While it was clearly unfortunate that an exercise simulating a plane crash was held so soon before September 11--a day when four airliners crashed--the situation was worse than that. Just 11 days earlier, on August 30, 2001, United Airlines had run another exercise that was also based on the scenario one of its planes crashing. Furthermore, the August 30 exercise was so realistic that some airline employees got upset and some were physically ill because they believed hundreds of people on the plane had died. [2]
It was extraordinary that, of all the airlines in the United States, United Airlines conducted exercises just before 9/11 that simulated serious emergencies involving its planes, since two of the four planes that were apparently hijacked by Arab terrorists and then crashed on September 11 belonged to United Airlines. United Airlines Flight 175, which was apparently hijacked between 8:42 a.m. and 8:46 a.m. that day, crashed into the South Tower of the World Trade Center at 9:03 a.m. and United Airlines Flight 93, which was apparently hijacked at 9:28 a.m. that day, supposedly crashed in a field in Pennsylvania at 10:03 a.m. after a group of passengers tried to overpower the hijackers and retake control of the plane. [3]
United Airlines personnel therefore had important roles to play on September 11. But if, as a result of the two surprise exercises in the previous 12 days, they were unsure whether the crisis that day was real or part of another exercise, their response to it could have been impaired.
OPERATIONS CENTER WAS LIKE 'A TRADING ROOM AT A WALL STREET FIRM'
The exercise on September 10, 2001, took place in the United Airlines System Operations Control (SOC) center. This was located adjacent to the airline's headquarters building, 10 miles northwest of Chicago's O'Hare International Airport in Elk Grove, Illinois.
The United Airlines SOC was an important facility, since the SOC is the nerve center of an airline, responsible for its day-to-day operations. It was a rectangular room, the size of a football field, with "people sitting at computer terminals, controllers and dispatchers tracking flights and pulling up crew schedules, maps, text messages, weather graphics," journalist and author Jere Longman wrote. [4]
It was equipped with large screens that displayed electronic maps and the thousands of planes that were airborne at any one time over North America, and television screens tuned to CNN, which enabled employees to keep an eye on the news. [5]
Around 300 people worked there. Among them were numerous flight dispatchers, who served as the main liaison between the airline and the pilots of its aircraft. Each dispatcher was responsible for monitoring the progress of between 10 and 30 flights during a shift, and up to a couple of dozen flights at any one time. [6] They were also responsible for handling any problems that arose with a flight. If a problem occurred, the pilot of the troubled flight and the dispatcher could between them devise a plan of action. [7]
AIRLINE PERSONNEL WERE TOLD A PLANE WAS GOING TO CRASH NEAR THE NORTH POLE
Gene Kim, one of the dispatchers in the United Airlines SOC in 2001, explained what happened on September 10. Late in the afternoon, United Airlines held "an emergency response exercise" involving one of its aircraft that was flying near the North Pole, he recalled. He was notified of the mock emergency in a message on his BlackBerry. (A BlackBerry was a wireless e-mail messaging device, which some United Airlines personnel used.) "A page came out close to the end of the day, about 5 o'clock, that said that that flight had experienced an uncontained engine failure, heavy casualties, and the flight was going down near the North Pole, somewhere up in the polar region," he said.
A lot of employees had recently left work and were driving home. These people had to "turn their cars around and try to get back to headquarters as quick as possible to deal with the emergency." However, after a time, SOC personnel were informed that the emergency was only simulated. "A few minutes later, another page came out saying that this was just a drill, so called everything off," Kim said. [8]
The exercise appears to have been similar to what is called a "no-notice exercise." A no-notice exercise is an exercise where participants are not told beforehand when the exercise will take place and the scenario on which it will be based. They know only that there is going to be an exercise and have agreed to participate. [9]
However, what happened on September 10 seems to have been more than this, since United Airlines personnel were apparently not told in advance that an exercise was going to be held. The exercise that day was one that "nobody was aware of" and "nobody was prepared for," Kim explained. [10] It would therefore be more accurate to call what happened a surprise exercise.
The exercise had a particularly unfortunate consequence the following morning, when there was an actual emergency that, like the exercise scenario, involved planes crashing. Specifically, at least some people at the United Airlines SOC initially thought the real-world crisis on September 11 was part of another exercise and consequently paid no attention to it.
AIRLINE PERSONNEL THOUGHT IT WAS ANOTHER EXERCISE WHEN THEY WERE TOLD A PLANE HAD HIT THE WORLD TRADE CENTER
Kim was in a meeting when he learned something was wrong on the morning of September 11. He was attending his "first official meeting as a union board member" that day, he explained. He had arrived at work at about 7:00 a.m. Central time (8:00 a.m. Eastern time) and the meeting with "the president of the union and then two reps from the company, management representatives," began "shortly thereafter," he recalled. It was a mundane meeting. The purpose was "to go over the vacation bid packages for the dispatchers."
At some point after 8:46 a.m. (Eastern time), when American Airlines Flight 11--the first plane to apparently be hijacked that day--flew into the World Trade Center, Kim and the other people in the meeting received a text message alerting them to the crash. "The first indication we received that something was wrong was a page that we got," Kim recalled. The page stated: "Aircraft has struck the World Trade Center. More information to follow."
Unfortunately, because of what happened the previous afternoon, the meeting participants thought United Airlines was holding another surprise exercise and the crash was fictitious. "We thought this was the same thing; we thought this was coming from corporate security, just as another drill," Kim recalled. They were annoyed about this. "I recall looking at that and just kind of shook my head in disbelief," Kim mentioned. One person said in exasperation, "Man, somebody's gonna lose their job over this if they keep sending drill messages out like that."
The men in the meeting therefore did nothing in response to the notification. "We all cleared our pagers and literally went back to work," Kim said. They only took action after the union president was called by his wife, who said it was being reported on television that a plane had crashed into the World Trade Center.
Kim explained that "a few minutes" after he received the page stating, "Aircraft has struck the World Trade Center," the president of the union answered a call from his wife "and we could hear over the cell phone her asking him if he was okay." The union president's wife then reported that "on the news, she was watching that an aircraft had hit the World Trade Center." The meeting's participants now started to take the situation seriously. "At that point, we knew something was wrong and then we went out to the dispatch floor to see what was going on," Kim recalled. [11]
It is possible that others at the SOC besides Kim and the people with him in the meeting initially thought the news that a plane had crashed into the World Trade Center was part of an exercise because of what happened the previous afternoon. Unfortunately, Kim has only given a brief description of the September 10 exercise and its consequences, and so we have no way of knowing whether this was the case.
EXERCISE BASED ON THE SCENARIO OF AN AIRLINER CRASHING WAS HELD 12 DAYS BEFORE 9/11
Incredibly, the September 10 exercise wasn't the only thing that could have caused United Airlines personnel to mistake the real-world crisis on September 11 for a scenario in a training exercise. Less than two weeks earlier, United Airlines had conducted another exercise that was very similar to it. This exercise too was based on the scenario of one of the airline's flights suffering a mechanical fault and crashing. And, as with the exercise on September 10, airline personnel received no advance notification that it was going to take place.
The exercise was organized by Andy Studdert, the chief operating officer and executive vice president of United Airlines at the time. Studdert had been concerned that since United Airlines hadn't had a "real accident" involving one of its planes in a long time, its personnel had become complacent and were unprepared for a major emergency. "I was worried we'd become cocky," he recalled. He therefore decided to arrange a crisis exercise.
The exercise took place on August 30, 2001. Studdert set things in motion when he arrived at work that day. He gave instructions to a colleague, who he has referred to as his "safety guy." (This person may have been Ed Soliday, since Soliday was United Airlines's vice president of safety, quality assurance, and security at the time.) He told his colleague to contact the pilot of a United Airlines Boeing 747 that was going to fly to Australia that day and instruct them to simulate an emergency during the trip. At a particular point during the flight, the pilot should call in and report that his plane had suffered an "uncontained number three engine failure, rapid descent, decompression." Then, mid-word, he should go silent, thereby giving the impression that the plane had crashed.
"We told the captains we were gonna turn them off and let the system think that we'd actually had explosive decompression ... and engine failure and then loss of [transponder] signal," Studdert explained. (A transponder is a device that sends an aircraft's identifying information, speed, and altitude to the radar screens of air traffic controllers on the ground.)
