong by violating protocol in response to the apparent hijacking of Flight 11 because he thought the incident was part of an exercise.
In light of these possibilities, it is curious that when Bueno called the Cape TRACON about the possible hijacking of Flight 11, Tim Spence, the operational supervisor he spoke to, thought the call was part of an exercise. "Because [the call] was so different from anything I'd dealt with here before, I almost thought it was a training exercise," Spence commented. "My first reaction, gut reaction, was, 'Maybe it's a training exercise,'" he said. [45] Bueno must therefore have been behaving in a way that Spence thought a person would if they were playing a role in an exercise.
EVENTS ON SEPTEMBER 11 RESEMBLED PREVIOUS TRAINING SCENARIOS
A couple of other features of the events of September 11 support the contention that personnel at the Boston Center were either participating in a training exercise that day or thought the hijacking of Flight 11 was part of an exercise they weren't participating in and perhaps hadn't been informed of.
The first of these is that the unusual incidents that occurred after Flight 11 was apparently taken over by hijackers resembled simulated incidents Boston Center personnel had faced in the dynamic simulation training facility. As Richard Beringer pointed out, training in the DYSIM had included a scenario in which "the transponder goes off, the plane won't answer, and he makes a turn"--all things that occurred for real on September 11. [46] And, as Shirley Kula pointed out, a DYSIM training session could involve a scenario in which "one of the aircraft gets hijacked." [47]
It is surely therefore possible that Pete Zalewski and other Boston Center employees mistakenly thought the loss of Flight 11's radio and transponder signal, and the threatening communications indicating that a plane had been hijacked, were part of some kind of training activity. Alternatively--and chillingly--the unusual incidents they faced may have been part of a training activity based around a scenario that closely resembled real-world events taking place at the same time.
SENIOR PERSONNEL WERE TAKING TRAINING AT THE TIME OF THE ATTACKS
The second of the features is that an unusually large number of the Boston Center's more senior personnel were training at a radar scope instead of carrying out their normal duties on the morning of September 11. "The radar associate positions were manned by experienced personnel sitting in to maintain their qualifications," the 9/11 Commission noted. [48]
William Dean and Shirley Kula--two of these "experienced personnel"--mentioned the training they were taking that morning during their interviews with the 9/11 Commission in September 2003. Dean, who usually worked in the traffic management unit, recalled that at approximately 8:00 a.m. to 8:30 a.m. on September 11, he went to Area E, Sector 20, to work as an air traffic controller. "We're required to stay current on positions within our area of proficiency," he explained. He needed to get eight hours of "currency" per month at a radar scope, he said. As a result, on the morning of September 11, he "had to go down into Area E ... where Sector 20 is and work." After sitting down at the sector, he served as John Hartling's radar associate controller. (A radar associate controller is an air traffic controller who works with a radar controller to plan the separation of aircraft, and coordinate with other sectors and facilities.) [49]
Kula, who normally worked as an operations supervisor in Area B, recalled that she too was getting her obligatory "eight hours' currency per month" at a radar scope that morning. There were "two other supervisors on duty in the area" she worked in, and so she was able to "let someone else take the aisle and I could plug in, make use of that time," she said. As a result, when the attacks on the World Trade Center occurred, she was "plugged in in the Athens Sector Radar Associate position, acting as a controller."
She also revealed that it was highly unusual to have so many senior personnel taking their monthly training at a radar scope concurrently, as happened that day. When she was asked, "How often does that occur that a portion of your workforce would be actually trained supervisors as well as controllers?" she replied, "That was fairly unusual." And when it was then suggested to her, "Normally, to have that much experience on the scopes would not, that would not be ..." she interjected, "It wouldn't happen, it wouldn't happen." [50]
Why then were so many senior members of staff working at radar scopes on September 11 of all days? It is surely possible that it was because a training exercise was scheduled to take place that day that would include simulations of incidents air traffic controllers would not normally encounter--such as a hijacking, maybe--and it was realized that the exercise would provide a valuable opportunity for senior personnel to gain experience dealing with these unusual events so they would be better prepared if the events occurred for real. Consequently, their monthly training at a radar scope was arranged to take place at the same time as the exercise.
OFFICIAL INVESTIGATIONS OF 9/11 LEFT KEY QUESTIONS UNANSWERED
We can see that the FAA's response to the hijacking of American Airlines Flight 11 on September 11, 2001, featured many anomalies, some of which seem highly suspicious. But while there have been numerous official investigations of the 9/11 attacks, such as the supposedly definitive one carried out by the 9/11 Commission in 2003 and 2004, none of the investigations adequately examined these anomalies.
Among other things, they failed to explain why some Boston Center employees were slow to take action, violated the protocol for dealing with a hijacking, or in other ways responded inappropriately to the crisis. Alarmingly, they did not determine why FAA headquarters never called the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon to report the hijacking of Flight 11 and ask for military assistance, even though this was a particularly serious failure.
A problem with the investigations was that the possibility of some FAA employees being complicit in the 9/11 attacks was overlooked. This possibility also appears to have been unofficially forbidden from all mainstream discussion of the attacks, even though it could help explain the unusual aspects of the FAA's response to the crisis. But if we want to find out exactly what happened on September 11, we need to investigate the actions of FAA personnel that day without restraint. And we need to ask difficult questions about who was responsible for 9/11.