The exercise took place at around 2 o'clock that afternoon. As instructed, the pilot of the Boeing 747 reported the supposed emergency to the dispatcher responsible for his flight and turned off his plane's transponder. [12]
AIRLINE PERSONNEL WERE 'THROWING UP IN THE HALL' AND 'CRYING'
Subsequently, Studdert's secretary ran into Studdert's office and said, "Andy, we have a crisis." She explained that contact had been lost with a Boeing 747 that was somewhere over the Pacific Ocean. In response to the news, Studdert hurried out from his office and headed to the SOC to help personnel there deal with the simulated emergency. Since personnel in the SOC were unable to make contact with the Boeing 747, he opened the airline's crisis center.
Unfortunately, because they were not told that the crisis was only simulated, personnel in the SOC believed the 747 had really crashed and the 270 people on board had died. Consequently, when Studdert arrived at the SOC, he found the place "in complete stress." People there were upset and some had become physically ill. "There are people throwing up in the hall, there are people crying, there are people just staring out the windows," Studdert recalled.
The exercise lasted about 30 minutes. "I let it go on for half an hour," Studdert mentioned. Only then did he let people know the crisis was simulated, there had been no plane crash, and no one had died. He got on the crisis center's communications link and told United Airlines employees around the U.S. and around the world, "This has been a no-notice drill, there is no event, everything's fine." [13]
AIRLINE PERSONNEL WERE UNAWARE THAT AN EXERCISE WAS GOING TO TAKE PLACE
Studdert has called the exercise a "no-notice drill." [14] However, like the exercise on September 10, it appears to have been more than this, since airline personnel were apparently not told in advance that it was going to take place. (As previously mentioned, with a no-notice exercise, participants do at least know beforehand that an exercise is going to be held, even though they are not told the date and time when it will take place.) As with the September 10 exercise, then, it would be more accurate to call what happened on August 30 a surprise exercise.
Studdert had at least told the United Airlines management team that he intended to run an exercise, though. "One of these days, I'm gonna come in here and I'm gonna do a no-notice drill," he'd said. However, he did this about six months before he held the exercise. [15] By the time the exercise took place, therefore, the managers would likely have forgotten what he had said. They may even have been unaware of the exercise when it took place, since the exercise scenario presumably had little relevance to their roles at the airline. Studdert's advance notification would thus have been of little benefit if the few people he gave it to were not participating in the exercise.
EXERCISES HAD SIMILARITIES TO WHAT HAPPENED ON SEPTEMBER 11
It is extraordinary that United Airlines held two surprise exercises in the fortnight before 9/11 and both of them seem to have been particularly realistic. The key question to consider is whether the exercises impaired the response of United Airlines personnel to the real-world emergency on September 11.
There were certainly similarities between the scenarios for the exercises and what happened on September 11 that could have caused United Airlines personnel to think real-world events on September 11 were part of another exercise. The most notable of these was that the scenarios for both exercises involved a United Airlines plane crashing. In the August 30 exercise, United Airlines personnel were led to believe one of the airline's Boeing 747s had crashed over the Pacific Ocean. [16] And in the September 10 exercise, they were led to believe one of the airline's flights was going down near the North Pole. [17] On September 11, meanwhile, United Airlines Flight 175 crashed into the South Tower of the World Trade Center at 9:03 a.m. and United Airlines Flight 93 supposedly crashed in a field in Pennsylvania at 10:03 a.m. [18]
The August 30 exercise also resembled what happened on September 11 in that it involved the loss of communication with a United Airlines plane. As previously mentioned, the pilot of a United Airlines Boeing 747 broke off radio contact mid-word when he called in and reported that his plane had suffered an engine failure. [19] And on September 11, air traffic controllers lost radio contact with Flight 175 and Flight 93 when the planes were apparently hijacked by Arab terrorists. [20]
It is possible that the September 10 exercise, too, involved the loss of communication with a United Airlines plane, even though this detail has not been stated publicly. Indeed, considering that the exercise was based on the scenario of a plane crashing, it presumably would have involved losing contact with the troubled plane as it crashed. This detail may have not been stated publicly simply because Gene Kim has only given a brief description of what happened when the exercise took place and presumably therefore omitted some key information in his account.
Another similarity between what happened during the August 30 exercise and what happened on September 11 is that the exercise involved a United Airlines plane having its transponder switched off. The pilot of the Boeing 747 involved in the simulation turned off his plane's transponder to create the impression of an aircraft emergency. [21] And on September 11, Flight 93's transponder was turned off 13 minutes after Flight 93 was apparently hijacked. Flight 175's transponder was never turned off. However, a change in transponder signal was still a feature of what happened to Flight 175. Specifically, the plane's transponder signal changed twice in the space of a minute just after Flight 175 is believed to have been hijacked. [22]
The September 10 exercise, too, may have involved the loss of a plane's transponder signal, only this has not been stated publicly, since Kim gave only a brief description of what happened and therefore presumably omitted some details of the exercise. Indeed, since the exercise was based on the scenario of a plane crashing, it presumably would have involved the supposedly troubled plane's transponder going off.
CRISIS CENTER WAS OPENED DURING THE AUGUST 30 EXERCISE
A notable similarity between what happened during the August 30 exercise and what happened on September 11 is that on both occasions, the United Airlines crisis center was activated. [23]
The crisis center, which was located just off the United Airlines SOC, was "a terraced, theater-like room that resembled NASA's mission control," Jere Longman wrote. [24] The facility had several television screens, which displayed CNN and other news media. It also had a large Aircraft Situation Display screen on one wall, which tracked all aircraft in the United States and Canada that had filed flight plans, including commercial jets and private planes. [25]
It was standard procedure in a crisis situation for an airline to isolate the plane involved in the emergency and move the handling of the plane away from the SOC to the crisis center so as to avoid disrupting the rest of the airline's operations. [26] But activating a crisis center, whether during an exercise or during a real emergency, was still a major event. "Opening a crisis center in an airline is the single most significant thing you do," Andy Studdert noted. [27] Doing so was "pretty expensive" and "when we open that room, we affect a lot of the operation" of the airline, Ed Soliday explained. [28]
The process of assembling and fully activating the United Airlines crisis center apparently took about 30 minutes. (Certainly, this was how long it took on September 11.) [29] Activating the crisis center "triggered the mobilization of more than 3,000 United employees," Studdert said. [30] A representative from every division of the airline's corporate structure would report to the center and have specific duties to carry out. [31]
During the August 30 exercise, Studdert opened the crisis center in order to manage the simulated emergency. [32] On September 11, meanwhile, the crisis center was activated after SOC personnel saw television coverage of the first crash at the World Trade Center, in order to deal with the real-world emergency. [33]
The United Airlines crisis center may also have been opened during the September 10 exercise, even though this has not been stated publicly. Opening the facility on that occasion would certainly have made sense considering that it was normal procedure in a crisis situation to move the handling of the plane that was in trouble to the crisis center. And since the September 10 exercise involved a scenario much like the one for the August 30 exercise, it would be reasonable to think that, like the August 30 exercise, the September 10 exercise involved opening the crisis center. If the crisis center was indeed opened on September 10, this may not have been stated publicly simply because Gene Kim has given only a brief description of the exercise that day and may therefore have omitted some key details.
NEWS OF THE SIMULATED AND ACTUAL EMERGENCIES WAS COMMUNICATED IN TEXT MESSAGES
Kim has revealed one notable similarity between what happened during the September 10 exercise and what happened on September 11, though. Specifically, on both occasions, some people in the United Airlines SOC were informed that there was a crisis in a text message on their BlackBerries.
As previously mentioned, Kim recalled that on September 10, "A page came out close to the end of the day, about 5 o'clock," which stated that a United Airlines flight "had experienced an uncontained engine failure, heavy casualties, and the flight was going down near the North Pole." And on September 11, he said, "The first indication we received that something was wrong was a page that we got," which stated: "Aircraft has struck the World Trade Center. More information to follow." [34]
The message Kim received on September 11 may have been one sent by Mike Barber, a manager of flight dispatch operations at United Airlines. After Sandy Rogers, an air traffic control coordinator in the SOC, called the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) that day and was told the plane that hit the North Tower of the World Trade Center belonged to American Airlines and not United Airlines, Barber sent a page to about 100 United Airlines personnel. The message notified them of "the American Airlines plane that went into [the North Tower]," the 9/11 Commission stated.
Sending a page was of course an appropriate way to inform airline personnel of a crisis--real or simulated. Doing so was "the quickest way to disseminate a message to principal members of the corporation in the event of an aviation accident," the 9/11 Commission noted. [35] It is therefore perhaps unsurprising that this method of communication was used both during the September 10 exercise and on the morning of September 11. All the same, the similarity is worth noting since it could have increased the likelihood that United Airlines personnel would think the real-world crisis on September 11 was simulated and part of another exercise.
It is surely possible that some United Airlines personnel learned of the supposed emergency from a text message on their BlackBerries during the August 30 exercise, too, even though this has not been stated publicly. If they did, this feature of the exercise may not have been revealed simply because Andy Studdert failed to mention some details in his accounts of what happened.
MAINTENANCE FACILITY RECEIVED SOME PRANK PHONE CALLS BEFORE 9/11
Curiously, some unusual incidents occurred before 9/11 at another United Airlines facility besides the SOC, which, like the two surprise exercises, could have impaired the response of United Airlines personnel to the real-world crisis on September 11.
The incidents occurred at the System Aircraft Maintenance Control (SAMC), located at San Francisco International Airport in California. The SAMC was a single point agency for helping the crews of United Airlines aircraft and maintenance personnel to solve maintenance problems. [36] Flight crews called it to report mechanical problems, obtain advice on troubleshooting, or request maintenance while in flight. [37]
Like the SOC, the SAMC played a key role on the morning of September 11. Specifically, personnel at the facility answered phone calls from flight attendants on the two United Airlines planes that were apparently hijacked that day--Flight 175 and Flight 93--who reported that their planes had been hijacked and provided key details of the hijackings. [38] But before then, personnel at the SAMC received some unusual prank phone calls.
Few details of the prank calls have been revealed. Rich Belme, a manager at the SAMC, said only that they occurred "months prior to [9/11]," were "strange," and were made by "disgruntled mechanics." [39] But because they'd received these calls, it is surely possible that SAMC personnel thought the calls they received from flight attendants on Flight 175 and Flight 93 were also prank calls and consequently failed to treat them with urgency.
MAINTENANCE FACILITY RECEIVED CALLS FROM TWO OF THE HIJACKED PLANES ON SEPTEMBER 11
The call from Flight 175 to the SAMC was received at 8:52:01 a.m. on September 11. [40] It was made by a male flight attendant and answered by Marc Policastro, an operator at the SAMC. The flight attendant said his plane had been hijacked, both of the plane's pilots had been killed, a flight attendant had been stabbed, and he believed the hijackers were flying the plane. [41]
After the call ended, Policastro and another operator, Andrew Lubkemann, went and told Belme about it. However, because of what happened months earlier, Belme initially thought the call might have been another prank. "Just in the back of my mind I was thinking, 'Well, maybe this is a hoax from one of our ground mechanics,'" he recalled. [42]
Lubkemann, too, initially doubted whether the flight attendant's call was genuine. He was with Policastro when Policastro answered the call. After the call ended, Policastro took off his headset and said, "That flight just said they were being hijacked." In response, Lubkemann asked, "Well, did it sound like a joke or was it, did it sound serious?"
However, it is unclear whether Lubkemann's uncertainty was a consequence of the prank calls. Lubkemann only started working as an operator at the SAMC two weeks before 9/11. [43] He presumably therefore was not at the SAMC when the prank calls were received. All the same, it is at least possible that he was told about the calls during his first two weeks at the SAMC and his awareness of them caused him to think the flight attendant's call might be a joke.
The call from Flight 93 to the SAMC was received at 9:35:40 a.m. on September 11. [44] It was made by flight attendant Sandy Bradshaw and initially answered by Lubkemann but passed on to Belme after a minute or two. Bradshaw said she was on Flight 93 and the plane was being hijacked. She explained that hijackers were in the cabin behind the first-class curtain and in the cockpit. They had killed a flight attendant and announced that they had a bomb on the plane, she mentioned. [45]
Whether Lubkemann, Belme, or anyone else at the SAMC thought her call might have been a prank is unknown. Neither Lubkemann nor Belme said they had thought so when they were interviewed in November 2003 by the 9/11 Commission--the body created by Congress and the president to investigate the 9/11 attacks. [46] It is of course possible, though, that they thought it might have been a prank but failed to mention this to the 9/11 Commission.
AIRLINE EMPLOYEES MAY HAVE THOUGHT REPORTS ABOUT THE ATTACKS ON SEPTEMBER 11 WERE PART OF AN EXERCISE
It is concerning that incidents occurred before 9/11 that could have caused United Airlines personnel to think real-world events on September 11, 2001, were either part of a training exercise or a hoax, since two of the four airliners that were apparently hijacked on September 11 were United Airlines planes and so United Airlines personnel had key roles to play that day.
Unfortunately, only a limited amount of information about the surprise exercises on August 30 and September 10, 2001, and the prank phone calls received at the SAMC months before 9/11 has been revealed. Many questions about these events therefore still need to be addressed.
It would certainly be helpful to know how many people in the United Airlines SOC thought, initially at least, that the crisis on September 11 was part of an exercise as a consequence of what happened on August 30 and September 10.
We know that Gene Kim and a people in the meeting with him on the morning of September 11 thought a text message informing them that an aircraft had struck the World Trade Center was part of "another drill" like the one held the previous afternoon, and therefore ignored it and carried on as if nothing was wrong. [47] But were these men an exception or did other SOC personnel think the same thing when they learned about the first crash at the World Trade Center? And if other SOC personnel thought the news of the crash was part of an exercise, did they too dismiss it and carry on as if nothing was wrong?
If any of the flight dispatchers or other employees at the SOC thought the news was part of an exercise, United Airlines's response to the crisis that morning may have been seriously impaired. Unfortunately, it is currently impossible to determine if SOC personnel other than Kim and the people in the meeting with him thought it was part of an exercise since the few accounts describing their reaction to the news are vague and contradictory.
USA Today reported that when Andy Studdert arrived at the SOC shortly after he learned a plane had crashed into the World Trade Center, the staff there "already knows" the crisis was not part of an exercise. However, the newspaper provided no evidence to support its assertion. [48] And contradicting it, the Chicago Tribune stated that Studdert sensed "disbelief among his employees" after he reached the SOC, implying that he thought they didn't believe the crash was a real incident. [49]
Studdert was certainly concerned that SOC personnel might think the crisis was only simulated and he consequently clarified that it was not part of an exercise. At some point after he reached the SOC, he shouted out, "This is not a drill!" He did this "because I was worried that they were gonna be thinking [the crisis was part of an exercise]," he explained. [50]
Unfortunately, if anyone in the SOC indeed thought the crisis was part of an exercise, they may still have thought so after Studdert told them it was "not a drill." This is because Studdert clearly showed that he could be extremely deceptive on the afternoon of August 30. He allowed SOC personnel to think an airliner with 270 people on board had crashed for 30 minutes before letting them know that the crash was only simulated, even though some of them were extremely upset because they thought the disaster was real. [51]
PREVIOUS EXERCISE INCLUDED SIMULATED TELEVISION FOOTAGE OF A PLANE CRASH
SOC personnel may actually have thought the crisis on September 11 was just part of an exercise even though they saw reports on television about the terrorist attacks.
Television screens that showed CNN had been installed in the SOC shortly before 9/11. [52] Those in the SOC on September 11 would therefore presumably have seen coverage of the World Trade Center on fire as soon as it was first reported on CNN, at 8:49 a.m. that day, about three minutes after American Airlines Flight 11 crashed into the North Tower. [53]
SOC personnel in fact appear to have only learned something was wrong that day when they saw the coverage of the crash on television. Rich Miles, the SOC duty manager, recalled that he and some other managers had been discussing "work-related items" when "someone noticed and I looked up, and we saw the CNN pictures of the Trade Center tower." [54]
Mike Barber, another key official in the SOC that day, also revealed that he learned of the crisis from seeing the coverage of the crash on one of the large overhead television screens in the SOC. He'd been looking at the screen and then blurted out, "My God, the World Trade Center's on fire." [55] For those in the SOC, "the first report [they received] of an airplane striking one of the towers of the World Trade Center came from CNN," Air Safety Week commented. [56]
People in the SOC were in fact transfixed by the coverage of the North Tower on fire. Patti Carson, United Airlines's vice president of human resources at the time, recalled that she, Studdert, and some other senior executives headed to the SOC after they learned that a plane had crashed into the World Trade Center. When they entered the SOC, "there was deathly silence" and "every single person in that room--and there were more than one hundred--was staring up at the TV monitors," she said. [57] And Gene Kim recalled that after he and the men with him ended their meeting and went out to the dispatch floor, he noticed that "everybody was fixated on the screens." [58]
While one might assume that because they saw the crash at the World Trade Center being reported on television, these people would have known the incident was real and not part of an exercise, this may not necessarily have been the case. This is because at least one exercise previously held by United Airlines included simulated television footage of a plane crash. During the exercise, which was held in October 1996 and based on the hypothetical crash of an airliner in Venezuela, United Airlines personnel saw simulated television coverage of the burning aircraft "beamed onto a screen." [59] SOC personnel might therefore have thought the images they saw of the World Trade Center on fire on September 11 were another piece of simulated television coverage that had been created for an exercise.