NOTES
[1] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With F-15 Fighter Pilot Major Daniel S. Nash." 9/11 Commission, October 14, 2003.
[2] Matt Viser, "Two Pilots Revisit Their 9/11." Boston Globe, September 11, 2005.
[3] "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Interview With Terry Biggio, Deputy of Facility, Boston Center." 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003.
[4] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Dan Bueno, part 1. 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003.
[5] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Richard Beringer. 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Shirley Kula. 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003.
[6] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Brazalino Martins. 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003.
[7] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Shirley Kula.
[8] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Richard Beringer.
[9] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Terry Biggio. 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003.
[10] Hart Seely, "Amid Crisis Simulation, 'We Were Suddenly No-Kidding Under Attack.'" Newhouse News Service, January 25, 2002; Jason Tudor, "Inner Space." Airman, March 2002; William B. Scott, "Exercise Jump-Starts Response to Attacks." Aviation Week & Space Technology, June 3, 2002; William M. Arkin, Code Names: Deciphering U.S. Military Plans, Programs, and Operations in the 9/11 World. Hanover, NH: Steerforth Press, 2005, p. 545.
[11] Leslie Filson, Air War Over America: Sept. 11 Alters Face of Air Defense Mission. Tyndall Air Force Base, FL: Headquarters 1st Air Force, Public Affairs Office, 2003, p. 122; Michael Bronner, "9/11 Live: The NORAD Tapes." Vanity Fair, September 2006.
[12] Michael Bronner, "9/11 Live: The NORAD Tapes."
[13] Lynn Spencer, Touching History: The Untold Story of the Drama That Unfolded in the Skies Over America on 9/11. New York: Free Press, 2008, p. 26.
[14] "Transcripts From Voice Recorder, 11 September 2001 1227Z-1417Z, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Rome, NY." North American Aerospace Defense Command, September 11, 2001; Michael Bronner, "9/11 Live: The NORAD Tapes."
[15] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With the Personnel From Huntress ID." 9/11 Commission, October 27, 2003; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Maureen Dooley, Shelley Watson, and Stacia Rountree, part 1. 9/11 Commission, October 27, 2003.
[16] "Q&A With 9/11 Boston Center Air Traffic Controller." 9/11 Guide, October 28, 2007.
[17] "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview With Joseph Cooper, Traffic Management Unit Coordinator." 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Joseph Cooper, part 2. 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003.
[18] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With the Personnel From Huntress ID"; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Maureen Dooley, Shelley Watson, and Stacia Rountree, part 1.
[19] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Major Paul Goddard (Canadian Forces) and Ken Merchant." 9/11 Commission, March 4, 2004; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Ken Merchant and Paul Goddard, part 1. 9/11 Commission, March 4, 2004.
[20] "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview With Colin Scoggins, Military Operations Specialist." 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003; Colin Scoggins, 9/11 Commission interview, handwritten notes 1. 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003; Colin Scoggins, 9/11 Commission interview, handwritten notes 2. 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Colin Scoggins, part 1. 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003.
[21] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Colin Scoggins, part 1.
[22] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Maureen Dooley, Shelley Watson, and Stacia Rountree, part 1.
[23] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Major Paul Goddard (Canadian Forces) and Ken Merchant"; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Ken Merchant and Paul Goddard, part 1.
[24] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Phil Swinney. 9/11 Commission, December 4, 2003.
[25] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Robert Felser." 9/11 Commission, December 15, 2003; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Robert Felser. 9/11 Commission, December 15, 2003.
[26] "Memorandum for the Record: Unsolicited Phone Call From
[Name Redacted] Former Controller Boston Center." 9/11 Commission, October 22, 2003.
[27] Phil Swinney, 9/11 Commission interview, typed notes. 9/11 Commission, December 4, 2003; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Phil Swinney; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Robert Felser.
[28] "Memorandum for the Record: Unsolicited Phone Call From
[Name Redacted] Former Controller Boston Center."
[29] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Robert Felser.
[30] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Phil Swinney.
[31] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Dan Bueno, part 1.
[32] "Memorandum for the Record: Unsolicited Phone Call From
[Name Redacted] Former Controller Boston Center."
[33] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Robert Felser.
[34] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Phil Swinney.
[35] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With the Personnel From Huntress ID"; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Maureen Dooley, Shelley Watson, and Stacia Rountree, part 2. 9/11 Commission, October 27, 2003.
[36] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Robert Felser.
[37] Phil Swinney, 9/11 Commission interview, typed notes; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Phil Swinney.
[38] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Dan Bueno, part 1.
[39] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Robert Felser"; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Robert Felser.
[40] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Dan Bueno, part 1.
[41] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Phil Swinney.
[42] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Robert Felser.
[43] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Dan Bueno, part 1.
[44] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Phil Swinney; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Robert Felser.
[45] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Tim Spence. 9/11 Commission, September 30, 2003.
[46] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Richard Beringer.
[47] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Shirley Kula.
[48] "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Interview With Terry Biggio, Deputy of Facility, Boston Center."
[49] "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview With William Dean, Traffic Management Unit Specialist." 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with William Dean. 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003.
[50] "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview 1 With Shirley Kula, Operations Supervisor, Boston Center." 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Shirley Kula.