Supporting this possibility is the fact that some people--albeit at other locations--are known to have indeed thought the television coverage of the attacks in New York was simulated footage for a training exercise.
At Fort Monmouth, an Army base about 50 miles south of New York, an exercise was taking place on the morning of September 11 based on a simulated biochemical terrorist attack at the base. Consequently, when people at the base first saw live footage of what was happening at the World Trade Center on television, they reportedly "thought it was some elaborate training video to accompany the exercise." A training officer for the Fort Monmouth Fire Department was told, "You really outdid yourself this time." [60]
And at the Canadian Air Force's headquarters in Winnipeg, Canada, Alain Parent, director of the Canadian Air Operations Center, made a similar mistake.
The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) was in the middle of a major annual exercise called Vigilant Guardian, which has been described as "an air defense exercise simulating an attack on the United States." [61] Therefore, when Parent saw coverage of the first crash at the World Trade Center on a large screen as he walked into the Air Operations Center on the morning of September 11, he initially thought he was watching video that had been created for the exercise. "I didn't believe it was actually happening. I thought it was part of an exercise scenario that they had done--that they had gone all out with some sort of Hollywood production," he recalled. [62]
THOUSANDS OF UNITED AIRLINES EMPLOYEES MAY HAVE BEEN DECEIVED DURING THE EXERCISES
It would surely be helpful to know how many United Airlines employees in total--not just at the SOC but also in the rest of the U.S. and around the world--were informed of the supposed crashes during the exercises on August 30 and September 10, 2001, since the response of any of these people to the terrorist attacks on September 11 may have been affected as a consequence of what happened in the exercises. Anyone who was notified that a plane had crashed and then subsequently told it was just a drill on August 30 and/or September 10 might have thought the real-world crisis on September 11 was simulated and part of another exercise, and may therefore have responded inappropriately to it.
Thousands of airline employees could have been told a plane had crashed during the August 30 exercise since, according to Andy Studdert, "The drill activated 3,000 people in different jobs, from humanitarian to operational." [63] The United Airlines crisis center was opened during the exercise and whenever the crisis center was opened, "3,000 people are put on an immediate activation," Studdert explained. [64]
Studdert also noted that the crisis center's communications link had "170 stations and people all over the country, all over the world." Presumably, then, United Airlines employees all around the United States and all around the world were notified of the supposed crash during the exercise. [65]
We have less information indicating how many United Airlines employees were told a plane had crashed during the exercise on September 10. Certainly, a significant number of people at the SOC are known to have been involved in the exercise. Gene Kim mentioned that "a lot of folks [who worked at the SOC] that were on the drive home" had to "turn their cars around and try to get back to headquarters as quick as possible to deal with the emergency" after the notification was received about a plane crashing. [66] But if the crisis center was opened during the September 10 exercise, as may well have happened, 3,000 people would surely have been put on "an immediate activation" and presumably would have been told about the supposed crash.
If United Airlines personnel around the U.S. and around the world were incorrectly told a plane had crashed during one or both of the surprise exercises, this could explain why Patti Carson made the effort on September 11 to tell United Airlines employees outside the SOC that the crisis was real and not just part of an exercise. After she saw the second crash at the World Trade Center live on television, at 9:03 a.m. on September 11, Carson went from the SOC to the crisis center and started calling the human resources leaders of United Airlines's other crisis centers around the United States. She recalled that she told the people she spoke to what had happened in New York and said they needed to activate their crisis centers immediately. But she also clarified that "this was not a drill." [67]
DISPATCHERS ASSURED PILOTS THAT THE CRISIS ON SEPTEMBER 11 WAS 'NOT A DRILL'
The pilots of United Airlines flights, too, may have been informed that a plane had crashed during the exercises on August 30 and September 10. If they were, this could have led to a lot of confusion on September 11, since United Airlines pilots who were in the air when America came under attack could have thought the crisis was part of another exercise when they were informed that planes had crashed or given other indications that something was wrong that day.
Many United Airlines pilots received what was presumably their first notification that something was wrong on September 11 in a message from the dispatcher responsible for their flight. From as early as 9:00 a.m. that day, several dispatchers at the United Airlines SOC sent out messages informing pilots of the crashes at the World Trade Center. They did this using something called ACARS. [68] ACARS (Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System) is a system for the transmission of typed text messages between pilots and an airline's dispatch center. It is the method by which dispatchers and pilots primarily communicate. [69]
Pilots of United Airlines flights also received ACARS messages telling them to beware of possible hijacking attempts. This came about because at 9:21 a.m., Sandy Rogers sent a message to the dispatchers on the SOC floor informing them that there could be more hijackings taking place and advising them to tell pilots to take precautions. "There may be Addnl hijackings in progress. You may want to advise your flts to stay on alert and shut down all cockpit access Inflt," the message stated. [70]
In response to this, beginning at 9:23 a.m., dispatchers sent warning messages to the planes they were responsible for. (One dispatcher in fact started sending warning messages of his own initiative before Rogers issued his advisory message. Beginning at 9:19 a.m., Ed Ballinger transmitted a message to the flights he was responsible for, which stated, "Beware any cockpit intrusion--Two a/c [aircraft] hit World Trade Center.") [71]
It would be interesting to know if any of the pilots who received a message informing them of the crashes at the World Trade Center or advising them to restrict access to their cockpit thought the message was sent as part of an exercise. They may have thought this because they received an ACARS message on August 30 and/or September 10 informing them that a plane had crashed but were subsequently informed that no plane had crashed and the ACARS message had just been sent as part of an exercise.
Certainly, some of the dispatchers at the SOC seem to have been concerned that pilots might think the ACARS messages they received on September 11 relating to the terrorist attacks were part of an exercise, since these dispatchers emphasized that the crisis was real and not a joke or part of an exercise in ACARS messages that they sent that day.
For example, at 9:38 a.m., Jeff Eldred sent a message to three aircraft, which stated: "LOCK YOUR COCKPIT DOOR IMMEDIATELY. THIS IS NO JOKE." At 9:45 a.m., David Hora sent a message to four aircraft, which stated: "DIVERT BACK TO ORD [i.e., Chicago] NOW DUE TO SABOTAGE THAT HAS OCCURRED...THIS IS NO JOKE." And a minute later, Dan Willis sent a message to four aircraft, which stated: "THIS IS THE REAL THING. DO NOT KNOW WHAT IS HAPPENING IN NY CTR NOW BUT TWO AC ONE OURS HAS HIT THE TRADE CTRS AND NOW THEY WANT ALL AC ON THE GRND ASAP."
Then, at 9:49 a.m., Gene Kim sent a message to an aircraft, which stated: "PLS DIVERT IMMEDIATELY TO OMA [i.e., Omaha]. THIS IS NOT A DRILL." A minute later, Tom Radtke sent a message to an aircraft stating, "NO DRILL FLIGHTS WITHIN 45 MINUTES OF DEST MAY CONTINUE OTHERS NEED TO LAN. ITS VER VERY BAD." And between 10:02 a.m. and 10:03 a.m., Terry Nichols sent a message to four aircraft, which stated, "THIS IS NO DRILL.....2 COMMERCIAL FLTS HAVE CRASHED INTO THE WORLD TRADE CNTRS..ONE AMERICAN...AND ONE UNITED....(FLT 175) OTHER HIJACKINGS IN PROGRESS." [72]
It is surely possible that these dispatchers made the effort to clarify that the crisis was genuine because United Airlines pilots had been sent ACARS messages during the exercises on August 30 and September 10 stating that a plane had crashed, and the dispatchers were therefore concerned that United Airlines pilots might think the ACARS messages they received on September 11 relating to the real-world emergency were part of another exercise.
AIRLINE HELD AROUND FOUR CRISIS EXERCISES A YEAR
It would surely be worth examining how it came about that United Airlines held two crisis exercises within such a short space of time during the summer of 2001. The airline reportedly held crisis exercises every three or four months on average. It held three or four "crisis drills" a year, John Kiker, its vice president of worldwide communications at the time of the 9/11 attacks, said. [73] Ed Soliday, meanwhile, told the 9/11 Commission, "We practiced four times a year." [74] Other senior United Airlines personnel effectively told the 9/11 Commission the same thing. "The staff assigned to the crisis center" had "planned quarterly exercises initiated by corporate security," they said. [75] It must have been unusual, then, for United Airlines to hold two crisis exercises just 11 days apart, on August 30 and September 10, 2001.
It must also have been unusual for United Airlines to hold exercises that were so realistic. The realism of the exercises on August 30 and September 10 was surely unusual since it apparently never occurred to airline employees on both occasions that the plane crashes they were notified of were fictitious and part of an exercise.
This was definitely the case on August 30. As previously noted, the exercise that day was so realistic that some airline employees became upset and even physically ill because they thought a plane with hundreds of passengers on board really had crashed.
The level of realism must have been unprecedented, since many people were subsequently furious with Andy Studdert for arranging the exercise. "I had the board members calling, I had the unions demanding I be fired, I had people telling me I'm the most evil person in the world," Studdert recalled. "They wanted to kill me," he said. [76] The exercise surely would not have caused such outrage if equally realistic and dramatic exercises had been held on previous occasions.
Indeed, Studdert himself commented on how unusual the exercise was. The exercise was "maybe the most controversial thing I've ever done in my life," he said. "We shook the foundations of the company," he added. [77]
It is in fact puzzling that United Airlines held another surprise exercise that was apparently just as realistic and based on an almost identical scenario 11 days later, on September 10. One would think the airline would have resolved to ensure an exercise like the one on August 30 never happened again. After all, there would have been a risk that another such exercise would damage staff morale and cause hostility toward--and distrust of--the airline's senior management.
EXERCISES COULD HAVE BEEN INTENDED TO IMPAIR THE RESPONSE TO THE 9/11 ATTACKS
It is also curious that, of all the times to do so, United Airlines held two highly realistic surprise exercises just before September 11, 2001--the one day when its personnel particularly needed to be able to carry out their jobs with clear heads. The exercises surely created a significant risk that United Airlines personnel would not have clear heads on September 11. Instead, their ability to do their jobs that day may have been impaired, since they could have thought the catastrophic real-world events were part of another surprise exercise, and consequently responded inappropriately and ineffectively to them.
Indeed, some United Airlines employees are known to have reacted to real-world events in this way on September 11. As previously noted, when Gene Kim and the other people in a meeting with him were informed that an aircraft had struck the World Trade Center, they "thought this was coming from corporate security, just as another drill," and therefore "cleared our pagers and literally went back to work." [78] And after Studdert arrived at the SOC following the first crash at the World Trade Center, he reportedly sensed "disbelief among his employees," which was why he assured them, "This is not a drill!" [79]
But was it really just an unfortunate coincidence that United Airlines held two particularly realistic exercises unusually close together at probably the worst possible time or was there a more sinister reason for what happened?
Were the exercises perhaps part of a deliberate attempt to impair the response of United Airlines personnel to the real-world crisis on September 11? Bad actors may have wanted United Airlines personnel to think reports relating to the hijackings and plane crashes on September 11 might be part of another surprise exercise so their response to the crisis would be hindered.
But if this was the case, it would mean the 9/11 attacks were planned by a group other than al-Qaeda. After all, Osama bin Laden's terrorist network would surely have been unable to influence United Airlines's training activities. The attacks must instead have been planned by a network of corrupt individuals within the United States, which presumably included some senior people at United Airlines.
AIRLINE'S HEAD OF SECURITY WAS 'THE DRILLMASTER'
To examine this possibility, it would be helpful to know who planned the two surprise exercises. It might also be helpful to know which people were told about the exercises in advance.
Andy Studdert indicated that he was responsible for planning the August 30 exercise. He recalled that the exercise was arranged after he told United Airlines managers, "One of these days, I'm gonna come in here and I'm gonna do a no-notice drill." And when he described the exercise to the 9/11 Commission, he said, "I did a test about 10 days [before 9/11] where I simulated [an emergency] out over the Pacific." [80] Nevertheless, it is surely possible that he organized the exercise after being directed to do so by someone else.
Studdert also mentioned just four people knowing about the August 30 exercise in advance. They included himself, the pilot who reported that their plane had suffered an engine failure during the exercise, and Studdert's "safety guy"--possibly Ed Soliday--who told the pilot what they had to do when the exercise took place. [81] The dispatcher who received the report of an engine failure from the pilot during the exercise apparently also knew what was going to happen beforehand. This person "was in on it as well," Studdert commented. [82]
Less has been revealed about who organized the September 10 exercise. Gene Kim said that "our corporate security" initiated the exercise, but did not mention any names. [83] He may have been referring to Soliday, though, since Soliday was United Airlines's head of security at the time.
If Soliday did indeed initiate the September 10 exercise, it would suggest a possible connection between the two surprise exercises. Since Studdert said his "safety guy" helped him arrange the August 30 exercise and this person may have been Soliday, Soliday may have been involved in organizing both of the exercises.
Additional evidence supports the possibility that Soliday was involved in planning both surprise exercises. To begin with, Soliday himself indicated that this would likely have been the case. "I run the exercises, the practices," for the United Airlines crisis center, he told the 9/11 Commission. [84] And in an article about emergency planning at some of the major U.S. airlines, the Wall Street Journal called him "the drillmaster" due to his key role in organizing United Airlines's exercises. [85]
A final question about the surprise exercises worth considering is why have only two people--Andy Studdert and Gene Kim--ever discussed the exercises publicly? In light of the turmoil the exercises caused when they were held and the detrimental effect they may have had on the response of United Airlines personnel to the 9/11 attacks, one might expect more people to have talked about them. Were United Airlines employees perhaps instructed to keep quiet about the exercises?
MAINTENANCE FACILITY MANAGER THOUGHT A CALL FROM ONE OF THE HIJACKED PLANES WAS A POSSIBLE HOAX
It would also be helpful to learn more about the prank phone calls received at the United Airlines System Aircraft Maintenance Control in the months before 9/11, since these calls, like the exercises on August 30 and September 10, could have affected the response of United Airlines personnel to the crisis on September 11. SAMC personnel may have thought the calls they received from Flight 175 and Flight 93 on September 11 in which flight attendants reported that their planes had been hijacked were prank calls due to what happened months earlier, and consequently treated them with a lack of urgency.
Indeed, Rich Belme admitted that when he was informed about the call from Flight 175, he was uncertain whether the call was genuine. He explained that because the SAMC had received "some strange calls" months earlier, he thought, "Maybe this is a hoax from one of our ground mechanics." [86]
It is unclear whether anyone else at the SAMC doubted whether the call was genuine as a result of the prank calls months earlier. It is also unclear whether doubts about the authenticity of the flight attendant's call might have affected how SAMC personnel responded to the call. However, some evidence suggests that they were slow to inform the United Airlines SOC about the call.
As previously mentioned, the flight attendant's call was answered by Marc Policastro at 8:52:01 a.m. on September 11 and the caller said he was on Flight 175, and gave details of the hijacking of his plane. The call lasted 75 seconds, ending at 8:53:16 a.m. [87] Policastro subsequently went and told Belme and Ray Kime--who, like Belme, was a manager at the SAMC--about the call. Kime then called the United Airlines SOC and passed on what Policastro had told him. [88]
It is difficult to determine for sure whether SAMC personnel were slow to alert the SOC to the flight attendant's call, since the exact time when Kime phoned the SOC is unclear. People who were at the SAMC on September 11 were unable to give a precise time for Kime's call when they were interviewed by the 9/11 Commission in November 2003. [89] And United Airlines was unable to state when Kime's call was made, since it did not keep any records of calls from the SAMC at the time. [90]
However, SOC personnel indicated that Kime called the SOC at around 9:01 a.m. or 9:02 a.m. Rich Miles, who answered the call, said he spoke to Kime "not long before" Flight 175 crashed into the South Tower of the World Trade Center, meaning shortly before 9:03 a.m. [91] And during a briefing at the SOC in November 2003, 9/11 Commission staffers were told that Miles received the call from Kime "moments before [Flight 175] went into the building." [92]
Since the flight attendant's call ended at 8:53:16 a.m., if Kime called the SOC at 9:01 a.m. or 9:02 a.m., this would mean it took eight or nine minutes for Policastro to tell Belme and Kime about the call, and Kime to then phone the SOC to pass on what Policastro told him. Eight or nine minutes seems a long time, especially considering that the flight attendant revealed that a serious crisis was underway and so SAMC personnel should have responded to his call with urgency.
The 9/11 Commission certainly appears to have considered the SAMC's response to the flight attendant's call slow. It referred in a memo to "the delay in transmission of information about the 8:52 a.m. call from the San Francisco office to United headquarters in Chicago." [93]
If SAMC personnel were indeed slow to inform the SOC about the call, this surely could have been because they thought the call might have been another prank and were therefore hesitant to pass on to the SOC information that might be bogus.
MAINTENANCE FACILITY WAS CALLED BY A FLIGHT ATTENDANT ON FLIGHT 93
As previously mentioned, the SAMC received a second call from a flight attendant who said their plane had been hijacked on September 11. This call, which was received at 9:35:40 a.m. that day, was made by Sandy Bradshaw who was on Flight 93. [94] It was initially answered by Andrew Lubkemann but Rich Belme took Lubkemann's place on the call after a minute or two. Bradshaw said she was on Flight 93 and gave details of the hijacking of her plane. [95]
The call lasted five minutes and 53 seconds, ending at 9:41:33 a.m. [96] Following the call, Belme told a colleague called Mark Eminino to contact the FBI. He then went to Ray Kime and explained what had happened. Kime subsequently called the SOC and told Rich Miles what Bradshaw had said. [97]
Unfortunately, the time when Kime phoned the SOC about Bradshaw's call is even less clear than the time of Kime's first call to the SOC that day and so it is difficult to ascertain whether SAMC personnel were slow to respond to Bradshaw's call.
The 9/11 Commission stated that Kime called the SOC about Bradshaw's call at "some point between 9.45 a.m. and 9:50 a.m." It therefore implied that SAMC personnel took between three and a half and eight and a half minutes to contact the SOC after Bradshaw's call ended. However, the time range it gave appears to have been just a rough estimate and therefore of little evidentiary value. Although Miles said he received the call from Kime at "probably" around 9:45 a.m. when he was interviewed by the 9/11 Commission in November 2003, he admitted that this was only a guess. "I'm just trying to come up with a figure for you here. I'm guessing at that," he said.
And since United Airlines did not keep any records of calls made from the SAMC at the time of the 9/11 attacks, like Kime's previous call to the SOC, it presumably had no record of when Kime's second call to the SOC was made. [98]
Because we lack the information necessary to determine if SAMC personnel were slow to respond to Bradshaw's call, then, it is difficult to surmise whether SAMC personnel thought Bradshaw's call was a prank call because of what happened months earlier. All the same, this scenario is still a possibility worth considering.
But was receiving some strange phone calls shortly before 9/11, of all times, simply due to bad luck or was there a more sinister reason for what happened? It is surely possible that the prank calls, like the two surprise exercises, were specifically intended to impair the response of United Airlines personnel to the crisis on September 11. Bad actors may have wanted SAMC personnel to think any calls they received from the apparently hijacked planes on September 11 could be prank calls so they would respond to them ineffectively.
It would certainly be helpful to learn more about the prank calls in order to assess this possibility. For example, what did the prank callers say? Did they ever claim there was an emergency involving a United Airlines plane? Did the calls in any other way resemble the calls SAMC personnel received from flight attendants on Flight 175 and Flight 93 on September 11? And who exactly were the callers? Belme said they were mechanics. "We had some strange calls from mechanics, disgruntled mechanics," he recalled. [99] However, this may have been just a guess.
WAS UNITED AIRLINES RUNNING A TRAINING EXERCISE ON SEPTEMBER 11?
Finally, it is worth considering whether United Airlines held a surprise exercise on September 11. While the exercises on August 30 and September 10 certainly may have impaired the response of United Airlines personnel when America came under attack, an exercise taking place when the attacks were underway could have had particularly damaging consequences.
Although no one has ever stated publicly that United Airlines held a training exercise on September 11, this could be because the people who know about the exercise have never mentioned the exercise when speaking publicly.
It is worth noting that even though countless people must have been involved in the exercises on August 30 and September 10, only two people--Gene Kim and Andy Studdert--have ever spoken publicly about these exercises. And while it is surely in the public interest that United Airlines held an exercise on the afternoon before 9/11 based on the scenario of an airliner crashing, the existence of the September 10 exercise was only revealed 18 years after the exercise took place, when Kim gave a brief description of what happened during an interview for a television documentary broadcast in September 2019.
If United Airlines held an exercise on September 11, this fact could also have remained secret because most of the airline's employees were unaware that the exercise took place. If it was a surprise exercise, only a few United Airlines employees would have known in advance that it was going to be held. And if United Airlines employees were never told after the fact that there was an exercise on September 11, they may not subsequently have realized that the exercise took place.
If the exercise included scenarios that resembled the real-world events of September 11, such as hijackings, they may have thought simulated events were actual events. And if the exercise included scenarios that differed from the real-world events, they may have thought reports relating to these scenarios were just errors due to confusion amid an unprecedented crisis.
If United Airlines did indeed run an exercise on September 11, it is definitely possible that the exercise included scenarios that resembled the terrorist attacks that day, such as hijackings or plane crashes, since United Airlines previously held exercises based on these scenarios. Ed Soliday mentioned that its exercises had included hijacking scenarios when he was interviewed by the 9/11 Commission. "We practiced hijackings of various varieties," he said. [100] John Kiker stated the same thing. At least one of the airline's regular "crisis drills" before 9/11 had been based on hijackings, he said. He also revealed that at least one of the crisis drills had included the scenario of "planes crashing into buildings."
Furthermore, he mentioned that at least one drill included another scenario that resembled what happened on September 11: "two planes crashing in separate incidents within a few hours of one another." [101] (On September 11, two United Airlines planes--Flight 175 and Flight 93--crashed one hour apart, at 9:03 a.m. and 10:03 a.m.)
There are clearly many questions regarding the training exercises and other goings-on at United Airlines before and on September 11, 2001, that deserve closer examination. Unfortunately, official investigations of the 9/11 attacks have all been based on the assumption that Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda terrorist network were to blame for the attacks and therefore paid little attention to evidence that casts doubt on this assumption.
But what if a different group was responsible for 9/11? What if a network of corrupt American officials was behind the attacks on the U.S. and some senior United Airlines officials were involved? What if the surprise exercises held by United Airlines and the prank phone calls received at the SAMC shortly before 9/11 were part of an effort to impair the response to the crisis on September 11 and thereby increase the likelihood that the attacks would be successful? A new investigation of 9/11 is surely needed to investigate this plausible alternative scenario.
NOTES
[1] "9/11: Voices of the Aircraft Dispatchers." Frame of Mind, KERA TV, September 9, 2019.
[2] Center for Values-Driven Leadership, "Preparing Your Organization for a Crisis: Andy Studdert, Former COO of United Airlines." YouTube video, March 15, 2012; Stacey Becker, "In Dubuque, Ex-Airline Executive Recounts 9/11 Crisis." Dubuque Telegraph Herald, November 12, 2015; Grant Bradley, "In the Hot Seat on 9/11: United Airlines Boss Tells What to do When Your Company is at War." New Zealand Herald, December 5, 2019.
[3] 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004, pp. 7-8, 11, 13-14; Staff Report: The Four Flights. 9/11 Commission, August 26, 2004, pp. 20, 24, 38, 45-46.
[4] Scott McCartney and Susan Carey, "American, United Watched and Worked in Horror as Sept. 11 Hijackings Unfolded." Wall Street Journal, October 15, 2001; Jere Longman, Among the Heroes: United Flight 93 and the Passengers and Crew Who Fought Back. New York: HarperCollins, 2002, pp. 60, 77; "Bankruptcy Provides Time, No Guarantees." Chicago Tribune, July 16, 2003; Center for Values-Driven Leadership, "9/11 Communication and Leadership: Andy Studdert, Former COO of United Airlines, CEO of NES Rentals." YouTube video, April 23, 2012.
[5] "Lessons Learned From Dealing With Terrorism: The Emerging Threat--Biological Attacks in Airliners." Air Safety Week, April 29, 2002; "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Rich Miles, UAL Manager of Station Operations Control." 9/11 Commission, November 21, 2003.
[6] Jere Longman, Among the Heroes, pp. 68, 77.
[7] Lynn Spencer, Touching History: The Untold Story of the Drama That Unfolded in the Skies Over America on 9/11. New York: Free Press, 2008, pp. 35, 72; "Flight Dispatchers." Careers in Aerospace, n.d.
[8] "9/11: Voices of the Aircraft Dispatchers."
[9] "TOPOFF Exercise Activity Anticipated for Monday." United States Department of Justice, May 21, 2000; Thomas V. Inglesby, Rita Grossman, and Tara O'Toole, "A Plague on Your City: Observations From TOPOFF." Clinical Infectious Diseases 32, no. 3 (2001): 436-445; "Mystery Patient Drill: Overview and Checklist." City of New York, n.d.; "Step 2: Develop Scope." Exercise Builder, n.d.
[10] "9/11: Voices of the Aircraft Dispatchers."
[11] Ibid.
[12] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Andrew Studdert, part 3. 9/11 Commission, November 20, 2003; Center for Values-Driven Leadership, "Preparing Your Organization for a Crisis"; Amber Johnson, "How to Prepare for a Crisis: Lessons From United's 9/11 Chief of Operations." Center for Values-Driven Leadership, April 26, 2012; Stacey Becker, "In Dubuque, Ex-Airline Executive Recounts 9/11 Crisis."
[13] Alan Levin, Marilyn Adams, and Blake Morrison, "Part I: Terror Attacks Brought Drastic Decision: Clear the Skies." USA Today, August 12, 2002; Center for Values-Driven Leadership, "Preparing Your Organization for a Crisis"; Stacey Becker, "In Dubuque, Ex-Airline Executive Recounts 9/11 Crisis"; Grant Bradley, "In the Hot Seat on 9/11."
[14] Center for Values-Driven Leadership, "Preparing Your Organization for a Crisis"; Grant Bradley, "In the Hot Seat on 9/11."
[15] Center for Values-Driven Leadership, "Preparing Your Organization for a Crisis."
[16] Ibid.; Stacey Becker, "In Dubuque, Ex-Airline Executive Recounts 9/11 Crisis"; Grant Bradley, "In the Hot Seat on 9/11."
[17] "9/11: Voices of the Aircraft Dispatchers."
[18] 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 22, 30; Staff Report: The Four Flights, pp. 24, 46.
[19] Center for Values-Driven Leadership, "Preparing Your Organization for a Crisis"; Stacey Becker, "In Dubuque, Ex-Airline Executive Recounts 9/11 Crisis."
[20] 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 7, 28; Staff Report: The Four Flights, pp. 20, 38.
[21] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Andrew Studdert, part 3; Stacey Becker, "In Dubuque, Ex-Airline Executive Recounts 9/11 Crisis."
[22] 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 21, 29; Staff Report: The Four Flights, pp. 21, 43.
[23] "Memorandum for the Record: Briefing on the United Airlines System Operations Control Center and Crisis Center." 9/11 Commission, November 20, 2003; "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Rich Miles, UAL Manager of Station Operations Control"; "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Captain Ed Soliday, Former Vice President of Safety, Security and Quality Assurance for United Airlines (Part II)." 9/11 Commission, November 21, 2003; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Edmond Soliday, part 1. 9/11 Commission, January 15, 2004; Center for Values-Driven Leadership, "9/11 Communication and Leadership."
[24] Jere Longman, Among the Heroes, p. 77.
[25] Seth C. Grandeau, The Processes of Airline Operational Control. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1995, p. 53; Paul Holmes, "For United Airlines, a Crisis Without Precedent." PRovoke Media, October 3, 2001; Alan Levin, Marilyn Adams, and Blake Morrison, "Part I: Terror Attacks Brought Drastic Decision: Clear the Skies"; "Memorandum for the Record: Interviews of United Airlines and American Airlines Personnel in Key Roles on September 11, 2001." 9/11 Commission, November 17-21, 2003; "Memorandum for the Record: Briefing on the United Airlines System Operations Control Center and Crisis Center."
[26] "Memorandum for the Record: Interviews of United Airlines and American Airlines Personnel in Key Roles on September 11, 2001"; "Memorandum for the Record: Briefing on the United Airlines System Operations Control Center and Crisis Center."
[27] Center for Values-Driven Leadership, "9/11 Communication and Leadership."
[28] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Edmond Soliday, part 1.
[29] "Memorandum for the Record: Briefing on the United Airlines System Operations Control Center and Crisis Center"; Staff Report: The Four Flights, p. 22.
[30] National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: Public hearing. 9/11 Commission, January 27, 2004.
[31] "Memorandum for the Record: Briefing on the United Airlines System Operations Control Center and Crisis Center."
[32] Center for Values-Driven Leadership, "Preparing Your Organization for a Crisis"; Stacey Becker, "In Dubuque, Ex-Airline Executive Recounts 9/11 Crisis."
[33] "Memorandum for the Record: Briefing on the United Airlines System Operations Control Center and Crisis Center"; "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Rich Miles, UAL Manager of Station Operations Control"; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Rich Miles. 9/11 Commission, November 21, 2003.
[34] "9/11: Voices of the Aircraft Dispatchers."
[35] "Memorandum for the Record: Briefing on the United Airlines System Operations Control Center and Crisis Center."
[36] Larry J. Stetz, An Ex Post Facto Analysis of E-3 Maintenance Indicators in the 552D Air Control Wing Since Reorganization Under an Aircraft Generation Squadron Concept. Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: Air Force Institute of Technology, 1999, p. 9.
[37] Staff Report: The Four Flights, p. 40.
[38] Richard Belme, interview by the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation, September 11, 2001; Andrew Lubkemann, interview by the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation, September 11, 2001; "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Rich Belme, Manager of United Airlines SAMC in San Francisco, CA." 9/11 Commission, November 21, 2003; "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Andrew A. Lubkemann, UAL 'Star-Fix' Operator, San Francisco, CA." 9/11 Commission, November 21, 2003; "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Marc Policastro, UAL 'Star-Fix' Operator, San Francisco, CA." 9/11 Commission, November 21, 2003; Staff Report: The Four Flights, pp. 21, 40.
[39] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Rich Belme, Manager of United Airlines SAMC in San Francisco, CA"; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Rich Belme. 9/11 Commission, November 21, 2003.
[40] "Memorandum for the Record: Department of Justice Briefing on Cell and Phone Calls From UA Flight 175." 9/11 Commission, May 13, 2004.
[41] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Marc Policastro, UAL 'Star-Fix' Operator, San Francisco, CA"; 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 7-8; Staff Report: The Four Flights, p. 21.
[42] Ray Kime, interview by the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation, September 11, 2001; "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Rich Belme, Manager of United Airlines SAMC in San Francisco, CA"; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Rich Belme; "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Andrew A. Lubkemann, UAL 'Star-Fix' Operator, San Francisco, CA"; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Andrew Lubkemann. 9/11 Commission, November 21, 2003; "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Marc Policastro, UAL 'Star-Fix' Operator, San Francisco, CA."
[43] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Andrew A. Lubkemann, UAL 'Star-Fix' Operator, San Francisco, CA"; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Andrew Lubkemann.
[44] "Memorandum for the Record: Department of Justice Briefing on Cell and Phone Calls From UA Flight 93." 9/11 Commission, May 13, 2004.
[45] Richard Belme, interview by the FBI; Andrew Lubkemann, interview by the FBI; "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Rich Belme, Manager of United Airlines SAMC in San Francisco, CA"; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Rich Belme; "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Andrew A. Lubkemann, UAL 'Star-Fix' Operator, San Francisco, CA"; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Andrew Lubkemann; Staff Report: The Four Flights, p. 40; "The Footnotes of 9/11." CNN Presents, CNN, September 11, 2011.
[46] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Rich Belme, Manager of United Airlines SAMC in San Francisco, CA"; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Rich Belme; "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Andrew A. Lubkemann, UAL 'Star-Fix' Operator, San Francisco, CA"; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Andrew Lubkemann.
[47] "9/11: Voices of the Aircraft Dispatchers."
[48] Alan Levin, Marilyn Adams, and Blake Morrison, "Part I: Terror Attacks Brought Drastic Decision: Clear the Skies."
[49] "Bankruptcy Provides Time, No Guarantees."
[50] Alan Levin, Marilyn Adams, and Blake Morrison, "Part I: Terror Attacks Brought Drastic Decision: Clear the Skies"; "Bankruptcy Provides Time, No Guarantees"; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Andrew Studdert, part 3; Grant Bradley, "In the Hot Seat on 9/11."
[51] Alan Levin, Marilyn Adams, and Blake Morrison, "Part I: Terror Attacks Brought Drastic Decision: Clear the Skies"; Stacey Becker, "In Dubuque, Ex-Airline Executive Recounts 9/11 Crisis"; Grant Bradley, "In the Hot Seat on 9/11."
[52] "Lessons Learned From Dealing With Terrorism."
[53] "CNN Sept. 11, 2001, 8:48 a.m.-9:29 a.m." CNN, September 11, 2001; "Terrorist Attack on United States." Breaking News, CNN, September 11, 2001.
[54] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Rich Miles, UAL Manager of Station Operations Control"; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Rich Miles.
[55] Scott McCartney and Susan Carey, "American, United Watched and Worked in Horror as Sept. 11 Hijackings Unfolded."
[56] "Lessons Learned From Dealing With Terrorism."
[57] "Reality HR With Patti Carson." HR.com, July 1, 2005.
[58] "9/11: Voices of the Aircraft Dispatchers."
[59] Susan Carey, "Recent Drills Help United Cope With Airport Collision." Wall Street Journal, November 21, 1996.
[60] Debbie Sheehan, "Force Protection Plan a 'Timely Alert.'" Monmouth Message, September 21, 2001; Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, U.S. Army Communications-Electronics Command, A Concise History of the Communications-Electronics Command and Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. Fort Monmouth, NJ: Fort Monmouth, 2003, p. 71.
[61] Hart Seely, "Amid Crisis Simulation, 'We Were Suddenly No-Kidding Under Attack.'" Newhouse News Service, January 25, 2002; Leslie Filson, Air War Over America: Sept. 11 Alters Face of Air Defense Mission. Tyndall Air Force Base, FL: Headquarters 1st Air Force, Public Affairs Office, 2003, p. 122; William M. Arkin, Code Names: Deciphering U.S. Military Plans, Programs, and Operations in the 9/11 World. Hanover, NH: Steerforth Press, 2005, p. 545.
[62] Leslie Young, "Not a Drill: Canada's Air Force on 9/11." Global News, September 9, 2011.
[63] Grant Bradley, "In the Hot Seat on 9/11."
[64] Center for Values-Driven Leadership, "9/11 Communication and Leadership"; Stacey Becker, "In Dubuque, Ex-Airline Executive Recounts 9/11 Crisis."
[65] Center for Values-Driven Leadership, "Preparing Your Organization for a Crisis."
[66] "9/11: Voices of the Aircraft Dispatchers."
[67] "Reality HR With Patti Carson."
[68] Staff Report: The Four Flights, p. 36; "ACARS Messages From Dispatch; Messages From Aircraft to Ed Ballinger and Chad McCurdy; and Messages to Flights 93." United Airlines, n.d.
[69] "Memorandum for the Record: Briefing on ARINC (Service Provider for Communications to/From Aircraft)." 9/11 Commission, May 27, 2004; Lynn Spencer, Touching History, p. 35; "What is the Role of the Flight Dispatcher? How do the Dispatcher and the Flight Crew Interact?" Aviation Stack Exchange, March 17, 2017.
[70] "Memorandum for the Record: Briefing on the United Airlines System Operations Control Center and Crisis Center"; Staff Report: The Four Flights, p. 37.
[71] Ed Ballinger ACARS log. United Airlines, September 11, 2001; 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 11; "ACARS Messages From Dispatch; Messages From Aircraft to Ed Ballinger and Chad McCurdy; and Messages to Flights 93."
[72] Ed Ballinger ACARS log; "ACARS Messages From Dispatch; Messages From Aircraft to Ed Ballinger and Chad McCurdy; and Messages to Flights 93."
[73] Paul Holmes, "For United Airlines, a Crisis Without Precedent."
[74] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Captain Ed Soliday, Former Vice President of Safety, Security and Quality Assurance for United Airlines (Part II)"; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Edmond Soliday, part 1.
[75] "Memorandum for the Record: Briefing on the United Airlines System Operations Control Center and Crisis Center."
[76] Center for Values-Driven Leadership, "Preparing Your Organization for a Crisis"; Stacey Becker, "In Dubuque, Ex-Airline Executive Recounts 9/11 Crisis"; Grant Bradley, "In the Hot Seat on 9/11."
[77] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Andrew Studdert, part 3.
[78] "9/11: Voices of the Aircraft Dispatchers."
[79] "Bankruptcy Provides Time, No Guarantees."
[80] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Andrew Studdert, part 3; Center for Values-Driven Leadership, "Preparing Your Organization for a Crisis."
[81] Center for Values-Driven Leadership, "Preparing Your Organization for a Crisis"; Stacey Becker, "In Dubuque, Ex-Airline Executive Recounts 9/11 Crisis."
[82] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Andrew Studdert, part 3.
[83] "9/11: Voices of the Aircraft Dispatchers."
[84] 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Edmond Soliday, part 1.
[85] Susan Carey, "Recent Drills Help United Cope With Airport Collision."
[86] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Rich Belme, Manager of United Airlines SAMC in San Francisco, CA"; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Rich Belme.
[87] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Marc Policastro, UAL 'Star-Fix' Operator, San Francisco, CA"; "Memorandum for the Record: Department of Justice Briefing on Cell and Phone Calls From UA Flight 175"; Staff Report: The Four Flights, pp. 21, 90-91.
[88] Ray Kime, interview by the FBI; "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Andrew A. Lubkemann, UAL 'Star-Fix' Operator, San Francisco, CA"; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Andrew Lubkemann; "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Marc Policastro, UAL 'Star-Fix' Operator, San Francisco, CA."
[89] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Ed Ballinger, Former United Airlines Flight Dispatcher." 9/11 Commission, April 14, 2004.
[90] Staff Report: The Four Flights, p. 91.
[91] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Rich Miles, UAL Manager of Station Operations Control"; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Rich Miles.
[92] "Memorandum for the Record: Briefing on the United Airlines System Operations Control Center and Crisis Center."
[93] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Ed Ballinger, Former United Airlines Flight Dispatcher."
[94] "Memorandum for the Record: Department of Justice Briefing on Cell and Phone Calls From UA Flight 93."
[95] Richard Belme, interview by the FBI; Andrew Lubkemann, interview by the FBI; "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Rich Belme, Manager of United Airlines SAMC in San Francisco, CA"; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Rich Belme; "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Andrew A. Lubkemann, UAL 'Star-Fix' Operator, San Francisco, CA"; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Andrew Lubkemann; Staff Report: The Four Flights, p. 40; "The Footnotes of 9/11."
[96] "Memorandum for the Record: Department of Justice Briefing on Cell and Phone Calls From UA Flight 93."
[97] Ray Kime, interview by the FBI; "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Rich Belme, Manager of United Airlines SAMC in San Francisco, CA"; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Rich Belme; "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Rich Miles, UAL Manager of Station Operations Control"; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Rich Miles; Staff Report: The Four Flights, pp. 40, 43.
[98] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Rich Miles, UAL Manager of Station Operations Control"; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Rich Miles; Staff Report: The Four Flights, pp. 43, 91.
[99] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Rich Belme, Manager of United Airlines SAMC in San Francisco, CA"; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Rich Belme.
[100] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Captain Ed Soliday, Former Vice President of Safety, Security and Quality Assurance for United Airlines (Part II)"; 9/11 Commission audio file, Commission interview with Edmond Soliday, part 1.
[101] Paul Holmes, "For United Airlines, a Crisis Without Precedent."
